Henry, Albinism

The New South Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Practice
Author(s): James Barber

Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 81, No.
5 (Oct., 2005), pp. 1079-1096
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
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The new South Africa's foreign policy:
principles and practice
JAMES BARBER*
Shortly before the I994 election, which marked the birth of the new South
Africa, Nelson Mandela published an article in Foreign Affairs. In this he
outlined the principles and aims of the foreign policy of a future African
National Congress (ANC) government. Emphasizing that he wrote not as an
individual but as party leader, he echoed views that had already been agreed by
an ANC working group, in which Thabo Mbeki had played a prominent part.
In March 2004 the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) released a Strategic
Plan for 2003-2005, which repeated some but not all the original principles.'
This article seeks to examine how far ANC governments-under Presidents
Mandela and Mbeki-have succeeded in implementing those stated principles.
The ANC's foreign policy principles
Mandela and the ANC group stated that their 'core concern' was the pursuit of
human rights-broadly interpreted to cover economic, social and environ-
mental as well as political rights. These were directly related to the promotion
of democracy, on the basis that just and lasting solutions to international
problems 'can only come through the promotion of democracy world wide'.
Other principles included respect for international law, support for peace and
disarmament, and universality (having negotiated successfully with the apart-
heid regime, the ANC assumed it could do business with anybody). Many of
these principles are found in western liberal thought, but Mbeki rejected the
notion that they were particular to the West. For the ANC, similar principles
were found in the Freedom Charter of I955 (which after initial doubts the
ANC embraced as its own).
The principles were to be pursued in four settings. The first was the global
division between the First and Third Worlds. In a search for economic equality,
* I am indebted to Professor Deon Geldenhuys ofJohannesburg University for his valuable comments.
Nelson Mandela, 'The new South Africa's future foreign policy', Foreign Affairs 72: 5, I993; ANC, Foreign
Policy in a New Democratic South Africa (Pretoria: ANC, I993). For the 2004 DFA paper, see www.dfa.gov.za.
International Affairs 8I, 5 (2005) 1079-I096
James Barber
the new government (in contrast with its white predecessors) identified itself
with the Third World, stressing its concern about economic inequality and an
unjust global trading system. The second was the arena of international organi-
zations: Mandela argued that bodies such as the United Nations (UN), the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the
Commonwealth were central to the search for human rights, peace and equality.
Third was demilitarization so that in future, South Africa's forces would be used
only in self-defence, and for peacemaking and peacekeeping. As relations with
other states changed, it was assumed that this would yield financial savings, which
were to be diverted to social development. Finally, it was recognized that
South Africa's destiny lay in Africa, where a debt was owed for support in the
liberation struggle. Looking to the future, it became increasingly clear that
South Africa could not flourish surrounded by a sea of poverty. South Africa
would contribute to the region as a partner, 'resisting any pressure or tempta-
tion to pursue its own interests at the expense of the rest of southern Africa'.
Mandela's government
Although the ANC won a decisive election victory in I994, Mandela was
obliged by the terms of the constitutional settlement to form a Government of
National Unity (GNU), based on the levels of support gained respectively by
the main parties at the election. As a result, the GNU cabinet initially did not
consist solely of ANC ministers, but included others from the National Party (NP),
led by F. W. de Klerk and representing a majority of whites and Coloureds,
and from the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi,
supported mainly by traditional Zulus. Nevertheless, Mandela ensured that the
international face of the new government was exclusively in ANC hands. He
did so by involving himself and Mbeki (First Deputy President) in foreign policy,
and by appointing ANC stalwarts to appropriate departments: Alfred Nzo and
Azid Pahad to foreign affairs, Alec Erwin to trade, and Joe Modise and Ronnie
Kasrils to defence. By contrast, F. W. de Klerk, the Second Deputy President,
was pushed to the sidelines. Resentfully, he wrote that while he was eager to
promote the new South Africa abroad, 'I was never asked to represent the country
at international meetings.'2 Within a couple of years he became so frustrated
that he led the NP out of the GNU, whereas the IFP ministers remained in
post. However, in its early years in office the ANC had to rely on the old civil
service, including the DFA. This came about through a 'sunset clause' in the
constitutional settlement, which secured for a period the positions of existing
civil servants, and helped to cover the ANC's lack of experience in running a
large complex state. 'We were', Mandela admitted, 'taken from the bush, or from
the underground or from prison, to come and take charge. We were suddenly
into this immense responsibility of running a highly developed country.'3
2 F. W. de Klerk, The last trek: a new beginning (Basingstoke: Macmillan, I998), p. 347.
3 Anthony Sampson, Mandela: the official biography (London: HarperCollins, 1999), p. 495.
io8o
The new South Africa'sforeign policy
A further salient factor was that the new government was born into a world
in flux. During the long years in exile, the ANC had moved to the left. That
came about because the Soviet Union gave not only diplomatic support, but
training and supplies for the ANC's military wing (Umkhonto we Sizwe or
'MK'). In contrast, western states refused to support the armed struggle, and
some leaders -Margaret Thatcher among them-branded the ANC terrorists.
In addition, the ANC established a working relationship with the South
African Communist Party (SACP) that included joint participation in the
armed struggle. In these circumstances the exiled leadership came to believe
that the tide of history was running in favour of socialism.
At the Morogoro conference in I969, the ANC leader in exile, Oliver
Tambo-himself a social democrat rather than a communist-declared that the
world was witnessing 'a transition to socialism, with the breakdown of
colonialism as a result of the national liberation and socialist revolutions'.4
Tambo was equally clear when he addressed the UN's General Assembly in
1976. He declared that the apartheid regime could sustain itself only 'because of
the economic, military and political support it receives from the West'.5 He
predicted that the gap between the ANC and the West would grow wider,
because imperialism continued to associate its own survival with that of the
apartheid regime.
By the I99os the international tide was indeed turning, but not in the way
predicted by Tambo. Socialism was in retreat; the ANC found itself operating
in a western-dominated global setting. De Klerk saw this as an opportunity for
his government. 'It was', he claimed, 'as if God had taken a hand ... We have
not waited until the position of power turned against us.'6 To an extent de
Klerk was right, for the ANC's major supporter temporarily withdrew from the
new international scene. This created tension within the ANC between those
who held on to socialist views and those who accepted the new situation; and
this tension emerged in the formulation of future economic policy. The ANC's
first effort was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP),
published just before the 1994 election. On balance, this programme reflected
the views of those inclined towards the western market economy rather than
those disposed to retain their socialist allegiance. Within a couple of years the
RDP gave way to a new initiative-the Growth, Employment and Redistri-
bution programme (GEAR), which ratcheted policy further towards the
market. Rukhsana Siddiqui saw GEAR as accepting 'the challenge of an open
global system', and aiming 'to increase savings and also attract more foreign
inflows in order to increase levels of investment'.7 These moves did not go
unchallenged. For instance, Ben Turok, a communist and an ANC MP,
4 The ANC speaks: document and speeches of the African National Congress (selection of speeches and
documents 1955-77; n.p., n.d.).
5 ANC Speaks, pp. 198-21 I.
6 De Klerk, The last trek, pp. I6I-2.
7 Rukhsana Siddiqui, The globalisation of South Africa political economy, Bradlow paper No. I6 (ohannesburg:
South African Institute of International Affairs, I999), p. I22.
IO8I
James Barber
complained that the ANC had abandoned its development aims and had
succumbed to 'international pressures to integrate further into the global
economy'.8 Yet, backed by the patronage of office and a sense of common
destiny, the ANC held together.
The new government in action
Although the ANC had no experience of governing a state, nonetheless in the

four years from I990 to I994-while involved in complex negotiations about
the country's future-it succeeded in transforming itself from a liberation
movement into a political party, and then into a government. And despite its
inexperience the new government had advantages. These included an enthusi-
astic welcome from international organizations, which Mandela freely acknow-
ledged had contributed to the struggle against apartheid. Moreover, the new
South Africa offered hope for the future. In I990 US President George Bush
(Senior) spoke optimistically of a 'new world order'-an international com-
munity at peace with itself, enjoying economic expansion, and in which
persistent problems (the Middle East, Northern Ireland, the Balkans and South
Africa) would be resolved.9 Such hopes were soon crushed-except in South
Africa. There was born the only child of the new order, and as such it was
treasured. Nor was the welcome confined to applause. Although, judged by
the usual criteria, South Africa was too wealthy to qualify for development aid,
an exemption was made to compensate for the suffering endured under
apartheid. UNICEF, for instance, made an initial allocation of US$20 million
to contribute to the health of women and children.
The new government itself was eager to be active internationally. The contrast
with apartheid days is indicated by foreign representation. At the beginning o
1990 'white' South Africa had 30 diplomatic missions abroad; by I996 Mandela's
government had 124, and it had a membership of 45 international organizations
whereas the white regime had been excluded from most of them. Soon the
new government gained further prominence by hosting and chairing a range of
international bodies-including the NAM, the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) and the Commonwealth. In Africa it became a member of the
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the OAU. Further-
more, it became prominent in promoting 'good causes'-such as cooperating
with Canada and New Zealand to eliminate anti-personnel mines. In
international sport it hosted the rugby and cricket world cups. Looking to the
future, it had hopes of gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council
In terms of the international economy, Alec Erwin, the minister of trade and
industry, describes South Africa as 'a bridge between the developed and the
8 Ben Turok, Beyond the miracle: development and economy in South Africa (Cape Town: Fair Share Univer-
sity, I999).
9 T. Millar, 'A new world order', World Today 48: I, 1992.
1082
developing worlds'. Erwin explained this in terms of the country's economic

structure (with its First and Third World elements), its geographical position
astride the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and its global trading interests.10? The
adoption of this bridging role has not been universally popular inside the ANC:
some have accused the government of kow-towing to the developed world.
Even a government official complained that South Africans were required to
parade like beauty queens before prying western eyes. Despite such doubts,
Pretoria became convinced that it must secure a place within the global world
economy, not only for itself but for the good of Africa as a whole. A parli-
amentary committee concluded that although the country's long-term future
lay with the Third World, 'there are certain realities we dare not ignore'. In
this spirit the government undertook long, difficult negotiations with the EU,
which eventually led to a trade, development and cooperation agreement."I
Mandela's government and Africa
The new government concentrated much of its attention on Africa, but there
was an element of self-doubt about its approach, as well as suspicion from other
African states. At first Pretoria claimed that it was simply another African state:
just one of the pack, and a new and inexperienced one at that. However,
although in global terms South Africa is a small or medium-sized state, in Africa
it is a giant. By all measurable standards it is more advanced than the rest of sub-
Saharan Africa. The issue is not therefore whether but how Pretoria uses its
strength in Africa. It was soon to learn that while power may stimulate respect
it seldom fosters love.
The major western states were eager for Pretoria to adopt a continental
leadership role. Frustrated by their failures to resolve Africa's problems of poverty
and political instability, they saw South Africa as the best internal hope of
stimulating economic growth and bringing order to the troubled continent. As
a result, a burden of expectation fell on the new government, based on the
hope or assumption that it would be able to achieve the goals that had eluded
others. The ANC government was cautious, suspecting that the West wanted
to reduce its commitment to Africa by transferring responsibility to Pretoria.
South Africa soon had difficulties of its own in a clash with Nigeria over
human rights. When Mandela came to power Nigeria was under an authori-
tarian military regime led by General Sani Abacha. A protest campaign by the
Ogoni people, who claimed that their land had been ruined by the oil industry,
was broken by the regime and the leaders were arraigned before a military
tribunal. They were found guilty of plotting a coup and attacking chiefs, and
ordered to be executed. Mandela, who saw the process as an infringement of
human rights, attempted to restrain the Nigerians through diplomacy, including
10 Marie Muller, 'The institutional dimension', in Walter Carlsnaes and Marie Muller, eds, Change and
South Africa's external relations (ohannesburg???: Thompson, I997).
i Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, The European Union-South Africa Agreement Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2000).
1083
James Barber
visits to Nigeria by Mbeki and Archbishop Tutu.

At this point, in November I996, Mandela attended his first Common-
wealth Conference, in New Zealand. On arrival, when questioned about
Nigeria, he said he was sanguine about the situation. However, next day news
came that the executions had taken place. Furious and humiliated, Mandela
called for action. Following his lead, the conference suspended Nigeria from
the Commonwealth; but Mandela wanted more, including diplomatic isola-
tion and economic sanctions, and pointed the way by withdrawing the South
African High Commissioner. He called on western states to boycott Nigerian
oil, and summoned an extraordinary meeting of the SADC at which he called
for coordinated pressure on Nigeria.'2
His efforts produced nothing. The West continued to buy oil, and the African
states had no appetite for confrontation. They saw Nigeria not as an abuser of
human rights, but as a continental leader, which had supported other liberation
struggles and was a major contributor to the OAU. They accused Mandela of
breaking African unity. Indignantly, Liberia claimed that the 'campaign against
Nigeria is very shocking', and called on others 'not to allow South Africa to be
used in undermining of African solidarity'. The Nigerians themselves described
Mandela's attitude as 'horrific and terrible', and spoke of South Africa as 'a
white state with a black head'.13 Even at home Mandela gained little support.
After it was pointed out that Nigeria had given substantial financial support to
the ANC's electoral chest, the government started back-pedalling. Mbeki told
parliament that South Africa must act not alone but in concert. His anti-
imperialist and African elements to the fore, Mbeki asserted that in Nigeria's
case understanding was preferable to confrontation. Then he accused the West
of manipulating Mandela and trying to expose him to ridicule. The real power,
said Mbeki, lies with rich states. They purchase the oil and bank the vast finances
involved. In contrast, South Africa neither marketed the oil nor banked the
cash. Mbeki had succeeded in moving attention away from the abuse of human
rights in Nigeria to criticism of the West.I4
Another difference of viewpoint arose over the expansion of South African
economic and trading relations with the rest of the continent. From Pretoria,
the rapid expansion of African trade was seen as a success. In I993 total 'official'
trade with the rest of Africa was just above R8 billion (probably an under-
estimate, because with UN sanctions in place many traders covered their tracks).
Subsequent years saw a steady growth. By I999 trade had reached about R27
billion; by 2003 it stood at around R47 billion. Yet it must be recognized that
the main thrust of South African trade was outside the continent. In 2003 no
African state was numbered among the country's top ten trading partners.'5
Furthermore, Pretoria's perception of success was not always reciprocated. Critics
I2 James Barber, 'Reaching for values: the Commonwealth and Nigeria', World Today 53: I, 1997.
13 Denis Venter, Regional security in sub-Saharan Africa (Pretoria: Africa Institute, I996).
14 Proceedings of National Assembly, I7 May I996, cols I458-9.
'5 South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2001/2, p. 495; 2003/4, p. 444 (Johannesburg: South African
Institute of International Affairs).
1084
elsewhere on the continent complained about South Africans undermining

local firms, creaming off profits and absorbing capital investment-and about
the continuing prominence of white businessmen. They accused Pretoria of
exploitation and neo-colonialism. When they looked at the trade figures, they
noted the marked tilt in South Africa's favour: in 2000, for instance, its imports
from Africa totalled R4,340 million, compared with exports of R27,245 million,
and by 2003 the figures were R8,I82 million and R38,886 million.'6 'Partner
or hegemon?' asked Alois Mlambo from Zimbabwe, and answered his own
question by concluding that, despite promises of partnership, 'South Africa con-
tinues to pursue economic policies that disadvantage its smaller neighbours.'I7
Mandela favoured the promotion of peaceful change by negotiation, with-
out involving the armed forces other than as observers. There were two main
reasons for this. First was the danger of being branded as a bully; of being
accused of stepping into the shoes of the apartheid regime. The second reason
concerned the state of the forces. During Mandela's presidency, the principal
tasks were to create a new force by merging old enemies-the liberation forces
and the South African Defence Force (SADF)-and then retraining them as
peacekeepers. Theses formidable tasks absorbed the military leadership during
the ANC's early years in government.
Mandela's first attempt at peacemaking initially appeared to go well. Together
with the presidents of Zimbabwe and Botswana, and under an SADC banner,
he settled a dispute that threatened the stability of the small mountain kingdom
of Lesotho. However, the settlement did not last, and in September I998 South
African forces entered Lesotho to restore order, on the only occasion during
Mandela's presidency that the forces were so used. But the intervention proved
to be a disaster, albeit on a small scale. With poor intelligence and the wrong
equipment, the South Africans entered Lesotho expecting no resistance. In the
event they were attacked by dissident elements of the Lesotho forces, and eight
South Africans were killed and much damage done before order was restored.
Even greater difficulties faced Mandela's peacemaking attempts in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In I996 the corrupt edifice of President
Mobutu's Zairean government started to disintegrate under the assaults of Laurent
Kabila's revolutionary forces. Mandela's attempts to negotiate a peaceful agree-
ment failed, because Kabila realized that military victory was within his grasp.
However, even after Mobutu's overthrow instability continued and Kabila,
who proved as poor a ruler as Mobutu, was assassinated. Fighting, which had
never completely stopped, flared up again as former allies turned on each other,
and faction fought against faction. Mandela's efforts at negotiations made little
progress. One of the reasons for this was that other SADC members-led by
Zimbabwe, with Angola and Namibia following-sent troops in to support
Kabila. Claiming to act within a SADC framework, and supported by Angola
16 SAIIA Yearbook 1999/2ooo, p. 442; 2003/4, p. 444.

17 Alois Mlambo, 'Partner or hegemon?', in SAIIA Yearbook 2000/1, p. 65. Of South Africa's 15 main
trading partners at the time, only one was African: Zimbabwe, in I3th place.
Io85
James Barber
and Namibia, Mugabe sent some I0,000 troops into the DRC, a contribution
for which he and his family, cronies and senior officers were rewarded by Kabila.
Since coming to power in I980 Mugabe's government had gained a mixed
reputation in Zimbabwe. In its early days serious allegations were made about
the brutal use of force against the Ndebele-the main supporters of Joshua
Nkomo's ZAPU. Nkomo himself fled to London in fear of his life. However,
thereafter Zimbabwe enjoyed a reasonable degree of harmony: the economy
remained relatively strong, and when Nkomo returned home he accepted that
ZAPU be absorbed into ZANU (PF). However, relations with the ANC were
never warm. Mugabe harboured a resentment dating from the liberation
struggle, when the ANC had allied itself with Nkomo's ZAPU, not Mugabe's
ZANU (PF). Added to those past differences were those relating to the current
leadership. Neighbouring liberation struggles had produced contrasting leaders:
one a tyrant, the other a secular saint. Mugabe believes in confrontation and
aggression, with the use of force to achieve his ends, whereas Mandela had taken
up arms only when all else failed, and was now committed to pursuing peace
by persuasion and negotiation. To add fuel to the fire, Mugabe resented the star
treatment given to Mandela, and at South Africa's having ousted Zimbabwe as
the leading regional state. Jonathan Moyo-a Zimbabwe cabinet minister-
complained that South Africans (black and white) 'were arrogant and domin-
eering, and had negative images of other Africans'. He resented their claims to
represent the continent, asserting that they had much to learn, and yet distanced
themselves from and assumed superiority over other Africans.'8
Policy adjustments
In attempting to implement its stated principles, Mandela's government had
several successes, both in broad terms (for example, in its impact on inter-
national organizations) and in specific cases (for example, in the help given to
Mozambique during the floods of I999, when the South African forces helped
to save many lives). Yet, inevitably, the overall picture was mixed. Alongside
the successes, Pretoria had either to abandon or to compromise some
principles. It came to appreciate that to achieve its ends it depended on the
capacity and willingness of others to cooperate. For example, 'universalism'
foundered on the rocks of'the two-China's policy'. The new government had
inherited from its white predecessor strong links with Taiwan. The Taiwanese,
who were not averse to chequebook diplomacy, had already made substantial
investments, with the offer of more to come for the RDP, and they had contri-
buted to ANC election funds in 1994. Mandela was eager to preserve the links
with Taiwan, while building good relations with mainland China. However,
Beijing would not countenance that, stating baldly that South Africa must
choose: it was 'them' or 'us'. After some hesitation, Mandela eventually cut
8 Jonathan Moyo, 'The African Renaissance: a critical assessment', Sappho (Harare) is: 7, 1998.
io86
formal links with Taiwan. There was also a shift of direction in the arms
industry. At first it was assumed that the ANC would run it down, but w
the industry's advocates pointed to its importance in the national economy
government decided to allow it to continue, while ensuring that it was mo
selective in its sales. In the event the industry expanded.
The government also adjusted its views with regard to human rights, a
process in which the spat with Nigeria played a major part. The change ca
detected in two publications: an ANC paper of 1997, and a report from t
DFA in I998.19 The ANC authors noted that there was no single definition
'human rights': the meaning of the phrase depended on culture, creed an
conviction. The group did not advocate abandoning the principle, but sug-
gested that, rather than being supported as a separate 'core concern', 'hum
rights' be incorporated within 'good government' and 'democracy'. Furth
the group, although continuing to identify with the Third World, recogn
the impact of globalization and the West's dominance of the world econom
It suggested that South Africa should not overestimate its own strength a
emphasized the need to cooperate with others.
A year later, Jackie Selebi, the first black head of the DFA, published
departmental report in which he too presented human rights not as a separ
item but as a contributor to good government. He went on to give priority
South Africa's own interests and especially its economy. Then in 2004 the
department issued a Strategic Plan, which contained a list of principles. By then
'universalism' was not included but 'human rights' and 'democracy' were,
although neither was picked out for special mention.
Mbeki's government
The I999 and 2004 elections consolidated the ANC's hold on political power,
and although the constitutional obligation to offer seats to other parties no
longer applied, Mbeki retained IFP ministers until 2004. Yet within this broad
picture of continuity there were significant changes. The most striking came at
the top, with the replacement of the charismatic Mandela by the reserved,
enigmatic Mbeki. Mbeki was already influential in foreign policy work in
Mandela's day, and towards the end of his presidency Mandela admitted that
'the de facto ruler is Thabo Mbeki. I am shifting everything to him.'20 Now
Mbeki became dominant. Alongside him was a new foreign minister, Dr
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who replaced Nzo on his death. Although a more
forceful character than Nzo, she followed closely the Mbeki lead. A distinctive
feature that Mbeki brought to policy-making was an ideological element, in
which Laurie Nathan has identified three core elements: 'democratic; Africanist;
'9 ANC, Developing a strategic perspective on South Africa's foreign policy (Pretoria: ANC, 1997); DFA (Selebi
paper), Thematic Review-Strategic Plan (Pretoria: DFA, I998).
20 William Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC (Cape Town: Zebra Press,
2005), p. 62.
Io87
James Barber
and anti-imperialist'. Nathan concluded that while Mbeki's Africanist and anti-
imperialist elements sit easily together, that is not necessarily the case with
'democratic'; and, as noted above, the ANC had come to link 'human rights'
with 'democracy'. When clashes occurred, Nathan concluded, 'usually the
democratic position gives way'.21
A further pointer to the relative decline of democracy and human rights as a
policy priority came in March 2005, when the government entertained the
Deputy President of North Korea-an unreconstructed Marxist totalitarian
state. In welcoming the visitor, Deputy PresidentJacob Zuma thanked him for
his country's help in the liberation struggle and went on to call for stronger ties
between the two states.22
Focus on Africa
Mbeki has given top priority to Africa. 'I am an African,' he proudly pro-
claimed in May I996-identifying himself with the triumphs and tragedies, the
good and evil, the strengths and weaknesses of the continent's peoples. He
spoke of past wrongs, when 'the strong had annulled the injunction that God
created all men and women in his image'; when race and colour were 'used to
determine who is human and who is subhuman'. Yet, despite that, his message
was one of hope, based on the courage, resilience and ability of the African
people.23 His commitment to Africa has never faltered, and, despite many
setbacks, he believes that it 'will prosper and confound its critics'. It was in this
spirit that Mbeki called for an African Renaissance. According to Vale and
Maseko, this turned out to be 'high on sentiment, low on substance'.24 Yet a
broad and flexible approach had advantages, for by stressing different aspects he
could call on fellow Africans to wage 'a war against poverty, ignorance and
backwardness' while at the same time appealing to American businesspeople to
invest in a continent that offered excellent prospects for profit.
Relations with Nigeria improved greatly following the death of Abacha in
1999. The stronger links that ensued were illustrated by Mbeki's official visit to
Nigeria in October 2000, and a reciprocal visit to South Africa by President
Olusegun Obasanjo. During these exchanges it was agreed to form a binational
commission, with Deputy President Jacob Zuma leading for South Africa.
Eager to strengthen the ties further, Pretoria urged various companies-
including such giants as Anglo-American, SA Breweries and Standard Bank-
to follow up the initiative. Investment and trade in goods and services between
these two African companies grew rapidly. In 1998 trade between the two was
worth R72I million; by 2003 it had risen to R5,3I2 million.25
21 Laurie Nathan, 'Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy', International Affairs 81:
2 (2005), p. 363.
22 Mail and Guardian, 30 May 2005.
23 The African Renaissance, occasional paper no. 8 (Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, I998).
24 Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko, 'The African Renaissance', International Affairs 74: 2 (I998).
25 SAIIA Yearbook 2000/1, p. 495; 2004/5, p. 444.
io88
The new South Africa's foreign policy
NEPAD and the African Union
Mbeki's efforts are not confined to bilateral issues. He occupies an increasingly

prominent role in continental affairs, a position he enjoys not only as the leader
of a relatively powerful state, but by virtue of a combination of personal
characteristics-hard work, determination and vision. In July 2002 Mbeki
chaired the first session of the African Union (AU), retaining the position for
the first year. By the beginning of 2005 he was involved in negotiations to settle
conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and the Comoros,
as well as in mediation in Zimbabwe and Swaziland.26 As a continental leader
he has followed the ANC approach, favouring peaceful negotiation and
conciliation. Moreover, the West frequently has to turn to Mbeki (as they did
to Mandela) as a representative for all Africa-for example, at G8 meetings and
the annual Davos economic summits. They do so because of the relative
strength, stability and honesty of South Africa, and because Mbeki and his
colleagues are people with whom the West can do business. Like Mandela,
Mbeki has accepted his part, and has faced criticism as a result, being accused of
acting as a tool of capitalism. In I999 Mandela replied to such criticism, stating
that to defeat racism and poverty required strong economies as well as
democratic institutions, and that these could be achieved only by cooperation
at international as well as national level, and with support from rich states.27
Mbeki also chaired the steering group that established the New Economic
Policy for Africa's Development (NEPAD), launched in October 200I with a
secretariat provided by South Africa. NEPAD's main aims were the eradication
of poverty, sustainable growth, and the integration of Africa into the global
economy.28 Mbeki and his colleagues realized not only that to gain these ends
they needed support from the powerful G8 states, but that progress could not
be made without political stability and good governance in Africa itself. Echoing
ANC principles, they argued that stability was 'impossible in the absence of
true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance'. Their
aims were to 'adopt policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability,
high economic growth, sustainable development and integration'. To monitor
progress they created an African Peer Group Review Mechanism (APGRM),
with the intention of putting pressure on those who fell short of democratic
standards.29 With greater or less enthusiasm most African leaders accepted
NEPAD, although Qadhafi dismissed it as a US-inspired plot. For Mbeki it
moved in the right direction and created an opportunity for him to play a
leading continental role.
NEPAD was welcomed in the West, and early signs were encouraging. A
G8 meeting in 2002 agreed an 'Action Plan for Africa', and the US and EU
26 Africa Confidential 46: i (2005).

27 South African government press release, 29 Jan. I999.
28 Ross Herbert, 'The AU and Nepad in 2002: a pivotal year', SAIIA Yearbook 2002/3, pp. 241-57.
29 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Report on South Africa. sth Report of session 2003/4.
HC. I 17 (London: Stationery Office, 2004), pp. 48-50.
Io89
James Barber
agreed to increase aid over the next five years by 50 per cent. Washington also
announced an extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act beyond
the initial end date of 2008, and signed a free trade agreement with the Southern
African Customs Union (South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and
Namibia). In 2005 there have been renewed bursts of international concern
about Africa, with mass campaigns to 'make poverty history' and initiatives led
by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who, believing that 'Africa is a scar
on the conscience of the world', set up a Commission on Africa. At the same
time his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown fought for the reduction
of debt in the world's poorest states.30
Yet there remains an element of uncertainty about NEPAD's main focus.
Was it-as the G8 emphasized-a means of establishing a better-governed and
peaceful continent, backed by Africans determined to put their own house in
order? Or was it-as most Africans believed-to be the means of establishing
greater global justice and equality through flows of aid, trade and investment
from the rich? Few African states showed enthusiasm for the peer group review
process, which they believed could compromise their sovereignty, and possibly
expose skeletons in cupboards. Increasingly, therefore, African leaders have
limited the scope of the review and stressed that participation is voluntary. By
early 2004 only i6 states had agreed to take part, and even a country as stable
and relatively prosperous as Botswana (which had served on NEPAD's imple-
mentation committee) decided in January 2003 to reject the peer review.
The element of uncertainty clinging to NEPAD also attaches to the AU,
which in 2003 replaced the OAU as the continent's principal multilateral
organization. The AU has an elaborate structure (with an Assembly, Executive
Council, a Security Council and a Commission) and in theory has agreed to
create a standby peacekeeping force of about 5,000 (troops and policemen)-
drawn from South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt. Furthermore, 15 member
states, including South Africa, have agreed to form an African Court of Human
and People's Rights. However, like NEPAD, the AU suffers from uncertainty
about its main focus. Is it to be seen mainly as a more efficient OAU-retaining
the emphasis on individual state sovereignty-or is it a step towards greater
continental integration, even towards the vision of a United States of Africa
first advocated by Kwame Nkrumah and now favoured by Qadhafi? Will it
arise, phoenix-like, from the ashes of the OAU to become an efficient,
effective body? Or will it become as moribund as its predecessor?
African peace missions

A clear difference from the Mandela years has been the employment of South
African forces on UN and AU peace missions. Mbeki was able to take on these
commitments because by the time he assumed power the radical restructuring
30 Myles Wickstead, 'Building a strong and prosperous Africa', Optima 51: 2, June 2005.
1090
and retraining of the forces embarked upon under Mandela had largely been
achieved. By 2005 there were almost 3,000 South African troops involved in
peace missions, and between I999 and 2005 14,300 tours of duty had been
undertaken. The main efforts were in the DRC and Burundi, but there were
also small groups in the peace zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea and Sudan's
Darfur region. In Burundi their first tasks were to bolster the authorities by
protecting politicians and later overseeing the reintegration of Hutu fighters
into the forces. The UN troops in the DRC are present under a UN Chapter
VII mandate, which offers scope for enforcement action, and the South
Africans have been involved in gunfights with rebel forces.31 The employment
of these troops marks an alteration in kind of Pretoria's continental role, which
it hopes will enhance its diplomatic prestige and claims to a permanent UN
Security Council seat.
Mbeki has personally been involved in negotiations and peace efforts, but
again his fortunes have been mixed. For every step forward there has been a
step back; for every successful negotiation a new outbreak of violence; and
every optimistic forecast is matched by a gloomy one. This chequered picture
was well encapsulated by the events of January 2005. At the beginning of the
month Mbeki was present in Khartoum at the signing of a peace agreement for
southern Sudan that he had helped to bring about. From there he flew to Cote
d'Ivoire, where he had been involved in negotiating a peace agreement between
the government and a rebel group. However, peace here hung on a slender
thread: the rebels refused to meet Mbeki, complaining that he was biased
against them. A longer period of frustration for Mbeki (as for Mandela before
him) is linked to 'Africa's Great War'. Centred on the DRC, this has drawn in
not only the Great Lakes area but also some SADC states, including
Zimbabwe. Despite South Africa's best efforts, the major parties in the disput
have frequently chosen to fight rather than negotiate. This in turn has created a
rift in SADC between those, led by Zimbabwe, who favour military action,
and those who support Pretoria's efforts at peaceful negotiation.
South Africa and Zimbabwe
Apart from the DRC dispute, Zimbabwe has become the most difficult extern
problem for Mbeki's government. Inside Zimbabwe things started to fall apar
in the late I99os. Since then Mugabe and ZANU (PF) have been so determine
to hold on to power that they have trampled over human rights-by attackin
political opponents, fixing elections, suppressing free speech, muzzling the
press, seizing white farms, attacking and driving the farmers and black workers
from their homes, ignoring the rule of law, refusing to accept court judgments,
and employing the armed forces and police to intimidate opponents. Mugab
made no attempt to hide his activities. For instance, following a court decisio
3 Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, 'Guardian of peace: Pretoria's burden', Focus (Johannesburg) 38, 2nd
quarter 2005.
I09I
James Barber
against the government, he told the judiciary it had no right to overrule the
President. 'It can', he said, 'clearly be interpreted as an action of utter judicial
indiscretion, or as I regard it, as an outrageous and deliberate act of impudence.'32
Soon afterwards he removed some independently minded judges and filled the
posts with ZANU (PF) supporters.
As a result of the government's behaviour Zimbabwe's economy has col-
lapsed. Previously it had enjoyed relative wealth, and was able to supply grain
to its neighbours. However, as Diana Games has written, by 2002 'an estimated
80% of the population barely subsists at below the poverty datum line'.33 The
self-inflicted crisis continued, with the result that by 2005 more than half of
Zimbabwe's people relied on food aid from abroad. With the seizure of'white'
farms the dispute over land and race became entangled. When criticized,
Mugabe responds by accusing the whites of 'trying to live in the Rhodesian
past' and of trying to subvert his government. Black critics he dismissed as curry-
ing favour with imperialists. The confiscated farms have not been handed to
skilled or experienced agriculturalists; instead, many have gone to Mugabe's
cronies, senior ZANU (PF) figures, officers of the armed forces and war veterans.
Mbeki, too, identifies land as a central concern. On a visit to Harare in
December 2003 he claimed that the two countries faced similar problems, and
that South Africa had much to learn from Zimbabwe and from Mugabe in
particular. He concluded that 'with everything having failed to restore the land
to its original owners in a peaceful manner, a forcible process of land redistri
bution perhaps became inevitable'.34
Mugabe's actions have attracted a great many critics, including many in South
Africa and Zimbabwe itself. He has been condemned by church leaders, inclu-
ding Zimbabwe's Archbishop Pius Ncube, who said: 'Everything is geared to
support the dictatorship of one man-Robert Mugabe.'35 These critics have
tried to persuade Mbeki to act against Mugabe, or at least to denounce publicly
his breaches of human rights. They have pointed out the Zimbabwean leader'
blatant disregard for human rights and his defiance of the international com
munity. They have underlined the potential problems his behaviour is creating
for South Africa: not only the immediate loss of trade, the inflow of refugee
and the failure to pay for services (power and transport); but also the danger
that in the future South Africa will be tarred by the same brush-that externa
confidence and investment will disappear on the assumption that today'
Zimbabwe will be tomorrow's South Africa.
Support for Mugabe in Africa, although declining, has not been confined to
Mbeki alone. For example, while following the 2002 election Commonwealth
observers reported 'a climate of fear and suspicion' and 'a systematic campaign
of intimidation', an ANC team claimed that 'the will of the people of
32 Martin Meredith 'Mugabe: power and plunder in Zimbabwe', Public Affairs, 2004, p. 153.
33 Diana Games, The Zimbabwe Economy, SAIIA Report Number 30, 2003.
34 Gumede, Thabo Mbeki, p. I89.
35 Nandile Ngubentombi, 'South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe', SAIIA Yearbook 2003/4, p. 159.
1092
Zimbabwe has prevailed'. It was supported by the OAU observers, who found
the election 'transparent, credible, free and fair', while Nigerian observers dis-
covered nothing to undermine the integrity of Mugabe's victory. Then in January
2005 the SADC states announced their support for Mugabe's land reforms and
opposed sanctions against Zimbabwe.
Mbeki accepts that Zimbabwe has problems. But he has rejected Britain's
'megaphone diplomacy', which he says is more concerned with 'kith and kin'
than with Zimbabwe, whereas his own 'quiet diplomacy' is designed to help
everybody. Writing in May 2003, he stated that Zimbabwe's people had to
decide their own destiny and resolve their own problems, and that the current
difficulties were the legacy of colonialism and white dominance. Mbeki argued
that it was not corruption or waste of resources that had led to Zimbabwe's
economic difficulties, but the heavy expenditure on education and health services
and subsidies to benefit the poor. Consequently, he concluded that 'the current
crisis did not arise from the desperate actions of a reckless political leadership or
from corruption. It arose from a genuine concern to meet the needs of the
black population.' However, continued Mbeki, international bodies refused to
help, either in addressing the needs of the poor or the results of the crisis. In the
circumstances the best option for the South African government was to exercise
quiet diplomacy in encouraging dialogue between the Zimbabwe government
and its internal political opponents.36
Mbeki's support for Mugabe has been further demonstrated at Common-
wealth meetings, where he has accused the prime ministers of the UK and
Australia (Tony Blair and John Howard) of being racist and of being unwilling
to let black nations take the lead; he claimed that the proposal to ostracize
Mugabe was 'inspired by notions of white supremacy'.37 At Abuja in 2003-in
one of the most divisive of Commonwealth meetings-Mbeki clashed openly
with Obasanjo over Nigeria's call for Zimbabwe's suspension. At the same
meeting, he tried but failed to have the Secretary General-Don McKinnon, a
New Zealander-replaced with a Sri Lankan candidate, because McKinnon
had enforced Zimbabwe's suspension. When Mbeki was included in a three-man
Commonwealth committee to monitor the situation, he favoured restoring
Zimbabwe to full membership, but was outvoted by the Nigerian and Australian
leaders. As Mugabe's excesses have continued, fewer Africans have been pre-
pared to support him, but Mbeki has stuck to his position. As Justice Malala
wrote in July 2005, 'Over the past six years Mbeki has been prepared to
jeopardise his most vital and personal relationships in defence of Mugabe. Even
as police raze shacks in and around Zimbabwe's cities-leaving hundreds of
thousands homeless-Mbeki was not prepared to condemn Mugabe.'38
Why has Mbeki defended Mugabe and his government? The first point to
make is that, ironically, there is no personal affinity between the two men.
36 Guardian website, March 2003.

37 ANC website, www.anc.org.za, May 2003.
38 Justice Malala, 'Why Mbeki is still backing Harare', Observer, IO July 2005.
1093
James Barber
Indeed, William Gumede states that 'Mbeki felt contempt for the ailing
octogenarian whom he saw as one of the last incarnation of Africa's "big men"-
corrupt leaders who plundered the national coffers to line their own pockets'.
For his part, Mugabe 'holds a dim view of Mbeki, whom he regards as an
arrogant young upstart who should defer to him as an elder statesman'.39 To
explain Mbeki's attitude we therefore have to move away from personality.
Instead, there are a number of possible explanatory factors, which can be
grouped broadly under four headings: first, Mugabe's status and position;
second, the land issue; third, 'the Mugabe factor' in South Africa's domestic
politics; and finally, African solidarity.
While Mugabe is regarded in the West as a despot with an appalling record
on human rights, many Africans see him in a very different light. For them he is
a hero of the liberation struggle who became a living legend when he defeated
the Smith regime against the odds. They see him as a man of determination and
iron will; a man who, as Zimbabwe's father figure, gave his all to the campaign
for freedom. Although Mbeki sees the man's flaws, unconsciously he may be
somewhat in awe of this elderly man-this 'big man'. In post-colonial Africa it
is the first generation of leaders in each new state-Nkrumah, Houphouet-
Boigny, Nyerere, Senghor, Kenyatta-who have gained the most attention and
the glory. They have a special place in the liberation saga. Mugabe is the last of
them who is still in power.
Nor has Mugabe rested on his laurels. He has taken on the most contentious
issue of all-the land. Giving or returning land to blacks is a popular move, and
Mugabe may have been motivated simply by an attempt to retain political support.
However, for many Africans land has a deeper importance than that. It is linked
to their way of life, embracing customs, social structures, and their sense of
security and identity, both as individuals and as groups. In this context land is
more than an economic entity; and whites, even those born in Africa, are
intruders. Mugabe, in the eyes of his admirers, realizes that liberation is not
fully achieved until the land is restored to its rightful owners-in their eyes, the
indigenous blacks.
Against this background it is easier to understand why Mugabe has been
greeted with enthusiasm in South Africa-by cheering students at Fort Hare,
and with more cheering and ululating at Mbeki's installation in Pretoria. From
such reactions Mbeki realized that if he adopted an antagonistic attitude
towards Zimbabwe he would have difficulties at home. Yet whatever attitude
he takes on Zimbabwe spills over into domestic politics. Already there is a clear
division within the ANC alliance itself, with the trade unionists and com-
munists critical of Mugabe, while the 'Africanists' (like Dlamini-Zuma) are
more sympathetic. Another factor that comes into play is the behaviour of the
Zimbabwe opposition, led by Morgan Tsvangirai. Failing to gain clear support
from Mbeki's government, they turned to the opposition Democratic Party led
39 Malala, ibid.
1094
by Tony Leon. For Mbeki that was like a red flag to a bull, and his response has
been to vacillate and preach quiet diplomacy.
The fourth factor which comes into play is Mbeki's enthusiasm for main-
taining African unity in international affairs. He believes that we live in an
unjust world, in which the western states impose their will on poorer, weaker
peoples. He is convinced that in such a situation it is only by remaining united
that Africans can defend and forward their beliefs and interests. Thus the attacks
by the West upon Mugabe and his government can be seen as a threat not only
to Zimbabwe, but to all Africans. South Africa's foreign minister, Dlamini-
Zuma, encapsulated this view when she stated that both the ANC and ZAPU
(PF), having thrown off the imperial yoke, were determined to settle their own
affairs and not to be dictated to by others. To ensure this happened, Africans
must be united. 'There is', she concluded, 'no Africa without Zimbabwe. Africa
is indivisible.'40 Equally, South Africa does not want to be isolated from other
Africa states. We must not, declared an ANC official, repeat Mandela's 'terrible
mistake', when he behaved like a 'bully' towards Nigeria and 'everyone stood
aside and we were isolated'.4' The overall result is that Mbeki's government
has not been prepared to condemn Mugabe. Again, Dlamini-Zuma encapsu-
lated the situation when she said 'It's not going to happen as long as this
government is in power'.42
Finally, Mbeki has supported Mugabe because the main thrust of Mugabe's
attacks has been against the West, in particular against Britain and British
imperialism. Mugabe frequently brands his African opponents 'agents' or 'lackeys'
of the British. Such a view reinforces Nathan's that if the three elements of
Mbeki's ideology come into conflict, it is 'democracy/human rights' that gives
way to 'anti-imperialism' and 'Africanism'.
Principle and practice in foreign policy
The gap between principles and practice in foreign policy is certainly not
confined to South Africa. It is a common characteristic, because states cannot
control the external setting in which they operate. As the ANC soon discovered,
its values and interests were not always shared by other international actors, and
even at home there are differences of values and priority over foreign affairs.
Because of this, foreign policy often appears to follow a tortuous path, and
becomes clear only in retrospect. That said, a strong case can be made that the
ANC government has been more open than most in setting out its principles
and, more often than not, in trying to implement them.
While the experience is common, the case of South Africa stands out for a
number of reasons. First, the ANC came to power as an internationally
renowned liberation movement, inspired by its experience of success in a
40 www.strauss.Zim.com; Africa (2005).

41 Quoted in Nathan, 'Consistency and inconsistencies', p. 368.
42 Gumede, op. cit., p. I88
1095
James Barber
righteous cause. The driving force was a great moral campaign, in which it
successfully fought to build a democratic society. As a result, and without
experience of government, the ANC assumed that, having set South Africa to
rights, it could make a similar contribution to the world, and so adopted an
idealistic approach. Thus the gap between principle and practice emerged
perhaps more clearly than in other cases.
Second, the ANC came to power in a blaze of publicity inspired by the long
international anti-apartheid struggle, which was enhanced by the personality of
Mandela and by the link that was made with the 'new world order'. Thus again
the gap between principle and practice was more publicly exposed than in most
instances.
Third, the new government was saddled with the expectations of othe
especially those of the western states, which hoped that the new regime
Pretoria would be able not only to resolve its own problems to but contribu
towards solving others in Africa that had confounded the western powers.
Fourth, in defending Zimbabwe Mbeki has, in the eyes of many-inside
and outside South Africa-fallen short of the ANC's own principles, by placi
loyalty to a common African cause above the pursuit of human rights.
Io96

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The New South Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Practice

Author(s): James Barber

principles and practice

The ANC's foreign policy principles

International Affairs 8I, 5 (2005) 1079-I096

The new government in action

Although the ANC had no experience of governing a state, nonetheless in the

developing worlds'. Erwin explained this in terms of the country's economic

Mandela's government and Africa

visits to Nigeria by Mbeki and Archbishop Tutu.

elsewhere on the continent complained about South Africans undermining

16 SAIIA Yearbook 1999/2ooo, p. 442; 2003/4, p. 444.

NEPAD and the African Union

Mbeki's efforts are not confined to bilateral issues. He occupies an increasingly

26 Africa Confidential 46: i (2005).

African peace missions

South Africa and Zimbabwe

36 Guardian website, March 2003.

Principle and practice in foreign policy

40 www.strauss.Zim.com; Africa (2005).

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