G.R. No.
193854 September 24, 2012 on said minor complainant AAA against her will and without her consent, which act is
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
DINA DULAY y PASCUAL, Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve an appeal from the Decision1 dated August 4, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03725 affirming with modification the Decision2 dated October 8,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 194, Parañaque City, finding appellant Dina
Dulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A. No. 1 (a) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) 8353 as a co-principal by
indispensable cooperation.
The records bear the following factual antecedents:
Private complainant AAA3 was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister
introduced the appellant to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, appellant convinced
AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Before going to the said
wake, they went to a casino to look for appellant's boyfriend, but since he was not there,
they went to Sto. Niño at Don Galo. However, appellant's boyfriend was also not there.
When they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish, they saw
appellant's boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, appellant and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the
Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan,
appellant suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the name "Speed" was
waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to appellant and heard "Speed" tell appellant to look
for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and
raped her. AAA asked for appellant's help when she saw the latter peeping into the room
while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, "Speed" and appellant
told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her.
AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and the
latter informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at
Barangay San Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the
complaint to the police station.
The Parañaque City Police Office (Women's and Children Concern Desk) asked the assistance
of the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, upon which the latter
assigned the case to Dr. Merle Tan. Consequently, with the consent of AAA and her mother,
and in the presence of a social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), Dr. Tan conducted the requisite interview and physical examination on AAA. Later
on, Dr. Tan issued a Medico-Legal Report4 stating that there was no evident injury in the body
of AAA, but medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse. During her testimony, Dr. Tan
explained that such impression or conclusion pertains to the ano-genital examination and
also stated that she found multiple abrasions on the back portion of the body of AAA.5
Thus, an Information was filed, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of July 2005, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with one alias "Speed," whose true name and identity and present
whereabouts is still unknown, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
the herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee complainant AAA, 12
year old minor, to accused alias "Speed," who with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
prejudicial to the normal growth and development of the said child.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
With the assistance of counsel de oficio, on August 3, 2005, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.7 Therafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To support the above allegations, the prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA and Dr.
Merle Tan. On the other hand, the defense presented the sole testimony of appellant which
can be summarized as follows:
Appellant met AAA a few days before June 2005 when the latter was introduced to her by
her cousin Eglay Akmad during the wake of a relative of AAA at Palanyag. The cousin of
appellant was AAA's neighbor at Palanyag. Around 1 o'clock in the morning of July 3, 2005,
appellant averred that she was at La Huerta, at the Bulungan Fish Port in Parañaque City with
her cousin Eglay and stayed there for about thirty (30) minutes. They then proceeded to the
house of appellant's cousin in Palanyag. In the said house, appellant saw "Speed" and two (2)
other male persons. She also saw AAA who was engaged in a conversation with "Speed" and
his two (2) companions. She asked AAA what she was doing there and the latter said that it
was none of her business ("wala kang pakialam sa akin"). Because of the response of AAA,
appellant left the house and went home to General Trias, Cavite.
On October 8, 2008, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding Accused Danilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for rape as a co-
principal by indispensable cooperation, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
Reclusion Perpetua under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and to pay the offended
party the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 by way of damages.
The period of her detention shall be considered part of the service of her sentence.
SO ORDERED.8
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, the appellant brought the case to the CA.
The latter, on August 4, 2010, promulgated its decision affirming the ruling of the RTC with a
modification on the award of damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to indemnify the offended party the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱ 50,000.00) as
civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱ 50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (₱ 25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the present appeal.
In her Brief, appellant assigned the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF RAPE
AS CO-PRINCIPAL BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AAA.10
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the appellee, refutes the above assignment
of errors by stating the following arguments:
I.
CONSPIRACY WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE.
II.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT. PROS. R. GARCIA: Now, what happened after you met this Dina Dulay?
III. WITNESS AAA: She invited me to go with her boyfriend, Sir.
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL CANNOT BE GIVEN GREATER EVIDENTIARY xxxx
WEIGHT THAN THE POSITIVE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT. 11 Q: You went to the bulungan, what happened when you reached the fish port or bulungan,
An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and the reviewing AAA?
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the A: Pumunta kami sa kubuhan, Sir.
trial court's decision on the basis of grounds other than those that the parties raised as Q: Where is this kubuhan located in relation to the fish port?
errors.12 A: At the back portion, Sir.
The appellant in this case was charged in the Information as having committed the crime of Q: And, when you said pumunta kami, who was then your companion in going to that
Rape under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to kubuhan?
Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. She was eventually convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape A: Dina Dulay and her boyfriend, Sir.
as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Q: Do you know the name of the boyfriend of Dina Dulay?
reclusion perpetua as provided under Article 266-B of the RPC. A: No, Sir.
In sustaining the conviction of the appellant as co-principal by indispensable cooperation, the xxxx
CA, ratiocinated: Q: All right. After reaching the kubuhan, what happened next?
To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or purpose A: Pina-rape po ako, Sir.
does not necessarily mean previous understanding, for it can be explained or inferred from Q: What made you say AAA that accused here Dina Dulay had you raped at the kubuhan?
the circumstances of each case. The cooperation must be indispensable, that is, without A: Kasi po binayaran siya nung lalaki, Sir.
which the commission of the crime would not have been accomplished. x x x Q: Now, do you know how much this Dina Dulay was paid by that person who was you said
xxxx raped you?
The proven facts and circumstances obtaining in this case fall squarely on the above-cited A: No, Sir. I just saw them.
example. It will be noted that the cooperation of the accused-appellant consisted in Q: And what did you see that was paid to Dina?
performing an act which is different from the act of execution of the crime committed by the A: Pera, Sir.
rapist. Accused-appellant cooperated in the perpetration of the crime of rape committed by Q: Aside from seeing a guy giving money to Dina Dulay, did you hear any conversation
"Speed" by acts without which the crime would not have been consummated, since she between this Dina Dulay and that man who gave money to her?
prepared the way for the perpetration thereof, convinced the victim to go with her under the A: Yes, sir.
guise of looking for her boyfriend and upon arrival at the kubuhan, she pulled the victim Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court AAA, what was that conversation you heard between
inside a room where "Speed" was waiting, delivered the victim to him, and then after this Dina Dulay and the person who gave money to her?
receiving some amount of money from "Speed" she settled in another room together with A: He said to look for a younger girl, Sir.16
her boyfriend so that "Speed" might freely consummate the rape with violence and xxxx
intimidation, as he did.13 PROS. R. GARCIA:
However, this Court is of another view and does not subscribe to the findings of the trial Q: Okay. After that conversation and the giving of money to Dina Dulay, what happened to
court, as sustained by the CA that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal you and the man?
by indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape. A: He raped me, Sir.
Under the Revised Penal Code,14 an accused may be considered a principal by direct Q: Where were you raped?
participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by A: At the Kubuhan, Sir. Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court how you were raped by
indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or that person?
unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing A: He tied me up, Sir.
another act without which it would not have been accomplished. 15 Nothing in the evidence Q: How were you tied up as you said?
presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are A: He tied up both my hands, Sir.
indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from Q: Then after tying your hands what happened next?
the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the A: He raped me and he pointed a knife at me, Sir.
man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have Q: When you said you were raped, are you referring to the insertion of his penis into your sex
accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still organ?
have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary A: Yes, Sir.
consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of Q: And, how did you feel at that time when the organ of this man was inserted into your
the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information, as well as organ?
in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she A: It was painful, Sir.
was raped by "Speed." Thus: Q: And, how did you react when as you said you were being raped by this person?
A: I cannot talk. He put clothes in my mouth, Sir.
Q: For how long did you stay in that kubuhan with this man? May isang oras ba kayo doon?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, tell us how AAA many times did this person insert his penis into your organ?
A: Only one (1) AAA, Sir.17
It must be clear that this Court respects the findings of the trial court that AAA was indeed
raped by considering the credibility of the testimony of AAA. The rule is that factual findings
of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.18However, the review of a
criminal case opens up the case in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both
the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, avoiding general conclusions based on
isolated pieces of evidence.19 In the case of rape, a review begins with the reality that rape is
a very serious accusation that is painful to make; at the same time, it is a charge that is not
hard to lay against another by one with malice in her mind. Because of the private nature of
the crime that justifies the acceptance of the lone testimony of a credible victim to convict, it
is not easy for the accused, although innocent, to disprove his guilt. These realities compel
this Court to approach with great caution and to scrutinize the statements of a victim on
whose sole testimony conviction or acquittal depends.20
In this light, while this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as
a principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A.
7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act, which states that:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution.21
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.22
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It
contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under
paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit.23
As alleged in the Information and proven through the testimony of AAA, appellant facilitated
or induced child prostitution. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.24 Thus, the act of apellant in convincing AAA, who was
12 years old at that time, to go with her and thereafter, offer her for sex to a man in
exchange for money makes her liable under the above-mentioned law. The purpose of the
law is to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. 25 A
child exploited in prostitution may seem to "consent" to what is being done to her or him
and may appear not to complain. However, we have held that a child who is "a person below
eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental
disability or condition" is incapable of giving rational consent26 to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse.
It must be noted that in the Information, it was alleged that appellant was accused of Rape
under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b)
of R.A. 7610, and then went on to enumerate the elements of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610 in its
body. The Information partly reads:
x x x the herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee complainant
AAA, 12 year old minor, to accused alias "Speed," who with lewd design and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge on said minor complainant AAA against her will and without her consent x x x 27
Undoubtedly, the above-quoted falls under Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, the appellant acting as
a procurer of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution. It must be remembered that
the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information
nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they may be
conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint
or information.28 The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or
defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the
narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently
apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.29 1âwphi1
To dispute the allegation and the evidence presented by the prosecution, appellant merely
interposes the defense of denial. It is well settled that denial is essentially the weakest form
of defense and it can never overcome an affirmative testimony, particularly when it comes
from the mouth of a credible witness.30
Anent the penalty, for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610, the
penalty prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
Therefore, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty
prescribed by the law.31 Notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 is a special law, appellant may enjoy
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.32 Since the penalty provided in R.A. 7610 is
taken from the range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause
of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.33 Thus, appellant is entitled to a maximum
term which should be within the range of the proper imposable penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) and
a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period
(ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months).34
As to the award of damages, the same must be consistent with the objective of R.A. 7610 to
afford children special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination and with the
principle that every person who contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same.35 Therefore, civil indemnity to the child is
proper in a case involving violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610. This is also in
compliance with Article 100 of the RPC which states that every person criminally liable is
civilly liable. Hence, the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 civil indemnity ex delicto as awarded in cases
of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 761036 shall also be the same in cases of
violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of appellant Dina Dulay y Pascual is hereby DISMISSED. However,
the Decision of the CA is hereby MODIFIED as appellant is not guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape, but of violating Section 5 (a), Article III R.A. 7610, amended, for
which she is sentenced to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is also
ORDERED to pay AAA the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131116 August 27, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, ARTEMIO AVERION, LANDRITO "DING" PERADILLAS and LUIS
CORCOLON,accused,
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ and ARTEMIO AVERION, accused-appellants.
PARDO, J.:
What is before this Court is an appeal from the decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 160,
Pasig City,1 finding accused Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon y Fadialan, Landrito "Ding"
Peradillas and Artemio Averion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder committed Nelson
Peñalosa and Rickson Peñalosa, and sentencing each of the accused, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused Antonio Sanchez, Landrito
"Ding" Peradillas, Luis Corcolon, and Artemio Averion GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER punishable under ART. 48 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences each of said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly
and severally, the heirs of the victims each the sum of P100,000.00 for the death of Nelson
Peñalosa and Rickson Peñalosa, P50,000.00 as actual damages and moral damages of
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
City of Pasig.
December 27, 1996.
(s/t) MARIANO M. UMALI
Judge2
On March 1, 1994, Senior State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Calamba, Laguna, an information for double murder against accused Antonio L.
Sanchez, Luis Corcolon y Fadialan, Landrito "Ding" Peradillas and Artemio Averion, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about April 13, 1991, at about 7:45 p.m. more or less, in Barangay Curba,
Municipality of Calauan, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding one
another, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with the use of a motor vehicle, at
night time, all the accused then being armed and committed in consideration of a price,
reward or promise and of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously shoot with the use of automatic weapons inflicting multiple gunshot wounds
upon Nelson Peñalosa and Rickson Peñalosa which caused their instantaneous deaths to the
damage and prejudice of their heirs and relatives.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On March 16, 1994, the case was raffled to Branch 34, Regional Trial Court, Calamba,
Laguna.4 On March 17, 1994, the court ordered the arrest of accused Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis
Corcolon and Ding Peradillas. On the same date, Artemio Averion voluntarily surrendered to
the court, which ordered Averion's transfer to the provincial jail, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.5
Thereafter, the trial court committed the accused to the custody of proper authorities.6
Upon arraignment on April 10, 1995, all the accused pleaded not guilty. 7 The trial of the case
thereby ensued. On December 27, 1996, the trial court convicted all the accused of the
complex crime of double murder, as charged, the dispositive portion of which is set out in the
opening paragraph of this opinion.
On February 27, 1997, all the accused, except Ding Peradillas, were present for the
promulgation of the decision. Peradillas was a member of the Philippine National Police and
was under the custody of his superiors. The trial court ordered his custodian to explain
accused's non-appearance. On March 14, 1997, P/C Supt. Roberto L. Calinisan, Chief, PNP-
PACC Task Force Habagat, denied any knowledge of the murder case against Peradillas.
Hence, Peradillas was not suspended from the service pending trial. However, at the time
that Peradillas was to be presented to the court for the promulgation of the decision, he had
disappeared and could not be located by his custodian.8 The promulgation of the decision as
to him was in absentia. Peradillas and Corcolon did not appeal from the decision.
Accused Antonio L. Sanchez and Artemio Averion filed their respective appeals to this Court.
The facts are as follows:
On April 13, 1991, at around 10:00 in the morning, state witness Vivencio Malabanan, team
leader of a group of policemen, went to the Bishop Compound in Calauan, Laguna, as part of
the security force of mayor Antonio L. Sanchez. After a while, accused Ding Peradillas arrived
and asked for mayor Sanchez. Peradillas informed mayor Sanchez that there would be a
birthday party that night at Dr. Virvilio Velecina's house in Lanot, Calauan, Laguna, near the
abode of Peradillas. Peradillas assured mayor Sanchez of Nelson Peñalosa's presence thereat.
Dr. Velecina was a political opponent of mayor Sanchez for the mayoralty seat of Calauan,
Laguna, Mayor Sanchez then replied, "Bahala na kayo mga anak. Ayusin lang ninyo ang
trabaho," and left the premises. Peradillas immediately called Corcolon and Averion and
relayed the message — "Ayos na ang paguusap at humanap na lang ng sasakyan." All the
accused, including Malabanan, understood it as an order to kill Nelson Peñalosa, one of the
political leaders of Dr. Velecina.9
Afterwards, Peradillas, Corcolon and Averion made arrangements to acquire two-way radios
and a vehicle for the operation. At around 2:30 in the afternoon, Malabanan and the three
accused went their separate ways and agreed to meet at mayor Sanchez' house at 6:00 in the
evening. Malabanan returned to his detachment area at Dayap, proceeded to the municipal
hall, then went home where Peradillas fetched him at 6:00 p.m. They proceeded to mayor
Sanchez' house where they met Averion and Corcolon, with the car and two-way radios.10
At around 7:00 in the evening, Malabanan and the three accused boarded the car and went
to Marpori Poultry Farm in Barangay Lanot, near Dr. Velecina's house. Peradillas alighted and
walked towards his own house, near Dr. Velecina's house, to check whether Nelson Peñalosa
was at the party.
Thereafter, using the two-way radio, Peradillas informed the occupants of the car that
Nelson Peñalosa's jeep was leaving the Velecina compound. Accused Averion immediately
drove the car to the front of Peradilla's house and the latter hopped in the car's back seat.
Corcolon sat in the front seat beside him; witness Malabanan sat at the left side of the
backseat and Peradillas stayed at the right side of the back seat. The group pursued
Peñalosa's jeep. When the accused's car was passing Victoria Farms, located about 100
meters from Peñalosa compound, Corcolon ordered Averion to overtake Peñalosa's jeep. As
the car overtook the jeep, Peradillas and Corcolon fired at Peñalosa's jeep, using M-16 and
baby armalite rifles, executed in automatic firing mode. There were three bursts of gunfire.
Based on the sketch prepared by Malabanan, illustrating the relative position of their car and
Nelson's jeep at the time of the shooting, the assailants were at the left side of the jeep.11
Rickson Peñalosa, son of Nelson Peñalosa, fell from the jeep. The jeep, however, continued
running in a zigzag position until it overturned in front of Irais Farm. After the shooting, the
accused proceeded to the house of mayor Sanchez in Bai, Laguna, and reported to mayor
Sanchez that Peñalosa was already dead.12
Together with his superior SPO4 Lanorio and photographer Romeo Alcantara, policeman
Daniel Escares went to the crime scene. There, he saw the body of Nelson Peñalosa slumped
at the driver seat of the owner-type jeep. They recovered the body of Rickson Peñalosa
slumped on a grassy place not far from where they found Nelson Peñalosa. After all the
evidence and photographs were taken, they brought the cadavers to Funeraria Señerez.
Daniel Escares submitted his investigation report of the incident to the Provincial Director,
Laguna PNP Command.13
Dr. Ruben B. Escueta, Rural Health Physician, Rural Health Unit, Calauan, Laguna, conducted
an autopsy on the bodies of Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa. Nelson Peñalosa suffered massive
intra-cranial hemorrhage and died of cranial injury due to gunshot wounds. Rickson Peñalosa
died of massive intra thoracic hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds.14 Dr. Escueta, as a
defense witness, testified that based on the points of entrance and exit of the wounds
sustained by the Peñalosas, it was not possible for the assailants to be at the left side of the
victims.15 It contradicted Malabanan's testimony that they were at the left side of the victims
when the shooting took place. He further stated that based on the wounds inflicted on the
victims, the assailants were either in a sitting or squatting position when they shot the
victims. Some of the wounds indicated an upward trajectory of the bullets.
On September 15, 1993, Janet P. Cortez, PNP ballistician, completed the ballistic tests
conducted on the twelve (12) empty shells found at the crime scene and the M-16 baby
armalite surrendered by Corcolon.16 She concluded that the 12 empty shells were fired using
three (3) different firearms, one of which was the M-16 baby armalite.17
On August 18, 1995, Adelina Peñalosa, common law wife of Nelson Peñalosa and mother of
Rickson, testified that the whole family was in mourning and could not eat after what
happened.18 She testified that the family incurred P250,000.00 for funeral expenses, but
failed to present the appropriate receipts. She also stated that Nelson Peñalosa was earning
one (1) million pesos per annum from his businesses. However, no income tax return or other
proofs were shown to substantiate the statement.19
The accused interposed the defense of alibi and denial.
Luis Corcolon stated that he spent the whole day of April 13, 1991, until 8:30 in the evening,
supervising the poultry farm of his employers, Edgardo Tanchico and Orlando Dizon. He
denied that he was in the company of Averion and Peradillas that day, and that he
participated in the Peñalosa killings. He denied that he was ever assigned as a security guard
of mayor Sanchez. He claimed that the murder charges were concocted against them for his
refusal to testify against mayor Sanchez in the Gomez-Sarmenta case. He alleged that he was
maltreated, tortured, electrocuted and forced to implicate mayor Sanchez in the Gomez-
Sarmenta rape-slayings. He denied that he owned the M-16 baby armalite used in killing the
Peñalosas.20
Detention prisoner George Medialde corroborated Corcolon's statement that they were
implicated in the Peñalosa killing for their refusal to testify against mayor Sanchez. He
claimed that Malabanan confessed to him that the latter had killed the Peñalosas, but with
the aid of CAFGU men and not herein accused. He averred that Corcolon and Averion were
wrongfully implicated in the murder charges in deference to the wishes of the
investigators.21 Zoilo Ama, another detention prisoner, claimed that Malabanan confessed
that he killed the Peñalosas, but did not mention the involvement of Corcolon, Averion and
mayor Sanchez.22
Accused Artemio Averion, a godson of mayor Sanchez, denied that he was involved in the
Peñalosa slayings. On April 13, 1991, he claimed that he was in Lucena City, attending to his
ailing father. He stayed there until April 15, 1991. He maintained that he was wrongfully
implicated in the Peñalosa killings for his refusal to testify against mayor Sanchez regarding
the Gomez-Sarmenta rape-slayings. Malabanan asked for his forgiveness for falsely
incriminating them in the Peñalosa case.23
Jesus Versoza, PNP Officer, Camp Crame, denied the allegations of Medialdea and Averion
that they were tortured and forced to testify against mayor Sanchez.24
Accused mayor Antonio L. Sanchez stated on April 12, 1991, he went to Anilao, Batangas,
with his family. Around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 13, 1991, his family went to Tagaytay
City and stayed overnight at Taal Vista Lodge. Around 10:00 in the morning of April 14, 1991,
they went home to Calauan, Laguna. After reaching his abode in Calauan around 12:00 noon,
mayor Sanchez learned of the ambush-slayings of the Peñalosas. He immediately ordered an
investigation of the case. He denied any involvement in the killing of the victims.25
The trial court ruled that the prosecution's evidence clearly and convincingly established the
participation of the four (4) accused in killing the Peñalosas. Malabanan gave a sincere, frank
and trustworthy account of the circumstances surrounding the killing. Furthermore, the trial
court explained the discrepancies between Malabanan's recollection of how the victims were
shot and Dr. Escueta's conclusion on what transpired based on the injuries sustained by the
victims.
The trial court stated that the doctor's conclusion was based on the assumption that the
victims were in a sitting position inside the jeep. However, it was possible that after the first
burst of gunfire, the victims were hit and fell. During the second burst of gunfire, the victims
were lying down or in a crouching position. Thus, the entry-exit points of the bullets did not
entirely correspond to Malabanan's account, which was based on the assumption that the
victims did not change their positions during the shooting incident.
The trial court ruled that the accused conspired in committing the crime. Treachery was
present, thereby qualifying the crime to murder. It appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, nighttime and use of motor vehicle.
The trial court considered the crime as a complex crime of double murder punishable under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, at the time of the commission of the offense
on April 13, 1991, there was a constitutional proscription on the imposition of the death
penalty. Thus, each of the accused was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and to pay damages
to the heirs of the victims, as earlier quoted.
Accused mayor Antonio L. Sanchez and Artemio Averion jointly appealed from the decision to
the Supreme Court.
In their sole assignment of error, accused mayor Sanchez and Averion contended that the
trial court failed to recognize the material inconsistencies between Malabanan's testimony
and the physical and scientific evidence presented before it. They pointed out the following
inconsistencies, to wit:
1. Malabanan testified that a) when they fired at the victims, they were about the same
elevation;26 b) they used two (2) guns in killing the victims;27 c) they were at the left side of
the victims when the shooting incident occurred.28 However, Dr. Escueta's autopsy report
revealed that: 1) the assailants were at a lower elevation; 2) three (3) kinds of guns were
used; and 3) based on the injuries, assailants were on the right side of the victims.
2. Malabanan's affidavit "Exhibit V" made on August 16, 1993, and sworn to on August 17,
1993, bears two (2) signatures of the affiant Malabanan and dated September 15, 1993.
However, during cross-examination, Malabanan stated that he executed and signed the
affidavit on one occasion only, August 15, 1993.
3. Aurelio Centeno testified in the case of Gomez-Sarmenta slayings that Malabanan only
responded to the report that Peñalosa had been killed. He averred that contrary to
Malabanan's report, the latter was not at the crime scene.
The two accused further averred that the material inconsistencies between Malabanan's
testimony and the autopsy and laboratory findings and conclusions seriously affect his
credibility. They stressed that Malabanan has sufficient motive to implicate mayor Sanchez
and Corcolon in the Peñalosa killings due to threats of mayor Sanchez. They alleged that
although generally alibi is considered a weak defense, there are times when it is worthy of
credence, such as in this case.
The Solicitor General supports the trial court's ruling that the prosecution adequately
established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Malabanan positively
identified the accused as the perpetrators. He testified in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner. The defense failed to satisfactorily show that Malabanan
had an ill motive to testify falsely against the accused. The alleged threat to Malabanan's life
was not adequately established or sufficient for him to falsely implicate the accused. As
regards the supposed inconsistencies between Malabanan's account of the events vis á vis
the autopsy and ballistic reports, the Solicitor General pointed out that both vehicles were
running at the time of the ambush. It was a matter of instinct for the victims to shift positions
as they were fired upon. Thus, contrary to Dr. Escueta's conclusion, it was not impossible that
the victims were hit from the right side of their bodies, even if assailants were physically
situated at the victim's left side. Hence, the apparent inconsistencies do not affect witness
Malabanan's credibility.
After a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, we agree with the trial court that the
prosecution adequately established accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Malabanan gave a detailed account of the planning, preparation and the shooting incident.
He narrated the participation of each of the accused, to wit: (1) the order given by mayor
Sanchez to execute Peñalosa; (2) Averion's acquisition of a vehicle and two-way radios to be
used for the operation and in driving the car; (3) Peradillas' act of relaying the information
that Nelson Peñalosa's jeep was leaving the Velecina compound; 4) the way they pursued the
victims; and 5) Corcolon and Peradilla's act of firing and killing the Peñalosas.
The accused concentrated mainly on the seeming contradiction between the narration of
Malabanan on how the victims were shot, and the physician's report on the location of
injuries sustained by them. However, as the Solicitor General stated, both vehicles were
running at the time of the shootout. It was unlikely that the victims drove in a straight line
parallel to that of the assailants. In fact, Malabanan testified that while being fired at,
Peñalosa's jeepney was running in zigzag manner.29 It was a natural reaction for Peñalosa to
evade the assailants as much as possible and to try to dodge the bullets. Furthermore, the
assailants fired the guns in automatic firing mode. Thus, the bullets burst out in different
directions simultaneously. Hence, it was not impossible for the victims to be hit in different
parts of the body.
"This Court has held time and again that any minor lapses in the testimony of a witness tend
to buttress, rather than weaken, his or her credibility, since they show that he or she was
neither coached nor were his or her answers contrived. Witnesses are not expected to
remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall."30
Furthermore, the fact that the trial court relied on the testimony of a single witness does not
effect the verdict of conviction. Criminals are convicted, not on the number of witnesses
against them, but on the credibility of the testimony of even one witness, who is able to
convince the court of the guilt of the accused beyond a shadow of doubt. 31 What witness can
be more credible than someone who was in the planning, preparation and execution of the
crime.
The inconsistency between the affidavit and testimony of Malabanan is too minor to affect
his credibility. At any rate, we have held that affidavits are generally subordinate in
importance to open court declarations. Affidavits are not complete reproductions of what
the declarant has in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer
and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to him.32
Accused-appellants raised that Malabanan's delay in reporting the involvement of the
accused in the crime casts doubt on his credibility. However, jurisprudence teaches us that
delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the
credibility of a witness, especially where such witness gives a sufficient explanation for the
delay.33 It was natural for Malabanan to keep silent during that time for, aside from being a
co-conspirator, mayor Sanchez was a powerful opponent.
Consequently, we find that accused-appellant's defenses of alibi and denial are bereft of
merit. The defenses of alibi and denial are worthless in the face of positive testimony of a
witness showing the involvement of each of the accused.
However, we disagree with the trial court that the accused committed a single complex crime
of double murder. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means of committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
The question is whether the act of shooting the victims using armalites in automatic firing
mode constitutes a single act and, thus, the felonies resulting therefrom are considered as
complex crimes. We rule in the negative.
In People v. Vargas, Jr., we ruled that "several shots from a Thompson sub-machine, in view
of its special mechanism causing several deaths, although caused by a single act of pressing
the trigger, are considered several acts. Although each burst of shots was caused by one
single act of pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, in view of its special mechanism the
person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his finger
and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be
considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually
produced them."34 In the instant case, Malabanan testified that he heard three bursts of
gunfire from the two armalites used by accused Corcolon and Peradillas. Thus, the accused
are criminally liable for as many offenses resulting from pressing the trigger of the armalites.
Therefore, accused are liable for two counts of murder committed against the victims,
Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa, instead of the complex crime of double murder.
Evidently, treachery was present in the execution of the crimes. The attack against the
victims, who were unarmed, was sudden, catching them unaware and giving them no
opportunity to defend themselves.35 The presence of treachery qualifies the crimes to
murder.
Conspiracy is likewise adequately established. Notwithstanding the fact that mayor Sanchez
was not at the crime scene, we are convinced that he was not only a co-conspirator, he was
the mastermind of the ambush slayings or the principal by inducement.36 Malabanan
testified that Nelson Peñalosa was killed upon order of mayor Sanchez. After the commission
of the crime, the assailants reported to mayor Sanchez. In conspiracy, it is not necessary to
show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What is important is that the
participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to
indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim. Conspiracy
renders appellants liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.37
The trial court properly appreciated the existence of evident premeditation. The prosecution
clearly showed the presence of the following requisites: a) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung
to their determination; and c) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow them to reflect upon the consequences of their acts. 38 As clearly as 10:00
in the morning, the accused had conspired to kill Nelson Peñalosa. They even looked for two-
way radios and a vehicle to be used for the operation. Indeed, sufficient time had lapsed to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of their actions.
Accused specifically used a motor vehicle to execute the crime. Thus, the aggravating
circumstance of use of a motor vehicle must be appreciated.
However, we cannot appreciate the generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime; while the
crime was committed at night, the prosecution failed to show that the malefactors
specifically sought this circumstance to facilitate the criminal design.39 The fact that the crime
happened at 7:00 in the evening does not indicate that accused made use of the darkness to
conceal the crime and their identities.
At the time of the commission of the crime on April 13, 1991, the penalty for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. Considering the presence of aggravating circumstances, the accused should be
sentenced to the death penalty for each murder. However, in view of the constitutional
proscription of the death penalty at that time, each of the accused is sentenced to two (2)
penalties of reclusion perpetua.
Regarding the civil liability of the accused, the trial court ordered the accused to pay the heirs
of Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa each, the sum of P100,000.00, P50,000.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay
the costs.
The P50,000.00 award as actual damages should be deemed as indemnity for the untimely
demise of the victims. We have held that only expenses supported by receipts and which
appear to have been actually expended in connection with the death of the victims may be
allowed.40 No proof was presented to sustain the award of actual damages.
Similarly, we can not award damages for loss of earning capacity. All that was presented in
evidence was the testimony of the common law wife, Adelina Peñalosa, that Nelson earned
P1,000,000.00 a year. We have held that "for lost income due to death, there must be
unbiased proof of the deceased's average income. Self-serving, hence unreliable statement,
is not enough."41
Considering the attendance of aggravating circumstances, we sustain the award of exemplary
damages of P30,000.00, per victim, in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code.42
As regards moral damages, we affirm the P50,000.00 awarded to the heirs of Rickson
Peñalosa.43 His mother, Adelina Peñalosa, testified to the suffering caused by his death.44 We
also sustain the award of moral damages to the heirs of Nelson Peñalosa. His common law
wife testified to the mental anguish suffered by the family due to Nelson's death. 45 Under
Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendancts and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased. However, the common law wife is not entitled to share in the
award of moral damages.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 160, Pasig
City, and finds accused-appellants Antonio L. Sanchez and Artemio Averion guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder, and sentences each of them to suffer two (2)
penalties of reclusion perpetua, and each to pay jointly and severally the respective heirs of
victims Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa, as follows:
1) Indemnity for death - P50,000.00

2) Moral damages - 50,000.00

G.R. No. 128966 August 18, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
3) Exemplary damages - 30,000.00
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM, KENNETH FLORENDO and
ELMER CASTRO, accused,
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, appellant.
Total - PANGANIBAN, J.:
P130,000.00 When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when a conspirator? What is the distinction
========= between the two?
Statement of the Case
These are the main questions passed upon by the Court in resolving the present appeal,
With costs. which assails the March 12, 1997 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch
SO ORDERED. 57) in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31323, finding Appellant Edwin De Vera and Accused Roderick
Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.
In an Information dated June 11, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero charged
with murder Appellant Edwin De Vera, together with Roderick Garcia and two other persons
who were subsequently identified during the trial as Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro. The
crime was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping . . . two (2) other persons, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation,
treachery and use of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the
use of a .22 cal. with trade mark "Paspar Armas" bearing SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of
caliber 22 ammo inside, hitting him between his eyes and striking him with the use of a
baseball bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon.2
On July 9, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico P. Bringas filed a Motion to Amend the
Information to include the use of a .32 caliber firearm in the killing of Frederick Capulong.
The trial court granted the Motion, and the Amended Information now reads as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping . . . two (2) other persons, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation,
treachery and use of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the
use of a .22 cal. with trade mark "Paspar Armas" bearing SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of
caliber 22 ammo inside and a .32 cal. firearm of still undetermined make, hitting him
between his eyes and striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the mouth, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Frederick Capulong y
Dizon.3
On their arraignment, Appellant Edwin De Vera4 and Roderick Garcia5 pleaded not guilty. The
other two accused were at large. Trial in due course proceeded only against De Vera and
Garcia. Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA
and RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER and they are hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, including
all its accessory penalties; to indemnify the heirs of Frederick Capulong y Dizon, as follows:
a) P50,000.00, as death indemnity;
b) P211,670.00, as compensatory damages;
c) P600,000.00, as indemnification for loss of earning capacity;
d) P500,000.00, as moral damages;
e) Interest at the legal rate on a) and b), hereof from the filing of the information until
full payment; and,
f) Costs of suit.16
Only Edwin De Vera filed a Notice of Appeal.7
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,8 the Office of the Solicitor General presented the following narration of facts:9
As earlier stated, the prosecution presented an eyewitness in the person of Bernardino
Cacao, a resident of Denver Loop Street, Filinvest II, Quezon City before he moved to No. 58
Elisa Street, Caloocan City. He was residing at Filinvest II, together with his wife and children,
at the time of the incident on June 28, 1992 in the house owned by David Lim. He was then
employed at a Kodak branch in Caloocan City, while his wife served as secretary of the
homeowners association.1âwphi1.nêt
About 1:30 in the afternoon of June 8, 1992, while bringing out the garbage, the witness saw
a car passing by, driven by victim Frederick Capulong together with four (4) other passengers.
He knew the victim by name who was a resident of the subdivision. He recognized and
identified two of the passengers as Kenneth Florendo and Roderick Garcia, both familiar in
the subdivision.
Cacao did not at first notice anything unusual inside the car while it passed by him, but then
he heard unintelligible voices coming from the car as it was cruising around Denver Loop
Street, a circular road whose entrance and exit were through the same point (ibid, p. 12). His
curiosity taking [the] better part of him, Cacao walked to the opposite side of the road from
where he saw the car already parked. Moments later, he saw the victim dragged out of the
car by Florendo and brought to a grassy place. Florendo was holding a gun (ibid, p. 13). Upon
reaching the grassy spot, Florendo aimed and fired the gun at the victim, hitting him between
the eyes, After the shooting, Florendo and his companions fled in different directions.
When he submitted a sworn statement to the investigating prosecutor, Cacao attached a
sketch of the crime scene prepared by police officers, indicating therein his relative position
at the time of the incident. While testifying in court, Cacao identified Garcia and pointed to
appellant as among the companions of Florendo.
Ten minutes later, or about 2:40 in the afternoon, the desk officer of the Investigation
Division, Station 5, Central Police District, Quezon City received a report about the shooting
incident from a security guard of the subdivision. The officer immediately dispatched a team
to Filinvest II, composed of PO2 Armando Garcia, PO3 Armando Junio, and PO3 Jovencio
Villacorte, to investigate and gather evidence (TSN, p. 5, September 13, 1993). A security
guard guided the team to the corner of Denver and Doña Justina Streets, site of the shooting,
where they discovered blood stains and damaged grass (ibid, p. 6). The guard informed them
that the victim was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center by other security guards. The
policemen then found a color red sports car with plate no. NBZ 869, with engine still running
and its doors opened. They recovered inside the car several class cards and a license
belonging to one Ric Capulong, who was later identified as Frederick Capulong.
The policemen went around the subdivision to look for possible suspects. They came upon a
person wearing muddled maong pants and white t-shirt "standing and walking around" near
the clubhouse of the subdivision. When asked his name, the person identified himself as
Edwin de Vera, herein appellant. Explaining the mud stains on his pants, appellant declared
that he was a victim of a hold-up. Suspicious [of] his conduct, the policemen brought
appellant to Station 5 and turned him over to the desk officer for investigation.
Another prosecution witness, SPO3 Mario Guspid, a police investigator since 1989, was
assigned to investigate the shooting of Frederick Capulong. He was assisted by SPO4 Pablito
Selvido, SPO2 Armando Rivera, SPO3 Jovencio Villacorte, SPO3 Rolando Gacute, SPO3 Danilo
Castro and other police officers.
Upon receiving his assignment, SPO3 Guspid immediately went to the East Avenue Medical
Center where he saw the victim lying inside the intensive care unit receiving medical
treatment. The victim was unconscious. After conferring with the victim's parents and
relatives, SPO3 Guspid returned to Station 5. On his arrival, the desk officer referred
appellant to him for questioning. He was told that appellant was picked up near the crime
scene acting suspiciously. When appellant was asked about his participation in the shooting,
he was reluctant at first to talk, but later relented after SPO3 Guspid told him that his
conscience would bother him less if he would tell the truth.
Without any hesitation, appellant admitted being [with the] group which perpetrated the
crime, and implicated Roderick Garcia. He was then persuaded to accompany a group of
policemen to the residence of Garcia, which turned out to be at Doña Justina Street, Filinvest
II Subdivision. Finding Garcia at home, SPO3 Guspid informed him that he was implicated by
appellant [in] the crime. He was then invited to the station to shed light [on] the incident.
Garcia consented.
At Station 5, SPO3 Guspid interviewed appellant and Garcia. In the course of the interview,
Garcia revealed the place where he hid a .22 caliber gun, black t-shirt and black cap.
According to Garcia, Florendo asked them to wear black t-shirts. With the revelation, SPO3
Guspid, SPO2 Rivera, SPO3 Gacute and SPO3 Castro, together with the suspects, went back
to the subdivision and proceeded to a grassy portion near the boundary of Filinvest II and San
Mateo, Rizal. The place was near a creek and about 50 meters away from the residence of
Garcia (TSN, pp. 9-14, September 30, 1993). Truly, the policemen recovered a .22 caliber
revolver, black t-shirt and black cap (TSN, pp. 12-13, August 24, 1993).While there, SPO3
Guspid and SPO2 Rivera prepared a sketch of the crime scene to reflect the explanations and
answers given by appellant and Garcia in response to their questions. As identifying marks,
SPO3 Gacute placed his initials "OG" (acronym for his first name and family name) between
the handle and cylinder of the gun, and on the neck of the t-shirt, as well as in the inner lining
of the black cap.
From the crime site, the policemen and the suspects returned to Station 5 where SPO3
Guspid asked them if they were willing to give their written statements, to which they
assented. Consequently, they were brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon
City Chapter, at Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City. They were then introduced to Atty.
Confesor Sansano, the [c]hairman of the Free Legal Aid of the IBP. Also, present at that time
were appellant's relatives, including his mother and sisters, and other lawyers of the IBP.
SPO3 Guspid inquired from them if they would agree to be assisted by Atty. Sansano, "a
competent lawyer." They replied in the affirmative. Thereafter, the two conferred with Atty.
Sansano.
Atty. Sansano, a rebuttal witness of the prosecution, testified that upon arrival of the
suspects [i]n his office, he requested the policemen, as a matter of policy, to step outside the
building in order to assure that no pressure would be exerted on the suspects even by their
mere presence (TSN, p. 6, November 6, 1996). After they left, Atty. Sansano interviewed the
suspects for about twenty minutes, informing them of their rights under the constitution and
inquiring from them if they indeed wanted to give voluntary statements. To the query, the
suspects answered positively. They also affirmed their earlier declaration that they were
willing to be assisted by the IBP (ibid, pp. 8-9). He further advised them of their right during
the investigation to answer or not to answer the questions which they thought would
incriminate them, but they retorted that they fully understood their right.
Satisfied that they were not coerced or threatened to give their statements, Atty. Sansano
requested the suspects to show their upper bodies to enable him to determine any telltale
signs of torture or bodily harm. Finding no such signs, he then summoned the policemen to
re-enter the building. The investigators readied two typewriters and each suspect was
assigned to an investigator. He served as the lawyer of the suspects, cautioning them against
answering questions that they did not understand, and to seek . . . a clarification, if needed.
According to Atty. Sansano, the interrogation took place in his office, a single separate room
from where his five staff members were visible. He sat between the two tables used by the
investigators for typing the questions and answers, involving himself from beginning to end
of the investigation until the signing of the statements. He never left the office to attend to
anything else, consistent with [the] standing policy of the IBP to properly safeguard the rights
of suspects during investigation.
He recalled that the investigators first typed the headings of the statements, then informed
the suspects before starting the investigation about their rights under the constitution,
specifically, the right of the suspects to have a lawyer of their own choice; if not, the police
would provide them with one who would assist them; that they could answer or refuse to
answer the questions. The investigators also asked him if he was willing to serve as counsel
of the suspects. They also asked the suspects if they were willing to accept him as their
counsel. They agreed expressly by saying: "Oho."
SPO3 Guspid investigated Garcia while SPO4 Selvido investigated appellant. They conducted
the question and answer investigation in Pilipino. The statement of appellant was marked as
Exhibit O and that of Garcia was marked as Exhibit N. The statements were signed by the
suspects and Atty. Sansano.
For his part, SPO4 Selvido declared that SPO3 Guspid requested his help in taking the
statements of the suspects (TSN, p. 4, June 29, 1993). He took the statement of appellant in
the presence of Atty. Sansano. Before proceeding, he reminded appellant of the
constitutional warnings, consisting of four (4) questions under the heading "Paunawa," to
which the latter gave positive answers. The statement was signed by appellant and Atty.
Sansano. After taking down the statement, he turned over appellant to SPO3 Guspid.
Following the investigation, the policemen brought the suspects to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory for paraffin testing. The result: "both hands of Edwin de Vera y
Garcia @ Boy/Bong gave positive results [in] the test for gunpowder nitrates while both
hands of Roderick Garcia y Galamgam @ Deo gave negative result [in] the test for gunpowder
nitrates."
After coming from the crime laboratory, SPO3 Guspid contacted the mother of the victim to
get her own statement. Next, he obtained a death certificate and prepared a referral to the
Quezon City Prosecution Office which was signed by Senior Inspector Ernesto Collado, Chief
of the Station Investigation Division. During the inquest, the prosecutor asked the suspects
some clarificatory questions.
Surveillance and follow-up operations were conducted against Florendo and his other
companion, Elmer Castro. However, the two were never arrested and brought to trial.
Version of the Defense
Appellant claims that he had no part in the killing, and that it was Kenneth Florendo who had
shot the victim. He avers that he merely accompanied to Filinvest the other accused and
Florendo, who was his friend, upon the latter's request. A few hours after the shooting
incident, appellant was picked up by the police, who subsequently tortured and coerced him
into signing his Statement regarding the incident. The trial court summarized appellant's
evidence in this wise:10
Edwin de Vera admitted that, as of June 8, 1992, he and Kenneth Florendo were already
close friends for about a year, sometimes sleeping in the latter's house at No. 106 Kamias
Road, Quezon City. His own residence at the time was at No. 7 Bignay Street, Project 2,
Quezon City. That was also the address of Elmer Castro, his and Kenneth's friend.
Edwin had slept in Kenneth's house on Kamias Road from June 6 to June 8, 1992 and went
home at 7:00 am of June 8th Later at around 10:30 am, Kenneth passed by Edwin's house to
invite him back to [the former's] house that morning and to bring Elmer along. Kenneth
mentioned that he, his girlfriend, and Deo, who were then with him, would be going
somewhere first. Deo, or Roderick Garcia, was another friend of Kenneth's.
Edwin and Elmer later went to and arrived at Kenneth's house at 11:00 am. Kenneth, his
girlfriend, and Deo were already taking lunch, and invited the two to lunch. After lunch,
Kenneth asked Edwin to go with him to Filinvest without telling why. It was Deo who
mentioned to Edwin that Kenneth was going to see a friend. Edwin was not aware if Kenneth
had also asked the others to go with him to Filinvest, but the four of them — Kenneth, Edwin,
Elmer, and Deo — later proceeded to Filinvest [i]n Kenneth's car. Edwin sat at the back seat.
The time was past 12:00 noon.
Kenneth drove his car. Upon reaching Filinvest, Kenneth stopped at a house and the four of
them alighted in front of the house. Edwin did not know whose house it was. Kenneth and
Elmer told Edwin and Deo to wait near the car because they were going to see a friend. At
that point in time, Edwin knew the person[,] whom Kenneth and Elmer went to see[,] by
name, never having met him personally before then. From his conversation with Deo, Edwin
found out that the house was where Deo stayed.
Then, Edwin heard the voices of Kenneth and his friend and they appeared to be arguing (". .
. . parang nagtatalo sila") The voices came from some twenty-two (22) meters away. Not
before long, Edwin also heard a gunshot which came from where Kenneth and Elmer had
gone to. He was shocked because he was not used to hearing gunfire. Frightened, he
panicked and ran away from the place. His singular thought while running was to get out of
Filinvest. Deo also ran away.
Edwin denied that either he or Deo carried any firearm on that occasion.
Edwin was arrested by the police at past 2:00 p.m. when he was already outside of Filinvest
subdivision in front of Batasan. He was brought to Station 5 where four (4) persons in civilian
attire tortured him by forcing him to lie down on a bench, tying his feet together and binding
his hands from his back with handcuffs, and then covering his face with a piece of dirty cloth
into which water was poured little by little into his face and mouth, while one of them sat on
his thighs. This maltreatment lasted for about 20 or 25 minutes, because they wanted him to
admit "something" and to name "my companions" but he refused to admit or to name
anyone. They next took him outside to a mango tree where they repeated his ordeal for 30
minutes. At one point during the torture, a policeman untied his feet and hands and poked a
gun to his temple, telling him to run as it was his chance to escape, but he did not escape
because he could see that they were merely frightening him.
None of the policemen told him that he could . . . get a lawyer[;] instead, one of them, whose
name he [did] not know, told him that "I should listen only to them and not to anyone else."
He claimed that he saw one [of] his tormentors in court, and he identified him as police
officer Rivera. Guspid did not participate in his torture, because he merely took down his
statement. His tormentors were not drunk or under the influence of drugs, but Guspid
seemed to be under the influence of drugs when he took his statement because of his
troubled appearance.
Edwin was not advised to inform or call any of his relatives. Before his torture, his request to
contact his relatives or lawyer was turned down. His intimidation continued (". . . . puro
pananakot and ginawa nila sa akin"). After his torture at the mango tree, he was returned
inside and thrown into a cell, where he remained until the following day (June 9th). During
the night, an inmate named Cesar boxed him once in the upper body upon instruction of a
policeman. He was not given any dinner.
At around noontime of the next day (June 9th), Edwin was taken out of the cell and brought
to the IBP office by police officers Guspid and Selvido. Also with them were Deo Garcia and
two other police officers. At the IBP office, the officers talked with one of the lawyers there,
whom Edwin came to know to be Atty. Sansano only after the lawyer was introduced
("present") to him and Deo. That was the first he met and saw Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano informed both Edwin and Deo that they had the choice whether to talk or not.
Edwin could not make any comment because "wala po ako sa sarili ko". Then, Atty. Sansano
warned Edwin substantially that: "Alam n'yo ba na ang salaysay na ito ay maaring hindi ninyo
sumpaan," referring to the statement taken from Edwin by officers Guspid at around past 8
p.m. until 9 p.m. on the day before (June 8, 1992) at the police station. He was not assisted
by counsel, and had no relatives present. Guspid appeared to be "like drunk or tipsy," when
he took down Edwin's statement that night."
At the IBP office, Edwin's and Deo's statement were taken separately by Guspid and Selvido,
respectively. At the time, Edwin and Deo were about six (6) meters from each other, but he
could hear what was being asked of Deo. Guspid asked the questions and typed both the
questions and his answers, which were given in Tagalog. All the while, Atty. Sansano was
inside his office, which was about seven (7) meters away from where he and Guspid were
situated. The office of Atty. Sansano was separated by a divider, so that he could not see
what Atty. Sansano was doing at the time. After the questioning, he signed a paper which he
was not able to read. He did not see Atty. Sansano sign the paper.
xxx xxx xxx
On July 14, 1992, Edwin executed a so-called salaysay ng pagbabawi ng sinumpaang salaysay,
which he swore to before Prosecutor Tobia of Quezon City, for the purpose of recanting his
statements given at the precinct in the evening of June 8, 1992 and at the IBP office on June
9, 1992 on the ground that they were given under coercion, intimidation, and in violation of
his constitutional rights.
Ruling of the Trial Court
Based on the testimony of Eyewitness Bernardino Cacao, the trial court ruled that it was
indeed Kenneth Florendo who had actually shot the victim, Roderick Capulong. It convicted
appellant as a principal, however, because "the scientific and forensic findings on the
criminal incident directly and substantially confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the
four [accused], namely, Kenneth Florendo, Elmer Castro, Edwin de Vera, and Roderick
Garcia.11
The Issues
Appellant submits for the consideration of this Court the following alleged errors:
I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PROSECUTION EYE-WITNESS BERNARDO
CACAO HAD TESTIFIED TO NO CRIMINAL ACT OF APPELLANT;
II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A CONSPIRACY TO
KILL THE VICTIM AND THAT APPELLANT WAS A CO-CONSPIRATOR;
III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT "O", ALLEGED STATEMENT OF APPELLANT;
AND IN NOT DECLARING THE SAME AS AN INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE CONSIDERING THE
BARBARIC MANNER UNDER WHICH IT WAS EXTRACTED/OBTAINED FROM THE APPELLANT
WHICH VIOLATED THE LATTER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS
NOT PROVED THE APPELLANT'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE APPELLANT.12
In the main, the Court will resolve three questions: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, (2) the admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial statement, and (3) the nature of his
liability.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only as an accomplice, not as
a principal.
First and Third Issues:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence and Appellant's Liability
Because the first and the third questions mentioned above are interrelated, they shall be
discussed jointly.
Eyewitness Account
In ruling that there was conspiracy between Florendo, Castro, Garcia and Appellant De Vera,
the trial court relied mainly on the testimony of Eyewitness Cacao. Specifically, it based its
conclusions on the following facts: appellant was seen with the other accused inside the
victim's car; the victim was clearly struck with a blunt object while inside the car, and it was
unlikely for Florendo to have done it all by himself; moreover, it was impossible for De Vera
and Garcia to have been unaware of Florendo's dark design on Roderick.
We disagree. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt.13 In the present case, the bare testimony of Cacao fails to do so.
Cacao testified that he saw Appellant De Vera in the car, where an altercation later occurred.
Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong and
shoot the victim in the head moments later.
Cacao's testimony contains nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from the fact that
he was inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to
conspiracy.14 Indeed, the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions,
and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit murder. Such
suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court has repeatedly
stated, criminal conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures.
Clearly, Cacao's testimony does not establish appellant's culpability.
Appellant's Extrajudicial
Statement
Aside from the testimony of Cacao, the prosecution also presented Appellant De Vera's
extrajudicial statement, which established three points.
First, appellant knew of Kenneth Florendo's malevolent intention.
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at
pumayag kang maging kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay
nagkahiyaan na lamang at napilitan akong sumama.15
Second, appellant's companions were armed that day, a fact which revealed the
unmistakable plan of the group.
T: Ikaw ba ay mayroong dalang armas noong hapon na iyo[n]?
S: Wala po akong dalang armas. Pero itong si Kenneth ay mayroong dalang dalawang
baril[,] sina Deo at Elmer ay wala. Pero noong naroroon na kami sa lugar ay ibinigay ni
Kenneth ang isang baril niya kay Deo at itong si Elmer ay mayroong nang dalang baseball bat.
Third, he cooperated with the other accused in the commission of the crime by placing
himself at a certain distance from Kenneth and the victim in order to act as a lookout. This is
clear from the following portion of his statement:
S: Kabarkada ko po si Kenneth at dalawang araw po akong nakitulog sa kanila at
noong araw ng June 08, 1992 ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth Gumabao na huwag raw akong
uuwi, dahil [mayroon] daw po kaming lakad. Pagkaraan ng ilang oras ay dumating naman
itong si Roderick Garcia @ Deo at may sinabi sa kanya itong si Kenneth at sinabi naman ito sa
akin ni Deo na kaysa raw maunahan siya ni Frederick Sumulong [sic] ay uunahan na raw po
niya ito. Umalis po itong si Kenneth na kasama ang kanyang nobya at itong si Deo, para ihatid
ang kanyang [sic] sa hospital at bago sila umalis ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth na sunduin ko
raw itong si Elmer Castro at magbhihai [magbihis] na rin daw ako at pagdating nila ay . . .
lalakad na raw po kami. Mga ilang oras pa ay sinundo ko na itong si Elmer Castro at pagdating
namin sa bahay nila Kenneth ay naroroon na itong si Kenneth at Deo. Matapos magpalit ng
damit itong si Kenneth ay sumakay na kami sa kanilang kotse at nagtuloy sa kanilang katabing
bahay at doon ay kumain kami. Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na kami at nagtuloy sa F[i]l-
Invest. P[a]gdating namin sa isang lugar doon sa medyo malayo-layo sa bahay nila Deo ay
bumaba na itong si Deo at Elmer at sila ay nagpunta doon sa lugar ng pinagbarilan para kunin
ang bayad sa utang ni Fred[er]ick Capulong sa tiyuhin ni Deo P[a]gkaraan ng ilang minuto ay
sumunod po kami ni Kenn[e]th sa lugar at ako ay naiwan nang medyo malayo-layo sa lugar
upang tingnan kung mayroong darating na tao. Samantalang si Kenneth ay lumapit kina Deo
at Frederick at kasunod noon ay nagkaroon ng sagutan itong si Kenneth at Frederick at nakita
kong inaawat ni Deo itong si Kenneth. Hindi nakapagpigil itong si Kenneth at nasipa niya s[i]
Frederick at kasunod noon ay binunot niya ang kanyang baril na kalibre .38 at pinaputukan
niya ng isang beses itong si Frederick na noong tamaan ay natumba sa lupa. Lumapit si Elmer
kina Kenneth habang binabatak ni Kenneth itong si Frederick at kasunod po noon ay lumapit
sa akin si Deo at sinabihan ako na tumakbo na kami. Tumakbo na po kami, pero ako po ay
nahuli ng mga security guard ng Subdivision at itong si Deo ay nahuli naman sa kanilang
bahay. Itong sina Kenneth at Elmer ay hindi pa nahuhuli.16
Appellant an Accomplice,
Not a Conspirator
In other words, appellant's presence was not innocuous. Knowing that Florendo intended to
kill the victim and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a
lookout to watch for passersby. He was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus
criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime. These facts, however, did not
make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice.
The Revised penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when "two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."17 To prove
conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three requisites: "(1) that two or
more persons came to an agreement, (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a
crime, and (3) that the execution of the felony [was] decided upon."18 Except in the case of
the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that the accused performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy.19 The Court has held that in most instances, direct proof of a
previous agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts
of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest. 20
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not
being included in Article 17,21 cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts."22 The Court has held that an accomplice is "one who knows the criminal
design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which,
even if not rendered, the crime would be committed just the same."23 To hold a person liable
as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1) the "community" of criminal design;
that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with
the latter in his purpose;" and (2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are
not indispensable to the commission of the crime.24
The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its effect on
appellant's penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not individual.
The act of one of them is deemed the act of all. 25 In the case of an accomplice, the liability is
one degree lower than that of a principal.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the
criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves
have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the
principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its
execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a
crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
Thus, in People v. Castro,26 the Court convicted Rufino Cinco, together with two others, as a
principal, although he had acted merely as a lookout. The Court held that "their concerted
action in going armed and together to their victim's house, and there, while one stayed as a
lookout, the other two entered and shot the mayor and his wife, leaving again together
afterwards, admits no other rational explanation but conspiracy." It may be noted further
that Cinco executed a Sworn Statement that the three of them, together with some others,
had planned to kill the victim on the promise of a P5,000 reward.
In People v. Tawat et al.,27 the lookout, Nestor Rojo, was convicted as a principal for
conspiring with two others. The Court ruled that the conspiracy was shown by their conduct
before, during and after the commission of the crime. The Court also noted that, upon their
arrest, they disclosed that they had intended to rob the victim's store and that they did so in
accordance with their plan. In that case, it was clear that all three of them, including the
lookout, were the authors of the crime.
In People v. Loreno,28 the Supreme Court convicted all the accused as principals because they
had acted in band. In acting as a lookout, Jimmy Marantal was armed at the time like the
other conspirators, and he gave his companions effective means and encouragement to
commit the crime of robbery and rape.
Upon the other hand in People v. Corbes,29 the Court noted that Manuel Vergel knew of the
criminal design to commit a robbery, and that he cooperated with the robbers by driving the
vehicle to and from the crime scene. In convicting him as an accomplice and not as a
conspirator, the Court observed that he was merely approached by one of the robbers who
was tasked to look for a getaway vehicle. He was not with the robbers when they resolved to
commit a robbery. When his services were requested the decision to commit the crime had
already been made.
In People v. Tatlonghari,30 the Court was asked to resolve the responsibility of some
appellants who "knowingly aid[ed] the actual killers by casting stones at the victim, and
distracting his attention." The Court ruled that they were accomplices and not co-
conspirators, "[i]n the absence of clear proof that the killing was in fact envisaged by them."
In People v. Suarez et al.,31 Wilfredo Lara merely introduced the gang of Reyes to Suarez who
intended to perpetrate the crime with the help of the said group. In ruling that he was
merely an accomplice, the Court noted that there was no evidence showing that he "took
part in the planning or execution of the crime, or any proof indicating that he profited from
the fruits of the crime, or of acts indicative of confederacy on his part."
In People v. Balili,32 the Court convicted appellant as an accomplice, holding that "in going
with them, knowing their criminal intention, and in staying outside of the house with them
while the others went inside the store to rob and kill, [he] effectively supplied the criminals
with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accompliance." The Court noted that
there was no evidence that he "had conspired with the malefactors, nor that he actually
participated in the commission of the crime."
In People v. Doble,33 the Court held that Cresencio Doble did not become a conspirator when
he looked for a banca that was eventually used by the robbers. Ruled the Court: "Neither
would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Crescencio into his band of malefactors that
would commit the robbery more than Just asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had
enough men, all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the commission of which
needed planning and men to execute the plan with full mutual confidence of each other,
which [was] not shown with respect to appellants by the way they were asked to look and
provide for a banca just a few hours before the actual robbery."
In the present case, Appellant De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill
Capulong at the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not participate in
the decision to kill Capulong; that decision was made by Florendo and the others. He joined
them that afternoon after the decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was there
because "nagkahiyaan na." This is clear from his statement, which we quote again for the
sake of clarity:
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at
pumayag kang maging kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay
nagkahiyaan na lamang at napilitan akong sumama.34
Significantly, the plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It should be noted
further that he alone was unarmed that afternoon. Florendo and Garcia had guns, and Castro
had a baseball bat.
In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was part of the
conspiracy to kill the victim. His participation, as culled from his own Statement, was made.
after the decision to kill was already a fait accompli. Thus, in several cases, the Court has
held:
[L]ack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates the doubt whether they had acted as
principals or accomplices in the perpetration of the offense, impels this Court to resolve in
their favor the question, by holding . . . that they were guilty of the "milder form of
responsibility," i.e., guilty as mere accomplices.35
Second Issue:
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statement
Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution, provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
If the confession meets these requirements, "it is subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e.,
if it was given freely — without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and
credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind." 36
Appellant claims that his extrajudicial statement was inadmissible, because it was not made
in the presence of counsel. Although Atty. Confesor Sansano of the Quezon City IBP Legal Aid
Committee purportedly assisted him and his co-accused in the execution of their extrajudicial
Statements, appellant asserts that the lawyer was in his office, not with them, at the time.
Appellant adds that he was tortured.
Appellant's claims must be rejected. Atty. Sansano testified that he did not leave them at any
time.
Q: You were involved in the interrogation from the very start?
A: Yes, from the beginning to the end of the interview until the boys signed their
statements.
Q: Did you recall having at any time left your office to attend to some official matters?
A: I never left the office to attend to anything.
Q: Is that the usual manner by which you assist persons referred to you by the police
insofar as custodial investigation is concerned?
A: It is our policy that when we assist [in] that capacity, we [want] to see to it that the
rights of the accused or suspects are properly [protected] during the course of the entire
interrogation.37
In fact, Atty. Sansano even checked to see if there were torture marks on Appellant De Vera,
and Garcia and interviewed the two to make sure that they understood what they were
doing.
Q: What was your purpose in asking the police officers to leave the room?
A: My purpose in asking the police officers to step out of the building was to assure
myself that no pressure could be exerted on the two boys by the presence of the police
officers during my personal interview. Before we allow any police officers to take the
statements of people brought before us[,] we see to it [that] we interview the persons
personally out of hearing and sight of any police officer.
Q: After the police officers left the room, completely left the room[,] you were able to
interview the two accused namely Mr. de Vera and Mr. Garcia?
A: Yes, I spent about 15 to 20 minutes interviewing the boys.
Q: What was the nature of your initial interview with these two accused?
A: I asked the boys Roderick and Edwin if it [was] true that they [were] going to give
their own statements to the police?
Q: And what did they say?
A: They said yes, sir.
Q: What was your reaction to that?
A: Routinely[,] I informed them about their rights under the constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Having obtained their answers, what next transpired?
A: After telling them the statements they may give to the police could be used against
them for a [sic] in any court of the Phil., I was satisfied that nobody coerced them, that they
were never threatened by anybody much less by the police officers to give these statements.
Casually I asked the two boys to raise their upper clothes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was your purpose in requiring these persons to show you or remove their
upper clothing?
A: I wanted to assure myself that there were no telltale signs of torture or bodily harm
committed on the[m] prior to their [being brought] to the office. In spite of their [personal]
assurances . . . , verbal assurance that they were never hurt.38
The right to counsel is enshrined in the Constitution in order to address, among others, the
use of duress and undue influence in the execution of extrajudicial confessions. 39 In the
present case, the Court is satisfied that Atty. Sansano sufficiently fulfilled the objective of this
constitutional mandate. Moreover, appellant's allegations of torture must be disregarded for
being unsubstantiated. To hold otherwise is to statements at the mere facilitate the
retraction of solemnly made statements of the mere allegation of torture, without any proof
whatsoever.
When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes
evidence of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind
would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and
conscience.40 The defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force,
duress or promise of reward.41 Appellant failed to overcome the overwhelming prosecution
evidence to the contrary.
Sec. 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that "[a]n extrajudicial confession made by an
accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of
corpus delicti." In the present case, the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the
two elements of corpus delicti: (a) a certain result has been proven — for example, a man has
died; and (b) some person is criminally responsible. 42 It is indubitable that a crime has been
committed, and that the other pieces of prosecution evidence clearly show that appellant
had conspired with the other accused to commit the crime. He himself does not deny that he
was at the crime scene. In fact, he was seen by the prosecution eyewitness in the company of
the gunman. Furthermore, Atty. Sansano and the police officers testified to the voluntariness
of his confession. It must be stressed that the aforementioned rule merely requires that
there should be some other evidence "tending to show the commission of the crime apart
from the confession."43
Criminal and Civil Liability
In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the killing was
attended by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these
was enough to qualify the crime as murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating
circumstances. The lower court explained that the evidence established evident
premeditation, for Florendo's group acted with deliberate forethought and tenacious
persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design. Treachery was also proven,
because the attack was planned and performed in such a way as to guarantee the execution
of the criminal design without risk to the group. There was also abuse of superior strength,
because the attackers took advantage of their superiority in numbers and weapons.
We disagree with the court a quo in appreciating two generic aggravating circumstances,
because treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength.44 Hence, there is only one generic
aggravating circumstance, not two. Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating
circumstance, we cannot impose the death penalty, because the crime was committed
before the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law.
In the present case, the penalty of appellant as an accomplice is one degree lower than that
of a principal, which in murder cases is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
He is also entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
We sustain the trial court's grant of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, which may be awarded
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The award of P211,670 as
compensatory damages was duly supported by evidence. Based on the evidence presented,
moral damages is also warranted, but only in the amount of P50,000, not P500,000 as fixed
by the trial court. Furthermore, we affirm the payment of interest.45 However, the grant of
P600,000 for loss of earning capacity lacks factual basis. Such indemnification partakes of the
nature of actual damages, which must be duly proven. 46 In this case, the trial court merely
presumed the amount of Capulong's earnings. Since the prosecution did not present
evidence of the current income of the deceased, the indemnity for lost earnings must be
rejected.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby partially GRANTED. Appellant De Vera is CONVICTED as an
accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder. He is sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of 8 years and 1 day ofprision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. We AFFIRM the awards of: (a) P50,000 indemnity ex
delicto, (b) P211,670 as compensatory damages and (c) interest of six percentper annum on
these two amounts. The award of moral damages is however REDUCED to P50,000 and the
award for the loss of earning capacity is DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989
LITO VINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the resolution of this
Court dated January 18, 1989 denying the herein petition is whether or not a finding of guilt
as an accessory to murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the alleged principal in a
separate proceeding.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house at
Burgos Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch
television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was resting, he heard
two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been
shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights of their house. Aside
from Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They went
down to meet Roberto who was crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The
neighbor responded by turning on their lights and the street lights and coming down from
their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar
riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle while Salazar was
carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar
pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.
Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta
took his ante-mortemstatement. In the said statement which the victim signed with his own
blood, Jessie Salazar was Identified as his assailant.
The autopsy report of his body shows the following-
Gunshot wound
POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal
1 & 2 cm. diameter left
Slug found sub cutaneously,
2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Tension Hemathorax 1
Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt.
Ernesto N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March
22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's
Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the case against Vino was
given due course by the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was
indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed an information charging Vino of the crime of
murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with
the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own
behalf, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence to which the
prosecutor filed an answer. On January 21, 1986, 2 a decision was rendered by the trial court
finding Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on him the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 Years and 2 months of prision correccional as
minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the sum of P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and to pay
the costs.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having been denied, he interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals. In due course, a Decision was rendered affirming the
judgment of the lower court. 3
Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following grounds are invoked:
1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS BEING
CHARGED SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE
CRIME PROVED IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.
2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL" TO BE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN
LAW TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE OF THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST BE ACTUAL;
3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PRINCIPAL
VIOLATES PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS. 4
During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case against Salazar in the
JAGO was remanded to the civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He was
later charged with murder in the same Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal
Case No. 2027-A. In a supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988, petitioner informed
this Court that Jessie Salazar was acquitted by the trial court in a decision that was rendered
on August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The comment was submitted by
the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the Court resolved to
deny the petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent court had
committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment. Hence, the present motion for
reconsideration to which the respondents were again required to comment. The required
comment having been submitted, the motion is now due for resolution.
The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the information as
a principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an accessory? The
answer is in the affirmative.
Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under Article
16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible for the
commission of the same offense are the accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt
that the crime of murder had been committed and that the evidence tended to show that
Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner was present during its commission or
must have known its commission is the only logical conclusion considering that immediately
thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and they were
together when they left shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada,
attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his escape.
Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory.
This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved or
established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, in which case the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.
5 observation:
In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it appears that there was
a mistake in charging the proper offense, and the defendant cannot be convicted of the
offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, in which case the
defendant must not be discharged if there appears to be a good cause to detain him in
custody, so that he can be charged and made to answer for the proper offense. 6
In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission
of the said crime was established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the offense
committed. The variance is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the
petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence
adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater
responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an
accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal.
At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an accessory right then
and there. The degree of responsibility of petitioner was apparent from the evidence. At any
rate, this lapse did not violate the substantial rights of petitioner.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can proceed
without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal. The answer is also in
the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory
are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can
proceed independently of that of the principal.
The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted can
the conviction of the petitioner as an accessory be maintained?
In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled
that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of
minority or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless be
convicted if the crime was in fact established.
Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson case that
the acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it
was shown that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident.
Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the accessory.
In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the
petitioner as an accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt that the
commission of the same offense had been proven in the separate case against Salazar who
was charged as principal. However, he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by
the same judge who convicted Vino as an accessory. The trial court held that the identity of
the assailant was not clearly established. It observed that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar
carrying a rifle while riding on the bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated,
and that two other witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian who were listed in the
information, who can corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not presented by the
prosecution.
The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim pinpointing
Salazar as his assailant on the ground that it was not shown the victim revealed the identity
of Salazar to his father and brother who came to his aid immediately after the shooting. The
court a quo also deplored the failure of the prosecution and law enforcement agencies to
subject to ballistic examinations the bullet slug recovered from the body of the victim and
the two empty armalite bullet empty shells recovered at the crime scene and to compare it
with samples taken from the service rifle of Salazar. Thus, the trial court made the following
There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to the ineptitude of the law
enforcement agencies to gather material and important evidence and the seeming lack of
concern of the public prosecutor to direct the production of such evidence for the successful
prosecution of the case. 9
Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of the
prosecution to adduce the quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction as he was
not positively identified as the person who was seen holding a rifle escaping aboard the
bicycle of Vino.
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an
unidentified person as passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime
immediately after the commission of the crime of murder. The commission of the crime and
the participation of the principal or assailant, although not identified, was established. In
such case, the Court holds that the accessory can be prosecuted and held liable
independently of the assailant.
We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped before he could be
tried and sentenced. Should the accessory be acquitted thereby even if the commission of
the offense and the responsibility of the accused as an accessory was duly proven? The
answer is no, he should be held criminally liable as an accessory.
Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was
Salazar, as two witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the
separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court
was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the man with the gun riding on the
bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against Vino, wherein he did not even adduce
evidence in his defense, his liability as such an accessory was established beyond reasonable
doubt in that he assisted in the escape of the assailant from the scene of the crime. The
identity of the assailant is of no material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of
the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the responsibility of Vino as an
accessory is indubitable.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and this denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111426 July 11, 1994
NORMA DIZON-PAMINTUAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The chief issue presented for our determination in this petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is the correctness of the decision of 29 March 1993 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 110241 which affirmed the decision of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila in Criminal Case No. 88-649542 finding the petitioner guilty of the violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612) but set aside the penalty imposed and ordered the trial
court to receive additional evidence on the "correct valuation" of the pieces of jewelry
involved for the sole purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed.
The information in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 charged the petitioner with the violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law in that
on or about and during the period from February 12, to February 24, 1988, inclusive, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent of gain for herself or for another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly buy and keep in her possession and/or sell
or dispose of the following jewelries, to wit: one (1) set of earrings, a ring studded with
diamonds in a triangular style, one (1) set of earrings (diamond studded) and one (1)
diamond-studded crucifix, or all valued at P105,000.00, which she knew or should have
known to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery committed by
Joselito Sacdalan Salinas against the owner Teodoro and Luzviminda Encarnacion.3
On the basis of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Teodoro Encarnacion (one of the
offended parties), Cpl. Ignacio Jao, Jr., and Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez, both of the Western
Police District, the trial court promulgated on 16 November 1990 its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilty of the accused for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1612 beyond reasonable doubt, the accused Norma Dizon-
Pamintuan is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of prision mayor to NINETEEN (19) YEARS of reclusion temporal.
No civil liability in view of the recovery of the items, subject-matter of this case.
With costs.4
The evidence of the prosecution is summarized by the trial court as follows:
Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, Department of Public Works and Highways testified
that he has just arrived at his residence located at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque at
around 9:45 p.m. of February 12, 1988 coming from the Airport and immediately proceeded
inside the house, leaving behind his driver and two housemaids outside to pick-up his
personal belongings from his case. It was at this point that five unidentified masked armed
persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns
to his driver and two helpers and dragged them inside his house. That the men pointed a gun
at him and was made to lie face down on the floor. The other occupants, namely his wife, the
maids and his driver were likewise made to lie on the floor. Thereafter, the robbers
ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other personal properties including cash.
After the intruders left the house he reported the matter immediately to the police. He was
then interviewed by the Parañaque police and was informed that an operation group would
be assigned to the case.
He likewise reported the matter to the Western Police District on February 15, 1988. Two
days later, a group of WPD operatives came over to his house and he was asked to prepare a
list of items of jewelry and other valuables that were lost including a sketch of distinctive
items. He was later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by the
informer the police had dispatched. That an entrapment would be made with their
participation, on February 14, 1988. As such, they went to Camp Crame at around 9:00 a.m.
and arrived at the vicinity of 733 Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at about 10:00
a.m.; that he is with his wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of the
jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan; the pieces
were: 1 earring and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000 bought from estimator
Nancy Bacud (Exh. "C-2"), 1 set of earring diamond worth P15,000 (Exh. "C-3") and 1 gold
chain with crucifix worth P3,000 (Exh. "C-4").
Corporal Ignacio Jao, Jr. of the WPD testified that he was with the spouses Teodoro
Encarnacion, Jr. in the morning of February 24, 1988 and they proceeded to Florentino Torres
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at the stall of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan together with Sgt. Perez.
After the spouses Encarnacion recognized the items subject matter of the robbery at the
display window of the stall being tended by the herein accused, they invited the latter to the
precinct and investigated the same. They likewise brought the said showcase to the WPD
station. He further testified that he has no prior knowledge of the stolen jewelries of the
private complainant from one store to another.
Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez of the WPD testified that he reported for duty on February 24, 1988;
that he was with the group who accompanied the spouses Encarnacion in Sta. Cruz, Manila
and was around when the couple saw some of the lost jewelries in the display stall of the
accused. He was likewise present during the early part of the investigation of the WPD
station.5
The recovery of the pieces of jewelry, on the basis of which the trial court ruled that no civil
liability should be adjudged against the petitioner, took place when, as testified to by
Teodoro Encarnacion, the petitioner "admitted that she got the items but she did not know
they were stolen [and that] she surrendered the items and gave them to [his] wife." 6
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as testified to by Rosito Dizon-Pamintuan, is
summarized by the trial court thus:
The defense presented only the testimony of Rosito Dizon-Pamintuan who testified that he is
the brother of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan and that sometime around 11:00 a.m. of February
24, 1985, he, together with the accused went infront of the Carinderia along Florentino
Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila waiting for a vacancy therein to eat lunch. Suddenly, three
persons arrived and he overheard that Cpl. Jao told her sister to get the jewelry from inside
the display window but her sister requested to wait for Fredo, the owner of the stall. But ten
minutes later when said Fredo did not show up, the police officer opened the display window
and got the contents of the same. The display stall was hauled to a passenger jeepney and
the same, together with the accused were taken to the police headquarters. He likewise
testified that he accompanied his sister to the station and after investigation was sent
home.7
In convicting the petitioner, the trial court made the following findings:
The prosecution was able to prove by evidence that the recovered items were part of the
loot and such recovered items belong to the spouses Encarnacion, the herein private
complainants. That such items were recovered by the Police Officers from the stall being
tended by the accused at that time. Of importance, is that the law provides a disputable
presumption of fencing under Section 5 thereof, to wit:
Mere possession of any goods, article, item object, or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
There is no doubt that the recovered items were found in the possession of the accused and
she was not able to rebut the presumption though the evidence for the defense alleged that
the stall is owned by one Fredo. A distinction should likewise be made between ownership
and possession in relation to the act of fencing. Moreover, as to the value of the jewelries
recovered, the prosecution was able to show that the same is Ninety Three Thousand Pesos
(P93,000.00).8
The petitioner then appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 11024)
where she raised two issues: (1) that the judgment was based on a mere presumption, and
(2) that the prosecution failed to show that the value of the jewelry recovered is P93,000.00.
In its challenged decision of 29 March 1993, the Court of Appeals disposed of the first issue in
this wise:
The guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. All the elements of
the crime of fencing in violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (P.D. No. 1612), to wit:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. A person, not a participant in said crime, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells; or in any manner deals in any article or item,
object or anything of value;
3. With personal knowledge, or should be known to said person that said item, object
or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
4. With intent to gain for himself or for another;
have been established by positive and convincing evidence of the prosecution . . .
...
The fact that a crime of robbery has been committed on February 12, 1988 is established by
the testimony of private complainant Teodoro T. Encarnacion who immediately reported the
same to Parañaque Police Station of the Southern Police District (TSN, Hearings of October 3,
1988, November 9, 1988 and January 11, 1989; Exh. A) and submitted a list and sketches of
the jewelries robbed, among other things, from their residence located at Better Living
Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila (Exh. C,
C-1 to C-4 and D).
The second element is likewise established by convincing evidence. On February 24, 1988,
accused-appellant was found selling the jewelries (Exhs. C-2, C-3 and C-4) which was
displayed in a showcase in a stall located at Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. [Testimonies
of Teodoro Encarnacion (id. supra); Cpl. Ignacio Jao (TSN, Hearing of February 13, 1989) and
Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez (TSN, Hearing of June 4, 1989)].
On the element of knowledge that the items are derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery and of intent to gain for herself or for another, the Anti-Fencing Law provides:
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. — Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or
anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing.
Knowledge and intent to gain are proven by the fact that these jewelries were found in
possession of appellant and they were displayed for sale in a showcase being tended by her
in a stall along Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.9
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that there was not enough evidence to
prove the value of the pieces of jewelry recovered, which is essential to the imposition of the
proper penalty under Section 3 of P.D.
No. 1612. It opined that the trial court erred in concluding that "the value of the recovered
jewelries is P93,000.00 based on the bare testimony of the private complainant and the self-
serving list he submitted (Exhs. C, C-2 and C-4, TSN, Hearing of October 3, 1993)."10
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not commit any reversible error, its decision
dated October 26, 1990 convincing accused appellant is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the penalty imposed is SET ASIDE and the Regional Trial Court (Branch 20)
of Manila is ordered to receive evidence with respect to the correct valuation of the
properties involved in this case, marked as Exhibits "C", "C-2" and "C-4" for the sole purpose
of determining the proper penalty to be meted out against accused under Section 3, P.D. No.
1612. Let the original records be remanded immediately.11
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner contends that:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE CAÑEBA, IN BLATANT DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE LAW AND
WELL-ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
 II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN REMANDING THE CASE TO
THE COURT A QUO FOR RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE
CORRECT PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED.12
On 23 February 1994, after the public respondents had filed their Comment and the
petitioner her Reply to the Comment, this Court gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
The first assigned error is without merit.
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any person
who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire,
conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory, as
the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an
accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the
Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Nothing,
however, the reports from law enforcement agencies that "there is rampant robbery and
thievery of government and private properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have
become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready
buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D.
No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the
crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft
could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However,
in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes aprincipal in the crime of
fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on
the other, are separate and distinct offenses. 13 The state may thus choose to prosecute him
either under the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter
would seem inevitable considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612
creates a presumption of fencing14 and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the
property.15
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly
established. A robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of the private
complainants who afterwards reported the incident to the Parañaque Police, the Western
Police District, the NBI, and the CIS, and submitted a list of the lost items and sketches of the
jewelry taken from them (Exhibits "C" and "D"). Three of these items stolen, viz., (a) a pair of
earrings and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000.00 (Exhibit "C-2"); (b) one set of
earrings worth P15,000.00 (Exhibit "C-3"); and (c) a chain with crucifix worth P3,000.00
(Exhibit "C-4"), were displayed for sale at a stall tended to by the petitioner in Florentino
Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles for sale clearly manifested
an intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.
The more crucial issue to be resolved is whether the prosecution proved the existence of the
third element: that the accused knew or should have known that the items recovered from
her were the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or
awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with
facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. 16 When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually
believes that it does not exist.17 On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact
that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such
fact exists.18 Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court
cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein,
it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given
two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the
one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence.19
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good,
article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery
shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have
knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery
or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise
from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the
fundamental law.20 In the early case of United States vs.
Luling, 21 this Court held:
It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional provision is
violated by a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact or facts shall
constitute prima facieevidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant
for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without
unlawful intention. (Commonwealth vs. Minor, 88 Ky., 422.)
In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what are known as common law
offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The state
having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations, has
a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of
showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or
intention.
In his book on constitutional law,22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz said:
Nevertheless, the constitutional presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary
presumptions based on the experience of human conduct [People vs. Labara, April 20, 1954].
Unexplained flight, for example, may lead to an inference of guilt, as 'the wicked flee when
no man pursueth, but the righteous is as bold as a lion. Failure on the part of the accused to
explain his possession of stolen property may give rise to the reasonable presumption that it
was he himself who had stolen it [U.S. vs. Espia, 16 Phil. 506]. Under our Revised Penal Code,
the inability of an accountable officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him will be
considered prima facie evidence that he has appropriated them to his personal use [Art.
217]. According to Cooley, the constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is
"some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the
inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be purely
arbitrary mandate" [1 Cooley, 639].
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on
the testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on
the contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of
jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo.23
Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that he was a licensed
dealer or supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 provides that "all stores,
establishments or entitles dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article, item, object or
anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before
offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the
station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store,
establishment or entity is located." Under the Rules and Regulations24 promulgated to carry
out the provisions of Section 6, an unlicensed dealer/supplier refers to any person,
partnership, firm, corporation, association or any other entity or establishment not licensed
by the government to engage in the business of dealing in or supplying "used secondhand
articles," which refers to any good, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the same has actually or in fact been
used.
We do not, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the actual value of the recovered articles.
As found by the trial court, the recovered articles had a total value of P93,000.00, broken
down as follows:
Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 1612 provides that the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon the accused if the value of the property involved is more than P12,000.00 but does not
exceed P22,000.00, and if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty of
prision mayor should be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00; the total penalty which may be imposed, however, shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory
penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed. The
maximum penalty that can be imposed in this case would then be eighteen (18) years and
five (5) months, which is within the range of reclusion temporal maximum. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence law which allows the imposition of an indeterminate penalty which,
with respect to offenses penalized by a special law, shall range from a minimum which shall
not be lower than the minimum prescribed by the special law to a maximum which should
not exceed the maximum provided therein, the petitioner can thus be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum, as minimum to eighteen (18) years and five (5) months of reclusion temporal
maximum as maximum, with the accessory penalties corresponding to the latter.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the penalty imposed
by the trial court and in remanding the case to the trial court for further reception of
evidence to determine the actual value of the pieces of jewelry recovered from the
petitioner and for the imposition of the appropriate penalty.
We do not agree with the petitioner's contention, though, that a remand for further
reception of evidence would place her in double jeopardy. There is double jeopardy when
the following requisites concur: (1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second,
(2) the first jeopardy must have validly been terminated, and (3) the second jeopardy must
be for the same offense as that in the first.29 Such a concurrence would not occur assuming
that the case was remanded to the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED by setting aside the challenged decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11024 insofar as it sets aside the penalty imposed
by Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 and orders
the remand of the case for the trial court to receive evidence with respect to the correct
value of the properties involved. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED subject
to the modification of the penalty which is hereby reduced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor maximum as minimum to
Eighteen (18) years and Five (5) months of Reclusion Temporal maximum as maximum, with
the accessory penalties of the latter.
SO ORDERED.
a) one earring and ring studded with diamonds (Exh. "C-2") — P75,000.00
b) one set of earring (Exh. "C-3") — P15,000.00
c) one gold chain with crucifix (Exh. "C-4") — P3,000.00
These findings are based on the testimony of Mr. Encarnacion 25 and on Exhibit "C,"26 a list of
the items which were taken by the robbers on 12 February 1988, together with the
corresponding valuation thereof. On cross-examination, Mr. Encarnacion re-affirmed his
testimony on direct examination that the value of the pieces of jewelry described in Exhibit
"C-2" is P75,000.0027 and that the value of the items described in Exhibit "C-3" is P15,000.00,
although he admitted that only one earring — and not the pair — was recovered. 28 The
cross-examination withheld any question on the gold chain with crucifix described in Exhibit
"C-4." In view, however, of the admission that only one earring was recovered of the jewelry
described in Exhibit "C-3," it would be reasonable to reduce the value from P15,000.00 to
P7,500.00. Accordingly, the total value of the pieces of jewelry displayed for sale by the
petitioner and established to be part of the proceeds of the robbery on 12 February 1988
would be P87,000.00.

G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,
ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65,
both of the Revised Rules of Court, by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially
prays for the issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 20131
and April 23, 20132 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division
and En bane, respectively, in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada" for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) a Petition-in-Intervention3 filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim),
wherein he prays to be declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila
in view of private respondent former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s (former President
Estrada) disqualification to run for and hold public office.
The Facts
The salient facts of the case are as follows:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No.
26558, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al." The dispositive
part of the graft court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No.
26558 finding the accused, Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of PLUNDER, defined in and penalized by Republic Act No.
7080, as amended. On the other hand, for failure of the prosecution to prove and establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and
Atty. Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and accordingly, the Court
hereby orders their ACQUITTAL.
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in accordance with
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the accused Former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under
detention shall be credited to him in full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide
by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, the Court hereby declares the forfeiture in favor of the government of the
following:
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty[-]Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety[-]One
Thousand Pesos (₱545,291,000.00), with interest and income earned, inclusive of the
amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (₱200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and
account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty[-]Nine Million Pesos (₱189,000,000.00), inclusive of
interests and income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account.
(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as "Boracay Mansion" located at
#100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio are
hereby ordered cancelled and released to the said accused or their duly authorized
representatives upon presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof and
subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. Likewise, the hold-departure orders
issued against the said accused are hereby recalled and declared functus oficio.4
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President
Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. The
full text of said pardon states:
MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA
By the President of the Philippines
PARDON
WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who have reached the age of
seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office,
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I
hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights.
The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full, including all writs
and processes issued by the Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except for the bank
account(s) he owned before his tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day of October, in the year of Our Lord,
two thousand and seven.
Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)
By the President:
IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)
Acting Executive Secretary5
On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received and accepted"6 the
pardon by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy7 for the
position of President. During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the
COMELEC: (1) SPA No. 09-024 (DC), a "Petition to Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy" filed by Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao Pamatong, ESQ; (2) SPA No. 09-028 (DC), a petition
for "Disqualification as Presidential Candidate" filed by Evilio C. Pormento (Pormento); and
(3) SPA No. 09-104 (DC), a "Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M.from Running as
President due to Constitutional Disqualification and Creating Confusion to the Prejudice of
Estrada, Mary Lou B" filed by Mary Lou Estrada. In separate Resolutions8 dated January 20,
2010 by the COMELEC, Second Division, however, all three petitions were effectively
dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection
applies to a sitting president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by
former President Arroyo restored the former’s right to vote and be voted for a public office.
The subsequent motions for reconsideration thereto were denied by the COMELEC En banc.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections, however, former President
Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes.
Of the three petitioners above-mentioned, only Pormento sought recourse to this Court and
filed a petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 191988, entitled "Atty. Evilio C.
Pormento v. Joseph ‘ERAP’ Ejercito Estrada and Commission on Elections." But in a
Resolution9 dated August 31, 2010, the Court dismissed the aforementioned petition on the
ground of mootness considering that former President Estrada lost his presidential bid.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena,
and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,10 this time vying for a local elective post, that ofthe
Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for
Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC. The petition was
docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC). Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that
"[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction
for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled ‘People of the
Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada’ Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion
Perpetuawith Perpetual Absolute Disqualification."11 She relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which
state respectively, that:
Sec. 40, Local Government Code:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgmentfor subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty. (Emphases supplied.)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for
disqualification, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter lack of
merit.12
The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that "[h]aving taken judicial cognizance of the
consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May
2010 En Banc resolution affirming it, this Commission will not be labor the controversy
further. Moreso, [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse the
standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring categorically that [former President
Estrada’s] right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon
him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this Commission has already spoken, it will
no longer engage in disquisitions of a settled matter lest indulged in wastage of government
resources."13
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was denied in a Resolution
dated April 23, 2013.
On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the present petition.
She presented five issues for the Court’s resolution, to wit:
I. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S PARDON WAS NOT
CONDITIONAL;
II. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA IS DISQUALIFIED
TO RUN AS MAYOR OF MANILA UNDER SEC. 40 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTCODE OF 1991
FOR HAVING BEEN CONVICTED OF PLUNDER, AN OFFENSE INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE;
III. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION ON
THE GROUND THAT THE CASE INVOLVES THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES IT ALREADY
RESOLVED IN THE CASES OF "PORMENTO VS. ESTRADA", SPA NO. 09-028 (DC) AND IN "RE:
PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ESTRADA EJERCITO, JOSEPH M. FROM RUNNING AS PRESIDENT,
ETC.," SPA NO. 09-104 (DC);
IV. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S PARDON
NEITHER RESTORED HIS RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE NOR REMITTED HIS PERPETUAL ABSOLUTE
DISQUALIFICATION FROM SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE; and
V. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT HAVING EXERCISED ITS POWER TO MOTU
PROPRIO DISQUALIFY RESPONDENT ESTRADA IN THE FACE OF HIS PATENT
DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE BECAUSE OF HIS PERPETUAL AND ABSOLUTE
DISQUALIFICATION TO SEEK PUBLIC OFFICE AND TO VOTE RESULTING FROM HIS CRIMINAL
CONVICTION FOR PLUNDER.14
While this case was pending beforethe Court, or on May 13, 2013, the elections were
conducted as scheduled and former President Estrada was voted into office with 349,770
votes cast in his favor. The next day, the local board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly
elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
On June 7, 2013, Lim, one of former President Estrada’s opponents for the position of Mayor,
moved for leave to intervene in this case. His motion was granted by the Court in a
Resolution15 dated June 25, 2013. Lim subscribed to Risos-Vidal’s theory that former
President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon granted to the
latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification. Further, given that former
President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes obtained by
the latter should be declared stray, and, being the second placer with 313,764 votes to his
name, he (Lim) should be declared the rightful winning candidate for the position of Mayor
of the City of Manila.
The Issue
Though raising five seemingly separate issues for resolution, the petition filed by Risos-Vidal
actually presents only one essential question for resolution by the Court, that is, whether or
not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in
public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing out that the pardon granted to
former President Estrada was conditional as evidenced by the latter’s express acceptance
thereof. The "acceptance," she claims, is an indication of the conditional natureof the
pardon, with the condition being embodied in the third Whereas Clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office." She explains that the aforementioned commitment was what impelled
former President Arroyo to pardon former President Estrada, without it, the clemency would
not have been extended. And any breach thereof, that is, whenformer President Estrada filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for President and Mayor of the City of Manila, he breached the
condition of the pardon; hence, "he ought to be recommitted to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence x x x and disqualifies him as a candidate for the mayoralty
[position] of Manila."16
Nonetheless, Risos-Vidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon which former President
Estrada mustbe disqualified from running for and holding public elective office is actually the
proscription found in Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 ofthe OEC. She argues
that the crime of plunder is both an offense punishable by imprisonment of one year or more
and involving moral turpitude; such that former President Estrada must be disqualified to run
for and hold public elective office.
Even with the pardon granted to former President Estrada, however, Risos-Vidal insists that
the same did not operate to make available to former President Estrada the exception
provided under Section 12 of the OEC, the pardon being merely conditional and not absolute
or plenary. Moreover, Risos-Vidal puts a premium on the ostensible requirements provided
under Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold
publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of
the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
(Emphases supplied.)
She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it is not enough that a pardon
makes a general statement that such pardon carries with it the restoration of civil and
political rights. By virtue of Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring civil and political rights
without categorically making mention what specific civil and political rights are restored
"shall not work to restore the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage; nor shall it
remit the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification for
the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal."17 In other words, she
considers the above constraints as mandatory requirements that shun a general or implied
restoration of civil and political rights in pardons.
Risos-Vidal cites the concurring opinions of Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and
Florentino P. Feliciano in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.18 to endorse her position that "[t]he
restoration of the right to hold public office to one who has lost such right by reason of
conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no
matter how intensely arguable, but must be statedin express, explicit, positive and specific
language."
Applying Monsantoto former President Estrada’s case, Risos-Vidal reckons that "such express
restoration is further demanded by the existence of the condition in the [third] [W]hereas
[C]lause of the pardon x x x indubitably indicating that the privilege to hold public office was
not restored to him."19
On the other hand, the Office ofthe Solicitor General (OSG) for public respondent COMELEC,
maintains that "the issue of whether or not the pardon extended to [former President
Estrada] restored his right to run for public office had already been passed upon by public
respondent COMELEC way back in 2010 via its rulings in SPA Nos. 09-024, 09-028 and 09-104,
there is no cogent reason for it to reverse its standing pronouncement and declare [former
President Estrada] disqualified to run and be voted as mayor of the City of Manila in the
absence of any new argument that would warrant its reversal. To be sure, public respondent
COMELEC correctly exercised its discretion in taking judicial cognizance of the aforesaid
rulings which are known toit and which can be verified from its own records, in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court on the courts’ discretionary power to take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, orare capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to them because of their judicial functions." 20
Further, the OSG contends that "[w]hile at first glance, it is apparent that [former President
Estrada’s] conviction for plunder disqualifies him from running as mayor of Manila under
Section 40 of the [LGC], the subsequent grant of pardon to him, however, effectively
restored his right to run for any public office."21 The restoration of his right to run for any
public office is the exception to the prohibition under Section 40 of the LGC, as provided
under Section 12 of the OEC. As to the seeming requirement of Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, i.e., the express restoration/remission of a particular right to be stated
in the pardon, the OSG asserts that "an airtight and rigid interpretation of Article 36 and
Article 41 of the [RPC] x x x would be stretching too much the clear and plain meaning of the
aforesaid provisions."22 Lastly, taking into consideration the third Whereas Clause of the
pardon granted to former President Estrada, the OSG supports the position that it "is not an
integral part of the decree of the pardon and cannot therefore serve to restrict its
effectivity."23
Thus, the OSG concludes that the "COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions." 24
For his part, former President Estrada presents the following significant arguments to defend
his stay in office: that "the factual findings of public respondent COMELEC, the Constitutional
body mandated to administer and enforce all laws relative to the conduct of the elections,
[relative to the absoluteness of the pardon, the effects thereof, and the eligibility of former
President Estrada to seek public elective office] are binding [and conclusive] on this
Honorable Supreme Court;" that he "was granted an absolute pardon and thereby restored
to his full civil and political rights, including the right to seek public elective office such as the
mayoral (sic) position in the City of Manila;" that "the majority decision in the case of
Salvacion A. Monsanto v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,which was erroneously cited by both Vidal
and Lim as authority for their respective claims, x x x reveal that there was no discussion
whatsoever in the ratio decidendi of the Monsanto case as to the alleged necessity for an
expressed restoration of the ‘right to hold public office in the pardon’ as a legal prerequisite
to remove the subject perpetual special disqualification;" that moreover, the "principal
question raised in this Monsanto case is whether or not a public officer, who has been
granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement toher former
position without need of a new appointment;" that his "expressed acceptance [of the
pardon] is not proof that the pardon extended to [him] is conditional and not absolute;" that
this case is a mere rehash of the casesfiled against him during his candidacy for President
back in 2009-2010; that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code "cannot abridge or
diminish the pardoning power of the President expressly granted by the Constitution;" that
the text of the pardon granted to him substantially, if not fully, complied with the
requirement posed by Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code as it was categorically stated in
the said document that he was "restored to his civil and political rights;" that since pardon is
an act of grace, it must be construed favorably in favor of the grantee;25 and that his
disqualification will result in massive disenfranchisement of the hundreds of thousands of
Manileños who voted for him.26
The Court's Ruling
The petition for certiorari lacks merit.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point
of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. Recall that the petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal against
former President Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC), was anchored on Section 40 of
the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral turpitude, former
President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public elective office
notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes a statement
expressing "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights." Risos-Vidal theorizes that
former President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor of Manila inthe May 13,
2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local elective post despite the
presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason that
it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification, particularly the restoration of his (former President Estrada) right to vote
and bevoted upon for public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code
as the foundations of her theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former
President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be
inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President
Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot
be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C,
provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along
with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election
laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which
the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that
have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws,
rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the
COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador27 and Pelobello v. Palatino,28 which were decided under the 1935
Constitution,wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the President shared similar
phraseology with what is found in the present 1987 Constitution, the Court then
unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the
pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action." The Court
reiterated this pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.29 thereby establishing that,
under the present Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it is unmistakably the long-standing position of this
Court that the exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not
be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided
for by the Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon by
acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an
overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a
proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of the President in the form of
"offenses involving graft and corruption" that would be enumerated and defined by Congress
through the enactment of a law. The following is the pertinent portion lifted from the Record
of the Commission (Vol. II):
MR. ROMULO. I ask that Commissioner Tan be recognized to introduce an amendment on
the same section.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tan is recognized.
SR. TAN. Madam President, lines 7 to 9 state:
However, the power to grant executive clemency for violations of corrupt practices laws may
be limited by legislation.
I suggest that this be deletedon the grounds that, first, violations of corrupt practices may
include a very little offense like stealing ₱10; second, which I think is more important, I get
the impression, rightly or wrongly, that subconsciously we are drafting a constitution on the
premise that all our future Presidents will bebad and dishonest and, consequently, their acts
will be lacking in wisdom. Therefore, this Article seems to contribute towards the creation of
an anti-President Constitution or a President with vast responsibilities but no corresponding
power except to declare martial law. Therefore, I request that these lines be deleted.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President,may the Committee react to that?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, please.
MR. REGALADO. This was inserted here on the resolution of Commissioner Davide because of
the fact that similar to the provisions on the Commission on Elections, the recommendation
of that Commission is required before executive clemency isgranted because violations of the
election laws go into the very political life of the country.
With respect to violations of our Corrupt Practices Law, we felt that it is also necessary to
have that subjected to the same condition because violation of our Corrupt Practices Law
may be of such magnitude as to affect the very economic systemof the country.
Nevertheless, as a compromise, we provided here that it will be the Congress that will
provide for the classification as to which convictions will still require prior recommendation;
after all, the Congress could take into account whether or not the violation of the Corrupt
Practices Law is of such magnitude as to affect the economic life of the country, if it is in the
millions or billions of dollars. But I assume the Congress in its collective wisdom will exclude
those petty crimes of corruption as not to require any further stricture on the exercise of
executive clemency because, of course, there is a whale of a difference if we consider a lowly
clerk committing malversation of government property or funds involving one hundred
pesos. But then, we also anticipate the possibility that the corrupt practice of a public officer
is of such magnitude as to have virtually drained a substantial portion of the treasury, and
then he goes through all the judicial processes and later on, a President who may have close
connections with him or out of improvident compassion may grant clemency under such
conditions. That is why we left it to Congress to provide and make a classification based on
substantial distinctions between a minor act of corruption or an act of substantial
proportions. SR. TAN. So, why do we not just insert the word GROSS or GRAVE before the
word "violations"?
MR. REGALADO. We feel that Congress can make a better distinction because "GRAVE" or
"GROSS" can be misconstrued by putting it purely as a policy.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. May I speak in favor of the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. The power to grant executive clemency is essentially an executive power, and
that is precisely why it is called executive clemency. In this sentence, which the amendment
seeks to delete, an exception is being made. Congress, which is the legislative arm, is allowed
to intrude into this prerogative of the executive. Then it limits the power of Congress to
subtract from this prerogative of the President to grant executive clemency by limiting the
power of Congress to only corrupt practices laws. There are many other crimes more serious
than these. Under this amendment, Congress cannot limit the power of executive clemency
in cases of drug addiction and drug pushing which are very, very serious crimes that can
endanger the State; also, rape with murder, kidnapping and treason. Aside from the fact that
it is a derogation of the power of the President to grant executive clemency, it is also
defective in that it singles out just one kind of crime. There are far more serious crimes which
are not included.
MR. REGALADO. I will just make one observation on that. We admit that the pardoning
power is anexecutive power. But even in the provisions on the COMELEC, one will notice that
constitutionally, it is required that there be a favorable recommendation by the Commission
on Elections for any violation of election laws.
At any rate, Commissioner Davide, as the principal proponent of that and as a member of the
Committee, has explained in the committee meetings we had why he sought the inclusion of
this particular provision. May we call on Commissioner Davide to state his position.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I am constrained to rise to object to the proposal. We have just approved the
Article on Accountability of Public Officers. Under it, it is mandated that a public office is a
public trust, and all government officers are under obligation to observe the utmost of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, to lead modest lives and to act with patriotism
and justice.
In all cases, therefore, which would go into the verycore of the concept that a public office is
a public trust, the violation is itself a violation not only of the economy but the moral fabric
of public officials. And that is the reason we now want that if there is any conviction for the
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which, in effect, is a violation of the
public trust character of the public office, no pardon shall be extended to the offender,
unless some limitations are imposed.
Originally, my limitation was, it should be with the concurrence of the convicting court, but
the Committee left it entirely to the legislature to formulate the mechanics at trying,
probably, to distinguish between grave and less grave or serious cases of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Perhaps this is now the best time, since we have
strengthened the Article on Accountability of Public Officers, to accompany it with a mandate
that the President’s right to grant executive clemency for offenders or violators of laws
relating to the concept of a public office may be limited by Congress itself.
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Sarmiento is recognized.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I briefly speak in favor of the amendment by deletion.
Madam President, over and over again, we have been saying and arguing before this
Constitutional Commission that we are emasculating the powers of the presidency, and this
provision to me is another clear example of that. So, I speak against this provision. Even the
1935 and the 1973 Constitutions do not provide for this kind of provision.
I am supporting the amendment by deletion of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Tingson would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tingson is recognized.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, I am also in favor of the amendment by deletion because I
am in sympathy with the stand of Commissioner Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo. I do believe and we
should remember that above all the elected or appointed officers of our Republic, the leader
is the President. I believe that the country will be as the President is, and if we systematically
emasculate the power of this presidency, the time may come whenhe will be also handcuffed
that he will no longer be able to act like he should be acting.
So, Madam President, I am in favor of the deletion of this particular line.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Colayco would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Colayco is recognized.
MR. COLAYCO. Thank you very much, Madam President.
I seldom rise here to object to or to commend or to recommend the approval of proposals,
but now I find that the proposal of Commissioner Tan is worthy of approval of this body.
Why are we singling out this particular offense? There are other crimes which cast a bigger
blot on the moral character of the public officials.
Finally, this body should not be the first one to limit the almost absolute power of our Chief
Executive in deciding whether to pardon, to reprieve or to commute the sentence rendered
by the court.
I thank you.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now?
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Padilla would like to be recognized, and after him will be
Commissioner Natividad.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. Only one sentence, Madam President. The Sandiganbayan has been called the
Anti-Graft Court, so if this is allowed to stay, it would mean that the President’s power
togrant pardon or reprieve will be limited to the cases decided by the Anti-Graft Court, when
as already stated, there are many provisions inthe Revised Penal Code that penalize more
serious offenses.
Moreover, when there is a judgment of conviction and the case merits the consideration of
the exercise of executive clemency, usually under Article V of the Revised Penal Code the
judge will recommend such exercise of clemency. And so, I am in favor of the amendment
proposed by Commissioner Tan for the deletion of this last sentence in Section 17.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now, Mr. Floor Leader?
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one more.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Natividad is recognized.
MR. NATIVIDAD. I am also against this provision which will again chip more powers from the
President. In case of other criminals convicted in our society, we extend probation to them
while in this case, they have already been convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we
can offer mercy to them is through this executive clemency extended to them by the
President. If we still close this avenue to them, they would be prejudiced even worse than
the murderers and the more vicious killers in our society. I do not think they deserve this
opprobrium and punishment under the new Constitution.
I am in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. We are ready tovote, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is this accepted by the Committee?
MR. REGALADO. The Committee, Madam President, prefers to submit this to the floor and
also because of the objection of the main proponent, Commissioner Davide. So we feel that
the Commissioners should vote on this question.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan
to delete the last sentence of Section 17 appearing on lines 7, 8 and 9, please raise their
hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.)
The results show 34 votes in favor and 4 votes against; the amendment is approved. 30
(Emphases supplied.)
The proper interpretation of Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive power and
prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes.
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s interpretation that the said Articles contain
specific textual commands which must be strictly followed in order to free the beneficiary of
presidential grace from the disqualifications specifically prescribed by them.
Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold
publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of
the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
(Emphases supplied.)
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as proposed by Risos-Vidal, is
unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or unduly restrict the power of the President to
grant executive clemency.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be
no departure.31 It is this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue
which declares that former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights" substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.
The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos Vidal that there was no
express remission and/or restoration of the rights of suffrage and/or to hold public office in
the pardon granted to former President Estrada, as required by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal provisions must be
followed by the President, as they do not abridge or diminish the President’s power to
extend clemency. He opines that they do not reduce the coverage of the President’s
pardoning power. Particularly, he states:
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form. They only provide a
procedural prescription. They are not concerned with areas where or the instances when the
President may grant pardon; they are only concerned with how he or she is to exercise such
power so that no other governmental instrumentality needs to intervene to give it full effect.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to include in the
pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the remission of
the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification,he or she should do so expressly.
Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the President state his or her intentions clearly, directly,
firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To belabor the point, the President retains the power to
make such restoration or remission, subject to a prescription on the manner by which he or
she is to state it.32
With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad statement that Congress may dictate as to
how the President may exercise his/her power of executive clemency. The form or manner
by which the President, or Congress for that matter, should exercise their respective
Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be interfered with unless it is so provided in
the Constitution. This is the essence of the principle of separation of powers deeply ingrained
in our system of government which "ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere."33 Moreso, this fundamental principle must be observed if
noncompliance with the form imposed by one branch on a co-equal and coordinate branch
will result into the diminution of an exclusive Constitutional prerogative.
For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way
that will give full effect to the executive clemency granted by the President, instead of
indulging in an overly strict interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the import of
the pardon which emanated from the Office of the President and duly signed by the Chief
Executive himself/herself. The said codal provisions must be construed to harmonize the
power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the
power of the President to grant executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that
the pardon of the principal penalty does notcarry with it the remission of the accessory
penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon. It
still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to
decide to pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon
both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided upon by the
President on the penalties imposedin accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that
both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in
the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former
President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him
of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to
his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the textof the pardon that the accessory penalties
of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together
with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In this jurisdiction, the right toseek public elective office is recognized by law as falling under
the whole gamut of civil and political rights.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225,34 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003," reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.– Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption
of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they
took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot
be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which theyare
naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non commissioned officers in the armed forces
of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphases supplied.)
No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Philippines
is a signatory, acknowledges the existence of said right. Article 25(b) of the Convention
states: Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
xxxx
(b) To vote and to be electedat genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will
of the electors[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,35 the Court unequivocally referred
to the right to seek public elective office as a political right, to wit:
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino
citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative
act that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner’s failure to comply there
with in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is
yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn
renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective
office in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective office is
unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier statement
that the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits no other interpretation other
than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted tohim, he regained his FULL civil
and political rights – including the right to seek elective office.
On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes beyond the plain meaning of said penal
provisions; and prescribes a formal requirement that is not only unnecessary but, if insisted
upon, could be in derogation of the constitutional prohibition relative to the principle that
the exercise of presidential pardon cannot be affected by legislative action.
Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.36
to justify her argument that an absolute pardon must expressly state that the right to hold
public office has been restored, and that the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
has been remitted.
This is incorrect.
Her reliance on said opinions is utterly misplaced. Although the learned views of Justices
Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano are to be respected, they do not form partof
the controlling doctrine nor to be considered part of the law of the land. On the contrary, a
careful reading of the majority opinion in Monsanto, penned by no less than Chief Justice
Marcelo B. Fernan, reveals no statement that denotes adherence to a stringent and overly
nuanced application of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code that will in effect require
the President to use a statutorily prescribed language in extending executive clemency, even
if the intent of the President can otherwise be deduced from the text or words used in the
pardon. Furthermore, as explained above, the pardon here is consistent with, and not
contrary to, the provisions of Articles 36 and 41.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to
Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any elective local
position. Risos-Vidal argues that former President Estrada is disqualified under item (a), to
wit:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it provides for an
exception, to wit:
Section 12. Disqualifications. – x x x unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty. (Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that former President Estrada’s conviction for plunder
disqualifies him from running for the elective local position of Mayor of the City of Manila
under Section 40(a) of the LGC. However, the subsequent absolute pardon granted to former
President Estrada effectively restored his right to seek public elective office. This is made
possible by reading Section 40(a) of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC.
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in
absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a
plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has
been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense
involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or
national position.
Take notice that the applicability of Section 12 of the OEC to candidates running for local
elective positions is not unprecedented. In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,37 the
Court acknowledged the aforementioned provision as one of the legal remedies that may be
availed of to disqualify a candidate in a local election filed any day after the last day for filing
of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation.38 The pertinent
ruling in the Jalosjos case is quoted as follows:
What is indisputably clear is that false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a
petition under Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises from a
crime penalized by prision mayor, a petition under Section 12 ofthe Omnibus Election Code
or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a
choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple
remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to petitioner. 39 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion
that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been
restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation,
considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually
introduced by the word "whereas."40 Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because,
strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. 41 In this case, the
whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore,
does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of
the pardon.
On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant excerpt of COMELEC Commissioner
Maria Gracia Padaca’s separate concurring opinion in the assailed April 1, 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), which captured the essence of the legal effect of
preambular paragraphs/whereas clauses, viz:
The present dispute does not raise anything which the 20 January 2010 Resolution did not
conclude upon. Here, Petitioner Risos-Vidal raised the same argument with respect to the
3rd "whereas clause" or preambular paragraph of the decree of pardon. It states that
"Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or
office." On this contention, the undersigned reiterates the ruling of the Commission that the
3rd preambular paragraph does not have any legal or binding effect on the absolute nature
of the pardon extended by former President Arroyo to herein Respondent. This ruling is
consistent with the traditional and customary usage of preambular paragraphs. In the case of
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court ruled on the legal effect of preambular
paragraphs or whereas clauses on statutes. The Court stated, viz.:
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show
its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of
a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its
operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s
promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the
same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an
integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd
preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former
President Estrada.42 (Emphasis supplied.)
Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyo’s silence on former President
Estrada’s decision torun for President in the May 2010 elections against, among others, the
candidate of the political party of former President Arroyo, after the latter’s receipt and
acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her intention to restore him to his rights to
suffrage and to hold public office.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the President is in issue,
the Court must turn to the only evidence available to it, and that is the pardon itself. From a
detailed review ofthe four corners of said document, nothing therein gives an iota of
intimation that the third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation, proviso, stipulation or
condition on the grant of the pardon, such that the breach of the mentioned commitment
not to seek public office will result ina revocation or cancellation of said pardon. To the
Court, what it is simply is a statement of fact or the prevailing situation at the time the
executive clemency was granted. It was not used as a condition to the efficacy orto delimit
the scope of the pardon.
Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the third Whereas Clausewas one of the
reasons to grant the pardon, the pardon itself does not provide for the attendant
consequence of the breach thereof. This Court will be hard put to discern the resultant effect
of an eventual infringement. Just like it will be hard put to determine which civil or political
rights were restored if the Court were to take the road suggested by Risos-Vidal that the
statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights" excludes the restoration of
former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to hold public office. The aforequoted text
ofthe executive clemency granted does not provide the Court with any guide asto how and The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal
where to draw the line between the included and excluded political rights. bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a "whimsical, arbitrary
Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the ultimate issue for resolution is not whether the or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion orrefusal to perform a positive
pardon is contingent on the condition that former President Estrada will not seek janother duty enjoined by law" or were so "patent and gross" as to constitute grave abuse of
elective public office, but it actually concerns the coverage of the pardon – whether the discretion.
pardon granted to former President Estrada was so expansive as to have restored all his On the foregoing premises and conclusions, this Court finds it unnecessary to separately
political rights, inclusive of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. Justice Leonen is of discuss Lim's petition-in-intervention, which substantially presented the same arguments as
the view that the pardon in question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite the Risos-Vidal's petition.
statement that former President Estrada is "hereby restored to his civil and political rights," WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-inintervention are DISMISSED. The
that is, the foregoing statement restored to former President Estrada all his civil and political Resolution dated April 1, 2013 of the Commission on Elections, Second Division, and the
rights except the rights denied to him by the unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of the Commission on Elections, En bane, both in SPA No. 13-
disqualification made up of, among others, the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. He 211 (DC), are AFFIRMED.
adds that had the President chosen to be so expansive as to include the rights of suffrage and SO ORDERED.
to hold public office, she should have been more clear on her intentions.
However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," to the mind
of the Court, iscrystal clear – the pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute,
meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in
character, as the term "political rights"adverted to has a settled meaning in law and
jurisprudence.
With due respect, I disagree too with Justice Leonen that the omission of the qualifying word
"full" can be construed as excluding the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold
public office. There appears to be no distinction as to the coverage of the term "full political
rights" and the term "political rights" used alone without any qualification. How to ascribe to
the latter term the meaning that it is "partial" and not "full" defies one’s understanding.
More so, it will be extremely difficult to identify which of the political rights are restored by
the pardon, when the text of the latter is silent on this matter. Exceptions to the grant of
pardon cannot be presumed from the absence of the qualifying word "full" when the pardon
restored the "political rights" of former President Estrada without any exclusion or
reservation.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon granted to former
President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual
basis upon which to anchor or support the Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon.
To reiterate, insofar as its coverageis concerned, the text of the pardon can withstand close
scrutiny even under the provisions of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-Vidal, the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Resolutions.
The Court has consistently held that a petition for certiorariagainst actions of the COMELEC is
confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patentand substantial
denial of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters
falling within its domain.43
As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary exercise of power due
to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise April 5, 2016
of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or G.R. No. 202124
to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as having been done with PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
grave abuse of discretion, such an abuse must be patent and gross.44 vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant.
 DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay
Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22
firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary
Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the
umbilicus, directed upward toward the left upper abdomen."
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter
Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"
which directly caused their instant death.
That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given
provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the offense.
Contrary to law.2
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel,
was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad
Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with
intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot
with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby
commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not
perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or
accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants
Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina,
both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said
proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002,
he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was
only appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other two had no participation in the
shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was not present at the crime
scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima
facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel. 4 Thus, upon motion of the
prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel
was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to appellant.5
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr.
Lourdes Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the
children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr.
Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet wounds showed that the victims were at a
higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of ammunitions were
used.6
Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening
of June 6, 2002, as his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to
sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting
bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men
responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were
illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3
men as appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.
The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The
men then uttered, "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with
them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong
kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and Norberto
immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to protect them from
being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his
family huddled together in their hut.7
When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2)
young daughters were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from
neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the
street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at
the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her.8
In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant,
Norberto replied that he had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the
fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against appellant's two other brothers for molesting his
daughter.9
On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense.
Appellant's testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San
Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro
San Miguel, where he had been living for several years, at the time the shooting incident
occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said house was a mere five-
minute walk away from the crime scene.10
Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of
Norberto, the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together
with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was
then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted
Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of
Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to
suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine Divina and accused is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to
pay for the costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No.
7702-G, reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under
Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional as
minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the
offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina.
Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012,
the CA rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged.13
Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012,
the Court issued a Resolution14 notifying the parties that they may submit their respective
Supplemental Briefs. Both parties manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental
briefs since they had exhaustively discussed their positions before the CA.15
The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's
testimony, such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns,
and to categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s
children.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions
based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court
will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the
trial court and affirmed by the CA.16
The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA,
that appellant acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms
and simultaneously firing at Norberto and his family, killing his two young daughters.
Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with their firearms as there is illumination
coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its walling was stripped
off, to wit:
Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do
you have light in your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of light was there?
A: A gas lamp.
Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?
A: In the middle of our house.
xxxx
Q: when did they fire a shot?
A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.
Q: How many gunshots did you hear?
A: Only one.
Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?
A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)
xxxx
Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?
A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were
hit.
xxxx
Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?
A: All of them.
Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were
having one firearm each?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And they fired shots at the same time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?
A: To the place where we were.
Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position
then?
A: I ordered my children to lie down.
Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie
down?
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering
them to line (sic) down face down)
Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?
A: Less than five minutes, sir.
Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what
happened to them?
A: Yes, sir, they were hit.
x x x17
Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's
daughters because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the
perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their
concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is
the act of all.18 Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house
of Norberto together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to
identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed
the children.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a
person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or
evident premeditation.19 The presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in
Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.20 The trial court correctly
ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended the killing of Norberto’s
two children, thus:
x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by
side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly
their wall made of sack was stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and
Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he
refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two (2)
daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very tender
ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 ½
years old respectively. In this case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly overpowered
by armed assailants when they were gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack
was made suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend
themselves. Norberto and his wife and his children could have already been asleep at that
time of the night. x x x 21
Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As
held in People v. Fallorina,22 the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on
an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by
reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person
illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court held:
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is
either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or
frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender
intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the
nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and
number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e)
the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant
as shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered24during, as well as the manner of, the
commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes with approval the trial court’s finding that
appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:
In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder
first by suddenly stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the
intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If
only there were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been
killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were
liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted
Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as
[appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the
crime committed.25
Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state
from the very beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the
shots from appellant’s firearm that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to
put a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's testimony would show
that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor
inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of
witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime."27 Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward
testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to
the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People28 that:
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that
would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's
determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial
court in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their
truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x.29
The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding
or exceptional circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is
no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence,
particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is
worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt
that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.
However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court
to identify the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by
the trial court's use of the terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in
convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court
meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of
Attempted Murder.
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during
trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder,
as the killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant
and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of
Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears
stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section
13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the
same is defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v.
Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al.,30 thus:
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give
the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to
sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more
charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground
for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he
enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move
for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the
same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground
of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as
many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each
offense.31
Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted
murder, respectively, and proven during trial.
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as
defined in Article 4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the
law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one
penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound
crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the
other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in
the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts
result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from
separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.34
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two
others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their
respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several
gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows
their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime.
What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because
as held in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their
respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct
and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime."36
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account
dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:
That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given
provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the offense.37
Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:
x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill,
qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms
the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission
of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution
which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the
spontaneous desistance of the accused x x x38
In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that
dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human
abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he
who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in
the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation
therefor.40The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant
violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein,
without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated
dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the
penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus,
with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for
each of two (2) counts of murder.41 However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346,
proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant
should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for
parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for
each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should
be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted
murder.
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as
regards criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally,
in these types of criminal cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court;
namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be
awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the
offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from
other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages
in civil law.42 This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be
increased by the Court when appropriate.43 Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the
latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil
indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment
imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as
restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum
amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a
ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing
the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it.44
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also
compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals45 expounded on the nature and
purpose of moral damages, viz.:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold
injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the
concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the
claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary
loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity
being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must
have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the
cases expressed in Article 221946 and Article 222047 of the Civil Code. x x x.
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages
awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong." 48 They
may also be considered and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation,
indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailant's conduct, as
well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant
humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress."49
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey
Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible,
of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted."50
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount
of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental
anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in
relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil
indemnity.52
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are
intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to
account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted,53 the theory
being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible
conduct of the defendant – associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness,
malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud 54 – that
intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to
those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter
the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.55
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense
has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other
upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is
basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award
of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative
to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 56
The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure57 requires
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or
information. It is in order not to trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or she has committed. A criminal
complaint or information should basically contain the elements of the crime, as well as its
qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the
proper penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability.
In the civil aspect, the presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the
information but proven during trial would entitle the victim to an award of exemplary
damages.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to
the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case
show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way
as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article
2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v.
Matrimonio,58 the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse
tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in
People v. Cristobal,59 the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral
corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant
married woman. In People v. Cañada,60 People v. Neverio61 and People v. Layco, Sr.,62 the
Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders
who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00,63 despite the
lack of any aggravating circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to
₱50,000.00 in order to deter similar conduct.
If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because
of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence64 sets the amount of ₱100,000.00
as exemplary damages.
Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first
consider the penalty imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty
on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other
Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to impose the
death penalty under certain circumstances.65 Under the same law, the following crimes are
punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,66 mutiny on the high seas,67 and simple
rape.68 For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death: qualified piracy;69 qualified bribery under certain circumstances;70 parricide;71
murder;72 infanticide, except when committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of
concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same
purpose;73kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain circumstances; 74 robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons under certain circumstances;75 destructive
arson, except when death results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under the article;76 attempted or frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed
by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder;77 and carnapping, when the driver or occupant of
the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.78 Finally, RA 7659 imposes the death penalty on the
following crimes:
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii)
when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is
raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under Article 320, death results.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or
homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim
is under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in
full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree
of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when
the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible
penalties or single indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of
the RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance,
the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is
no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act,
the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their
number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the
preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the
court has the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court
can impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present.
But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of
the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.79
As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose
reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages,
following the ruling in People v. Salome80 and People v. Quiachon,81 is "the penalty provided
by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty
actually imposed on the offender."82
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death
penalty were it not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v.
Victor,83 that the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death
should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of
the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." 84 Such
reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later
increased to ₱100,000.00.85
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa,86
₱50,000.00 was awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in
rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily results
from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages. 87
Subsequently, the amount was increased to ₱75,000.00 in People v. Soriano88 and
P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao.89
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346,
the imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569,
must be used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty
imposed.1avvphi1
Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an
ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty,
the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence90 pegs the amount
of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying
aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the
amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and
moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the
exemplary damages shall be fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but
also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes x x
x."91
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua
only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper
amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and
₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating
circumstances present.
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the
offender caused several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the
amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of
victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple
murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the
maximum penalty shall be imposed,92 then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be
indemnified with ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48
of the RPC, the following doctrines are noteworthy:
In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,93 this Court ruled that special complex crime, or
more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v.
Barros,94 explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject
to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not
consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound
crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex
crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of
aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such
composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses."95
In People v. De Leon,96 we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to
commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before,
during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as
to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime
that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime,
namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that
aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the
victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide.
Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is
robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
"homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and
infanticide.97
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood
in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or
on occasion of the rape.98 Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of
superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the
crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with
homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales:99
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against
persons and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case
correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his
arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant
Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled
that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the
Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the
actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to
murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be
imposed.100
Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot
be imposed due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
the civil indemnity and moral damages will be ₱100,000.00 each, and another ₱100,000.00
as exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If
there is another composite crime included in a special complex crime and the penalty
imposed is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 moral damages
and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.
For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide101 wherein three (3) people died as a
consequence of the crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages
as discussed earlier. This is true, however, only if those who were killed were the victims of
the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those who died were the perpetrators or
robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide may still be committed even
if one of the robbers dies.102 This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there is more
than one victim of rape.
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in
which the crime was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as
those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is
death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral
damages that should be awarded will each be ₱100,000.00 and another ₱100,000.00 for
exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of
reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be ₱75,000.00 each,
as well as exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is
in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will I. For those crimes106 like, Murder,107 Parricide,108 Serious Intentional Mutilation,109
each be ₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral Infanticide,110 and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of
damages when the crime proven is in its attempted stage. The difference in the amounts indivisible penalties:
awarded for the stages is mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, 1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA
in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The said 9346:
amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
attempted murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is 1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages and a. Frustrated:
exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each. i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
victims (except the robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
remembered that in a special complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component b. Attempted:
crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the offender/s is to i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the said crime, ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with homicide, iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still 2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
robbery with homicide as the injuries become part of the crime, "Homicide", in the special a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
part of the essential element of robbery,103 which is the use of violence or the use of force c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries sustained by the victims must 2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim a. Frustrated:
suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should b. Attempted:
likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted stage. i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
penalties, like homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be ₱50,000.00 and II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded. However, an award 1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA
of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an 9346:
aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the information. a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
cases. The award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper c. Exemplary damages111 – ₱100,000.00
when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.104 Under 1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:112
Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
proved.105 In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
damages to ₱50,000.00. 2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
further made atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
a mere 3½-year-old toddler, and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
awards for damages is befitting to show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over 2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
such crimes and wastage of lives. a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
In summary: b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
penalty consists of indivisible penalties: 2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
9346: b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00 c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00 In Robbery with Physical Injuries,126 the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00 the nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned: The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the incident.1âwphi1
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00 additional rape committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other shall be entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate
complex crimes where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple rape/qualified rape shall apply.
indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible
imposed, as the case may be. penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, 113 Robbery with Rape,114 dishonour of the offender,127 Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional
Robbery with Intentional Mutilation,115 Robbery with Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
Arson,116 Rape with Homicide,117 Kidnapping with Murder,118 Carnapping with Homicide119 or 1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
Carnapping with Rape,120 Highway Robbery with Homicide,121 Qualified Piracy,122 Arson with a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
Homicide,123 Hazing with Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other crimes with death, b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible 1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are
penalties: no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA a. Frustrated:
9346: i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00 ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00 b. Attempted:
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00 i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00
the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the
occur. Information,128 in addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds125 and could have died if not for a damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated; ₱30,000.00 for
timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded: frustrated; and ₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00 following:129
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries: a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00 b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00 c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00130
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00 B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned: have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00 c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua. a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
medical intervention, the following shall be awarded: c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina
expenses is presented in court, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b)
awarded. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) ₱50,000.00
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of as temperate damages.
civil indemnity is P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum (2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY
amount cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder defined and
modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.131 penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum,
victims the following damages: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4)
children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages for each of the two victims; (3) another counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount of
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and (4) temperate damages P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of PS0,000.00 to each of
in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts of the four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
Attempted Murder, appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral Divina.
damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the (3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six
civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages payable by the percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be
appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate
this decision until fully paid.132 damages.
Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges (4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be
against Gilberto Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as FURNISHED a copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately
the companions of appellant on the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger
straightforward and unwavering in his identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two San Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
other people who fired the gunshots at his family. More significantly, as noted by the Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.
prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were not at the SO ORDERED.
crime scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the
basis for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause against the two.
Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain
"Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a
firearm and the two other people with him had no participation in the shooting incident. Said
circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and San
Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy
because the same only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has
attached before the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a
second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only
(a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or
the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 133 In this case, the
case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there
can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real
participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine
Divina.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and hereby
sentences him to suffer two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1612
ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979
WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that there is rampant robbery and
thievery of government and private properties;
WHEREAS, such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless
elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen
properties;lawphil.net
WHEREAS, under existing law, a fence can be prosecuted only as an accessory after the fact
and punished lightly;
WHEREAS, is imperative to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of
the crimes of robbery and theft.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of
the land the following:
Section 1. Title. This decree shall be known as the Anti-Fencing Law.
Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean as follows:
(a) "Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall
buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should
be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
(b) "Fence" includes any person, firm, association corporation or partnership or other
organization who/which commits the act of fencing.
Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000
pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the
accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be
imposed.
(b) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of
the property robbed or stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property involved is more than 200 pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos.
(d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the value of the property involved is over 50 pesos but not exceeding 200 pesos.
(e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value is over five (5) pesos but
not exceeding 50 pesos.
(f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
Section 4. Liability of Officials of Juridical Persons. If the fence is a partnership, firm,
corporation or association, the president or the manager or any officer thereof who knows or
should have known the commission of the offense shall be liable.
Section 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or
anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing.
Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. For purposes of this Act, all
stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article item, object
of anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before
offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the
station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store,
establishment or entity is located. The Chief of Constabulary/Director General, Integrated
National Police shall promulgate such rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this
section. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by this section or
who violates any of the provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall
upon conviction be punished as a fence. lawphi1.net
Section 7. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-nine.
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 6 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1612, KNOWN AS THE ANTI-FENCING LAW.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1612, known as the Anti-Fencing Law, the
following rules and regulations are hereby promulgated to govern the issuance of
clearances/permits to sell used secondhand articles obtained from an unlicensed dealer or
supplier thereof:
I. Definition of Terms
1. "Used secondhand article" shall refer to any goods, article, item, object or anything of
value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the same has
actually or in fact been used.
2. "Unlicensed dealer/supplier" shall refer to any persons, partnership, firm, corporation,
association or any other entity or establishment not licensed by the government to engage in
the business of dealing in or of supplying the articles defined in the preceding paragraph.
3. "Store", "establishment" or "entity" shall be construed to include any individual dealing in
the buying and selling used secondhand articles, as defined in paragraph hereof.
4. "Buy and Sell" refer to the transaction whereby one purchases used secondhand articles
for the purpose of resale to third persons.
5. "Station Commander" shall refer to the Station Commander of the Integrated National
Police within the territorial limits of the town or city district where the store, establishment
or entity dealing in the buying and selling of used secondhand articles is located.
II. Duty to Procure Clearance or Permit
1. No person shall sell or offer to sell to the public any used secondhand article as defined
herein without first securing a clearance or permit for the purpose from the proper Station
Commander of the Integrated National Police.
2. If the person seeking the clearance or permit is a partnership, firm, corporation, or
association or group of individuals, the clearance or permit shall be obtained by or in the
name of the president, manager or other responsible officer-in-charge thereof.
3. If a store, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other establishment or entity has a
branch or subsidiary and the used secondhand article is acquired by such branch or
subsidiary for sale to the public, the said branch or subsidiary shall secure the required
clearance or permit.
4. Any goods, article, item, or object or anything of value acquired from any source for which
no receipt or equivalent document evidencing the legality of its acquisition could be
presented by the present possessor or holder thereof, or the covering receipt, or equivalent
document, of which is fake, falsified or irregularly obtained, shall be presumed as having
been acquired from an unlicensed dealer or supplier and the possessor or holder thereof
must secure the required clearance or permit before the same can be sold or offered for sale
to the public.
III. Procedure for Procurement of Clearances or Permits
1. The Station Commanders concerned shall require the owner of a store or the president,
manager or responsible officer-in-charge of a firm, establishment or other entity located
within their respective jurisdictions and in possession of or having in stock used secondhand
articles as defined herein, to submit an initial affidavit within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice for the purpose thereof and subsequent affidavits once every fifteen (15) days within
five (5) days after the period covered, which shall contain:
(a) A complete inventory of such articles acquired daily from whatever source and the names
and addresses of the persons from whom such articles were acquired.
(b) A full list of articles to be sold or offered for sale as well as the place where the date when
the sale or offer for sale shall commence.
(c) The place where the articles are presently deposited or kept in stock.
The Station Commander may, at his discretion when the circumstances of each case warrant,
require that the affidavit submitted be accompanied by other documents showing proof of
legitimacy of the acquisition of the articles.
2. A party required to secure a clearance or permit under these rules and regulations shall file
an application therefor with the Station Commander concerned. The application shall state:
(a) The name, address and other pertinent circumstances of the persons, in case of an
individual or, in the case of a firm, corporation, association, partnership or other entity, the
name, address and other pertinent circumstances of the president, manager or officer-in-
charge.
(b) The article to be sold or offered for sale to the public and the name and address of the
unlicensed dealer or supplier from whom such article was acquired.
In support of the application, there shall be attached to it the corresponding receipt or other
equivalent document to show proof of the legitimacy of acquisition of the article.
3. The Station Commander shall examine the documents attached to the application and may
require the presentation of other additional documents, if necessary, to show satisfactory
proof of the legitimacy of acquisition of the article, subject to the following conditions:
(a) If the legitimacy of acquisition of any article from an unlicensed source cannot be
satisfactorily established by the documents presented, the Station Commander shall, upon
approval of the INP Superintendent in the district and at the expense of the party seeking the
clearance/permit, cause the publication of a notice in a newspaper of general circulation for
two (2) successive days enumerating therein the articles acquired from an unlicensed dealer
or supplier, the names and addresses of the persons from whom they were acquired and
shall state that such articles are to be sold or offered for sale to the public at the address of
the store, establishment or other entity seeking the clearance/permit. In places where no
newspapers are in general circulation, the party seeking the clearance or permit shall,
instead, post a notice daily for one week on the bulletin board of the municipal building of
the town where the store, firm, establishment or entity concerned is located or, in the case
of an individual, where the articles in his possession are to be sold or offered for sale.
(b) If after 15 days, upon expiration of the period of publication or of the notice referred to in
the preceding paragraph, no claim is made with respect to any of the articles enumerated in
the notice, the Station Commander shall issue the clearance or permit sought.
(c) If, before expiration of the same period for publication of the notice or its posting, it shall
appear that any of the articles in question is stolen property, the Station Commander shall
hold the article in restraint as evidence in any appropriate case to be filed. Articles held in
restraint shall be kept and disposed of as the circumstances of each case permit, taking into
account all considerations of right and justice in the case. In any case where any article is
held in restraint, it shall be the duty of the Station Commander concerned to advise/notify
the Commission on Audit of the case and comply with such procedure as may be proper
under applicable existing laws, rules and regulations.
4. The Station Commander concerned shall, within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of
the application, act thereon by either issuing the clearance/permit requested or denying the
same. Denial of an application shall be in writing and shall state in brief the reason/s
therefor.
5. The application, clearance/permit or the denial thereof, including such other documents as
may be pertinent in the implementation of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 shall be in the forms
prescribed in Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", and "E" hereof, which are made integral parts of
these rules and regulations.
6. For the issuance of clearances/permit required under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612, no fee
shall be charged.
IV. Appeals
Any party aggrieved by the action taken by the Station Commander may elevate the decision
taken in the case to the proper INP District Superintendent and, if he is still dissatisfied
therewith may take the same on appeal to the INP Director. The decision of the INP Director
may also be appealed to the INP Director-General whose decision may likewise be appealed
to the Minister of National Defense. The decision of the Minister of National Defense on the
case shall be final. The appeal against the decision taken by a Commander lower than the INP
Director-General should be filed to the next higher Commander within ten (10) days from
receipt of notice of the decision. The decision of the INP Director-General should be appealed
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision.
V. Penalties
1. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by Section 6 of P.D. 1612
or who violates any of the provisions of these rules and regulations shall upon conviction be
punished as a fence.
2. The INP Director-General shall recommend to the proper authority the cancellation of the
business license of the erring individual, store, establishment or the entity concerned.
3. Articles obtained from unlicensed sources for sale or offered for sale without prior
compliance with the provisions of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 and with these rules and
regulations shall be held in restraint until satisfactory evidence or legitimacy of acquisition
has been established.
4. Articles for which no satisfactory evidence of legitimacy of acquisition is established and
which are found to be stolen property shall likewise be held under restraint and shall,
furthermore, be subject to confiscation as evidence in the appropriate case to be filed. If,
upon termination of the case, the same is not claimed by their legitimate owners, the
article/s shall be forfeited in favor of the government and made subject to disposition as the
circumstances warrant in accordance with applicable existing laws, rules and regulations. The
Commission on Audit shall, in all cases, be notified.
5. Any personnel of the Integrated National Police found violating the provisions of Section 6
of P.D. No. 1612 or any of its implementing rules and regulations or who, in any manner
whatsoever, connives with or through his negligence or inaction makes possible the
commission of such violations by any party required to comply with the law and its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be prosecuted criminally without prejudice to the
imposition of administrative penalties.
VI. Visitorial Power
It shall be the duty of the owner of the store or of the president, manager or responsible
officer-in-charge of any firm, establishment or other entity or of an individual having in his
premises articles to be sold or offered for sale to the public to allow the Station Commander
or his authorized representative to exercise visitorial powers. For this purpose, however, the
power to conduct visitations shall be exercise only during office or business hours and upon
authority in writing from and by the INP Superintendent in the district and for the sole
purpose of determining whether articles are kept in possession or stock contrary to the
intents of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 and of these rules and regulations.
VII. Other Duties Imposed Upon Station Commanders and INP District Superintendent
and Directors Following Action on Applications for Clearances or Permits
1. At the end of each month, it shall be the duty of the Station Commander concerned
to:
(a) Make and maintain a file in his office of all clearances/permit issued by him.
(b) Submit a full report to the INP District Superintendent on the number of applications for
clearances or permits processed by his office, indicating therein the number of
clearances/permits issued and the number of applications denied. The report shall state the
reasons for denial of an application and the corresponding follow-up actions taken and shall
be accompanied by an inventory of the articles to be sold or offered for sale in his
jurisdiction.
2. The INP District Superintendent shall, on the basis of the reports submitted by the Station
Commander, in turn submit quarterly reports to the appropriate INP Director containing a
consolidation of the information stated in the reports of Station Commanders in his
jurisdiction.
3. Reports from INP District Superintendent shall serve as basis for a consolidated report to
be submitted semi-annually by INP Directors to the Director-General, Integrated National
Police.
4. In all cases, reports emanating from the different levels of the Integrated National Police
shall be accompanied with full and accurate inventories of the articles acquired from
unlicensed dealers or suppliers and proposed to be sold or offered for sale in the jurisdictions
covered by the report.
These implementing rules and regulations, having been published in a newspaper of national
circulation, shall take effect on June 15, 1979.