ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Every work accomplished is a pleasure-a sense of satisfaction. However, a number of people also motivate,
criticize and appreciate a work with their objective ideas and opinions. Hence, I would like to use this
opportunity to thank all, who have directly or indirectly helped me to complete this project study.

Firstly, I would like to thank my professor Dr.Shephali Yadav, for giving me this opportunity to do this
wonderful project and for his helpful comments that helped me to improve my project on the topic: “Courts
and Intent of Legislature”, which also helped me in doing a lot of research and I came to know about so many
new facts and rules related to Interpretation of Statutes.

The study related to this project has indeed helped me to explore more knowledgeable avenues related to my
subject of Interpretation of Statutes and I am sure it will help me in future.

I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me in finalizing this project, without whom this
project completion would not be possible and I feel fortunate enough to get their constant support and
encouragement.
Table of Content
 INTRODUCTION

We are living in a democratic world where people have rights and obligations toward the state as well as the
society. But, ‘How is this order maintained in the society?’ It is done because of the presence of ‘Law’. The
Law maintains an order for just and stable existence of the mankind because it is evident from the human
tendency that some kind of sanctions is necessary to regulate the behavior and it is done only by the presence
of ‘Laws’. This fact can also be proved if we go by the history of the mankind starting from Stone Age to the
Cyber Age. Law is that element which binds the members of the community together in their adherence to
recognized values and standards.

The Law derives its presence in society from various source like Customs, Precedents and Legislations. But,
the most authentic and reliable source among all sources, is ‘Statutes’ or popularly known as ‘Enacted laws,
Modern acts and rules’. These are made by the parliament in consideration of the demand of the hour and the
need of the society. These are used as the primary source by any judicial authority for dispensing justice in
their day to day operation ranging from the smallest Magistrate Court to the Supreme Court of India. Each and
every judicial and administrative body works as per the enacted laws, prescribed rules and regulations.

But, there is a problem with this source of law and that is with the change of time, the society changes and this
finally changes the mindset, leading to a need for its interpretation by the courts. These enacted laws, specially
the Modern Acts and rules, are drafted by legal experts and it is expected that the language used in that
particular statute will leave little room for interpretation or construction. But, the reality is different as those
persons who bear this task of application of law, finds difficulty in interpreting the meaning of the ambiguous
words and expressions while resolving the inconsistencies. The main reason for such problem is the
indifference in the person who drafts the law and the person who applies the law in working. Thus, to address
this problem of application of enacted laws certain rules of ‘Interpretation’ or construction has been formulated
and one is ‘Intention of Legislature’.

This interpretation or construction of statute by the court is done when it cannot go through the ordinary rules
of interpretation then the court do it by just looking at the intention of legislature and it is derived from the
words of the statute which was used while enacting the statute.

But, if we go by the Indian context, courts have often gone beyond the words of the statute and interpreted
statutory provisions in a manner as to what they considered as be socially and morally sound. This is the main
reason that judicial activism has been praised and the slight circumvention of the canons of interpretation has
been ignored in the Indian Judicial system. But, such “activism” brings into question as to, what is the
theoretical binding value of legislative intent? This gave rise to an issue that whether the role of legislative
intent in statutory construction has over the years dwindled considerably or not. But, we will do it later on;
first of all we will look what is the concept behind this intention of legislature and interpretation of statutes.
We all know that, a statute is understood as the edict of the Legislature. However, the extent to which the
legislature’s intent shapes the understanding and implementation of a statute is indeterminate. The binding
value of legislative intent varies with time as well as across jurisprudences. In India, in a time where judicial
activism is hailed as the protective force behind the rights of the citizenry, it becomes necessary to evaluate
the role of legislative intent in statutory interpretation. So, in this project study, we will look toward the issue
for understanding how court is using this intention of legislature for doing interpretation.
 INTERPREATATION OF STATUTE

We all know that, ‘Words spoken or written are the means of communication’. Where they are possible of
giving one and only one meaning there is no problem. But where there is a possibility of two meanings, a
problem arises and the real intention is to be sorted out by the court. If two persons communicating with each
other are sitting together; they can by subsequent conversation clear the confusion and make things clear. But
what will happen if a provision in any statute is found to convey more than one meaning? The Judges and the
Lawyers whose duty it is to interpret and to aid in interpretation of statutes have no opportunity to converse
with the Legislature which had enacted a particular statute. The Legislature, after enacting statutes becomes
functus officio so far as those statutes are concerned. It is not their function to interpret the statutes. Thus two
functions are clearly demarcated. Legislature enacts and the Judges interpret.

The difficulty with Judges is that they cannot say that they do not understand a particular provision of an
enactment. They have to interpret in one way or another. They cannot remand or refer back the matter to the
Legislature for interpretation. That situation led to the birth of principles of interpretation to find out the real
intent of the Legislature. Consequently, the Superior Courts had to give us the rules of interpretation to ease
ambiguities, inconsistencies, contradictions or lacunas. The rules of interpretation come into play only where
clarity or precision in the provisions of the statute are found missing.

Good enactments are those which have least ambiguities, inconsistencies, contradictions or lacunas. Bad
enactments are gold mine for lawyers because for half of the litigation the legislative draftsmen are
undoubtedly the cause.

The purpose of the interpretation of the statute is to unlock the locks put by the Legislature. For such unlocking,
keys are to be found out. These keys may be termed as aids for interpretation and principles of interpretation.
The aids for interpretation may be divided into two categories, namely, Internal and External aids for
interpretation.

The Internal Aids are those which are found within the statute. They may be as follows: - 1. Long title 2.
Preamble 3. Chapter Headings 4. Marginal Notes to every section of statute. 5. Punctuations. 6. Illustrations
given below the sections. 7. Definitions. 8. Provisos. 9. Explanation. 10. Saving Clauses and non-obstante
Clauses.

External Aid for interpretation are those which are not contained in the statute but are found else-where. They
may be as follows: - 1. Historical background. 2. Statement of objects and reasons. 3. The original Bill as
drafted and introduced. 4. Debates in the Legislature. 5. State of things at the time a particular legislation was
enacted. 6. Judicial construction. 7. Legal dictionaries. 8. Commonsense.
 COURTS&INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE

The first and the foremost step to understand this topic is to understand, what the Intention of Legislature
island how court uses this for interpretation of statutes. If we define it in a general sense, “Legislative intent
as such is nothing more than the purpose the legislature had in mind as to the meaning and implication of the
words of a statute while framing it”. In general the purpose behind framing any statute is to curb some public
evil or effectuate some public benefit.1 With this in mind, the legislature is presumed to garner certain meaning
to the words of a statute. A statute must be rendered in accordance with such meaning.

When we interprets a statute we go by the Rules of Interpretation and these rules are used to gather the facts
which are later processed to clear the vagueness of the statute and giving a meaning to the ambiguous word or
phrase. In general parlance this process of interpretation is done going just by the words of the statute but
sometimes the statute itself is open to more than one interpretations. Then, what is the resort to the court. In
this situation the Court has to choose the ‘Intention of Legislature’ used in enacting a statute and specifically
that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature,2 so court will always look to the ‘legal
meaning’ or ‘true meaning’ of the statutory provision. Under these conditions the legislative intent of the
legislature in enacting legislation is considered.

The judiciary does so in the following provided reasons:

 When the ‘Words’ are imperfect symbols to communicate intent. They are ambiguous and change in
meaning over time, does not appear to be directly or adequately addressing a particular issue and when
there appears to have been a legislative drafting error.
 Unforeseen situations are inevitable, and new technologies and cultures make application of existing
laws difficult.
 Uncertainties may be added to the statute in the course of enactment, such as the need for compromise
or catering to special interest groups.

But, when a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts have said, repeatedly, that the inquiry into legislative
intent ends at that point.

Thus, we can say that the intention of the legislature is to be construed only when there is a possibility that
two different interpretations are arising otherwise not and this intention has to be essentially constructed of
two aspects: the ‘concept of meaning’, i.e., what the words mean and in the another aspect, it conveys the
‘concept of purpose and object’ or the ‘reason and spirit’ pervading through the statute. The former connotes

1
United Bank of India, Culcutta v. Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 2957.
2
Venkataswami Naidu, R v. Narasarn Naraindas,AIR 1966 SC 361.
an understanding derived from the literal meaning of the words of a statute. The latter points to the spirit and
reason pervading through the statute.3The process of construction, therefore, combines both the literal and
purposive approaches. In other words the legislative intention, i.e., the true or legal meaning of an enactment
is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose
or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed. Thus, the courts
have to keep these aspects in mind while reading a statute; and are aided in this task by certain sources of
legislative intent. These popularly include:4

1. The text of the statute as proposed to the legislature.

2. Proposed amendments to the statute, whether accepted or rejected, with reasons thereof.
3. The record of hearings on the topic.
4. Legislative records or journals.
5. Speeches and parliamentary debates made prior to the vote on the bill.
6. Legislative subcommittee (such as Standing Committee) minutes, factual findings, and/or reports
7. Other relevant statutes that can be used to understand the definitions in the statute on question; for
example the General Clauses Act, 1897.
8. Other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in question; such as previous statutes on
the same matter.
9. Legislative files of the executive branch, such as the governor or president.
10. Case law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the problems or issues the legislature
was attempting to tackle with the statute.
11. Constitutional determinations
12. Legislative intent, which is the reason for passing the law

So, it can be said that this expression ‘Intention of legislature’ is a shorthand reference to the meaning of the
words used by the Legislature objectively determined with the guidance furnished by the accepted principles
of interpretation. This is crucial because if one may gather the true intent behind something then it might
become easy for doing interpretation of that particular word or phrase of the statute.

This is done by judges when they place themselves into the situation when that legislation was being drafted
because we know that a statute is an edict of the Legislature 5 and if they could ascertain the mind map of the
legislature only then it becomes possible in what sense that word or phrase in the statute which is important to
impart justice fairly. So, it is the prime reason that this conventional way of interpretation of a statute is done
according to the ‘intention’ of those persons who make it. Salmond has also said that, it is the ‘duty of the

3
Guru Prasanna Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 12th Ed., 12 (2010).
4
Yule Kim, CRS Report for Congress, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends (2008).
5
Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (Pvt) Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamp, AIR 1968 SC 102.
judicature to act upon the true intention of legislature- the mens or sentential legis’. By this he tried to convey
that, “the object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it”. Thus, we
can say that this expression ‘intention of legislature’ is a shorthand reference to the meaning of the words used
by the legislature objectively determined with the guidance furnished by the accepted principles of
interpretation.6

Now, the importance of this subject is considerable because the primary function of modern appellate courts
is the interpretation of statutes, and it is conventional for courts to make use of the rules in the course of
interpretation. Our law has gradually developed a vast body of authority pertaining to statutory interpretation.
Some of the rules in this law are very ancient, others rather recent. Most of this authority is applicable to
statutes in any field; some of it only to one field, such as criminal law or constitutional law. Nearly all of it is
entirely judge made, although a few rules of interpretation appear in the general statutes of most states.7

The words "rules of statutory interpretation" are used loosely in this article to include any of the legal principles
and concepts devoted to the meaning of statutes. Some of these rules are frequently referred to by the courts
as canons of construction. The ostensible purpose of every rule is to clarify statutory meaning. The appellate
courts of all the states have used substantially all of these rules at one time or another.

Most rules of statutory interpretation can be classified in one of two ways: those concerned with relations
between the words of a statute; and those concerned with the relation of the words in a statute to outside
materials. In addition, there is a scattering of rules that do not fit either of these major categories.

Thus, as stated above, certain principles of interpretation as formulated by the Superior Courts to find out the
‘real intent of the Legislature’ may be enumerated as follows: -

1. Literal construction: In construing a statutory provision the first and the foremost rule of construction is
that of literal construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is, what does the provision say? The
Courts are bound by the mandate of the Legislature and once it has expressed its intention in words which
have a clear significance and meaning, the Court is precluded from speculating.

If the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision the legislative intent is clear, the other rules of
construction of statutes need not be called into aid. They are called into aid only when the legislative intention
is not clear. But the courts would not be justified in so straining the language of the statutory provision as to
ascribe the meaning which cannot be warranted by the words employed by the Legislature. If the words are
clear, they must be applied, even though the intention of the legislator may have been different or the result is
harsh or undesirable. The literal rule is what the law says instead of what the law was intended to say.

6
R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment exparte Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All ER 195.
7
Quintin Johnstone, “An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation”, 2 YLJ 1-2 (1954).
2. No external aid Where words plain and unambiguous:
Where the words of a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous, the intention of the Legislature is to be
gathered from the language of the statute itself and no external aid is admissible to construe those words. It is
only where a statute is not exhaustive or where its language is ambiguous, uncertain, clouded or susceptible
of more than one meaning or shades of meaning that the external aid may be looked into for the purpose of
ascertaining the object which the Legislature had in view in using the words in question.

3. Mischief rule (Heydon's case):

When a question arises as to the interpretation to be put on an enactment, what the Court is to do is to ascertain
"the intent of them that make it," and that must of course be gathered from the words actually used in the
statute. That, however, does not mean that the decision should rest on a literal interpretation of the words used
in disregard of all other materials. The literal construction, then, has, in general, but prima facie preference.
Legislative intent is determined by examining secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law
review articles and corresponding statutes.
The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it allows him
to effectively decide on Parliament's intent. It can be argued that this undermines Parliament's supremacy and
is undemocratic as it takes law-making decisions away from the legislature.
To arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of
the whole Act; to consider:
1. What was law before the Act was passed?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the law had not provided?
3. What remedy Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease? And
4. The true reason of the remedy and then the judges have to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the
mischief.

4. Words coupled together to take colour from each other:

The rule is when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they
are understood to be used in their cognate sense and they take their colour from each other, the meaning of the
more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. This rule, however, does not
apply where the Legislature has deliberately used wider words in order to widen the scope of the provision.
5. The golden rule: No hypothetical considerations-
Argument on hypothetical considerations should not have much weight in interpreting a statute. However, if
the language so permits, it is open to the Court to give to the statute that meaning which promotes the benignant
intent of the legislation. A Court has the power to depart from the grammatical construction, if it finds that
strict adherence to the grammatical construction will defeat the object the Legislature had In view. No doubt,
grammar is a good guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate.

6. Absurdity or hardship:
If a literal interpretation of a statute leads to absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not Intended, then a
construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the
sentence. Again, however, the Court has no power to give the language of the statute a wider or narrower
meaning than the literal one, unless there is compelling reason to give such other meaning. If the language is
plain the fact that the consequence of giving effect to it may lead to some absurd result is not a factor to be
taken into account in interpreting a provision, as it is for the Legislature to step in and remove the absurdity.
If on either of two possible views hardship must result to one or the other party, then the considerations of
hardship ought to be ignored.

7. Contextual interpretation:
Although the meaning of the statutory provision has to be ascertained only from the words employed by the
Legislature, the set up' and context are also relevant for ascertaining what exactly was meant to be conveyed
by the terminology employed. The same words may mean one thing in one context and another in a different
context. In ascertaining the true intention, of the Legislature, the Court must not only look at the words used
by the Legislature but also have regard to the context and the setting in which they occur, The exact colour
and shape of the meaning of words in an enactment is not to be ascertained by reading them in isolation, The
provisions of the statutes which bear upon the same subject-matter must be read as a whole and in their entirety,
each throwing light on and illumining the meaning of the other. The Court must have regard to the aim, object
and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety. It must ascertain the intention of the Legislature by directing
its attention not merely to the clause to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with
the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause to be Interpreted occurs. If the context clearly
suggests that a particular rule of grammar is inapplicable then the requirement of context must prevail over
the rule of grammar.

8. Liberal construction:
In construing a provision of a statute the Court should be slow to adopt construction which tends to make any
part of the statute meaningless or ineffective. An attempt must always be made to reconcile the relevant
provision as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. Where the literal meaning of the words used in a
statutory provision would manifestly defeat its object by making a part of it meaningless and ineffective, it is
legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the
statute and to make the whole of it effective and operative. Whether the narrower or the wider sense of a term
should be adopted depends not only on the provisions of the statute in which that term occurs but also on facts
and circumstances of each case. But again if the words used in the statutory provision are reasonably capable
of only one construction the doctrine of liberal construction can be of no assistance. Procedural enactments
should be construed liberally in such a manner as to render the enforcement of substantive rights effective.
But the requirements as to the time-Limit within which an administrative act is to be performed are to be
liberally construed. Provisions ensuring the security of fundamental human rights must, unless the mandate be
precise and unqualified, be construed liberally so as to uphold the right. This rule applies to the interpretation
of constitutional and statutory provisions alike. Welfare, social and beneficial statutes are not to be construed
strictly. Doubts are resolved in favour of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute is enacted. On the
other hand penal and taxing statutes and statutes excluding Court's jurisdiction should be strictly construed.

9. Harmonious construction:
Every statute has to be construed as a whole and the construction given should be a harmonious one. It is a
cardinal rule of construction that when there are in a statute two provisions which are in such conflict with
each other, that both of them cannot stand together, they should possibly be so interpreted that effect can be
given to both and that a construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should not be
adopted except in the last resort. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid conflict between two provisions, and
whenever it is possible to do so to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. This
rule of harmonious construction applies not only to different provisions in one Act but also to different cognate
Acts such as the Court Fees Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. Where, however, the words of the statute
are not reasonably capable of the construction canvassed, then It would be unreasonable and illegitimate for
the Court to limit the scope of those words - arbitrarily solely for the purpose of establishing harmony between
the assumed object and the scheme of the Act.

10. Construction to avoid invalidity:

It is the duty of the Court to endeavour as far as possible to construe a statute in such a manner that the
construction results in validity rather than its invalidity and gives effect to the manifest Intention of the
Legislature enacting that statute. An interpretation leading to the failure of the plain intention of the Legislature
by reason of a slight in exactitude in the language of the provision should be avoided. A statute is designed to
be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission
or clear direction makes that end unattainable.
The reason behind the maxim is that it is to be presumed that the Legislature or other legislative authority
would not make an infructuous or unconstitutional provision. The words of a statute must be construed so as
to give sensible meaning to them. An interpretation which would defeat the purpose of the statutory provision
and, in effect obliterate it from the statute book should be eschewed. If more than one construction is possible,
the one which preserves its workability and efficacy should be preferred to the other which would render it
otiose or sterile.
Thus, an Act of Legislature must be so interpreted, wherever possible, so as to make it constitutional rather
than unconstitutional. Likewise, a rule, i.e. a piece of delegated legislation, should be so interpreted as to make
it not only constitutional but also within the authority conferred by the Legislature on the Government while
conferring on it the power to make rules.

11. Reading down:

While making such construction it is permissible for the Court even to "read down" a provision in order to so
understand it as not to attempt something beyond the competence of the legislative body. This is called the
principle of "reading down".

12. Ejusdem generis:

The ejusdem generis rule is explained in Halsbury's Laws of England thus-
'"As a rule, where in a statute there are general words following particular and specific words, the general
words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified, although this, as a rule of construction;,
must be applied with caution, and subject to the primary rule that statutes are to be construed in accordance
with the intention of Parliament. For the ejusdem rule to apply, the specific words must constitute a category,
class or genus; if they do constitute such a category, class or genus, then only things which belong to that
category, class or genus fall within the general words".

13. Same words, same meaning:

Where a Legislature uses same expression in the same statute at two places or more, then the same
interpretation should be given to that expression unless the context otherwise requires. But the application of
the rule of "same word, same meaning" may be excluded by the context. If one construction will lead to an
ambiguity while another will give effect to what common sense would show was obviously Intended, the
construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected even if same words used in the same
section and even in the same sentence have to be construed differently.
14. Later law abrogates earlier laws not consistent with It:
This principle is expressed in the Latin maxim posteriores leges priores contrarias abrogant. This principle
has been applied by the Supreme Court in several cases. After discussing the principles of interpretation it
would also be useful to discuss about mandatory and directory provisions.

Mandatory and Directory Provisions: The study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead to
formulation of any universal rule except this that language alone most often is not decisive. The use of words
'shall' and 'may' is not the determinant factor. Regard must be given to the context, subject matter and object
of the statutory provision in question, in determining whether the same is mandatory or directory.
But, Court has to always took into consideration that they didn’t start doing legislative function in the form of
the interpretation or in the disguise of interpretation and they must avoid the danger of an a prioridetermination
of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into
which the provision is to be interpreted is somewhat how fitted.8

This only means that judges cannot interpret statutes in the light of their views as to policy; but they can adopt
a purposive interpretation if they can find in the statute read as a whole or in the material to which they are
permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression of Parliament’s purpose or policy.

As warned by LORD SCARMAN that, “Judges have no doubt a genuine creative role but the Constitution’s
separation of powers, or more accurately functions, must be observed if the judicial independence is not to be
put at risk. For if the people and Parliament come to think that the judicial power is to be confined by nothing
other than the judge’s sense of what is right, confidence in the judicial system will be replace by the fear of it
becoming uncertain and arbitrary in its application.

Thus, the judges have to be conscious in their task of interpreting and applying a statute, that in the end the
statute is the master and not the servant of the judgement and that ‘no judge has choice between implementing
the law and disobeying it’.

8
D.A. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commissioner, AIR 1977 SCC 842, page 853, 854.
 CONCLUSION

“Errors are committed by the humans and Errors are corrected by the humans, so better to learn from the past
and make future better because Justice is all what humanity wants from the Judicial System.”

Hence, we can conclude that the usage of intention of the legislature by the court should be justified by proper
reasons and its usage should not be left open to each and every statute. We all know that court is assigned this
task of statutory interpretation but it should always be done with proper care and caution taking care of all the
rules of construction. This is because the court can always go to interpret in its own way as to what considers
to them right. So, it should always be taken in care that the statute gets that interpretation which first derives
from the word used under it and then a recourse can always be made toward the object and reason for finding
out the intention of legislature in enacting the statute.

There can be different statutes where intention can be looked upon but in the case of ‘Taxation’ and ‘Penal
Code’ statutes the intention is never looked by the court. The interpretation of these statutes is different from
the ordinary statutes because here we have clear provisions as to what impose tax or liability on certain subjects
and if it is not so, then it is better to left it on the legislature because the matter of Taxation and Penal Statute
is directly related to public policy and the people will be the ultimate sufferer in case the interpretation goes
in the wrong way. This is the main reason that both of these statutes should be clear for interpretation because
if it is ambiguous or unclear then there will be no interpretation. In these statutes the court does not give effect
to each and every word and court will only interpret if that is Crystal clear and thus in case of ambiguity the
court doesn’t looks toward the aim & objective of the statute but will always look into the enacting provisions
of the statute. In these statutes the court only applies the Literal interpretation by restraining the words of the
statute and by taking a popular or ordinary meaning of that word in the statute but in otherwise the court does
not apply any canon of construction for interpretation of statute.

Thus, it is to be taken care of by the court that they should move at that path where justice is provided taking
care of the all the care of all the rules of construction. In Law every word has a meaning and we all know that
law is a world of words. So, you cannot expect to interpret in that way that the interpretation itself becomes
outside the scope and beyond the reach of the objectives and reasons for which the statute was enacted in the
legislature. So, this task of the court should be rest on the shoulders of the learned council and the judges
because of whom suggestions and understanding this all construction is possible in case of any statute or
constitutional provision.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:

1. Justice G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th edn, Lexis Nexis Publications 2016).

2. Dr. M.P. Tandon, Interpretation of Statutes & Legislation (12th edn, Allahabad Law Agency 2016).

Website references:

1. Legislative Intent in Interpretation of Statutes, available at: https(Visited on October 26, 2016).

2. Judicial Interpretation, available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_interpretation (Visited on

October 27, 2016).

3. Statutory Interpretation, available at: http://www.ijtr.nic.in/articles/art21.pdf (Visited on October 29,

2016).

4. Google Scholar-Legislative Intent, available at:

https://scholar.google.co.in/scholar?start=10&q=courts+and+intention+of+the+legislature+in+enacting
+the+statute&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5 (Visited on October 30, 2016).