Hacienda Luisita vs PARC

Case Digest GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011

Facts:

In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing
public and private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One
of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed
agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac.
Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac
Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or controlled by Jose
Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an expropriation
suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform
(now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered
judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.

In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the government’s case against TADECO. The CA
dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain
the approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan)
and to ensure its implementation.

Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative
modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme
is the preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda
Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.

After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution
Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of
TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.

From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the
farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups representing the
interests of the farmers – the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of
them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or
revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they haven’t actually received those benefits
in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives haven’t really improved contrary to
the promise and rationale of the SDOA.

The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms
of the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations
of the Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of
Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory
acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and
subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme
under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.

On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA
6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to
stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of
distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of
agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

Administrative Law

Issue 1: W/N PARC has the authority to revoke the Stock Distribution Plan or SDP

Constitutional Law

Issue 2: W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657

Held: No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenged the constitutionality of RA
6657, Sec 31 at the earliest possible opportunity. It should have been raised as early as
Nov 21, 1989, when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a reasonable
time thereafter.

Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case. Before the
SC, the lis mota of the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not the PARC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the original
positions of the groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis mota is
the non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the the SDP may be revoked. Such
issues can be resolved without delving into the constitutionality of RA 6657.

Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of acts of the
executive or legislative departments have not been met in this case.

* The SC, through a resolution dated Nov 21 2011 of the motion for reconsideration filed
by HLI, affirmed the revocation of HLI’s SDP and the placing of Hacienda Luisita under
the compulsory land distribution scheme of the CARP law. It was also held that the date
of taking was Nov 21 1989, when the PARC, by Resolution 89-12-2, approved the SDP
of HLI. ##
J. Joya v. PCGG

Facts: The PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote on 09 August 1990 to President
Corazon Aquino regarding the scheduled sale between the Republic of the Philippines
and Christie’s of 82 Old Masers Painting housed in Metropolitan Museum of Manila and
7 boxes of antique silverware in the custody of Central Bank. This was approved on 14
August 1990 and the consignment was signed the following day. On 26 October 1990
the Commission on Audit submitted audit findings to the President – the assets subject
of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance and thereby prohibited by
law. As Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists, petitioners Dean Jose Joya et al
contended that they have legal personality to restrain respondent from acting contrary to
preserving artistic creations pursuant to Sec 14-18 Article XIV of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

Decision: Petition for prohibition and mandamus dismissed for lack of merit. Legal
standing means a personal and substantial interest on the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The paintings legally belongs to the foundation or the members of thereof
and the silverware are gifts to the Marcos couple. When the Marcos administration was
toppled and the said objects were confiscated it did not mean that ownership has
passed to the government without complying with constitutional and statutory
requirements of due process and just compensation. If these were already acquired,
any defect in the acquisition must be raised by the true owners. Petitioners failed to
show that they are the legal owners of the said objects that have become publicly
owned.

Bankers Association of the Phils v. Comelec

Facts: This was a petition for the issuance of a status quo to enjoin theimplementation
of the Money Ban Resolution issued by COMELEC. The said ban prohibits the
withdrawal of cash, encashment of checks and conversion of any monetary instrument
into cash from May 8 to 13, 2013 exceeding One Hundred Thousand pesos (P
100,000.00) or its equivalent in any foreign currency per day in banks
finance companies quasi/banks, pawnshops
remittance companies and institutions performing similar functions. However all other
non/cash transactions are not covered. For this purpose, the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas and other financial agencies of the government are hereby deputized to
implement with utmost dispatch and ensure strict compliance with this resolution without
violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, and Republic Act No.
6426.
Issue:

Whether or the COMELEC’s resolution was exercised in excess of its duty.

Held:

The Court held to dismiss the case, as it became moot and academic. The Court has
issued a Status quo Ante on May 10, 2013, thus the Money Ban Resolution was not in
force during the most critical period of the elections. In addition, nothing in the
exceptions of “moot and academic” principle relates to the case at bar. The Court
considers it significant that the BSP and the Monetary Board continue to possess full
and sufficient authority to address
the COMELEC’s concerns and to limit banking transactions to legitimate purposes
without need for any formal COMELEC resolution if and when the
need arises. Likewise, the Congress should take note of the Money Ban Resolution and
the evil it sought to prevent in application of its plenary power for future elections, thus
rendering unnecessary further action on the merits of the assailed Money Ban
Resolution at this point.

BENGZON VS. DRILON

G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
Gutierrez, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are
currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos
issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of
the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638
was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the
pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was
not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the
wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to
overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in
this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its
publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB
16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken
away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992
relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or
valid.
HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.
Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition
of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices
on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential
treatment” to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect
asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be
repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992
GAA are declared valid and subsisting.

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

Nicos Industrial Corp. V. CA

FACTS:

(1) The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the
aforementioned constitutional requirement of Article 8 Section 14 of the Constitution.
The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and
distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. Petitioners complain
that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial
court merely confining itself to the pronouncement that the sheriff's sale was valid and
that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate
factual or legal basis for the decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the
Court of Appeals.
(2) January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00
from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof
executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The
mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's
sale was held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the
original date for the auction was
changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor.
(3) CA decision: We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo
while leaving much to be desired, substantially complies with the rules.
 ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court’s decision is unconstitutional

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case is REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10,
for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986, conformably
to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the appeal
thereof, if desired, in accordance with law.

RATIO:
(1) The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the
letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution.
(2) It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of
how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to
the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in
favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for
its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a
higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed.
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it
is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the
court for review by a higher tribunal.
(3) Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for
substance. As the ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the
merits, the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.
(4) Kilometric decisions without much substance must be
avoided, to be sure, but the other extreme, where substance is also lost in the
wish to be brief, is no less
unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with welcome economy of
words, arrives at the factual findings reaches the legal conclusions renders its ruling
and having done so ends.

Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. CA

G.R. No. 127682 April 24, 1998
Regalado, J.

Issue:

whether or not issuance of Minute Resolutions is valid under Section 14,

Article VIII of the Constitution

Held:
 “Resolutions” are not “decisions” within the above constitutional
requirements; they merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained.
And the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but
of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial
since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals’ decision.

The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases “submitted for

decision,” i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefor
stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Supreme Court, after deliberating on a
petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and
states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the
respondent court’s decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.

Valdez vs CA

Facts: A complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio andVenida Valdez
against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella. Without any color of title
whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision
in favor of the petitioners, ordering private respondents to vacate the property. The
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners
failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had
given the private respondents the right to occupy the premises

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINTCLEARLY

MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

Held: It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of
action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the
action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is
legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer. The
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. The evidence revealed that
the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception. Clearly, defendant’s entry into
the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently,
it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. An examination of the
complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that will support an action for
ejectment are lacking.