Silverio vs RP

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name
“Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth
certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment.
He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and
acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining
that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex
alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex
reassignment.

HELD:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases
where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or
write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The
petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery.
The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law
allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. The Court denied the petition
Republic vs Cagandahan
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate[In her
petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in
the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics
and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that
she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed
that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or
menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in
mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate
be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.

RULING:
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his
life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking
lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He
chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents development to
reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or
not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become
or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to
take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this
gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy.
To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent
and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as
valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the
ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and
thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name
is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change
of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the
change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
Manila Doctors Hospital vs. Chua and Ty
Facts: Respondent Chua, mother of Ty, was admitted to petitioner hospital for hypertension and
diabetes. While Chua was confined, another daughter Judith Chua was admitted for treatment
of injuries sustained after a vehicular accident. Ty shouldered the hospital bills for the two. After
Judith was discharged, respondent Chua remained confined. Ty was able to pay P435,800.00. The
hospital bills eventually totaled P1,075,592.95. When Ty was unable to pay the bills, the hospital
allegedly pressured her, by cutting off the telephone line in her room and removing the air-
conditioning unit, television set, and refrigerator, refusing to render medical attendance and to
change the hospital gown and bed sheets, and barring the private nurses or midwives from
assisting the patient, to settle the same through the signing of a promissory note. Ty issued
postdated checks to pay the note. The checks bounced.
 The petitioner alleged that that as early as one week after respondent Chua had been
admitted to its hospital, Dr. Rody Sy, her attending physician, had already given instructions for
her to be discharged, but respondents insisted that Chua remain in confinement. It also alleged
that Ty voluntarily signed the agreement that she will pay the bills and that no undue pressure
was exerted by them; and that the cutting-off of the telephone line and removal of the air-
conditioning unit, television set, and refrigerator cannot constitute unwarranted actuations, for
the same were resorted to as cost-cutting measures and to minimize respondents' charges that
were already piling up, especially after respondent Ty refused to settle the balance
notwithstanding frequent demands. Finally it alleged that this case was instituted by Ty to
provide leverage against the hospital for filing criminal charges against the latter for violation of
BP 22.
Both the trial court and the CA rendered decisions in favor of the respondents finding that
the removal of the facilities led to the worsening of Chua’s condition.
Issue: Whether or not the hospital is liable for damages.
Ruling: No. The operation of private pay hospitals and medical clinics is impressed with public
interest and imbued with a heavy social responsibility. But the hospital is also a business, and,
as a business, it has a right to institute all measures of efficiency commensurate to the ends for
which it is designed, especially to ensure its economic viability and survival. And in the
legitimate pursuit of economic considerations, the extent to which the public may be served and
cured is expanded, the pulse and life of the medical sector quickens, and the regeneration of the
people as a whole becomes more visibly attainable. In the institution of cost-cutting measures,
the hospital has a right to reduce the facilities and services that are deemed to be non-essential,
such that their reduction or removal would not be detrimental to the medical condition of the
patient.
The lower court’s decisions are results of misappreciation of the uncorroborated and self-
serving evidence presented by the respondents. The evidence in the record firmly establishes
that the staff of the petitioner took proactive steps to inform the relatives of respondent Chua of
the removal of facilities prior thereto, and to carry out the necessary precautionary measures to
ensure that her health and well-being would not be adversely affected. Also, the medical
condition of respondent Chua, as consistently and indisputably confirmed by her attending
physician, Dr. Rody Sy, a cardiologist, who was called as witness for both parties, whom even
respondent Chua repeatedly praised to be "my doctor" and "a very good doctor" at that, and
whose statements at times had been corroborated by other competent witnesses, had been
"relatively well," "ambulatory," "walking around in the room," and that she was "able to leave
the hospital on her own without any assistance;" that although she complained of symptoms
such as dizziness, weakness, and abdominal discomfort, Dr. Sy requested several medical
examinations, such as the laboratory tests, renal tests, MRI, ultrasound, and CT scan, all of which
were administered after procuring the consent of respondent Chua's family as admitted by
respondent Ty herself, and even called on other specialists, such as a neurologist,
endocrinologist, and gastroenterologist, to look into her condition and conduct other tests as
well according to their fields of specialty, all of which yielded no serious finding. Finally, her
illnesses were "lifelong illnesses" at a stage where they cannot be totally removed or
abolished, making it clear to her family that "one hundred percent recovery is not possible"
despite being given daily medication in the hospital. Her condition, nonetheless, is not serious, as
the blood pressure is more or less controlled and within acceptable limits, "not that critical to
precipitate any acute attack," nor likely to fall into any emergency, nor yet does she require
continuous or prolonged hospitalization since she was stable enough to be treated at home and
on an "out-patient" basis, so much so that Dr. Sy encouraged her to exercise and avoid resting all
the time, and recommended that "anytime she may be discharged" even in just "two weeks after
confinement," the propriety of his order of discharge concurred upon by the other specialists as
well, had it not been for respondents' insistence to stay in the hospital in view of their hope for
absolute recovery despite the admission of respondent Chua herself that she cannot anymore
be totally cured.
Authorities explicitly declare that a patient cannot be detained in a hospital for non-
payment of the hospital bill. If the patient cannot pay the hospital or physician's bill, the law
provides a remedy for them to pursue, that is, by filing the necessary suit in court for the
recovery of such fee or bill. If the patient is prevented from leaving the hospital for his inability
to pay the bill, any person who can act on his behalf can apply in court for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus. The form of restraint must be total; movement must be restrained in all
directions. If restraint is partial, e.g., in a particular direction with freedom to proceed in another,
the restraint on the person's liberty is not total. However, the hospital may legally detain a
patient against his will when he is a detained or convicted prisoner, or when the patient is
suffering from a very contagious disease where his release will be prejudicial to public health,
or when the patient is mentally ill such that his release will endanger public safety, or in other
exigent cases as may be provided by law. Moreover, under the common law doctrines on tort,
it does not constitute a trespass to the person to momentarily prevent him from leaving the
premises or any part thereof because he refuses to comply with some reasonable condition
subject to which he entered them. In all cases, the condition of this kind of restraint must be
reasonable in the light of the circumstances.
At any rate, as stated above, the patient is free to leave the premises, even in the
ostensible violation of these conditions, after being momentarily interrupted by the hospital staff
for purposes of informing him of those reasonable conditions or simply for purposes of making a
demand to settle the bill. If the patient chooses to abscond or leave without the consent of the
hospital in violation of any of the conditions deemed to be reasonable under the circumstances,
the hospital may nonetheless register its protest and may choose to pursue the legal remedies
available under law, provided that the hospital may not physically detain the patient, unless the
case falls under the exceptions abovestated.
 Authorities are of the view that, ordinarily, a hospital, especially if it is a private pay
hospital, is entitled to be compensated for its services, by either an express or an implied
contract, and if no express contract exists, there is generally an implied agreement that the
patient will pay the reasonable value of the services rendered; when a hospital treats a patient's
injuries, it has an enforceable claim for full payment for its services, regardless of the patient's
financial status. The requirement to have the relative of respondent Chua to execute a
promissory note as part of the arrangement to settle the unpaid obligations is a formality that
converts any implied contract into written form and, moreover, amounts to a reasonable
condition, the non-fulfillment of which, in itself, however, as discussed, cannot allow the hospital
to detain the patient. Contrary to the findings of the courts a quo, that such an agreement
embodied in a promissory note, as well as the Contract for Admission and Acknowledgment of
Responsibility for Payment dated October 30, 1990, do not become contracts of adhesion simply
because the person signing it was under stress that was not the result of the actions of the
hospital, especially taking into account that there is testimony to the effect that respondent Ty
signed the Promissory Note dated June 5, 1992 in the presence of counsel and acting under his
advise.
Board of medicine vs. Ota

FACTS
Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a Filipina, who has continuously re
sided in the Philippines for more than 10 years.

He graduated from Bicol Christian College of Medicine on April 21, 1991 with a degree of Doct
or of Medicine.

He filed an application to take the medical board examinations in order to obtain a medical licens
e.

He was required by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to submit an affidavit of un

dertaking, stating among others that should he successfully pass the same, he would not practice
medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists between Japan and the Philippines in admi
tting foreigners into the practice of medicine.

(Bago tyo tumuloy. Alamin muna naten kung ano nga ba itong reciprocity na ito.

Simple lang naman eh. Para siyang treaty na nagsasabi na pedeng magpractice ng profession sa i
sang bansa ang isang foreigner.Basic lang.)
He then submitted the same. Then he took the exams. Then he passed.

But, the board of medicine of the prc denied his request for a license to practice medicine in the
Philippines on the ground that there is no genuine reciprocity exists between japan and the ph to
practice said profession because no filipino has successfully passed the board exams for the pract
ice of medicine in japan. (ang babaw ng reasoning diba? Pero totoo. Mahirap na nga initially kasi
board exams pang med tapos Japanese language pa ang mga tanong.)

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NIT THERE IS A GENUINE RECIPROCITY BETWEEN JAPAN AND PH.

RULING.

YES THERE IS.

Petitioners argue that while the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan allows foreigners to practice
medicine therein, said document does not show that conditions for the practice of medicine in sai
d country are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant; and since the requirements are pract
ically impossible for a Filipino to comply with, there is no reciprocity between the two countries,
hence, respondent may not be granted license to practice medicine in the Philippines

It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to get license and practice there
in
Sabi ng SC "it is not the fact that a filipino has passed the board exams in the PH to 9rvoe that th
ere is genuine reciprocity between the two countries. It is enough that the laws in the foreign cou
ntry permit a Filipino to get license and practice therein

Granting that there is still no Filipino who has been given license to practice medicine in Japan, i
t does not mean that no Filipino will ever be able to be given one.
In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and qualifications of respondent. He finished
his medical degree from Bicol Christian College of Medicine. He completed a one-year post grad
uate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, a government hospital. Then
he passed the Medical Board Examinations which was given on August 8, 1992 with a general a
verage of 81.83, with scores higher than 80 in 9 of the 12 subjects
Additional shit that you should know.

There is no question that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the
government.

The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reaso
nable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and co
ntrol the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those auth
orized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.
Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine fi
rst to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercise
s of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational require
ments i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school for admission to t
he medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority
of the state.

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE

LAROYA, respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

Facts :

The two vehicle, driven by the respondent Laroya and the petitioner Capitulo and
Avelino had an accident. As a result two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case
against Laroya for quasi-delict.
ISSUE:

Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.

Ruling:

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may
be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. Thus, the offended
party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case
where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the
other a civil case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on non-forum shopping.
The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission
he is accused of in the criminal case.

To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing
to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law,
access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo
is proper. The order of dismissal on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.

SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA

BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA
SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, petitioners, vs. HON.
NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q.
RONDARIS, President/Chairman, respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
 In this Petition for Review on Certiorari dated March 1, 2002, petitioners
[1]

assail the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and
January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari and denying
their motion for reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of their complaint to
recover civil indemnity for the death and physical injuries of their kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was
charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple
Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound
Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which
claimed the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its passengers,
including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5)
of the vans passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a
reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was
made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on
December 17, 1998. [2]

On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against

Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file a
separate civil action. They cited therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.
[3]

Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper

service of summons, prescription and laches, and defective certification of non-
forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant
in view of the separate personality of Viron Transit from its officers.[4]

Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that

the right to file a separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years
reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there was
no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed
barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the
cause of action had already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions
based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners cause of action to be,
prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence,
notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a
separate civil action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground
of prescription. [5]
 Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground for dismissal
of the complaint as summons was served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of
the legal department without mentioning her designation or position.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the
complaint is not based on quasi delict but on the final judgment of conviction in
the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the
judgment. The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
[6]

reiterating that petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delictand had
prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was filed
more than four (4) years after the vehicular accident. As regards the improper
[7]

service of summons, the trial court reconsidered its ruling that the complaint
ought to be dismissed on this ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of appeal. The appellate
[8]

court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration reasoning that even if
the respondent trial court judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the order of dismissal, certiorari is still not the permissible remedy as appeal
was available to petitioners and they failed to allege that the petition was
brought within the recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu
of appeal.[9]

In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the rule that
certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a judicial rejection of an
existing obligation arising from the criminal liability of private respondents.
Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint
arose ex delicto and is not based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly
committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause of action
invoked by petitioners is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action
had prescribed. Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private
respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of
conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was procedurally
flawed, petitioners implore the Court to exempt this case from the rigid operation
of the rules as they allegedly have a legitimate grievance to
vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and physical injuries caused by private
respondents for which no civil liability had been adjudged by reason of their
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
In their Comment dated June 13, 2002, private respondents insist that the
[10]

dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription was in order. They point
out that the averments in the complaint make out a cause of action for quasi
delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive
period of four (4) years should be reckoned from the time the accident took
place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced
since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron
Transits contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer contemplated in
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil
aspect of the case was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file
a separate civil case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the Court of
Appeals via certiorari was improper as petitioners should have appealed the
adverse order of the trial court. Moreover, they point out several other
procedural lapses allegedly committed by petitioners, such as lack of
certification against forum-shopping; lack of duplicate original or certified true
copy of the assailed order of the trial court; and non-indication of the full names
and addresses of petitioners in the petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply dated September 14, 2002, while private
[11]

respondents filed a Rejoinder dated October 14, 2002, both in reiteration of

[12]

their arguments.
We grant the petition.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may consist of restitution,
[13]

reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential

damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising
[14]

from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to
three notable exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives the
right to recover damages from the accused; second, when the offended party
reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in
order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and third,
when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit
against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal
case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,
which governed the institution of the criminal action, as well as the reservation
of the right to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111 thereof states:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is instituted,

the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such action as
provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award
for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint
or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon
filing thereof in court for trial.

Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate

civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of
this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting
Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation
to file a separate civil action made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint,
they seek to recover private respondents civil liability arising from crime.
Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the
trial court dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners cause of action was
based on quasi delict and should have been brought within four (4) years from
the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent
with petitioners claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising
from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan
and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were
pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of
the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the
choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under
the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil
Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such
as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g.,
culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil
Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right
to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article
33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the
[15]

offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules
above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause
of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can
pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the
surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the
action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company was decided upon a
[16]

similar set of facts. Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus Company was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property. The plaintiff
made an express reservation for the filing of a separate civil action. The driver
was convicted which conviction was affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff filed
a separate civil action for damages based on quasi delict which was ordered
dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the action was instituted more than
six (6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had already prescribed.
Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another action, this time based on the
subsidiary liability of the bus company. The trial court dismissed the action
holding that the dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a bar to the filing
of the action to enforce the bus companys subsidiary liability.
 We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a
bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is
a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily
liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates
with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being
deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the
employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on
the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex
delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners allegations in
their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for
[17]

reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to

[18]

recover civil liability arising from crime.

This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a
separate civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule
is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the
same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale action for
[19]

damages based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more

occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents as the
only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This
interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious
reasons.
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed the
order of dismissal of the trial court instead of filing a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however, should be exempted
from the strict application of the rules in order to promote their fundamental
objective of securing substantial justice. We are loathe to deprive petitioners
[20]

of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a final judgment of
conviction based solely on a technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an
injustice.
[21]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the

resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9,
2002, respectively dismissing the present action and denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower court dated February 26,
2001 and July 16, 2001. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.