THOMAS AQUINAS ON BRIDGING

THE GAP BETWEEN MIND AND REALITY*

ELENA BĂLTUŢĂ

Abstract: The aim of this article is to follow Thomas Aquinas in his attempt to prove
that the gap between mind and reality is bridgeable. This whole epistemological puzzle
is by no means a new one, but unlike his predecessors who were unable to solve it,
Aquinas managed to bridge the epistemological gap by applying the Aristotelian recipe
of agent intellect and its act of abstraction, improved by adding the illumination
ingredient. The article follows a tripartite configuration: At first Aquinas’s arguments
for the sources of human cognition and for the impossibility of cognizing particulars are
presented, at second the differences between specific objects of cognition are given and
at third Aquinas’s solution is stated.
Key words: Thomas Aquinas; universals; particulars; agent intellect; abstraction; illumination.

Aquinas repeatedly states that senses are concerned with particular things,
intellect with universals, and that senses are material and intellect is immaterial.
The problem with this two-layered account is that it can lead to an epistemological
gap between human cognition dependent on sense perception of material particulars
and immaterial cognition of universals. The puzzle is by no means a new one;
Aquinas inherited it from the ancients, but, unlike them, he believed that by following
and improving the Aristotelian recipe of abstraction, he was able to bridge the
epistemological gap.
Let us begin, without further delay, by stating the epistemological puzzle.
Instead of offering a description, I shall offer a reconstruction of three arguments:
(1) sensation is of particulars, (2) intellectual cognition is of universals, and (3) intellect
cannot have cognition of particulars, but all cognition starts from the senses.

Elena Băltuţă
Romanian Society for Phenomenology, Bd. M. Kogălniceanu, no. 49, ap. 45, Bucharest, Romania, 050104;
email: elena_baltuta@yahoo.com

* This paper was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific
Research, CNCS-UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0661.

Rev. Roum. Philosophie, 56, 1, p. 147–160, Bucureşti, 2012

148 Elena Băltuţă 2

(1) Sensation is of particulars: (a) cognition takes place when the cognized is
in the cognizer (through its similitude1) in accordance with the mode of the cognizer
(Sent. de Anim. lib. 2, lect. 12, n. 52); (b) all cognition arises from the senses (S.Th.
I, q. 78, a. 4, ad. 4; q. 84, a. 8, ad. 1; q. 86, a. 4, ad. 2); (c) all cognition arises from
senses, which have a bodily organ (S.Th. I, q. 78, a. 3); (d) Sensation takes place
when the sensed object is in the sense in accordance with the mode of the sense
(from 1.a); (e) all cognition arises from sensation, which is a function of a bodily
organ that takes place when the sensed object is in the sense in a bodily and
material way (from 1.a, 1.c and 1.d); (f) the cognizer in act is the cognized in act
(S.Th. I, q. 14, a. 2, co.); (g) sense in act is sensible (thing which has a bodily and
material existence, which is a particular) in act (S.Th. I, q. 14, a. 2, co.); (h) sensation
represents things as particulars (Sent. de Anim, lib. 2, lect.12, n. 5); therefore (i) all
cognition arises from sensation which represents the things as particulars.
(2) Intellectual cognition is of universals: (a) cognition takes place when the
cognized is in the cognizer (through its similitude) in accordance with the mode of
the cognizer (Sent. de Anim., lib. 2, lect. 12, n. 5); (b) intellection, which is an
immaterial power with no bodily organ, takes place when the cognized object is in
the intellect in accordance with the mode of the intellect (Sent. de Anim., lib. 2,
lect. 12, n. 5); (c) intellection, which is an immaterial power with no bodily organ,
takes place when the cognized object is in the intellect in an incorporeal and
immaterial way (from 2.b); (d) the cognizer in act is the cognized in act (S.Th. I, q.
14, a. 2, co.); (e) intellect in act is the intelligible (which has an incorporeal and
immaterial way of existence, which is a universal) in act (S.c.G. lib. I, cap. 51, n. 6);
therefore (f) intellect represents the thing as universal.
(3) Intellect cannot have cognition of particulars but all cognition starts from
the senses: (a) all cognition arises from sensation which represents the things as
particulars (1.i); (b) cognition of universals arises from senses (1.e); (c) intellect
represents the things as universals, intellect has cognition of universals (2.f);
(d) that which is immaterial cannot have cognition of that which is material (Sent.
1
See, for example Dominik Perler, Theorien der Intentionalitaet im Mittelalter, (Vittorio
Klostermann Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2002), n. 90, p. 73: „Berücksichtigt man allerdings die
Tatsache, dass Thomas similitudo als Terminus technicus verwendet, muss man nicht von einem
“Hinübergleiten” von einer stärkeren zu einer schwächeren These sprechen: Die Rede von einer
similitudo ist nichts anderes als die Rede von einer Identität, denn similitudo besteht in nichts
anderem als im gemeinsamen Haben ein und derselben Form.” The treatment of the similitude as a
technical term meaning sharing or agreement of a form is also present in the Middle Ages in the
works of Bonaventura, Boethius, Augustine and Albertus Magnus.
2
In this article I will use the following Latin editions: De ente et essentia (De ente et essentia) –
ed. H.F. Dondaine, Opera omnia (ed. Leonina) XLIII, Roma: Commisio Leonina, 1976; Quaestiones
disputatae de Potentia (De. Pot.) – P. M. Pession, Torino & Roma: Marietti 1965; Sentencia libri de
Anima (Sent. de An.) – ed. R.-A. Gauthier, Opera omnia (ed. Leonina) XLV, Roma & Paris: Commissio
Leonina & Vrin 1984; Summa contra Gentiles (S.c.G.) – C. Pera, Torino & Roma: Marietti 1961; Summa
Theologiae (S.Th.) – P. Caramello, Torino & Roma: Marietti 1952; and the following English translations
De. Pot. – English Dominican Fathers, The Newman Press, 1952; S.c.G. – Joseph Rickaby, London Burns
and Oates, 1905; S.Th. – Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Benziger Bros. edition, 1947.
3 Thomas Aquinas on Bridging the Gap between Mind and Reality 149

de Anim., lib. 2, lect. 12, n. 6); (e) nothing corporeal can make an impression on the
corporeal (S.Th. q. 84, a. 6, co.); therefore (f) intellect cannot have cognition of
particulars, but cognition arises from sensation which cognizes the particulars.
The question which arises after reaching (3.f) is: How come cognition, which
arises from senses which represent things as particulars, has access to universals,
when nothing corporeal can make an impression on something incorporeal? In
order to be able to solve this puzzle, we must first shed more light on what the
difference between particular and universal is. Designated matter, unlike common
matter, is matter considered under specific dimensions, under specific time and
space coordinates, here and now. Every object from the world we live in, trees, houses,
animals etc. is formed of designated matter and substantial form. The designated
matter is the so called principle of individuation3; it is that specific component
which makes this piece of wood this piece of wood and not that one. Sensible
particular things are in act in the extra mental world, hence there is no need, in
order to have a direct contact with them, for our senses to be active.4 They exist as
such in a natural and material manner in the extra mental world and they act on our
senses, which in turn trigger the process of cognition. Unlike the particulars, the
universals are composed of common, not designated matter, and substantial form.
If designated matter was to be understood like this bone, this flesh and so on,
common matter should be understood like flesh, bones and so forth, without any
specific determinations. The universals as such exist only in the mind of the
cognizer, and in the extra mental world, where they can fall upon the universal
intentions, they exist in things: “universalia, secundum quod sunt universalia, non sunt
nisi in anima. Ipsae autem naturae, quibus accidit intentio universalitatis, sunt in
rebus.” (Sent. de Anim., lib. 2, lect.12, n. 8). In other words, universals exist in
particular objects not as such, but only in as for as they are universally conceivable.
In the mind of a cognizer the universals have an immaterial and intentional way of
existence, in accordance with intellect’s way of being, which means they exist
apart from any material or individuating conditions, which in turn makes them
intelligible. Following Aristotle, Aquinas says that existing matter, apart from
which a particular thing cannot exist, is not actually intelligible (“Aristoteles non
posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia
existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum
sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu.”5). But universals,
which exist apart from any material and individuating conditions in a perfectly
immaterial manner, have an intelligible structure: “sicut res sunt separabiles a materia,
sic circa intellectum sunt” (S.Th., q. 85, a. 1, s.c.).
Due to the fact that our senses come into contact only with particular material
objects which are non-intelligible, universals need to be rendered intelligible by
being separated from matter. In other words, universals as they exist in particular
3
See De ente et essentia (cap. II, 75).
4
S.Th. (I, q. 79, a. 3, ad. 1).
5
S.Th. (I, q. 79, a. 3, co).
150 Elena Băltuţă 4

objects are only potentially and not actually intelligible. Is this also the case of
particulars? No, sense objects, particular objects composed of designated matter
and substantial form, are already to be found in a state of actuality in nature,
therefore positing an active sense power to actualize them would be nothing but a
futile extension. One thing must be kept in mind, namely that sense objects are
active, therefore senses do not need to be active, in turn are passive, and the
intellectual objects are passive, therefore there must be an active intellectual power.
Before discussing about the agent intellect and Aquinas’s bridging solution to the
epistemological gap, allow me to resume the differences between sensorial and
intellective levels by means of a table.

Sensorial level Intellective level

Specific Particulars Universals
objects Material existence Immaterial existence
Composed of designated matter and Composed of common matter and substantial
substantial form form
In the nature they are in an active state In nature they are in a passive state
Non-intelligible Intelligible
Specific Senses (external and internal senses) Intellectual powers (agent and possible intellect)
powers Are passive relative to their specific Must have at least an active power relative to
objects its specific objects
Have a bodily organ Does not have a bodily organ

Maybe the easiest way to understand the differences between senses and
intellect is by shortly describing their activities. Whenever Thomas Aquinas
examines the objects of human mental states, he does it by putting at work a
layered structure: The sensible species6 (species sensibilis) or the sensorial forms
which transmit the properties of extra mental objects7 are received by the
cognizer’s external senses. Starting from the data provided by the external senses
the internal senses8 form an image (phantasma9) of the extra mental object. Until
this moment the data comes from the external object towards the senses which in
6
The sensible species are the first causal intermediary entities we come into contact with, as
the realists would say. They are numerically different in different cognizers, and are the id quo of our
cognition, the means by which we know; based on their similitude with the object, they work as
causal mediators for our cognition. Aquinas, like other medieval thinkers, also speaks about species in
medio, whose existence is made possible by the action of the celestial bodies, but for the purpose of
this article I shall not take them into account.
7
The objects of sensation can be the proper objects, namely colour, smell, etc., the common
objects, like movement, size, etc., and the accidental objects, like trees, people, etc., which exceed the
power of a single sense.
8
The internal senses are common sense, which acts like the root of all external senses, the cogitative
power, which prepares the images and compares different individual intentions, the memory, which stores
the images and recognizes past experiences, and imagination, which retains and combines the images.
9
Though it is called phantasma – image, this is not properly a visual image, but more like a
comprehensive image formed out of all the information received from all the external senses, a sum
of all the sensible species received.
5 Thomas Aquinas on Bridging the Gap between Mind and Reality 151

turn give rise to certain modifications whose effect was the forming of images. All
cognitive powers involved in these stages of cognition play a more passive, then an
active role: the external senses are informed by the sensible species emanated by
the extra mental object, the internal senses process the data gathered from the
external senses, but do not change the extra mental object’s input. It can be said that, at
least until the formation of the images, the movement is an ascending one, from the
object towards the cognitive powers; as far as senses can go the data is gathered,
transformed and generalized. But since the knowable object must be proportionate
with its specific cognitive power, and the images are still associated with the
particular object because they are constituted from the accidental forms of the extra
mental hylomorphic object placed under specific space and time coordinates, it
follows they cannot be fitted for the immaterial intellect. The mark of the
individuality present in the images must be removed and, at the same time, the
object’s universal essence, the informational core of the extra mental object, must
be kept. This is performed by the action of the agent intellect10 which illuminates
and abstracts the intelligible species11 from the images.
Allow me now to return to the puzzle which triggered this whole investigation.
The issue at stake here is the epistemological gap between mind and reality: Human
cognizers can only have cognition of universals, but all of cognition is sense dependent
and senses can only have access to material particular objects. This puzzle is by no
means a new one. In fact, Aquinas thought that unlike his predecessors he had the
necessary arguments for bridging this gap by following Aristotle’s recipe. From his
predecessors, Aquinas mentions Plato and the Neo-Platonist position on one side
and Democritus on the other, but in his opinion they all have embraced the puzzle
without trying to solve it. First of all, Democritus held up that all cognition was
caused by images issuing from the bodies we thought of and entering into our
souls. Basically, Aquinas resumes Democritus’ position on cognition as a process
of discharge of images, and holds responsible for this view his lack of distinction
between intellect and senses. Second of all, Plato distinguished between senses and
intellect, but still was unable to bridge the epistemological gap, because intellectual
cognition had its source not in the senses, but in separate intelligible forms being
participated by the intellect. If in the case of Democritus, intellectual cognition was
extrinsic to the soul, in the case of Plato, the source was intrinsically to the soul.
Aristotle, and Aquinas with it, took the middle way; cognition was neither wholly
extrinsic, nor wholly intrinsic to the soul. Like Plato he believed intellect and sense
were different, but like Democritus he thought cognition starts from the senses. The
10
For a historical approach of the agent intellect see: Ruth Reyna, „On the Soul: A Philosophical
Exploration of the Active Intellect in Averroes, Aristotle, and Aquinas”, Thomist: a Speculative Quarterly
Review, vol. 36, 1972; Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, Oxford
University Press, 1992. It must be said that Thomas Aquinas talks about two intellects, an agent and a
possible one, but this does not concern the topic of this article.
11
The intelligible species are cognitive intermediary entities which replicate the essential form
of a cognized object, and are the id quo of cognition, namely the means by which we cognize, not
those we cognize.
152 Elena Băltuţă 6

gist of the problem lies in the fact that nothing corporeal can make an impression
on the corporeal and so the simple sensible impression will not suffice for
intellectual cognition:

I answer that, On this point the philosophers held three opinions. For Democritus
held that “all knowledge is caused by images issuing from the bodies we think of
and entering into our souls,” as Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4).
And Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge
is cause by a “discharge of images.” And the reason for this opinion was that
both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not distinguish between
intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (De Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since
the sense is affected by the sensible, they thought that all our knowledge is
affected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which
impression Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images. Plato, on
the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from the senses: and that it is
an immaterial power not making use of a corporeal organ for its action. And
since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, he held that
intellectual knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting the
intellect, but by separate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect,
as we have said above (Articles 4,5). Moreover he held that sense is a power
operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a spiritual power,
affected by the sensible: but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible,
the result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself the species
of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24)
where he says that the “body feels not, but the soul through the body, which it
makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what is
announced from without.” Thus according to Plato, neither does intellectual
knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor sensible knowledge
exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the sensible soul to the
sentient act, while the senses rouse the intellect to the act of understanding.
Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that intellect and
sense are different. But he held that the sense has not its proper operation
without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul
alone, but of the “composite.” And he held the same in regard to all the
operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the
sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the
“composite,” Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of
the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not
by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For
Democritus maintained that every operation is by way of a discharge of atoms,
as we gather from De Gener. i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an
operation which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing
corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to
cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused
7 Thomas Aquinas on Bridging the Gap between Mind and Reality 153

by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for “the
agent is more noble than the patient,” as he says (De Gener. i, 5). 12

For Aquinas forms do not exist in reality separated from matter as Plato said,
but always as a part of a hylomorphic compound. As soon as we state this, our
problem becomes more obvious: by being joined with matter forms do not have an
intelligible character. To be specific, they do not have an actual intelligible character,
but a potential one. It is for this reason the intelligible character of forms, of images,
needs to be actualized. At the same time, for Aquinas, nothing is actualized except by
something actual13, as for example happens at the sensorial level where the passive
external senses are actualized when an actual sensible object acts on them through
its sensible species. At the intellective level the agent intellect14 is the one power
always in act and which renders actual the intelligible character of the images by its
double function of illuminating and abstracting of the intelligible species:
12
„Respondeo dicendum quod circa istam quaestionem triplex fuit philosophorum opinio.
Democritus enim posuit quod nulla est alia causa cuiuslibet nostrae cognitionis, nisi cum ab his
corporibus quae cogitamus, veniunt atque intrant imagines in animas nostras; ut Augustinus dicit in
epistola sua ad Dioscorum. Et Aristoteles etiam dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod Democritus
posuit cognitionem fieri per idola et defluxiones. Et huius positionis ratio fuit, quia tam ipse
Democritus quam alii antiqui naturales non ponebant intellectum differre a sensu, ut Aristoteles dicit
in libro de anima. Et ideo, quia sensus immutatur a sensibili, arbitrabantur omnem nostram cognitionem
fieri per solam immutationem a sensibilibus. Quam quidem immutationem Democritus asserebat fieri
per imaginum defluxiones. Plato vero e contrario posuit intellectum differre a sensu; et intellectum
quidem esse virtutem immaterialem organo corporeo non utentem in suo actu. Et quia incorporeum
non potest immutari a corporeo, posuit quod cognitio intellectualis non fit per immutationem
intellectus a sensibilibus, sed per participationem formarum intelligibilium separatarum, ut dictum est.
Sensum etiam posuit virtutem quandam per se operantem. Unde nec ipse sensus, cum sit quaedam vis
spiritualis, immutatur a sensibilibus, sed organa sensuum a sensibilibus immutantur, ex qua immutatione
anima quodammodo excitatur ut in se species sensibilium formet. Et hanc opinionem tangere videtur
Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., ubi dicit quod corpus non sentit, sed anima per corpus, quo velut
nuntio utitur ad formandum in seipsa quod extrinsecus nuntiatur. Sic igitur secundum Platonis
opinionem, neque intellectualis cognitio a sensibili procedit, neque etiam sensibilis totaliter a
sensibilibus rebus; sed sensibilia excitant animam sensibilem ad sentiendum, et similiter sensus
excitant animam intellectivam ad intelligendum. Aristoteles autem media via processit. Posuit enim
cum Platone intellectum differre a sensu. Sed sensum posuit propriam operationem non habere sine
communicatione corporis; ita quod sentire non sit actus animae tantum, sed coniuncti. Et similiter
posuit de omnibus operationibus sensitivae partis. Quia igitur non est inconveniens quod sensibilia
quae sunt extra animam, causent aliquid in coniunctum, in hoc Aristoteles cum Democrito
concordavit, quod operationes sensitivae partis causentur per impressionem sensibilium in sensum,
non per modum defluxionis, ut Democritus posuit, sed per quandam operationem. Nam et Democritus
omnem actionem fieri posuit per influxionem atomorum, ut patet in I de Generat. Intellectum vero
posuit Aristoteles habere operationem absque communicatione corporis. Nihil autem corporeum
imprimere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum
Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia
agens est honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit” (S.Th. q. 84, a. 6, co.).
13
See for example S.Th. I, q. 2, a. 3, co.: “Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de
potentia in actum, de potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu.”
14
See Gyula Klima, „Aquinas on the Materiality of the Human Soul and the Immateriality of the
Human Intellect”, Philosophical Investigations, vol. 32, nr. 2, 2009 and idem „MAN=BODY+SOUL:
Aquinas's Arithmetic of Human Nature”, http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/BODYSOUL.HTM.
154 Elena Băltuţă 8

But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from
matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows
that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not
actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by
something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We
must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things
actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions.
And such is the necessity for an active intellect.15

A bit further in the same 79th Quaestio, article 3, from Summa Theologiae
Aquinas says the agent intellect is essential in the process of human cognition
where it acts like light acts on sensible sight. For Aquinas light renders the transparent,
the medium of sight, actual and, this way, it enables its passing through by the
sensible species. In a similar manner the agent intellect renders actual the image’s
intelligibility, making it possible for the possible intellect to cognize them:

There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is
required for sight, in order to make colors actually visible. And according to
this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the
same reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is
required for sight; not for the colors to become actually visible; but in order
that the medium may become actually luminous, as the Commentator says on
De Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to
light is verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light
required for seeing; but not for the same reason. 16
Now the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider
the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And
therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passive
intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which
makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction. 17
15
„Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae
autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum
sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in
actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur ponere
aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a
conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem” (S.Th. I, q. 79, a. 3, co.).
16
„Ad secundum dicendum quod circa effectum luminis est duplex opinio. Quidam enim
dicunt quod lumen requiritur ad visum, ut faciat colores actu visibiles. Et secundum hoc, similiter
requiritur, et propter idem, intellectus agens ad intelligendum, propter quod lumen ad videndum.
Secundum alios vero, lumen requiritur ad videndum, non propter colores, ut fiant actu visibiles; sed ut
medium fiat actu lucidum, ut Commentator dicit in II de anima. Et secundum hoc, similitudo qua
Aristoteles assimilat intellectum agentem lumini, attenditur quantum ad hoc, quod sicut hoc est
necessarium ad videndum, ita illud ad intelligendum; sed non propter idem” (S.Th. I, q. 79, a. 3, ad. 2).
17
„Intelligibile autem in actu non est aliquid existens in rerum natura, quantum ad naturam
rerum sensibilium, quae non subsistunt praeter materiam. Et ideo ad intelligendum non sufficeret
immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, nisi adesset intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in actu per
modum abstractionis” (S. Th. I, q. 79, a. 3, ad. 3).
9 Thomas Aquinas on Bridging the Gap between Mind and Reality 155

The agent intellect abstracts and, at the same time, illuminates the images.
But how exactly can be understood this abstraction of the intelligible species from
the images? Eleonore Stump18 describes the process as one of stripping away of the
individual and material characteristics which are being conserved within the image,
and concentrating on object’s quiddity or essence. The agent intellect removes the
individual and material characteristics of the object from its essence. But how can
the agent intellect tell the difference between what is particular (individual) and
what is universal in an image? For example, if we have a subject, let’s name him
John, who looks at a painting. In order for John to distinguish the red from the
other colours of the painting, he must first perceive the whole painting, namely all
of its colours. If we apply this to the case of agent intellect, would we be entitled to
believe that, since it has the power of discriminating and removing individual elements
from universal ones, it has access to both particular and universal features? The
simplest answer would be an affirmative one, but the problem is Aquinas does not
allow it. He says that as a consequence of intellect’s immateriality is the fact that it
has access only to universal essences of things. Even more, in S.Th. (I, q. 84, a. 6, co.)
he says that nothing corporeal can affect something corporeal: “Nihil autem corporeum
imprimere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem
operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium
corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia agens est honorabilius patiente, ut
ipse dicit.” But images are the products of corporeal organs corresponding to the
internal senses, so they are, at least at some extent, corporeal. What is the solution
to this problem? In the extra mental world material objects have a natural, material
and non-intelligible existence, but the agent intellect has the power to render them
intelligible in order to make them fit the possible intellect:

Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the
mere intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression of some
superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which
he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above (Question 79,
Articles 3,4) causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually
intelligible, by a process of abstraction. According to this opinion, then, on the
part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But
since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and
require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect.19

How exactly this rendering intelligible takes place? I believe one hint can be
gained by looking at agent intellect’s function of illumination. By understanding
18
Eleonore Stump, Aquinas, Routledge, London and New York, 2003, p. 175.
19
„Non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola impressione aliquarum
rerum superiorum, ut Plato posuit, sed illud superius et nobilius agens quod vocat intellectum
agentem, de quo iam supra diximus, facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu, per
modum abstractionis cuiusdam. Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a
sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet
quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem” (S.Th. I, q. 84, a.6, co.).
156 Elena Băltuţă 10

how illumination works, we will be able to understand and come up with a solution
for the above problem (the abstraction on the intelligible from sensible and the
possibility of discrimination between two types of objects, sensible and
intelligible).
First of all it must be said that our intellect participates, by likeness, to the
uncreated divine light:

For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated
likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types.
Whence it is written (Ps. 4:6,7), “Many say: Who showeth us good things?”
which question the Psalmist answers, “The light of Thy countenance, O Lord,
is signed upon us,” as though he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light in
us, all things are made known to us.20

Our agent intellect has, by participation21, something in common with the

divine light, something which enables it to illuminate the images. In each human
being exists a source of cognition, namely the light of the agent intellect which
enables us to know and to have access, without appeal to any inductive or
deductive inferences, to the universal principles of cognition (the principle of non-
contradiction, the principle of the excluded middle etc.). But how can illumination
be understood in the specific framework of human cognition and, even more, how
can it solve the intelligibility problem?
As I see things illumination can be understood as following: the images are
potentially intelligible from the beginning, as it happens with everything created by
God in conformity with human powers, but, at the same time, they are not “aware”,
so to speak, of their intelligibility. I do not intend to say that images have a
conscience of their own, but only that, though they have a potentially intelligible
character, the cognitive powers until the level of the agent intellect do not have the
ability to notice this specific feature, intelligibility. In the same way in which in
order for a thing to be seen, the transparent needs to be rendered actual by the light,
the image’s intelligibility needs to be actualized. The operation of illumination is
analogue to switching the lights into a darkened room in order to make visible
things which otherwise would have remained invisible to the human eye.22 Perhaps
another example would make things even more clear. Suppose our cognizer, John,
had a handball accident and needs to take radiography. At first John’s bones are not
visible with the naked eye, though they are a part of his body. They are not yet
20
„Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata
similitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes aeternae. Unde in Psalmo IV, dicitur, multi
dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? Cui quaestioni Psalmista respondet, dicens, signatum est super nos
lumen vultus tui, domine. Quasi dicat, per ipsam sigillationem divini luminis in nobis, omnia nobis
demonstrantur” (S.Th. I, q. 84, a. 5, co.).
21
See Huston Smith, „Aquinas’s Abstractionism”, Medieval Philosophy and Theology, vol. 10,
2001.
22
This example was suggested to me by Dominik Perler.
11 Thomas Aquinas on Bridging the Gap between Mind and Reality 157

visible because are hidden behind tissues, blood, ligaments etc. It is only after the
unit of radiation exposure transmits the short frequency ionized electromagnetic
radiation which passes through the soft tissues of his body, that the bones become
“visible”. What was first visible only in potency, hidden behind individual pieces
of matter, becomes visible in act and, at the same time, the skin, its color and
texture, along with all other visible individual determinations of the object which is
photographed, become invisible. Acting just like such an apparatus the agent
intellect does not need the ability to “see” both sensible particulars and immaterial
universals for being able to abstract the latter ones from the images. Therefore, we
could say, that illumination is the intellect’s operation or function which makes
manifest the intelligible character of extra mental objects, their conceptual skeleton, in
order to make possible the abstraction of intelligible species from images.
The results of this operation or function is the intelligible species which, just
like the images and the sensible species, are the means by which possible intellect
cognizes the extra mental object’s essences, the quo of intellective cognition. Through
this double function, abstraction and illumination, the agent intellect offers the
possible intellect its material capital because the intelligible species are later deposited
in the possible intellect, and they are the ones which will inform the possible intellect:

Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm: it does more; by
its own power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm. It throws
light on the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater
power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active
intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction therefrom of
intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active intellect abstracts the intelligible
species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we
are able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration
the specific nature, the image of which informs the passive intellect.23

After being deposited in the possible intellect, it assimilates them by forming

a concept24 (intention intellecta, verbum mentis or conceptus). By forming this concept
the possible intellect understands the essence of extra mental object:
23
„ Ad quartum dicendum quod phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente; et iterum ab
eis, per virtutem intellectus agentis, species intelligibiles abstrahuntur. Illuminantur quidem, quia,
sicut pars sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectivam efficitur virtuosior, ita phantasmata ex virtute
intellectus agentis redduntur habilia ut ab eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahantur. Abstrahit autem
intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum per virtutem intellectus agentis
accipere possumus in nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine individualibus conditionibus,
secundum quarum similitudines intellectus possibilis informatur” (S.Th. I, q. 85, a. 1, ad. 4).
24
Further readings about the concept: Joshua P. Hochschild, "Does Mental Language Imply
Mental Representationalism? The Case of Aquinas’s Verbum Mentis," Proceedings of the Society for
Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, Volume 4, 2004, http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/
PSMLM4/PSMLM4.pdf; Uwe Meixner, „Abstraktion und Universalie bei Thomas von
Aquin”, in Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft, Alber Verlag, Freiburg, 1994;
Marc Eugene Ozon, The emergence of theories of mental language in early fourteenth-century
158 Elena Băltuţă 12

The action of understanding is not exercised without something being conceived in

the mind of the one who understands, and this is called the word: since before
a concept of some kind is fixed in the mind we are not said to understand but
to think about a thing in order to understand it.25

As it can be noticed, the possible intellect, just like the agent intellect, has
two operations or functions, a passive and an active one. The first implies receiving
the intelligible species, the ability of being informed by them, and the latter consist
in the formation of a concept, a mental word which will be later expressed by a
spoken word, in and by which the possible intellect is able to cognize the
hylomorphic extra mental object’s essence:

For in the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by
the intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a
definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by a word. Wherefore the
concept conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition conveys the
intellect's division or composition. Words do not therefore signify the
intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for itself for
the purpose of judging of external things.26

We must further consider that the intellect, having been informed by the
species of the thing, by an act of understanding forms within itself a certain
intention of the thing understood, that is to say, its notion, which the definition
signifies. This is a necessary point, because the intellect understands a present and

philosophy as explanations of complex cognition, A thesis submitted in conformity with the

requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of Philosophy,
University of Toronto, 2005; Henri Paissac, Theologie du Verbe: Saint Augustin et Saint
Thomas, Edition de Cerf, Paris, 1951; Giorgio Pini, “Species, Concept and the Thing: Theories of
Signification in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century”, Philosophy and Theology, vol. 8, nr. 1,
1999; Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in Latter Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1997; Claude Panaccio, ”Aquinas on Intellectual Representation”, Chaiers d’épistémologie,
nr. 265, Publication du Groupe en Épistémologie Comparée, Quebec, 2002; Claude Panaccio, “Le
discours interior de Platon a Guillaume d'Ockham”, Le Seuil, Paris, 1999; Claude Panaccio,
“From Mental Word to Mental Language”, Philosophical Topics, vol. 20, nr. 2, 1992; Claude
Panaccio, “Mental representation”, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, vol. 1,
eds. Robert Pasnau and Christina van Dyke, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 346–356;
Olivier-Thomas Venard, “Thomas d’Aquin poéticien”, Revue roumaine de philosophie, tome
55, 2, 2011, pp. 303–333.
25
„Ipsum enim intelligere non perficitur nisi aliquid in mente intelligentis concipiatur, quod
dicitur verbum; non enim dicimur intelligere, sed cogitare ad intelligendum, antequam conceptio
aliqua in mente nostra stabiliatur” (De Anim. q. 9, a. 9, co.).
26
„Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur
specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel
compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et
enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsas
species intelligibiles; sed ea quae intellectus sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus” (S.Th.
I, q. 85, a.2, ad. 3).
13 Thomas Aquinas on Bridging the Gap between Mind and Reality 159

an absent thing indifferently. In this the imagination agrees with the intellect. But
the intellect has this characteristic in addition, namely, that it understands a thing as
separated from material conditions, without which a thing does not exist in reality.
But this could not take place unless the intellect formed the abovementioned
intention for itself.27
Allow me to offer an example for what has been said until now, in order to
make things clearer. When John, is looking at a piece of citrine28, his five external
senses receive the sensible species of the object, the forms of the properties of the
external object, and the means by which (id quo) our senses actually sense the
object, and not what is sensed. At this particular moment John can see the yellow
colour of the semiprecious stone, if he touches it, he can sense the texture, and he
can observe its size and shape, or what we can call the proper and common sensible.29
After the external senses are informed, the internal senses gather all the information
and form a phantasm, an image of the external object. Now John can “see” this
particular stone with this particular shade of yellow, with a specific textural structure,
placed in this particular moment in time and under specific spatial coordinates.
From the phantasms, to which the intellect will always need to return, in order to
get a glimpse of the particular and because human thinking revolves around
images, the agent intellect abstracts the intelligible species. The intelligible species
can be best understood as citrine’s the chemical formula: SiO2Fe3. John is now able
to apprehend in what size, in what shape and in what genus this “thing” consists.
Due to the fact that intelligible species are the things by means of which (id quo)
we cognize (in virtue of their similarity relation with the essential form of the
object) and not those that are cognized, at the end of this process John is able to
know the quiddity or the essence of the object30. The final step of this first
operation ends with the intellect’s active formation of a concept, which will later be
signified by a spoken word, and will help John to actually understand the external
object. Returning once more to our citrine example, the concept can be understood
as the chemical formula SiO2Fe(x), where x stands for different quantities of iron
which can produce different varieties of quartz, among which citrine.
27
„Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo
format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio.
Et hoc quidem necessarium est: eo quod intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem absentem et
praesentem, in quo cum intellectu imaginatio convenit; sed intellectus hoc amplius habet, quod etiam
intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit; et hoc
non posset esse nisi intellectus sibi intentionem praedictam formaret” (S.c.G. lib. 1, cap. 53, n. 3).
28
Citrine is a semiprecious yellow quartz resembling topaz. Its chemical formula is SiO2Fe3.
29
The objects of sensation can be the proper objects, namely color, smell, etc., the common
objects, like movement, size, etc., and the accidental objects, like trees, people, etc., which exceed the
power of a single sense.
30
The quiddity or the essence of an object signifies what is common to all natures, through
which the various beings are placed in various genera and species. In the case of human beings,
humanity is the essence that can be signified by a definition, which includes both the common matter
and the substantial form.
160 Elena Băltuţă 14

Now that we have seen how Aquinas thinks that, by positing an agent
intellect endowed with the power to abstract and illuminate, he was able to bridge
the epistemological gap, instead of taking one last survey on the arguments
employed in this article, allow me to return once more to his own words. Let us see
in a nutshell Aquinas’s improved Aristotelian recipe for solving the epistemological
puzzle which triggered this whole investigation:

But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from
matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows
that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not
actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by
something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We
must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things
actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions.
And such is the necessity for an active intellect.31

31
„Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae
autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum
sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in
actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur ponere
aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a
conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem” (S.Th. I, q. 79, a. 3, co.).