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G.R. No.  Government-owned or controlled corporation--- We rule that MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt
155650 July 20, refers to any agency organized as a stock or non- from real estate tax imposed by local governments.
2006 stock corporation, vested with functions relating to  First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
MANILA INTERNATIONAL public needs whether governmental or proprietary in corporation but an instrumentality of the National
AIRPORT nature, and owned by the Government directly or Government and thus exempt from local
AUTHORITY, petitioner, through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA
vs. applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and
COURT OF APPEALS, extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital thus exempt from real estate tax.
CITY MAYOR OF  Respondents argue that MIAA, being a government-
PARAÑAQUE,  Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National owned or controlled corporation, is not exempt from
SANGGUNIANG Government, not integrated within the department real estate tax. Respondents claim that the deletion of
PANGLUNGSOD NG framework, vested with special functions or the phrase "any government-owned or controlled so
PARAÑAQUE, CITY jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all exempt by its charter" in Section 234(e) of the Local
ASSESSOR OF corporate powers, administering special funds, and Government Code withdrew the real estate tax
PARAÑAQUE, and CITY enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a exemption of government-owned or controlled
TREASURER OF charter. corporations. The deleted phrase appeared in Section
PARAÑAQUE, respondents. 40(a) of the 1974 Real Property Tax Code enumerating
the entities exempt from real estate tax.

 There is no dispute that a government-owned or

controlled corporation is not exempt from real estate
tax. However, MIAA is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation.

 A government-owned or controlled corporation must be

"organized as a stock or non-stock corporation."
MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it
has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has
no stockholders or voting shares

 MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with

corporate powers to perform efficiently its
governmental functions. MIAA is like any other
government instrumentality, the only difference is that
MIAA is vested with corporate powers.



G.R. No. L-33022 April 22,
1975  "National Government" refers only to the central  It is Our considered view that contracts entered into by
CENTRAL BANK OF THE government, consisting of the legislative, executive petitioner Central Bank are not within the contemplation
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, and judicial departments of the government, as of Sections 607 and 608 cited by it. Immediately to be
vs. distinguished from local governments and other noted, Section 607 specifically refers to "expenditure(s)
COURT OF APPEALS and governmental entities a of the National Government" and that the term
ABLAZA CONSTRUCTION "National Government" may not be deemed to include
& FINANCE  Not synonymous, therefore, with the terms "The the Central Bank.
CORPORATION, responden Government of the Republic of the Philippines"  Under the Administrative Code itself, the term "National
ts. or "Philippine Government", which are the Government" refers only to the central government,
expressions broad enough to include not only the consisting of the legislative, executive and judicial
central government but also the provincial and departments of the government, as distinguished from
municipal governments, chartered cities and other local governments and other governmental entities and
government-controlled corporations or agencies. is not synonymous, therefore, with the terms "The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines" or
"Philippine Government", which are the expressions
broad enough to include not only the central
government but also the provincial and municipal
governments, chartered cities and other government-
controlled corporations or agencies, like the Central
REPUBLIC v. ATTY. Provisions relevant to the case
RICHARD B.  Section 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987 is clear and
RAMBUYONG  Sec. 90.[10] Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, unambiguous. It categorically provides that the term
city and municipal mayors are prohibited from "instrumentality" includes government-owned or
practicing their profession or engaging in any controlled corporations. Hence there is no room for
occupation, other than the exercise of their functions construction. All that has to be done is to apply the law
as local chief executives. as called for by the circumstances of the case. It is not
 (b) Sanggunian members may practice their disputed that the NPC is a government-owned or
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in controlled corporation. Therefore following Section 2 of
schools except during session hours: the Administrative Code of 1987, the NPC is clearly an
Provided, That sanggunian members who are also members instrumentality of the government.
of the Bar shall not:  It is also significant to point out that in Maceda v.
 Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case Macaraig, Jr.[14] the Court stated that "[t]he NPC is a
wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, government instrumentality with the enormous task of
or instrumentality of the government is the adverse undertaking development of hydroelectric generation of
party; power and production of electricity from other sources,
xxx xxx xxx as well as the transmission of electric power on a
nationwide basis, to improve the quality of life of the


 Sec. 5.[11] Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation people pursuant to the State policy embodied in Section
of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall [9], Article II of the 1987 Constitution."
xxx xxx xxx  Given the categorical words of both the law and
jurisprudence, to still go to extra-ordinary lengths to
interpret the intention of the lawmakers and come out
 (e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this with the construction that a government-owned or
Code where no legal provision or jurisprudence controlled corporation like the NPC is not included within
applies, resort may be had to the customs and the term "instrumentality of the government" is grave
traditions in the place where the controversies take abuse of discretion.
place. (Emphasis supplied.)
 "By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious
 Sec. 2.[12] General Terms Defined. Unless the specific and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a lack of jurisdiction."[15]"Grave abuse of discretion is an
particular statute, shall require a different evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
meaning: a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law
xxx xxx xxx as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and
evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism."[16]
 (4) "Agency of the Government" refers to any of the
 The strained and contrary interpretation of clearly
various units of the Government, including a
worded provisions of law, which therefore should be
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
merely applied and not interpreted, is an earmark of
government-owned or controlled corporations, or a
despotism and grave abuse of discretion.
local government or a distinct unit therein.
xxx xxx xxx

 (10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the

National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions
or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Emphasis supplied.)

 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative  Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin
LT. GEN. ALFONSO P. remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, suit outright for three reasons. First, under the doctrine


(Ret.), complainant, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot
vs. unless the available administrative remedies take cognizance of cases pending before
JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. have first been resorted to and the proper administrative agencies. In Factoran, Jr. v. Court of
PADERANGA, Regional authorities have been given an appropriate Appeals,20 the Court held that:
Trial Court, Branch 38, opportunity to act and correct their alleged The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
Cagayan de Oro errors, if any, committed in the administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity
City, respondent. forum. and convenience, should not entertain suits unless
the available administrative remedies have first
 Doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take been resorted to and the proper authorities have
cognizance of cases pending before administrative been given an appropriate opportunity to act and
agencies of special competence. correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum.
 In Dy v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a party
must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can
resort to the courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals,22 the
Court held that:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently
held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that
he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy
should be exhausted first before court’s judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of
court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of
cause of action.

 In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail

of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court
and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended,
states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau
of Forest Development Director are subject to review
by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of the DENR


Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3)
courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR
Secretary except through a special civil action
for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy,23 the Court held that
all actions seeking to recover forest products in the
custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency
— not the courts.

 Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts

cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence. The
DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of
forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated
that members of DENR’s Task Force Sagip
Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought
them to the DENR Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office. This should have alerted
Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the
forest products, that administrative proceedings may
have been commenced, and that the replevin suit had
to be dismissed outright

Go, SR vs Ramos  Deportation may be effected any time after entry, but
shall not be effected under any other clause unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within
five years after the cause of deportation arises. The
court a quo is correct when it ruled that the 5-year
period should be counted only from the time when Luis
filed his complaint for deportation. It is the legal
possibility of bringing the action which determines the
starting point for the computation of the period of
prescription. A prescription shall begin to run from the
dayof the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. The counting could not
logically start when his passport was issued because
the government was unaware that he was not a Filipino


 Deportation proceedings are administrative in
character, summary in nature, and need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of
ordinary court proceedings. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of
due process are sufficiently met.

FELICITAS M. MACHADO Jurisdiction is conferred by law and a judgment issued by a  The COSLAP does not have jurisdiction over the
and MARCELINO P. quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void present case.
MACHADO, Petitioners,
RICARDO L. GATDULA, Ejusdem generic prescribes that where  That the Commission may, in the following cases,
COMMISSION ON THE general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or
SETTLEMENT OF LAND words of a particular and specific meaning, such general disputes which are critical and explosive in nature
PROBLEMS, and IRINEO words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to considering, for instance, the large number of the
S. PAZ, Sheriff IV, Office of be held as applying only to persons or things of the same parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
the Provincial Sheriff, San kind as those specifically mentioned. tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations
Pedro, requiring immediate action:
Laguna, Respondents. (a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease
agreement holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government
reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land
claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or
subdivision of lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and
 Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules
in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before
it, e.g., COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the
matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to
(e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to the
agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or


resolution.21In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction
over a case or to refer it to the particular agency
concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or
classification of the land involved; (b) the parties to the
case; (c) the nature of the questions raised; and (d) the
need for immediate and urgent action thereon to
prevent injury to persons and damage or destruction to
property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on
the COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction
over any land dispute or problem.22 Thus, under EO
561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve
land disputes are limited only to those involving public
lands or those covered by a specific license from the
government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber
concessions, or reservation grants.2
Undisputably, the properties involved in the present dispute are
private lands owned by private parties, none of whom is a
squatter, a patent lease agreement holder, a government
reservation grantee, a public land claimant or a member of any
cultural minority.24
 Moreover, the dispute between the parties can hardly
be classified as critical or explosive in nature that would
generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation
that would require immediate and urgent action. The
issues raised in the present case primarily involve the
application of the Civil Code provisions on Property and
the Easement of Right of Way. As held in Longino v.
General,25 "disputes requiring no special skill or
technical expertise of an administrative body that could
be resolved by applying pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular

 The Machados cannot invoke Section 3, paragraph

2(e) of EO 561, which provides that the COSLAP may
assume jurisdiction over complaints involving "other
similar land problems of grave urgency," to justify the
COSLAP’s intervention in this case. The statutory
construction principle of ejusdem generic prescribes


that where general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed
in their widest extent but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind as those
specifically mentioned.26 A dispute between two parties
concerning the right of way over private lands cannot
be characterized as similar to those enumerated under
Section 3, paragraph 2(a) to (d) of EO 561.1avvphi1

University of Santo Tomas The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires  In this case, the doctrine does not apply because petitioners
vs Danes B. Sanchez that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, failed to demonstrate that recourse to the CHED is
the administrative agency concerned must be given the opportunity mandatory or even possible in an action such as that
to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought brought by the respondent, which is essentially one for
before the courts.[12] Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a mandamus and damages. The doctrine of exhaustion of
ground for dismissal of the action.[13] administrative remedies admits of numerous
exceptions,[14] one of which is where the issues are purely
legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the
present case.[15] Petitioners liability if any for damages will
have to be decided by the courts, since any judgment
inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the
Civil Code.[16] As such, exhaustion of administrative
remedies may be dispensed with.
G.R. No. L-45839 June 1, It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a Indeed, a reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers
1988 board or commission has a certain power, the authority given to the respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step
should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without
RUFINO MATIENZO, which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by
GODOFREDO ESPIRITU, to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be the petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such powers six (6)
DIOSCORRO FRANCO, upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely
AND LA SUERTE the end is required, the appropriate means are deemed given provides for the withdrawal of the State's waiver of its right to
TRANSPORTATION (Martin, Administrative Law, 1979, p. 46). punish said colorum operators for their illegal acts. In other
CORPORATION, petitioners words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium
, suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators
vs. shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board's exercise
HON. LEOPOLDO M. of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service
ABELLERA, ACTING Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the
CHAIRMAN OF THE avowed purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov.
BOARD OF 7, 1936).



AL., respondents.

[ GR No. 79684, Feb 19, We likewise take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on Given the premises that both projects, mapping and cadastral
1991 ] this doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and survey, have the same purpose or registering titles and that one
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court has may substitute for the other, do not justify the sweeping
CA consistently held that "acts of an administrative agency must conclusion that the undertaking of one would render the other
not casually be overturned by a court, and a court should as a unnecessary.
rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
agency acting within the parameters of its own The question on the necessity of either or both projects must be
competence,"[9] unless "there be a clear showing of arbitrary better addressed to the sound discretion of the proper
action or palpable and serious error."[10] In similar vein, we administrative officials who admittedly have the competence and
reiterated recently the rule that the findings of fact of technical expertise on the matters. In the case at bar, the
quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise petitioner Director of Lands is "the official vested with direct and
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, executive control of the disposition of the lands of the public
in the present case cadastral surveys and mappings and land domain."
registration, are accorded not only respect but more often than
not even finality

In the case at bar, the petitioner Director of Lands is "the

official vested with direct and executive control of the
disposition of the lands of the public domain."[8] Specifically,
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that "xxx
[T]he Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of
the survey, classification, lease, sale, or any form of
concession or disposition and management of the public
domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be
conclusive when approved by he Secretary of Agriculture and



Commerce (now the Secretary of Environment and Natural

G.R. Nos. 95122- True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take
23 May 31, 1991 exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases cognizance of the proceedings instituted by respondent
against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and
BOARD OF their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which
COMMISSIONERS [1989]). And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition
(COMMISSION ON divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
IMMIGRATION AND deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 and in line with the pronouncements of this Court in Chua
DEPORTATION), BOARD Phil. 531 [1954]). Hiong and Co cases.
COMMISSIONER ANDREA However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an
D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are
COMMISSIONER JORGE V. concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged
SARMIENTO, ACTING deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation proceedings
ASSOCIATE be allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be
COMMISSIONER REGINO ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs.
R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court answered
OF THE BOARD OF the question in the affirmative, and We quote:
ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO When the evidence submitted by a respondent is
MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
KALAW, petitioners, review should also be recognized and the courts
vs. should promptly enjoin the deportation
HON. JOSELITO DELA proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace,
ROSA, Presiding Judge, without molestation from any official or authority, and
RTC Manila, Branch 29, if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has
WILLIAM T. the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his
GATCHALIAN,respondents. protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of
prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks
jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is
satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing
the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him
the remedy only after the Board has finished its
investigation of his undesirability
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of
Commissioners over deportation proceedings is, therefore, not
without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970];


Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention,
however, should be granted only in cases where the "claim of
citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy
should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent
court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation
Board, supra; Co. vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107
[1977]). It appearing from the records that respondent's claim
of citizenship is substantial, as We shall show later, judicial
intervention should be allowed.

G.R. No. 84811 August 29, The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction
1989 1344, entitled "Empowering the National Housing Authority to because of Section 41 of PD No. 957, earlier quoted, is also
Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions unacceptable. We do not read that provision as vesting
SOLID HOMES, Under Presidential Decree No. 957." concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial Court and the Board
INC., petitioner, over the complaint mentioned in PD No. 1344 if only because
vs. The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, grants of power are not to be lightly inferred or merely implied.
TERESITA PAYAWAL and leaves no room for doubt that "exclusive jurisdiction" over the The only purpose of this section, as we see it, is to reserve.
COURT OF case between the petitioner and the private respondent is to the aggrieved party such other remedies as may be
APPEALS, respondents vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National provided by existing law, like a prosecution for the act
Housing Authority. complained of under the Revised Penal Code. 6

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it

has become necessary to create more and more
administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified
activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them,
they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise
and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the
courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture
of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now
not unreasonably called the fourth department of the
Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies
must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their
assigned duties in accordance with the legislative
purpose. 8 Following this policy in Antipolo Realty Corporation


v. National Housing Authority, 9 the Court sustained the
competence of the respondent administrative body, in the
exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957
and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights of the parties under
a contract to sell a subdivision lot.

G.R. No. On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies In the present petition for certiorari, we find that there are four (4)
156164 September may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly compelling reasons to allow the petitioners' invocation of our
4, 2009 resorted to immediately: (a) when there is a violation of due jurisdiction in the first instance, even without prior recourse to a
process; (b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; motion for reconsideration or to the exhaustion of administrative
SPS. LEONARDO AND (c) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting remedies, and even in disregard of the principle of hierarchy of
MILAGROS to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on courts:
CHUA, Petitioners, the part of the administrative agency concerned; (e) when
vs. there is irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent is a
HON. JACINTO G. ANG, department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the First, the petitioners raise a pure question of law involving
DENNIS R. PASTRANA, IN President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; jurisdiction over criminal complaints for violation of P.D. No. 957.
THEIR CAPACITIES AS (g) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
CITY AND ASSISTANT would be unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to a Second, the present case requires prompt action because public
PROSECUTOR OF PASIG, nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a private interest and welfare are involved in subdivision and
RESPECTIVELY, land in land case proceedings; (j) when the rule does not condominium development, as the terms of P.D. Nos. 957 and
FERDINAND T. SANTOS, provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when 1344 expressly reflect.16 Questions of conflicting processes,
ROBERT JOHN L. there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial essentially based on jurisdiction, will consistently recur as
SOBREPEÑA, NOEL M. intervention people’s need for housing (and hence, subdivisions and
CARIÑO, ROBERTO S. condominiums) escalate. Shelter is a basic human need whose
ROCO, ALICE ODCHIQUE- Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may fulfillment cannot afford any kind of delay
BONDOC,* ROMULO T. exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the
SANTOS AND ENRIQUE A. provisions of the statute creating and defining the terms of the .1Third, considering that this case has been pending for nearly
SOBREPEÑA, agency’s mandate. seven (7) years (since the filing of the Complaint-Affidavit on
JR., Respondents. September 3, 2002) to the prejudice not only of the parties
Significantly, nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests the HLURB involved, but also of the subdivision and condominium regulatory
with jurisdiction to impose the Section 39 criminal system and its need for the prompt determination of
penalties. What the Decree provides is the authority of the controversies, the interests of justice now demand the direct
HLURB to impose administrative fines under Section 38, as resolution of the jurisdictional issue this proceeding poses.
implemented by the Rules Implementing the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree.
Fourth, the petition is meritorious. The public respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal



complaints for violation of P.D. No. 957 on the ground that
jurisdiction lies with the HLURB.

In the present case, the petitioners have expressly chosen to

pursue the criminal prosecution as their remedy but the
prosecutor dismissed their complaint. The prosecutor’s
dismissal for prematurity was apparently on the view that an
administrative finding of violation must first be obtained before
recourse can be made to criminal prosecution

[G.R. No. 128354. April 26, . It correctly relied on Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Petitioner claims that HLURB has no power to declare the
2005] HLURB, et al.[18] where we squarely ruled on the question of mortgage contract over real property executed between a real
HLURBs jurisdiction to hear and decide a condominium buyers estate developer and petitioner, a banking institution, void or
HOME BANKERS SAVINGS complaint for: (a) annulment of a real estate mortgage unenforceable, as it is properly within the jurisdiction of the
& TRUST constituted by the project owner without the consent of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner asserts that being a mortgagee
CO., petitioner, buyer and without the prior written approval of the NHA; (b) of the subject lots and a purchaser in good faith, it is not a project
vs. THE annulment of the foreclosure sale; and (c) annulment of the owner, developer, or dealer contemplated under P.D. No. 1344,
HONORABLE condominium certificate of title that was issued to the highest the law which expanded the jurisdiction of the NHA; and that
COURT OF bidder at the foreclosure sale. since there is no seller-buyer relationship existing between it and
APPEALS, PABLO private respondents, HLURB has no jurisdiction to rule on the
N. AREVALO, validity of the mortgage and to annul foreclosure proceedings.
FRANCISCO A. UY, We hold that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real
SPOUSES estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over The argument is untenable.
LEANDRO A. complaints for specific performance of the sale, or annulment
SORIANO, JR. and The CA did not err in affirming the decision of the Office of
of the mortgage, of a condominium unit, with damages. the President that HLURB has jurisdiction to declare invalid the
ALFREDO LIM and mortgage contract executed between Garcia/TransAmerican
FELISA CHI and petitioner over the subject lots insofar as private
LIM/ALFREDO respondents are concerned
LIM, respondents.

G.R. No. An examination of Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. We agree with the ruling of the RTC that it has jurisdiction over
180394 September 1344,16 which enumerates the regulatory functions of the the case based on the allegations of the complaint. Nothing in
29, 2008 HLURB,17 the complaint or in the contract to sell suggests that petitioner is
The aforequoted provision must be read in the light of the the proper party to invoke the jurisdiction of the HLURB. There
MARJORIE B. CADIMAS, statute’s preamble or the introductory or preparatory clause is nothing in the allegations in the complaint or in the terms and
by her Attorney-In-Fact, that explains the reasons for its enactment or the contextual conditions of the contract to sell that would suggest that the


vs. basis for its interpretation. The scope of the regulatory nature of the controversy calls for the application of either P.D.
MARITES CARRION and authority thus lodged in the National Housing Authority (NHA) No. 957 or P.D. No. 1344 insofar as the extent of the powers and
GEMMA [now HLURB] is indicated in the second and third preambular duties of the HLURB is concerned.
HUGO, Respondents paragraphs of the statute
Note particularly paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1344
The boom in the real estate business all over the country as worded, where the HLURB’s jurisdiction concerns cases
resulted in more litigation between subdivision commenced by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers. As
owners/developers and lot buyers with the issue of the to paragraph (a), concerning "unsound real estate practices," the
jurisdiction of the NHA or the HLURB over such controversies logical complainants would be the buyers and customers against
as against that of regular courts. In the cases that reached this the sellers (subdivision owners and developers or condominium
Court, the ruling has consistently been that the NHA or the builders and realtors), and not vice versa.20
HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts The complaint does not allege that petitioner is a subdivision lot
between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those buyer. The contract to sell does not contain clauses which would
aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with indicate that petitioner has obligations in the capacity of a
its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision lot developer, owner or broker or salesman or a
subdivision a better place to live in. person engaged in real estate business.

[G.R. No. 131683. June 19, Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the In the case at bar, petitioners complaint is for specific
2000] right to act in a case.[12] It is conferred by law and not by mere performance to enforce their rights as purchasers of subdivision
administrative policy of any court or tribunal.[13] It is determined lots as regards rights of way, water, open spaces, road and
JESUS LIM ARRANZA; by the averments of the complaint and not by the defense perimeter wall repairs, and security. Indisputably then, the
LORENZO CINCO; contained in the answer.[14] Hence, the jurisdictional issue HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint.
QUINTIN TAN; JOSE involved here shall be determined upon an examination of the
ESCOBAR; ELBERT applicable laws and the allegations of petitioners complaint The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest
FRIEND; CLASSIC HOMES before the HLURB. the HLURB of that jurisdiction. A receiver is a person appointed
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, by the court, or in this instance, by a quasi~judicial administrative
INC.; BF NORTHWEST agency, in behalf of all the parties for the purpose of preserving
HOMEOWNERS Similarly, in Alcasid v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court ruled that and conserving the property and preventing its possible
ASSOCIATION, INC.; and the HLURB, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the complaint destruction or dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any
UNITED BF of lot buyers for specific performance of alleged contractual of the parties.[19] It is the duty of the receiver to administer the
HOMEOWNERS and statutory obligations of the defendants, to wit, the assets of the receivership estate; and in the management and
ASSOCIATIONS, INC., execution of contracts of sale in favor of the plaintiffs and the disposition of the property committed to his possession, he acts
petitioners, vs. B.F. introduction in the disputed property of the necessary facilities in a fiduciary capacity and with impartiality towards all interested
HOMES, INC. AND THE such as asphalting and street lights. persons.[20] The appointment of a receiver does not dissolve a
HONORABLE COURT OF corporation, nor does it interfere with the exercise of its corporate
APPEALS, respondent. rights.[21] In this case where there appears to be no restraints
imposed upon respondent as it undergoes rehabilitation
receivership,[22] respondent continues to exist as a corporation



and hence, continues or should continue to perform its
contractual and statutory responsibilities to petitioners as

[G.R. No. 125447. August Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse Contrary to MARINAs assertion, H.L. CARLOS complaint was
14, 1998] judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another hardly a duplication of Civil Case No. 89-5870 which was filed to
(and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than collect the sum of money corresponding to unpaid billings from
MARINA PROPERTIES by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the their Construction Contract. The cause of action in the civil case
CORPORATION, pe institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded was, therefore, totally distinct from the cause of action in the
titioner, vs. COURT on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other complaint before the HLURB. For this reason, neither could
OF APPEALS and court might look with favor upon the party there have been splitting of a cause of action.
INC., respondents.

G.R. No. The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power
135808 October 6, to make rules and regulations is based on the impracticability
2008 of lawmakers' providing general regulations for various and
SECURITIES AND varying details of management.30 To rule that the absence of
EXCHANGE implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress,
COMMISSION, petitioner, such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the
vs. administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying
INTERPORT RESOURCES the implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law,
CORPORATION, MANUEL because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob
S. RECTO, RENE S. the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare
VILLARICA, PELAGIO whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet
RICALDE, ANTONIO developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know.31 It
REINA, FRANCISCO is well established that administrative authorities have the
ANONUEVO, JOSEPH SY power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
and SANTIAGO TANCHAN, given statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules
JR., respondents. and regulations conform to the terms and standards
prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into effect
its general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the
rules and regulations cannot assert for themselves a more
extensive prerogative or deviate from the mandate of the
statute.32 Moreover, where the statute contains sufficient
standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of



Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should
be no impediment to its implementation.

Padua vs. Ranada, Doctrines of Primary Jurisdiction  The laws and the TRB Rules of Procedure have
390 SCRA 663 Under the principle of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot or will provided the remedies of an interested expressway
G.R. No. 141949 not determine a controversy involving question within the user—there must be a prior resort to the Toll
October 14, 2002 jurisdiction of an administrative body prior to the decision of Regulatory Board since it is the agency assigned to
that question by the administrative tribunal where: supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of
toll facilities.
1. The question demands administrative determination
requiring special knowledge, experience and services of the  Obviously, the laws and the TRB Rules of Procedure
administrative tribunal; have provided the remedies of an interested
2. The question requires determination of technical and Expressways user. The initial proper recourse is to file
intricate issues of a fact; a petition for review of the adjusted toll rates with the
TRB. The need for a prior resort to this body is with
3. The uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with reason. The TRB, as the agency assigned to supervise
purposes of the regulatory statute administered the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll
facilities, has the necessary expertise, training and
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies skills to judiciously decide matters of this kind. As may
This doctrine calls for resort first to the appropriate be gleaned from the petition, the main thrust of
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy petitioner Zialcita’s argument is that the provisional toll
falling under their jurisdiction and must first be appealed to rate adjustments are exorbitant, oppressive, onerous
the administrative superiors up to the highest level before the and unconscionable. This is obviously a question of
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. fact requiring knowledge of the formula used and the
factors considered in determining the assailed rates.
Definitely, this task is within the province of the TRB.
G.R. No. L-50141 January Findings of facts of Administrative agencies respected unless  There is moreover so strong a presumption respecting
29, 1988 there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such the correctness of the acts and determinations of
evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial. administrative agencies like the BOI, that the policy has
BEAUTIFONT, INC. and been adopted for courts not to interfere therewith
AURA LABORATORIES, unless there be a clear showing of arbitrary action or
INC., petitioners, palpable and serious error. The legal presumption is
vs. that official duty has been duly performed; and it is
COURT OF APPEALS, “particularly strong as regards administrative agencies
RUSTAN MARKETING x x vested with powers said to be quasi-judicial in
CORP. and HOLIDAY nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws
COSMETICS, affecting particular fields of activity, the proper
INC., respondents. regulations and/or promotion of which requires a
technical or special training, aside from a good


knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant
to said field, obtaining in the nation (Pangasinan
Transportation vs. Public Utility Commission, 70 Phil.
221). The consequent policy and practice underlying
our Administrative Law is that courts of justice should
respect the findings of fact of said administrative
agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in
support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly
and patently insubstantial (Heacock vs. NLU, 95 Phil.
553). Hence, “(c)ourts of justice will not generally
interfere with purely administrative matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter
acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or
when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical
manner such that their action may amount to an excess
or lack of jurisdiction.” Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 157 SCRA 481, No. L-50141 January 29,
[G.R. No. 89483. August Doctrines of Primary Jurisdiction RTC has no jurisdiction over the PCGG;
30, 1990.] Under the principle of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy involving question within the Petitioner assails the trial court’s cognizance of the petition filed
REPUBLIC OF THE jurisdiction of an administrative body prior to the decision of by private respondent. Particularly, petitioner argues that the
PHILIPPINES THRU: THE that question by the administrative tribunal where: trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the PCGG. This
PRESIDENTIAL matter has already been settled in Peña,supra, where the Court
COMMISSION ON GOOD 1. The question demands administrative determination ruled that those who wish to question or challenge the PCGG’s
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), requiring special knowledge, experience and services of the acts or orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan,
AFP ANTI-GRAFT BOARD, administrative tribunal; which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction.
COL. ERNESTO A. 2. The question requires determination of technical and
PUNSALANG and PETER intricate issues of a fact; The Sandiganbayan’s decisions and final orders are in turn
T. TABANG, Petitioners, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.
Versus 3. The uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with
HON. EUTROPIO purposes of the regulatory statute administered
MIGRINO, as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial
Court, NCJR, Branch 151,
Pasig, Metro Manila and
TECSON, Respondents.


G.R. No. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction  In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to
88550 April 18, apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases
1990 involving matters that demand the special competence
of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court
INDUSTRIAL has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case,
ENTERPRISES, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in
INC., petitioner, character. However, if the case is such that its
vs. determination requires the expertise, specialized skills
THE HON. COURT OF and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
APPEALS, MARINDUQUE because technical matters or intricate questions of
MINING & INDUSTRIAL facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in
CORPORATION, THE HON. an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be
GERONIMO VELASCO in supplied by the courts even though the matter is within
his capacity as Minister of the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of
Energy and PHILIPPINE primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim
NATIONAL is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into
BANK, respondents. play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body, in such case the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view" (United States v.
Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59,).
 Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds
application in this case since the question of what coal
areas should be exploited and developed and which
entity should be granted coal operating contracts over
said areas involves a technical determination by the
BED as the administrative agency in possession of the
specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial
Court does not have the competence to decide matters
concerning activities relative to the exploration,
exploitation, development and extraction of mineral
resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial
judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand
aside even when apparently they have statutory power
to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of
an administrative agency.



 The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
however, does not call for the dismissal of the case
below. It need only be suspended until after the
matters within the competence of the BED are threshed
out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose
behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily
Mining Exploration Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the  We must point out that courts will not interfere in
Company sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
vs. Court of Appeals, regulation of activities coming under the special technical government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
317 SCRA 388 knowledge and training of such agencies. activities coming under the special technical knowledge
G.R. No. 108846 and training of such agencies and that findings of
October 26, 1999 administrative agencies are accorded not only respect
but finality except when there is insufficient or
insubstantial evidence on record to support the
findings, a situation that does not obtain in this case
Qualitrans Limousine In administrative cases, notice is not indispensable, but the  The Commission’s action must have been preceded by
Service, Inc. vs. Royal deprivation of opportunity to be heard. due notice and hearing, and precisely, it is Qualitrans’
Class Limousine Service complaint that it had been deprived of due process for
179 SCRA 56 failure of the transportation body to give it notice and
hearing (in particular, of Royal Class’ motion to lift
cease and desist order). The records show, however,
that the decision of the Board is founded on substantial
 Moreover, in administrative cases, “notice” is not
indispensable, but the deprivation of opportunity to be
heard. That is not the case here. The reality is that on
October 1, 1986, Qualitrans opposed Royal Class’
application for “declaratory relief.”
 It can not therefore be heard to say that the
Commission had acted without giving the petitioner an
avenue to air its side of the story. , 179 SCRA 569,
G.R. No. 79886, G.R. No. 79887 November 22, 1989
Paat vs. Court of Appeals Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies-  It is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained
G.R. No. 111107. January Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and
10, 1997. Paat vs. Court of it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the retained by them for administrative forfeiture
Appeals, 266 SCRA 167, means of administrative processes afforded him. proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D.
G.R. No. 111107 January 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack
10, 1997


of cause of action in view of the private respondents'
failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have
been the proper course of action by the lower court
instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and
consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the
truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative
forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's
recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an
element of private respondents' right of action, is too
significant to be waylaid by the lower court.

Chiongbian vs. Orbos The division of the country into regions is intended to  Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of
facilitate not only the administration of local administrative regions have been by the President
governments but also the direction of executive pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In
departments which the law requires should have conferring on the President the power “to merge [by
regional offices. administrative determination] the existing regions”
following the establishment of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the
pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the
initial organization of administrative regions in 1972.
 The choice of the President as delegate is logical
because the division of the country into regions is
intended to facilitate not only the administration of local
governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have
regional offices.
Guilles vs CA Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and  Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot
will not determine a controversy involving a question which is and will not determine a controversy involving a
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially question which is within the jurisdiction of an
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative tribunal, especially where the question
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, demands the exercise of sound administrative
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience
determine technical and intricate matters of fact and where a and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of technical and intricate matters of fact and where a
the regulatory statute administered. uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered.

 Additional Info:



While it may plausibly be contended that the case for the heirs
of John Guilles, Sr. could also fall under the exceptions to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, just like that
of June Prill Brett in G.R. No. 74223 and thereby justify their
immediate coming to court, there is a marked difference in their
respective positions. Petitioner June Prill Brett, in G.R. No.
74223, never appealed to the Office of the President, unlike the
heirs of John Guilles, Sr. in G.R. No. 77098. This spelled the

G.R. No. L- The Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members The grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land
28790 April 29, 1968 should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or Registration of the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the
to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to
ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme
as Commissioner of Land a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon that Court's
Registration, vs. CLAUDIO between public utilities is void. recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges
TEEHANKEE, as Secretary would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void.
of Justice, and RAFAEL M. Such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it Consequently, the investigation and suspension of the
SALAS, as Executive would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of
Secretary powers, by charging this court with the administrative function the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of
of supervisory control over executive officials, and discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief
Executive over such officials. The decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and
not upon other parties. This limitation in effect identifies the
resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those
of any other bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind
his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's resolutions
are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative;
any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the
corresponding department head.

But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the

Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial (or more properly
quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the
Land Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151,
sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution of consultas are


but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive
functions and merely incidental to the latter.

G.R. No. 84592 October 27, Findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Commission
1988 not only respect but also finality when the decision and order on Audit finding that "to the effect that there is positive showing
ESTHER E. CUERDO vs. are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would of negligence on the part of the applicant in not taking
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, amount to abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. The necessary precaution or zeal in returning the money in the safe
respondent. findings of facts must be respected, so long as they are in order to safeguard it not only from fire but also from theft or
Esther Cuerdo supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming robbery. In the instant case the sole issue raised being factual,
or preponderant. the same is not reviewable by this Court on certiorari.

Moreover, it is the general policy of this Court to sustain the

decisions of administrative authorities "not only on the basis
of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed knowledgeability and even expertise in the laws
they are entrusted to enforce.
G.R. No. L-57665 July 2, It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly Under the Pres. Decree No. 463, Section 90 confers upon the
1990 delegate to administrative agencies the authority to Secretary of Natural Resources, upon recommendation of the
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given Director of Mines, the authority to issue rules, regulations and
ALEJA SIBAYAN VDA. DE legislation and effectuate its policies. In order to be valid, the orders necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of
PINEDA, CLARA SIBAYAN administrative regulation must be germane to the objects and the Decree. In accordance with the statutory grant of rule-
VDA. DE GADDI, and purposes of the law, conform to the standards that the law making power, the Department Secretary on May 17, 1975
MIGUELA SIBAYAN prescribes and must relate solely to carrying into effect the issued the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order
RAMENTO, petitioners, general provisions of the law. Implementing Pres. Decree No. 463, which was published in
vs. the Official Gazette on June 16, 1975.
The HON. TEODORO As a rule, the courts will not interfere with purely
PEÑA, MINISTER OF administrative matters involving the exercise of judgment and One such implementing rule is Section 128, which respondent
NATURAL RESOURCES; discretion, and findings of fact, of the administrative agency. Minister of Natural Resources relied upon in his decision to
The HON. JUANITO The exception is when there is a clear showing that the dispose of the jurisdictional issue raise d by petitioners. Section
FERNANDEZ, DIRECTOR agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or 128 provides:
OF MINES & GEO- when it acted in a capricious manner such that its action may
SCIENCES; and the KM. 21 amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. Sec. 128. Issues Joined . . .
MINING EXPLORATION The Director, or the Secretary, in case of appeals, may motu
CORPORATION; The proprio look into the validity of mining claims, whether raised as
BAGUIO GOLD MINING an issue or not.
DE CARMELO and JOSEPH With these guidelines, Section 128 of the implementing rules
PALENGAOAN, invoked by public respondents as basis for their jurisdiction
cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by the


Department Head pursuant to validly delegated rule-making
powers. Second, it does not contravene the provisions of Pres.
Decree No. 463, nor does it expand the coverage of the
Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes a procedural rule to
implement the general provisions of the enabling law. It does
not amend or extend the provisions of the statute.

Section 128, being a valid implementing rule, has the force and
effect of law. Thus, public respondents were duly empowered
to inquire into the validity of the mining claims involved in the
protest case, even if not raised in issue.

However, respondent Minister gravely abused his discretion

when he disregarded the rebuttal evidence submitted by
petitioners which otherwise would have had the effect of
reversing respondent Director's finding.

He evidently knew of the existence of the amicable settlement,

since he discussed the terms thereof in his decision.
Nevertheless, respondent Minister overlooked the fact that from
the terms of the settlement, petitioners clearly were not liable to
pay the assessment works for the years in question, and that
consequently there was no basis for a finding of abandonment
of the "Ped" claim by petitioners.

Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that public

respondents had the authority to ascertain the validity of the
"Ped" claim. Nevertheless, in affirming that portion of the
decision of the Director of Mines declaring petitioners to have
"abandoned and lost their rights" over the "Ped" claim,
respondent Minister committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 129958 November The power of administrative agencies to promulgate rules in There is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule
25, 1999 the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what because the findings of the COMELEC conforms to rather than
MIGUEL MELENDRES, JR. is provided for in the legislative enactment. However, the conflicts with the governing statute and controlling case law on
vs. THE COMMISSION ON courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the the matter.
ELECTIONS and RUPERTO sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
P. CONCEPCION regulation of activities coming under the special technical The COMELEC overruled the assailed Order of the
knowledge and training of such agencies. Metropolitan Trial Court reasoning as follows:


Still, when an administrative agency renders an opinion or Petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave
issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre- abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not
existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best dismissing the election protest for failing to comply with the
advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law required payment of filing and legal research fees as
means. Thus an action by an administrative agency may be prescribed in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, such
set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, requirement being jurisdictional, as opposed to the contention
abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of of public respondent. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule
discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the 37, Sec. 6, states:
Sec. 6. Filing fee. — No protest shall be given due course
without the payment of a filing fee of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00) and the legal research fee as required by law.
(Emphasis supplied).

There is no denying private respondent's failure to comply with

this requirement, given the certification of the Clerk of Court of
Branch 68. Melendres' failure to pay said fee at the time the
election protest was filed is also clear from the questioned
Order and in the July 7, 1997 Manifestation of Concepcion filed
with this Commission. Hence, the contested Orders must be
G.R. No. L-58870 December Rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the As to the alleged implementing rules and regulations
18, 1987 power conferred by law would have the force and effect of promulgated by the then MECS to the effect that allowances
law if the same are germane to the subjects of the legislation and other benefits may be charged against the 60% portion of
CEBU INSTITUTE OF and if they conform with the standards prescribed by the the proceeds of tuition fee increases provided for in Section
TECHNOLOGY (CIT) vs. same law. 3(a) of Pres. Dec. No. 45 1, suffice it to say that these were
HON. BLAS OPLE, et al issued ultra vires, and therefore not binding upon this Court.
The statutory grant of rule-making power to administrative
agencies like the Secretary of Education is a valid exception The rule-making authority granted by Pres. Dec. No. 451 is
to the rule on non-delegation of legislative power provided confined to the implementation of the Decree and to the
two conditions concur, namely: 1) the statute is complete in imposition of limitations upon the approval of tuition fee
itself, setting forth the policy to be executed by the increases, to wit:
agency, and 2) said statute fixes a standard to which the
latter must conform. SEC. 4. Rules and Regulations. — The Secretary of Education
and Culture is hereby authorized, empowered and directed to
issue the requisite rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of this Decree. He may, in addition to the
requirements and limitations provided for under Sections 2 and


3 hereof, impose other requirements and limitations as he may
deem proper and reasonable.

The power does not allow the inclusion of other items in

addition to those for which 60% of the proceeds of tuition fee
increases are allocated under Section 3(a) of the Decree.

Since the implementing rules and regulations cited by the

private schools adds allowances and other benefits to the items
included in the allocation of 60% of the proceeds of tuition fee
increases expressly provided for by law, the same were issued
in excess of the rule-making authority of said agency, and
therefore without binding effect upon the courts. At best the
same may be treated as administrative interpretations of the
law and as such, they may be set aside by this Court in the
final determination of what the law means.

Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 232 grants to the Minister of Education

(now Secretary of Education) rule-making authority to fill in the
details on the application or use of tuition fees and other school
charges. In the same vein is section 70 of the same law which

SEC. 70. Rule-making Authority. — The Minister of Education,

Culture and Sports charged with the administration and
enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations.

Contrary to the petitioners' insistence that the questioned rules

and regulations contravene the statutory authority granted to
the Minister of Education, this Court finds that there was a valid
exercise of rule-making authority.

With the basic policy as well as, specific policies clearly set
forth in its various provisions, the Act is complete in itself and
does not leave any part of the policy-making, a strictly
legislative function, to any administrative agency.



And, given the policies and objectives, there are sufficient
standards to guide the Minister of Education in promulgating
rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the
Education Act of 1982. There is sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle.

G.R. No. L-23825 Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet
December 24, 1965 Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
EMMANUEL PELAEZ vs. forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
THE AUDITOR GENERAL that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we
implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or sentence of Section 68, the President:
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a ... may change the seat of the government within any
statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every require.
law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would
be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of the phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified, not the
his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to
the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is which the seat of the government may be transferred. This fact
worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section
with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which provided
thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the that, "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the
system of checks and balances, and, consequently, public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the
undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including
the change of the seat of the government "to such place ... as
the public interest requires." The opening statement of said
Section 1 of Act No. 1748 — which was not included in Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code — governed the time at
which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein
conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first
sentence of said section referred exclusively to the place to
which the seat of the government was to be transferred.

The creation of municipalities is not an administrative function,

but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in


character. The question of whether or not "public interest"
demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is
"purely a legislative question.

If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect,

remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and
including therein the barrio in which the official concerned
resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by
merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if
he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local
officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising
over them the power of control denied to him by the

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive

departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the
authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere
in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such
control does not include the authority either to abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a
consequence, the alleged power of the President to create
municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise
by him of an authority even greater than that of control which
he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In
other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate
above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over
local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and
does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power
over municipal corporations than that which he has over said
executive departments, bureaus or offices.

In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative

powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the
Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917,
must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the
Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and
inconsistent with said statutory enactment.


G.R. No. 194065, June 20, Administrative issuances are merely interpretations and not When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued
2016 expansions of the provisions of law, thus, in case of RMC 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten
inconsistency, the law prevails over them. Administrative years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such
PHILIPPINE BANK OF agencies have no legislative power circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec.
COMMUNICATIONS xvs. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret
COMMISSIONER OF the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute
INTERNAL REVENUE passed by Congress.

It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are

considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific
and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued
from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It
is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute
by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled
to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation
is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be
erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative
issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in
harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement.

Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in

estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. As
pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of RMC
No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is an administrative interpretation which is not in
harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC, for being contrary to the
express provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation could
not be given weight for to do so would, in effect, amend the
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the A.O. No. 308 which seeks the adoption of a national
1998 President which relates to specific aspects in the computerized identification reference system involves a subject
administrative operation of government. It must be in that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.
BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified
D. TORRES, et al implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles of governance." and "embodies changes in
administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the



It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for
the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies — the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering
by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent
of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves
the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative
order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates
the administrative power of the President to make rules and the
legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it
deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308

is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty,
affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No.
308, a citizen cannot transact business with government
agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get
this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a
citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his
privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308
gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand

the limits of administrative legislation and consequently erodes
the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary
to the established approach defining the traditional limits of
administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many
regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that
administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and
application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for
the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a
public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to
respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not
an independent source of power to make laws."


G.R. No. 125350 In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the Although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local
December 3, 2002 power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of
HON. RTC JUDGES them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987
MERCEDES G. DADOLE , by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the Philippine Constitution provides that:
et al vs. COMMISSION ON other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify
AUDIT, r or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment supervision over local governments. x x x
of the former for that of the latter."
The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a
local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted
contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if powers over local government units. Hence, the President or
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as
to a valid delegation. long as the concerned local government unit acts within the
parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos
that is, regulating only the personnel of an administrative seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on
agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity
publication required of the so-called letters of instruction because it violates the principle of local autonomy and
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or separation of powers of the executive and legislative
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the departments in governing municipal corporations.
performance of their duties.
LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be
given by a local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in
provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Section 458,
par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as
the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional
allowances to judges "when the finances of the city government
allow." The said provision does not authorize setting a definite
maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges.
Thus, we need not belabor the point that the finances of a city
government may allow the grant of additional allowances
higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government
exceed its annual expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a city
government with locally generated annual revenues of P40
million and expenditures of P35 million can afford to grant
additional allowances of more than P1,000 each to, say, ten
judges inasmuch as the finances of the city can afford it.


Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances

is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in
Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped
its power of supervision over local government units by
imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it
sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of
the circular had no legal basis.

In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that

DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of
allowances and other additional compensation to government
officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a
mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more
than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government
workers of their allowance and additional compensation sorely
needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least,
before the said circular under attack may be permitted to
substantially reduce their income, the government officials and
employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the
publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines – to the end
that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever
opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the
matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic
precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative Resolution No. 105 issued by the respondent Professional
1988 authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the Regulation Commission (PRC), mandating that no examinee in
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and the licensure examinations in accountancy shall attend any
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, et al regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or
vs. COURT OF APPEALS in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
and PROFESSIONAL purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then school, college or university, or any review center or the like or
REGULATION they must be held to be invalid. any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of
COMMISSION the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days
immediately proceeding every examination day including
examination day. is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also
infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on


the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for
the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from
taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of
their ambition to become public accountants. They have every
right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their
endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to
acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal
growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme

G.R. No. L-30918 July 18, The Philippine Nursing Act, Republic Act No. 877 as [In relation to the power to inspect] where the board finds in the
1974 amended by Republic Act No. 4704 (approved June 18, course of its periodic inspection that a nursing school does not
ANNIE SAND, LYDIA 1966) expressly empowers in section 9 thereof the Board of meet the standing minimum requirements and standards then it
VALDES, LUZ SABAS, Nursing "subject to the approval of the President of the is the board's duty, as provided in the rule, to require
JOSEFINA A. MENDOZA Philippines [to] promulgate such rules and regularly as may the deficient school to make the required improvements as
and ROSARIO A. ORDIZ, in be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." would enable it to meet the minimum standards which must be
their capacity as Chairman carried out within one year and meanwhile to bar the would-be
and Members of the Board graduates of such deficient school from the nurses'
of Examiners for examination until its deficiency and that of its would-be
Nurses, petitioners, graduates shall have been removed.
ANGELES, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon
City, respondents
G.R. No. 78385 August 31, The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the
1987 may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that
FOUNDATION, hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due may be charged by all private schools in the country for
INC., petitioner, process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and
vs. agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.
THE SECRETARY OF notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.
When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative


EDUCATION, CULTURE agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
AND SPORTS, respondent. throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative
character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply
exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact,
then its function is quasi-judicial in character.
G.R. No. 119761 August 29, Two kinds of administrative issuances — a legislative A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the
1996 rule and an interpretative rule. circumstances under which it has been issued, convinces us
that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective
COMMISSIONER OF Legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, measure (revoking in the process the previous holdings of past
INTERNAL REVENUE vs. designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the Commissioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of
HON. COURT OF details thereof . In the same way that laws must have the the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly,
APPEALS, HON. COURT benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More"
OF TAX APPEALS and legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In this and "Champion" within the classification of locally
FORTUNE TOBACCO connection, the Administrative Code of 1987 provides: manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby
CORPORATION have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law
Public Participation. — If not otherwise required by law, an would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally
agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were
notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the not so classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any issuance of the questioned circular, "Hope Luxury," "Premium
rule. More," and "Champion" cigarettes were in the category of
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid locally manufactured cigarettes not bearing foreign brand
unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a subject to 45% ad valorem tax. Hence, without RMC 37-93, the
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks enactment of RA 7654, would have had no new tax rate
before the first hearing thereon. consequence on private respondent's products.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall

be observed.
In addition such rule must be published.
Interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to
the law which the administrative agency is in charge of
It should be understandable that when an administrative rule
is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already



G.R. No. A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend [To implement RA 8240, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
163583 August 20, the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the laws. issued Revenue Regulations No. 1-97, which classified the
2008 The classification is considered valid and reasonable existing brands of cigarettes as those duly registered or active
BRITISH AMERICAN provided that: (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is brands prior to January 1, 1997. New brands, or those
TOBACCO, petitioner, germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it applies, all things registered after January 1, 1997, shall be initially assessed at
vs. being equal, to both present and future conditions; and (4) it their suggested retail price until such time that the appropriate
JOSE ISIDRO N. applies equally to all those belonging to the same class. survey to determine their current net retail price is conducted.]
CAMACHO, in his capacity
as Secretary of the It is clear that the afore-quoted portions of Revenue
Department of Finance Regulations No. 1-97, as amended by Section 2 of Revenue
and GUILLERMO L. Regulations 9-2003, and Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-
PARAYNO, JR., in his 2003 unjustifiably emasculate the operation of Section 145 of
capacity as Commissioner the NIRC because they authorize the Commissioner of Internal
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to update the tax classification of new brands every
Revenue, respondents. two years or earlier subject only to its issuance of the
Philip Morris Philippines appropriate Revenue Regulations, when nowhere in Section
Manufacturing, Inc., 145 is such authority granted to the Bureau. Unless expressly
fortune tobacco, corp., granted to the BIR, the power to reclassify cigarette brands
MIGHTY CORPORATION, remains a prerogative of the legislature which cannot be
and JT InTERNATIONAL, usurped by the former.
S.A., respondents-in-
G.R. No. It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF
131082 June 19, power as provided in Section 51 of R.A. No. 7742 and required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the
2000 Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that
ROMULO, MABANTA, rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated employers should have both provident/retirement and housing
BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC power to create new and additional legal provisions that have benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption
& DE LOS the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No.
ANGELES, petitioner, authority granted by the legislature to the administrative 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that
vs. agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section
HOME DEVELOPMENT objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal
MUTUAL to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the
FUND, respondent. delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not
consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative
issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but
must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry
out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.



G.R. No. 116422 November It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an Is SSS Resolution No. 56 then within the ambit of and thus
4, 1996 administrative order, the former must prevail. A rule or proscribed by Sec. 28 (b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968?
AVELINA B. CONTE and regulation must conform to and be consistent with the
LETICIA BOISER- provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or We answer in the affirmative. Said Sec. 28 (b) as amended by
PALMA, petitioners, regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a public RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any
vs. administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it insurance or retirement plan — other than the GSIS — for
COMMISSION ON AUDIT may not use either to abridge the authority given it by the government officers and employees, in order to prevent the
(COA), respondent. Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. It is beyond
the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions cavil that Res. 56 contravenes the said provision of law and is
control with respect to what rules and regulations may be therefore invalid, void and of no effect. No ignore this and rule
promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other
fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules government office or agency to put up its own supplementary
and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of retirement benefit plan under the guise of such "financial
the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is assistance".
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation
of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. Though well-settled is
the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor
of the retiree, nevertheless, there is really nothing to
interpret in either RA 4968 or Res. 56, and correspondingly,
the absence of any doubt as to the ultra-vires nature and
illegality of the disputed resolution constrains us to rule
against petitioners.
G.R. No. The Constitution grants the COA the exclusive authority to Pursuant to this authority, COA Memorandum No. 2002-053
174788 April 11, define the scope of its audit and examination, and establish was promulgated, giving the General Counsel the authority to
2013 the techniques and methods therefor. deputize a special audit team, viz:
TEAM, COMMISSION ON In case the Director, Legal and Adjudication Office for the
AUDIT, Petitioners, sector in the Central Office finds that the transaction/event is a
vs. proper subject of special or fraud audit, he shall recommend
COURT OF APPEALS and the creation of a special audit team for approval of the General
GOVERNMENT SERVICE Counsel who shall sign the office order for the purpose. This
INSURANCE memorandum shall constitute authority for the General Counsel
SYSTEM, Respondents. to deputize the team pursuant to the provisions of Section 40 of
P.D. 1445.

G.R. No. 113097 April 27, The Labor Code, as amended by RA 6727 (the Wage NWPC and not the RTWPB has the power to "prescribe the
1998 Rationalization Act), grants the National Wages and rules and guidelines" for the determination of minimum wage
NASIPIT LUMBER Productivity Commission (NWPC) the power to prescribe and productivity measures. While the RTWPB has the power to
COMPANY, INC., and rules and guidelines for the determination of appropriate issue wage orders under Article 122 (b) of the Labor Code,



PHILIPPINE WALLBOARD wages in the country. Hence, "guidelines" issued by the such orders are subject to the guidelines prescribed by the
CORPORATION, petitioners Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards (RTWPB) NWPC. One of these guidelines is the "Rules on Minimum
, without the approval of or, worse, contrary to those Wage Fixing," which was issued on June 4, 1990. Rule IV,
vs. promulgated by the NWPC are ineffectual, void and cannot Section 2 thereof, allows the RTWPB to issue wage orders
NATIONAL WAGES AND be the source of rights and privileges. exempting enterprises from the coverage of the prescribed
PRODUCTIVITY minimum wages. However, the NWPC has the power not only
COMMISSION, WESTERN to prescribe guidelines to govern wage orders, but also to issue
AGUSAN WORKERS exemptions therefrom, as the said rule provides that
UNION (WAWU-ULGWP "[w]henever a wage order provides for exemption, applications
LOCAL 101), TUNGAO thereto shall be filed with the appropriate Board which shall
LUMBER WORKERS process the same, subject to guidelines issued by the
UNION (TULWU-ULGWP Commission." In short, the NWPC lays down the guidelines
LOCAL 102) and UNITED which the RTWPB implements.
103), respondents.