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USHA
AT ARUSHA
RULING
*
MUGASHA/ J
This is an old case r^;hich has bcen lying in this registry
tor rnore t5a'
fourteen (14) years. on 12ri'June, 2013, this Court schedulecj
the maf[ei- t.o
::': rcar'J for 1.\ri,c iJa;,5 ci.rnsccLrtively. Howc:vr:r; on 21:;t Arrc;trs;1,
2_01:1,
i'll iilllert Msando counscl for Lhe plaintiff addressed
this Cour-[ that, t_hcr
scllccjuling ordcr has expired. l-le asked and this Court
accep[eci the nratt.e,:r
L'c:;cilcduled on 3"rseptetttbcr, 2013 when parties shculd
be hearcl o. tlrcr
0<pil';'of the sclteCLrling ordcr trtci absence oI Resolution
of tltr: [jc;:ircj rri
:'iir, ii:r'r; OI tl-rr'1;1.:rrrijf [':; i t..r11)f );iIy i)trtirCtr-isirtrl irtst.i[tr[iOrr of
G lirt] .;Itl
i'lr, .\ibCr'1. l'ls.trtcjcl t'u[,\tr.]\r.rnk,(i llrc pl;irrLif f, ullrilc Mr. /\lrrtt: lvlrrglrw..tr
lirl)rt"'rltr[Ocl Lltr'] clt:Itlttrlitttt';. F'lr. Iv]s;;trtclcr ..;ullrttitt'qtcl iltarL, Urc 1.tr.c:r.r.clirrr;:;
ii,'['tt,: Il)i', Cillttl (1r(' ,r rtullilr,, i'r 'f 1lllc.1r tlrr. llr.l.rlrirtlitrr:; ()r.rl.i lt.rCl t.x,ir.Ctl
l' ir'jlt'ti r;ll !ltr' ( r'lttttt,'j( r,rl ( ,r';r' rrf )n,lf l) tJV/ri(tl{A ,rl:,:r-l.lii,li
ti, \r,.
l)l l-Ai.lTI SllAll .l,r Ol lil;ltS, ( r r| il ilr ,ti t,ll ( ,tiir,
f,lr,r. ,l() til .,1001j.
on the other hand, Mr. Mughwai submitted that, although
there are
diverse decisions on the matter he aligned himself
with the case of
MWANZA BRANCH, (HC) Civir Case No. 15 0f 2001, where the High Court
held that, expiry of scheduling order does not render
proceedings a nullity
and the matter thus has to be determined on merits
because expiry of the
scheduling order qoes by nccessary implication that,
mediation has failecj
thereby necessitating trial on merits. Moreover, Mr. Mughwai raised
another point of objection that the suit was not competent
because the
{ t,,
plaint is not signed by the officer of the plaintiff as
required by order VI
rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code which requires a pleading
to be signecl
Dy a party ancj his advccate if any. Mr. Mughwai also submitted tlrat, the
sui[ js not competent because wlren the plaint rryas filed, the
same ,v,ras not
accompanied by a Resolution of tlre Board of Directors
of the company. In
ihat regard, I'r'lr, lrlughirtai urged this court to strike ouc the
suit for
incompetence ;rrrd pnrceccl witlr U-rc countcr clainr.
According to the amended scheduling order dated 16th March, 2010, the
scheduling order expired on 30tr'June,2011 and no attempt has been
made by either pany to vary the same. I fully subscribe to what was held
iN thc Citcd CASC Of ATNTCAru ENTERPRISES LTD VS. NATIONAL BANK OF
CoMMERCE oF MWANZA BRANCI (supra) which is to the effect that, failure
(, ro apply for extensiorr of time to va:-y the scheduling order leaves tlre Court
( ,*rith a duty determine the merits cf the case. In the premises; this Court
goes directly to the merits of the case.
How6ver, before addressing the merits of the case, there are two pertinent
issues that are, lack of Board Resolution prior to irrstitution of a suit and
lack of signature of an officer of the plaintiff on the plaint raised by the
learned counsel for the clefendants. It is important to note that, Mr.
f'1ughrruai made his inpcrts though Mr. Msanclo contencled to have been
[akerr by surprise particularly thc,lacking signattrre of the ofl'icer of tlrcl
p.ia!ntiff on [hc plairrt. lic r;laiirncct tliaL nc-r rto[icc was served to tlrc plairrlifl'
arrd rnore so tlie plaintiff ought to ltave rarised the clbjection at the ear.liest
pc-rssi ble opporLu n i [y.
rtr', rrt,;lrIly:;trl;rrrillt:rl lry tltLr rlrtfrtttrlirttt':; r:ourr:;cl, f;rilrtr-c t.o s]ccure attcl
,rtt,rr.li (r Iiuirt(l':, l{i'l;ollrttritt [tt:iolc irrs;titrrtirrr; i] s;ttit on llcltalf of .il
t'()(it:;tctt:(l r()nrl)(rlry r.^,,littlt t',,t lc(;,tl t:trtity willt .rll rit;ltt:., irttcl li,rl_rilitrr)ti lg
1l
sue and to be sued respectively, renders the suit not competent.
As far as legal personality is concerned, it is now settled in larry that, no
separate legal entity from its share holders capable of suing and or being
sued as rightly observed in the case of sALoMoN vs. SALOMON (1897) A.c
22, rryhere the Court observed at page 30 that;
€L those who took paft in the promotion of the company are abso/utely
irrelevant rn ciiscussing uvhat tltose rlghts and liabrlities are".
r.L.R 127 where the Court of Appeal of Tanzania cited at page 128 that;
rl
frur and on behalf of the company including instituting legal actions
fourts of law without first obtaining a board resolution for that purpose.
The signing of pleadings solely by counsel for the plaintiff do not suffice
the learned counsel to have been duly instructed by the company
unless the board resolution of the plaintiff's company is made available as
pointed out by the defendants' learned counsel. In a n.utshell, without the
Board's Resolution one cannot claim to be mandated with authority to
institute the suit for and or on behalf of the plaintiff. In the premises,
€u irt absence of the Board Resolution what is pleaded in the plaint and
signed by ttlr. Chaddar is a nullity as there is no authority cf
the suing company that is, the plaintiff.
ofiiccr of [hc lrlarirrtiff. l1c: c.itccl tlrc carsc ol'SU_G_gnERE coFFEE GRowERE
LTD vs. SEllADtJi(A nf'lD ANO'fllEIt AND AI_QIr_tEl_r_ Lle_7!.1 LF,.A_. _L!l =-
r,r.rf16';r1 tlrr'Ilrillr (.orrr'[ ,[ Url.trrrl.r ltr:lcl [, tlrt: .ffi:r;t ,ltt 0[[ir,,r.:r 0[ tltt'
1;l.rrrrtiIf trlr:;t',rr1tr tlrtt plr.:.trlittr.;:;.
lv1r. Mughwai also made reference to MULI-A on CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 4th
Edition at page 1901. He also cited the case of sr. grRruao's HospITAL
COMPANY LI uwA. Commercial
Case No. 57 of 2004 (Unreported) (High Court Reglstry at Dar es Salaarn).
In that regard, the learned counsel for the defendants argued that, trlr.
Chaddar had no authority to institute the suit for and. or on behalf of the
plaintiff. As such, Mr. Muqhwai urged this Court to strike out the main sLrit
and remain to dispose of the Counter Clainr.
(.
Order VI Rule 14 of the Procedure Code (supra) provides;
"Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his advocate (if any);
providcd tltaI v,.,11r','e ,=t lnrly plc,,tdlng is, l)y t'r'tson of absencc: or for
other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by
any person duly authorized by him to srgn the same or to sue
or defend on his behalf".
ltlcitdirtgs ntusL bc sigricci by it parrLy artcl an aclvocat.c (if any). For tlrc sake
of clarity, a plaint is rtot at all proper if it is signccl solely by an advocate.
Cr A plaint must be signed by a pc-lrt! or an ol'ficer duly authorized by the
lllainti[f. In o[lter worcls, a plaint is properly sigrred if it is signecJ by a par[y
or iut o[iiccr clrrly irrrIltorizccl (ivcn if'rloI s;ic1'rccl lty an acJvcicatc. l-l6wcvc",
Iltit plitinI is nol lrrolx)r'if iL is signccl by;rrr arclvocate ellone arncl rrclt by a
P;tr[y or a cltrly autltot'izttcl offic:cr ol'[lrc pl;rintiff . trr thc cersc at hancl, wlrait,
r:; llti: l.rtc of tlrr: 1-rl.rlrL u.rlrrt lr r:,:;rc;rrccl :;ctlt:ly lly trrt itclvt_rr;;.rLctl
I
The plaintiff ltas rro[ availed reason as to why the plaint was not signed by
an officer duly authorized by the plaintiff. indian Courts have held that,
the requirement'falls under those matters which can be rectified through
an amendment of the pleadings. In other words, it is not a defect that
ttould outlveigh and nullify the pleadings to affect Jurisdiction of the Court.
This is also ',vlrat was held in the case of MA NGWE vs. MA HME (ArR) 1923
Rangoon 206. That stands to be the position in"our local jurisdiction
AS it TVAS hCId iN thc CASC Of TNAruSGEN TRUST VS. TANZANIA ZOISITE
coRp LTp f1968.l H.C.p s01. In the premises, that objection lacks
merits and it is overruled.
L
Reading Paragraphs 18 and 21 of the Written Statement of Defense and
the Counter claim reveals that, the Counter Claim hinges on employment
I
I issues reg4rding suspension and termination of employment which is
J,
alleged to be rvrongful arrd r-rrtlawl'ul [lrus rcsr.rlting irrto loss of cmployment,
l-
I loss of income and enrbarrassment. Thus, in the Counter Claim, the
cjcfcrrdants' clairn is for special dantages as to loss of sala:ies,
gratuity and unlawful terrnina[iott whiclt is urged to be defamatory
t
t,.
in tlrc nature of their pi'ol'cssion as teachers. Moreovclr, it is the clefenclants'
3 r rinLcntion llra[, tltt: ;rr.t:; ctI tltc ltlatirt[itf occasiolrecl s;trr-.s:;ct:; itrrrj
sLrain on tlrcir part. [:ur[ltcrnrot'c; the clcl'endants clainr fclr general
ci,rnrirUcs to lli: ir',!;csti(r(l lry tlri:; Cotttt..
i\:, c;rrlic:r rcrltlt'itlctl, tlrr:(,rrtlttt'r (-l;rittt t.ottltritt:; two cli:,tirtr,,t r:lttittt:; to llr:
,rrlrlltr:,1;('{l Ir,,t Iltr,; ("rltrt, Illc.;t' ;]t'o (lr'f ;ttttirtion iu)(l t'ttrg.rlrtytrrr:ttl rli:;lttttr:.
r'it tlrrs ;rrrrr.trl,', rt i:, 1.rt:tttttrtt)l'trr ttotc llt,rt:; tlrc <:l,riilt o[ rkrlr:r'rrl;,irrL lrirtr,;rl!;
0n both defama[ion and employment which were a result of the
tlleged wrongful and unlawful termination. The nexus to what the
to be defamatory is illegal terrlinaticln which is
p:laintiff considors
indeed a labour matter as also evidenced in the prayers under
paragraphs 23 (iii), (v), (vi) & (vii) of the Written Statement of Defence
and Counter Claim of the defendants.
i'/hich is the proper forum or Court vested with jurisdiction to entertain the
defendants' case? It is not in dispute that the counter claim which contains
claims on employment was pending in Court when Employment and Labour
Relations Act came into force on 2Otr' December, 2006. What is in dispute is
whether it was an Employment Case. The answer is in the negative
because the Counter Clairn founds its way in Court through Civil Case
No. 10 of 1999. It was not an employment. As such; it cannot be
safell, concluded that the Counter Claim was penciing in Court before
the conring in[o force of the Employment and Labour Relations Act.
If at all it vras an cn'tploynterrt cause, then; iI was not l'ilecJ irr tlre
proper forun r vcstcd with mandate to resolve labour clisputes.
Irr rrry corrsiclcrc:cl vicw, Lltc ct-lutt[cr cl;tirrr witlr crtrl;loyrncnL clairrrs is rroL
'ff
cclrrrpctcnI arrcl it ougltt tcl ltatvc bccn sunrrnarily rejcctccl.
Irrrr:;rlit.Iiort i:; vr:stcrl tly l.tw.tttcl no[ [ltc: likc:; or clislikcs of tlrc ltartics,
\^,/lrrkr tlti:; rorrrt i:; r,,c::;tccl wiflr jrrrisclictiort tcl try cl<lf'itrtt;rtiort (:itscs;/ it is rrol"
.rllorv,:tl irt r"\r)r('ir;(.' oI it:; ottclirral jttt'i:,iclit,tiotr Lri try llrltotrr tlisJ:ttlcs.
I'r.rrttrtt,rtcly, ilrt: l.rlrtnrr (.ortL r:ttjtty:; ;ttt'i:;tlic.Lior) ()n ctrrJ-llctyrttcrrt niatt.t:(,:t':;
tr'l,tttlrrl ttr tlttlrtl', lr,rl'rlrt\r, llrr'; t', ltttt',tt,rtrl l1 /\rl NJ1, li 1l ,)()0(l
kfi'ffinrended section 94(1) of the Employrnent and Labour Relations Act,
.tl, tl,lr l(t ltl,td as
a
fcllows:-
l-he rule against split of claims demands the suii to have been instituted in
the High Court (Labour Division) or any other appropriate forum available
bi, the time ior.dispute resclrrtion (if any). The offerrsive paragrailhs are so
interwcven in that they all together combine the complaint on illegal
ter-minaticn and defarnation. If the defendants so wish; they may lodge a
defamation case irr tliis Court but r,vithout pleading labour related issues
rnihich nrusf be pursued in a cottrt'/ested with conrpetent jr"rrisdic;iion.
pLlrcly bascd on lerbor.rr clispu[c wlrich lras [cl be institr;ted in thc cstablishr:d
l.tl.l<lttr clisl>ttLtl'; t.t:srtlvttlr,; t ttrlt.lt;tt tisttt,
[-rlrtl)(]rnor'-:; !lrr: l)r'(ry('r:; un(lct'1r;tr;l([',.iplr:; /--1 (i), (ii) ;Lttc.l (iv) s;l.itrtcl tt'r
r ir;tlltlrgil .;tilll'. ,lt(l {)\vrri't';lti1t ttl 'it. (.titt:;t.ttrtitrtt ltt[r,:t'lt;rli0lt;rl iit lttiril tltt
! l.
I rl rLilI against f;plit (rl' il,rilti:,, c"l(]rnaltds the suit to have been instituted in
lltr, l"ligh Cour[ (Labour Divisinn) or any other appropriate forum available
tltc titll(l for dislttr[: r'('r.ir]lrtrclrt (if arry). The offensive paragrallhs arc so
in[ertryoven in that tlrcy flll [ogether combine the complaint on illegal
t€rntination artd defamation, If the defendants so wish; they may lodge a
defarrtation case itt tltis Corrrt but without pleacling labour relatecl issues
trhiclt must be pttrsued in a cclurt vesred with competent jurisdiction.
l'lourever, irt the light clf tlre principle against split of claims, the illegal
terntirtation which resulted into defanration is a tortuous liability and it is
safc for tlrat to bi: ltlclgr:cl irt thc Lcrbour Court. ln view of the aforesaicl,
l- [ltis cot-lnter clairn is nol" t:rlttllctcrtt ancl it is struck crut wiLlr costs. I1 tlr;:t"
|t:giltd, tltis Cottrl ls ol tltc ccttt:;iclct'ccl view [ltat, tltt,r t.lor:rrLcr (.l.rirrr is
',;)tlrtll! [las;tlcl c,tt l;t[)<lttr tli';llttti' t'vlticlt ltirs to l.rc-. irtstit.trtccl irr Ilrc cst.itblir;hrtrl
l;rtlorrr clisgtrrtc:.; r'r-lsolvinq I no(,lr,tnisrtt,
lrtrrtlterrltctrc; tlttl 1)t'lty(:r'': r.lt(krr par;trlraJllrs 23 (i), (ii) .,rpcl (iv) starrcl [tr
Ilr;rllcngc slirtrrij ,trtrl t)v\/1,,r,;lrrp ol St. Ccirt:;t;trrl.l.ttl lnltl,rr..tl.tt)tt,rl Sirtliool ort
()lrrr lt,ttrrl irrrl \i()nt(, r,lr,t ttr rn,, rottrlttt.lrrl lry lltr, r,:;l.tlrli:;lrtttct
Pl,rirtlilf
') |
tr,e Executr,,,e Conrn-rirtee of the plaintiff's Board on the other hand'
Ot' iheyarenottheoneSt,..,hoinstitutedtheCounterC|aim.
anclough|tohavebeenrejectedinthefirstinstance,
S.E.
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2t)
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