Republic of the Philippines SO ORDERED.
3
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 104664 August 28, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELYBOY SO Y ORBES, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XLIX in
Criminal Case No. 91-95478, convicting the appellant Elyboy So of the crime of murder and
imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On 10 June 1991, Elyboy So was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila for the death of Mario Tuquero. The information reads:
That on or about June 3, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and
evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one
Mario Tuquero y Alas by then and there stabbing him several times with a fan knife on
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said Mario Tuquero Y Alas mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.1
On 19 July 1991, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio, pleaded "NOT GUILTY."2
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court handed down its decision on 17 January
1995, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Murder" qualified by treachery, as defined
in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby condemns the said
Accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of
the law. The Accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Mario Tuquero in the
amount of P50,000.00. The period during which the Accused was detained in the City Jail
shall be credited to him in full provided that he agreed in writing to abide by and comply
strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila. With costs against the
Accused.
The facts established by prosecution's evidence are summarized in the People's brief as
follows:
On June 2, 1991, at around 9:00 p.m., Elyboy So met his lady friend, Teresita Domingo, in a
jeep in Quiapo bound for Pasig. Since Elyboy's house which is located in 2969-D Ramon
Magsaysay Boulevard, Sta. Mesa, Manila, is walking distance to Teresita's house located in
2050 Abad Santos Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, Teresita requested Elyboy to bring her home
(tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 6-7; Nov. 12, 1991, p. 7).
While walking along Araullo Street on their way to Teresita's house, they passed by the house
of Elyboy's first cousin, Esteban, Edgar, and Emy, all surnamed So (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 8-9).
When they passed by his cousins' house, he saw his cousin Edgar with Ronnie Tan and three
(3) others and noticed that a drinking spree was taking place in front of the house (tsn, Oct.
23, 1991, pp. 9-10).
Upon seeing Elyboy, Edgar greeted him by saying: "Bingbong Crisologo is coming (tsn, Oct.
23, 1991, p. 10). He then invited Elyboy to have a drink and requested that his lady
companion be introduced to them (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 11). Elyboy answered: "I cannot
introduce her to you because she is mine." (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 12).
Elyboy then proceeded to bring Teresita directly to her house (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 12).
Immediately after bringing Teresita to her house, Elyboy passed by his cousins' house to
honor their invitation (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 12).
After an exchange of pleasantries, Edgar offered Elyboy a bottle of beer which the latter
declined because it was already past 10:00 p.m. and he was on his way home already. Edgar
convinced him to drink just a little and to stay awhile so he could also meet his future
brother-in-law, Mario Tuquero, who will arrive later with his sister Emy. Elyboy was prevailed
upon to stay on as he was also interested in meeting Mario (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 14).
Before Emy and Mario arrived, Edgar invited Elyboy and Ronnie to watch the dance in the
playground which was part of the fiesta celebration. At the playground, Esteban met Edgar,
Elyboy and Ronnie and informed them that Emy and Mario had arrived and instructed them
to buy beer
(tsn, October 23, 1991, pp. 15-18).
Edgar, Elyboy and Ronnie proceeded to buy beer while Esteban went home ahead of them
(tsn, October 23, 1991, p. 19).
After buying beer, they proceeded to the house. Upon arriving in the house, Emy introduced
Elyboy to her boyfriend Mario (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 14-20).
Mario Tuquero worked as a manager of a restaurant in Paris, France, and arrived in the
Philippines on March 7, 1991. Emy So, who is a registered nurse, met Mario sometime in
1|P a g e
March, 1991 and they started living in as husband and wife in her parents' house at 1920,
Araullo Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, also in the same month until June, 1991. However, Mario
was legally married to a certain Evelyn Tuquero and this fact was not known to Emy (tsn,
Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 37-39, 42-43, 54-55).
The group, consisting of Esteban, Edgar, Elyboy, Ronnie, Mario and Emy resumed their
drinking spree. However, after the group consumed four (4) cases of beer and before 3:00
a.m., Emy felt sleepy and went inside (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, p. 52; Oct. 23, 1991, p. 21).
While Emy was sleeping inside the house, she was awakened by the noise coming from the
group outside their house (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, p. 59).
It turned out that Elyboy had a misunderstanding and altercation with somebody and he was
shouting loudly, disturbing the neighbors in the process (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 59, 63).
After pacifying the protagonists, Mario advised Elyboy to go home because his loud voice was
disturbing the neighbors (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991,
pp. 62-63).
After he was pacified and advised to go home, Elyboy ran towards home (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991,
pp. 62-63).
At around 4:00 a.m. of June 3, 1991 Mario and Emy decided to leave for Fairview Subdivision,
Quezon City, in order to get papers of a vehicle owned by Mario that they will bring out of
the Bureau of Customs (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 30-31, 60).
While Mario and Emy were waiting for a taxi at the corner of Magsaysay Avenue and Pureza
Street, Elyboy suddenly appeared from behind and stabbed Mario at the back several times
with an eleven inch fan knife with a white handle (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 30, 32, 67; Sept. 9,
1991, p. 25).
Emy shouted for help (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, p. 33).
When Mario was about to run, he slid and fell to the ground lying on his back. Elyboy took
advantage of this circumstance and repeatedly stabbed Mario on the front part of his body
(tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, p. 33).
Emy pleaded to Elyboy to stop stabbing Mario but Elyboy ignored her and continued
delivering stabbing blows at Mario (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991,
p. 34).
Elyboy fled from the scene of the crime and ran to a dark alley (tsn., Sept. 4, 1991, p. 34; Oct.
23, 1991, p. 40).
Emy called for a taxi that passed by and brought Mario Tuquero to the University of the East-
Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital (tsn., Sept. 1991, p. 34).
Elyboy stayed in the alley for about thirty (30) minutes until the policemen arrived at the
scene of the crime and shouted at him to surrender. After a while, Elyboy went out of hiding
and shouted at the policemen not to fire because he is surrendering. When Elyboy
surrendered, he was blushing and uneasy and naked from the waist up because he removed
his shirt to wipe the blood on his face (tsn, Sept. 9, 1991, pp. 6, 13; Nov. 12, 1991,
p. 3).
Elyboy was then brought by the policemen to Precinct No. 8 of the Western Police District
and the fan knife used was surrendered by Barangay Chairman Aida de los Santos to the
police authorities (tsn., Sept. 9, 1991, pp. 7, 25).
As a result of the stabbing incident, Mario suffered several stab wounds numbering eighteen
(18) on the different parts of his body with at least four (4) fatal wounds causing his death
(tsn., Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 8-23).4
Appellant vehemently opposed the version of the prosecution. According to him, while they
were drinking and talking about France, Esteban So suddenly stood up and said that the
reason he was not able to work in France is because his surname was "So". Appellant felt
aggrieved as he recalled the time when he lived with Esteban So and his family and was
driven out by them. He was told that his only link to them is the surname "So". Then when
Esteban So pulled a knife and Edgar So broke bottles of beer and Mario Tuquero pulled out
"something" from his socks, appellant, fearing for his life, fled. Appellant claims that Esteban
So and Mario Tuquero chased him but were not able to catch him.5
Appellant further narrated that when he tried to go back to his cousin's house and talk to
them, he met Mario Tuquero and Emy So at the corner of Pureza and Magsaysay Streets.
Suddenly Mario Tuquero attacked him with a knife but because Tuquero's thrust was slow,
he was able to evade it. He grabbed the knife and proceeded to stab Tuquero repeatedly. He
ignored the pleas of Emy So but finally stopped when four (4) persons in a jeep passed by and
shouted at him. He ran into a dark alley until the police came and brought him to the police
precinct.6
Appellant claimed self-defense and in the instant appeal assigned the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED SELF-DEFENSE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
ELYBOY SO IS UNDESERVING OF CREDIT, IMPROBABLE AND IMPLAUSIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS TREACHERY IN THE INSTANT
CASE.
2|P a g e
IV
Their family is a broken family and ours is intact, Your Honor. And they live only from hand-
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF outs from relatives and also from us, Your Honor.
INSANITY ON THE PART OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ELYBOY SO.
COURT:
V
So, what was the grudge about? You even help them. You even helped the Accused. What
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF was the grudge all about?
MURDER.7
WITNESS:
We deny the appeal.
I just do not know really why they have such ill feelings towards us. I think it's jealousy
Appellant's second assigned error, in essence, raises the issue of credibility of witnesses. "inggit", Your Honor.
Whose testimony is more believable and reliable, prosecution witness Emy So's narration or
appellant's version? Appellant would like us to believe that Emy So's testimony was biased in xxx xxx xxx
favor of her brothers and the victim who was her common-law-husband8 and aggravated by
an alleged grudge harbored by her family against appellant's family. ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

We give no credence to appellant's argument. Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the You are not concerned with Elyboy he being not a resident in your community?
rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to WITNESS:
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of No, ma'am.
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.9 In the instant
case, although Emy So readily admitted that her relationship with appellant was "not close", ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
she explained that it was appellant who had
ill-feelings against her family and bore a grudge. The defense has not shown such degree of That is because you have grudge over this person. Referring to the Accused, is that correct?
partiality on the part of prosecution witness Emy So as would cast doubt on her credibility
and impeach her testimony, especially when said testimony is "not inherently improbable in WITNESS:
itself".10 Emy So testified thus:
No, ma'am, we are not so close that's why.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
COURT:
You mentioned of a grudge between your family and that of the Accused and this referred to
the surname, So. What was the trouble all about? Another question. Is it your habit not to be concerned with the welfare of your relatives?

WITNESS: WITNESS:

Actually, there was no grudge with respect to the family name So. They really have a grudge I have concern to my other relatives, Your Honor.
in our family, Your Honor.
COURT:
COURT:
How about the Accused, you are not concerned with him?
What was that grudge all about?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:

3|P a g e
No, Your Honor.
COURT:
Why, because of the fact between your family and their family?
WITNESS:
It could be said that way, Your Honor, because since then, he is a problem child that's why
my feelings towards him is not so intimate anymore.11
The fact alone that the victim was Emy So's live-in partner does not impair her testimony.
The Court has time and again ruled that mere relationship of the witness to the victim does
not automatically impair his credibility and render the testimony less worthy of faith and
credit.12 In People v. Estrellanes, Jr. and Manolo,13 we put it thus:
. . . It is settled that the relationship of the key witness to the victim does not necessarily
disqualify him for being biased and interested. A son or a wife is not incompetent to testify
simply because of his or her relationship to the victim. In other words, the relationship of the
witnesses to the victim does not per se affect their credibility. Their testimony must be
evaluated and assessed according to its own merit and if not otherwise offset by more
credible evidence on record or any other revealed intrinsic defect should be given credit.
Appellant's strategy to discredit Emy So on ground of bias and interest to exculpate himself
from criminal liability cannot succeed.
Appellant maintains that he stabbed the victim in legitimate self-defense and invokes in his
favor the constitutional presumption of innocence claiming that, despite his plea of self-
defense, the prosecution retains the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.14
This argument deserves no credit in light of the established and time-honored rule that when
self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to show that the killing
was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, for, even if the
latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the
killing. He must prove the essential requisites of self-defense, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the
aggression, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.15
In People v. Jotoy,16 we stated:
It is oft-repeated that in criminal cases, the burden rests on the prosecution to establish the
guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, when the accused invokes
self-defense, the onus probandi is shifted and he is duty bound to prove the elements of the
plea by clear and convincing evidence otherwise, conviction is inescapable.
We shall now proceed to determine whether or not appellant has completely and
satisfactorily proven the elements of self-defense. The initial and crucial point of inquiry is
whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim for absent this essential
element, no claim of self-defense can be successfully interposed. If there is no unlawful
aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel and the second requisite of self-defense
would have no basis.17
Appellant's claim that the victim, Mario Tuquero, attacked him with a knife fails to convince
us. The record reveals glaring and serious inconsistencies in appellant's testimony that makes
it totally unworthy of credence.
Appellant testified that he was able to wrest the knife from Tuquero because the latter's
thrust was slow. However, this contradicts his statement during the same cross-examination,
that the incident happened so fast and that Tuquero's attack was sudden.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL PERALTA:
And the first time that you saw Mario near the corner of Magsaysay and Pureza, how far
were you in relation to him the first time that you saw him?
WITNESS:
I think about 1 and 1/2 armslength, sir, because I was on the other side and Mario was also
on the other side and we exactly met at the corner, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And the first time that you saw him bringing out something from his waistline, what did you
do?
WITNESS:
The incident happened so fast, sir. After pulling out something from his waistline,
immediately thereafter, he made a thrust on me but I was able to grab the knife from him sir.
(Emphasis ours.)18
Further, we share the incredulity of the trial court that the victim stabbed appellant in slow
motion:
Even the testimony of the Accused denigrated his claim that he acted in self-defense. For,
when he testified before the Court, the Accused claimed that Mario Tuquero stabbed him
but that Mario Tuquero failed to hit the accused because Mario Tuquero stabbed the
accused slowly and the Accused was able to evade the thrust and that the latter, thereupon,
wrested the knife from Mario Tuquero. It is sheer lunacy for the Accused to asseverate that
Mario Tuquero stabbed the Accused in slow motion . . .19
Even if we allow appellant's contention that Tuquero was the initial unlawful aggressor, we
still cannot sustain his plea of self-defense. After appellant successfully wrested the knife
4|P a g e
from Tuquero, the unlawful aggression had ceased. After the unlawful aggression has ceased,
the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.20
As correctly pointed out by the trial court:
. . . More, there is no evidence in the record that, after the Accused wrested the knife from
Mario Tuquero, the latter still did any overt act to indicate that he still tried to grab or wrest
back the knife from the Accused or, in any manner, persist in inflicting any harm on the
Accused. On the contrary, after the Accused wrested the knife from Mario Tuquero, the
Accused repeatedly stabbed Mario Tuquero in the front portions of his body even after Mario
Tuquero embraced the Accused to hang on for dear life. At the time the Accused stabbed
Mario Tuquero, the latter's initial unlawful aggression had already ceased and that there was,
therefore, no more need for the Accused to still stab Mario Tuquero and stab him with
impunity. . .21
We reiterated the same rule in People v. Gomez:22
But even if We assume that it was the deceased who attacked the accused with a knife, as
the latter would make Us believe, We still hold that there was no self-defense because at
that point when accused was able to catch and twist the hand of the deceased, in effect
immobilizing him, the unlawful aggression had already ended. Thus, the danger having
ceased, there was no more need for the accused to start stabbing the deceased, not just
once but five (5) times.
and in People v. Gomez:23
There was no self-defense where the accused was able to obtain possession of the weapon
from the deceased and there was no necessity to stab the latter for aggression had already
ceased.
Appellant's claim of self-defense is, likewise, contradicted and negated by the physical
evidence on record. The victim sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds on different parts of his
body. Of the eighteen (18), four (4) were fatal stab wounds.24 The presence of a large
number of wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and location disprove self-defense
and instead indicate a determined effort to kill the victim.25
We quote with favor the observations of the trial court in this regard:
In this case, the evidence in the record buttresses the testimony of Emy So, on the one hand,
and belied and deprecated the testimony of the Accused on the other. As can be gleaned
from the Necropsy Report of Dr. Florante Baltazar, (Exhibits "B" and "C"), the deceased
sustained no less than eighteen (18) stab wounds. Four (4) of the stab wounds sustained by
the deceased were on the posterior aspects of his body, namely, stab wounds No. 4 (Exhibit
"C-4"), stab wound No. 13 (Exhibit "B-13"), stab wound No. 15 (Exhibit "C-15") and stab
wound No. 18 (Exhibit "C-18") and the rest of the stab wounds sustained by the victim were
on the anterior portions of his body. These jibe with the testimony of Emy So that the
Accused suddenly darted from behind Mario Tuquero and stabbed him on the posterior
aspects of his body and, when Mario Tuquero slipped because his shoe slid, and fell on the
ground, face up, the Accused then stabbed Mario Tuquero anew successively on the anterior
aspects of his body.
On the other hand, if the Accused acted merely on self-defense, it is incomprehensible that
he would stab Mario Tuquero no less than eighteen (18) times (Exhibits "B" and "C"), not only
on the anterior but also on the posterior aspects of his body.26
Considering the number and nature of the wounds inflicted by appellant on the victim, the
testimony of the prosecution witness Emy So that appellant unexpectedly and suddenly
attacked the victim from behind and the fact that appellant suffered not a single injury, we
agree with the trial court that the killing was attended by treachery. This clearly illustrates
that appellant, in the commission of the crime, employed means, methods and form in its
execution which tended directly, and especially to ensure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the victim might make.27
Not content with a self-defense plea the defense likewise seeks to exempt appellant from
criminal liability by claiming that appellant was insane at the time he stabbed the victim.
The claim is unmeritorious.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it.28
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete
depreciation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without
the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude
imputability.29
The testimony of Dr. Omer Galvez, Chief of the Child & Adolescent Service of the National
Center For Mental Health (NCMH) and attending physician of appellant when he was
confined at the National Center for Mental Health from June 8, 1985 to December 2, 1985,
only established the previous confinement of appellant at the NCMH and that appellant
showed signs of psychosis or insanity at the time. The rest of his testimony consisted merely
of assumptions, possibilities and generalities:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
Why did you attend to this Elyboy So?
WITNESS:
He was admitted June 8, 1985 to the service of the Child and Adolescents Service, ma'am.
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
Why?
5|P a g e
 What are the causes that will trigger the recurrency of this kind of illness?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
He showed signs of psychosis or insanity, ma'am.
Generally, the main characteristic of this patients who are suffering from this illness is, they
xxx xxx xxx are very sensitive to any kind of social censures and criticisms.

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

What are the characteristics of this kind of illness Mr. Witness? Could you enlighten what do you mean by social censures?

WITNESS: WITNESS:

Even this illness it is assumed that this patient will have episodes of insanity for the rest of his If they were told about a behavior that they are showing that is unacceptable, they will react
life especially if he will not to that in a disproportionate way, ma'am.
take the medicines that will prevent the episodes of insanity. (Emphasis ours.)
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
What do you mean by disproportionate way?
And you said that this patient per your record was discharged on December 3, 1985. Do we
understand that from the time of his discharge, he was already healed or recovered from WITNESS:
that kind of insanity?
It will not be proportionate that the amount of stimulus meaning, to say that they will
WITNESS: overreact.

I can only say that at the time of the last check up he was doing well three (3) months after ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
that, he was discharged because he failed to come back for his check-up, ma'am. (Emphasis
ours.) Is violence a kind of over reaction to a given stimulus?

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: WITNESS:

You mentioned that this will be for the rest of his life. Patients who are suffering from this condition has more proclivity to violence than the
general population.
WITNESS:
xxx xxx xxx
For many patients, it is like that. It is very exceptional that they will be able to recover or
completely cured from it, ma'am. (Emphasis ours.) COURT:

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: Doctor, you told that he was discharged. Was he told to come back for further treatment?

When you say for the rest of his life, do we understand that this will be recurrent? WITNESS:

WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor, that is standard that we tell to everybody. (Emphasis ours.)

Yes, ma'am. COURT:

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: And how often is he supposed to come back for treatment in the case of the Accused Elyboy
So?

6|P a g e
 FISCAL PERALTA:
WITNESS:
If the Patient was discharged in 1985 and finished his college degree in four (4) years, do you
After six (6) months he failed to come. He was supposed to come every month after his passe think that by that time he was already cured of his sickness?
which was given on August 1, 1985, Your Honor.30
WITNESS:
xxx xxx xxx
It will look like that, sir. (Emphasis ours.)
Further and more importantly, the testimony of Dr. Galvez is bereft of any evidence that
appellant was completely deprived of intelligence or discernment at the time or at the very FISCAL PERALTA:
instant when he stabbed the victim.
What do you mean it will look like that?
Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of appellant should relate to the
period immediately before or at the very moment the act was committed.31 In the present WITNESS:
case, the testimony of Dr. Galvez refers to appellant's treatment six (6) years before the
incident happened. It will look that while there are various types of clinical courses, meaning, the development of
an illness in a patient and if the patient was able to finish college, then the outcome of the
Moreover, Dr. Galvez admitted that after appellant's last check-up sometime in 1985, or six treatment that was given to him in 1985 was quite good.
(6) years before the crime was committed, he was doing well and relieved from psychosis:
FISCAL PERALTA:
xxx xxx xxx
And do you think doctor that could have been the reason why he already failed to report on a
COURT: monthly basis considering that he was already in college and actually finished his college
degree?
When he came back, after his discharge, was he given medication?
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
WITNESS:
That might be misleading, Your Honor, considering that the testimony of the doctor, he said
Yes, Your Honor. that he should report six (6) months after the discharge but he took his college degree for
several years thereafter.
COURT:
COURT:
How did you find his behavior when he came back for medication?
The only point of the fiscal is that, is that an indication of having been cured. If he was able to
WITNESS: take and finish even college. Go ahead.

As per record, he was doing well, Your Honor. (Emphasis ours.) WITNESS:

COURT: It would look that during that period, he would have been cured and there are some also
who although that they may not be entirely cured would be able to get a degree, make the
When you say doing well, what exactly do you mean by that? standards of education and there are some who could also get the standard of employment
despite their craziness. "Medyo naitatago or nakakaya." Psychosis is something in many
WITNESS: patients it is very obvious. You could see that they are really grossly disorganized "talagang
sira." But there are some who has some ability to keep it just there and maintain a proper
He was relieved from psychosis at that time, Your Honor. (Emphasis ours.) social behavior and be able to achieve socially acceptable functioning in society.

xxx xxx xxx COURT:

7|P a g e
In other words, that illness is dormant.
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
I don't know, sir, because I was out of myself.
Yes, Your Honor.
FISCAL PERALTA:
COURT:
After repeatedly stabbing the front portion of his body, you said that you also stabbed him at
And it emerges in some point of time? the back?

WITNESS: WITNESS:

Yes, Your Honor. When he was already embracing me, sir, my right hand was freed and that was the time
when I stabbed him at the back.
COURT:
FISCAL PERALTA:
So, it is possible doctor that the decease is there but at the same time, the patient is able to
study? And how did you stab him at the back?

WITNESS: WITNESS:

Yes, Your Honor. The possibilities are these he was cured entirely cured during the period or Like this, sir. He was embracing me, my right hand was freed.
the decease is just there and it is not affecting his behavior. So there are two (2)
possibilities.32 (Emphasis ours) INTERPRETER:

A perusal of appellant's testimony further negates his plea of insanity. His recall of the events
that transpired before, during and after the stabbing incident, as well as the nature and
contents of his testimony, does not betray an aberrant mind. His memory conveniently
blanks out only as to the number of wounds he inflicted on the victim. This, appellant
attributes to insanity but we are far from convinced. A man may act crazy but it does not
necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so.33
Witness demonstrated by stretching his right hand, swinging it from the right side to the
front towards his body.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And how many times also did you stab the back portion of the body of the victim?

xxx xxx xxx WITNESS:

FISCAL PERALTA: I could not recall also, sir.

Afterwards, when you got hold of the knife, you repeatedly stabbed him? FISCAL PERALTA:

WITNESS: And when you stopped stabbing the victim when you said four (4) men boarded a jeep and
shouted "itigil na, itigil na"?
Yes, sir, because after I got hold of the knife, I was able to wrest it from him. And with the use
of my right hand, I repeatedly stabbed him. At the time his left arm was embracing me and I WITNESS:
repeatedly stabbed him with my right hand from the left swinging it to the right in front,
hitting him on the front of his body, sir. It was during the time when both of us fell down. I was on top of him and I stabbed him on
his chest, sir. That was when four (4) persons arrived and shouted "itigil na, itigil na," and I
FISCAL PERALTA: stopped,
sir.34
How many times did you stab him on the front portion?

8|P a g e
xxx xxx xxx and in the later case of People v. Aquino,37 we ruled:

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: The clinical case report also shows that appellant, when interviewed upon his admission to
the mental institution, recalled having taken 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and
And what did you do when you were not hit? consumed about 3 sticks of marijuana before the commission of the crime. This admission
substantially affirms his prior extrajudicial confession that he was under the influence of
WITNESS: marijuana when he sexually abused the victim and, on the occasion there of killed her. It is,
therefore, beyond cavil that assuming appellant had some form of mental illness, it did not
By the time I evaded his thrust I was able to get hold of his palm, ma'am. totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled
him to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters,
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: sufficiently discounts any intimation of insanity of appellant when he committed the
dastardly felonies. The annals of crime are replete with documented records, and we are not
And when you were able to get hold of his palm, what happened? without our share in this jurisdiction, where mental illness has been feigned and invoked to
provide a defense for the accused in a criminal prosecution. (Emphasis ours.)
WITNESS:
In the present case, the defense has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to overthrow the
Because I was so made of what he did, when I was able to grab and get hold of the knife, I hit presumption of sanity. The State, thus, continues, its guard against sane murderers who seek
him, ma'am. to escape punishment through a general plea of insanity.38

INTERPRETER: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against appellant.
Witness demonstrating by raising his right hand upward on the level of his breast swinging
his right hand towards the right.35 SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx

In People v. Renegado,36 we held thus:

By his testimony appellant wants to convey that for one brief moment he was unaware or
unconscious of what he was doing, that he "regained his senses" when he heard the voice of
Mrs. Tan telling him: "Loreto, don't do that," and only then did he realize that he had
wounded Lira. That, to Us, is incredible. For it is most unusual for appellant's mind which was
in a perfect normal state on Monday morning, August 29, to suddenly turn blank at that
particular moment when he stabbed Lira. Appellant himself testified that he was acting very
sanely that Monday morning, as shown by the fact that he went to the canteen in a jovial
mood "singing, whistling, and tossing a coin in his hand"; he saw the persons inside the
canteen namely, Venecia Icayan, Lolita Francisco, Benita Tan, Felipe Tingzon and a guest of
the latter (all of whom, except the last one, testified for the prosecution); he noticed the
arrival of Lira who banged his folders on the table, elbowed him, and said in a loud voice:
"ano ka", he saw Lira put his right hand inside his pocket and with the other hand push a
chair towards him; he became "confused" because he remembered that Lira threatened to
kill him if he would see him again; at this point he "lost his senses" and regained it when he
heard the voice of Mrs. Tan saying: "Loreto, don't do that", and he then found out that he
had wounded Lira. If appellant was able to recall all those incidents, We cannot understand
why his memory stood still at that very crucial moment when he stabbed Lira to return at the
snap of a finger as it were after he accomplished the act of stabbing his victim . . . (Emphasis
ours.)

9|P a g e
 of the deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs. The following facts are not
disputed.

In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm
in Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and
his five children. From there they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias
Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find
employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month's stay or rather on December 28,
1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The
accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the
wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung
and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent
Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo
who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living
room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in
response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who
witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.

Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D,

wherein he admitted that he killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy because according
to his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her
in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining
illicit relations because he noticed that his had become indifferent to him (defendant).

During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the
accused pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First
Instance, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel
presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to
Republic of the Philippines the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane
SUPREME COURT person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of
Manila his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings;
that he would refused to take a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison
EN BANC authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even
alone by himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was opened,
G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950 he suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain
his liberty.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant. exempt from criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court
rejected this same theory and we are inclined to agree with the lower court. According to the
Luis Contreras for appellant. very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could
appellee. distinguish right from wrong.

MONTEMAYOR, J.: In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the
appellant guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on

10 | P a g e
paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and
applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the Revised Penal
Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be
taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;1 that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of
the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the
commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will,
because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.2
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to
imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that
the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition.
Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that
a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental
condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not
feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or
eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife.
From the case of United States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote the following syllabus:
Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the
accused was moved by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other
testimony to the effect that, while in confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted
absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The conduct of
the defendant while in confinement appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition
produced by remorse.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile.
According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything
or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He
regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and
even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally,
as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent
measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the
belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he
believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere
product of hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a
lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In addition to the observations made by
appellant in his written statement Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his wife first went to
live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter was living with his
grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in
the house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights. All
this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his
way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate
beings, simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His
action in picking up the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her
upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse
at having killed his loved one though he thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did
not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police
to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed
his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus
saving the government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring his
conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the
aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems that
the prosecution was not intent or proving it. At least said aggravating circumstance was not
alleged in the complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in the Court of First
Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt and we therefore declined to
find the existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the
accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance
provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
namely that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of
action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish
the exercise of his will power." To this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph
6 of the same article, — that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to
have produced passion or obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of
jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to
offset them, at first we thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of article 64,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which is reclusion perpetua to death. It will be
observed however, that article 64 refers to the application of penalties which contain three
periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each
one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is
not true in the present case where the penalty applicable for parricide is composed only of
two indivisible penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to the
application of indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible
penalties like that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the
one applicable in the present case.
11 | P a g e

Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is
attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in the
case of United States vs. Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of parricide, in applying
article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code) which corresponds to article 63,
paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano said the
following:
And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating
circumstances of a qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any
aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law,
because, according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not
contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the
Rev. Penal Code.) (Decision of September 30, 1879.)
Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and
which, under the law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power
conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal Code; and.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper
petition be filed with the executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be
deemed proper in the exercise of the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may
reduce the penalty to that of the next lower.
Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme
Court in affirming the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua,
said that notwithstanding the numerous mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as
the penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two
indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the
said Code must be applied. The Court further observed:
We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such
moral turpitude as requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5
of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the
case with a view to executive clemency after appellant has served an appreciable amount of
confinement.
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of
the lower court with the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any
preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases
above cited, and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should
be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the
penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive
clemency in the manner he sees fit.
Moran, Bengzon, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.
PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as alleged in the
information, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with the intention of
killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest,
with premeditation shot him in the breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and
killed the said Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried the body of the
deceased in a well. The motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in that the accused
had prepared his plans to take the deceased to the forest, there to kill him, so that no one
could see it, and to bury him afterwards secretly in order that the crime should remain
unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Tarlac and sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal,
accessories, indemnification and costs. The defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as to the
important facts. The accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909,
he, with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went
to work on a malecon or dam on his land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and a few
shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers at work. He
remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short distance away across a
12 | P a g e
stream to see how the alteration which he had made in the malecon affected the flow of
water from the rice filed on the other side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him
across the stream. On the other side of the stream he met the deceased, who, with his
mother and uncle, had been living in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-
harvesting season. The accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good
place in which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the
shack sick of fever. The deceased, a young man about 20 years of age, was working at
something under a manga tree a short distance from the shack. Although the accused
directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased answered the question
and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest near the edge of which stood the
shack. There is some contradiction between the testimony of the accused and the
Government witnesses just at this point. The uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and
the accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens and that the accused accepted
the invitation. The accused, however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to go
hunting with him, neither did the deceased go with him, but that he remained under the
manga tree "trying something." At any rate the accused went into the forest with his gun.
What took place there is unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon that subject he
testified as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the wild chickens
were to be found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill some wild
chickens we would have something to eat on that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a
wild chickens and I shot him. And after I shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up
the chicken and went near the place where I heard the noise, and after I saw that I had
wounded a man I went back toward the malecon, where my companions were working,
running back, and when I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree not far from
where my companions were working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the
occurrence, and to him I told of that occurence because he is my friend and besides that he
was a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this he and myself went
together to see the dead body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound. Chicken
feathers were found in considerable qualities at the point where the chicken was shot and
where the accident occurred. The defendant within a few minutes after the accident went
out of the woods to the malecon where he had left his laborers at work, carrying the dead
chicken with him. The accused called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the laborers, to go with him
and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa says that they went a little way toward the
woods and came back. The accused says that they went to the place where the body of the
deceased lay and removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it would not be easily
observed. It is certain, however, that the body was concealed in the cogon grass. During the
afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow laborers were working, probably to
hunt for a place in which to hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul
take the chicken which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife of the
accused, who testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it had been killed
by a gunshot wound. That evening the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the
body finally. They took it from the cogon grass where it lay concealed and carried it about
seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from the place where it had originally fallen, and
buried it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth and burning straw on top of the well
for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the accused dispose of the
body because he was afraid of him, although he admits that the accused in no way
threatened or sought to compel him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial denied all
knowledge of the death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the body. On the trial,
however, he confessed his participation in the death of the deceased and told the story
substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused and
the deceased had been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of
the accused. There was no enmity and no unpleasant relations between them. No attempt
was made to show any. There appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission
of the crime. The Government has not attempted to show any. The only possible reason that
the accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden
quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the
chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary
shall appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident
without liability or intention of causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is
proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be
entitled to an acquittal.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is taken by
misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and
without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33;
State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160;
Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro,
Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused.
Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when
the accident occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause
the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the
defendant are his concealment and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):
13 | P a g e
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such
a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing,
and the burden is upon the State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration
of all the evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to
whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But where
accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was
intentional. Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to
instruct the jury that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a preponderance of
the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was properly held to be erroneous.

In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:

Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide,

which must be submitted to the jury. And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal
intent (or its equivalent) which constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to
warrant a conviction it must be negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.

In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.

We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.

The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his
discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
CARSON, J., concurring: Manila

I concur. EN BANC

I am in entire agreement with the conclusions of the majority in this case. I think it proper to G.R. No. L-54414 July 9, 1984
estate, nevertheless, that the doctrine laid down in the somewhat loosely worded West
Virginia case of State vs. Legg, cited in the majority opinion, and in the citation from 3 L. R. A., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
N. S., can not be said to be in conformity with the general doctrine in this jurisdiction, as laid vs.
down in the decisions of this court, without considerable modification and restriction limiting EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY MARANTAL y LONDETE, accused-appellants.
its scope to cases wherein it is properly applicable.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Reynaldo Herrera for accused-appellants.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

14 | P a g e
In an information filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, accused Eustaquio
Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete were charged with tile crime of Robbery
with Double Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th of January, 1978, in the Barangay of Magsaysay, Municipality of
Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with John Doe, Jose Doe, Richard Doe,
Peter Doe, Charlie Doe, and Ricky Doe, who are still at large, armed with firearms, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and rob,
taking advantage of nighttime to better accomplish their purpose, did then and there were
Ifully unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and use violence and intimidation upon the
person of Elias Monge by tying his two hands and the hands of the members of his fully and
on the occasion hereof, while they were made lying flat on the floor, the herein accused take,
rob and carry away, without the consent of said Elias Monge, owner thereof, of the following
properties, to wit:
One camera with trademark Olympus worth P400.00
Two birthstones rings worth 700.00
One wedding ring with name MONDING 100.00
One pair of earrings heartshape 100.00
thereof in the aforementioned amount. That on the occasion thereof, the abovenamed
accused with lewd design, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual intercourse with Monica Monge, a
virgin of 16 years old, and with Cristina Monge, all against their will. 1
Upon arraignment, both accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete
entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment adverse to the accused, the dispositive portion
of which read:
ACCORDINGLY, we find the guilt of the accused Eustaquio Loreno has been established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt and hereby find him GUILTY of Robbery with Double Rape,
penalized by Par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. There being present aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the offense, Eustaquio Loreno is hereby sentenced to
LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the maximum penalty provided by law.
Likewise, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused Jimmy Marantal has been established
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby finds him GUILTY of the crime of ROBBERY penalized
under Par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Jimmy Marantal is sentenced to
indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision
correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, in view of
the aggravating circumstances present.

Two pieces of necklace solid worth 400.00 Said accused Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal shall indemnify jointly and severally Elias
Monge in the sum of P10,619.50 without subsidiary imprisonment, In addition, Eustaquio
Two pieces of mosquito net 110.00 Loreno shall indemnify Monica Monge and Cristina Monge in the sum of P10,000.00 each or
a total of P20,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment.
Three pieces of blankets color orange and spotted 200.00
The accused herein shall pay one-half of the costs each. 2
Three men pants and also one cut of cloth 235.50
The facts of the case as stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief, areas follows:
One beach towel, with decoration 35.00
In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house located at
One aluminum Reynold kettle 30.00 barrio Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two young daughters, namely:
Monica Monge, single, then 14 years old, and Cristina Monge, married, then 22 years old,
One One caserola 15.00 were preparing to attend the dance to be held in the barrio proper that evening. But they
had to wait for a while because his wife, Beata Monge, was still changing the diaper of baby
Two pieces of pillow case 12.00 Rachel Baybayon, four-month old daughter of Cristina Monge. The other occupants present
in the house that evening were his sons, Mario, then 11 years old, and Nilo, then 13 years
Two cans of rice 70.00 old, and their farm helper, also staying with them, by the name of Francisco Fable. Cristina
was then vacationing at her parents' house. Her husband, Raymundo Baybayon, was in
One flashlight Eveready two batteries 30.00 Manila (pp. 2-5, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp, 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM: pp. 2-4, tsn, Oct. 19,
1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
TOTAL P10,619.50
At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while he was at the balcony of said house, Francisco
all in the total amount of TEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS and FIFTY Fable saw at first four men with flashlights approaching. When they came near, he heard one
CENTAVOS (P10,619.50), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the owner of them call Elias Monge saving that there was a letter from the chief hepe). Fable called Elias

15 | P a g e
Monge who was in the sala, informing him that there was a letter from the chief. Two of the
visitors, one wearing red clothes and the other in dark sweater. came up the house. When
Elias Monge went out to the balcony the man in dark sweater handed to him the letter.
Because it was dark to read it, Elias Monge invited the man in dark sweater to come inside
the sala. The other man in red clothes posted himself near the post of the balcony (pp. 4-5,
tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp. 4-9, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AMOUNT pp.
4-7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
When be and the man in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked his daughter,
Monica to fetch his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias Monge and Monica read the
following: "Kami mga NPA", which caused Monica to run to her mother, seized with fear,
informing her what she came to know about camme visitors. Cristina Morgagor came
attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo but she was held back by the man in dark
sweater who then announced to all those inside not to make any scandal. kitchen Elias
Monge turned to look at him the man in dark sweater poked his gun at him, and ordered all
those inside the on the floor (pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 Pvl p. 7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp.
4 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 4, 13, 16, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM)
In the meantime outside at the balcony the man in red clothe asked Fable for a glass of water
arid the latter asked Mario Monge to get the glass of later, but Mario did not obey and
instead went to the sala Hence, fabie himself outside inside the house to the the glass of
water. But, as he went inside the sala, he noticed the man in red clothes following him. As
Fabie reached the door to the sala, the man in red clothes poked his gun on Fabie's back and
pointed a sharp instrument on his neck and then he wish pushed to go inside the sala. Once
inside the sala, which Aras lighted, Fable saw and recognized the man in red clothes these to
Estaquio loreno. Also Elias Monge and his two daughters, Monica and Cristina, saw and
recognized Eustaquio Loreno as he entered the sala as one of the companions of the man in
dark sweater. All tile occupants of the house were ordered by the man in dark sweater and
Loreno to remain lying flat on their stomachs on the floor (pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp.
10-12, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 1-8, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM
pp. 5, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM p. 5, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed loreno to tie all their victims on the floor.
Loreno tied them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby's hammock (duyan) and
got the ropes with which he and Loreno used to reinforce in tying the victim's hands together
behind their backs. Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to go downstairs
and drive the barking dog away. Loreno held Fable and brought him downstairs to drive the
barking dog away (pp, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM).
On reaching the corner of the house below the flashlight used by Loreno happened to focus
on the person of Jimmy Marantal. Fable immediately recognized Jimmy Marantal as one of
the visitors who remained on the ground as lookouts. Jimmy Marantal beamed his flashlight
on the face of Fable, and seeing the latter, he kicked him (Fabie) on the right side of his rib
which caused him to fall on the ground. Marantal kicked Fable who managed to roll on his
side and was hit on his left thigh. After a while, Loreno lifted Fable bodily from the ground,
and brought am back upstairs (pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979
AM).
After Loreno and Fable returned to the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold of Monica
Monge and dragged her up to a room located above the balcony. She tried to resist but she
was then still tied, Inside the room, Monica was asked to reveal the whereabouts of her piggy
bank savings. She said there was none. He ransacked the room but found none. The man in
dark sweater then seized Monica and forcibly removed her pants. Monica resisted and
shouted at her parents for help. He boxed and slapped her. Despite her struggle, he was able
to remove her panty and then made her he on the floor near the bed. After undressing
himself, he forcibly went on top of her. She kept on struggling and shouting for help, but he
succeeded in inserting his organ into her vagina. She felt pain. He proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with her. She could not do anything to stop him from consummating his lust as
she was still tied. When he was through with her, she noticed blood in her private part (p. 9,
tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 5, 14, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Below in the sala, Monica Monge's parents and others heard her shouts for help and the
struggle she put up inside the room. Hearing her shouts for help, Loreno menacingly pointed
his gun at them, telling them not to rise if they wanted to live, Then Loreno brought Beata
Monge first to the masters room and then to the teacher's room. During these two
occasions, he forced Beata Monge to open the aparador and the trunk respectively, with her
keys, and he got their contents, which he brought to the sala, holding on to Beata Monge
who remained tied. All the things he got from the two rooms were poured on the floor of the
sala (pp. 7, 9, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 10-1 1, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 7-13, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp. 17-19, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater returned to the sala, dragging along Monica Monge
whose hair was dishevelled and was crying, and he made her joined the others on the floor of
the sala. He reached for a can of pineapple j nice from the aparador and the sala and drank
its contents. Not long thereafter, he turned his attention to Cristina Monge, and he dragged
her to the room which was then rented by school teacher Miss Olitoquit (who was then in
Naga City). Inside the room, the man in dark sweater forced his lewd designs on her but she
resisted and struggled although her hands were still tied behind her back. He boxed her,
hitting her on her right eye which caused her to lose consciousness. He then proceeded to
satisfy his lust on her. When she regained consciousness, the man in dark sweater returned
her shorts. She then realized that he had succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (p.
6, 17-19, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 7-8, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 11-12, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979
AM pp. 6, 14-15, 18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
While the man in dark sweater and Cristina Monge were still inside the teacher's room, a
third man entered the sala, and he told Loreno to cover their victims on the floor with a mat.
Loreno found instead a piece of lawanit with which they covered their victims. The third man
proceeded to the kitchen, and when he returned to the sala, he was bringing along some
rice. Then, a fourth man entered the sala and he asked from Elias Monge for a cigarette. Elias
Monge stood up and told him to get it from his pocket as he was still tied. Reacting to
Monge's reply, the fourth man boxed him, hitting him on his breast and solar plexus which
caused him to fall on the floor. Then Loreno asked Elias Monge to accompany him to the
house of a nearby neighbor. On reaching the balcony, Elias Monge protested and refused to
accompany Loreno who then held Elias Monge by the neck, pointing his gun at him. Beata
Monge protested, telling her husband not to go along. loreno desisted from his plan to go to
16 | P a g e
the nearby neighbor's house, Elias Monge did not recognize the Identities of both the third
and fourth men (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16-17, 25-26, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp.
12-13, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 7, 14-15, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter Loreno entered the room where Cristina Monge was earlier brought by the man in
dark sweater, and he found her still lying on the floor. Loreno embraced her trying to kiss her
and touch her private parts. One of the malefactors on the ground called those upstairs to
hurry because a man was approaching. Loreno then released Cristina Monge and told her to
return to the sala to breastfeed her daughter who was continuously crying. Thereafter, the
malefactors went down from the house one by one, bringing along all the things they robbed
from their victims. The man in dark sweater returned to the sala and touched the thighs of
Cristina Monge, who was already wearing her shorts, and he told them not to tell anybody
what happened to them, otherwise he will kill them. And then all the malefactors left the
place (pp. 15-16, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16, 18, 19-20, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Soon thereafter, Elias Monge heard Sixto Agapito who was On the ground near the fence of
the house calling him, asking if he was going to the dancehall Elias Monge replied from
upstairs that he was not feeling well, and Agapito left. EUSTAQUIO Monge was able to untie
himself, and then he also untied the others. Fable then revealed to him that earlier when he
had gone down with Loreno, he (Fabie) saw and recognized Jimmy Marantal as among those
left on the ground as lookout for the group that had just robbed them. Cristina and Monica
Monge also told their father that they were abused by the man in dark sweater when they
were brought inside the rooms. For the rest of the night, they remained on guard and could
hardly sleep (pp. 15-16, 17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 10-11, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they were robbed of their following personal
properties: jewelry valued at Pl,000.00' two mosquito nets, P70.00; three bets, P200.00; one
caldero of rice, P30.00; one reversible jacket, P40.00; three chickens, P30.00; one camera,
P400.00; one beach towel, P35.00; cash in the amount of P6,500,00; and several others, all in
the total of P10,305.00, more or less (pp. 4-6, 8, 14-17, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979; pp. 16-17, tsn, Oct.
18, 1979 AM).
Fabie had often seen and had known Loreno because the latter's daughter married a
member of the youth organization in the barrio when he (Fabie) was its president. Elias
Monge had already known Loreno whose occupation was catching wild pigs, and the latter
used to place bobby traps in his (Monge's) place to catch pigs, during which occasions Loreno
usually slept in his house, Monica Monge and Cristina Monge also had already known Loreno
because his daughter married a neighbor near their house. Monica often saw Loreno traverse
the playground of the Magsaysay Elementary School where he was studying. Fable had also
known Jimmy Marantal because the latter often attended dances held by the barrio youth
organization, and he (Marantal) even married one of its members, He had engaged Marantal
in conversations many times p. 3, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 2-
3, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 7-8, tsn, Oct. 18-1979 AM pp. 2-3, 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 PM pp. 2, 8-10, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Despite the revelation of her daughters to him that they were sexually abused that fateful
evening, Elias Monge forced himself to report the following day, Sunday the robbery-rape
incident at the PC detachment in Sipocot, but there was no one to talk there. So he
proceeded to the PC headquarters at Camp Tara, bringing along the ropes and rattan which
were used by the malefactors in tying him and his family during the robbery-rape incident.
He was given a written recommendation from the PC to the hospital with instructions to have
himself and his daughter Monica be physically examined. Cristina Monge was informed that
there was no need for her to submit for physical examination because she was already
married. (pp. 18-19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 18; tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM p. 8, tsn., Oct. 29,
1979 PM).
Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro, the chief of the investigation section of the 243rd PC Company,
stationed at Tara, Camarines Sur, investigated on January 10, 1978 the robbery-rape incident.
He was informed by Barangay Captain Elias Monge that his house was robbed and his two
daughters were raped by the robbers in the evening of January 7, 1978 in their house and
that he (Monge) was able to Identify two of the robbers, mentioning their names as
Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal of Barrio Calabnigan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. After
Sgt. del Socorro and his team made an ocular inspection of the place on that same day, they
proceeded to barrio Calabnigan where they picked up Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal
and brought them to the PC camp. At the PC camp on January 17, 1978, the two suspects
were duly Identified upon confrontation as two of the robbers by the above-mentioned
barrio captain, his daughters Monica and Cristina Monge, and their helper Fable. During the
investigation, the two suspects refused to give their written statements. Thus, Sgt. del
Socorro was able to secure the written statements of Elias Monge, Francisco Fable, Monica
Monge, and Cristina Monge about the robbery-rape incident. Upon being Identified both said
suspects told their victims ff they could just talk and settle the matter, but Elias Monge
replied that what they did that evening was an oppression (kaapihan) against him and his
family, The two suspects retorted that it was up to him (pp. 19-21, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp.
18-20, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 1-5, 6, 8- 12, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 AM).
Dr. Jesus H. Miraflores, resident physician of the Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital at Naga
City, examined Elias Monge on January 10, 1978. The X-Ray examination's result was
negative. But the doctor found him to have sustained an external injury which he classified as
"resolving hematoma, right cestal region" a close wound, already spread out but and the
process of healing, located on the right side of the middle portion of the thorax. He gave Elias
Monge a prescription for anti-infection to stop the bleeding as there was still slight bleeding
and to subside the swelling. Afterwards he gave the corresponding medical certificate to Elias
Monge (Exhibit "A"; pp. 22-26, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM p. 19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM
Dr. Erlie S. Cabral, another resident physician of the same provincial hospital examined
Monica Monge on January 10, 1978. The doctor did not find any fresh wound on her body,
but examining her hymen, she found fresh and incomplete lacerations of said hymen at 3:00
and 9:00 o'clock locations and, inserting her index finger inside her patient's sex orifice, lt
easily admitted her forefinger. She had the patient's vagina smeared for spermatozoa but
none was found after laboratory examination The doctor observed that the lacerations did
not reach the base of the hymen but the edges of the lacerated portions were still reddish
and slightly swollen. The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the
forcible penetration of a male's penis into the patient's vagina. The doctor further expeled
that the laceration of the hymen heals after five days. She also expeled that male
spermatozoa stays inside the female vagina at the most for 72 hours. She stated that,
17 | P a g e
admitting there was orgasm during the forcible sexual intercourse, any sperm must have
already disappeared when she examined Monica Monge on January 10, 1978 which was
already beyond 72 hours since she was raped in the evening of January 7, 1978 (pp. 26-28,
31, 33-34, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; Exhibit "B"). 3
Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal
or greater injury. They admitted that they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of
January 7, 1978, 4 but they were only forced by a man wearing black sweater and his five
companions who claimed to be members of the New People's Army (NPA), operating in the
locality, with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and their families would be
killed. We, however, find the contention untenable.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability
because he does not act with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere
instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of Appellee's Brief. death or serious bodily harm if the act is not
done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of Such a character as
to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 5
A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in their
joint brief (pp. 3-10), showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the
crimes of robbery and rape against Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further
established were facts inconsistent with appellant's claim of having acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, to wit:
1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and the man in dark
sweater went up the house of Elias Monge. While inside the house, Loreno pointed the gun
to the victims which enabled the malefactors to ransack the house (p. 38, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979
PM
2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater reached the balcony, Loreno
positioned himself next to the post in the balcony, while the man in dark sweater delivered
the letter to Elias Monge. Loreno admitted that, without prior instructions, he immediately
positioned himself near the post of the balcony (p. 10, tsn, Id.), an act which showed his
voluntary participation in the criminal acts.
3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan and thereafter, with ropes of the
hammock. Loreno in fact admitted that he was the one who furnished the rattan which he
got from inside the house (pp. 14-15, tsn, Id.).
4. When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for help from inside the room where
she was earlier dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno's immediate reaction was to
point his gun to the victims who were then lying on the floor, telling them not to rise if they
wanted to live (p. 38, tsn., Id.).
The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata
Monge to the master's room and the teacher's room where he made her open the trunk and
the "aparador" with her keys and got the contents which he brought and poured on the floor
of the sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat and assistance of the man in
dark sweater. And after the man in dark sweater consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in
the teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her
and tried to kiss and touch her private parts.
When Eustaquio Loreno and Francisco Fable went downstairs to drive the barking dog away,
the flashlight of Loreno happened to be focused on the face of Jimmy Marantal who in turn
beamed his flashlight on the approaching Fable. Upon seeing Fable, Jimmy Marantal kicked
the former twice causing him (Fabie) to fall to the ground. Marantal's reaction towards Fable
was due to the fact that Fable had recognized him and the blows which he gave to Fable who
was still tied at the moment was to serve as a warning to Fable not to report his presence
and participation in the robbery-rape incident to the authorities.
Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the
shouts of Monica Monge for help and must have known by then that Monica Monge was
being abused by his two companions who earlier went up the house. As a "lookout" or guard,
Jimmy Marantal gave his companions effective means and encouragement to commit the
crimes of robbery and rape. There was no showing that Jimmy Marantal raised a voice of
protest or did an act to prevent the commission of the crimes.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The
foregoing acts, though separately performed from those of their unidentified companions,
clearly showed their community of interest and concert of criminal design with their
unidentified companions which constituted conspiracy without the need of direct proof of
the conspiracy itself. 6 Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts of the accused
themselves and when said acts point to joint purpose and concert of action and community
of interest, which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to establish the existence of
conspiracy, 7 and the degree of actual participation petition by each of the conspirators is
immaterial. 8 Conspiracy having been establish, all the conspirators are liable as co-penpals
regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in contemplation of law,
the act of one is the act of all. 9
The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was combat muted on January 7, 1978, by
more than three persons, all armed, 10 in conspiracy with each other, attended by the
aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime and dwelling and is, under P.D. 767,
promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by death. But, for lack of the required number
of votes, the accused should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the accused cused JIMMY MARANTAL is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. With costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
18 | P a g e
Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and assigned to form part of the latter group, whose duty was to deliver letters and messages.
Cuevas, JJ., concur. Apparently, Felix Semañada was unhappy and discontented and oftenly scolded by his
parents, so he easily yielded to the propaganda of the Hukbalahap organization, for he did
Fernando, C.J., and Teehankee, J., took no part. not have the opportunity to obtain any academic schooling except up to Grade II.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave. On or about 6 o'clock in the evening of June 12, 1952, Felix, Semañada, then 19 years of age,
and in company of 2 Huks, i.e., Commanders Wennie and Heling, all armed, arrived at the
house of the spouses Serapio Villate and Nieves Magtibay, situated at barrio Sastre, Gumaca,
Separate Opinions Quezon, where they had a store. The couple were taking their supper when Felix Semañada
ordered Serapio Villate to go down and, apparently because the latter resisted the order, he
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: was brought down to a distance of about an arm's length from his house. Once there he was
seized and hogtied by Commanders Wennie and Heling with a string used for fishing. As his
Appellant Jimmy Marantal is guilty of robbery only no clear proof that he know Monge companions held the victim Semañada stabbed Villate several times with a sharp pointed
Monge was being raped and even if he did, he could not prevent it if he was on the ground bolo measuring about a palm's length (dangkal). The torture lasted for about 30 minutes
outside the house as look out. causing the victim to cry in agony "aroy, aroy". His wife, Nieves Magtibay, who hails from the
same barrio of Semañada, actually saw the stabbing from the opening of an upstair a window
and she ran to her husband's aid but she was not able to help him because of the 2 Huks that
were unknown to her, one of whom blocked her way while the other hit her with the butt of
his gun on the upper lip, as a result of which her upper lip was cut and she lost 3 front teeth.

After the killing of Serapio Villate, Felix Semañada and his companions went up the victims
house. There Semañada pushed Nieves Magtibay to a corner, threatened to kill her and
demanded from her the shotgun of the deceased. The three also ransacked the couples
wardrobe, after which they left with the shotgun valued at P250.00 and other merchandise
and money of a total value of P900. The widow also left the place to report the incident to
her brother-in-law Daniel Villate, who in turn reported the matter to the Philippine
Constabulary, and that same evening the authorities found the deceased Serapio Villate lying
dead, face downward and hogtied.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT A post-mortem examination of the cadaver disclosed that a total of 51 wounds were inflicted
Manila on the thorax and abdomen of the deceased, 50 of which were superficial and only one fatal,
for it penetrated the abdomen, with a depth of 5 inches, one inch long and one centimeter
EN BANC wide (Exhibit A).

G.R. No. L-11361 May 26, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIX SEMAÑADA, alias SEMAÑADA, alias COMMANDER DANTE, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Frine C. Zaballero for appellee.
Edgardo Z. Olivera for appellant.
FELIX, J.:
Sometime in 1950 Felix Semañada, alias Semañada, alias Commander Dante, a young boy of
17 years of age, joined the Hukbalahap organization, which was composed of 4 units, namely,
the organization, the contacting, the liquidation and the courier groups, and Semañada was
The widow, however, kept silent as to the identity of Felix Semañada as one of the
malefactors until he surrendered to the authorities in Nagcarlang, Laguna, on December 5,
1955. Upon learning that said Huk was already in the custody of the law, she revealed to the
authorities that the person who stabbed her husband to death in the evening of June 12,
1952, was Felix Semañada and explained that the reason for her long silence was her fear
that while Semañada were at large living in the mountains, she might be liquidated if he
would learn that a charge for murder was filed against him by the widow of the deceased.
Due to this revelation and after the corresponding investigation a complaint for "robbery in
band with murder" was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Gumaca, Quezon, against
Felix Semañada, alias Semañada, alias Commander Dante et al., without naming the said 2
other commanders who were still at large unidentified. After proper proceedings the Justice
of the Peace Court, convinced that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense imputed to him, remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Quezon where

19 | P a g e
the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding information this time against Felix Semañada,
alias Semañada, alias Commander Dante alone, charging him with the crime of robbery with
homicide, defined and punished by Article 294 in connection with Article 299 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 18.
Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty but after hearing the Court found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, defined and punished
under Article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, with the attendance of 3
aggravating circumstances with none mitigating to offset the same, and sentenced him to die
in the electric chair, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Serapio Villate in the sum of
P6,000.00 and to pay the further sum of P900.00, value of the cash and goods robbed from
the deceased, with costs.
Defendant did not appeal from this decision but this case was nevertheless, brought to this
Court under the provisions of Section 9 Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, for review and
judgment as law and justice shall dictate.
In this instance counsel for the defense maintains that the lower Court erred:
1. In holding that the accused-appellant Felix Semañada is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with murder, although the evidence of the prosecution is wholly
insufficient as it is improbable and contrary to common experience;
2. In giving weight and merit to the evidence of the prosecution to the effect that widow
Nieves Magtibay kept silent as to identify assailant until the accused surrendered to the
authorities for fear that she might be liquidated also by the accused with as living in the
mountain as a Hukbalahap;
3. In concluding that the wounds have been inflicted one by one, torturing the deceased for
one-half hour constituting all aggravating circumstance of cruelty, although there is no
evidence to support said conclusion;
4. In not extending to the accused-appellant the benefit of Article 12, paragraphs 5 and 6,
although the evidence shows that he acted under the influence of uncontrollable fear or
compulsion of an irresistible force;
5. In holding the accused-appellant liable for the acts of his companions when he had neither
knowledge of the intention to kill the deceased nor had he actually participated in its
commission; and
6. In not holding and extending to the accused the mitigating circumstances of (1) lack of
instruction; (2) for having acted under the influence of grave fear not entirely uncontrollable
under paragraph 1, article 13, in connection with paragraph 6 of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (3) voluntary surrender of the accused to the authorities on December 5,
1955, within paragraph 10, of article 13 of the Revised. Penal Code.
The version of the defendant as to the execution of the crime at bar is as follows:
On or about June 12, 1952, at about 3 o'clock p.m., while Felix Semañada was in barrio
Labnig, Gumaca, Quezon, waiting for letters to be delivered, Commanders Wennie and Heling
of the liquidation unit arrived. The 2 commanders ordered him to accompany them to barrio
Sastre, but he refused on the ground that as a courier he had his own duty to do, but the said
commanders took their firearms, pointed them toward him saying that he would be killed if
he refused to guide them to the house of Serapio Villate. He was told that they were just to
visit Serapio Villate without showing any intention of killing that man. Had he not been
forced to go to with them to barrio Sastre, he would not have gone with them. They arrived
at barrio Sastre at about 6 o'clock in the evening and when they were about 20 arm-length
away from the house of Serapio Villate, the 2 commanders Wennie and Heling ordered him
to stay guard near the road; while thus guarding alone, he could have escaped but he did not
for fear that if he did so he would be liquidated by the 2 notorious commanders and, beside
that, he had no reason to escape, as he was made to believe that they were going there only
for a visit. As a matter of fact, while thus guarding the road he heard neither cries nor shouts
from the house of Villate. On the other hand, he hold not have gone to town because he
would have been arrested by the army.
On December 5, 1955, in Nagcarlang, Laguna, upon realizing the evils of communism and
having grown up to understand the beauty of democracy, he surrender voluntarily to Sgt.
Regalado of the 26th B.C.T. He said that he wanted to live peacefully and to start a new life.
In consonance with this version defendant disclaims any criminal liability for the death of
Villate and the robbery in the latter's house. He admitted having been at the scene of the
crime at the time it was being committed, but he says that it was so, because he was under
the influence of a great fear. Consequently — counsel for the defense argues — that in so far
as the defendant is concerned, the circumstances of treachery and cruelty cannot be
appreciated against him, because the killing was not executed by him, aside from the fact
that the testimony of the widow Nieves Magtibay, who averred to have seen the defendant
stabbing the deceased for 30 minutes deserves no credence because from the opening of the
window thru which she allegedly was peeping, she was unable to see the defendant, specially
if it is considered, that her view was intercepted by at least 3 persons.
Counsel further maintains that even if convicted of the crime charged defendant is entitled to
the benefits of the mitigating circumstances of (1) lack of instruction; (2) having acted under
the influence of fear not entirely uncontrollable to be exempting under Article 12, paragraph
6 of the Revised Penal Code, but coming within the purview of Article 13 paragraph 1 of the
same legal body; and (3) voluntary surrender to the authorities on December 5, 1955, which
also may be considered as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 10 of the
Revised Penal Code, for it constitutes a circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to the
circumstance of voluntary surrender to a person in authority or agent covered, by paragraph
7 of said article 13.
Upon going over the evidence on record, We find no reason for the widow Nieves Magtibay
to testify falsely against the defendant herein and to impute to him the commission of so
heinous offense. She knew very well the defendant and was able to identify him fully. Any
way, the matter devolves into a case of credibility of witnesses and the trial judge, who had
the opportunity of observing their demeanor while testifying in his presence and is in a
20 | P a g e
better position than the appellate Court to gauge their credibility, has given full credence to
the testimony of said widow.

As to the circumstance of lack of instruction, the Solicitor General states that the test for the
mitigating circumstance is not illiteracy alone, but rather lack of sufficient intelligence
(People vs. Ripas, et al., * G.R. No. L-6246, promulgated May 28, 1954), and the record
discloses that far from his claim that he suffers from lack of instruction, he possesses an Republic of the Philippines
intelligence worthy of a lawyer considering his ability, for one unschooled, to distinguish SUPREME COURT
between implications and innuendos. At any rate, lack of instruction is not mitigating in cases Manila
of robbery (U.S. vs. Pascual, 9 Phil., 491; People vs. Melendrez, 59 Phil., 154; People vs. De la
Cruz, et al., 77 Phil., 44), although it might be under certain situations in cases of murder SECOND DIVISION
(People vs. Taluk, et al., 65 Phil., 696) and homicide (People vs. Hubero, 61 Phil., 64).
G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014
With respect to the alleged "uncontrollable fear or compulsion of an irresistible force", which
appellant says the lower court did not consider in his favor, the Government contends that PEOPLE OF THE :PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
the purported uncontrollable fear was a mere fabrication and that appellant was a willing vs.
participant in the criminal design. Moreover, fear or duress in order to be a valid defense, SHIRLEY A. CASIO, Accused-appellant.
should be based on real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's life or limb. It should not be
inspired by speculative, fanciful or remote fear. A person should not commit a very serious DECISION
crime on account of a flimsy fear (People vs. Quilloy, 88 Phil., 53), and the evidence on record
does not show that defendant really acted by such uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater LEONEN, J.:
injury.
"Chicks mo dong?"1
Anent the circumstance of voluntary surrender or of a similar or analogous circumstance We
hold that defendant cannot claim it in his favor in the case at bar, because he did not With this sadly familiar question being used on the streets of many of our cities, the fate of
surrender to the authority or its agents by reason of the commission of the crime for which many desperate women is sealed and their futures vanquished. This case resulted in the
he is herein prosecuted, but for being a Huk who wanted to come within the pale of the law rescue of two minors from this pernicious practice. Hopefully, there will be more rescues.
(see People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil., 27, 33-34). Trafficking in persons is a deplorable crime. It is committed even though the minor knew
about or consented to the act of trafficking.
On the strength of the foregoing considerations We find Felix Semañada, alias Semañada,
alias Commander Dante, guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide attended by the This case involves Republic Act No. 9208,2 otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in
aggravating circumstance of treachery (which include nocturnity and aid of superior Persons Act of 2003."3
strength), dwelling and cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly increasing the sufferings of the
victim. He should, therefore, be sentenced to the supreme penalty of death which, however, Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(a),
cannot be imposed upon him for lack of the required number of votes necessary for the qualified by Section 6(a). The information against accused, dated May 5, 2008, states:
imposition of said penalty.
That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 o’clock A.M., in the City of Cebu,
Wherefore, the decision of the lower Court rendered in this case and brought to Us in Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
consultation is hereby affirmed, although the penalty imposed upon the defendant is deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a minor, 17
lowered to life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua), in accordance with the provisions of the years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as their
last paragraph of Section 9 of Republic Act. 296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, with the procurer for different customers, for money, profit or any other consideration, in Violation of
corresponding accessories of the law and the payment of the costs. It is so ordered. Sec. 4, Par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. (a), of R.A. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, CONTRARY TO LAW.4
J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

21 | P a g e
On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM),5 a nongovernmental organization,
coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu
City.6
Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and
PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed the team of police operatives.7 PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso
were designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their
guests.8 IJM provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter.9
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. These rooms were
adjacent to each other. Room 24 was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for
the rest of the police team.10
PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu
City’s red light district. Accused noticed them and called their attention by saying "Chicks mo
dong?" (Do you like girls, guys?).11
During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their conversation with accused went
as follows:
Accused: Chicks mo dong?(Do you like girls, guys?)
PO1 Luardo: Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests naghulat sa motel. (Are
they new? They must be young because we have guests waiting at the motel.)
Accused: Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I’ll get them.)12
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that they found a prospective
subject.13
After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private complainants in this
case.14 Accused: Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)
PO1 Veloso: Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are they good in sex?)15
Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1 Luardo inquired how much
their serviceswould cost. Accused replied, "Tag kinientos" (₱500.00).16
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with them to Queensland Motel.
Upon proceeding toRoom 24, PO1 Veloso handed the marked money to accused.17
As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a missed call. This was their pre-
arranged signal. The rest of the team proceeded to Room 24, arrested accused, and informed
her of her constitutional rights. The police confiscated the marked money from accused.18
Meanwhile, AAA and BBB "were brought to Room 25 and placed in the custody of the
representatives from the IJM and the DSWD."19
During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, 1991. This statement was
supported by a copy of her certificate of live birth.20
AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house helper in Mandaue City. In March 2008
she stopped working as a house helper and transferred to Cebu City. She stayed with her
cousin, but she subsequently moved to a boarding house. It was there where she met her
friend, Gee Ann. AAA knew that Gee Ann worked in a disco club. When Gee Ann found out
that AAA was no longer a virgin, she offered AAA work. AAA agreed because she needed the
money in order to helpher father. AAA recalled that she had sex with her first customer. She
was paid ₱200.00 and given an additional ₱500.00 as tip. For the first few weeks, Gee Ann
provided customers for AAA. Eventually, Gee Ann brought her to Barangay Kamagayan,
telling her that there were more customers in that area.21
AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because AAA would usually see her pimping
girls to customers in Barangay Kamagayan.22 AAA further testified that on May 2, 2008,
accused solicited her services for a customer. That was the first time that she was pimped by
accused.23 Accused brought her, BBB, and a certain Jocelyn to Queensland Motel.24
AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed inthe taxi, while she and BBB went to Room 24. It was in
Room 24 where the customer paid Shirley. The police rushed in and toldAAA and BBB to go
to the other room. AAA was then met by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
personnel who informed her that she was rescued and not arrested.25
AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display herself, along with other
girls, between 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. She received ₱400.00 for every customer who selected her.26
The prosecution also presented the police operatives during trial. PSI Ylanan, SPO1
Mendaros, and SPO1 Altubar testified that after PO1 Veloso had made the missed call to PSI
Ylanan, they "rushed to Room 24 and arrested the accused."27 SPO1 Altubar retrieved the
marked money worth ₱1,000.00 from accused’s right hand "and upon instruction from
PCINSP Ylanan recorded the same at the ‘police blotter prior operation’. . . ."28
The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from the IJM "in conducting the
operation against the accused."29
Version of the accused
In defense, accused testified thatshe worked as a laundry woman. On the evening of May 2,
2008, she went out to buy supper. While walking, she was stopped by two men on board a
blue car. The two men asked her if she knew someone named Bingbing. She replied that she
only knew Gingging but not Bingbing. The men informed her that they were actually looking
for Gingging, gave her a piece of paper witha number written on it, and told her to tell
Gingging to bring companions. When accused arrived home, she contacted Gingging.
Gingging convinced her to come because allegedly, she would be given money by the two
males.30 Ruling of the trial court
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and held31 that:
22 | P a g e
Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . . as defined under paragraph
(a), Section 3 of R.A. 9208 for the purpose of letting her engage in prostitution asdefined
under paragraph [c] of the same Section; the act of "sexual intercourse" need not have been
consummated for the mere "transaction" i.e. the ‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of
the "bust money" of Php1,000.00 already consummated the said act.
....
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A. CASIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
trafficking in persons under paragraph (a), Section 4 as qualified under paragraph (a), Section
6 of R.A. 9208 and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS and to pay a fine
of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00).
Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.
SO ORDERED[.]32
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the fine and
awarded moral damages. The dispositive portion of the decision33 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated 10 August 2010 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14
in Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CBU-83122 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The accused-
appellant is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Php2,000,000 and is ordered to pay each of the private complainants Php150,000 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.34
Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013, which the Court of Appeals noted and
gavedue course in its resolution36 dated January 6, 2014. The case records of CA-G.R. CEB-CR
No. 01490 were received by this court on March 17, 2014.37
In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to notify the parties that they
may file their respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. This court also
required the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women to confirm the
confinement of accused.39
Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor General41 filed their respective
manifestations, stating that they would no longer file supplemental briefs considering that all
issues had been discussed in the appellant’s brief and appellee’s brief filed before the Court
of Appeals. Through a letter42 dated June 17, 2014, Superintendent IV Rachel D. Ruelo
confirmed accused’s confinement at the Correctional Institution for Women since October
27, 2010.
The sole issue raised by accused iswhether the prosecution was able to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
However, based on the arguments raised in accused’s brief, the sole issue may be dissected
into the following:
(1) Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid, considering that
there was no prior surveillance and the police did not know the subject of the operation;43
(2) Whether the prosecution was able to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
even though there was no evidence presented to show that accused has a history of
engaging in human trafficking;44 and
(3) Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering that AAA
admitted that she works as a prostitute.45
Arguments of accused
Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was instigated into
committing the crime.46 The police did not conduct prior surveillance and did not evenknow
who their subject was.47 Neither did the police know the identities of the alleged victims.
Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should be acquitted because the
prosecution did notpresent evidence that would prove she had a history of engaging in
human trafficking or any other offense. She denied being a pimp and asserted that she was a
laundry woman.48 In addition, AAA admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was
her decision to display herself to solicit customers.49
Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee
The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines,
argued that the trial court did not err in convicting accused because witnesses positively
identified her as the person who solicited customers and received money for AAA and BBB.50
Entrapment operations are valid and have been recognized by courts.51 Likewise, her arrest
in flagrante delicto is valid.52 Hence, the trial court was correct in stating that accused had
"fully consummated the act of trafficking of persons. . ."53
We affirm accused Shirley A. Casio’s conviction.
I.
Background of Republic Act No. 9208
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN CTOC) was
"adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession"54 on November 15, 2000.
The UN CTOC is supplemented by three protocols: (1) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; (2) the Protocol against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol against the Illicit
23 | P a g e
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and
Ammunition.55
On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations "Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children" (Trafficking
Protocol).56 This was ratified by the Philippine Senate on September 30, 2001.57 The
Trafficking Protocol’s entry into force was on December 25, 2003.58
In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined as:
Article 3 Use of terms For the purposes of this Protocol:
(a) "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring
or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs;
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in
subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in
subparagraph (a) have been used;
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose
of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in persons" even if this does not involve any of
the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;
(d) "Child" shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that the "Anti-Trafficking Act will
serve as the enabling law of the country’s commitment to [the] protocol."59
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship speech and described trafficking
in persons as follows:
Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of its hideousness, is
tantamount to modern-day slavery at work. It is a manifestation of one of the most flagrant
forms of violence against human beings. Its victims suffer the brunt of this insidious form of
violence. It is exploitation, coercion, deception, abduction, rape, physical, mental and other
forms of abuse, prostitution, forced labor, and indentured servitude.
....
As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women; the 1995 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the United
Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families; and the United
Nations’ Resolution on Trafficking in Women and Girls, among others.
Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United Nations’ Convention Against
Organized Crime, including the Trafficking Protocol in October last year.
At first glance, it appears thatwe are very responsive to the problem. So it seems.
Despite these international agreements, we have yet to come up with a law that shall
squarely address human trafficking.60
During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then numbered as Senate Bill No. 2444,
Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta asked if there was a necessity for an anti-trafficking law when
other laws exist that cover trafficking.61
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada explained:
At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking issue are the Revised Penal
Code, Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, R[epublic]
A[ct] No. 6955 or the Mail-Order Bride Act, and Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine
Passport Act. These laws address issues such as illegal recruitment, prostitution, falsification
of public documents and the mail-order bride scheme. These laws do not respond to the
issue of recruiting, harboring or transporting persons resulting in prostitution, forced labor,
slavery and slavery-like practices. They only address to one or some elements of trafficking
independent of their results or consequence.62 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address the issue of human
trafficking. Republic Act No. 9208 was passed on May 12, 2003, and approved on May 26,
2003.
II.
Elements of trafficking in persons
The elements of trafficking inpersons can be derived from its definition under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 9208, thus:
(1) The actof "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with
or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders."
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs."63
24 | P a g e

On January 28, 2013,Republic Act No. 1036464 was approved, otherwise known as the
"Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012." Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 was
amended by Republic Act No. 10364 as follows:
SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
"(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat, or use
of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person
for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
"The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for
exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not
involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to
include the following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders;"
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person"
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs" (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals found thatAAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their services
were peddled to the police who acted as decoys.65 AAA was a child at the time that accused
peddled her services.66 AAA also stated that she agreed to work as a prostitute because she
needed money.67 Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as one who
need money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.68
III.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.
Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even before May 2, 2008. She
concludes that AAA was predisposed to having sex with "customers" for money.69 For
liability under our law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still becommitted even if the victim gives consent.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— As used in this Act:
a. Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or
receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes ata
minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any
of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.70 (Emphasis supplied)
The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive
means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking.71 Even without the use of coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given outof his or her own free will.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts of trafficking in persons.
Accused was charged under Section 4(a), which states:
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons.— It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or judicial,
to commit any of the following acts.
a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including
those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;72
Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of trafficking in
persons is qualified.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons.— The following are considered as qualified
trafficking: a. When the trafficked person is a child;
b. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the
"Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995" and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation,forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt
bondage;
25 | P a g e
c. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against
three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
d. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercise
authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or
employee;
e. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the
military or law enforcement agencies;
f. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and
g. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies,
becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunod eficiency Virus (HIV)
or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). (Emphasis supplied)73
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines "child" as:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— As used in this Act:
....
b. Child- refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18)
but isunable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.74
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of trafficking in
persons, accused performed all the elements in the commission of the offense when she
peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in
exchange for money. The offense was also qualified because the trafficked persons were
minors.
Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for the customers waiting at
Queensland Motel. AAA also testified that she was only 17 years old when accused peddled
her. Her certificate of live birth was presented as evidence to show that she was born on
January 27, 1991.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused committed the
offense of trafficking in persons, qualified by the fact that one of the victims was a child. As
held by the trial court:
[T]he act of "sexual intercourse" need not have been consummated for the mere
"transaction" i.e. that ‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the "bust money" of
Php.1,000.00 already consummated the said act.75
IV.
Validity of the entrapment operation
In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective test and the subjective test to
determine whether there was a valid entrapment operation:
. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of
intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States to determine whether entrapment actually
occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense
charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.
All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses,
activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to
assess his state of mind before the crime. The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's
propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct and reflects an
attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary
criminal." If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at
any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent usedan
unduly persuasive inducement.
Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test. . . . Here, the court considers the
nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry is
focused on the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the
accused and his predisposition to commit the crime.For the goal of the defense is to deter
unlawful police conduct. The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law
enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is
ready and willing, to commit the offense; for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-
abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by
the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)77
Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply the objective test in
determining the whether there was an entrapment operation or an instigation.78 However,
the use of the objective test should not preclude courts from also applying the subjective
test. She pointed out that:
Applying the "subjective"test it is worth invoking that accusedappellant procures income
from being a laundry woman. The prosecution had not shown any proof evidencing accused-
appellant’s history in human trafficking or engagement in any offense. She is not even
familiar to the team who had has [sic] been apprehending human traffickers for quite some
time.79 (Citations omitted)
Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a prior surveillance before the
entrapment operation.
Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between entrapment and instigation.
In Chang v. People,80 this court explained that:
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the
apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation
26 | P a g e
when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two
lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens reaoriginates from the mind
of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation,
the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who
adopts the idea and carries it into execution.81
Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly instigated by the police to
commit the offense. She denied being a pimp and claimed that she earned her living as a
laundrywoman. On this argument, we agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals:
[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction with PO1 Luardo and PO1
Veloso by calling their attention on whether they wanted girls for that evening, and when the
officers responded, it was the accused-appellant who told them to wait while she would
fetch the girls for their perusal.82
This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she initiated the
transaction. As testified by PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo, accused called out their attention by
saying "Chicks mo dong?" If accused had no predisposition to commit the offense, then she
most likely would not have asked PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo if they wanted girls.
The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The police merely proceeded to
D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan. It was accused who asked them whether they
wanted girls. There was no illicit inducement on the part of the police for the accused to
commit the crime.
When accused was arrested, she was informed of her constitutional rights.83 The marked
money retrieved from her was recorded in the police blotter prior to the entrapment
operation and was presented in court as evidence.84
On accused’s alibi thatshe was merely out to buy her supper that night, the Court of Appeals
noted that accused never presented Gingging in court. Thus, her alibi was unsubstantiated
and cannot be given credence.85
With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a condition for an
entrapment operation’s validity.86 In People v. Padua87 this court underscored the value of
flexibility in police operations:
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust
operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good
police work. However the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as long as the rights
of the accused have not been violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom
thereof. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the
need for prior surveillance.88 (Citations omitted)
This flexibility is even more important in cases involving trafficking of persons. The urgency of
rescuing the victims may at times require immediate but deliberate action on the part of the
law enforcers.
V.
Imposition of fine and award of damages
The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of 2,000,000.00. Section 10 (b) of
Republic Act No. 9208 provides that:
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions.— The following penalties and sanctions are hereby
established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:
....
c. Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (₱2,000,000.00) but not more
than Five million pesos (₱5,000,000.00);
However, we modify by raising the award of moral damages from ₱150,000.0089 to
₱500,000.00. We also award exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00. These
amounts are in accordance with the ruling in People v. Lalli90 where this court held that:
The payment of ₱500,000 as moral damages and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages for the
crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code,
which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
....
27 | P a g e
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes
of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a
prostitute without one’s consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a day by
different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in
Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a
syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise justified.91

Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of poverty and its accompanying
desperation that compels our women to endure indignities. It reflects the weaknesses of that
society even as it convicts those who deviantly thrive in such hopelessness. We should
continue to strive for the best of our world, where our choices of human intimacies are real
choices, and not the last resort taken just to survive. Human intimacies enhance our best and
closest relationships. It serves as a foundation for two human beings to face life’s joys and
challenges while continually growing together with many shared experiences. The quality of
our human relationships defines the world that we create also for others.

Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, we affirm the text
and spirit of our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence moulding their character in
environments free of the vilest motives and the worse of other human beings. The evidence
and the law compel us to affirm the conviction of accused in this case.

But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our duties, we also express the hope that
our people and our government unite against everything inhuman. We contribute to a
commitment to finally stamp out slavery and human trafficking.

There are more AAA's and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to be rescued. They, too, need
to be shown that in spite of what their lives have been, there is still much good in our world.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated Republic of the Philippines
June 27, 2013, finding accused Shirley A. Casio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating SUPREME COURT
Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, and sentencing her to suffer Manila
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱2,000,000.00, with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate SECOND DIVISION
Sentence Law) in accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.92

The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows: G.R. No. 171951 August 28, 2009

Accused is ordered to pay each of the private complainants: AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, Petitioner,

(1) ₱500,000.00 as moral damages; and vs.

(2) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

SO ORDERED.
DECISION

28 | P a g e
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the Decision[2] dated July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado Garcia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide. Contested as well is the appellate courts Resolution[3] dated
March 13, 2006 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[4]
On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an Information that alleges as
follows:
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA @ Manding of the crime of
Murder, defined and penalized under Article [248] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
bottle, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, box, club and maul one Manuel K. Chy,
inflicting upon the latter fatal injuries which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel Foz, Jr. and Armando
Foz had a drinking spree at the apartment unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the
house of Manuel K. Chy. At around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for the group to quiet down as
the noise from the videoke machine was blaring. It was not until Chy requested a second
time that the group acceded. Unknown to Chy, this left petitioner irate and petitioner was
heard to have said in the Ilocano vernacular, Dayta a Manny napangas makaala caniac dayta.
(This Manny is arrogant, I will lay a hand on him.)[6]
On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of Ador Tacuboy not
far from Chys apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the group to stop singing lest they be told
off again. This further infuriated petitioner who remarked, Talaga a napangas ni Manny saan
ko a pagbayagen daytoy, meaning, This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live
long.[7]
Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group convened at the house of
Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr. and Fred Rillon mused over the drinking session on
the 26th and 28th of September and the confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the memory,
petitioner blurted out Talaga a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita. (This
Manny is really arrogant, I will finish him off today.)[8] Later that afternoon, the group
headed to the store of Adela dela Cruz where they drank until petitioner proposed that they
move to Punta. On their way to Punta, the group passed by the store of Aurelia Esquibel,
Chys sister, and there, decided to have some drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who, incidentally, was coming out
of his house at the time. Upon being summoned, the latter approached petitioner who
suddenly punched him in the face. Chy cried out, Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka naman
[inaano]? (Why did you box me[?] Im not doing anything to you.)[9] But petitioner kept on
assaulting him. Foz attempted to pacify petitioner but was himself hit on the nose while Chy
continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the
lower back portion of Chys head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house and phoned his wife
Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the mauling and complained of difficulty in
breathing. Upon reaching Chys house, the policemen knocked five times but nobody
answered. Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious
on the kitchen floor, salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The
autopsy confirmed that Chy died of myocardial infarction.
After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9) found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of HOMICIDE
defined and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and after applying in his favor
the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum;
2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
PESOS, as death indemnity; TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, representing
expenses for the wake and burial; THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS, as
moral damages; and THREE HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND (P332,000.00] PESOS, as
loss of earning, plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision dated December 20,
2005, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and the July 2, 2003 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal Case No. 08-1185, is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in a Resolution dated March
13, 2006.
Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:
I.
29 | P a g e
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
PETITIONER IS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING THE SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED MANUEL CHY.
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING
PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MANUEL CHY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CAUSE OF
DEATH IS MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, A NON-VIOLENT RELATED CAUSE OF DEATH.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH
CONCLUDED THAT THE HEART FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY WAS DUE TO FRIGHT OR SHOCK
CAUSED BY THE MALTREATMENT.
IV.
BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of Manuel Chy.
In his undated Memorandum,[13] petitioner insists on a review of the factual findings of the
trial court because the judge who penned the decision was not the same judge who heard
the prosecution evidence. He adds that the Court of Appeals had wrongly inferred from,
misread and overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.[14]
At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he implicates Armando
Foz as the author of the victims injuries. Corollarily, he challenges the credibility of Armandos
brother, Fidel, who testified concerning his sole culpability. Basically, petitioner disowns
responsibility for Chys demise since the latter was found to have died of myocardial
infarction. In support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio[15] that Chys
medical condition could have resulted in his death anytime. Petitioner asserts that, at most,
he could be held liable for slight physical injuries because none of the blows he inflicted on
Chy was fatal.
The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial courts assessment of the witnesses and
its conclusion that the beating of Chy was the proximate cause of his death.
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution as well as the
defense in this case, we are unable to consider the petitioners appeal with favor.
The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, yet, petitioner raises
questions of fact. Indeed, it is opportune to reiterate that this Court is not the proper forum
from which to secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, save where the factual findings of the
trial court do not find support in the evidence on record or where the judgment appealed
from was based on a misapprehension of facts.[16] Neither exception applies in the instant
case as would justify a departure from the established rule.
Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on non-interference with the
determination of the credibility of witnesses. He points out that the judge who penned the
decision is not the judge who received the evidence and heard the witnesses. But while the
situation obtains in this case, the exception does not. The records reveal that Judge Conrado
F. Manauis inhibited from the proceedings upon motion of no less than the petitioner
himself. Consequently, petitioner cannot seek protection from the alleged adverse
consequence his own doing might have caused. For us to allow petitioner relief based on this
argument would be to sanction a travesty of the Rules which was designed to further, rather
than subdue, the ends of justice.
We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the
ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. It does not
follow that the judge who was not present during the trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot
render a valid and just decision.[17] Here, Judge Andres Q. Cipriano took over the case after
Judge Manauis recused himself from the proceedings. Even so, Judge Cipriano not only heard
the evidence for the defense, he also had an opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas Antonio who
was recalled to clarify certain points in his testimony. Worth mentioning, too, is the fact that
Judge Cipriano presided during the taking of the testimonies of Fidel Foz, Jr. and Alvin Pascua
on rebuttal.
In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its entirety to decide it on
the basis of the records on hand.[18] He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and
calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to common
experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate
substantive and procedural due process of law.[19]
The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the following injuries:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body embalmed, well preserved.
Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.
Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of the left ear; 4.0 x 2.8 cms., left
inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1 cms., upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms., lower lip; 5.8 x 5.5 cms.,
dorsum of left hand.
Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of the upper lip on the right side.
No fractures noted.
Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No hemorrhage noted.
Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut sections show a reddish
brown myocardium with an area of hyperemia on the whole posterior wall, the lower portion
of the anterior wall and the inferior portion of the septum. Coronary arteries, gritty, with the
caliber of the lumen reduced by approximately thirty (30%) percent. Histopathological
findings show mild fibrosis of the myocardium.
30 | P a g e

Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark red to dark purple. Cut sections
show a gray periphery with reddish brown central portion with fluid oozing on pressure with
some reddish frothy materials noted. Histopathological examinations show pulmonary
edema and hemorrhages.
Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show congestion. Histopathological
examinations show mild lymphocytic infiltration.
The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the myocardium[27] caused by a
previous heart attack. Said fibrosis[28] or formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered
the middle and thickest layer of the victims heart less elastic and vulnerable to coronary
occlusion from sudden emotion. This causation is elucidated by the testimony of Dr. Antonio:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the part of the victim, Doctor?

Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish materials and other partially digested A: Yes, sir.
food particles.
Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on the mouth and[/]or hitting
CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)[20] on the nape by a bottle?

At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his undated Memorandum, A: Yes, sir.
however, he admitted inflicting injuries on the deceased, albeit, limited his liability to slight
physical injuries. He argues that the superficial wounds sustained by Chy did not cause his Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by emotional crisis, Doctor?
death.[21] Quite the opposite, however, a conscientious analysis of the records would
acquaint us with the causal connection between the death of the victim and the mauling that A: Yes, sir.
preceded it. In open court, Dr. Antonio identified the immediate cause of Chys myocardial
infarction: Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so fast, so much so, that there
was less oxygen being pumped by the heart?
ATTY. TUMARU:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial infarction that is because there was
an occlusion in the artery that prevented the flowing of blood into the heart? Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor?

A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes, the hyperemic changes [in] A: Yes, sir, it could be.[29]
the heart muscle were the one[s] that made us [think] or gave strong conclusion that it was
myocardial infarction, and most likely the cause is occlusion of the blood vessels itself. In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as follows:
(Emphasis supplied.)[22] ATTY. CALASAN:

By definition, coronary occlusion[23] is the complete obstruction of an artery of the heart, Q: I will repeat the question Dr. Antonio testified that the deceased died because of the blow
usually from progressive arteriosclerosis[24] or the thickening and loss of elasticity of the that was inflicted, it triggered the death of the deceased, do you agree with his findings,
arterial walls. This can result from sudden emotion in a person with an existing Doctor?
arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a heart attack will not occur.[25] Dr.
A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.
Jessica Romero testified on direct examination relative to this point:
Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?
ATTY. CALASAN:
A: It could be, sir.
Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?
Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?
A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,] considering that the
patient [does] not have any previous [illness] of hypertension, no previous history of A: Yes, sir.[30]
myocardial [ischemia], no previous [arteriosis] or hardening of the arteries, then excitement
[cannot] cause myocardial infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)[26] It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the emotional strain from
the beating aggravated Chys delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable

31 | P a g e
conclusion then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. The essential requisites for the application of this provision are: (a) the
intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended
albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors wrongful acts.[31]
In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a
bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter
petitioners liability for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine laid down in
the case of United States v. Brobst[32] that:
x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact
that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does
not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.[33]
In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez[34] enunciates that:
x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady, if,
because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond
peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration as the
result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury. (Emphasis supplied.)[35]
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from the one
he intended;[36] el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado (he who is the cause of
the cause is the cause of the evil caused).[37] Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did not
intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability.
Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his
guilt in accordance with Article 13(3)[38] of the Revised Penal Code.[39] Nevertheless, we
must appreciate as mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical
injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have resulted naturally and logically, in the actual
death of the victim, if the latters heart was in good condition.
Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed without any aggravating
circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is,
reclusion temporal in its minimum period,[40]or anywhere from twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to fourteen years (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law,[41] the trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty
of ten (10) years of prisin mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel Chy for his loss of
earning capacity in the amount of P332,000. In fixing the indemnity, the victims actual
income at the time of death and probable life expectancy are taken into account. For this
purpose, the Court adopts the formula used in People v. Malinao:[42]
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of the
the victim at the annual net income which time of this death) would have been received
by the heirs for support.[43]
Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the salary which Manuel Chy was
receiving as a sheriff of the court. At the time of his death, Chy was 51 years old and was
earning a gross monthly income of P10,600 or a gross annual income of P127,200. But, in
view of the victims delicate condition, the trial court reduced his life expectancy to 10 years.
It also deducted P7,000 from Chys salary as reasonable living expense. However, the records
are bereft of showing that the heirs of Chy submitted evidence to substantiate actual living
expenses. And in the absence of proof of living expenses, jurisprudence[44] approximates net
income to be 50% of the gross income. Accordingly, by reason of his death, the heirs of
Manuel Chy should be awarded P1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity, computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-51) x [P127,200 - (P127,200)]
= 2/3 x (29) x P63,600
= 19 1/3 x P63,600
= P1,229,600
We sustain the trial courts grant of funerary expense of P200,000 as stipulated by the
parties[45] and civil indemnity of P50,000.[46] Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory
in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death
of the victim.[47] However, in obedience to the controlling case law, the amount of moral
damages should be reduced to P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution dated March 13,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000. Petitioner is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Manuel K. Chy P50,000 as civil indemnity; P200,000, representing
expenses for the wake and burial; and P1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
32 | P a g e
 years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to pay private
offended party P19,361.15 as actual damages and P10,000 as attorney’s fee.

The Information against petitioner reads:

On October 4, 1998, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, at Sitio Puntod, Barangay Balagnan,
Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault, and stab one Roy Mangaya-ay with the use of a bolo, thus, inflicting a mortal
wound on the abdomen of the latter; accused thereby performed all the acts of execution
which would have produced the felony of Homicide which was not produced because of the
timely and effective medical attendance administered on the said victim.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249, in relation with Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code.3

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty and trial thereafter ensued.

The facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and borne by the records, are as follows:

In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, petitioner Arturo Romera was with the victim, Roy
Mangaya-ay, and five other men namely, Eligario "Beboy" Acenas, Dennis "Bobong"
Republic of the Philippines Mangaya-ay, Ric Mangaya-ay, Bebing Zulueta and Franklin Generol. They were all headed for
SUPREME COURT Biasong to play volleyball. When they reached Biasong, it was raining, so they decided to
Manila while away time at the house of Ciriaca Capil. Franklin Generol hung a string made of
cigarette foil on Bebing Zulueta’s pants and said, "There’s a monkey among us." Everybody
SECOND DIVISION laughed except Roy Mangaya-ay, who got angry and chided Franklin Generol to stop lest he
make enemies. Bebing Zulueta also got angry and pointed a finger at Franklin Generol and
G.R. No. 151978 July 14, 2004 said, "Even if you are stronger and older, if you will be hit by my fist, you will crawl."
Petitioner then stood up and warned everyone, "You all watch out in Balaguan." He pulled
ARTURO ROMERA, petitioner, Franklin Generol to join him and said, "Let’s go, there are many boastful people here."
Thereafter, petitioner and Franklin left the group.
vs.
At six o’clock in the evening, Roy and his companions arrived in Balaguan. On their way
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. home, they passed by the house of one Antonio Mangaya-ay. In said house, which is about
one kilometer away from petitioner’s own, they saw petitioner already carrying a bolo
waiting for them.
DECISION
Suddenly, raising the bolo with his right hand, petitioner uttered, "Here are the brave ones."
Roy and his companions ran away but Roy slipped on the muddy ground. Petitioner
QUISUMBING, J.: approached Roy and said, "Come here, brave one." He held Roy up by the collar and stabbed
him in the stomach. Roy fell unconscious. When he woke up, he found himself at the
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals, in provincial hospital where he underwent surgery and stayed for more than three weeks.
CA-G.R. CR. No. 23753, affirming the August 16, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, in Criminal Case No. 98-1089. The RTC convicted petitioner After the stabbing incident, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to a certain Tibo Ramoso of
Arturo Romera of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from one the Citizen’s Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU). Ramoso accompanied petitioner to the
(1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) Balingasay police station.

33 | P a g e
For his part, petitioner testified on what happened as follows:
Petitioner and his family were having dinner in their house at around seven o’clock in the
evening. Thereafter, they went to bed. While lying in bed, they heard Roy call petitioner and
his wife, asking if they had beer and a fighter for sale. He did not answer Roy because he
knew that Roy was already drunk. Roy asked for petitioner but when the latter’s wife told
him that petitioner was already asleep, he told her to wake her husband up. Petitioner went
down the house and asked who was at the door. Just as he opened the door for Roy, Roy
thrust his bolo at him. He successfully parried the bolo and asked Roy what it was all about.
Roy answered he would kill petitioner. Petitioner tried to prevent Roy from entering, so he
pushed the door shut. As Roy was hacking at the wall, petitioner’s wife held the door to allow
petitioner to exit in another door to face Roy. He hurled a stone at Roy, who dodged it. Roy
rushed to him and hacked him, but he parried the blow. Petitioner grappled for the bolo and
stabbed Roy in the stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness. According to
petitioner, he ceased harming Roy for fear he might kill him.
The trial court discounted petitioner’s story of self-defense. It found that when petitioner got
hold of the bolo, there was no more danger to his life. Petitioner was convicted of frustrated
homicide. The dispositive part of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused ARTURO
ROMERA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the offense charged. Consequently,
taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the
provisions of the [I]ndeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to a penalty ranging
from One (1) year Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days of Prision Correccional as minimum
to Six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay the private offended
party as actual damages, P19,361.15 and another sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fee
without, however, subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning to the trial court the following
assignments of error:
1. FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE THEORY OF SELF DEFENSE.
2. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPRECIATE SPECIAL PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF DEFENSE, ARTICLE 69, REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH
LOWER THE PENALTY BY TWO DEGREES.
3. FURTHER ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPLY ARTICLE 62 (5) REVISED PENAL CODE, WHICH
LOWER THE PENALTY BY ONE DEGREE LOWER WITH THE PRESENCE OF TWO OR MORE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.5
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It pointed out that assuming
arguendo that it was the victim who was the aggressor at the start, the unlawful aggression
ceased to exist when petitioner took possession of the bolo from the victim. Absent unlawful
aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense becomes unavailing.
The appellate court also ruled that Article 696 of the Revised Penal Code finds no application
in this case. It explained that there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless
the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. It held,
however, that petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as
it was established during trial that after the incident he surrendered himself to the CAFGU
and later on to the police authorities.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground that both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals erroneously failed to apply Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code, which lowers the imposable penalty by one degree when two or more mitigating
circumstances are present.
Petitioner contends that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger when the latter woke him
up and thrust a bolo at him without warning as petitioner opened the door. Moreover, by
hacking and destroying the bamboo wall of his house, and endangering the lives of his
children, the victim also obfuscated his thinking and reasoning processes, says the petitioner.
For public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the mitigating
circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation are unavailing to petitioner since it
was he who initiated the attack. The OSG insists that it was not the victim who went to
petitioner’s house, but petitioner who went to where the victim was resting.
We note that while both the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not categorically state who
started the attack, it can be reasonably gleaned from their decisions that it was the victim
who initiated the aggressive encounter. This finding of fact is amply supported by the
evidence on record.
Are the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation present in this
case?
Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his
house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and
obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger.
Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while petitioner was still
in a fit of rage. In our view, there was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of passion
or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense.
But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate
mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based
on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance.7 From
the facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set
of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating
circumstances.
Nonetheless, we hold that since the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is also
present, Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code should be applied, to wit:
34 | P a g e
ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. –…
[G.R. No. 46095. October 10, 1938.]
...
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances
are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the v.
period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances. CUSTODIO ROSEL, Defendant-Appellant.

... Pedro R. Arteche, for Appellant.

The penalty for frustrated homicide, pursuant to Article 508 of the Revised Penal Code, is the Solicitor-General Tuason, for Appellee.
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for consummated homicide. The
penalty for consummated homicide is reclusion temporal, hence the penalty next lower in
degree is prision mayor. There being two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating DECISION
circumstance, pursuant to Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the next lower penalty,
prision correccional, is the next statutory penalty. But following the Indeterminate Sentence
Law herein applicable, the minimum term of the penalty that should be imposed on DIAZ, J.:
petitioner for frustrated homicide should be within the range of arresto mayor in any of its
periods or from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months, while the maximum term
should be within the range of prision correccional in its medium period or two (2) years, four The accused-appellant Custodio Rosel was convicted of the crime of murder qualified by
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. treachery, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the offended party
Francisco Baldostano in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs. From said judgment of
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction he appealed to this court and, in support of his appeal, in his brief alleges that the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, is MODIFIED as far as the trial court committed the following errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
penalty imposed is concerned. Petitioner ARTURO ROMERA is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and "1. In not acquitting him on the ground that he merely acted in defense of himself;
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. He is also ORDERED to pay the private
offended party P19,361.15 as actual damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Costs de "2. In finding that the wounded Francisco Baldostano with treachery, notwithstanding that
oficio. there is no evidence in the record showing the presence of such circumstance; and

SO ORDERED. "3. In holding that no justifying, exempting or mitigating circumstances whatever were
present in the commission of the crime."cralaw virtua1aw library

The facts which gave rise to the prosecution of the appellant for the said crime of murder
are, according to the record, briefly as follows: On the night of February 14, 1938 several
persons, among them Francisco Baldostano, were gathered for a small celebration in the
house of Hilario Ilada in the barrio of Guyo, municipality of Catubig, Province of Samar. Some
entertained themselves by singing when the accused Custodio Rosel, Esperato Orsolino,
Ignacio Alberne and Pedro Gorlon arrived. Appellant greeted everybody in the house. In
answer Francisco Baldostano said rather sarcastically that strangers should leave the place,
adding in the following words more or less: "It is good I have means of livelihood. I have a
Republic of the Philippines rice land. You stranger (addressing the appellant) live at the expense of your wife." There was
SUPREME COURT no doubt that he referred to the appellant because he addressed the latter when he said,
Manila "You stranger . . . etc.", and because appellant was not a native of the place. Appellant
resented the greeting or remark which Francisco Baldostano made concerning him and
demanded an explanation. Were it not for the intervention of some persons present, he
EN BANC would have attacked Baldostano at that very moment. He left for his house a little afterwards

35 | P a g e
and returned about one-half hour later. Upon seeing that Francisco Baldostano was
engrossed in conversation with some of those who still remained in the house, he propped
his left arm against the railing of the stairs and stabbed Baldostano from below in the left
armpit with the bolo with which he was armed and withdrew immediately. The wound thus
inflicted on Francisco Baldostano caused his death eight days later. So unexpected was the
attack of which he was the object on the part of the appellant that he was not able to lower
his arm to protect his armpit or to lean forward to dodge the attack. This, undoubtedly,
constitutes treachery because the same is present when means, methods or forms are
employed in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its
commission without risk to the person of the aggressor resulting from the defense which the
offended party might make.

Testifying in his behalf, appellant declared that on the day after wounding Francisco
Baldostano he presented himself to policemen Melecio Melendres and Juan whose surname
he could not recall. It does not appear, however, that he informed them of the crime he had
committed for which reason they did not place him under arrest.

The remarks of the deceased Francisco Baldostano under the circumstances in which he
made them were highly offensive to the appellant and to any other person in his place. It is
not strange that they engendered obfuscation in him and impelled him to act, as he did, in
the immediate vindication of a grave offense.

Considering the facts proven, our conclusion is that the crime committed by the accused and
appellant is that of murder. However, there being present the fifth mitigating circumstance in
the commission thereof, without any aggravating one to offset it, the judgment rendered
against him should be modified.

Wherefore, modifying the judgment appealed from appellant is sentenced to suffer an

indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor to seventeen years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal. In all other respects, said judgment is affirmed
with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18792 February 28, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

GUILLERMO BELLO, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

36 | P a g e
Ferdinand E. Marcos for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon in its Criminal Case No. 592-
G, for murder.
The information filed against the accused alleged four (4) aggravating circumstances, namely:
treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime, and superior strength. The trial court made a
finding of "treachery, evident premeditation and in cold blood and without any provocation";
however, the dispositive portion of the appealed decision states as follows:
... the Court finds the accused Guillermo Bello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder defined an punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating
circumstances of (1) nighttime, (2) abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness, (3)
superior strength offset only by his surrender to the authorities and hereby sentence him to
DIE by electrocution in the manner provided by law ordering his heirs, after his death, to
indemnify the heirs o the deceased Alicia Cervantes in the sum of P3,000.00, wit costs.
The record bears out, the Office of the Solicitor General does not challenge, and the counsel
de oficio agree with, and adopts, the following findings of fact of the trial court:
From the evidence adduced at the hearing of the case, it has been established to the
satisfaction of the Court (1) that on September 17, 1954, the accused Guillermo Bello, a
widower who at that time was about 54 years of age, took a young peasant lady named Alicia
Cervantes, about 24 years old his common-law wife; (2) that from that day they lived
together apparently in blissful harmony as man and wife without the benefit of marriage
bearing, however, no child, ...; (3) that on May 15, 1958, the accused who had no means of
substantial livelihood except that of making "kaingin" and who apparently was then in
financial straits induced Alicia Cervantes to accept an employment as entertainer in a bar and
restaurant establishment known as Maring's Place situated the corner of Aguinaldo and
Bonifacio Streets, Gumaca, Quezon (4) that Alicia Cervantes entered the service of Maring's
Place on that day as a public hostess; (5) that the accused being infatuated with his young
bride used to watch her movements in Maring's Place everyday; (6) that on May 16 he saw
Alicia enter the Gumaca theater in Gumaca with a man whom the accused found later was
caressing his common-law wife inside the movie house; (7) that being in love with her he
took her out from the movie and warned her to be more discreet in her personal conduct in
Gumaca; (8) that Alicia Cervantes continued to serve at Maring's Place as a public hostess; (9)
that on May 20, 1958, at 3:00 p.m. the accused went to Maring's Place to ask for some
money from Alicia; (10) that Maring, the owner of the place, and Alicia refused to give
money, Maring telling him to forget Alicia completely because he was already an old man, an
invalid besides and should stop bothering Alicia; (11) that having failed to obtain financial
assistance from his paramour, accused left the place somewhat despondent and went home
passing Bonifacio Street; (12) that on his way home he met the brothers Justo Marasigan and
Luis Marasigan who greeted the accused, Luis saying to his brother Justo the following: "So
this is the man whose wife is being used by Maring for white slave trade"; (13) that these
remarks of Luis Marasigan naturally brought grief to the accused, to drown which he sought
Paty's place in Gumaca where he drank 5 glasses of tuba; (14) that from Paty's place he went
to Realistic Studio which is in front of Maring's Place and from there watched the movements
of Alicia; (15) that at about 9:00 o'clock that night he entered Maring's Place and without
much ado held Alicia from behind with his left hand in the manner of a boa strangulating its
prey and with his right hand stabbed Alicia several times with a balisong; (16) that seeing
Alicia fallen on the ground and believing her to be mortally wounded, he fled and went to the
municipal building and there surrendered himself to the police of Gumaca.
Both the prosecution and the defense also agree that the crime committed is not murder but
only homicide, but they disagree in the qualifying or aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. The prosecution holds that the crime is homicide, aggravated by abuse of
superior strength, but offset by voluntary surrender. On the other hand, the defense
maintains that the accused is entitled to the additional mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation. The trial court held a different conclusion, as earlier stated.
While it cannot be denied that Alicia was stabbed at the back, the wound was but a part and
continuation of the aggression. The four (4) stab wounds (the 3 others were in the breast,
hypogastric region, and in the left wrist as shown in the certificate of the Municipal Health
Officer) were inflicted indiscriminately, without regard as to which portion of her body was
the subject of attack. The trial court itself found that the stab in the back was inflicted as
Alicia was running away. For this reason, treachery cannot be imputed (People v. Cañete, 44
Phil. 478).
Evident premeditation was, likewise, not established. The accused had been carrying a
balisong with him for a long time as a precaution against drunkards, and without any present
plan or intent to use it against his common-law wife. That he watched her movements daily
manifest his jealous character, but there is no evidence that from this jealousy sprouted a
plan to snuff out her life.1äwphï1.ñët
The evidence does not show, either, any superior strength on the part of the accused, and,
not possessing it, he could not take advantage of it. True that he was armed with a balisong,
but he was old and baldado (invalid), while Alicia was in the prime of her youth, and not
infirm. The facts are not sufficient to draw a comparison of their relative strength. Possession
of a balisong gives an aggressor a formidable advantage over the unarmed victim, but the
physique of the aggressor ought also to be considered. At any rate, taking into account the
emotional excitement of the accused, it is not clearly shown that there was "intencion
deliberada de prevalerse de la superioridad o aprovecharse intencionadamente de la misma"
(Sent. TS. 5 Oct. 1906), i.e., deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength.
The crime was committed at nighttime, but the accused did not seek or take advantage of it
the better to accomplish his purpose. In fact, Maring's Place was bright and well-lighted;
hence, the circumstance did not aggravate the crime. (U.S. vs. Ramos, et al., 2 Phil. 434; U.S.
vs. Bonete, 40 Phil. 958.)
We can not understand how the trial court came to couple the crime with the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness. There is nothing to show
that the assailant and his common-law wife reposed in one another any special confidence
that could be abused, or any gratitude owed by one to the other that ought to be respected,
and which would bear any relation, or connection, with the crime committed. None is
37 | P a g e
inferable from the fact that the accused was much older than his victim, or that he was
penniless while she was able to earn a living and occasionally gave him money, since both
lived together as husband and wife. Neither is it shown that the accused took advantage of
any such special confidence in order to carry out the crime.

Since the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of

superior strength, which could have qualified the crime as murder, were not present, and
since the generic aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence and
obvious ungratefulness have not been established, the accused can only be liable for
homicide.

Both defense and prosecution agree that the accused-appellant is entitled to the benefit of
the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities. The remaining area of
conflict is reduced to whether the accused may lay claim to a second mitigating
circumstance, that of having acted on a provocation sufficiently strong to cause passion and
obfuscation. The defense submits that accused is so entitled, because the deceased's flat
rejection of petitioner's entreaties for her to quit her calling as a hostess and return to their
former relation, aggravated by her sneering statement that the accused was penniless and
invalid (baldado), provoked the appellant, as he testified, into losing his head and stabbing
the deceased. The state disputes the claim primarily on the strength of the rule that passion
and obfuscation can not be considered when "arising from vicious, unworthy, and immoral
passions" (U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. 217).

We are inclined to agree with the defense, having due regard to the circumstances disclosed
by the record. It will be recalled that the lower court found that the accused had previously
reproved the deceased for allowing herself to be caressed by a stranger. Her loose conduct
was forcibly driven home to the accused by Marasigan's remark on the very day of the crime
that the accused was the husband "whose wife was being used by Maring for purposes of
prostitution," a remark that so deeply wounded the appellant's feelings that he was driven to
consume a large amount of wine (tuba) before visiting Alicia (the deceased) to plead with her
to leave her work. Alicia's insulting refusal to renew her liaison with the accused, therefore,
was not motivated by any desire to lead a chaste life henceforth, but showed her
determination to pursue a lucrative profession that permitted her to distribute her favors
indiscriminately. We can not see how the accused's insistence that she live with him again,
and his rage at her rejection of the proposal, can be properly qualified as arising from
immoral and unworthy passions. Even without benefit of wedlock, a monogamous liaison
appears morally of a higher level than gainful promiscuity.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision should be, and hereby is, modified. This Court finds the
accused-appellant, Guillermo Bello, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide,
attended by two (2) mitigating circumstances: (a) passion and obfuscation, and (b) voluntary
surrender, and, therefore, imposes upon him an indeterminate sentence ranging from a
minimum of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to a maximum of ten (10) years of
prision mayor; orders him also to personally indemnify the heirs of Alicia Cervantes in the
amount of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

38 | P a g e

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 130654 July 28, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO BASIN JAVIER, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 dated April 15, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32,2 in Criminal Case No. A-3155, convicting accused-
appellant Eduardo Javier of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P21,730.00 as actual expenses.1âwphi1.nêt
The Information filed before the trial court which charged accused-appellant with the crime
of parricide reads as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the Municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of
La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with the intent to and being then armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use of personal violence, by hacking with the
said weapon one FLORENTINA JAVIER Y LACESTE, his legitimate spouse, and as a result of
which his said wife suffered fatal injuries which directly caused her death immediately
thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
Contrary to law. 3
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.
The prosecution evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Consolacion Javier Panit and Alma
Javier, daughters of the victim and accused-appellant, and SPO1 Rotelio Pacho are detailed as
follows:
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier and the victim Florentina Laceste Javier were legally
married on December 18, 1954. 4 In their forty-one years of marriage, they begot ten
children. Accused-appellant and Florentina lived at Tubod, Sto. Tomas, La Union with one of
their daughters, Alma Javier.5
On June 15, 1996 between two o'clock and three o'clock in the morning, Consolacion Javier
Panit, who lives near her parent's house about ten to fifteen meters away, heard her mother,
Florentina shouting "Arayatan dac ta papatayen nac ni Tatangyo" (Your father is going to kill
me). After she heard her mother scream for help, Consolacion rushed out of her house and
met her sister, Alma who, weeping, told her that their parents were quarrelling. Alma, at the
time of the incident was living in her parents' house. Consolacion and Alma then proceeded
to their brother Manuel's house, which is located about seventy to eighty meters away from
their parents' house. The three then proceeded to their parents' house. Manuel, who
entered first, found the lifeless body of his mother and his father, accused-appellant,
wounded in the abdomen. Manuel then ordered Consolacion to get a tricycle to bring their
father to the hospital. At this point, Manuel informed her sisters that their mother was dead
and that their father confessed to him that he killed his wife and there after allegedly
stabbed himself. Florentina was found dead in their bedroom, drenched in her own blood. 6
Accused-appellant was brought to the hospital by Consolacion's husband, and her son,
Jefferson, while Manuel went out to get help. 7
SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, assigned as desk investigator at the Sto. Tomas Police Station in La
Union, testified in the investigation he conducted with SP04 Manuel Zarate and SPO1 Agaton
Laroza regarding the incident of June 15, 1996. He stated that he received a call for
assistance from the barangay captain of Tugod, Sto. Tomas because accused-appellant
allegedly killed his wife. The police authorities then proceeded to accused-appellant's house
in Brgy. Tugod, Sto.Tomas, where they saw Florentina lying in the bedroom floor covered
with blood. Upon interviewing the victim's children, Pacho testified that Manuel told him
that his father confessed to killing his wife. Manuel then surrendered to him the bolo
covered with blood which was found in the bedroom. The bolo was allegedly used by
accused-appellant in assaulting his wife. 8 The medical findings indicated that the victim
suffered from multiple injuries and her neck was almost cut off from her body. 9
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier, in his testimony, admitted killing his wife in their bedroom
with the use of a sharp bolo. He identified the bolo as the same one presented by the
prosecution as Exhibit "A" and which he used in wounding himself. Accused-appellant told
the court that he killed his wife because he could not sleep for almost a month. He claimed
that when the killing took place, his mind went totally blank and he did not know what he
was doing. 10 He claims that he was insane at the time of the incident.
The trial court rejected accused-appellant's defense of insanity and on April 15, 1997
rendered a decision finding him guilty of parricide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the accused, Eduardo Javier y Basin is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death; to pay the heirs of the victims the amount
39 | P a g e
of P50,000.00 as moral damages for the death of the victim and P21,730.00 as actual
expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.11
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty, considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances of illness of the offender
and passion and obfuscation. 12 While accused-appellant does not question the decision of
the trial court in rejecting his defense of insanity, he argues that he should be meted a lower
penalty because at the time of the incident, he was suffering from loss of sleep for a
prolonged period of time, which would have caused him to commit the crime.
He further contends that his suspicion that his wife was having an illicit relationship with
another man, aggravated by his illness, goaded him to commit the crime.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that accused-appellant cannot
claim the mitigating circumstance of illness in the absence of a medical finding to support his
claim. Accused-appellant cannot likewise be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation in the absence of sufficient evidence.
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant, during trial, admitted killing his wife, but interposed as defense the
exempting circumstance of insanity. However, the trial court rejected this defense of insanity
for failure of the defense to prove that accused-appellant was indeed insane at the time of
the incident. The defense never presented any medical record of the accused-appellant, nor
was a psychiatrist ever presented to validate the defense of insanity. Equally important, the
defense, during trial, never alleged the above-claimed mitigating circumstances of illness and
passion and obfuscation, thus weakening the case of accused-appellant.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that prior to the incident, he had been suffering
from insomnia for around a month, thus leading him to commit an act beyond his control,
the killing of his wife, Florentina. The defense went on to cite medical literature on the
effects of total and partial sleep loss to support his contentions. 13
For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law requires
the presence of the following requisites: (1) illness must diminish the exercise of the will-
power of the offender; and (2) such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness
of his acts. 14
Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon him to
prove the claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case, however, aside from the
testimony of the accused that his mind went blank when he killed his wife due to loss of
sleep, no medical finding was presented regarding his mental condition at the time of killing.
This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere
presumptions and conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that accused-
appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his exercise of will-power at the time of
the killing.
On the other hand, it is clear that accused-appellant was aware of the acts he committed.
First, he remembered killing his wife in their bedroom with the use of a bolo, where he
mangled her neck twice; he remembered trying to commit suicide, by wounding himself with
the same bolo he used in killing his wife; and he remembered being brought to the hospital.
Since he remembered the vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, from the time
of the killing up to the time he was brought to the hospital, it shows that he was in full
control of his mental faculties. This negates his claim that he was suffering from an illness
that diminished the exercise of his will-power. On the basis of the foregoing, we cannot
appreciate the mitigating circumstance alleged by accused-appellant.
Neither can we appreciate the circumstance of passion and obfuscation to mitigate his
criminal liability.
In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and to obfuscation, the
following elements should concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which
the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. 15 The foregoing elements were not
proved to be present in instant case. In fact, during accused-appellant's testimony, he even
stated that he was not jealous of his wife.
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General:
In the case of appellant, there is lack of proof of the cause which produced alleged passion
and obfuscation. Appellant, in his testimony, did not account how he killed his wife nor did
he explain the cause why he was prompted to kill his wife. Verily, there exists no justifiable
basis for applying to him this mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation as the cause
which produced it has not been established. 16
All told, the allegations propounded by accused-appellant that his suspicions regarding his
wife, aggravated by his illness made it possible for him to kill his own wife, is but a mere
afterthought to whittle down his criminal liability.
Additionally, it is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts will generally not be
disturbed by the appellate court because it is in the best position to properly evaluate
testimonial evidence considering that it observes the demeanor, conduct and attitude of
witnesses during the trial. In the case at bar, the trial court was able to observe the behavior
of accused-appellant and it stated that his recollection of the details surrounding the killing is
so impeccable that only a person in his right mind can make it.
Thus, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of parricide
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section
5) which provides that:
Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
40 | P a g e

The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se as it is not punishable by mandatory
death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible
penalties, the application of the lesser or the greater penalty depends on the presence of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.17
In this case, the information for parricide against accused-appellant did not allege any
aggravating circumstance. Nor did the evidence show that the prosecution was able to prove
any aggravating circumstance. 18 Likewise, no mitigating circumstance is appreciated by this
Court in favor of the accused-appellant. Thus, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance for the accused-appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed.
As regards the monetary liability, the Court takes the amount of P50,000.00 imposed by the
trial court as one of civil indemnity instead of as moral damages.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32, in
Criminal Case No. A-3155 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant Eduardo Javier y Basin should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel
theory -- the battered woman syndrome (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense.
Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there
was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-
husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of
cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
psychological paralysis she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the
mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation.
The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite
of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put
her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled
her to vindicate her life and her unborn childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from
custody on parole, because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while
under detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic
Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused,
Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as
provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and
after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages.[2]
The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of
Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN
GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused
had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
41 | P a g e
Cadaveric spasm.
Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its
sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in]
laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of
the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial
hemorrhage.
Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the
epidermis.
Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.
which caused his death.[4]
With the assistance of her counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on
March 3, 1997.[6] In due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions version of the facts in
this wise:
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City.
Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Bens
younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however,
appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte
where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their
salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Bens
house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that
appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo
went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a
bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas
rented house, he heard her say I wont hesitate to kill you to which Ben replied Why kill me
when I am innocent? That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that
since then, the Genosas rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living
about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu
for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their
neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to
Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one
carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was.
Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas rented house. Joseph, appellant and
her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that
appellant did not want to talk to him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor
emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out
the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a
duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He
was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a
hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive
smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed
covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing
this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his sons
misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as
that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police
station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas rented
house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin
proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of
Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only
had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe
about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured
three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an
open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken
outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr.
Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for
medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his
body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the
findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded
that the cause of Bens death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial
hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15,
1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling
since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went to look for Ben at the
marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk
upon their return at the Genosas house. Ecel went home despite appellants request for her
to sleep in their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight.
She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their
42 | P a g e
homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with
the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching
television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom,
but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and
screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted
him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage,
dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and
told her You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me. Appellant testified that she was
aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got
a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben with a
pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape
with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside
the bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She
supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the
spot, though, but in the bedroom.[7] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her
marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor
of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her husbands death,
as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John
Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in
Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents
were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from
courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together with Bens
brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily. But
apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become
violent.
4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben
and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben
would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in
1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand
was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently
having asked for Bens forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex
and his father apparently rushed to Bens aid again and saw blood from Bens forehead and
Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently
again asked for Bens forgiveness.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic
married in 1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City. She said as the marriage
went along, Marivic became already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after
the birth of Marivics two sons, there were three (3) misunderstandings. The first was when
Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on
November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead using a sharp instrument until
the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear and her husband went to Ben to
help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the
house in Bilwang and she saw that Bens hand was plastered as the bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 After we
collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO. They stayed there for three
(3) hours, after which they went to Uniloks and drank beer allegedly only two (2) bottles
each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was
not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait for
the runner and the usher of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on
masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can place
my bet. On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They
were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one Fredo who is used by Ben to feed his
fighting cocks. Basobas testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him
was Marivic saying I will never hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am
innocent. Basobas thought they were joking.
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence.
Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday.
He claims that he once told Ben before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa
that he should leave her and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him
so many times.
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had
been quarreling. He said Ben even had a wound on the right forehead. He had known the
couple for only one (1) year.
6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a
habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her
down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but
Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her
forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino
Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her
by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he
was drunk, at least three times a week.
7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the
abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
43 | P a g e

7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on
November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting
for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses grappling with each other. Ben
had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify.
(Please note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified
that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped
through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw the
spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the
neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate
he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go
fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this was
the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in
Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece
and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always
quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the
money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so
angry, but would be pacified if somebody would come. He testified that while Ben was alive
he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say,
Teody because that was what he used to call me, mokimas ta, which means lets go and look
for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben would box his wife and I would see bruises
and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as
according to her a knife was stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had
been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the
afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for
Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could not
find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the
Genosa house because she might be battered by her husband. When they got to the Genosa
house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that her husband was already there and
was drunk. Miss Arano knew he was drunk because of his staggering walking and I can also
detect his face. Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please
note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified
that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would
be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep
over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple were
very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase. She said Marivic ran
into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and a knife
and showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us. She said that Marivic
shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she left
Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS,
Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient many times and had also received treatment from other
doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6)
episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-
Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr.
Caing and considered him an expert witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-
three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The OPD Chart of Marivic at
the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6)
incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether
the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who
is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient, whether she is capable of
committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified
that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the
evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing
family troubles. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again
and assumed that they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with
each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her
husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband
would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact,
Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5)
times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the
reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy
about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the
bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied
in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not
bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher
under the alias Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just
wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did
not know what happened to the pipe she used to smash him once; that she was wounded by
44 | P a g e
Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was whirled by Ben, he
kicked her ass and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his
things.
9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was
made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all
the prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at
the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all
medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra.
Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in
1986. She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there,
she saw some police officer and neighbor around. She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket,
lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area
of the head which she described as a fracture. And that based on her examination, Ben had
been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her
with the crime of PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence
premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x
her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.
12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23
September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6
August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT
finding Marivic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, and further found
treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of
DEATH.
14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of
24 January 2000, Marivics trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to
Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of
Appellants Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not
conformed to by her.
The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of
appearance of undersigned counsel.
15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000,
to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of
Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her Brief without counsels to
the Court.
This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable
Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying
that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the
cause of his death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to
allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and
psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only
qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the death
wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a gunshot wound
than a beating with a lead pipe.
17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivics
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea,
within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the
proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence,
if any, submitted.
18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed
Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal
Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done
at her clinic.
Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her
own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor.
Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a
member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Josephs
College; and was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB
in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling],
Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of the
Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological
Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from about 68
countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy,
recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in
domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research
45 | P a g e
about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled Energy Global Psychology
(together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has
testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked
at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that there are lots of
variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to
psychiatric disorder.
Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of incidents of psychological
abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of
herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think
very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually think that
they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their
spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them. Dra. Dayan said that
usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from broken homes.
Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also has a very low opinion
of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very
arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance
for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs.
And they become violent. The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which
over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how
their parents abused each other so there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the family.
Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her
husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which
makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the family
intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or
lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering physical violence
on both of them. She said that in a normal marital relationship, abuses also happen, but
these are not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out. In an abnormal
marital relationship, the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and even would
cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was
her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because inspite of her feeling of
self-confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of
humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time
she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for
nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic
then thought of herself as a victim.
xxxxxxxxx
19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away,
appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine
Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the
practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was
connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on
psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his
retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained
his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World
Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical
Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military
Academy from the Period 1954 1978 which was presented twice in international congresses.
He also authored The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000, which was
likewise published internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the
use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R.
Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and
neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the
other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to
become a specialist in psychiatry.
Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already
encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen probably
ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was
reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a
consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where
there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a
woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The
46 | P a g e
affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder depends on the vulnerability of the victim. Dr.
Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may
induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of
the victim is stronger, it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic
stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.
In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the anxiety neurosis or
neurologic anxcietism. It is produced by overwhelming brutality, trauma.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the beating or trauma as
if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks of nothing
but the suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is
unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent.
She has higher sensitivity and her self-world is damaged.
Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individuals illness, such as
the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he
normally internalizes what is around him within the environment. And it becomes his own
personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows
his strong faade but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the
one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic)
because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend
themselves, and primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is
available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the
household. He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has reached the lowest rock
bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted
for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and
social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report,
dated 22 January 2001.
xxxxxxxxx
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed
her husband Marivicc mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma. He said
that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not
controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that
things happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind. At the time he
interviewed Marivic she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is
mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.
xxxxxxxxx
20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public
prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the
partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated.[9]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the
prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping.
Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery,
because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep
when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic
review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court
allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2)
the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts
reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative,
a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellants Motion,
remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea; and requiring the lower court to
report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN
and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two
clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan[10] and Alfredo Pajarillo,[11] supposedly experts
on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then
presented to and admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to
form part of the records of the case.[12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Courts consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting
on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
47 | P a g e

2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally
married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial
and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-
beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic
Genosa.
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila and her
subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her
unborn child.
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of
treachery.
8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in
determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby
erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the
ultimate penalty of death.[13]
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-
defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben
Genosa.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the
resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge
gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of the case.[14]
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or
misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial courts disposition of
the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense. We note that in his 17-page Decision,
Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the
defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record --
made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the
testimony and the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court, may not
agree with the trial judges conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial
evidence, that he failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an obviously hasty manner.
The Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial
began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two
months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial
and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to
condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he handled the case
should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in substantial compliance with his
constitutional obligation.[15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had
been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v.
Malabago,[16] this Court held:
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of
parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not
objected to.
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellants
deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic.[17] The defense
raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant
herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to Ben.[18] Axiomatic is the rule that a
judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing
that (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact
made.[19] Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the
defense offered no proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her
marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Bens death --
whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court
elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, [c]onsidering that the appellant has
admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and
of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if
not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the victims death.
Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or
defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a
drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review,
appellant had not raised the novel defense of battered woman syndrome, for which such
evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue
48 | P a g e
before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under
prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to
the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past behavior, did not
constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellants
children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to
determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to present.[20] As the former further
points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting
her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them
to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to
Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are
attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial courts
appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense
and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is
incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing
evidence.[21] Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly,
defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the
defense.[22]
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome.
While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign
jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.[23] By
appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign
courts convey their understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has
been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time.[24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants
her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any
form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she
remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional
beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the
dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterers actions; and false
hopes that the relationship will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of
violence,[27] which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering
incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight
physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the
batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way.
What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are
comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by
the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her placatory and
passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually
successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent
loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the
battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally
unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some
unpredictable point, the violence spirals out of control and leads to an acute battering
incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and,
sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also
inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the
violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his
reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him,
and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although
she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute
violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically,
and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering
incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or
intervenors are likely to get hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During
this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer
may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been
viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to
beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the
battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this
good, gentle and caring man is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of
the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The
truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help,
49 | P a g e
are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he
seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful A Yes, sir.
reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.
Q Who are these doctors?
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered womans psyche. In
this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of tension,
violence and forgiveness, each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be xxxxxxxxx
separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning without the
other.[31] Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?

History of Abuse A Yes, sir.

in the Present Case
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several
witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows: A Of course my husband.

ATTY. TABUCANON Q You mean Ben Genosa?

Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa? A Yes, sir.

A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and xxxxxxxxx
a behavior of habitual drinker.
[Court] /to the witness
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you
and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you? Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me
down on the bed and sometimes beat me. A Everytime he got drunk.

Q How many times did this happen? Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your
occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?
A Several times already.
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
A Three times a week.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me. [32]
Q What will happen when he follow you?
Referring to his Out-Patient Chart[33] on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D.
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to him Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
and he said sorry.
Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by clinic?
your husband, were you able to see a doctor?

50 | P a g e
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
A I did.
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.
Q What did she tell you?
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness
of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero; A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she told
me that it was done to her by her husband.
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion (R)
breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; Q You mean, Ben Genosa?

3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla; A Yes, sir.

4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing; xxxxxxxxx

5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and ATTY. TABUCANON:

6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending physician: Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month
Dr. Canora. of November, 1995 when this incident happened?

Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending A As per record, yes.
physician, is that correct?
Q What was the date?
A Yes, sir.
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What
do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla? Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant?

A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough substance A Yes, sir.
if force is applied.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A Yes, sir.
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So, [pain]
meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain. Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her
pregnancy or for some other findings?
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?

51 | P a g e
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
A One day.
Q Where?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to
examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I
have a record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for
twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not
response when the medication was given to her, because tension headache is more or less
stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history
in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask
to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which is
unfortunately does not response to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the
accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood
pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus. [34]
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte,
testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions
Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by
Ben.[35]
Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to
sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and
hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten oclock at
night, because the couple were very noisy and I heard something was broken like a vase.
Then Marivic came running into Ecels room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the
window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben
-- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him
already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house.
Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing,
she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other
witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling.[37] Marivic relates in detail the following
backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a vivid
picture of his cruelty towards her:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I
boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked
my son, where was his father, then my second child said, he was not home yet. I was worried
52 | P a g e
because that was payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him,
my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time
because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me
so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the
same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if
any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried he
might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for
fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his
provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him, why did you switch off the light
when the children were there. At that time I was also attending to my children who were
doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went
to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
53 | P a g e
 A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his
Q What did he do with the bolo? clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.

A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V. Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?

Q What else happened after he cut the wire? COURT INTERPRETER:

A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front
was already holding the bolo. neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
Q How do you described this bolo?
ATTY. TABUCANON:
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q Where did he bring you?
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me
A For chopping meat. that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.

Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo? Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

A He was about to attack me so I run to the room. A Yes, sir.

Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you? Q What is there in the drawer?

A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside. A I was aware that it was a gun.

Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you? COURT INTERPRETER:

A I screamed for help and then he left. (At this juncture the witness started crying).

Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside? ATTY. TABUCANON:

A Yes, sir. Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?

Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going? A Yes, sir.

A Outside perhaps to drink more. Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not
open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade
about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and
then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him
then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:

54 | P a g e
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely). Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in laymans term
describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
xxxxxxxxx
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering
ATTY. TABUCANON: emotional anguish.
There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room? abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she was the one who was practically the
bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with
A Outside. barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very angry
and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting
Q In what part of the house? from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity, the
husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she was very angry,
A Dining. she was at the same time very depressed because she was also aware, almost like living in
purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day out. [39]
Q Where were the children during that time?
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or
A My children were already asleep. unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:

Q You mean they were inside the room? Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her
about three hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?
A Yes, sir.
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life.
3 inches long, how does it look like?
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the facts
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide. of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?

Q Is it a flexible blade? A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as
substantial.
A Its a cutter.
xxxxxxxxx
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were
A Yes, because he once used it to me. fond of battering their wives?

Q How did he do it? A I also heard that from her?

A He wanted to cut my throat. Q You heard that from her?

Q With the same blade? A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. [38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to
assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa
for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly
related the latters ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of
battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their
wives.

55 | P a g e
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc
where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really
happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think
that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a
self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also believe that she
became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering
that happened and so she became an abnormal person who had lost shes not during the time
and that is why it happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the
psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is this]
all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of
that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who can
exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust.
That the data that Im gathering from her are the truth.[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his
Psychiatric Report,[42] which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa.
The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked
good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until Ben started to be attracted to
other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same
time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family,
particularly to his wife. The Report continued: At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but
as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her
husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to
anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had
been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was battered and
maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting
from the Report, [s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning
friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering
became more and more frequent and more severe. x x x.[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Courts mind that
Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of
mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the
judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately
surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the
psychological effect of battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and
necessary. How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average
member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why
should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to
the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go.
Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such
is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called battered wife
syndrome.[44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should not be drawn from
that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been
subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to
-- those who have not been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify
and refute common myths and misconceptions about battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic
violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the
treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of
her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted
upon the battered woman immobilizes the latters ability to act decisively in her own
interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape.[46] In her
56 | P a g e
years of research, Dr. Walker found that the abuse often escalates at the point of separation
and battered women are in greater danger of dying then.[47]
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the battered woman usually has
a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x
x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they
were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be
physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.[48]
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily
leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latters belief that
she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for
the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change.[49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously
testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated probably ten to twenty
thousand violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such
cases abounded. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a
consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about
forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman
would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.[50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could result in posttraumatic
stress disorder, a form of anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism.[51] After being
repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons may believe that they are essentially
helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have
the effect of stimulating the development of coping responses to the trauma at the expense
of the victims ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma.
Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will have a
predictable positive effect.[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania,
found that even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she
will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to
escape. He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the individuals thoughts -- that proved all-
important. He referred to this phenomenon as learned helplessness. [T]he truth or facts of a
situation turn out to be less important than the individuals set of beliefs or perceptions
concerning the situation. Battered women dont attempt to leave the battering situation,
even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict
their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible
circumstances.[54]
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent
behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no
escape.[55] Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to
leave the relationship.[56] Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only
because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she
leaves she would be found and hurt even more.[57]
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing
that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long
period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to
find sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to
find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death
of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was
able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that
single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to
prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar
pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering?
How did Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively minor abuses? What means did she
employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She
simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mothers or fathers house;[58] that
Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his
words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did
she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support
of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did
she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as
preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and
thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the
syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense.
Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the
personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated
and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse.
They corroborated each others testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies
of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences
and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded
that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be
proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that
would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically
in the case of the Genosas.
57 | P a g e

BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the
legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the
context of self-defense.[59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS
defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense[60] -- she must
have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to
kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense
must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent
and actual, not merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following
requisites and effect of self-defense:[62]
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.[63] It presupposes actual,
sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person.[64] In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself,
there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and
escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and
went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens bedroom -- and
based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have
pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life
would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS,
further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents
of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to
await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing
her to murder by installment.[65] Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim
in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendants use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.[66]
Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-
defense.[67] In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or
incomplete -- on the part of the victim.[68] Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not completely
justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying
circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in
her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an
appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not
been raised by the parties.[69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic
experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke
down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed
heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic
truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which
can only be ended by an act of violence on her part. [70]
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of
repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment as well as the
severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress
disorder.[71] Expounding thereon, he said:
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the
battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged commission of
the battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one
is the public and social support available to the victim.
If nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxxxxxxxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the
postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder
is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus
that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like
holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and
boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus,
like for example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not only
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protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic]
degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest
now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and
probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be
thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it
is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six
(6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is
chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal and
then become normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of
post[t]raumatic stress disorder. [72]
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his
or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.[73]
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted
in cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-
control, psychological paralysis, and difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an
illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however,
depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her
freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article
13 of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered
as a mitigating factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has
been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.[77] To appreciate this circumstance, the
following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her
normal equanimity.[78]
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded
his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the
neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was
eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her
fetus.[79] His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both
Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her
reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental
state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with
feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of
indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the
weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable
period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is
Dr. Pajarillos testimony[80] that with neurotic anxiety -- a psychological effect on a victim of
overwhelming brutality [or] trauma -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were
real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control re-
experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered. She thinks
of nothing but the suffering. Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under
similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time
interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should
further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as
passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the
battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a
period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness
diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had
inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months
pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise
on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on
her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
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There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense
that the offended party might make.[81] In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the
circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be
deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of
evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself.[83]
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of
death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the
lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an open, depressed, circular fracture
located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked,
however, the prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of
appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death:
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front
neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me
that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not
open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade
about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and
then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him
then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about
3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.

Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer? Q How did he do it?

A Yes, sir. A He wanted to cut my throat.

Q What is there in the drawer? Q With the same blade?

A I was aware that it was a gun. A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.

COURT INTERPRETER xxxxxxxxx

(At this juncture the witness started crying) ATTY. TABUCANON:

ATTY. TABUCANON: Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?

Q Were you actually brought to the drawer? A Yes, because I smashed him.

A Yes, sir. Q What happened?

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A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I
ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I
was frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the same
time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with him, I took pity on myself
and I felt I was
about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot
him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no
showing of the victims position relative to appellants at the time of the shooting. Besides,
equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel,
treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be
said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor
must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the
party attacked.[86] There is no showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally
chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from
any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using
the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her
batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately
employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution,
this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.[87]
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have
been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by
one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5[88] of the same Code.[89] The penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating
circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no
other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the
offense.[90] Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be
within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum
shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison
as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as
maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply
for and be released from detention on parole.[91]
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy
nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts in the present case. The
Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort
beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case,
it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to
understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically
abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general
and appellants counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the
limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we
amend the Revised Penal Code.
Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome.
We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent
harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save
her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not
necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of
violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances
61 | P a g e
could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case,
however, not all of these elements were duly established.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED.
However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance
attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby
imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her
from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held
for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

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