106 Hontiveros Vs RTC

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340 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Hontiveros vs. Regional
Trial Court, Br. 25, Iloilo
City
*
G.R. No. 125465. June 29, 1999.
SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS,

petitioners, vs.REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES
GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON, respondents.
Appeals; Petitions for Review; Pleadings and Practice; Direct appeals to the Supreme
Court from the trial court on questions of law have to be through the filing of a petition for
review on certiorari.—The petition in this case was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. As explained in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals: Under Section 5, subparagraph (2)(e), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify,
or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in
___________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
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which only an error or question of law is involved. A similar provision is contained in

Section 17, fourth paragraph, subparagraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by
Republic Act No. 5440. And, in such cases where only questions of law are involved,
Section 25 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in
conjunction with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5440, provides that the appeal to the
Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court from the trial
court on questions of law have to be through the filing of a petition for review on certiorari.
Actions; Dismissals of Actions; The court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without
violating the plaintiff’s right to be heard; Exceptions.—There are instances when the trial
court may order the dismissal of the case even without a motion to that effect filed by any
of the parties. In Baja v. Macandog, this Court mentioned these cases, to wit: The court
cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without violating the plaintiff’s right to be heard, except
in the following instances: if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial; if he fails to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or if he fails to comply with the
rules or any order of the court; or if the court finds that it has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit.
Same; Judgment on the Pleadings; Where there are actual issues raised in the answer,
such as one involving damages, which require the presentation of evidence and assessment
thereof by the trial court, it is improper for the judge to render judgment based on the
pleadings alone.—Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after the
answer is filed, the trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the
pleadings filed by a party. Where there are actual issues raised in the answer, such as one
involving damages, which require the presentation of evidence and assessment thereof by
the trial court, it is improper for the judge to render judgment based on the pleadings alone.
In this case, aside from the amount of damages, the following factual issues have to be
resolved, namely, (1) private respondent Teodora Ayson’s participation and/or liability, if
any, to petitioners and (2) the nature, extent, and duration of private respondents’
possession of the subject property. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied petitioners’
motion for judgment on the pleadings.
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Same; Verifications; Jurisdiction; The absence of the verification required in Article
151 of the Family Code does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter
of the complaint; If the court doubts the veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made
to settle the case among members of the same family, it could simply order the petitioners
to verify them.—The trial court erred in dismissing petitioners’ complaint on the ground
that, although it alleged that earnest efforts had been made toward the settlement of the case
but they proved futile, the complaint was not verified for which reason the trial court could
not believe the veracity of the allegation. The absence of the verification required in Art.
151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the complaint.
The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the
allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the same family, it
could simply have ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court has already ruled, the
court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served. Otherwise, mere
suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial court as to the truth of the allegation that earnest
efforts had been made toward a compromise but the parties’ efforts proved unsuccessful is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown that such efforts had not
really been exerted would the court be justified in dismissing the action.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Persons and Family Relations;Words and
Phrases; The inclusion of parties who are not members of the same family takes the case
out of the ambit of Article 151 of the Family Code; The phrase “members of the same
family” refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants,
and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood, but does not include “brothers-in-law”
and “sisters-in-law.”—The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and
petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the
Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the
husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and
sisters, whether full or half-blood. As this Court held in Guerrero v. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br.
XVI: As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayonthat the enumeration
of “brothers and sisters” as members of the same family does not comprehend “sisters-in-
law.” In that case,
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then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that “sisters-in-law” (hence, also “brothers-
in-law”) are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same
11/16/2018 family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code CentralBooks:Reader
repeats essentially the same enumeration of
“members of the family,” we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter.
Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-
law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a
compromise before filing the present suit.
Same; Same; Same; Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given
any legal effect in this jurisdiction.—Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are
not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who
is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered
strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
Judicial Review; Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the
very lis mota of the case.—Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of
the Family Code on the ground that it in effect amends the Rules of Court. This, according
to them, cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in favor of the Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the conclusion we have
reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon this
question. Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the very lis
mota of the case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Iloilo City, Br. 25.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
Resurreccion S. Salvillafor private respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros,

filed a complaint for damages against pri-
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ANNOTATED
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vate respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
19504. In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel
of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz, as shown by OCT No. 0-
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2124, issued pursuant to the decision ofCentralBooks:Reader
the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated
April 12, 1984, which modified the decision of the Court of1 First Instance of
Capiz, dated January 23, 1975, in a land registration case filed by private
respondent Gregorio Hontiveros; that petitioners were deprived of income from
the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case; that such income
consisted of rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year
from 1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that private
respondents filed the land registration
2
case and withheld possession of the land
from petitioners in bad faith.
In their answer, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged
that private respondent Hontiveros was a widower while private respondent Ayson
was single. They denied that they had deprived petitioners of possession of and
income from the land. On the contrary, they alleged that possession of the property
in question had already been transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by
virtue of a writ of possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of
the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, Mambusao, the return thereof having been
received by petitioners’ counsel; that since then, petitioners have been directly
receiving rentals from the tenants of the land; that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise
had been made, considering that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private
respondent Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers; that the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court in Land Registration Case No. N-581-25 was
_________________
1 Docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-581-25, LRC Rec. No. 288.
2 See Amended Complaint; Petition, Annex A; Rollo, pp. 28-30.
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null and void since it was based upon a ground which was not passed upon by the
trial court; that petitioners’ claim for damages was barred by prescription with
respect to claims before 1984; that there were no rentals due since private
respondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good faith and for value; and that
private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was not married
to private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any proprietary
interest in the subject property. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to private
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respondents by way of3 counterclaim, as CentralBooks:Reader
well as reconveyance of the subject land
to private respondents.
On May 16, 1991, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an
allegation that “earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made between the
parties but the same were unsuccessful.”
In due time, private respondents filed an Answer to Amended Complaint with
Counterclaim, in which they denied, among other things, that earnest efforts had
been made to reach a compromise but the parties were unsuccessful. On July 19,
1995, petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
private respondents’ answer did not tender 4
an issue or that it otherwise admitted
the material allegations of the complaint. Private respondents opposed the motion
alleging that they had denied petitioners’ claims5
and thus tendered certain issues
of fact which could only be resolved after trial.
On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion. At the same
time, however, it dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not
verified as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not
believe
_________________
3 See Amended Answer; Petition, Annex B; Rollo, pp. 31-35.
4 Petition, Annex C; Rollo, pp. 36-46.
5 Petition, Annex H.
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that earnest 6efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise. The order of the trial
court reads:
The Court, after an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both
parties, is of the opinion and so holds that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not
only for the fact that the defendants in their answer, particularly in its paragraph 3 to the
amended complaint, specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also
because of the ruling in De la Cruz vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 27759, April 17, 1970 (32 SCRA
307), citing Rili vs. Chunaco, 98 Phil. 505, which ruled that the party claiming damages
must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof and that though the rule is that failure to
specifically deny the allegations in the complaint or counter-claim is deemed an admission
of said allegations, there is however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegations
11/16/2018 refer to the amount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. This ruling is in accord
CentralBooks:Reader
with the provision of Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

That while the plaintiffs in their amended complaint allege that earnest efforts towards a
compromise with the defendants were made, the fact is that their complaint was not verified
as provided in Article 151 of the Family Code. Besides, it is not believed that there were
indeed earnest efforts made to patch up and/or reconcile the two feuding brothers, Gregorio
and Augusto, both surnamed Hontiveros.
The submission of the plaintiffs that, assuming no such earnest efforts were made, the
same is not necessary or jurisdictional in the light of the ruling in Rufino Magbaleta, et al.,
petitioners, vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, et al., respondents, No. L-44903, April 22, 1977,
is, to the mind of this Court, not applicable to the case at bar for the fact is the rationale in
that case is not present in the instant case considering these salient points:
a) Teodora Ayson, the alleged wife of defendant Gregorio Hontiveros and

allegedly not a member of the Hontiveros Family, is not shown to be
really the wife of Gregorio, a fact which Gregorio also denied in their
verified answer to the amended complaint;
b) Teodora Ayson has not been shown to have acquired any proprietary right
or interest in the land that was litigated by Grego
___________________
6 Id., Annex E.
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rio and Augusto, unlike in the cited case of Magbaleta where it was
shown that a stranger to the family acquired certain right;
c) In the decision rendered by the appellate court no mention was made at
all of the name of Teodora Ayson as part-awardee of Lot 37 that was
adjudged to Gregorio other than himself who was therein described as a
widower. Moreover, Teodora was never mentioned in said decision, nor
in the amended complaint and in the amended motion for judgment on
the pleadings that she ever took any part in the act or transaction that
gave rise to the damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs for which
they now claim some compensation.
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing premises, the Court orders, as it hereby
orders, the dismissal of this case with cost against the plaintiffs.
11/16/2018 SO ORDERED. CentralBooks:Reader
Petitioners moved
7
for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their motion
was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners contend:
I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN

DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THAT IT DOES
NOT ALLEGE UNDER OATH THAT EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARD
A COMPROMISE WERE MADE PRIOR TO THE FILING THEREOF
AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT
DENYING THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
AND ORDERING A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.
Private respondents raise a preliminary question. They argue that petitioners

should have brought this case on appeal to the Court of Appeals since the order of
the trial court judge was actually a decision on the merits. On the other hand, even
if petition for certiorari were the proper remedy, they contend that the petition is
defective because
8
the judge of the trial court has not been impleaded as a
respondent.
_________________
7 Id., Annex F.
8 Comment/Answer, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 60-61.
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Private respondents’ contention is without merit. The petition in this case was
filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As explained 9 in Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals:
Under Section 5, subparagraph (2)(e), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme
Court is vested with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. A similar provision
is contained in Section 17, fourth paragraph, subaragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended by Republic Act No. 5440. And, in such cases where only questions of law are
11/16/2018 involved, Section 25 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing Batas Pambansa
CentralBooks:Reader
Blg. 129, in conjunction with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5440, provides that the appeal
to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court from the trial court on questions
of law have to be through the filing of a petition for review on certiorari. It has been held
that:
x x x when a CFI (RTC) adjudicates a case in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the correct mode
of elevating the judgment to the Court of Appeals is by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error,
involving merely the filing of a notice of appeal—except only if the appeal is taken in special
proceedings and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under the law, in which even the
filing of a record on appeal is additionally required. Of course, when the appeal would involve purely
questions of law or any of the other cases (except criminal cases as stated hereunder) specified in
Section 5(2), Article X of the Constitution, it should be taken to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court.
By way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of law, this Court issued on

March 9, 1990 Circular No. 2-90, paragraph 2 of which provides:
_________________
9 201 SCRA 51, 58-59 (1991).
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2. Appeals from Regional Courts to the Supreme Court.—Except in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be
appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the
clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be
taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that herein
petitioner adopted the correct mode of appeal in G.R. No. 88354 by filing with this Court a
petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in Civil
Case No. 25528 and raising therein purely questions of law.
10
In Meneses v. Court of Appeals, it was held:
It must also be stressed that the trial court’s order of 5 June 1992 dismissing the petitioner’s
complaint was, whether it was right or wrong, a final order because it had put an end to the
11/16/2018 particular matter resolved, or settled definitely the matter therein disposed of and left
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nothing more to be done by the trial court except the execution of the order. It is a firmly
settled rule that the remedy against such order is the remedy of appeal and not certiorari.
That appeal may be solely on questions of law, in which case it may be taken only to this
Court; or on questions of fact and law, in which case the appeal should be brought to the
Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Murillo v. Consul, the appeal to this Court should be by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
As private respondents themselves admit, the order of November 23, 1995 is a

final order from which an appeal can be taken. It is final in the sense that it
disposes of the pending action before the court and 11
puts an end to the litigation so
that nothing more was left for the trial court to do. Further-
__________________
10 237 SCRA 484, 491-492 (1994).
11 Allied Free Workers Union v. Judge Estipona, 113 Phil. 748 (1961).
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more, as the questions raised are questions of law, petition for review
on certiorari is the proper mode of appeal. These questions are: (1) whether after
denying petitioners’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court could
dismiss their complaint motu proprio for failure to comply with Art. 151 of the
Family Code which provides that no suit between members of the same family
shall prosper unless it appears from the complaint, which must be verified, that
earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but the same have failed;
and (2) whether Art. 151 applies to this case. These questions do not require an
examination of the probative value of evidence presented 12and the truth or
falsehood of facts asserted which questions of fact would entail.
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint when no motion to that effect was made by any of the parties. They
point out that, in opposing the motion for judgment on the pleadings, private
respondents did not seek the dismissal of the case but only the denial of
petitioners’ motion. Indeed, what private respondents asked was that trial be held
on the merits.
Of course, there are instances when the trial court may order the dismissal of
the case even without a motion to that effect filed by any of the parties. In Baja v.
13
13
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Macandog, this Court mentioned these cases, to wit:
CentralBooks:Reader
The court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without violating the plaintiff’s right to be
heard, except in the following instances: if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the
trial; if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or if he fails to
comply with the rules or any order of the court; or if the court finds that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
However, none of these exceptions appears in this case.
__________________
12 See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 195, 199 (1996).
13 158 SCRA 391, 396-397 (1986).
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Moreover, the trial court itself found that “judgment on the pleadings is
inappropriate not only for the fact that [private respondents] in their answer . . .
specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also because of the
[rule] . . . that the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount
thereof . . . .” Necessarily, a trial must be held.
14
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings.—Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegation of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on
motion of the party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is
filed, the trial court has 15the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the
pleadings filed by a party. Where there are actual issues raised in the answer, such
as one involving damages, which require the presentation of evidence and
assessment thereof by the trial court, 16it is improper for the judge to render
judgment based on the pleadings alone. In this case, aside from the amount of
damages, the following factual issues have to be resolved, namely, (1) private
respondent Teodora Ayson’s participation and/or liability, if any, to petitioners and
(2) the nature, extent, and duration of private respondents’ possession of the
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subject property. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied petitioners’ motion for
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judgment on the pleadings.

However, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners’ complaint on the
ground that, although it alleged that earnest efforts had been made toward the
settlement of the case but they proved futile, the complaint was not verified for
which
____________________
14 Now Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
15 1 V.J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines 1033 (1973).
16 Rocamora v. RTC, Cebu (Branch VIII), 167 SCRA 615 (1988); 1 M. V. Moran, Comment on the
Rules of Court538 (1967).
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reason the trial court could not believe the veracity of the allegation.
The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the complaint. The verification
is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which
are alleged are true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations
regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the same family, it
could simply have ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court has already
ruled, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on
it and waive
17
strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may
be served. Otherwise, mere suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial court as to
the truth of the allegation that earnest efforts had been made toward a compromise
but the parties’ efforts proved unsuccessful is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. Only if it is later shown that such efforts had not really been exerted would
the court be justified in dismissing the action. Thus, Art. 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed. It if is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case
must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code.
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Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in
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this case
18
since the suit is not exclusively among family members. Citing several
cases decided
_________________
17 See Vda. de Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 137 (1996); Sy v. Habicon-Garayblas, 228
SCRA 644(1993); Buenaventura v. Halili, 149 SCRA 22 (1987).
18 Magbaleta v. Gonong, 76 SCRA 511 (1977); Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104 (1970); Mendez v.
Eugenia, 80 SCRA 82 (1977); Gon
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by this Court, petitioners claim that whenever a stranger is a party in a case

involving family members, the requisite showing of earnest efforts to compromise
is no longer mandatory. They argue that since private respondent Ayson is
admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the
requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as
defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the
ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase “members
of the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants
19
and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether 20full or half-
blood. As this Court held in Guerrero v. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI:
As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of
“brothers and sisters” as members of the same family does not comprehend “sisters-in-
law.” In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that “sisters-in-law” (hence,
also “brothers-in-law”) are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of
the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same
enumeration of “members of the family,” we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence
on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a
brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts
towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
Religious relationship
21
and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in
this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the
complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner
11/16/2018 _________________ CentralBooks:Reader
zales v. Lopez, 160 SCRA 346 (1988); Guerrero v. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI, 229 SCRA 274 (1994).
19 Family Code, Art. 150.
20 229 SCRA 274, 278 (1994).
21 1 A.M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 504
(1990).
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Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for

purposes of Art. 151.
Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code
on the ground that it in effect amends the Rules of Court. This, according to them,
cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in favor of the Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the conclusion
we have reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to
pass upon this question. Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless
they are the very lis motaof the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order, dated November 23,
1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25 is SET ASIDE and the
case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Puno, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, order set aside. Case remanded to trial court for further
proceedings.
Notes.—Earnest efforts towards a compromise is a condition precedent to

filing of suits between members of the same family, non-compliance of which,
complaint is assailable at any stage of the proceedings for lack of cause of action.
(O’Laco vs. Co Cho Chit, 220 SCRA 656[1993])
A brother-in-law is not a member of the family of his wife and is outside the
scope and coverage of Article 222 of the Civil Code requiring that the same
members of a family should exert efforts to bring about a compromise before the
commencement of a litigation. (Esquivias vs. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA
803 [1997])
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106 Hontiveros Vs RTC

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106 Hontiveros Vs RTC

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340 SUPREME COURT

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS,

VOL. 309, 341

Hontiveros vs. Regional

which only an error or question of law is involved. A similar provision is contained in

Hontiveros vs. Regional

VOL. 309, 343

Hontiveros vs. Regional

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros,

344 SUPREME COURT

VOL. 309, JUNE 29, 345

346 SUPREME COURT

with the provision of Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

a) Teodora Ayson, the alleged wife of defendant Gregorio Hontiveros and

VOL. 309, JUNE 29, 347

I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN

Private respondents raise a preliminary question. They argue that petitioners

348 SUPREME COURT

By way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of law, this Court issued on

VOL. 309, JUNE 29, 349

As private respondents themselves admit, the order of November 23, 1995 is a

350 SUPREME COURT

However, none of these exceptions appears in this case.

VOL. 309, JUNE 29, 351

judgment on the pleadings.

Rules of Court538 (1967).

352 SUPREME COURT

Eugenia, 80 SCRA 82 (1977); Gon

VOL. 309, JUNE 29, 353

by this Court, petitioners claim that whenever a stranger is a party in a case

354 SUPREME COURT

Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for

Bellosillo (Chairman), Puno, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Notes.—Earnest efforts towards a compromise is a condition precedent to

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