CRIMES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER
FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor
of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it
as many times.1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on
the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic
freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was
allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his
petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The
additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that
the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an
arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
SEY BERAMO
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure
intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved
their competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
declared for a unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by
recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the
power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.
Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized
as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical
school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case
is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as
noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is
sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things,
of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in
particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given
the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the
United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in
other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking
into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we
are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end
of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of
the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who
would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
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CRIMES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not
applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and
said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The
issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at
least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule.
The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical
profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the
power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed
are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is
the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is
not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and
health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the
law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical
schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be
doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional
right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved;
and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the
responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or,
no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who
wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of
course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his
entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist
cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be
for others.
SEY BERAMO
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course
of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better
prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our
already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him,
have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-
taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and
other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical
profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this
reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while
belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are
admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the
equal protection requires is equality among equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his
persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a
person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work
or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical
profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to
succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to
quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent
talents toward what may even be a brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have
left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be
better as merchants.
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CRIMES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of
education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by
initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words
of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of
misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January
13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8919. September 28, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellees, vs. AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN alias
GUINITA, DIONISIO SARMIENTO, ARCADIO BALMEO, PATRICIO GONZALES, FLORENTINO
FLORES, CRISPIN ESTRELLA, FELIPE CALISON, PEDRO VILLAREAL, CLAUDIO REYES, “PETER
DOE” and “JOHN DOE” Defendant, AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN, Appellant.
DECISION
FELIX, J.:
At about 11:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary00 o’clock in the evening of November 5, 1953, the
reports of gunfire awaked the spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana Tadeo, the 4 minor
children and Cipriana’s mother, Monica del Mundo, in their house at barrio Tikiw, San
Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Whereupon, Vicente Pacson crossed the room and shouted to one Tata
Pisio that persons were going up their house and then hid himself inside the ceiling.
In the meantime, someone broke the wall of the kitchen at the back of the house, and a few
moments later a person suddenly entered the dining room and shouted that the door leading
to the living room be opened. As no one of the house members obeyed, the intruder
removed 3 board pieces in the wall and through the opening thus made he entered the living
room. The intruder who was armed with a hunting knife was recognized by Cipriana Tadeo to
be Agustin Mangulabnan, who was previously known to her. Agustin removed the iron bar
from the door leading to the balcony and after opening said door, 2 persons whose identity
has not been ascertained entered. Agustin then approached Cipriana Tadeo and snatched
from her neck one necklace valued P50 and also took from her person P50 in the paper bills
and P20 in silver coins. Meanwhile, one of the two unidentified marauders searched the
person of Monica del Mundo and took from her P200 in cash and in gold necklace valued at
P200. But not contented with the loot, the same individual asked from Monica del Mundo to
give her diamond ring which the latter could not produce, and for this reason, he strucked
her twice on the face with the butt of his gun. One of the small children of Vicente Pacson
who was terrified called to his mother and that unidentified person, irked by the boys
impudence, made a move to strike him, but Monica del Mundo warded off the blow with her
SEY BERAMO
right arm. At this juncture, the second unidentified individual put his companion aside the
climbing on the table, fired his gun at the ceiling. Afterwards, Appellant and his two
unidentified companion left the place.
After they were gone, Cipriana Tadeo called to her husband Vicente Pacson, and receiving no
answer she climbed the ceiling and she found him lying face downward already dead.
According to Dr. Vicente P. Llado, who performed the autopsy, Vicente Pacson sustained the
injuries described in his autopsy reports, which reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
November 6, 1953
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Post-mortem findings on cadaver Vicente Pacson, age-37 years, married, of barrio Tikiw, San
Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
Time take:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 8:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary20 a.m.
1. Entrance — fracture of the frontal region of head due to gunshot wound.
Exit — wound at left side of the head, about the upper portion of the left ear.
2. Entrance — gunshot wound, left lateral side of the left middle arm.
Exit — gunshot wound inner side of left arm.
3. Entrance — gunshot wound, left lateral of the left forearm.
Exit — gunshot wound, left inner side of the left forearm.
4. Entrance gunshot wound around 2 inches more or less above the middle of the right
clavicle.
Exit — gunshot would at the back in the region of the spinal cord between the two scapula.
Cause of death — severe hemorrhage due to go gunshot wound of the frontal region of the
forehead.
(Exhibit C).
The incident was reported to the police authorities that same evening and in the ensuing
investigation Cipriana Tadeo informed the Chief of Police that Agustin Mangulabnan was one
of the malefactors who entered their house. When the latter was investigated, he readily and
voluntarily subscribed before the Justice of the Peace of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, an
affidavit admitting his participation in the robbery and killing of Vicente Pacson (Exhibit A and
Page | 3
CRIMES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
B). Much later, however, he subscribed to another affidavit before the Clerk of Court wherein
he exculpated from any participation Crispin Estrella, one of those he implicated in his
previous affidavit, though admitting the truth of the other allegations contained therein
(Exhibit D).
As the result of the investigation conducted by the authorities a complaint was filed in the
Justice of the Peace Court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, against Agustin Mangulabnan alias
Guinita, a surrendered Huk and 10 other unidentified persons. But the complaint was
amended on January 13, 1954, to include Dionisio Sarmiento, together with Arcadio Balmeo,
Patricio Gonzales, Florentino Flores, Crispin Estrella, Pedro Villareal, Claudio Reyes, “Peter
Doe” and “John Doe”, who were still at large, as Defendants. After the preliminary
investigation the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
where Defendants were accused of robbery with homicide. In that Court, Agustin
Mangulabnan was found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify Monica del Mundo in the sum of P400; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryCipriana Tadeo in the sum of P132; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP6,000
to the heirs of Vicente Pacson, and to pay the costs. Defendant Dionisio Sarmiento was
acquitted while the information as against the other Defendants who continued to be at
large was dismissed for lack of evidence, with the proportionate part of the costs de officio.
Agustin Mangulabnan moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, but
the motion was denied for lack of merit. Hence his appeal which is now before Us.
The motion for a new trial was based on the affidavits of Dr. Numeriano D. Lustre, Marino
Ventura, Marcosa Mudlong and Patricio Gonzales but they were not really newly discovered
nor could they alter the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court. As stated by the Solicitor
General, it is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that before a new trial may be granted on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) That
the evidence was discovered after trial; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) That such evidence
could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence (U. S. vs. Tan Jonjua, 1 Phil. 51; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs.
Palanca, 5 Phil. 269; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. 188; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Zamora, 2 Phil. 582; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs.
Torrente, 2 Phil. 1); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (c) That is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching (U. S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 343), and of such a weight
that it would probably change the judgment if admitted (U. S. vs. Zamora, supra; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Alvarez, 3 Phil. 24; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Luzon,
supra.; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Hernandez 5 Phil. 429; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Magtibay, 17 Phil. 417; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs.
Tongco, 2 Phil. 189; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Cu- Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand People vs. Reyes, 71 Phil. 598). The motion for new trial did not
comply with these requisites and was properly denied by the trial Court.
SEY BERAMO
Appellant’s objection to the admissibility in evidence of post- morten report (Exhibit C) is
evidently untenable. The fact that it is a mere carbon copy is of no amount, for it has been
signed by the physician who executed the same and his signature was identified by him at
the witness stand. Furthermore, Appellant did not offer any objection to its admission when
it was presented in evidence at the hearing. His objection now comes too late (Hodges vs.
Salas et al., 63 Phil. 567; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Ong Shiu, 28 Phil. 242).
The lower court did neither err in rejecting Exhibit 1 for the defense. This is an affidavit
purportedly executed by Sgt. Adan Fernando of the Philippine Constabulary. The main
portion of it (quoted in Appellant’s brief, page 32, and appearing on page 21 of the record), is
as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The Chief of Police of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, who first arrived at the scene of the crime,
have already picked up the empty shells of Cal. 30, Carbine type and were delivered to Cpl.
Lopez, one of the investigators of our unit. Information revealed that Civilian Commando of
barrio Pulo, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, has something to do with the crime committed, so I
proceeded to barrio Pulo to confiscate their arms. Among those arms confiscated were those
registered under Pedro Villareal and Claudio Reyes and upon examination of the Ballistic
Experts in Camp Crame, it appeared positive as per Ballistic Report” (Exhibit 1).
As may be seen, the latter part of the aforequoted testimony of Sgt. Adan Fernando is
hearsay and, anyway, it is of no moment in the case at bar, because 2 of the 3 persons who
entered the dwelling of the spouses Pacson were unidentified.
There is no denial that the crime of robbery with homicides was committed as described in
the information. By Appellant’s own admission (Exhibit A and B) and the testimony of
Cipriana Tadeo, we cannot have any doubt as to Appellant’s participation in the execution
thereof. And as pointed out by the Solicitor General, Appellant and the rest of the
malefactors came together to the house of the offended parties to commit the robbery
perpetuated therein and together went away from the scene of the crime after its
perpetration. This shows conspiracy among the offenders which rendered each of them
liable for the acts of the others (People vs. Delgado, 77 Phil. 11).
Moreover, the record shows that Appellant participated in the criminal design to commit the
robbery with his co-Defendants (People vs. Flores, et al., G. R. No. L-231, August 21, 1946),
and it is settled rule in this jurisdiction that unity of purpose and action arising from a
common design makes all parties thereto jointly liable (U. S. vs. Matanug, 11 Phil. 188), each
being responsible for the result, irrespective of the character of their individual participation
(U. S. vs. Ramos, 2 Phil., 434).
It may be argued that the killing of Vicente Pacson undertaken by one of the 2 unidentified
persons who climbed up a table and fired at the ceiling, was an unpremeditated act that
surged on the spur of the amount and possibly without any idea that Vicente Pacson was
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CRIMES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
hiding therein, and that the English version of Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code,
which defines the special, single and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide only
punished any persons guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, but this English version of the
Code is a poor translation of the prevailing Spanish text of said paragraph, which reads as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“1. ° Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion del robo
resultare homicidio.”
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with
homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason of on the occasion of the
robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878,
quoted in 2 Hidalgo’s Penal Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal
speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also
held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of
September 9, 1886; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryOctober 22, 1907; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryApril 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be
produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained,
without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration (Decision
of January 12, 1889 — see Cuello Calon’s Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).
The crime committed in the case at bar, of which Appellant Agustin Mangulabnan is a co-
participant, is the crime of robbery with homicide covered by Article 294, No. 1, of the
Revised Penal Code and punished with reclusion perpetua to death. The commission of the
offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of
superior strength and with the aid of armed men, and in consonance with the provisions of
Article 63, No. 1 of the same legal body, Appellant should be sentenced to the capital
punishment, as recommended by the Solicitor General. However, as the required number of
votes for the imposition of the capital penalty has not been secured in this case, the penalty
to be imposed upon Agustin Mangulabnan is the next lower in degree or reclusion perpetua
(Section 9, Republic Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948).
Wherefore the decision appealed from being in accordance with law and the evidence, is
hereby affirmed with costs against Appellant. It is SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
SEY BERAMO
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony
of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the
circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other
evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We
think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the
evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt,
the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be
substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc
Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as
a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40
meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers'
mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small
room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch
running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part
of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and
height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the
door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the
door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like
the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other
openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for
the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat
up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by
the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way
into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was
very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his
feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just
above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the
darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the
person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the
light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by
the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell
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CRIMES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who
immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to
his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident
just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as
cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife
under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly
and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either
returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity.
Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino
Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest
house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino
and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few
moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and
upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the
stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and
Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he
did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of
their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself,
unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate,
and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or
say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military
hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the
trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years
and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act,
in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
SEY BERAMO
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle
to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if
the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or
"ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would
doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his
threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned
that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in
using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly,
without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither
the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger
at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on
the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that
there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or
the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he
would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but
which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the
true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think
there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal
liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the
offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent)
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CRIMES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM SEY BERAMO

"cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence;
and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by contrary shall appear.
him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509;
Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as
used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question
roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can
worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or
be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia,"
ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal
which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but
Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other
omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was
crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts
redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol.
constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in
1, p. 74.)
order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the
various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to
that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of
exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done
the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of
was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless
legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in
admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in
the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is
general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have
an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the
shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of
all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or
imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit. intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our
And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of
is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the
place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in
again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other.
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the
criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to
object of the crime.
the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows
the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever
greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil
done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the
corruption was of one particular form or another. necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission
punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

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CRIMES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following
language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence
in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary
question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential
element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from
an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is
equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts
shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal
intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts
contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and
imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in
meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of
criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more
than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further
and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent
without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in
contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to
believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not
merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the
American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice
aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being
understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying
SEY BERAMO
rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428
and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the
definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice
aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent,
we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare
exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an
act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases,
thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the
intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done
is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that
—
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is
the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal
system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent,
without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit
rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito
factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of
the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on
the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment
of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance
takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return
of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him
to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in
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CRIMES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea,
if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other
doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be
punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this
doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris
non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be
administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the
courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of
the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that
the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the
commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and
beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158,
notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to
be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the
mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is
simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300,
and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore,
requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of
abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or
mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's
Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact
as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily
relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his
part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the
circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44
Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.)
That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared
to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding
circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
SEY BERAMO
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence
of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on
which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is
legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent
person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-
defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently
sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse,
whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear
to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself
correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him
though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme
measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule
is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road,
"holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his
life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the
pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at
the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer
believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly
exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took
the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or
assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent
is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination)
overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the
"act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards
appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either
manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the
probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom.,
417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he
advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his
hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the
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CRIMES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of
B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would
have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must
require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how
the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-
defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing,
are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to
flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few
of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the
case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man
with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom
he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the
shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with
which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him
to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown
lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-
law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in
about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused,
who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law,
whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he
be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force
used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to
twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the
accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering,
from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised
from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked,
struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have executed
their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and
considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they
might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because
his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same
stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use
means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which
he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death,
SEY BERAMO
and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such
strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or
more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish,
and considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed
rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8
of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part
of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a
distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and
almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the
voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they
have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he
cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the
victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he
retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author
of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so
find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that
of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting
under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to
him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means
employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17,
1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large
stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires
what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would
be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four
individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men,
who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared
exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the
requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the
requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity
for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the
condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night
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CRIMES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of
his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that
the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault
he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed
to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves
to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had
the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal
liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened
his person and his property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed,
and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond
exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Department of Education vs. San Diego G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989
Fundamental Principles and State Policies: Rearing of the Youth
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the
National MedicalAdmission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner contends
he may not, under its rule that- Astudent shall be allowed only 3 chances to take the NMAT.
After 3 successive failures, a student shall not beallowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time. The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
Facts:
Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS Zoology.
The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he
applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid
rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test. In his
original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic
freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was
allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his
petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The
additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
SEY BERAMO
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom, due process
and equal protection.
Held:
No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the
admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and
preparation for a medical education.
Ratio:
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional
right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved;
and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the
responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or,
no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. The Court
feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of
the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and
promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is
noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is
intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not
qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The
only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another
calling that has not excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lack
luster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the
appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his
potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant
future. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never
have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could
be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and
enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best
suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with
mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but
because we are a nation of misfits.
People v Mangulabnan G.R. No. L-8919, September 28, 1956 Felix J.
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CRIMES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM SEY BERAMO

One Liner: Mangulabnan and friends entered the house of Sps. Pacson to rob from the
residents therein. Mangulabnan decided to shoot the ceiling where Vicente Pacson was
allegedly hiding which resulted to his death.
FACTS: November 5, 1953 @ 11 PM, Nueva Ecija: Reports of gunfire awoke the household of
Sps. Vicente and Cipriana Pacson, together with their 4 minor children, and mother in law
Monica del Mundo They saw persons entering their house. Vicente hid himself inside a
ceiling. Mangulabnan (armed with a hunting knife) and 2 persons entered the premises and
snatched the following items: From Cipriana a. Necklace @ P50 b. Money @ P50 paper bills
and P20 silver coins From del Mundo a. Money @ P200 b. Gold necklace @ P200 Co-principal
A demanded del Mundo to give her diamond ring, when she could not produce the same, she
was struck twice on the face with the end of the gun. One of the young children called to
their mother which irked Co-principal A and made to strike him. Lola Del Mundo warded the
blow with her right arm Co-principal B pulled A aside, climbed on top of the table and fired at
the ceiling. All 3 left afterwards. Cipriana called to her husband. When she did not receive
any response, she climbed the ceiling and found Vicente lying face downward already dead.
CFI convicted R with the crime of robbery with homicide; sentenced to RP. Dionisio
Sarmiento was acquitted while the information as against the other Defendants who
continued to be at large was dismissed for lack of evidence.
WON the complex crime of robbery with homicide can be charged against the defendants?
YES. As co-principal due to conspiracy. Robbery with homicide - Art. 294 (1): …crime of
robbery with homicide…any persons guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation…when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall
have been committed.” Essential: homicide would result from robbery - Immaterial that
death would supervene by mere accident provided homicide be produced by reason or on
occasion of the robbery - Only result is obtained without reference to circumstances, causes,
modes, or persons intervening in the commission - ACs: night-time, dwelling, abuse of
superior strength. Note: The original facts pointed to only 3 defendants but the information
was amended to include several others. The one who shot Vicente was not named, but since
the crime was a conspiracy, Mangulabnan may be implicated as a coprincipal.
should knock on the door and say his name. On the night of Aug. 14, 1908, Ah Chong, who
was alone in his room, was awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room.
The defendant called out twice, asking the identity of the person but heard no answer.
Fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, the defendant called out that he would kill
the intruder if he tried to enter. At that moment, the door was forced open and the
defendant was struck first above the knee by the edge of the chair. Because of the darkness
of the room, the defendant thought he was being hit by the intruder and tried to defend
himself by striking wildly at the intruder using a common kitchen knife which he kept under
his pillow. It turned out that the said intruder was actually the defendant’s roommate,
Pascual Gualberto. The roommate was brought to the military hospital where he died from
the effects of the wound the following day.
Issue:
WON the defendant was criminally liable for committing a felony.
Held:
Defendant was not criminally liable and exonerated. In order for mistake of fact to be held as
a valid defense, there has to be several requisites. One, that the act done would have been
lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be. Two, that the intention of the
accused in performing the act should be lawful, and lastly, that the mistake must be without
fault or carelessness on the part of the accused. In the case at bar, had the intruder been a
robber as the defendant believed him to be, then AhChong acted in good faith, without
malice or criminal intent, and would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability and that
he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness.

US v. Ah Chong GR No. L-5272, March 19, 1910

Facts:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in one of the Officers’ quarters at Fort
McKinley, Rizal Province. Together living with him in the said quarters was the deceased,
Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a houseboy. There had been several robberies in
Fort McKinley prior to the incident thus prompting the defendant and his roommate to
reinforce the flimsy hook used to lock the door of their room by placing a chair against it. The
defendant and the deceased had an understanding that when either returned at night, he

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