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KILOSBAYAN VS.

MORATO
G.R. NO. 118910. July 30, 1993
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA,
EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO,
JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE
CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP.
JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and
the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:

1. GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract between Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the provision
in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries through a
collaboration, association, or joint venture.
2. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and
accessories on January 25, 1995. The agreement are as follow:
4. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less than an annual
rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
5. Rent is computed bi-weekly.
6. Term is 8 years.
7. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.
8. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P25M.
3. Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because:
4. It is the same as the old contract of lease.
5. It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.
6. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been approved by the President and it
is not most advantageous to the government.
4. PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
0. ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract.
1. ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No. 301.
2. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of Directors of PCSO.
3. Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment.
4. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
5. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.

Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.
2. Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an online lottery is valid.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.


1. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved.
2. LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present
case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling
cannot be in any sense be regarded as “the law of this case”. The parties are the same but the cases
are not.
3. RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot still apply. An issue actually and
directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any
future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not
apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second
proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the
one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an
independent examination of the legal matters at issue.
4. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the
petitioner’s standing.
5. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually
involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are ‘real parties of interest’.
6. Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are
bound either principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract.
7. Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of
public contracts maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
2. Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
1. It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO now bears all losses because the operation of
the system is completely in its hands.
2. Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not inclined
to review.
3. Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt is
discussed in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.)
4. In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitioners state that this
would allow PGMC to control and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court held that the
claim is speculative. In any case, in the construction of statutes, the resumption is that in making
contracts, the government has acted in good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not
a reason for denying power.
5. It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO does not have the power to enter into any
contract which would involve it in any form of “collaboration, association, or joint venture” for
the holding of sweepstakes activities. This only mentions that PCSO is prohibited from investing
in any activities that would compete in their own activities.
6. It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does not compete with their own
activities. The Court held that is also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that the
transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited association with
the PGMC.
7. O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials
and equipment and not on the contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases are only for privately-
owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government owned buildings or spaces for
private use.

Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The motion for reconsideration of petitioners is
DENIED with finality.

IBP v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora et al. case brief summary


G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000

FACTS: President Joseph Estrada ordered the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine
National Police (PNP) in visibility patrols around Metro Manila to stem the tide of rising violence and
crime. In response to such order, the PNP through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay
issued Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 02/2000 which detailed the joint visibility patrols called Task Force
Tulungan. This was confirmed by a memorandum Pres. Estrada issued dated 24 January 2000. On
January 17, 2000, the IBP filed a petition to annul LOI 02/2000 arguing that the deployment of the
Marines is unconstitutional and is an incursion by the military on the civilian functions of government
as embodied in Article II, Sec. 3 and Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: (1) Does the IBP have legal standing in the case at bar?
(2) Is the president’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces subject to judicial
review?
(3) Is the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP?

RULING: In the first issue, the IBP has failed to provide the requisites for legal standing in the case at bar in
that it has failed to conclusively prove that such deployment would harm the IBP in any way. It’s
contention that it is fighting to uphold the rule of law and the constitution is insufficient, too general
and too vague. As to the second issue, the Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor-
General that the president’s act is a political question beyond the authority of the Court to review
when the grant of power is qualified or subject to limitations, the issue becomes whether the
prescribed qualifications have been met, then it becomes a question of legality and not wisdom, so is
not a political question. It is then subject to the Court’s review power. As to the third issue, the
Marines only assist the PNP, the LOI itself provides for this. In fact, the PNP Chief is the leader of
such patrols and in no way places the over-all authority in the Marines.
Petition is dismissed.
Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner

Brief Fact Summary. A group of drug manufacturers challenged the authority of the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs to make regulations about labeling and advertising
prescription drugs under the amended Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The
challenge was brought prior to enforcement of the regulations.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Pre-enforcement review is appropriate where not
prohibited by the text of the Act itself, nor inconsistent with the legislative intent behind
the Act. There is an actual case or controversy where there has been a “final agency
decision”� and withholding judicial consideration will result in hardship to the parties.

Facts. Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in 1962 to
require manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the “established name”� (generic
name) of the drug prominently and in type at least half as large as the type used for
the “proprietary name”� (brand name) on labels and other printed material. The
purpose was to inform doctors and patients of drugs’ established names so that they
could be purchased at lower prices. The Commissioner of Food and Drugs published
proposed regulations (in addition to the Act) which required all drug labels and drug
advertisements to put the established name next to the proprietary name every time
the proprietary name appeared. A group of 37 drug manufacturers (the Petitioners)
challenged the regulations on the grounds that the Commissioner exceeded his
authority under the Act in issuing the regulations. The District Court granted injunctive
and declaratory relief against the Commissioner. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed, holding (1) that pre- enforcement review of the regulations was not
permitted by the Act, and (2) that no relief was available under the Administrative
Procedure Act because no actual case or controversy existed. The Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari.

Issues. Did Congress, by its Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, intend to forbid
pre-enforcement review of the sort of regulations promulgated by the Commissioner?
Were the issues ripe for judicial decision? Would withholding court consideration result
in hardship to the parties?

Held. Reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals to review the District Court’s
decision that the regulation was beyond the power of the commissioner. No. Nothing
in the Act itself precludes pre-enforcement review. A review of the legislative history
of the Act reveals that the specific review provisions were designed to provide an
additional remedy, and not to cut down more traditional channels of review. The Act
itself states, “The remedies provided for in this subsection shall be in addition to and
not in substitution for any other remedies provided by law.”� Yes, the issues
presented were ripe for judicial consideration, and withholding judicial consideration
would result in hardship to the parties. The parties agreed that the issue tendered was
a purely legal one. The regulations in issue were reviewable as a “final agency
action”� under the Administrative Procedure Act because “when, as here, they are
promulgated by order of the Commission and the expected conformity to them causes
injury cognizable by a court of equity, they are appropriately the subject of attack.”�
The regulations would have a direct day-to-day impact on the operation of the
companies, who either had to incur huge costs to comply with the regulations’
requirements or risk prosecution. Dissent. There were two unpublished dissents by
Mr. Justice Fortas and Mr. Justice Clark. Concurrence. None.

Discussion. Courts should look to the text of the statute itself, along with the
legislative history, to determine the intended application and scope. In this case, pre-
enforcement review was not precluded by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
Pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, there must be an actual case or
controversy in order for the Supreme Court of the United States to grant certiorari.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, “final agency actions”� are considered ripe
for judicial review. Here, the Petitioners would have suffered an operational and
financial hardship if judicial consideration was withheld.

Issue: WON the case is ripe for judicial determination.


ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES VS. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND BIENVENIDO ARCAYOS
G.R. NO. 130866
SEPTEMBER 16, 1998

Facts: Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes
for misappropriating funds worth Php 38,000 which was supposed to be taxes paid to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the dismissal was illegal,
respondent filed a case against St. Martin Funeral Homes in the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).

Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the respondent is not an
employee due to the lack of an employer-employee contract. In addition, respondent
is not listed on St. Martin’s monthly payroll.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that indeed, there was no
employer-employee relationship between the two and hence, there could be no illegal
dismissal in such a situation.

The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and
remanded the case to the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
but was denied by the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court –
alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s appeal/petition for certiorari was properly filed
in the Supreme Court.

Held: No.

Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the Secretary of Labor,
whose decisions are then appealable to the Office of the President. However, the new
rules do not anymore provide provisions regarding appellate review for decisions
rendered by the NLRC.

However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon themselves to review such
decisions from the NLRC by virtue of their role under the check and balance system
and the perceived intention of the legislative body who enacted the new rules.

“It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given
by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency
within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that
part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls
arbitrary and unjust adjudications.”

The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari
should have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle
of hierarchy of courts. As such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals.

Azores vs SEC

FactsL
Ptitioner wrote the Treasurer of the PCA, requesting change in his membership status from
resident to non-resident, in view of the fact that he had transferred residence to San Pablo.
The records do not show whether the request was granted, but petitioner claims that the
PCA later billed him as a non-resident member.

Petitioner filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a


complaint, praying for the replacement of his membership certificates and
his reinstatement as an active member upon payment of one month due for
every year of absence from the Philippines and for damages.
Petitioners complaint was referred to a Hearing Officer. After the parties
had submitted their pleadings and evidence, Hearing Officer Alberto P. Atas
rendered on August 5, 1992 a decision sustaining the PCA.5 Petitioner
moved for a reconsideration, but his motion was denied in an order
dated October 15, 1992. On October 20, 1992, he filed a Notice and
Memorandum of Appeal with the Hearing Officer. His appeal was, however,
dismissed on November 4, 1992 for having been filed out of time. Petitioner
filed on November 20, 1992 a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his
appeal. As his motion was denied, petitioner filed the present petition
for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not there were errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
Held: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. As such, even assuming that errors were
allegedly committed by the SEC en banc, the errors are not errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion. It is not disputed that, under the by-laws of the PCA, proprietary
membership is open only to Filipino citizens10 and that failure to pay dues for three
successive months result in the automatic termination of membership;11 that petitioner did
not pay his monthly dues from 1966 to 1981 when he worked in the United States; and that
he did not inform the PCA that he had obtained American citizenship. In this case for
certiorari we are limited to an inquiry into any jurisdictional errors of which we find none.

Villaruel vs NLRC

Facts: Private respondent Narciso Guarino started working as master baker at


petitioners bakery known as Ideal Bakery, receiving a daily wage and working with a
specified schedule. On 11 April 1991, private respondent was told by the petitioners
not to report for work anymore after he asked for a ten-peso increase of his daily wage.
Private respondent filed a complaint[2] before the Regional Office No. VI, Department
of Labor and Employment for recovery of wages, night shift differential, overtime
pay, and 13th month pay, which complaint was later amended[3] to include illegal
dismissal with reinstatement or separation pay, payment of backwages; service
incentive leave, moral, exemplary and actual damages plus attorneys fees.
Petitioner contends that he is not an employee but a partner in the bakery business
with a 50-50 sharing from the profits derived therefrom; that private respondent
abandoned his work when he failed to return from vacation; and that they were
surprised to know later that private respondent worked in another bakery which was
later known as 7-A.
Labor Arbiter Dennis D. Juanon rendered a decision[5] dismissing the complaint
for lack of merit. The labor arbiter ruled that there exists no employer-employee
relationship between the parties and that private respondents claim for illegal
dismissal and other money claims were without basis. Private respondent appealed to
the NLRC which reversed the labor arbiters decision. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari contending that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when:

1. it rendered its decision finding that private respondent was a regular


employee of petitioner and not a partner.

2. it found that private respondent did not abandon the partnership and transfer
to another bakery.

3. it directed the petitioners to pay private respondent salary differentials,


overtime pay, holiday premium, 13th month pay for 1988 to 1990 and night
shift differential.

Issue: W/N the jurisdiction of the SC to review a decision or resolution of the NLRC
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion.

Held:

We have time and again ruled that the jurisdiction of this Court to review a decision
or resolution of the NLRC, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, does not include a correction of its evaluation of the evidence but is confined
to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.[10] Grave abuse of discretion is
committed when the judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner. An abuse of discretion does not necessarily follow just because
there is a reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the labor arbiter, such as the case
at bench. Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary assessment of the NLRC
and that of the labor arbiter warrant another full review of the facts.[11] The NLRCs
factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, is entitled to great respect and
even finality, unless petitioner is able to show that it simply and arbitrarily
disregarded evidence before it or had misapprehended evidence to such an extent
as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had been properly appreciated.