CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

Case Digests
Section 6 - 12

Section 6 - LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Case #1
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

Marcos, petitioner

VS.

Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)

Facts:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people
power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return
to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the
nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar
the return of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer.
This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
Honasan’s failed coup
Communist insurgency movements
secessionist movements in Mindanao
devastated economy because of
accumulated foreign debt
plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their
travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from
returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He
also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national
security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her
jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel
which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses
a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Decision:

No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1,
Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President
of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the
same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over
all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power
to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution
outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary
powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the
people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art.
II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the
President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153),
inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the
president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of
the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances.
The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the
light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel,
subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even
remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to thne
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such
request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President
to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis
for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in
the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that
happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the
self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
Case #2
Manotoc Vs Ca
G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986 RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E. CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judges of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branches, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, the
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, as Commissioner of
Immigration, and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM), respondents.

FACTS : There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was
suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner and
Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court
to post bail. Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating
his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by
the prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to
annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad.
According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that
granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from
exercising his constitutional right to travel

ISSUE : WON the Court Acted with grave abuse of discretion

HELD : A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This
is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in
the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required
as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
on his right to travel If the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason,
he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts
and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his
surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied
petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary
results, that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the appellate court in allowing
Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of
her bail bond.

Case#3
RICARDO C. SILVERIO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No.
94284 April 8, 1991

Facts:
 Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in
Criminal Case of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional
liberty.

More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed
an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against
accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary
Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign
Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on
Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the
Trial Court’s finding that since the filing of the Information, “the accused has not yet been arraigned
because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is
evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad
without the knowledge and permission of this Court”. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from
leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that “An accused released on bail
may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines
without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of
the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable
impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.

SECTION 7- RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Case#4
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987 VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondent.
 FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked
in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil
Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the
civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu
City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly
represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.

ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees

HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It
does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official
records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore
exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It
follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that
involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public
interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody
of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned
any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the
burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold
otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law
Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the
government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access
may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate
concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied
only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as
to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny
the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which
would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take
judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence,
there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request
is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government
employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to
verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a
sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon
access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position
becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
Case#5
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989 RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL
CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO
BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL,
petitioners, vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.

FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their
right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the
names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were
able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal
note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies
of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the
public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the
reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner
Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now
considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our
desired objective in pursuance of public interest."

ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records
on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what
the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within
the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the
repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose
to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans
were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate
and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions
being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and,
therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract,
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court,
are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled
corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the
people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled
corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed
pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are
afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

Case#6
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the
Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as
an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition
with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The
agreement mentions “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” (BJE) to which it grants the authority and
jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and
jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local
statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act (IPRA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and
Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional

HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is
contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.

REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national and
local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of
people’s participation in the peace process.

Article III (Bill of Rights)

Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to official
records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data used as basis for policy development shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Article II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

LGC (1991), “require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No project
or program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and approval mus be
obtained.”

Article VII (Executive Department)

Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Article X. (Local Government)

Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the province,
cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.

Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of
the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region.

The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.

ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.

Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present constitution
and laws “shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework.” The president’s authority is limited to proposing
constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments
will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the
need to amend therein.

Case#7
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

FACTS :

On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old
daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659 “
The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were
denied with the court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress
compliant with the requirements for its imposition.

RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of
execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated
the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections
to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and
Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its
implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City
and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of
execution.

On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to mantain
status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for TRO until
resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in question is
unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a motion for Leave
of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and
degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how other countries have abolished the
death penalty and how some have become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating
that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.

ISSUE :
WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for being an undue
delegation of legislative power

HELD:

THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT
SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.

The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each
department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within
its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-
delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari potest.” (what has
been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule and one of the
recognized exceptions is “ Delegation to Administrative Bodies “

The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the
task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details
in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the
death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do
it, and what is the scope of his authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out
its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.

Case#8
Chavez vs Presidential Commission on Good Government GR 130716 19 May 1999

Facts: PCGG and Marcos siblings agreed to General and Supplemental Agreements with regards to
the ill-gotten wealth cases against their family. The same was filed with Sandiganbayan. Chavez
then filed petition with SC to enforce a constitutional right against the PCGG and to determine
whether the latter has been acting within the bounds of its authority. SC decided the case on 09
December 1998. However, the siblings did not file motion for reconsideration until the deadline for
such lapsed. They instead filed 1) a “Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion for Leave to File the
Attached Partial Motion for Reconsideration . . .” and (2) “Partial Motion for Reconsideration,”
contending that their exclusion from the case violated their constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection. Movants pray that the proceedings before the anti-graft court be allowed to take
their due course, consistent with the principle of the hierarchical administration of justice.

Issue: Whether or not equal protection was observed in the (principle of hierarchical) administration
of justice?

Decision: Motion denied. The movants are merely incidental parties to the instant case. Being
contractors to the General and Supplemental Agreements involving their supposed properties, they
claim that their interests are affected by the petition. However, the Agreements undeniably contain
terms an condition that are clearly contrary to the Constitution and the laws and are not subject to
compromise. Such terms and conditions cannot be granted by the PCGG to anyone. The principle of
the hierarchy of the courts generally applies to cases involving factual question. The oft-repeated
justification for invoking it is that such cases do not only impose upon the precious time of the Court
but, more important, inevitably result in their delayed adjudication. Often, such cases have to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum or as better equipped to resolve to the
issues, since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Inasmuch as the petition at bar involves only
constitutional and legal questions concerning public interest, the Court resolved to exercise primary
jurisdiction on the matter.

Section 8 - RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS

Case # 9
SSS Employees Association v Court of Appeals GR no. 85279 July 28, 1989

Facts:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to
the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members
from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return
to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return
to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be
declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which
included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and
holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of
service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.

Issue:

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

Held:

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State
"shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec.
31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning
of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the
1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295,
November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

Case #10
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union

FACTS: Benjamin victoriano a member of iglesia ni cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde
Rope factory Inc since 1958. Her was a member of elizalde rope workers union which had with the
company a CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follow “Membership union shall
be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees worker covered by this
agreement.” RA 3350 was enacted introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of
section 4 of RA 875 as follows “ but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect
which prohibit affiliation of their member in any such 0labor organization” Benjamin victoriano
presents his resignation to appellant union thereupon the union wrote a formal letter to separate the
appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the union as member of the
company notified the apellee and his counsel that unless the appellee could achieve a satisfactory
arrangement with the union the company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service . this
prompted appellee to file an action for injunction to enjoin the company and the union from
dismissing apallee.

ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional

HELD: the constitution provision only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or
the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. RA 3350 does not require as a
qualification on condition in joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion on in
any religious sect neither does the act requires affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its
member from joining a labor union as a condition on qualification for withdrawing from labor union
RA 3350 only exempts member with such religious affililiation from the required to do a positive act –
to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted from form the coverage of
any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. Therefore RA 3350 is never
an illegal evasion of constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result which is
lawful in itself by vering or following a legal way to do it.

Case # 11
In re: IBP membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial Edillon

Facts:
The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its
Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the
Rules of Court 139-A and the provisions of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws
pertaining to the organization of the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to
pay the same.

Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good
standing to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence
of this, compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to the
IBP.

Held:
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of a
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All
lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment of reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels
him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional free to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of the By-
Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys
of the Court.

Section 10 - NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

Case # 12
Ortigas & co. ltd. partnership vs. Feati bank & trust co digest
Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at
Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights
in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one
of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was
annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5
directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started
construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for
residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending
that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal
Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial
zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue:
Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and
commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local
Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality
should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local government in
promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community”. This is
found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of
police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in
the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic,
pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.
Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

Case # 13
Lozano vs. Martinez
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the Bouncing Check Law. BP 22 punishes a
person “who makes or draws and issues any check on account for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank..”. It is aimed at putting
a stop to the practice of issuing checks that are worthless which causes injury to the public interest.
Contentions on the law are that: 1) it offends constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for
debt; 2) it impairs freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; 4) it unduly
delegates legislative and executive powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed because the Interim
Batasan violated the prohibition on amendments in the Third Reading

ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 is a valid law (police power)

HELD:
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large since putting valueless commercial papers in circulation can
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. Hence, the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police
power and is not in conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP 22 impairs freedom of contract since
contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. The statute does not deny the equal
protection clause since it only penalizes the drawer of the check and not the payee. Additonally, BP
22 does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers. Contrary to the contention, the
power to define the offense and to prescribe the penalty are not delegated to the payee. On the last
contention, the Interim Batasan investigated the matter and reported that the clause in question was
an authorized amendment of the bill. With all the foregoing reasons, the constitutionality of BP 22 is
upheld.

Case # 14
Ganzon vs Inserto

FACTS:
Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of land in favor of private
respondents. Several months later, a deed of real estate mortgage was executed between the same
parties to secure the payment by the private respondents of a promissory not in favor of petitioner.
Private respondents filed a civil action against petitioners after Ganzon initiated extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings in accordance with the terms and conditions of the said mortgage.
Respondent judge ordered the substitution of the mortgage lien with a surety bond.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the order of respondent judge violates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

RULING:
YES. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to ensure the payment of a loan would in effect
change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues
affecting the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its
efficiency and dispensed with a primary condition.

Instant petition si GRANTED. Orders of the trial court are SET ASIDE.

Section 12 - CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Case: 15
Gamboa VS Cruz

Facts:
Petitioner herein was arrested and was brought to the police station because of vagrancy. The next
day, the petitioner and with other 5 detainees were ask to line up. The complainant, meanwhile,
during the line up pointed to the petitioner herein as a suspect of robbery. After that, he was asked to
sit in front of the complainant while the latter is being investigated. An information of robbery has
been filed against the herein petitioner.
During the arraignment, the prosecution offered and presented its evidence. While on the other
hand, the petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, instead preparing for his evidence, file a
Motion to Acquit or Demurrer of evidence. The petitioner filed this motion on the ground that the
conduct of the line up, without notice, and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional
right to counsel and to due process.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to counsel and to due process was violated during the line up.

Held:
No. The Rights to counsel and to due process is protected by the constitution whether it be 1973 or
1987.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, or when the investigating officers
tries to elicit or ask information from the accuse,even though the questions appeases to be innocent.
At this point of stage, the assistance of the counsel is needed in order to avoid the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips fo the person
undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.

When the petitioner was asked to line up with other detainees, he was not asked any question nor to
answer. The police line up is not wart of custodial inquest, hence the petitioner was not entitled to
right to counsel.
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to counsel attaches at the start of the investigation
against the respondent, and even before the adversary judicial proceedings against the accused
begins.

While the court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line up,
the moment there is a move to elicit admissions or confessions, even a plain information which may
appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted
by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of
the counsel.

Case 16
People VS Macam

Facts:
Prosecution’s version:

On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto
Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road
QC. Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch. Benito asked his maid
Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle outside the
house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while E. Roque remained in the
tricycle. After all the accused had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of
Benito Macam and pulled out his uncle’s gun then declared a hold-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia
Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs. After
a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she was stabbed and killed by
A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The total value of the items
taken was P536, 700.00.

Defense’s version:

Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benito’s house for a fee of
P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be
paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused inside the house to have lunch.
Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and
announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he abided out of fear. While
putting the said thins inside the car of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying “kailangan
patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan”. Upon hearing such phrase he escaped and
went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from
the province and in no way can be involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with his
brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo Macam) for him
to get his payment (50.00) . He and his brother was suddenly apprehended by the security guards
and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit certain things.

After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore contusions on their faces
caused by blows inflicted in their faces during investigation, was brought to the QC General Hospital
before each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification. Eugenio Cawilan was also
charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said case.

Issue:
Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest was valid. WON the
evidence from the line-up is admissible.

Held:
It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before trial. A
police line-up is considered a “critical” stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present
evidence regarding appellant’s identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused
again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by
illegal line-up.

The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from questioning
the legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash the said information and therefore
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty
and participating in trial.

The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining outside the house
served as a looked out.

Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque is guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide as co-conspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua.

Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes, betamax rewinder, Samsonite
attache case, typewriter, chessboard, TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997, assorted jewelry. .22
gun and money.

Case 17
People VS Judge Ayson

Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station.
It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.
A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of
the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating
that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not
ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty.
Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which
defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a
lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the
prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and
statement of accused.

Held:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to
witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not
present in case at bar).

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be
a witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and
not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He
must claim it and could be waived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused
include:

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

Case 18
People VS Pinlac

Facts:
The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide.
He assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial
confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having
appraised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.

Issue:
Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.

Held:
The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the
failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him
without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation.
Moreover the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is
inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and
subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused.

Case 19
People VS Bolanos

Facts:
Police authorities arrested the accused for murder. Together with the accused the police boarded a
jeep to take him to their station. While on board the jeep the accused started admitting killing the
deceased. This extrajudicial confession was used as evidence in court and the accused was
convicted.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.

Held:
Yes. The accused on board the police vehicle on the way to the police station is already under
custodial investigation and should therefore be accorded his rights under the Constitution and be
informed of his Miranda rights. Any extrajudicial confession he makes without his counsel is deemed
inadmissible to court.

Case 20
People VS Andan

Facts:
Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at Fatima was on her way to her school
dormitory in Valenzuelal, Metro Manila when Pablito Andan asked her to check the blood pressure of
the grandmother of Andan’s wife but there was nobody inside the house. She was punched in the
abdomen by Andan and was brought to the kitchen where he raped her. She was left in the toilet
until it was dark and was dragged to the backyard. It was when Andan lifted her over the fence to the
adjacent vacant lot where she started to move. Andan hit her head with a concrete block to silence
her and dragged her body to a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.

The death of Marianne drew public attention which prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to
form a team of police officers to solve the case. Apart from the vacant lot, they also searched
Andan’s nearby house and found evidences linked to the crime. The occupants of the house were
interviewed and learned that accused-appellant was in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. A police
team lead by Mayor Trinidad located Andan and took him to the police headquarters where he was
interrogated where he said that Dizon killed the girl. The three were then brought to Andan’s house
where he showed the police where the bags of Marianne were hidden. They were then brought back
to the police station while waiting for the result of the investigation.

The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were gathered at the police headquarters for
the result of the investigation, Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon
seeing the mayor, appellant approved him and whispered a request that they talk privately to which
the mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the Andan agreed to tell the truth and
admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. The mayor opened the door of the room to let the
public and the media representatives witness the confession. Mayor Trinidad first asked for a lawyer
to assist the appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed
and recorded in video. In the presence of the media and his relatives, Andan admitted to the crime
and disclosed how he killed Marianne and that he falsely implicated Larin and Dizon because of ill-
feelings against them.

However, appellant entered a plea of “not guilty” during his arraignment. He provided an alibi why he
was at his father’s house at another barangay and testified that policemen tortured and coerced him
to admit the crime but the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to death.

Issue:
Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without the assistance of counsel is in violation
of the constitution and cannot be admitted as evidence in court.

Held:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the appellant’s confession before the mayor is
inadmissible. A municipal mayor has “operational supervision and control” over the local police and
may be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article
III of the Constitution. However, Andan’s confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all and no police authority
ordered the appellant to talk to the mayor. It was the appellant who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor acted as a confidant and not as a law
enforcer and therefore did not violate his constitutional rights.

Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not

elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant
orally admitted having committed the crime. What the constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure
of incriminating facts or confession. Hence, we hold that appellant’s confession to the mayor was
correctly admitted by the trial court.

Andan was found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.

Case 21
Navallo VS Sandiganbayan

Facts:
Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School,
which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection of
tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of
collections exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury. An information for malversation of public
funds was filed. A warrant of arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not be found. on 10
December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and
conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced
in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was
released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the
RTC on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred
the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-
Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the
Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to
the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise.

The information was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was
issued by the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of
Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that
the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and (2) that
since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the
Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. However this was denied and trial ensued and he
was found guilty.

Issue:
Whether or Not the constitutional right against double jeopardy and in custodial investigations in
favor of the accused violated.

Held:
No. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites:
The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction;
The court has jurisdiction to try the case;
The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and
The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent.
The RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then
had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate
with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.

No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a normal audit examination is not
under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been
"pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime (examined cash, as ordered by
Espino, the provincial auditor) appears to be belied by his own testimony.

Case 22
People VS Dy

Facts:
Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder before the
trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting
the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a
confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the
accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such
statement was not made in writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial
investigation.

Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the
accused.

Held:
In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the court. An
oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he
wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is because such
confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not under investigation
when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper
procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable
where a witness who heard the confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if
he heard and understood it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it
must be given in substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of
custodial investigation can be admissible in court and was given due credence to warrant the
judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.

Case 23
People VS Alicando

Facts:
Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was arrested and
during the interrogation he made a confession of the crime without the assistance of a counsel. By
virtue of his uncounseled confession the police came to know where to find the evidences consisting
of the victim’s personal things like clothes stained with blood which was admitted to court as
evidences. The victim pleaded guilty during the arraignment and was convicted with the death
penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review.

Issue:
Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the accused.

Held:
Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He was not
informed of his right to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the information
against him was written in a language he could not understand and was not explained to him. This is
in violation of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The lower court also violated
section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant without conducting a search
inquiry on the voluntariness and full understanding of the accused of the consequences of his plea.
Moreover the evidences admitted by the court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible
because they were due to an invalid custodial investigation that did not provide the accused with due
process of the law. Thus the SC annulled the decision of the imposition of the death penalty and
remanded the case back to the lower for further proceeding.