GRI-00/0230

Draft Topical Report

Periodic Re-Verification Intervals

for High-Consequence Areas

Prepared by:

B. N. Leis
T. A. Bubenik
Battelle
505 King Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43201

for

Gas Research Institute

1700 S Mount Prospect Ave
Des Plaines, Illinois 60018-1804

Contract No. 5000-270-8194

January 2001
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ii
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January 2001 draft topical -

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS

Periodic Re-Verification Intervals for High-Consequence Areas GRI contract no.

5000-270-8194

6. AUTHOR(S)

B. N. Leis and T. A. Bubenik

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER
Battelle
505 King Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43201-2693

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING

AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
Gas Research Institute
1700 S Mount Prospect Ave GRI-00/0230
Des Plaines, Illinois 60018-1804

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

Factors controlling threats to gas-transmission pipeline integrity were evaluated to determine the frequency at which pipeline
condition must be re-verified to ensure safe operation in high-consequence areas. Corrosion was the primary factor controlling the
re-verification interval in high-consequence areas. Worst-case corrosion kinetics derived from the OPS incident database indicated
the re-verification interval for Class 3 and 4 designs was 16 years to avoid leaks or ruptures. For Class 1 designs the results
indicated an interval of 11.4 years to avoid leaks or ruptures. If average corrosion kinetics were adopted instead of worst-case
rates, the re-verification intervals would be about three times longer.

Other potentially significant incident causes also were evaluated. Fatigue and stress-corrosion cracking were indicated to be
unlikely threats in Class 3 and 4 designs. A prescriptive framework was found inappropriate for features like weld-seam defects
and hard spots, as well as for corrosion driven by locally unique factors. Mechanical damage was not amenable to management by
periodic re-inspection. Technology to reduce the frequency of incidents for mechanical damage was outlined.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

pipelines, safety, re-verifying integrity, pigging, hydrotesting, direct assessment

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified

NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev.2-89)
 Executive Summary
This report evaluates factors that are potential threats to the integrity of natural gas-transmission
pipelines and, on that basis, determines the interval at which the integrity of the pipeline must be
re-verified to ensure safe operation in high-consequence areas. Because the initial margin of
safety provided by CFR Title 49, Part 192, can be decreased by these factors if the protective
systems are not effective during pipeline operation, this evaluation involves time and right-of-
way dependent material, construction, operations, and maintenance concerns.
Factors that control threats to gas transmission pipeline integrity were evaluated and used to
determine re-verification interval as a function of Class Location. Specifically, the time interval
for integrity to potentially be reduced to a level that requires re-verification was determined in
terms of stress and wall thickness as a function of design factor. While the process used to
determine time-dependent integrity reduction, as a function of design factor, is similar for
prescriptive and performance based integrity management plans, the results in this report address
only a prescriptive plan. The re-verification interval to avoid incidents was determined assuming
high-consequence areas will overlay Class 3 and Class 4 locations. An implementation plan,
which begins with a baseline inspection that reflects current condition, and defines the scope and
procedures involved in subsequent periodic inspections, also has been developed, but is reported
independently.
The re-verification interval was determined using “worst-case analyses” based on numerical
failure models, which correctly predict the effects of service-simulation testing and full-scale
testing, in conjunction with field-failure experience. As this analysis was done for prescriptive
integrity-management plans, re-verification intervals were determined assuming they would be
applied to a wide range of pipelines operated under federal regulations. For this reason, these
intervals were developed within a very conservative “one-size-fits-all” framework, which means
exclusions exist for the application of the following conclusions. In practice, pipeline segments
excluded will be identified based on company records, and direct-assessment and other
inspection practices.
The analysis determined that the re-verification interval in high-consequence areas was
controlled by corrosion. Corrosion rates for this analysis were derived from the OPS incident
database, which reflects worst-case corrosion conditions as compared to typical conditions
elsewhere in the gas transmission pipeline system. These typical conditions involve the vast
majority of the 325,000 miles of natural gas pipelines that have not experienced a corrosion-
caused rupture since entering service. For such typical conditions, with corrosion protection
being reasonably to completely effective, the resulting corrosion kinetics would lead to a re-
verification interval of over 30 years. The worst case is represented by the 30 locations on bare,
cathodically protected pipelines that did experience a corrosion incident. Analysis using the
average corrosion kinetics for these failures would lead to a re-verification interval of about 18
years.
However, using kinetics for the very worst of these corrosion conditions, all of these incidents
would be avoided using a periodic re-verification interval of:
• 16 years to avoid leaks or ruptures for Class 3 and 4 designs, and,
• 11.4 years to avoid leaks or ruptures for Class 1 designs.

v
The re-verification intervals listed are appropriate and conservative for almost all operations
under a prescriptive regulatory plan. Situations involving less commonly occurring factors, such
as internal corrosion, or external corrosion driven by stray currents or microbiological factors,
for example, require re-verification intervals determined on a case specific basis. Technology
exists for this purpose, and operators will be required to apply it, but those analyses and
requirements are not within the scope of this analysis.
Other factors or phenomena that can reduce the integrity of pipelines and which have been
historical causes of incidents, also were evaluated, leading to the following conclusions:
• Fatigue is an unlikely cause for defect initiation or growth in Class 3 and 4 designs.
• Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is effectively precluded as a threat in Class 3 and 4
designs.
• Weld-seam defects and hard spots, which survived mill or pre-service hydrotesting, will
survive longer in Class 3 and 4 pipelines as compared to Class 1 pipelines, all else being
equal. However, as with internal corrosion and external corrosion driven by locally
unique factors, a prescriptive re-verification interval is inappropriate for such features.
Technologies exist to support the determination of a re-verification interval for weld-
seam defects and for hard spots. Those technologies are uniquely appropriate to each
feature and its local circumstances. As above, it is expected that operators will be
required to employ these technologies as appropriate, but their description and resulting
interval analyses are not within the scope of this work.
• Third-party mechanical damage is a random occurrence in both location and time and
therefore cannot be effectively managed by periodic inspection or re-verification.
Contact could occur minutes after an inspection and cause immediate failure, or a delayed
failure at any time in the future. That time can range from minutes or hours to years.
Management of third-party damage requires technology that limits future contact, and in
the event contact does occur identifies the point of contact. Near-term reduction of
delayed incidents due to existing damage might better be achieved using existing direct-
assessment technologies that detect the coating damage accompanying mechanical
damage. In-line inspection (ILI) tools under development to detect and assess
mechanical-damage severity may offer the same potential in the future, for portions of the
pipeline system that are piggable.
The central conclusion is that the time interval for re-verification of integrity in Class 3 and 4
designs is significantly longer than that appropriate for Class 1 designs due to the difference in
stress and wall thickness.
Exceptions to this analysis to determine re-verification intervals are noted. Such exceptions and
a plan to determine the re-verification intervals are presented in a companion report.

vi
 Research Summary
Title: Periodic Re-Verification Intervals for High-Consequence
Areas

Contractor: Battelle

Principal B. N. Leis and T. A. Bubenik

Investigators:

Report Period: March 2000 to January 2001

Objectives: Provide an engineering and science based interval between

various integrity inspections; pigging, hydrostatic testing and
Direct Assessment.

Technical
Perspective:

Results: Re-verification intervals depend on wall thickness and/or

design stress. The results indicate worst-case incident
circumstances can be avoided using a re-verification interval
of 16 years for Class 3 and 4 designs, and 11.4 years for
Class 1 designs.

Technical
Approach:

Project The intervals determined provide lower bound values based

Implications: on accelerated estimates of the deterioration mechanisms.

Project Manager: Keith Leewis

vii
 Table of Contents
Page
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 2
Pipeline Safety Threats ................................................................................................................... 4
Failure of Gas Pipelines .................................................................................................................. 6
Failure of Gas Pipelines .................................................................................................................. 7
Approach......................................................................................................................................... 9
Property Trends with Vintage and Grade ..................................................................................... 10
Typical Pipeline Geometries......................................................................................................... 15
Fracture Behavior of the Typical Pipeline .................................................................................... 16
Leak versus Rupture and Fracture Arrest ..................................................................................... 19
Pipeline Service Conditions.......................................................................................................... 20
Effect of Class Location on Wall Thickness................................................................................. 22
Degradation Rates and Re-Verification Intervals ......................................................................... 24
Fatigue Considerations.............................................................................................................. 24
Stress-Corrosion Cracking (SCC)............................................................................................. 27
Corrosion................................................................................................................................... 34
Defect-Specific Re-Verification Intervals .................................................................................... 40
Material and Construction Defects Not Found by Hydrotest ................................................... 40
Mechanical Damage Defects .................................................................................................... 43
Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 47
References..................................................................................................................................... 50

viii
 Background
Pending legislation and changes in federal pipeline design, construction, operation, and
maintenance regulations have focused attention on pipeline integrity in high-consequence areas
(HCAs). A key consideration in formulating provisions to ensure integrity in HCAs is the
observation that past field failures involved time-dependent degradation processes, as well as
random occurrences, such as those due to outside forces. Because the initial margin of safety
provided by CFR Title 49, Part 192 (hereafter the regulations) can erode due to such factors,
there is a need to periodically reassess the condition of the pipeline and reestablish or verify that
margin. This report evaluates factors controlling the potential degradation of pipelines and
thereafter establishes the interval at which the condition of the pipeline must be reassessed to
ensure safe operation. This report deals with pipelines designed in accordance with Subpart A
§192.5 of the regulations, to aid in formulating a rational basis for the pending changes dealing
with such pipelines.

1
 Introduction
Energy pipelines provide safe and efficient transport of energy resources from the supply basin
to market, covering distances often in excess of a thousand miles. This report deals with the
portion of the energy pipeline system that moves natural gas – focusing on the portion of the
natural gas system that operates at pressures creating a wall stress equal or greater than 40
percent of the specified minimum yield stress (SMYS).
Provisions for the design of natural-gas pipelines operating in the U.S. are set forth in CFR
Title 49, Part 192 (hereafter the regulations). Some key design requirements for pipelines
operating at pressures creating a wall stress equal or greater than 40 percent of SMYS are set
forth in Subpart A and Subpart C. Subpart C sets the highest permissible working stress at 72
percent of the specified minimum yield strength (stress)1. Subpart C also introduces design
factors that reduce this working stress as a function of class location, which are defined in §192.5
of Subpart A as a function of building density within a corridor either side of the pipeline. As
density increases, §192.5 requires that the highest permissible working stress be reduced, with
the intent to reduce risks associated with failure. Four class locations are introduced. That
where the highest permissible working stress is 72 percent of SMYS is termed Class 12. For
Class 2 the maximum working stress is reduced to 60 percent of SMYS, while for Classes 3 and
4 the maximum working stress is 50 and 40 percent of SMYS, respectively.
The compressibility of natural gas requires that transmission pipeline systems use compressor
stations distributed along the length of the pipeline to maintain the flow rate. Ignoring
decreasing pressure as a function of distance between discharge and suction of adjacent
compressor stations, gas pipelines operate at nominally constant pressure over very long
distances. Commonly, adjacent pipelines operated by the same company in one right-of-way
(RoW) are tied together at manifolds, such that the pressure is the same in those pipelines. The
regulatory requirement to reduce the wall-stress at locations along the RoW where class location
changes is met by using heavier-wall line pipe. Thus, where class-location differences have been
dealt with in this manner there is heavier-wall pipe. Failure processes that potentially threaten
integrity take longer to do so in heavier-wall pipe, all else being equal. This, coupled with
anticipated definitions of HCAs for a gas-transmission pipelines overlying that for class
locations, means that the re-verification interval will be lengthened in Class 2, 3, and 4 designs
as compared to Class 1.
The process used to determine the time increment added in Classes 3 and 4 as compared to
Class 1 is comparable for both prescriptive- and performance-based integrity management plans.
Performance-based plans are formulated on a pipeline specific basis, which means their results
are equally case-specific, whereas prescriptive plans are intended to address the U.S. pipeline
system. Because the purpose here is to address the dependence of this interval in a general
framework, this report only addresses prescriptive plans in a “one-size-fits-all” framework. For
this reason, exclusions exist for the application of the “one-size” results developed, which are
identified and evaluated through use of direct-assessment practices.

1
Excluding lines operated at 80 percent under a grandfather clause.
2
For present purposes, use of Class 1 refers to the design factor for this class location. Likewise, for Classes 2, 3,
and 4.

2
This report evaluates the increase in re-verification interval in Classes 3 and 4 as compared to
Class 13. Because this report deals with existing natural-gas pipelines operating through high-
consequence areas, this interval is evaluated in terms threats to integrity associated with service-
related factors, and includes consideration of mill and construction defects that survive mill and
pre-service hydrotesting and might become active over time. The next several sections outline
the approach taken and define the scope. Because the report quantifies degradation and failure as
a function of pressure level, the circumstances that underlie this evaluation are presented in terms
of line-pipe properties as a function of vintage, and pipe geometries and operating conditions.
Thereafter, results are presented for the approach and scope that is outlined next.

3
That the increased interval for re-verification is determined as a function of increased wall thickness as compared
to Class 1 means that pipelines not meeting class-location provisions with the same grade for the adjacent Class 1
line pipe are excluded.

3
 Pipeline Safety Threats
Because integrity is the focus, this evaluation considers the various threats to pipeline integrity.
A companion project(1) has evaluated these threats based on analysis of the Office of Pipeline
Safety (OPS) reportable4 incident database. These results point to outside forces, corrosion, and
material and construction defects as the most important threats for pipelines designed for high
operation above 40 percent of SMYS. The need to address these is evident when such data are
evaluated in terms of risk, which is the likelihood of an incident multiplied by its consequences,
which here are measured in monetary terms derived from the OPS database.
Risk exposure depends on both likelihood and consequences, which both increase as population
density increases. Thus, the potential significance of the various incident categories can be
simply evaluated in terms of class location using the OPS database. Risk referenced to the data
available in the OPS database is defined as the occurrence of an incident multiplied by the
reported cost. The resultant risk has been evaluated on a per-mile basis to remove the bias
associated with the significantly different mileages operating in each class location, based on
data(2) representing about 50,000 miles of pipeline operated by six companies. These data are
presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1 presents the distribution of mileage grouped by geographic region, and further
subdivided by class location. This distribution of mileage is taken herein as representative of the
distribution of mileage in the U.S. Figure 1 further splits the mileage in terms of population
density in the counties through which the pipeline passes. Two categories are included. One
represents higher-density areas, such as cities, while the second represents light- to medium-
density areas, such as towns and small villages. The mileage in higher-density areas represents
about 20 percent of that in the light- to medium-density areas for this database.
The results in Figure 1 indicate that the major difference between the more highly populated
areas and the light- to medium-density population areas lies in Class 2 and Class 3 pipeline
mileage. Very little mileage lies in Class 4 locations for this almost 50,000 miles of gas-
transmission pipeline. These trends can be rationally explained by noting that:
• routing during design kept gas-transmission pipelines away from what were then the
urban areas, and
• urbanization is slowly overtaking segments of pipeline RoW, which would lead to
gradual increases first in Class 2 mileage, then Class 3 mileage, and eventually Class 4
mileage.
Figure 1 indicates that population encroachment has resulted in increases in Class 2 and Class 3
mileage, but as yet population has not sufficiently concentrated around pipeline RoW to lead to
much Class 4 mileage. As a recent National Research Council study(3) notes, steady increases in
the proportion of mileage in the higher density population classes are inevitable. Because there

4
Reportable incidents involve three types of event. The first involves release of gas from a pipeline or of liquified
natural gas (LNG) or gas from an LNG facility and i) a fatality or personal injury necessitating in-hospitalization;
or ii) estimated property damage, including costs of gas lost by the operator or other, or both of $50,000 or more.
The second involves an emergency shutdown of an LNG facility. The third involves an event judged significant
by the operator, even though it did not fit 1) or 2) above.

4
Figure 1. Distribution of gas-transmission pipeline across class locations
in the U.S. by geographic region. (Data represents 50,000 miles of
pipeline operated by six companies.)

is very little mileage in Class 4 locations, normalizing by mileage in these locations also could
lead to an erroneous bias in the results. Accordingly, data for Classes 3 and 4 have been
combined for subsequent analysis involving the pipeline mileage.
Figure 2 indicates the significant risk associated with outside-forces incidents in areas of higher
population density. This incident category comprises acts of God, which typically involve
widespread damage involving multiple pipe joints, and acts of man, which involves mechanical
damage to the pipeline. These results show the risk of outside force incidents, which are
dominated by mechanical damage due to third-party contact, is five times that of any other when
evaluated in terms of monetary risk. When evaluated on a per-mile basis the data show risk due
to mechanical damage is greatest in Class 3 and 4 locations. This situation is not expected to
improve as urban areas continue to expand(3). When evaluated in this format, the incident
categories rank-order as mechanical damage, material and construction defects, corrosion, and
other. In contrast to threat significance ranked on a per-mile basis, the order based on
frequency of occurrence reverses the corrosion and material and construction categories, and
emphasizes Class 1 locations.
Based on Figure 2 and the incident data as reported in Reference 1, mechanical damage due to
third-party contact comprise the greatest threat to natural-gas pipeline integrity. Thereafter,
consideration needs to be given to threats involving both material and construction defects and

5
corrosion. For pipelines made from line pipe that was either mill-tested and/or cold expanded,
material defects should have been culled from the potential defect population. Likewise, for
pipelines subjected to regulatory-based pre-service hydrotesting, or subsequent re-testing, the
remaining construction defects that could threaten integrity at much reduced allowable
operating pressure should have been exposed and repaired. The exception to this is the material
and construction defects that can grow during service, most notably hard spots and ERW seam
defects that occur in certain types and vintages of line pipe5. Accordingly, concern for integrity
hereafter focuses on mechanical damage, corrosion6, and the selected material and construction
defects that are known to grow in-service.

Figure 2. Monetary risk per year, by incident category and class location,
normalized by mileage – mileage uncertainty for Classes 3
and 4 may overstate the magnitude indicated

5
This is a limited threat as such defects causing reportable incidents reflect line pipe supplied by specific mills,
made over a limited time interval. This knowledge is central to the management of such features.
6
Stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) is embedded in this category.

6
 Failure of Gas Pipelines
Pipeline failure occurs when the wall of the pipe is breached by a crack or metal-loss defect.
Crack is a generic term used to represent sharp features whereas metal-loss is a generic term used
to represent usually blunt or rounded features. The crack or metal-loss defect can develop from
anomalies that reflect early steel- and/or pipe-making practices, or be introduced during
construction. Cracks or metal-loss defects also can result from the effects of pipeline operation
and/or the environment that develops along the pipeline RoW during service.
Historically, pipeline failures result from localized processes, such as occur with the formation of
a crack or metal loss. The exception to this involves acts of God, as occur during a landslide, a
river washout, or other large-scale natural phenomenon that affects a major section of the
pipeline. When acts of God lead to reportable incidents, they are categorized as outside force in
the OPS reportable incident database. Such incidents are purely random, and are neither
controllable nor predictable. For this reason, their effect on integrity cannot be addressed by
periodic pipeline inspection no matter how frequent, and so are not addressed by the provisions
of this report.
Another random failure process reported in the outside forces category involves acts of man by
other than company employees or its contractors. These incidents involve “third-party” contact
that causes mechanical damage to the pipeline. While also random, future third-party contact is
considered manageable with currently developing technology, while existing damage might be
detected prior to causing problems. Accordingly, this report does consider incidents associated
with mechanical damage. Such damage can be so severe that it causes immediate failure, either
by puncture during contact, or during re-rounding as the damaging implement is withdrawn from
contact. Such events could be controlled by detecting encroachment to the RoW, sufficiently in
advance of the potential contact(4). However, they cannot be controlled by periodic pipeline
inspection, no matter how frequent. Accordingly, this type of mechanical damage incident also
is not addressed by the provisions of this report. At the other extreme, damage that is so minor
that it is benign from an integrity perspective, need not be addressed as it poses no threat.
Between immediate failures and inconsequential damage is a group mechanical damage defects
that could fail if they grow to a critical size during service, leading to a so-called delayed failure.
The population of such defects could be contained at its present level by implementing measures
that detect and pinpoint pipeline contact in real time(5). This threat also could be reduced if
inspection capabilities existed to consistently detect it. While work is underway to develop such
tools, both by direct assessment(6) and in-line inspection(7), they remain as yet under development
and so are not available commercially. For this reason, this report includes consideration of
delayed failures.
Failure at cracks and metal-loss defects occurs by either plastic collapse or fracture
mechanisms, although at a sufficiently low wall-stress level corrosion can penetrate the wall
without significant evidence of such mechanisms7. Pipeline failures occur when the wall of the

7
Failures on suspended pipeline spans lead to the potential for instability due to certain foundation and/or wind
loadings. Such instability can lead to failure as can localized instability leading to buckling. Wrinkle bends used
in early construction practices also can be sources of failure. Such sites of instability fail by either plastic collapse
or fracture.

7
pipe is breached by a crack or other defect. The opening that forms in natural gas pipelines
either leaks or ruptures, depending on the length and type of defect, the line-pipe steel, the pipe
geometry, and the pressure, temperature and composition of the gas. A leak occurs when the
opening that forms is stable, that is, the length of the defect does not increase through unstable8
crack extension when the wall is breached. Because the length does not increase beyond that
when the defect breaks through the wall, the leak-path is tight, and the area through which the
gas can pass is small. The limited length, tight leak path, and limited area of the breach are
characteristics of leaks. These traits restrict the gas flow associated with a leak, so that a small
volume and low release-rate are also characteristics of a leak.
A rupture occurs when the length of the defect exceeds a critical value, which leads to unstable
extension of the breach. In some cases, the unstable extension leads to a breach that is not much
longer than that for a leak. Even so, the slit formed as the unstable extension occurs typically
leads to local bulging, which increases the area of the slit, and so also increases the volume and
rate of flow. Occasionally the unstable propagation extends the length of the breach to the order
of the pipe diameter. But, more typically, unstable propagation occurs over several diameters,
often to a length on the order of a pipe joint, and usually leads to a full-bore opening. For this
reason, unstable growth of the breach that occurs with a rupture leads to potentially much larger
openings, and a correspondingly larger volume and rate of gas release.
Whether a leak or rupture occurs can be predicted as a function of the pipeline diameter and wall
thickness, the operating pressure, the inherent fracture toughness of the line-pipe steel, and the
length of the defect when the wall is breached(e.g., see 8, 9). Likewise, conditions associated with
fracture propagation following a rupture can be predicted with the additional consideration of the
temperature and composition of the gas(e.g., see 10, 11). Predictions of leak versus rupture, and the
extent of the rupture, are based on models that are validated by extensive full-scale testing(e.g.,
see 8, 12)
, some of which involves blind predictions(13, 14), and by such testing proven accurate and
valid for the range of conditions they are proven for.
Sensitivity studies with models of fracture initiation and propagation indicate that if the flaw is
long enough, or the inherent line pipe toughness is low enough, the defect will be unstable when
the pipe wall is breached and rupture will occur. How far it propagates unstably depends on the
pipe geometry, the driving pressure in the pipeline, and the properties of the gas. Short ruptures
occur when the energy driving crack growth is released, becoming too small to sustain it. This
happens because, once the wall is breached and the defect begins to grow (rupture), the loading
changes ahead of the crack tip. If the crack grows faster than the rate at which the pipeline
decompresses, growth continues. If the reverse occurs, the decompression wave passes the crack
tip, releasing the hoop stress that drives cracking before the crack arrives – so arrest occurs.
Higher toughness steels dissipate more energy than less tough steels. For this reason tougher
steels slow the speed of propagation. Slowing the fracture speed allows decompression wave to
reach the crack tip in less time. Decompression removes the driving force for growth so the
crack arrests. The sooner decompression occurs, the sooner crack arrest occurs, leading to a
shorter fracture length and the possibility of a leak for tougher steels.

8
Unstable here has a technical meaning associated with effectively instantaneous axial crack extension, which is
referred to as running fracture. Unstable extension beyond the initial breach occurs at speeds up to ~1300 feet-
second-1. The term stable has a technical meaning that refers to a breach that forms under quasi-static conditions,
which does not extend beyond the length associated with the leak.

8
 Approach
Pipeline integrity and re-verification interval are quantified as a function of wall thickness and
stress for a range of parameters including line pipe properties, defect type and size, with
consideration given to the effects of differing pipe diameter. Several approaches have been
pursued to evaluate integrity and re-verification interval on pressure and other parameters, to
establish credibility of the results, which included:
• the implications of full-scale testing and field experience, and
• the implications of mechanics analysis and numerical failure models.
These approaches were implemented to evaluate the effects of:
• re-verification interval associated with threats involving time-dependent degradation by
corrosion, stress-corrosion cracking (SCC), and fatigue,
• at sharp crack-like defects, blunt metal-loss features, and mechanical damage,
• for different operating and RoW conditions.
Where the approach evaluated integrity and re-verification interval associated with mechanical
damage, corrosion, and fatigue through analysis and model predictions, use was made of pipeline
geometries and properties characteristic of the U.S. pipeline system. To this end, file data have
been analyzed to establish trends as a function of line-pipe vintage and grade. Likewise, the OPS
incident database has been evaluated to identify commonly occurring pipeline geometries and
grades. On this basis, a worst-case pipeline geometry has been identified as the focus for this
investigation.
Results characterizing properties as a function of vintage and grade are presented first, followed
by generic geometries and the pipeline’s service conditions.

9
 Property Trends with Vintage and Grade
Pipeline properties of concern in assessing integrity and re-verification intervals are those that
characterize the two common limit states for pipeline failure – plastic collapse and fracture.
Which of these failure processes actually limits serviceability is independent of whether a leak or
rupture occurs.
Because the volume of product moved through a pipeline is proportional to the pressure in the
pipeline and the diameter of the pipeline, the demand for natural gas and other products moved
through pipelines motivates increasing pressure. Increased pressure results in increased stress,
which motivates developing pipeline materials that are capable of safe service at higher stresses.
For steel pipelines, the desire to use grades with strength beyond X60 led to the evolution to
modern line-pipe steel.
The evolution of modern line-pipe steels began in the 1960s with the introduction of high-
strength low-alloy steel (HSLA) making practices, to avoid the potential toughness and cracking
problems that would be associated with the traditional strengthening mechanisms in applications
to higher-strength grades. The HSLA practices of the 1960s transitioned through a range of
thermal-mechanical processing (TMP), including heavy rolling practices, beginning in the 1970s.
The desire to further improve the dynamic-ductile fracture resistance for that class of steels led to
further evolution, beginning in the 1980s, which culminated in today’s thermal-mechanical
controlled processed (TMCP) line-pipe steels. This class of steels makes use of a range of
finishing practices, including accelerated cooling and controlled rolling. It is noteworthy that
steel- and pipe-making practices are not standardized, and it is still possible to purchase line pipe
today that will not exceed toughness values typical of 60s-vintage line-pipe steels.
The development of modern line-pipe steels reflects what has been learned through the past 30
years, with consistent commercial production of higher-strength steels that also have high
fracture toughness and are weldable now routine for some mills. Because line-pipe steel has
continued to improve, it is necessary to account for such developments in the present analysis.
The following paragraphs outline how such changes influence plastic collapse and fracture.
Resistance to plastic collapse is characterized by the mechanical properties of the line pipe. The
simplest way to determine the mechanical property controlling resistance to plastic collapse is to
correlate failure of defect-free line pipe with the various mechanical properties. Reference 15
assembled such data and included consideration of a range of stressing conditions such as stress
biaxiality. Figure 3 derived from those data shows that the ultimate tensile strength (UTS), a
parameter that historically has been measured within the pipeline industry, correlates very well
with the hoop stress in failures controlled by plastic-collapse in line pipe. A similar conclusion
has been drawn recently by the European Pipeline Research Group (EPRG). It follows that
approaches accounting for the effect of defects on pipeline fitness for service would best use the
UTS as the bounding value for defect-free pipelines, as opposed to other properties such as the
actual or specified-minimum yield stress.
In addition to the UTS, it is appropriate to determine the yield stress of the steel, as this value
determines that the line pipe remains elastic in service. It likewise is useful to characterize the
variation in the ratio of yield stress to the UTS, denoted as Y/T, as this also is an important
parameter in satisfying requirements in Appendix B of Part 192. Figure 4 presents the trend in

10
Figure 3. Illustrating UTS as a failure criterion for plastic
collapse in steel pipelines.

Figure 4. Y/T as a function of actual yield stress.

11
Y/T as a function of grade for a wide variety of steels. This trend can be used to estimate the
value of UTS for a given grade of steel, in cases where the UTS has not been determined.
Fracture resistance is characterized in terms of fracture toughness, measured according to
established standards whose roots lie in a technology known as fracture mechanics(e.g., see 16). The
development of this technology is quite recent compared to the origin of the pipeline industry.
Thus, concern for fracture resistance developed in the pipeline industry years before the birth of
modern fracture theories. For this reason, this industry adopted the then available Charpy-vee
notch (CVN) impact test as their measure of apparent toughness. The energy measured in the
CVN test remains the industry’s standard measure of fracture resistance today. Use of the
modern fracture theories in applications to pipelines has been facilitated through correlations
between CVN energy and parameters valid within fracture-mechanics theories. Early
correlations representing a limited database(17) have been recently demonstrated valid for a much
broader class of line-pipe steels(18).
The motivation to increase pressure noted above was also motivation to increase toughness,
because fracture arrest in higher-pressure pipelines requires higher fracture arrest toughness.
Because the shift from carbon-manganese steels in the evolution to the modern high strength
steels began in the late 1960s, archival Battelle data indicate apparent toughness characterized by
CVN energy changed very little until the early 1970s. This is evident in Figure 5a, which
presents full-size equivalent (FSE) CVN energy data representing in excess of 600 joints of line
pipe, reflecting steel produced from about the 1930s through the 1980s. It is clear from Figure
5a that toughness began to increase significantly, although somewhat inconsistently starting in
the early 1970s.
Figure 5b, based on archival data for more than 300 pipe joints dominated by more recently
developed steels, indicates a weak dependence of apparent-toughness on grade. However, this
trend reflects a casual relationship, as changes that affected improvements in SMYS went hand
in hand with changes that positively affected toughness.
Because line-pipe steels have evolved as discussed earlier, there can be significant differences in
the values of the properties that control whether a leak or rupture occurs. For this reason, it is
necessary to evaluate leak versus rupture under conditions that represent the line-pipe used in
the low-wall-stress pipeline system.
The trends in Figures 3 through 5, coupled with changes in steel chemistry, finishing, and rolling
practices that affected changes in strengthening mechanisms and cleanliness can be identified by
decade, to define combinations of grade and toughness typical of pipelines constructed in that
era. Table 1 summarizes such combinations, which are considered representative of the line pipe
in the ground in the U.S.

Table 1. Summary of property combinations by decade.

Decade 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s

Grade X42/X52 X52/X60 X60/X65 X65/X70 X75
CVN, ft-lb 20 30 40 65 80

12
 a) as a function of year produced

b) weak apparent tie between toughness and yield stress

Figure 5. Some trends in CVN plateau energy.

13
Table 1 suggests that Grade X52 line-pipe be coupled with a typical plateau toughness of 30 ft-
lb, to represent much of the pipeline-miles constructed through the late 1960s. This combination
could be paired with Grade X42 coupled with a typical plateau toughness of 20 ft-lb to
reasonably represent much of the construction through the late 1950s. Consider now pipeline
geometries to tie to these properties, to define generic pipelines, which then be evaluated to
quantify leak versus rupture behavior.

14
 Typical Pipeline Geometries
As this reports deals with safety considerations, the pipeline geometries considered are biased
toward circumstances that have posed problems in past. Accordingly, pipeline geometries
considered representative have been identified with reference to the OPS incident database,
which trends incidents as a function of many parameters, including pipe diameter and wall
thickness. Typical geometries have been identified that reflect much different values of pipe
diameter to wall thickness, denoted hereafter as D/t. The OPS database indicates that ~60
percent of the reportable incidents involved line pipe with ~0.250- to ~0.312-inch-thick wall, in
diameters that ranged from 12 to 30 inches, and grades that ranged from Grade B to X52. As the
lower-bound re-verification interval occurs for the thinnest wall and the highest stress, X52
grade line pipe with a 0.250-inch thick wall has been selected to represent the typical worst-case
scenario.

15
 Fracture Behavior of the Typical Pipeline
Evaluation of this database indicates that suggests the use of a 30-inch diameter pipeline is
representative. However, this choice does not appear critical, because the predicted fracture
initiation response does not appear strongly dependent on diameter – all else being equal. This is
evident in Figure 6, which presents critical-flaw length on the y-axis as a function of line-pipe
diameter on the x-axis. These results have been generated using Battelle’s extensively validated
model for fracture initiation and instability(9) and reflect the behavior of flaws exposed by
hydrotesting at either a 90 or 110 percent of SMYS. Note that data for defect depths 30, 60, and
90 percent through-wall are included in this figure. The behavior of defects at lower pressures
reflecting service pressure levels is comparable. It is apparent from Figure 6 that no clear
dependence exists between critical-flaw length and diameter, all else being equal.
This result reflects diameters from 8 to 42 inches. Similar behavior develops in regard to wall
thickness, for thickness from ~0.2- to ~0.8-inch(e.g., see 19).

Figure 6. Weak dependence of critical-flaw length on

pipeline diameter for a range of crack depths.

Calculations using the same methodology that underlies Figure 6 have been made to determine
conditions under which fracture initiation will occur for the “typical” pipeline geometry and
properties identified above. These results are shown in Figure 7 on coordinates of normalized
failure pressure on the y-axis, and critical flaw depth on the x-axis. As the format of this chart is
quite involved, it is appropriate to discuss this before moving on to consider the practical
implications of these trends.
The contours in Figure 7 shown as either red or black lines represent a specific value of flaw
depth normalized (i.e., divided) by the wall thickness. Thus, a normalized flaw depth equal to
0.9 represents a flaw that is 90 percent through the wall. The trends in Figure 7 start at a

16
normalized depth of 0.9, which is the lowest, left-most trend. Each trend above that for 90
percent represents another step reduction of depth equal to one-tenth of the wall thickness. By
counting the red and black contours, it should be evident that depths from 90 percent through 10
percent of the wall thickness are covered in this figure.
With this coordinate system used in Figure 7, a value of 0.72 on the y-axis corresponds to a
pipeline pressure causing a wall stress equal to 72 percent of SMYS. Likewise, a value of 0.60
corresponds to Class 2, while values of 0.5 and 0.4 respectively reflect Classes 3 and 4. Flaw
sizes causing failure at any one of these values are found by tracing a horizontal line across the
chart. Where that line intersects each of the depth contours defines the depth for failure at that
normalized pressure. The corresponding initiation length is found by dropping a vertical line
from that intersection to the y-axis.
The blue trend in this chart corresponds to fracture instability (that is the boundary between leak
and rupture), while the green trend signals the onset of stable tearing, which eventually
culminates in instability. Combinations of pressure and flaw size that lie above the blue
boundary result in ruptures, whereas those below it are stable and so leak.
It can be determined from Figure 7a that operation at 72 percent of SMYS for this steel with FSE
CVP toughness of 30 ft-lb leads to ruptures for defects longer than about 5.5 inches, for this
“typical” pipeline situation. It is also apparent from the data trends that operation at lower
stresses (equally pressures) leads to critical sizes that increase significantly as pressure drops.
For example, the critical length at 40 percent of SMYS is ~9.5 inches long. The picture in
Figure 7a changes as toughness changes, so long as failure is controlled by fracture rather than
by plastic collapse9. For example, for the same geometry pipeline made with X52 having a FSE
CVP toughness of 20 ft-lb, the initiation boundaries shift slightly down and to the left. For this

a) for the 30 ft-lb steel b) for the 20 ft-lb steel

Figure 7. Conditions for fracture initiation and crack instability.

17
case, operation at 72 percent of SMYS for this steel leads to ruptures for defects slightly longer
than 5.3 inches. Again, operation at lower stresses (equally pressures) leads to critical sizes that
increase significantly as pressure drops. For example, the critical length at 40 percent of SMYS
is ~9 inches long. References 8 and 9 demonstrate that inherent toughness tends to have the
greatest influence on the initiation length of the various pipe property and geometry related
parameters.

9
Even low-toughness steels fail by plastic collapse, which tends to control as defects become shallow. Plastic
collapse also can govern failure through the remaining ligament for defects that are very deep.

18
 Leak versus Rupture and Fracture Arrest
The data in Figure 7 can be used to determine conditions that discriminate between a leak and a
rupture, as just illustrated for operation at 72 and 40 percent of SMYS. As noted above, this led
to critical-flaw lengths of about 5.3 and 9 inches, respectively, for the less-tough 20 ft-lb steel.
Similar interpolation of the data for the less-tough steel in gas pipeline operation at 60 and 50
percent of SMYS indicates critical lengths of about 6 and 7 inches, respectively. Interpolation of
Figure 7b, which characterizes the behavior of the less-tough 20 ft-lb steel, indicates that the
normalized depths corresponding to these lengths are a/t = 0.67 for 9 inches, a/t = 0.60 for 7
inches, a/t = 0.58 for 6 inches, and a/t = 0.56 for 5.3 inches. As expected, operation at lower
stresses (equally pressures) leads to critical lengths and depths that increase significantly as
pressure drops. The values just determined will be used to represent the critical-flaw dimensions
for the transition from leak to rupture, as appropriate for each class location of concern. As these
values specifically reflect the behavior of sharp flaws, their use for blunt metal loss and corrosion
will simplify discussions and provide a conservative basis to assess failure conditions.
Parametric analysis using Battelle’s extensively validated model for dynamic ductile fracture
also points to the important role of toughness. This model was developed in the 1970s(10) and
recently extended(11) and validated by full-scale testing(e.g., see 14) in regard to running fracture
concerns for the Alliance Pipeline. This model determines the required arrest-toughness, which
in contrast to fracture-initiation toughness, determines if arrest occurs following unstable
initiation. Results generated for a range of line-pipe geometries made of X52 steel indicate the
required arrest toughness is on the order 18 to 23 ft-lb for pipelines transporting methane at 110
F and operating at a wall stress of 72 percent SMYS10. With reference to Figure 5a, this required
arrest toughness is somewhat less than the toughness typically available when much of the U.S.
gas-transmission pipeline system was constructed. It follows that, even for steels with high
fracture-appearance transition temperature, fracture can generally be expected to arrest shortly
after initiation, if fracture initiation actually occurs. The fracture behavior evident for most
incidents support this prediction, as even the more violent initiation events associated with the
longer critical sizes that develop with SCC show instability arrests typically within a few pipe
joints.

10
Comparable although quantitatively different conclusions have been reached independently with a much different
numerical formulation using crack-tip opening angle (CTOA) to characterize fracture behavior(20). Quantitative
differences between these formulations are anticipated in that the CTOA approach significantly over predicted
required arrest toughness for the same full-scale tests, which recently led to the complete reformulation of this
model(e.g., see 21).

19
 Pipeline Service Conditions
Natural-gas transmission pipelines in the U.S. have typically operated at near-capacity,
experiencing relatively small and infrequent pressure cycles. Because of their minimum
regulatory-based burial depth, thermal cycling likewise is neither frequent nor severe. In spite of
the fact that incidents due to fatigue caused by in-service cycling have not been a factor,
consideration is given to the possible fatigue-sharpening of defects, and their subsequent growth
due to continued cycling. For this purpose, a daily demand-induced cycling from the maximum
allowable operating pressure (MAOP) to 70 percent of MAOP has been evaluated.
Gas-transmission pipelines operate over long distances. The compressibility of natural gas and
frictional losses require use of compressor stations distributed along the length of the pipeline to
maintain the gas-flow rate. The heat of compression increases the gas temperature, the extent to
which depends on the degree of
compression. It follows that the
gas at discharge is warmer than at
suction at the next compressor
station, as is shown for typical
behavior in Figure 811. There is
an associated pressure drop,
which also reflects frictional
losses in-route, as is apparent for
typical operation in Figure 8.
Accordingly, the average pressure
and gas temperature along a
typical natural-gas transmission
line varies. Before SCC was
recognized as a potential problem
and the role of temperature
understood, discharge
temperatures often exceeded Figure 8. Typical pressure and temperature
150 F. gradients between compressor
However, since the early 1970s stations
gas-compression practices have
changed, and some companies have installed aftercoolers to reduce discharge temperatures. This
has led to a marked reduction in discharge temperature on pipelines susceptible to SCC. A
temperature on the order of 110 F can be taken as representative of typical operations for major
companies with pipelines known to suffer SCC. This temperature has been adopted as

11
These trends reflect cross-country operation where compression adds significant heat to the gas, which warms the
pipe wall to roughly the gas temperature. This added heat is a negative factor in regard to SCC. However, it is a
potentially positive factor in terms of toughness, as it promotes ductile response. For steels with high fracture-
appearance-transition temperatures, it also can increase the apparent fracture resistance. For this reason,
applications where heat of compression is absent are excluded. Examples of such cases include lines fed from
LNG, and some intrastate lines downstream of pressure regulators where temperatures are much colder than
ambient surroundings.

20
representative of gas-transmission operations. But, where SCC is a consideration a range of
temperatures will be evaluated relative to this temperature.
It is more difficult to represent the typical coating type and condition, and conditions along the
RoW, as these vary significantly across the U.S., and also can vary for given pipeline12. For this
reason, “typical” conditions along a RoW cannot be identified, although the range of what might
be encountered could be indicated. Coating condition likewise varies, which again precludes
identifying typical circumstances for purposes of this report. Fortunately, these difficulties can
be circumvented through use of degradation rates that conservatively represent corrosion, stress
corrosion, or other mechanisms whose kinetics depends on environment, coating condition, and
the effectiveness of the cathodic-protection (CP) system. Kinetics that reflect in-service failures
on lines in sweet service13, or were derived from accelerated testing that reflect worst-case field
conditions, have been used for present purposes, as discussed following the next section.

12
In practice, representing the coating condition for a given pipeline can be difficult because it requires inference by
above ground DA measures, and first-generation ILI tools for this purpose are only now becoming available.
13
Early in-service failures reflect the combination of worst-case circumstances associated with the operating
environment, service conditions, and pipeline material, construction, and coating quality. Kinetics under such
circumstances tend toward the upper-bound of what occurs elsewhere on the same and other similar systems.
Instances where periodic upsets drove the field failure can experience increased kinetics during the upset, so such
applications involving periodic upsets must be excluded. Such exclusions could be local segments of a line
where stray currents or shielding occur, or they could extend the affected length of the line, as might occur for
sour-gas service.

21
 Effect of Class Location on Wall Thickness
Ignoring decreasing pressure as a function of distance between discharge and suction of adjacent
compressor stations evident in Figure 8, gas pipelines operate at nominally constant pressure
over very long distances. Pipelines designed to operate in areas remote to population centers and
areas of public conveyance and commerce, the regulations limit the allowable wall stress to a
value equal or less than 72 percent of SMYS for the line pipe steel specified. In other areas such
as population centers dealt with in §192.111, or areas of public conveyance and commercial
interest such as also dealt with in §192.111, the regulatory requirement to reduce the wall-stress
in proportion to a specified reduction in design factor may be met by using heavier-wall line
pipe. As will be demonstrated later in this report, where class-location differences have been
dealt with using heavier-wall pipe, it will take longer for the failure process to potentially
threaten integrity, all else being equal. This means that the re-verification interval can be
increased in Classes 2, 3, and 4 as compared to Class 1. Anticipating that definitions of HCAs
for gas-transmission pipelines will overlie that for Class 3 and 4 locations, this section evaluates
the extent of wall-thickness increase as a function of design stress for Classes 3 and 4 as
compared to Class 1, assuming the same grade of line pipe is used in all locations.
The relative difference in wall thickness can be found directly from the design provisions set
forth in Subparts A and C of the regulations. Subpart C sets the highest permissible working
stress at 72 percent of SMYS in areas remote to population centers and public conveyance,
which provides for a margin of safety of 1/0.72 = 1.39, or 39 percent14. This margin of safety is
increased for other areas through a design factor that reduces the allowable stress as a function of
class locations defined in §192.5 of Subpart A, and other circumstances defined in §192.111.
The data in the first two columns of Table 1 are obtained from Subpart C of the regulations, with
the data in the second column being the design factor, DF15.

Table 2. Regulatory-based difference in wall thickness relative to Class 1.

Design Reference Design Design-Factor
Part 192 Factor Factor Ratio
Class Location (DF) (RDF) (RDF/DF)
1 0.72 0.72 1.00
2 0.60 0.72 1.20
3 0.50 0.72 1.44
4 0.40 0.72 1.80

14
Further discussion of design factors, margins of safety, and other aspects of pipeline design can be found in
Reference 22, which contains many references on related topics.
15
The results generated are valid for any situation where the difference in design factors is accounted for by a
proportional change in wall thickness. Thus, while the present results are posed in terms of class location driving
the value of design factor, any regulatory requirement that changes the design factor from a value equal to 0.72
has the same effect on wall thickness discussed here with regard to class location.

22
The third column reflects the design factor that exists in Class 1, which as noted above reflects
the thinnest wall and serves as the reference design factor, RDF, to determine the increase in wall
thickness relative to Class 1. Finally, the data in the last column reflect the ratio of RDF / DF,
which reflects the relative difference in wall thickness between the classes, referenced to Class 1.
With reference to Figure 1, there is very little Class 4 mileage in gas-transmission service, and it
is unlikely that much Class 2 mileage will be classified as HCAs. For this reason, the relative
increase in wall thickness is taken as that for Classes 3, relative to Class 1. As the table shows,
the wall thickness in Class 3 can be taken as 1.44 times that for Class 1. Maintenance-related
rehabilitation, and work done to deal with changes in class location driven by encroachment,
may use different grades of steel as compared to the initial construction. Care must be taken to
evaluate this possibility in HCAs, as this affects the value of the RDF, and leads to values less
than that shown in Table 2.

23
 Degradation Rates and Re-verification Intervals
All mechanisms leading to in-service degradation exhibit a dependence on wall thickness. This
dependence develops directly through the added thickness that must be penetrated, or indirectly
through the wall-stress dependence of the critical-flaw size, as was illustrated for example for
sharp flaws in Figure 7. The crack-driving force for sharp, crack like features leading to fracture
depends on hoop stress, as does the net-section stress leading to plastic collapse. The increased
critical length and the corresponding depth can be estimated as a function of stress (equally
pressure) for sharp, crack-like defects from the trends shown in Figure 7b. These results provide
a conservative basis to assess the behavior of blunt metal-loss and corrosion defects. The results
for sharp, crack-like features will be adopted hereafter to define critical length and depth for the
sake of simplicity, in lieu of comparable calculations and further discussion associated with
criteria for ductile failure at blunt metal loss defects(e.g., see 23).
The following sections address the kinetics of the in-service degradation mechanisms potentially
active in transmission pipelines and evaluate the corresponding effect of increased wall thickness
on re-verification interval. Fatigue is considered first, then SCC, and corrosion, with the
emphasis on external corrosion. A subsequent section deals with mechanical damage, and
material and construction defects. In all cases, the increased wall thickness in Class 3 and 4
designs as compared to Class 1 is manifest in two potential forms. First, the kinetics of both
fatigue and SCC decrease with decreasing stress, which means a reduced rate of degradation and
so longer re-verification interval as compared to Class 1 designs, all else being equal. Second,
the increased wall thickness leads to more time before the degradation breaches the wall causing
an incident, as compared to Class 1 designs. This also leads to an increased re-verification
interval, and develops for all mechanisms considered. Finally, for the stress-driven mechanisms
(i.e., fatigue and SCC), this effect of increased wall increases nonlinearly, as it also leads to a
relative increase in critical-flaw size. This gives rise to a further increment in the re-verification
interval for Class 3 and 4 designs as compared to Class 1.

Fatigue Considerations
Crack Initiation
Fatigue damage per cycle of loading develops in response to the maximum stress in a given cycle
and the ranges of the stress and the strain, which are proportional if the response is locally
elastic. The amount of damage accumulated depends on the number of times that cycle is
applied.
First-order parameters in assessing the effect of increased wall stress on the kinetics (i.e., rate of
fatigue damage accumulation and in turn the re-verification interval) include:
• Pressure-cycle-induced stress range, mean stress, and strain range,
• Number of times that cycle is experienced,
• Stress concentrations local to welds and other geometric features, and
• Line-pipe fatigue resistance.

24
Second order factors that enter through their effect on critical flaw size include:
• Line-pipe diameter and wall thickness, and
• Line-pipe strength and toughness.
The literature indicates that the fatigue mechanism exhibits a threshold stress level below which
the kinetics slow to the point they no longer are a practically significant concern.(e.g., see 16) Such
thresholds are evident for smooth-bar data for line-pipe steels, which reflect the fatigue
resistance to crack initiation(e.g., see 18), as well as for pre-cracked specimens that reflect fatigue
crack propagation behavior(e.g., see 24). The existence of such thresholds in practice is indirectly
evident in the very long lives of pre-flawed vessels cycled under conditions relevant to high-
pressure pipelines(e.g., see 25). It is also evident in the results of parametric sensitivity studies for
high-pressure pipelines(e.g., see 25, 26) based on laboratory fatigue data. It is further demonstrated by
the absence of fatigue driven by in-service pressure cycling as a root cause16 for failures in gas-
transmission pipelines.
This section will demonstrate why fatigue has not been a practical problem for gas-transmission
pipelines with reference to infrequent small-amplitude cycles, and the fact that operating
conditions lie below the threshold for its effect. A conservative, relative assessment of its
potential role is developed in terms of the effect of increased wall thickness on the finite life of
gas-transmission pipelines. The kinetics of initiation and propagation are represented in this
analysis by data for line-pipe steels, which are reported in Reference 18.
The effect increased wall thickness on fatigue life has been evaluated in terms of the relative
effect of reducing the stress from 72 to 50 percent of SMYS. This relative evaluation makes use
of a fatigue damage parameter that accounts for the effects of stress range, mean stress, and
strain range in a universal way. This fatigue damage parameter, FDP, is taken in the form(27):

FDP = {(∆s + smean )·E·∆ε}1/2 ,

where ∆s = stress range, smean = mean stress, E = elastic modulus, and ∆ε = strain range. As this
is a relative calculation that presumes all other factors, such as local stress concentration, are
comparable, the analysis ignores such geometric factors. Because pipelines operate at nominally
elastic conditions, the quantity E·∆e is simply equal to the stress range, ∆s. Thus, the slope, m of
the fatigue-initiation resistance curve expressed in terms of this damage parameter can be used to
estimate the relative effect of reducing the stress from 72 to 50 percent of SMYS on the fatigue
life.
For fully-reversed cycling under nominally elastic conditions, the damage parameter has the
form of the stress range, which means the slope of the fatigue-initiation resistance curve is
negative one-twelfth. This value is typical of most C-Mn line-pipe steels, and most other steels
at longer lives. Assuming, as is reasonable for linear systems, that the range of the stress cycle
decreases in proportion to the decrease in maximum stress, the relative service life can be
determined from the damage parameter, which after raising both sides by the mth power and

16
Failures involving fatigue cracking initiated during improper rail shipment have occurred. However, these pipe
joints were commissioned with cracks long and deep enough to exceed the threshold for continued cracking under
the action of otherwise infrequent, small-amplitude pressure cycles. Line pipe shipped by rail, purchased prior to
changes in rail-shipment practices, with vintage and supplier known to produce such cracking, are excluded.

25
implementing this assumption has the form:

FDPm = {(∆s + smean )·∆s}m/2 .

After substitution, decreasing the wall stress by a factor proportional to the change in design
factors leads to a relative increase of life by a factor of about 80. Given the relative absence of
service incidents in Class 1 pipeline segments, the 80-fold decrease in kinetics for Classes 3 and
4 means that fatigue is not a threat to the integrity of such pipeline segments.

Crack Propagation
The factors controlling fatigue crack propagation are comparable to these for initiation, provided
the fundamentally different processes they represent are accounted for. A damage rate
parameter, DRP, is again used to account for the effects of stress range and mean stress, on
fatigue crack-growth rate. This is in analogy to the approach applied to analyze fatigue-crack
initiation kinetics.
For present purposes the form of the damage rate parameter adopted follows from the usual
power-law expression(16) between crack-growth rate and Mode I stress-intensity factor, denoted
KI. Assuming the range of the pressure cycles increase in magnitude in proportion to maximum
pressure increase, the DRP has the form:

DRP = Ca ∆KIn ∝ Ce ∆Pn.

Based on literature data(16, 18), the value of the constant n is about 3.5 for typical C-Mn and other
similar steels. The proportionality expressed above reflects the assumption the defect population
is the same for the cases being compared, and that all other conditions are identical.
Accordingly, the relative life spent in fatigue crack propagation is proportional to ∆Pn, where ∆P
is the range of the pressure cycle and n is the slope of fatigue crack growth-rate (FGR) curve.
For the above conditions the DRP shows that decreasing the pressure from 72 to 50 percent of
SMYS decreases the growth rate by a factor of about 3.6 times.

Discussion – Evaluating the Re-Verification Interval for Fatigue

The results indicate that where the wall thickness is increased in proportion to the decrease in
stress for locations in Class 3 designs as compared to Class 1, there will be a significant decrease
in cracking kinetics for crack initiation, as the life is about 80 times longer for the lower stress
case. As this result was determined independent of line-pipe steel, and pipeline geometry and
operation, it can be applied without regard to these circumstances. This result disregards the
somewhat smaller gain in life associated with the propagation phase of cracks, as well as the
increased distance for propagation resulting from the increased wall thickness and the deeper
critical crack size.

Summary for Fatigue

The results indicate that the increase in wall thickness in Class 3 and 4 designs reduces the
fatigue initiation kinetics by at least a factor of 80 as compared to Class 1 designs. This
reduction in kinetics corresponds to an increase in re-verification interval of the same order. The
80-fold decrease in kinetics for Classes 3 and 4 as compared to Class 1, and the historical

26
absence of service incidents in Class 1 pipeline segments, indicates fatigue is not a threat to the
integrity of Class 3 and 4 pipeline segments.

Stress-Corrosion Cracking (SCC)

For SCC to occur, three concurrent conditions must be mutually satisfied:

• Operating environment that can develop into a cracking environment,
• Susceptible pipeline steel in that cracking environment, and,
• Tensile stress (applied or residual), which exceeds the threshold for cracking in that
cracking environment
Two cracking environments have developed within the ground-water operating environmental of
a pipeline that are known to cause and support continued SCC for the stressing conditions and
steels typically encountered in gas-transmission pipelines. References 13 and 28 are excellent
resources detailing the SCC mechanism as it develops on pipelines. The cracking environments
begin to form as CP applied to the steel in the presence of ground water causes dissociation of
the water into hydrogen and hydroxide ions. The hydroxide ions combine readily with carbon
dioxide existing in the soil or dissolved in the ground water, producing carbonate and
bicarbonate ions and carbonic acid, the extent to which depends on the amount of carbon dioxide
available and the CP level, and the temperature17. Where the conditions along the pipeline
provide limited carbon dioxide and the CP develops higher current densities under coating
disbonds on the pipe’s surface, the pH tends to levels in excess of about nine. In contrast, where
there is little carbon dioxide and the CP develops low current densities, as occurs under
polyethylene coatings, the pH tends to about six. Cases where the pH is in excess of nine are
referred to as “high pH” environments because their pH is the larger of the two being greater
than six, the later logically being termed a “low pH”, or “near neutral” environment. The high
pH environment is also termed “classical”, as it was the first of these two environments to be
identified.

SCC Susceptibility and Factors Controlling Kinetics

To date, virtually all line-pipe steels under sufficient stress that are exposed to typical ground
water environments have been found to be susceptible to SCC to some degree. Differences in
susceptibility typically depend on the extent of microplastic strain that develops under the
stressing conditions typical of pipeline operation. The nominally elastic response of line pipe
steels at all regulatory-accepted operating stress levels limits the extent of this microplastic
straining. That microplastic straining is required rationalizes the existence of a threshold stress
for SCC – as at low enough stresses microplastic strain ceases to develop to a practically
significant level. It also is consistent with the absence of SCC incidents for pipelines other than
those in Class 1 service, which involves the highest allowable, but is still a nominally elastic
working stress. Reference 29 summarizes many aspects of transmission pipeline SCC in a

17
Because of the coupling of a disbonded coating with ground water and constituents in the soil, and the effects of
electrochemistry to develop a cracking environment, the occurrence of SCC can be quite specific to the soil
along the pipeline’s RoW.

27
practical setting related to detection of this cracking by in-line inspection (ILI). It includes a
good list of more fundamental references, which point to the extensive work of Parkins(e.g., see 28),
who laid the foundation to understand this phenomenon on transmission pipelines.
While three concurrent conditions must be mutually satisfied for SCC to occur, a fourth must be
satisfied for SCC to threaten pipeline integrity:
• SCC is an integrity concern under conditions where multiple, adjacent, small cracks,
which taken alone are effectively benign, coalesce axially creating a critical-length crack.
Because three concurrent conditions must be mutually satisfied for SCC, the first-order factors
for the effect of increased wall thickness on the kinetics, and in turn the re-verification interval,
include:
• Factors that produce and control the cracking environment at the steel’s surface (soil,
moisture, coating type/condition/disbonds, temperature, electrochemical conditions, etc),
• Local factors that control the cracking response to that environment (steel temperature, or
effectively the gas and soil temperatures, the local electrochemical potential), line-pipe
susceptibility,
• External factors that define the stressing conditions (pressure, and pressure cycles,
expressed in terms of stress range and mean stress for a given cycle, and stress
concentrations local to welds and other geometric features.
Second-order factors that enter through their effect on critical flaw size include:
• Line-pipe diameter and wall thickness, and,
• Line-pipe strength and toughness.

Conditions that satisfy the requirements for SCC to both occur and threaten the integrity of a
pipeline are the focus of this section. Given three concurrent conditions must be mutually
satisfied, one avenue to control would be removing any one of these conditions. Unfortunately, a
quick review of these conditions indicates control through them is practically problematic or
unacceptable for operating pipelines. It follows that for pipelines where the three concurrent
conditions have been mutually satisfied, control can be affected only by reducing the kinetics, or
by interrupting the process before it threatens integrity. Control of operation to diminish
operational temperatures is one way to control by reducing kinetics, which will be discussed
shortly. An example of control that interrupts the process is hydrostatic re-testing at an interval
that ensures integrity. Reference 30 presents a good review of control practices for pipelines
where the three concurrent conditions for SCC to threaten integrity have been satisfied.

SCC Thresholds – Implications for Class 3 and Class 4 Re-Verification Interval

Consistent with comments concerning the role of microplastic strain, the literature indicates that
SCC exhibits a threshold-stress below which the kinetics slow to rate so low it is no longer
practically significant. Reference 31 discusses thresholds for smooth-bar data for line-pipe
steels, which reflect initiation conditions for SCC, as well as data for pre-cracked specimens that
reflect cracking kinetics for longer cracks. It also addresses the transition from no-crack to a
crack that lies between these limiting states.

28
The wall stress in pipelines operating at pressures associated with design factors for Classes 3
and 4 fall below thresholds known for pipeline steels and cracking environments(e.g., see 31),
indicating that SCC is highly unlikely on these pipelines. Figure 9 presents some of the data
underlying the existence of a threshold for SCC, which in this case reflects high pH SCC. This
figure plots crack depth on the y-axis and maximum stress on the x-axis for results first reported
in Reference 32. The data in this figure represent testing in a very concentrated (aggressive)
cracking environment, at the optimum electrochemical potential for cracking (i.e., the worst-
case), and a temperature of 167 F, which is above the discharge temperatures for pipelines where
SCC is a consideration. These results reflect the effect of a slowly varying cycle designed to
simulate the behavior of gas-transmission service. Results are included for cycling conditions
that cover the reasonably expected operation of such lines as values of the stress ratio, R, defined
as the algebraic ratio of the minimum to maximum stress in a pressure cycle are included from
~0.7 up to ~0.9.
With reference to the data shown in Figure 9, there is no evidence of cracking below about 35
ksi. On this basis, a value of 35 ksi could be termed the threshold for cracking. Likewise, as this
cracking results from SCC, it could be termed a threshold for SCC. However, it is evident that
both the incidence and depth of cracking depend on stress from these data. It follows that the
correct threshold is determined by extrapolating the trend through the upper bound for these
results back to zero depth. With this more conservative and technically more relevant threshold
definition, the results in Figure 9 indicate the value of the threshold stress is slightly below that
reflecting Class 2 service, but above that for Class 3.
Inspection of the scale on the y-axis in Figure 9 shows that these data reflect very shallow crack
depths, which must grow significantly in depth and length size, and thereafter coalesce axially to
form a critical length flaw before such cracking poses an integrity threat. The data shown in
Figure 9 lie toward the lower-end of the laboratory database that determine the threshold for
SCC in this grade of line-pipe steel.
Were the x-axis in this figure re-
plotted using stress normalized by
SMYS, or actual yield stress, results
for several different grades of steel
would duplicate this trend.
Figure 9 indicates that thresholds
for SCC developed under worst-
case laboratory conditions do not
indicate SCC poses an integrity
threat at stress levels associated
with Class 3 and Class 4 pipeline
operation. Service experience in
the U.S. as well as elsewhere in the
world supports the view that SCC
does not threaten the integrity of
pipelines operated at lower stresses,
as for example Classes 3 and 4. Figure 9. Typical laboratory data for high pH
Experience with pipelines in the SCC under worst-case accelerated
UK, which typically operate at conditions.

29
lower wall stresses shows no
evidence indicating that SCC is
occurring on these lines, which means
there is no evidence that SCC poses
an integrity threat. Likewise, the
trunk lines that operate at low stresses
in Japan have not indicated the
presence of SCC. For such reasons,
SCC is not an integrity threat in
HCAs comprised of pipelines
operating at stress levels
corresponding to Classes 3 and 4.
Class 1 and 2 pipeline segments that
are adjacent to Class 3 and 4 locations
and operating at higher stresses could
experience SCC in light of Figure 9
and other such data – as the Figure 10. Relative kinetics of high pH SCC
maximum stress for Class 2 lies as a function of temperature.
roughly at typical threshold levels,
whereas that for Class 1 lies above
known thresholds. Because an incident in such segments could propagate a short distance into
an HCA, other controls for SCC to diminish that kinetics and might influence the re-verification
interval are presented.

Rupture into Class 3 and 4 from Adjacent Class 1 Pipelines – SCC Kinetics in
Pipeline Segments Adjacent to Class 3 or 4 Sites.
References 33 and 34 present and validate phenomenological models of the SCC process, which
provide the means to simulate SCC kinetics on operating pipelines, and to map kinetics
developed in accelerated testing data onto pipeline operating conditions. Validation presented in
these references involves demonstrating that predictions match the characteristic features of field
cracking. Such demonstrations include matching crack length, depth, and aspect ratio, and their
statistical distributions in SCC colonies. They also have addressed colony sizes and the
distributions of cracks and crack sizes in colonies, as well as populations of colonies along
pipelines. Finally, the time frame for the appearance of cracking and its growth to critical
proportions has been demonstrated, as have matches for crack sizes exposed by hydrostatic re-
testing, and the effectiveness of re-testing in controlling SCC.
Of the first-order factors that influence the SCC kinetics listed at the start of this section, three
are associated with pipeline operation – gas temperature, maximum stress, and stress range. The
field-proven models have been used to evaluate how SCC kinetics may influence re-verification
intervals, as a function of the stressing conditions and temperatures experienced in pipeline
segments adjacent to Class 3 and 4. Results have been generated for a range of operating
scenarios covering a broad window of temperature, maximum pressure, and pressure range.
These results have been analyzed to establish relative trends based on the kinetics of high pH
SCC, as presented in Figures 10 and 11. As these are relative assessments, they reflect situations
where all other parameters are held constant.

30
Figure 10 presents the relative dependence on gas temperature, under the reasonable assumption
that the steady-state temperature of the steel in the pipe wall during operation is very close to this
temperature. The trends shown in this figure are relative to the behavior for Class 1 operation at
110 F and a 50 percent probability of failure. The line drawn through the data point
corresponding to 110 F and a 50 percent probability of failure thus lies at a value of one on the y-
axis. Regardless of the probability chosen, the relative effect of temperature is found to be
roughly the same, which reflects the nearly deterministic effect of temperature on the kinetics for
SCC, and leads to the conclusion that the trends evident at 110 F and a 50 percent probability of
failure are indicative of what occurs at other probability values.
The results in Figure 10 indicate that the kinetics decrease as temperature decreases – either
through changes in compression ratio, or through use of aftercoolers. These results show that
pipelines experiencing recurrent SCC problems, that also have HCAs distributed along their
length, might achieve further control of SCC through temperature reduction. The relative effect
of temperature presented in Figure 10 is characteristic of the relative kinetics anywhere along a
pipeline. This means that as the temperature at discharge begins to drop as the gas is discharged
from the station, the kinetics decrease as indicated in Figure 10.
In absolute terms, the relative trends in Figure 8 reflect a drop on the order of 35 F or more
between suction and discharge, over distances as large as 100 miles. This, coupled with the
nonlinear behavior of this drop, makes it plausible that the gas has reached a much lower
temperature by the time it passes HCAs distributed downstream from compressor stations.
When coupled with the relative effect of temperature shown in Figure 10, such a drop comprises
a decrease in kinetics by a factor of about three, or more, depending on the specific pipeline and
its operation. Thus, the practical benefit of further temperature reduction at discharge diminishes
with distance downstream, and only can be assessed case-by-case. It follows that, depending on
the downstream location of the HCA the chance for SCC may approach that in the Class 3 and 4
designs – not because of low stress but
because of low temperature. Field data
are consistent with this, the data
showing that the incidence of SCC
tends to diminish sharply as a function
of distance downstream of compressor
stations – all else being equal. It was
the early observation of this tendency
that prompted use of aftercoolers.
Figure 11 presents the relative mean-
life-to-failure on the y-axis as a
function of the pressure loading
presented in terms of the magnitude of
the pressure cycle on the x-axis. Data
are included for three values of the
maximum allowable operating pressure
(MAOP) in the cycle. This variable is Figure 11. Relative kinetics of high pH
included through use of different SCC as a function of pressure
symbols, which as shown in the figure conditions.

31
reflect 72, 65, or 60 percent of SMYS. With reference to these values of MAOP, this figure
addresses stress ratios (i.e., R values) from near zero through 0.7.
The results in Figure 11 present the relative dependence of SCC kinetics referenced to service
lives corresponding to operation at MAOP with a near-zero pressure cycle. With this normalized
format the trends for each of value of MAOP appear to follow similar trends. This does not
mean that operation at 72 percent of SMYS leads to the same kinetics as operation at 60 percent
of SMYS, as the absolute lives for each of these differs significantly, consistent with the trends
of Figure 9. In absolute terms, the maximum spread between results at 72 percent and 60 percent
of SMYS is on the order of a factor of two. Thus, the near coincidence of these relative trends
indicated that the relative effect of pressure cycling on the kinetics is largely independent of the
maximum pressure – at least for these finite-life conditions. These results show little difference
in kinetics develops for cycles up to about five-percent of MAOP. Thereafter, increasing the
range of pressure cycling increases SCC kinetics, through pressure cycling on the order of 20
percent of MAOP. Over this interval, the kinetics show an increase of about a factor of two. For
cycling at larger pressure ranges, there is no further effect on SCC kinetics, although there is an
increase in corrosion-fatigue kinetics, which is beyond the current set of concerns.

Discussion – Integrity Threat from Adjacent Class 1 Pipeline Segments

Laboratory data for worst-case simulation tests reflecting pipeline operation do not indicate SCC
poses an integrity threat at stress levels associated with Class 3 and Class 4 pipeline operation18.
Service experience in the U.S. as well as elsewhere in the world supports the view that SCC does
not threaten the integrity of pipelines operated at lower stresses, as for example Classes 3 and 4.
For such reasons, until SCC is considered an integrity threat in Classes 3 and 4 there is no further
reason to consider its kinetics, nor determine a re-verification interval to demonstrate integrity in
regard with this threat.
As evident in Figure 8, pressure also diminishes with distance downstream. For gas pipelines,
the change in the pressure cycle experienced by a pipeline is directly proportional to the
maximum pressure. Thus, both maximum pressure and pressure cycles diminish with distance
downstream to the extent indicated in Figure 8. Given the absolute difference in pressure that
typically develops between discharge and downstream positions, the absolute results that
underlie Figure 11 indicate that the kinetics can be expected to decrease by roughly a factor of
two downstream – provided that the pipeline experiences pressure cycles whose range is less
than 5 percent of the maximum pressure. For such cases, the net effect of pressure cycles
reduces the SCC kinetics by about a factor of two. Comparing the relative trends in Figures 10
and 11 indicates for such situations that pressure cycling affects SCC kinetics less than does
temperature by about a factor of about two. In contrast, for cases where the pressure cycling is
larger, the roughly factor of two increase in kinetics due to the larger-amplitude pressure cycling
can offset the just-noted decrease effect due to decreased pressure experienced in moving
downstream. In such cases, there is little or no net influence of pressure or pressure cycling on
the kinetics, nor will there be a need to account for this aspect of the SCC kinetics on the re-

18
Because the results in Figures 9 through 11 pertain specifically to cracking in the high pH environment, and
related details for the near-neutral environment are still being generated, pipelines known to suffer near-neutral
pH SCC are excluded. It is, however, likely that similar thresholds will develop as both cracking mechanisms
show a similar dependence on microplastic strain.

32
verification interval. In such cases, comparing the relative trends in Figures 10 and 11 indicates
that pressure cycling affects SCC kinetics less than does temperature by about a factor of about
four.
Based on the results presented at stresses above the SCC threshold, cracking in areas well
downstream from compressor stations occurs at rates much reduced from that just beyond
discharge. The data indicate the rate is reduced by at least a factor of three, but values as five
may apply depending on the pipeline’s operating conditions. For pipelines experiencing small
amplitude cycling, there is a further reduction in kinetics by about a factor of two. While not as
worry-free as situations below the threshold for SCC, these results indicate that SCC may not
pose a major threat to pipeline segments immediately adjacent to HCAs at locations well
downstream from compressor stations. It follows that there is no clear basis for concern for a
rupture propagating into an HCA from adjacent Class 1 segments at sites well downstream from
compressor stations. Sites located close to compressor stations on lines experiencing recurrent
SCC need case-by-case analysis and integrity management.

Summary for SCC

The added wall thickness present in Class 3 and 4 designs limits the likelihood of SCC as a
threat to pipeline integrity, as supported by an absence of SCC-related incidents in such
pipelines. For pipelines experiencing recurrent SCC, case-by-case analysis should be considered
to assess the risk of an incident initiating in adjacent Class 1 line pipe propagating into the Class
3 and 4 segments. This analysis should consider the kinetics of SCC, as well as the ability of the
line pipe operating in Class 3 and 4 locations to immediately arrest the fracture running from the
rupture site. If arrest is demonstrated, or the kinetics slowed as they are well downstream from
the compressor station, SCC does not comprise an integrity threat in HCAs that overlay what are
now Class 3 and 4 locations.

33
Corrosion

Corrosion kinetics can be evaluated in regard to the usual process leading to local areas of metal
loss on the exterior of pipelines. Much has been done to quantify the kinetics of this process,
which reflects the electrochemical reaction between steel and ground water, in a process often
referred to as dissolution. Many textbooks and handbooks detail this process, as for example
Reference 35. This reaction occurs on bare pipe, as well as on pipe that is under CP, where this
protection system fails because of local shielding, or other complexities beyond the scope here.
Eventually corrosion penetrates the pipe wall, leading to a leak or rupture depending on the size
and shape of the defect, the pipeline pressure, and the other factors noted in the earlier discussion
on this topic.
Corrosion kinetics also could be evaluated in terms of microbiologically influenced corrosion
(MIC)(e.g., see 36 or 37), or other specific micro-mechanisms that accelerate the degradation rate.
MIC could occur on the exterior of the pipeline – but, also has occurred on the inside of pipeline.
MIC is a complex process that sometimes occurs in the presence of bacteria. These bacteria
form colonies in which their byproducts can accelerate corrosion of the line-pipe steel, ultimately
penetrating the wall and leading to concern for integrity. Reportable incidents involving these
kinetics are categorized in the OPS database as external or internal corrosion, depending on the
specifics of the incident. Frequently, the role of MIC goes unrecognized, particularly for cases
involving external corrosion. A handbook has been written and field kits developed to assist in
its recognition(38).
Finally, corrosion kinetics could be developed in terms of reactions that occur on the inside of
the pipeline involving moisture in the gas, and acid forming gases present at low partial pressures
in the methane. Again, integrity is threatened as this corrosion grows and penetrates the pipe
wall. Reportable incidents involving these kinetics are categorized in the OPS database as
internal corrosion. Somewhat less has been written about the specifics of these kinetics in gas
pipelines as compared to MIC. Never the less, the reactions and related considerations can be
found in textbooks and handbooks. Suffice it to say that removing or reducing the moisture
present in the gas stream reduces or stops the rate of internal corrosion, as would reducing or
removing the acid-forming gases.
The kinetics underlying the above-noted reactions depend on a host of parameters that are
specific to each type of reaction. Internal corrosion due to acid-forming gases typically requires
a minimum level of moisture to become a concern. However, unique pipeline design and
construction features provide places for liquids to “drop out”, which can reduce the minimum
level. A cross-over is an example of a design feature whereas a drip is an example of a
construction feature that make evaluation of the maximum acceptable moisture level pipeline
system specific. Because such features are specific to each pipeline, identifying a “typical”
situation for present purposes is difficult. Thus, consideration of such concerns tends to be
pipeline specific or even site specific.
This report focuses on external corrosion, where the corrosion process is less dependent on
design and construction, and much better characterized in terms of field data. But, even for
external corrosion the kinetics can vary over short distances along a given pipeline. For this
reason conservative kinetics found from field data have been adopted, as follows.

34
External Corrosion
Figure 12 presents two sets of corrosion rate data for steels observed under field conditions. The
data in Figure 12a are trends from results of field tests done with bare, unprotected coupons, with
a view to simulate corrosion rates for buried steel structures(39). The trends shown in this figure
bracket the results reported, with these bounds being reinforced with dashed red lines. Corrosion
“rate” has been calculated by dividing corrosion weight-loss averaged over a time interval on the
order of a few days. Figure 12a shows the lower-bound rate is about 0.001 inch per year, while
the upper-bound rate is stable at about 0.003 inch per year. For the higher-rate data the results
imply the corrosion process was initially much more reactive, as compared to the stable behavior
that developed after a few days. The bounds shown in Figure 12a represent general corrosion,
and differ in rate by a factor of about three. This scatter in rate is indicative of the variability in
the general corrosion process, even though these data reflect the same steel, in the same soil,
with the same moisture conditions, under controlled testing conditions. A factor of three seems
large until the variability for this process is compared, for example, to fatigue where a factor of
ten can be viewed as “low” scatter.
For present purposes, data such as that in Figure 12a are credible only if they reflect the actual
behavior of in-service pipelines. To this end, times to failure were determined for cases
representing bare but protected pipelines using data contained in the OPS database. Because
data for bare pipelines have been considered, no “adjustment” is required to account for the time
for coating failure. Rate has been calculated by dividing the full wall thickness by the pipeline’s
time in service. The data representing bare but protected pipelines are split almost evenly
between leaks and ruptures, with no pattern evident in rate as a function of failure mode. The
results have been culled to exclude pipe with diameters smaller than 12 inches, and cases
involving SCC. The small diameter pipe has been excluded, because steel and pipe making for
smaller diameter pipe can be much different than for larger-diameter transmission line pipe.
SCC has culled from the data as this process involves cracks, as opposed to metal loss corrosion
that typically involves much blunter features.

a) buried, unprotected bare steel coupons(39) b) bare, protected pipelines (OPS database)
Figure 12. Corrosion rate trends for buried steel coupons and pipelines.

35
Using corrosion kinetics derived from the OPS incident database19 means the kinetics reflect
worst-case field corrosion conditions as compared to circumstances elsewhere in the gas-
transmission pipeline system, where degradation must be occurring at a slower rate over the
pipeline’s life. Because the kinetics used reflect the leading edge of the population of corrosion
rates, this analysis has been made for three specific corrosion rates. A worst-case rate has been
used that reflects the fastest rate for all of the incidents on bare, protected pipe. In addition, rates
that reflect average kinetics for the bare, protected pipe incident population has been considered
as has a rate that reflects the 90th percentile20 for the population. For the general corrosion data
the rate-data scatter by about a factor of two, while the extremes for the pitting data differ by
about a factor of five. The worst-case corrosion rate for pitting is found to be ~0.022 inch-per-
year, while that for general corrosion is about half the pitting rate, at ~0.012 inch-per-year. The
corresponding 90th percentile rate is found to be ~0.012 inch-per-year for both pitting and
general corrosion, while the average rate for the worst-case situations is found to be 0.009 inch-
per-year. The similarity between the average and 90th percentile rates for general corrosion and
pitting corrosion is expected in light of the trends shown in Figure 12b, as is the difference in the
upper-bound rates which reflects the differences in scatter at the extremes of these two
populations.
Analysis of the OPS database for corrosion incidents leads to a maximum corrosion rate that is
comparable to the upper bound for the bare, protected pipelines, while the average corrosion
rate for all corrosion data is about a factor of three slower. The similar upper-bound values
may reflect the fact that the first-to-occur field failures on coated lines happen at areas of poor
coating, such that it takes little time for coating failure. Another factor is that where corrosion
occurs on a coated line, the process tends to be “focused” there for cathodically protected
pipelines. But, regardless of the cause, the results in Figure 12b remain credible worst-case
values for the full database, and are even more so a worst case when compared to the rest of the
pipeline system. This likewise is the case for the 90th percentile and average rates, as
demonstrated by the fact that the average rate for these corrosion data is about three times faster
as compared to the full OPS corrosion database.

Discussion – Determining the Re-Verification Interval for External Corrosion

The kinetics for general and pitting corrosion in Figure 12b have been adopted as a worst-case to
assess the effect of the increased wall thickness in Class 3 and 4 designs on the re-verification
interval for HCAs21. This analysis assumes that HCAs will overlay what are now Class 3 and 4
locations, and that heavy-wall pipe is present there to meet the requirements of lower wall stress
as prescribed by the regulations. In cases where pitting occurs the process results in smaller,

19
This database reflects mainly first-to-occur incidents for the pipeline segments involved, and covers lines put into
service over more than a 50-year interval, that are operated and maintained differently. Because it represents
primarily first-to-occur incidents, it reflects corrosion “hot-spots” along those pipelines, and provides a
reasonable worst-case estimate of corrosion rate. For these same reasons, pooling this data for purposes of other
analysis reflects an uncertain practice because most first-time incidents are cause for systemic response in terms
of both operations and maintenance practices.
20
That is 90 percent of the population had this rate, or a rate slower than this value. Thus, this value represents 90
percent of the worst-case corrosion scenarios that led to incidents.
21
As indicated earlier, as these kinetics do not apply to corrosion driven by upset conditions, localized portions of
pipelines exposed to stray currents, shielding, and similar situations are excluded. Likewise, as the kinetics
reflect “sweet, dry gas”, pipelines operating under other circumstances are excluded.

36
focused defects, which because of their size leak rather than rupture when the wall is breached.
In contrast, general corrosion covers larger areas and thus could lead to ruptures as the wall is
breached. Recognizing this difference, the pitting corrosion rate is used to analyze
circumstances associated with a leak, whereas the general corrosion rate is used in reference to
situations that produce ruptures.
While the two previous sections could evaluate the re-verification interval in relative terms, such
is not possible for corrosion as absolute corrosion rates identified in reference to Figure 12b are
utilized. Thus, this evaluation makes use of the “typical” pipeline geometry, and the related
analysis of critical flaw sizes for leak versus rupture for sharp flaws introduced earlier in this
report for Class 1 locations. Critical sizes and pipe wall thickness corresponding to a Class 3
design along this typical pipeline will be determined and compared to the Class 1 result to
determine the re-verification interval.
Recall from earlier discussion that the typical Class 1 pipeline had a diameter of 30 inches, and
was made from X52 grade line pipe with a 0.250-inch thick wall, with a FSE CVP = 20 ft-lb.
The corresponding pipeline in Class 3 service has a wall of (0.72/0.50) x 0.250 = 0.360 inch
thickness. Thus, for metal-loss defects that leak, the wall thickness increase is (0.360 – 0.250) =
0.110 inch. The critical defect length for metal-loss defects in Class 1 service was
conservatively estimated assuming its behavior is crack-like, which led to defects 7 inches long,
that became critical at a normalized depth of a/t = 0.60. For the subject X52 grade line pipe with
a 0.250-inch thick wall, a/t = 0.6 corresponds to a net wall thickness of 0.150 inch. The
increased wall thickness in Class 3 service reduces the wall stress at otherwise identical
maximum pressure, which leads to an increased critical flaw size. For the Class 3 conditions the
critical defect length increases to 8.2 inches at a normalized depth of a/t = 0.63, which for the
subject wall thickness is an 0.227 inch deep flaw. Thus, the net thickness increase in Class 3 as
compared to Class 1 for metal-loss defects that rupture is (0.227 – 0.150) = 0.057 inch.
Given the worst-case rate for leaks due to pitting is 0.022 inch-per-year, the increase in the re-
verification interval over that for Class 1 designs is (0.110 inch/0.022 inch-per-year) = 5 years.
The corresponding worst-case result for metal-loss defects that rupture due to general corrosion
leads to an increase in the re-verification interval of (0.057/0.012 inch-per-year) = 4.39 years.
Similar calculations to avoid leaks using the 90th percentile and average rates for the bare,
protected pipe database lead to increases in re-verification interval of (0.110 inch/0.012 inch-per-
year) = 9.17 years and (0.110 inch/0.009 inch-per-year) = 12.2 years, respectively. The
corresponding results to avoid rupture for the 90th percentile and average rates for the bare,
protected pipe database lead to increases in re-verification interval of (0.057 inch/0.012 inch-per-
year) = 4.75 years and (0.057 inch/0.009 inch-per-year) = 6.33 years, respectively. Thus, the re-
verification interval for external corrosion to avoid leaks or ruptures is ~4.4 years for the fastest
historical corrosion rate, ~4.7 years for the 90th percentile rate, and ~6.3 years for the average
rate, for conditions reflecting bare, protected pipe. Perhaps more realistic results would assess
the effect of the increased wall thickness in HCAs using average rates that reflect the full OPS
corrosion database. As these rates are a factor of three slower than the slowest of the above
rates, the just calculated re-verification intervals would increase by at least three-fold, giving a
re-verification interval in excess of 12 years for Class 3 designs.
The time increment associated with the increased wall thickness in Class 3 and 4 must be added
to the re-verification interval for Class 1 designs to determine the total re-verification interval.
With reference to the typical Class 1 pipeline discussed above, the 30-inch diameter pipeline

37
made from X52 grade line pipe had a 0.250-inch thick wall, with a FSE CVP = 20 ft-lb. As
noted there, critical conditions for corrosion determined by conservatively assuming crack-like
response indicated rupture due to general corrosion at a normalized depth of a/t = 0.60. For the
subject wall thickness, this normalized depth allows corrosion to a depth of 0.150 inch without
rupture, while pitting induced leaks occur when the full wall thickness is perforated.
Adopting the same conservative kinetics used above, the worst-case rate for leaks due to pitting
is 0.022 inch-per-year, which leads to a re-verification interval for Class 1 designs of
(0.250 inch/0.022 inch-per-year) = 11.36 years to avoid leaks. The corresponding worst-case
result for metal-loss defects that rupture due to general corrosion is (0.150/ 0.012 inch-per-year)
= 12.5 years. Similar calculations for the 90th percentile and average rates for the bare, protected
pipe database lead to (0.250 inch/0.012 inch-per-year) = 20.83 years and (0.250 inch/0.009 inch-
per-year) = 27.78 years, respectively, to avoid leaks. The corresponding results to avoid rupture
for the 90th percentile and average rates for the bare, protected pipe database are (0.150
inch/0.012 inch-per-year) = 12.5 years and (0.150 inch/0.009 inch-per-year) = 16.67 years,
respectively.
Thus, the re-verification interval for external corrosion to avoid leaks or ruptures in Class 1
designs is ~11.4 years for the fastest historical corrosion rate, ~12.5 years for the 90th percentile
rate, and ~16.7 years for the average rate, for conditions reflecting bare, protected pipe. Again,
perhaps more realistic results would assess the effect of the increased wall thickness in HCAs
using average rates that reflect the full OPS corrosion database. As these rates are a factor of
three slower than the slowest of the above rates, the just calculated re-verification intervals
would increase by at least three-fold.
As the Class 1 designs have been evaluated for a wall thickness of 0.250 inches, other pipelines
with this or greater wall thickness can make use of this or a longer prorated interval depending
on thickness. Thinner wall pipelines have a proportionally shorter prorated interval. Much of
the Class 1 pipeline system comprises line pipe with this thickness, or more. For that portion of
the system the re-verification interval to avoid leaks or ruptures in Class 1 segments under
worst-case conditions is the order of 11.6 years22.
Referenced to these intervals for Class 1 segments, the worst-case re-verification interval for
Class 3 and 4 pipeline segments to avoid leaks or ruptures is conservatively indicated to be
(11.4 +4.4) ~16 years. Were more typical kinetics used, these increased intervals for Class 3
could more than triple.

Summary for External Corrosion

Worst-case kinetics for general and pitting corrosion based on the incident experience in the
U.S., coupled with case-specific analysis for a typical gas-transmission pipeline, indicate that the
increased wall thickness of Class 3 designs leads to a re-verification interval of 16 years to avoid
leaks or ruptures. Parametric results presented and discussed for critical flaw sizes in Figure 6
indicate that these case-specific results are very weakly dependent on pipe geometry. It follows
that the re-verification interval in HCAs, if defined as an overlay to Class 3 and 4 designs, could
be set conservatively at 16 years to avoid rupture, while an interval of 11.4 years would avoid
leaks or ruptures in Class 1 designs based on worst-case corrosion kinetics for failures

22
Much thinner pipelines are excluded from the 10-year interval, but could be evaluated as above.

38
documented in the OPS database.

Internal Corrosion and Other Types of Accelerated Corrosion

As noted in the introduction to this section, condensed moisture also can lead to metal loss on the
inside of the pipe in cases where the gas is not both sweet and dry. Likewise, corrosion occurs
externally by mechanisms other than dissolution, as it can internally. At present, field data for
operating pipelines are too limited to determine a reasonable distribution of the related kinetics.
Results from laboratory simulation testing and theoretical calculations were considered as an
alternative to such field data. This practice is analogous to using the data in Figure 12a in place
of the pipeline data in Figure 12b for the evaluation just done for external corrosion. Given the
significant difference between the kinetics measured with coupons and that for in-service
pipelines evident in Figure 12, coupon-derived rates would not necessarily be conservative.
Where such forms of corrosion are an integrity concern, two avenues are possible to establish a
re-verification interval. One approach is to compare the field situation to the circumstances in
standards being developed to address MIC and internal corrosion(40). If the field situation
involves conditions better controlled or less severe as compared to that set in the standard, then
the re-verification interval would be fixed in accordance with the interval being developed in
reference to the standard’s field controls and requirements. However, if the field situation lies
outside the standard’s requirements or is more severe than they represent, then the effect of
increased wall thickness on re-verification interval must be evaluated case-by-case. Procedures
comparable to `that used herein form the basis for such analysis, with the kinetics derived from
basic chemistry and knowledge of the gas constituents, or species creating the aggressive
environment. The technology needed exists within the pipeline industry and other allied
industries, such as the chemical-process industry. The case-by-case analysis procedure will
parallel that used in developing the related standards, which could serve as a guide for case-
specific analysis. Once the Direct Assessment for Internal Corrosion report is completed,
methods will be available to monitor the effectiveness of controls for internal corrosion,
including the possible role of MIC.

39
 Defect-Specific Re-Verification Intervals
Thus far, the mechanisms that lead to potential in-service degradation of pipelines – that is
fatigue, SCC, and corrosion (dissolution) – have been characterized with regard to the effect of
increased wall thickness on re-verification interval as compared to Class 1. The purpose of this
section is to evaluate how those kinetics and increases in re-verification interval affect two
specific defect types that can grow in service by those mechanisms. Specifically, this section
addresses material and construction defects, and mechanical damage defects.

Material and Construction Defects Not Found by Hydrotest

Based on Figure 2 and the incident data as reported in Reference 1, it was earlier noted that in
addition to general coverage of the mechanisms for in-service growth, two specific defect types
required consideration. This section deals with material and construction defects. For pipelines
made from line pipe that was either mill-tested and/or cold expanded, material defects should
have been culled from the potential defect population. Likewise, for pipelines subjected to
regulatory-based pre-service hydrotesting, or subsequent re-testing, the remaining construction
defects that could threaten integrity at should have been exposed. The exception to the culling
effects of mill cold-expansion for sizing, mill pressure testing, and pre-service hydrotesting are
anomalies that fall into the OPS category involving material and construction defects,
specifically those that can grow during service.
Two types of material and construction defects have shown a tendency to grow to critical
proportions, leading to in-service reportable incidents. For this reason, these types of defects
pose a potential threat to pipeline integrity. One of these is seam-weld defects, such as hook
cracks and stitched welds: the second involves hard (quench) spots formed by inadvertent water
spills while the skelp was still in hot-rolling. Both types of feature are characteristic of specific
steel and pipe mills, and reflect known periods of upset production, which facilitates
identification from company records. More likely, pipelines with these features are known
because they were exposed in pre-service pressure testing, subsequent re-verification pressure
testing, or in some cases have been the source of a leak or rupture. This section begins with
consideration of seam defects; thereafter, hard spots are discussed.

Seam-Weld Defects Not Found in Mill-Pressure or Pre-Service Hydrotesting

Experience particularly with liquid/products pipelines that experience larger, more frequent
pressure cycles than do gas lines, indicates that certain long-seam welding processes were prone
to frequent upsets. These upsets created a variety of seam weaknesses that grew by fatigue in
service. Both the flash-welded (FW) process and certain electrical-resistance weld (ERW)
practices at specific plants have shown this tendency for line pipe produced over known
production intervals23. A recent book by Kiefner and Clarke(41) documents these seam-weld
processes and related problems. The API provides definitions of the specific defect types(42).

23
This is a limited threat as such defects causing reportable incidents reflect line pipe supplied by specific mills,
made over a limited time interval. This knowledge is a key to managing such features.

40
Typically, these defects were interfacial weaknesses between adjacent sides of the weld-seam,
and by virtue of this were narrow and sharp-tipped.
The integrity significance of seam-weld features can be analyzed using fitness-for-service
principles based on fracture mechanics(16). Experience gained in developing control strategies
for such features as part of re-certifying a line following seam failures indicates that quite good
predictions are possible – for both the effects of in-service cycling and high-pressure
hydrotesting. Laboratory full-scale test results likewise can be predicted using fatigue analysis
methods like that discussed earlier. It follows that it is possible to determine the increase in re-
verification due to increased wall thickness at Class 3 and 4 designs relative to that in Class 1.
While the expectation that seam defects will exist is reasonably well determined by seam type,
pipe maker, and production vintage, the population of defect sizes, shapes, and axial spacing is
not as well characterized. In the absence such data, which are determined pipeline section by
pipeline section by hydrotesting24, or by in-line inspection25 coupled with in-the-ditch sizing, the
absolute time increment that corresponds to a given change in wall stress is quite uncertain.
However, it is possible to determine this relationship in relative terms, when that the life of the
defect is controlled by fatigue crack propagation26 (FCP), as follows.

Increase in Re-Verification Interval for Class 3 Compared to Class 1

At finite rates of FCP, the growth rate is proportional to )J for line pipe steels, then the ratio of
the kinetics in Class 3 to Class 1 is proportional to ∆J3 / ∆J1 , all else being equal. Given that ∆J
= ∆K2 / E, where the symbols are as defined earlier, then ∆J ∝ ∆S2 x F(a)2 x a, where F(a) is a
function of the pipe and defect geometry. This means that ∆J3 / ∆J1 = ∆S32 / ∆S12, for otherwise
identical line pipe, and crack shape size. Accordingly:FCP3 = ( ∆S32 / ∆S12 ) FCP1 = 0.48 x
FCP1 Thus, the time interval spent in growing the seam defect to failure in
Class 3 designs is on the order of twice that for Class 1 designs. The form of this relationship
indicates the effect of reduced stress in Class 3 as compared to Class 1. Given that service
intervals, from commissioning to first failure, which exposes the largest (closest to critical size)
defect, are on the order of years depending on the pipe maker, seam type, and year of production,
the time for growth in Class 3 or 4 designs is on the order of years. This time increment is
conservative, as it ignores the larger critical flaw size at the lower stress, which arises because
the wall is thicker. For the “typical” pipeline discussed earlier, this adds (0.360 – 0.250) = 0.110
inch of growth in the through-wall direction for leaks, and (0.227 – 0.150) = 0.057 inch for
ruptures. At typical average FCP rates, this added margin on critical size adds another time
increment on the order of years.

It follows that the independent contributions of decreased wall stress and increased wall
thickness in Classes 3 and 4 adds several years to the re-verification interval established for

24
For hydrotesting to be effective in exposing defects it is necessary that the test pressure induce a wall stress that
approaches the actual yield stress. Tests to lower pressures will leave correspondingly larger anomalies in the
line. Care must be taken to select the maximum test pressure in light of the size of defect remaining after the
test, and the possibility that larger defects could grow in service.
25
One recently developed ILI tool is claimed to reliably detect such features, but its ability to consistently size them
remains a subject of debate among the experts.
26
Such has been the case for features examined at Battelle, which represent a range of ERW/FW seam defects, such
as hook cracks

41
Class 1. The exact time increment added must be established case-by-case, but can be
anticipated to be least the order of years. Technology exists and has been demonstrated valid to
evaluate the integrity threat posed by seam-weld anomalies – for both time-to-failure and burst
pressure. Methods to expose seam-weld defects and scope the maximum size of remaining
features exist in terms of hydrotesting, while methods to locate such features through in-line
inspection exist, although sizing remains somewhat uncertain. It follows that, while such
features must be evaluated case-by-case, proven technology exists to for this purpose.

Summary for Weld-Seam Defects

The decreased wall stress in Classes 3 and 4 could add several years to the re-verification
interval established for Class 1, all else being equal. The exact time increment added depends
on the nature of the loading, the supplier and vintage of the line pipe, and the type, shape, and
size of the defect. Line-pipe properties also might be a factor. Thus, integrity management of
such features will involve case-by-case consideration of many circumstances, with the
expectation that the increment will be of the order of years. Experience proven technology exists
to evaluate the significance of these features. Where they are known to exist, the presence of
seam defects historically has resulted in a systemic response to expose the near-critical features,
and management plans were developed to ensure operating integrity the line.

Hard Spots Not Found in Mill-Pressure or Pre-Service Hydrotesting

Hard spots result from inadvertent quenching of the skelp in some steels manufactured before the
1970s. They exist as patches, often round that show an in-plane radial gradient in hardness,
which varies spatially through the thickness. These features do not pose problems because they
are significant stress raisers, or planes of axial weakness through the thickness, as occurs for the
seam-weld defects. Instead, such features possess somewhat greater yield strength than the
surrounding steel, which makes these areas stiffer than the surrounding steel during bending to
form the pipe-can. Because they are un-tempered quench spots, these areas may crack during
pipe making, or during shipping and handling, or in construction. Such cracks, if near critical,
will be exposed in the mill-pressure test, or in the pre-service test. Otherwise, the cracks remain
dormant until either loading of sufficient magnitude causes them to grow in service, or they are
exposed to a source of hydrogen that leads to embrittlement and subsequent crack instability. It
follows that in-service failure at hard spots may be somewhat more selective than for hook
cracks or other seam-weld defects.
To date, hard spots evaluated at Battelle represent cases where subsequent embrittlement led to
their failure, as others found in association with the defect causing failure had either coating
damage, or had locally disbonded coating. It has been some time since hard spots were
associated with a reportable incident in the U.S. However, failures due to hard spots have
occurred recently on systems in outside of the U.S. This does not mean they do not still pose an
integrity threat in the U.S. But, the absence of related failures for many years in the U.S. points
to the possibility that features with near-critical cracks when they entered service have since been
exposed.
As with the seam-weld defects, it is possible to determine the relative effect of the reduced the
wall stress and increased wall thickness, when that the life of the defect is controlled by fatigue

42
crack propagation27 (FCP).

Increase in Re-Verification Interval for Class 3 Compared to Class 1

The same methodology used in regard to the seam defects is relevant for the hard spots, if
cracking involves a single, dominant crack. At finite rates of FCP, the ratio of the kinetics in
Class 3 to Class 1 is proportional to ∆S32 / ∆S12, for otherwise identical crack shape and size.
Accordingly:
FCP3 = ( ∆S32 / ∆S12 ) FCP1 = 0.48 x FCP1
Thus, the time interval spent in growing the seam defect to failure in Class 3 designs is on the
order of twice that for Class 1 designs. Given that service intervals, from commissioning to first
failure, which exposes the largest (closest to critical size) defect, are on the order of years
depending on the pipe maker, seam type, and year of production, the time for growth in Class 3
or 4 designs is on the order of years. While the above stress-based effect is the same as for
seam-welds, that associated with the increased wall thickness is not, because the remaining
ligament is conservatively considered to fail by brittle fracture.
It follows that the decreased wall stress in Classes 3 and 4 could add years to the re-verification
interval established for Class 1. The exact time increment added must be established case-by-
case, but can be anticipated to be least of that order. As for seam defects, technology exists and
has been demonstrated valid to evaluate the integrity they pose – for both time-to-failure and
burst pressure. Methods to expose such anomalies and scope the maximum size of remaining
features exist in terms of hydrotesting, while methods to locate such features through in-line
inspection exist, although sizing remains somewhat uncertain. It follows that, while such
features must be evaluated case-by-case, experience proven technology exists to for this purpose.

Summary for Hard-Spot Defects

The decreased wall stress in Classes 3 and 4 could add years to the re-verification interval
established for Class 1, all else being equal. The exact time increment added depends on the
nature of the loading, the supplier and vintage of the line pipe, and the shape and size of the
defect. Line-pipe properties also might be a factor. Thus, integrity management of such features
will involve case-by-case consideration of many circumstances, with the expectation that the
increment will be of the order of years. As for seam-weld defects, technology exists to evaluate
their significance. Their presence has historically resulted in a systemic response to expose the
near-critical features, and management plans were developed to ensure operating integrity the
line.

Mechanical Damage Defects

Mechanical damage defects include smooth dents, gouges, and dents in gouges. These features
could fail immediately as the damage is inflicted, or during re-rounding as the damaging
implement moves away from the pipeline. These features also could fail at some point in the
future, due to the effects of in-service loading.

27
FCP and brittle fracture are the likely modes of growth for such cracks.

43
A recent report(43) has evaluated mechanical damage in regard to six objectives, including:
(1) designing against its consequences,
(2) protecting against its consequences,
(3) developing reactive means to detect if and where it occurs in future,
(4) developing reactive means to identify it on existing pipelines,
(5) developing proactive means to avoid it in future by detecting encroachment, and,
(6) developing criteria to assess fitness-for-service in its presence.
This report also develops a failure criterion involving immediate failures, and a severity criterion
for potential delayed failures. Readers interested in the details should consult this document.
Suffice it here to emphasize the obvious – there is no re-verification interval in regard to
immediate failures. Based on Reference 43, in-service cracking mechanisms for mechanical
damage include fatigue and cyclic-stable tearing (CST)28. Increments of cracking per tension-
going load cycle for CST are orders of magnitude greater than for fatigue. But, this mechanism
operates only above a quite high threshold stress (equally maximum pressure), consequently
each pressure cycle will not lead to crack advance. The threshold stress for cyclic-stable tearing
is typically about an order of magnitude greater than that for the fatigue mechanism. It follows
that virtually every load cycle is much more likely to cause FCP than it is CST, but if CST is
activated, it causes a much larger increment of crack advance.
Reference 43 indicates that if cracking does not initiate during contact, or re-rounding in the
wake of contact, subsequent crack initiation (or growth) from the damage is unlikely for the
frequency and magnitude of pressure cycles typically experienced on gas-transmission
pipelines29. Accordingly, the presence or absence of cracks immediately following outside-
forces contact is a critical factor in the subsequent fitness-for-service of the resultant mechanical
damage.

Increase in Re-Verification Interval for Class 3 Compared to Class 1

Unfortunately, conditions that affect the severity of mechanical damage and integrity of the
pipeline are far more complex than for any other type of defect. It follows that the best that can
be done to assess the effect of stress reduction and increased wall thickness in Class 3 or 4
designs as compared to Class 1 is the relative analysis done above for material and construction

28
Reference 43 also deals with the less likely possibility of hydrogen-induced mechanisms, which become
important is the CP system charges hydrogen into the damage site through related coating damage. Corrosion
also is a possibility in some damage locations, particularly those associated with shielding as occurs at rock-
induced dents that involve coating failure. Finally, the report discriminated situations where certain forms of
damage may be considered benign, such as lower- versus upper-quadrant dents. The inference in such cases is
upper quadrant features are likely mechanical damage, while those on the lower quadrant are rock dents, which
some have concluded are benign. Field experience with pipelines across rock ledges indicates this conclusion is
erroneous.
29
This conclusion based, on historically typical operation, could change if gas pipelines experience large demand-
induced pressure swings, as occurs for example if a pipeline is the prime energy source for a distributed
electrical-power generation plant operating in peak-shaving service.

44
defects. Recall that this assessment is specific to FCP from the damage site. A similar relative
analysis is applicable for CST.
As before, at finite FCP rates the growth rate is proportional to )J for line pipe steels, so the ratio
of the kinetics in Class 3 to Class 1 designs is proportional to ∆J3 / ∆J1 , all else being equal.
Accordingly:FCP3 = ( ∆S32 / ∆S12 ) FCP1 = 0.48 x FCP1

Likewise:CST3 ≈ ( ∆S32 / ∆S12 ) CST1 = 0.48 x CST1

where CST in this use denotes a rate. Thus, the time interval spent in growing the mechanical
damage to failure in Class 3 designs is on the order of twice that for Class 1 designs for
otherwise identical mechanical damage. Note from the form of this relationship that it reflects
the effects of reduced stress in Class 3 as compared to Class 1. Data developed in laboratory
full-scale tests indicate that growth by fatigue from mechanical damage is associated with
relatively large lives. Referenced to the small-amplitude cycle-per-day scenario for typical gas-
transmission service, such lives correspond to the order of years of service following re-rounding
in the wake of damage. In contrast, growth by CST has caused failures in as few as three cycles,
and theoretically could produce failure in only one cycle.
It follows that the increment in useful life associated with the increased wall thickness in Class 3
and 4 designs as compared to Class 1 depends specifically on pipeline operation, and the severity
of the damage. At present, methods to assess damage severity are either unproven on a wide
scale, or still under development. For this reason, inspection-based strategies to ensure pipeline
integrity in the presence of mechanical damage may be difficult to implement in practice for
some time. It will be virtually impossible to achieve given the uncertain nature of both the
damage and the pipeline loadings, even using case-by-case analysis. Consequently, management
of mechanical damage must rely on technologies that limit future third-party contact with
pipelines, and identify sites of where contact occurs. Because the majority of the incidents due to
mechanical damage are immediate failures, the most effective action involves limiting future
third-party contact.

Summary for Mechanical-Damage Defects

The decreased wall stress in Classes 3 and 4 could add several years to the re-verification
interval established for Class 1, all else being equal. However, because of the uncertain nature
of both the damage and the pipeline loadings, even use of case-by-case analysis determining the
time increment added is very uncertain. For this reason, inspection-based strategies applied
periodically may not ensure integrity, or significantly reduce the risk of failure. More
importantly, because both the time and location of the event causing mechanical damage are
random rather than time-dependent processes, their effects cannot be controlled on a timeline,
nor is a periodic inspection likely to reduce their occurrence. For this reason, management of
existing mechanical damage defects to ensure integrity and reduce risk may be better achieved
by other measures.
Consideration should be given to proactively reducing the incidence of contact, and to reactively
detecting contact when and where it occurs. As noted earlier in this report, technology
improvements on both the proactive and reactive fronts offer the near-term potential to limit the
extent of future sources for mechanical damage incidents(4, 5). In regard to control of delayed
failures, direct-assessment technologies(6) that detect the effects of the coating damage done

45
during mechanical damage offer one means of locating potential sites of damage on coated
pipelines, as do ILI tools under development to detect mechanical damage(7, 44) for portions of the
pipeline system that are piggable. Because the majority of the incidents due to mechanical
damage are immediate failures(45), the most effective action is preventing future third-party
contact. Future delayed incidents can be controlled by technologies that detect contact and its
location along the pipeline.

46
 Summary and Conclusions
This report evaluated factors that control threats to gas-transmission pipeline integrity and on
that basis determined the frequency at which pipeline condition must be re-verified to ensure
integrity in high-consequence areas. Because the initial margin of safety provided by the design
factors for pipelines is degraded in service, this evaluation was in terms of time-dependent
material and construction anomalies, and defects developed in service. Specifically, the time
increment due to the change in stress and wall thickness in Class 3 and 4 designs was determined
under the assumption that these areas overlay Class 3 and 4 locations. An implementation plan,
which begins with a baseline inspection that reflects current condition, and defines the scope and
procedures involved in subsequent periodic inspections also has been developed, but is reported
independently.
Re-verification intervals were determined under the assumption that they would become part of a
prescriptive integrity management plan, which means they would be applied to a wide range of
pipelines operated under federal regulations. For this reason, these intervals were developed
within a “one-size-fits-all” framework. While developed for a prescriptive framework, the
process used is the same as would be involved in developing a performance-based integrity
management plans.
The interval at which integrity must be re-verified was indicated to depend on right-of-way
conditions, operating conditions, and the inherent mechanical and fracture properties of the line
pipe used in its construction. Accordingly, the report evaluated pipeline degradation in terms of
typical pipelines. A worst-case analysis based on numerical failure models, which correctly
predict the effects of service-simulation testing and full-scale testing, was used in conjunction
with field-failure experience for this evaluation. This evaluation considered defect sizes for leak
versus rupture, which were determined as a function of pressure, with a focus on natural-gas
pipelines operating through high-consequence areas. Following discussion that identified
integrity threats and dealt with leaks, ruptures, and fracture arrest, the work scope was presented,
as was the approach used. Thereafter, the kinetics for fatigue, SCC, and metal-loss corrosion due
to dissolution were presented and used to determine re-verification intervals for each of the
threats as a function of the stress and wall thickness based on the design factors for Classes 3
and 4, and Class 1. Finally, material and construction defects, and mechanical-damage defects
were evaluated in this same fashion.
The analysis determined that the re-verification interval in high-consequence areas was
controlled by corrosion. Corrosion rates for this analysis were derived from the OPS incident
database, which reflects worst-case corrosion conditions as compared to typical conditions
elsewhere in the gas transmission pipeline system. These typical conditions involve the vast
majority of the 325,000 miles of natural gas pipelines that have not experienced a corrosion-
caused rupture since entering service. For such typical conditions, with corrosion protection
being reasonably to completely effective, the resulting corrosion kinetics would lead to a re-
verification interval of over 30 years. The worst case is represented by the 30 locations on bare,
cathodically protected pipelines that did experience a corrosion incident. Analysis using the
average corrosion kinetics for these failures would lead to a re-verification interval of about 18
years.
However, using kinetics for the very worst of these corrosion conditions, all of these incidents

47
would be avoided using a periodic re-verification interval of:
• 16 years to avoid leaks or ruptures for Class 3 and 4 designs, and,
• 11.4 years to avoid leaks or ruptures for Class 1 designs.
The re-verification intervals listed are appropriate and conservative for almost all operations
under a prescriptive regulatory plan. Situations involving less commonly occurring factors, such
as internal corrosion, or external corrosion driven by stray currents or microbiological factors,
for example, require re-verification intervals determined on a case specific basis. Technology
exists for this purpose, and operators will be required to apply it, but those analyses and
requirements are not within the scope of this analysis.
Other potential causes of in-service degradation, and historical causes of incidents, also were
evaluated, leading to the following conclusions:
• Fatigue is an unlikely cause for defect initiation or growth because of the increased wall
thickness and reduced wall stress in Class 3 and 4 designs. Fatigue kinetics are reduced
by at least a factor of 80 as compared to Class 1 designs. This conclusion is supported by
full-scale test results and the absence of gas-transmission pipeline incidents due to
fatigue.
• SCC is effectively precluded as a threat in Class 3 and 4 designs because of the increased
wall thickness and reduced wall stress in these pipelines. This conclusion is supported by
laboratory evidence, developed under accelerated worst-case conditions, and by the
absence of SCC-related incidents in such pipelines.
• Weld-seam defects and hard spots, which survived mill or pre-service hydrotesting, will
survive longer in Class 3 and 4 pipelines as compared to Class 1 pipelines, all else being
equal. However, as with internal corrosion and external corrosion driven by locally
unique factors, a prescriptive re-verification interval is inappropriate for such features.
Technologies exist to support the determination of a re-verification interval for weld-
seam defects and for hard spots where these conditions have been identified. Those
technologies are uniquely appropriate to each feature and its local circumstances. As
above, it is expected that operators will be required to employ these technologies as
appropriate, but their description and resulting interval analyses are not within the scope
of this work.
• Third-party mechanical damage is a random occurrence in both location and time and
therefore cannot be effectively managed by periodic inspection or re-verification.
Contact could occur minutes after an inspection and cause immediate failure, or a delayed
failure at any time in the future. That time can range from minutes or hours to years.
Management of third-party damage requires technology that limits future contact, and in
the event contact does occur identifies the point of contact. Near-term reduction of
delayed incidents due to existing damage might better be achieved using existing direct-
assessment technologies that detect the coating damage accompanying mechanical
damage. In-line inspection (ILI) tools under development to detect and assess
mechanical-damage severity may offer the same potential in the future, for portions of the
pipeline system that are piggable.
The central conclusion is that the time interval for re-verification of integrity in Class 3 and 4

48
designs is significantly longer than that appropriate for Class 1 designs due to the difference in
stress and wall thickness.
Because re-verification intervals were evaluated a “one-size-fits-all” framework, there are
exclusions to the above-noted “one-size” conclusions. Significant exclusions involve portions of
pipelines exposed to other than sweet, dry gas, stray currents, shielding, as well as pipelines that
do not meet the provisions of Part 192 for Class 3 and 4 locations through increased wall
thickness. Portions of the pipeline excluded that involve field situations like stray currents are
identified and evaluated through direct-assessment practices. Other exceptions involving design,
which may have changed subsequently through maintenance and/or rehabilitation, are identified
and evaluated through company records. Such exceptions and a plan to implement re-
verification intervals are presented in a companion report.

49
 References

1. Selig, B., Clark, E.B., and Hereth, M., “Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines: Pipeline
Integrity, Prevention, Detection, and Repair Practices”, GRI-00/0193, December 2000: see
also Trench, C. J., “Safety Performance of Natural Gas Transmission and Gathering
Systems Regulated by the Office of Pipeline Safety”, Allegro Report to GRI, GRI-00/0077,
2000.

2. Eiber, R., McGehee, W., Hopkins, P., Smith, T., Diggory, I, Baldwink, T., and McHugh, D.,
“Valve Spacing Basis for Gas Transmission Pipelines”, Final Report to the PRCI, PR-249-
9728, January, 2000.

3. Anon., Pipelines and Public Safety, Special Report 219, Transportation Research Board,
United States National Research Council, 1988

4. Leis, B. N., Francini, R. L., and Kechter, G. E., “Real-Time Monitoring Supporting Contact
and Encroachment Detection – and Other Aspects of Smart Pipelines,” 3rd IBC Onshore
Pipelines Conference, International Business Conferences (UK), Berlin, November, 1999.

5. Leis, B. N., Francini, R. L., Stulen, F. B., Hyatt, R W., and Norman, Renny, “Real-Time
Monitoring to Detect Third-Party Damage,” 8th International Conference on Offshore
Pipelines and Polar Engineering, Vol. 2, 1998, pp 34 – 38.

6. Bubenik, T. A., Leis, B. N., Burgoon, D. A., Rust, S. W., Clark, E. B., Garrity, K., Veith, P.
H., van Oostendorp, D., “Direct Assessment and Validation”, Battelle Report to GTI, GRI
Report-00/0231, December 2000.

7. Torres, C. R., Simek, J. C., Leis, B. N., Bubenik, T. A., Nestleroth, J. B., Francini, R. B.,
“Developments in Detecting and Assessing the Severity of Mechanical Damage”, 4th Intl.
Conf. on Pipeline Rehabilitation and Maintenance, Prague, September, 2000.

8. Leis, B. N., Brust, F. W., and Scott, P. M., “Development and Validation of a Ductile Flaw
Growth Analysis for Gas Transmission Line Pipe”, NG-18 Report No. 193, A.G.A. Cat. No.
L51543, June 1991.

9. Leis, B. N., and Ghadiali, N., “Pipe Axial Flaw Failure Criteria—PAFFC: User’s Manual
and Software”, Release 1.0, NG-18 Report No. 211, AGA Cat. No. L51680, 1994, through
Release 4.0, to appear January 2001 (Reference 8 is the technical basis of PAFFC).

10. Maxey, W. A., 1974, “Fracture Initiation, Propagation, and Arrest”, Paper J, 5th Symposium
on Line Pipe Research, American Gas Association Catalog No. L30174

11. Leis, B. N., and Eiber, R. J., “Fracture Propagation Control in Onshore Transmission
Pipelines”, (Invited Paper), 2nd IBC Conference on Onshore Pipeline Technology,
International Business Conferences (London), Istanbul, Turkey, December 1998, pp. 2.1 –
2.35.

50
12. Pipeline Research Committee, Line Pipe Research Supervisory Committee Symposia, 1965
1st Symposium, 1969 4th Symposium, 1974 5th Symposium, 1979 6th Symposium, 1986 7th
Symposium, 1993 8th Symposium, 1996 9th Symposium.

13. Anon., Report of the Public Inquiry Concerning Stress Corrosion Cracking on Canadian Oil
and Gas Pipelines, National Energy Board (Canada), Proceeding MH-2-95, November
1996, pp. 135-139.

14. Eiber, R. J., Leis, B. N., Carlson, L. E., Horner, N., and Gilroy-Scott, A., “Full-Scale Tests
Confirm Pipe Toughness”, Oil & Gas Journal, Nov.8, 1999, pp. 48-54.

15. Leis, B. N., and Stephens, D. R., “An Alternative Approach to Assess the Integrity of
Corroded Line Pipe – Part One: Current Status and Part Two: Alternative Criterion”, 7th
International Conference on Offshore Pipelines and Polar Engineering, Vol. 3, pp 624 –
634 and pp 635 – 641, 1997,

16. Broek, D., Elementary Engineering Fracture Mechanics, Noordhoff, 1974.

17. Leis, B. N., and Brust, F. W., “Ductile Fracture Properties of Selected Line Pipe Steels”,
(NG-18 Report No. 183) A.G.A. Cat. No. L51604, January 1990.

18. Leis, B. N., and Kilinski, T. J., “Mechanical and Fracture Properties Essential in Integrity
Management of Steel Transmission Pipelines”, Draft Final Report, PRCI Report PR-3-
9606/9737, December, 2000

19. Leis, B. N., and Rudland, D. L., “Evaluation of the Benefits of Hydrotesting Gas-
Transmission Pipelines”, Phase Two – Year One Interim Report, PR-3-9523: see also Leis,
B. N., and Rudland, D. L., “Toward Alternatives to Hydrotesting to Ensure Safe
Serviceability of Pipelines,” 11th PRCI/EPRG Biennial Joint Technical Meeting on Line
Pipe Research, pp 28.1-20, Arlington, 1997.

20. Popelar, C. H., Grant, T. S., Bradley, W. L., and Stucker, G., “Development of a Procedure
to Apply Leak-Before-Rupture Concepts to Gas and Hazardous Liquid Transportation
Pipelines”, Texas Transportation Institute Report to Department of Transportation, 1997

21. Berardo, G. Salvini, P., Mannucci, G., and Demofonti, G., “On Longitudinal Propagation of
a Ductile Fracture in a Gas Line Pipe: Numerical and Experimental Analysis”, International
Pipeline Conference 2000, ASME, Volume 1, pp. 287-294, 2000

22. Leis, B. N., and Bubenik, T. A., “Primer on Design to Avoid Failure in Steel Transmission
Pipelines”, Battelle Draft Topical Report to GTI, GRI 00/0229, January, 2001.

23. Stephens, D. R., Leis, B. N., Kurre, M. D., and Rudland, D. L. “Development of an
Alternative Failure Criterion for Residual Strength of Corrosion Defects in Moderate- to
High-Toughness Pipe” Final Report to PRCI, A.G.A. Catalog Number L51794, January
1999.

24. Minakawa, K., Newman, J.C., and McEvily, A. J., “A Critical Study of the Crack Closure

51
 Effect on Near-Threshold Fatigue Crack Closure”, Fat. of Engr. Mat. and Struct., Vol. 6,
No. 4, pp. 359-365, 1983

25. Fowler, J. R., Alexander, C. R., Kovach, P. J., and Connelly, L. M., “Fatigue Life of
Pipelines with Dents and Gouges Subjected to Cyclic Internal Pressure”, 10th PRCI/EPRG
Biennial Joint Technical Meeting on Line Pipe Research, pp 15.1-20, Cambridge, UK, 1995

26. Leis, B. N., and Brust, F. W., “Ductile Crack Growth Model and Its Implications With
Regard to Optimum Hydrotest Strategies”, Pipeline Technology Conference, Part B,
Oostende, pp. 13.11-19, 1990

27. Leis, B. N., "An Energy-Based Fatigue and Creep-Fatigue Damage Parameter", Journal of
Pressure Vessel Technology, Trans. ASME, Vol. 99, No. 4, November, 1977, pp. 524-533.

28. Parkins, R. N., and Fessler, R. R., ALine Pipe Stress-Corrosion Cracking -- Mechanisms and
Remedies,” Paper 320, Corrosion ’86, NACE, 1986: See also Parkins, R. N., “The
Controlling Parameters in Stress-Corrosion Cracking", 5th Symposium on Line Pipe
Research, Pipeline Research Committee, AGA, Paper U, pp. U.1- 39, 1974

29. Bubenik, T.A., Stephens, D. R., Leis, B. N., and Eiber, R. J., “Stress-Corrosion Cracks in
Pipelines: Characteristics and Detection Considerations” Battelle Final Report to GRI, GRI-
95/0007, 1995

30. Leis, B. N., and Kurth, R. E., “Hydrotest Parameters for Control of High pH SCC on Gas-
Transmission Pipelines”, Battelle Report to the PRCI, PR-3-9404, 1999.

31. Leis, B. N., “Analysis Methods For Stress-Corrosion Cracking”, Proceedings of the Pipeline
Technology Conference, Part B, Oostende, pp. 18.1-11, 1990.

32. Leis, B. N., “Characterization of Axial Flaws in Pipelines, With a Focus on Stress-Corrosion
Cracking”, Battelle Final Report to PRCI, NG-18 Report No. 212, 1997.

33. Leis, B. N., and Parkins, R. N., “Mechanics and Material Aspects in Predicting
Serviceability Limited by Stress-Corrosion Cracking”, Fatigue and Fracture of Engineering
Materials & Structures 1998; Vol. 21: pp 583-601.

34. Kurth, R. E., and Leis, B. N., “Probabilistic Modeling of Stress-Corrosion Cracking: Part
One – Model Development and Part Two –Validation and Implications for Control”,
Probabilistic and Environmental Aspects of Fracture, ASME PVP Volume 386, 1999, pp3-
12 and pp13-23.

35. Jones, D. A., Principles and Prevention of Corrosion, Macmillian, 1991

36. Pope, D. H., Dziewulski, D., and Frank, J. R., “Recent Advances in Understanding
Microbiologically-Influenced Corrosion in the Gas Industry, and New Approaches to
Mitigation”, AGA Distribution and Transmission Conference, Los Angeles, 1990

37. Pope, D. H., et al, “Microbiologically-Influenced Corrosion: a State of the Art Review”,

52
 Rennsalear Polytechnical Institute Report to Materials Technology Institute of the Chemical
Process Industries, 1984

38. Anon., “Microbiologically-Influenced Corrosion”, Methods of Detection in the Field, GRI

Field Guide, 1990.

39. Romanoff, M., “Underground Corrosion”, NBS Circular 579, 1957: see also Flitt, H. J.,
Spero, C., and Ferris, P.M., “Prediction of Mild Steel Corrosion Rate in Clay Soil”,
Proceedings of Life Prediction of Corrodible Structures, Hawaii, Vol. 1, pp 320-333, 1991.

40. Anon., NACE TG-237 “External Microbiologically Induced Corrosion of Steel Pipelines”,
NACE TG-038 “Control of Internal Corrosion in Steel Pipelines and Piping Systems”, and
NACE TG-254 “Microbiologically Influenced Internal Corrosion of Steel Pipelines”: see
also Anon., “Redefining the Role of Standards and Standards Developing Organizations to
Further Improve Pipeline Safety”, January, 2001, Docket No. ….

41. Kiefner, J. F., and Clarke, E. B., History of Line Pipe Manufacturing in North America,
ASME, CRTD-Volume 43, 1996

42. Anon., Bulletin on Imperfection Technology, API Bulletin 5T1, 9th Edition, 1988.

43. Leis, B. N., and Francini, R. B., “Line Pipe Resistance to Outside Force – Volume Two:
Assessing Serviceability of Mechanical Damage”, Battelle Final Report to PRCI, Report No
PR3-9305-Volume 2, February 2000.

44. Bubenik, T. A., Nestleroth, J. B., Davis, R. J., Leis, B. N., Francini, R. B., Crouch, A., Udpa,
S., and Afzal, M. A. K., “In-Line Inspection Technologies for Mechanical Damage and SCC
in Pipelines,” Final Report from Battelle to the U. S. Department of Transportation, Office
of Pipeline Safety, Report No. DTRS56-96-C-0010, June 2000.

45. Veith, P. H., Keifner, J. F., “Analysis of Pipeline Incident Data – 1984 to 1998” final report
to PRCI, PR-218-9801, 1999

53