SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of

Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705[1] as amended by Executive Order (E.O.)
277.[2]
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a
member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a
ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will
pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task
Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in
Laoag City.[3]
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1
Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted
themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes
later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed
the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.[4]
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-
appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused-appellant
as the owner of the truck and the cargo.[5]
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When
interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted
in between the coconut slabs.[6]
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargos supporting documents,
specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3)
auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger
regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of
these documents. All he could show was a certification[7] from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he
legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of
the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. [8]
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force
at the provincial capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the
Provincial Task Force that there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs. [9]
At 10:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together
with three CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the
cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were
piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the tanguile lumber.[10] When the CENRO
personnel inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted two hundred
fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79
cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50.[11]
 On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The
Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck
bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258
pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of
Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic
meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary
permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities, thus
violating the aforecited provision of the law, to the damage and prejudice of
the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [12]

Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the
258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the
private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa[13] and Elpidio Sabal.[14] The PLTP
authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by
the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by th
PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as
payment for his hauling services.[15]
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as
evidence against him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and
seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck
owned by accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision[16] states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B.
Que guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705,
as amended by Executive Order No. 277 and he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties
provided by law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused
is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the
ten-wheeler truck bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the
commission of the crime are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. [17]
 Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of errors:[18]
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD705
as amended by EO 277 for possessing timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations on the ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for
the first time mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are no
existing forest laws and regulations which required certain legal
documents for possession of timber and other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused against unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused under custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for
violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to
penalize the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession
legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its
enactment.
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705
provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition
to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are
found. (emphasis supplied)
Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to those
laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O.
277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory
construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to
refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest
products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents
required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the
Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.

Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood,
veneer, non-timber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based
products/commodities shall be covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued
by authorized DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.

xxx

3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be
accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the
CENRO or his duly authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the
processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to
deal in such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be supported by
the company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales
invoice.

xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any
certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
xxx
xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could
not present a single document to justify his possession of the subject
lumber. xxx
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices,
he readily showed documents to justify his possession of the coconut
slabs. Thus, he showed a certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest
Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a
xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering the parcel of land where
the coconut slabs were cut. (Exhibit "F")
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:
THIS IS TO
CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transported
by Mr. Wilson Que on board truck bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were
derived from matured coconut palms gathered inside the private land of
Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614 (8) located at
Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
 This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que
for the purpose of facilitating the transportation of said coconut slabs
from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan
and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of its cargoes at its
final destination, whichever comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR
to transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11,
1994. The accused was apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his
truck bearing plate number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut
slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be
seen from the outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible
unless the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the
truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very
much aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber
(b)ut could not secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the
same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police authorities by
merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated
March 3, 1994 addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO that he would be transporting the
subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto.
Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the reason that he did not
need a permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibit 8, 8-A)
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on
March 4, 1994, the court has doubts that this was duly filed with the
concerned office. According to the accused, he filed the letter in the morning
of March 4 and returned in the afternoon of the same day. He was then
informed by an employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify that he did
not need a permit to transport the lumber because the lumber would be for
personal used (sic) and x x came from PLTP. (Ibid) The letter-request was
returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the
stance of the accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this
kind filed with a government agency are not returned. Hence, when a person
files or submits any document to a government agency, the agency gets the
original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that he has filed
such document with the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as regards the
identity of the employee of the CENRO who allegedly returned the letter-
request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on cross-examination,
the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of the CENRO
who returned the letter-request to him answered that he could recognize the
 person x x but they were already reshuffled. (TSN, February 8, 1995, p.
104) At one point, the accused also said that he did not know if that person
was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this
letter-request, to wit:
xxx
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view
of the fact that I am hauling and transporting my own lumber for my
own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of
transport agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this
letter with him when he transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted
source.[19]

xxx
Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly
constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellants argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal
forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the
cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are two
(2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the
authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial
whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or
not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates
the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because
E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the
proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized
lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being fruits of a poisonous tree. Appellant avers
that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against
unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right to counsel.
We do not agree.
 The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by
this court in People vs. Bagista,[20] thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this
manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal
effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or
on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in
violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others, be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the
seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to
be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that
they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search
appellants truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a
reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with
illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the
Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the
ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos
Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there
were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the
lumbers supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing
circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the
extensive search of appellants truck even without a warrant.Thus, the 258 pieces of
tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to
prove the guilt of accused-appellant.
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellants
right to counsel under custodial investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue
will not affect the finding of guilt of appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED. Costs Against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Revised Forestry Code.
Amending Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the
[2]

Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, For the Purpose of Penalizing Possession of Timber or Other
Forest Products Without the Legal Documents Required By Existing Forest Laws, Authorizing the
Confiscation of Illegally Cut, Gathered, Removed and Possessed Forest Products, and Granting Rewards
to Informers of Violations of Forestry Laws, Rules and Regulations.
[3]
TSN, December 2, 1994, pp. 3-4.
[4]
TSN, December 2, 1994, pp. 4-5; TSN, December 8, 1994, pp. 39-41.
[5]
TSN, December 2, 1994, p. 6.
[6]
TSN, December 2, 1994, pp. 7-8.
[7]
Exhibits E and E-1.
[8]
TSN, December 8, 1994, p. 43.
[9]
TSN, December 2, 1994, p. 7.
[10]
TSN, December 8, 1994, p. 44; Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3.
Inventory and Scale Sheet of Seized Lumber Loaded on Isuzu Ten Wheeler Truck Bearing Plate No.
[11]

PAD-548 prepared and signed by Aurelio E. Macugay, Forest Protection Officer, Clemente A. Visco, Jr.,
Scaler, and Maisee A. Bartolome, Forest Ranger (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2).
[12]
Original Records, p. 1.
[13]
Exhibit 4.
[14]
Exhibit 5.
[15]
TSN, February 8, 1995, pp. 91-93.
[16]
Penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin.
[17]
Rollo, p. 33.
[18]
Appellants Brief, Rollo, p. 57.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 28-31.
[20]
214 SCRA 63 (1992).
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996]

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY.
VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation
Division, DENR, respondents.

[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-

CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996]

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and
Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P.
PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR., respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally
assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were
subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna
Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo
de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-
092590-0469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
 Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A.
Robles were, during all the time material to these cases, the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the
Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches,
shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct
surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw
coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded
with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver
could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the
truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas
Avenue, Quezon City.[1] The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because
of the refusal of the owner.[2]
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive
Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioners lumberyard
four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra
lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.[3]
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's lumberyard in
Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because
the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber
origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the
invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. [4]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner
retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is
taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from
disposing them until further orders.[5]
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an
extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents
covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber
origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the motion on the
ground that the documents being required from the petitioner must accompany the
lumber or forest products placed under seizure.[6]
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to
Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang
Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and
possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck
with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR
 compound in the event its owner fails to submit documents showing legitimacy of
the source of said lumber within ten days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc.
and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and
almaciga lumber and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458 as well as the lumber
loaded therein for transport lumber using recycled documents.[7]
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the
petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner
to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be
cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing
the latter that the petitioner had already secured the required documents and was ready
to submit them. None, however, was submitted.[8]
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the
events which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered CONFISCATED in
favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law the approximately
311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside
the petitioner's lumberyard.[9]
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary injunction
against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case
(hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and
assigned to Branch 35 o the said court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure
on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with
Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and
lauan of different sizes and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the
orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of
3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting
upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of
DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan
Luna Street, Tondo, Manila.The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer
although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been suspended on 23 April
1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team went inside and
saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team
was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's
customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The members of
the team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to
be the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was
then out of town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs of the
stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting
machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team
thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan
lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt therefor.[10]
 As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter,
the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to
Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint
against the petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary
investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a
resolution[11] whose dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information

be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of
almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series
of 1987.

It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs
covered by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa. [12]

This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III,

who served as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging.[13]
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ
with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the information
reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the
premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.[14]
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision [15] in the
FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:

1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S.

Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the
Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga
lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized from the lumberyard of the
petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and instead
the respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said
311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be
dealt with as directed by law;
 2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action before
the proper court regarding the lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were
seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be
rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and
2 of this judgment;
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and almaciga lumber,
shorts and sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be
returned to said petitioner, is withheld in this case until after the proper court has
taken cognizance and determined how those lumber, shorts and sticks should be
disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and
seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of
lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not
offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid
warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where
warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle.[16] As to the
seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4
April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a continuation of that made the
previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by
Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even question.[17] And,
although the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan
lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the executing officer
is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of the search. [18]
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason
that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive
Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in
the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court
ruled that the same had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the
petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner admitted
in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the
Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to
Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the
information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to timber,
is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may
not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure;
and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL
CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the
seizure, raises a prejudicial question.[19]
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession thereof without the required legal
documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order
No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that
exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to
minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest
resources.[20]
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, [21] respondent Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the
ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws
and regulations is not a crime."[22]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October
1991,[23] the People filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424,
wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [24] in CA-G.R. SP
No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the
FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to the
claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing
the possession of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession without the
required legal documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of
Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product
involved has always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate
business of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider is that when appellant
was required to present the valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful
possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present any despite the period of
extension granted to it.[25]
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992.[26] Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by
way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2 May
1992.[27]
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in
the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because
(a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure was
made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license
was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No.
705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless search and seizure
under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed
the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
 In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's
appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied
upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition
of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the
market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood,
esp. when suitable or adapted for various building purposes," the respondent Court held
that since wood is included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No.
705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term forest
product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize
the forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to
Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as follows:

SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of the
Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police
shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in
his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing
the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process
of committing the offense.

Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the
cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products or possession
of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in
the resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February
1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424 with which the
other two were consolidated.

G.R. No. 106424

The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91
on the ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong
granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL
CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required legal
documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may
be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It
has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the
averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, constitute the elements of the offense,[29] and matters aliunde will not be
considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:

SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession
shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well
as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of
timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority;
and (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex
gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage,
do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation
of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion
that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged
to be in the possession of the private respondent, without the required legal documents,
are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa.
The almaciga and lauan specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as lumber.
They cannot refer to the lumber in no. (2) because they are separated by the words
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. with the conjunction and, and not with the preposition of.
They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section 3(q)
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:

SEC. 3. Definitions.
 xxx xxx xxx

(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum,
wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub,
and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational
and geological resources in forest lands.

It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The
public and the private respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the
information.Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items
therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the
information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion
that this Court go beyond the four corners of the information for enlightenment as to
whether the information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and
the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that only lumber has been envisioned
in the indictment.
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule
that only the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be
considered in determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his
conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman
Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred to,[30] cannot lead one to infer that what
the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4)
truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber,
and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (Italics supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution[31] of the investigating
prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself
to lumber; thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information

be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and
lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of
1987. (Italics supplied)

The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an

affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the
coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof
without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules
that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the
term timber.
 The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While
the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of Processing plant;
which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine

used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In
the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the market.[32] Simply put,
lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.[33] And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw
or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distanguit nec nos distinguere
debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion
to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said case.

G.R. No. 104988

We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show
that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29
November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No.
CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with
the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo
was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section
80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a
search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
constitutional mandate[34] that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable
cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure
of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless
search.[35]
 We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and
by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge
Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime
of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object
or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the
following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one
day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day,
provided it is still within the ten-day period.[36]
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession
of lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in the
term forest product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in
G.R. No. 106424.

G.R. No. 123784

The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpably fail to
show prima facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in
its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to
require the respondents to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment
of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that
its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23
April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of
up to 25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or
otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized
representative had the authority to seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:

Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly

Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violations of this
Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly
authorized representative may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally
cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .

The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must
also fail in view of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No.
106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which
involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the suspension of
the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to
cover up blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No.
705), as amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of
the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public
in light of the urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our
forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not the
present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government
must not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or
favor any person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our
forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and
ANNULLING, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the
challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ri
Chuy Po; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d)
DIRECTING the respondent Judge on her successor to hear and decide the case
with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure
of the petitioner to show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error in the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778
in the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, G.R. No. 10493, 37-38.
[2]
Id., 40.
[3]
Rollo, G.R. No. 106424, 6.
[4]
Id., G.R. No. 104988, 38.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Id., 39.
[7]
Rollo, G.R. No. 104988, 39.
[8]
Id., 40.
[9]
Rollo, G.R. 104988, 40-41.
[10]
Rollo, G.R. No. 123784, 26-27.
[11]
Id., G.R. No. 106424, 50-55 (Annex "I" of Petition).
[12]
Rollo, G.R. No. 106424, 54.
[13]
Id., 14.
[14]
Id., 32.
[15]
Id., G.R. No. 104988, 62. Per Judge Ramon P. Makasiar.
[16]
Citing People vs. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991].
[17]
Citing Johnson vs. state, 146 Miss. 593.
[18]
Citing VARON, Searches, Seizures and Immunities, vol. I, 2nd ed., 563-565, 568-570, which gave the
example that a search warrant authorizing the search for and seizure of a gun includes the
seizure of live shells found within the premises to be searched although not specifically
mentioned in the warrant; in other words, a departure from the command of the search warrant
describing what property may be seized thereunder is justified where there is a direct relation of
the additional articles seized to the primary purpose of the search.
[19]
Rollo, G.R. No. 106424, 33-35.
[20]
Id., 35.
[21]
Rollo, G.R. No. 106424, 32-39 (annex "A" of Petition).
[22]
Id., 39.
[23]
Id., 40 (Annex "B" of Petition).
[24]
Id., G.R. No. 104988, 36. Per Chua, S., J., with Kapunan, S., and Victor L., JJ., concurring.
[25]
Id., 43.25
[26]
Rollo, G.R. No. 104988, 45.
[27]
Id., 10.
[28]
Id., G.R. No. 123784, 26. Per Carpio-Morales, C., J., with Garcia C., and Callejo, R., JJ., concurring.
[29]
FLORENZ D. REGALADO, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. 2, Seventh Revised ed. [1995], 392,
citing People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]. See also VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, The Revised
Rules of Court (Criminal Procedure), 2nd, ed. [1969] 579; MANUEL V. MORAN, Comments of the
Rules of Court, vol. 4. [1980], 222.
[30]
Rollo, G.R. No. 106424, 41-42 (Annex "C" of Petition).
[31]
Id., 50-55 (Annex "I" of Petition).
[32]
Page 1345.
[33]
RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 131.
[34]
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
[35]
People vs. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174 [1994]. In this book on Remedial Law, vol. 4 (Criminal
Procedure), 1992 ed., 669, retired Justice Oscar M. Herrera of the Court of Appeals mentions a
sixth exception, viz., search based on probable cause under extraordinary circumstances, citing
People vs. Posadas, 188 SCRA 288 [1990]; Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 [1989];
People vs. Maspil, 188 SCRA 751 [1990]; People vs. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 [1991]; People vs.
Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 [1991].
[36]
FLORENZ D. REGALADO, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. 2, Seventh Revised Ed. [1995], 526,
citing Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal 42 Phil. 886 [1920].
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and G.R. No. 175289

ANIANO LATAYADA,
Petitioners, Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. August 31, 2011

x--- --- --- -- -- - --- --- -- --- --- -- - -- -- --- --- --- -- -- -- --- -- -x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws and
regulations makes one automatically liable of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 705,[1] as amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a valid defense.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28, 2005
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 which affirmed in
all respects the Judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Cagayan De
Oro City, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68,
P.D. No. 705, as amended.Likewise assailed in this
[4]
petition is the September 22, 2006 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]

Factual Antecedents
 In a Criminal Complaint[6] filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
4, Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest
Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada)
and three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of Tagpangi,
Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were
charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No.
277.[7]

Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City
issued a Resolution[8] dated March 13, 1996 recommending the filing of an Information
for the aforesaid charge not only against Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac but also against
petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin), then Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan
de Oro City. The dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria was likewise
recommended. Said Resolution was then approved by the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao through a Resolution[9] dated May 9, 1996 ordering the filing of the
Information in the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City.

Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information[10] was filed against petitioners Villarin
and Latayada and their co-accused Baillo and Boyatac, for violation of Section 68, P.D.
No. 705 as follows:

That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, pursuant to RA 7975, the
accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public officer being the Barangay Captain of Pagalungan,
this City, with salary grade below 27, taking advantage of his official position and
committing the offense in relation to his office, and the other above-named accused, all
private individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano Latayada,
confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously gather and possess sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes
belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of Four Thousand Three Hundred
Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at P108,150.00, without any authority and
supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation to the
damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]

On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation.[12] They alleged that the Joint Affidavit[13]of the personnel of the DENR
which became one of the bases in filing the Information never mentioned Villarin as one
of the perpetrators of the crime while the accusations against Baillo and Boyatac were not
based on the personal knowledge of the affiants. They also asserted that their indictment
was based on polluted sources, consisting of the sworn statements of witnesses like
Latayada and Sudaria, who both appeared to have participated in the commission of the
crime charged.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its Order[14] dated
January 27, 1997, directed Villarin, Boyatac, and Baillo to file their Motion for
Reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, it being the entity which
filed the Information in Court. On March 31, 1997, only Villarin filed a Petition for
Reinvestigation[15] but same was, however, denied by the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao in an Order[16] dated May 15, 1997 because the grounds relied upon were not
based on newly discovered evidence or errors of fact, law or irregularities that are
prejudicial to the interest of the movants, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 07 or the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman in Criminal Cases. The Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao likewise opined that Villarin was directly implicated by
Latayada, his co-accused.

The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas
of not guilty.[17] Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On December 31, 1995, at around five oclock in the afternoon, prosecution witness
Roland Granada (Granada) noticed that a public utility jeep loaded with timber stopped
near his house. The driver, petitioner Latayada, was accompanied by four to five other
persons, one of whom was Boyatac while the rest could not be identified
by Granada.[18] They alighted from the jeep and unloaded the timber 10 to 15 meters
away from the Batinay bridge at Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan De Oro City. Another
prosecution witness, Pastor Pansacala (Pansacala), also noticed the jeep with plate
number MBB 226 and owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber.[19] Being then the president
of a community-based organization which serves as a watchdog of illegal cutting of
trees,[20] Pansacala even ordered a certain Mario Bael to count the timber.[21]

At six oclock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain Angeles Alarcon
(Alarcon)[22] noticed that the pile of timber was already placed near the bridge. Since she
had no knowledge of any scheduled repair of the Batinay bridge she was surprised to
discover that the timber would be used for the repair. After inquiring from the people
living near the bridge, she learned that Latayada and Boyatac delivered the timber.[23]

Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven

oclock in the morning of January 1, 1996, Boyatac bought a stick of cigarette from his
store and requested him to cover the pile of timber near the bridge for a fee. Palanga
acceded and covered the pile with coconut leaves.[24]
On January 13, 1996, at around ten oclock in the morning, prosecution witness Juan
Casenas (Casenas), a radio and TV personality of RMN-TV8, took footages of the
timber[25] hidden and covered by coconut leaves. Casenas also took footages of more logs
inside a bodega at the other side of the bridge. In the following evening, the footages
were shown in a news program on television.

On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force Team measured the
timber which consisted of 63 pieces of Apitong flitches and determined that it totaled
4,326 board feet[26]and subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon for safekeeping.

Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was requisitioned by Villarin,
who was then Barangay Captain of Pagulangan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarin gave
Sudaria the specifications for the requisitioned timber. Thereafter, Boyatac informed
Villarin that the timber was already delivered on December 31, 1995.[27]

On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard at the DENR Region
10 Office, received and signed for the confiscated timber since the property custodian at
that time was not around.

The filing of the aforestated Information followed.

The Version of the Defense

In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an, Tuburan

and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair the impassable
Batinay bridge.The project was allegedly with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.

Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac

to inquire from Sudaria about the availability of timber without first informing the City
Engineer. Sudaria asked for the specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked
Baillo and Boyatac to attend to the same. When the timber was already available, it was
transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber flitches were seized by the
DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office where they were received by Vera Cruz,
the security guard on duty.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified the court of Boyatacs
demise.[28] However, the trial court did not act on such notice. Instead, it proceeded to rule
on the culpability of Boyatac. Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court found herein
petitioners and the deceased Boyatac guilty as charged. On the other hand, it found the
evidence against Baillo insufficient. The dispositive portion of the Judgment reads:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as
amended, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.[29]

In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:

Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then a Barangay Captain of
Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, was the one who procured the subject flitches, while
accused Aniano Latayada and Cipriano Boyatac mutually helped him and each other by
transporting the flitches from Sitio Batinay to the Pagalungan Bridge. The accused would
like to impress upon the Court that the subject fltiches were intended for the repair of
the Pagalungan Bridge and were acquired by virtue of Barangay Resolution No. 110 of
Barangay Pagalungan. The Court is not impressed by this lame excuse. There is no
dispute that the flitches were intended for the repair of the bridge. The Court finds it a
laudable motive. The fact remains though that the said forest products were obtained
without the necessary authority and legal documents required under existing forest laws
and regulations.[30]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] which was denied by the

RTC in its Order[32] dated August 20, 2002.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its Decision dated June 28,
2005. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court a quo finding
[d]efendant-[a]ppellants Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree 705 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.[33]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which the appellate court denied
for lack of merit in its Resolution[35] promulgated on September 22, 2006.
 Issues

Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT;

2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM WHAT

THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALWAYS BEEN SAYING, THAT, TO
CONVICT AN ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME MUST BE
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and;

3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING THE

PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE COURT A QUO[,] DEPARTED FROM
JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN CRIMES [INVOLVING] VIOLATION OF
SPECIAL LAWS[,] SPECIAL CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [CAN BE CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING HAD
THE VIOLATION BEEN PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
IN ORDER TO REDUCE PENALTY].[36]

Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is

tantamount to a denial of the right to due process. As Villarin was indicted in the
Information despite his not being included in the criminal complaint filed by Pioquinto of
the TL Strike Force Team of the DENR, they claim that he was not afforded a
preliminary investigation. They also bewail the fact that persons who appear to be equally
guilty, such as Sudaria, have not been included in the Information. Hence, they argue that
the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition for
reinvestigation because it deprived Villarin of his right to preliminary investigation and in
refusing and to equally prosecute the guilty. They contend that the Ombudsman should
not have relied on the prosecutors Certification[37] contained in the Information to the
effect that a preliminary investigation was conducted in the case.

Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt since they had no intention to possess the timber and
dispose of it for personal gain. They likewise claim that there was failure on the part of
the prosecution to present the timber, which were the object of the offense.

Our Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Villarin was properly afforded his right to due
process.

Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint charging
Sudaria, Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended.[38]The said complaint did not state the known addresses of the accused. Neither
was the notarized joint-affidavit of the complainants attached thereto. The subpoena
issued to the accused and the copy of their counter-affidavits were also not part of the
record. Moreover, the complaint did not include Villarin as a respondent. However, said
infirmities do not constitute denial of due process particularly on the part of Villarin.

It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of the
City Prosecutor that Villarin and all the accused participated in the scheduled preliminary
investigation that was conducted prior to the filing of the criminal case.[39] They knew
about the filing of the complaint and even denied any involvement in the illegal cutting of
timber. They were also given the opportunity to submit countervailing evidence to
convince the investigating prosecutor of their innocence.

Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that

Villarin was not afforded a preliminary investigation. Accordingly, we find no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in denying
Villarins motion for reconsideration. It validly relied on the certification contained in the
Information that a preliminary investigation was properly conducted in this case. The
certification was made under oath by no less than the public prosecutor, a public officer
who is presumed to have regularly performed his official duty.[40] Besides, it aptly noted
that Villarin was implicated by x x x Latayada in his affidavit dated January 22, 1996
before Marcelino B. Pioquinto, Chief, Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The
denial of Villarin cannot prevail over the declaration of witnesses.[41]

Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and
must not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance
and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation,
which, necessarily involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already
submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable
cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary
investigation.[42]

Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in
his Motion for Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he
never raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not
guilty during his arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits by
attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his
own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once
again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for
Reconsideration.[43] Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence
of a preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and
actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation.

Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as a principal in the
commission of the offense. However, whether Sudaria should or should not be included
as co-accused can no longer be raised on appeal. Any right that the petitioners may have
in questioning the non-inclusion of Sudaria in the Information should have been raised in
a motion for reconsideration of the March 13, 1996 Resolution of the Office of the City
Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the complaint
[44]
against Sudaria. Having failed to avail of the proper
procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.

Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of

Presidential Decree No. 705.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or

Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession
shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authorization; and
 (2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.[45]

The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is

consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the proper documents.

We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the
burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The evidence of the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners were in custody of timber
without the necessary legal documents. Incidentally, we note that several transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) were not submitted by the trial court. No explanation was
provided for these missing TSNs.Notwithstanding the incomplete TSNs, we still find that
the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt petitioners culpability.

The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was confiscated
from petitioners. It presented a Tally Sheet[46] to prove that the DENR Strike Force Team
examined the seized timber on January 13, 1996. The number, volume and appraised
value of said timber were also noted in the Tally Sheet. Seizure receipts were also
presented to prove that the confiscated timber were placed in the custody of
Alarcon[47] and eventually taken to the DENR Office.[48] There was a photograph of the
timber taken by the television crew led by Casenas.[49]

The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of

eyewitnesses Granada and Pansacala who testified that Latayada and Boyatac were the
ones who delivered the timber.[50]

More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned the
procurement of the timber[51] for the repair of the Batinay bridge. He even deputized
Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria and gave Latayada P2,000.00 to transport the
logs. Boyatac later informed him of the delivery of timber. However, he could not present
any document to show that his possession thereof was legal and pursuant to existing
forest laws and regulations.
Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:

Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports prior to the incident
on December 31, 1995 that Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria was also engaged
in supplying forest products like forest lumber?
A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride on his jeepney.

Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you and not only by one
but several persons from Barangay Tagpangi even up to Barangay Pagalungan?
A Thats true because he even has a record with the police.
Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?
A Yes, Sir.

Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was supplying illegally cut
lumber regularly?
A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein lumber was being
loaded, the lumber will be taken when it arrived in Lumbia, kilometer 5.

Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of Camilo Sudaria, still
he continued to load illegally cut lumber?
A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was ashamed because he was
the Barangay Captain of Tagpangi.

Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut lumber occurred prior
to June 1995?
A Yes, sir.

Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally cut[ting] forest products,
you as Barangay Captain of Pagalungan transacted with him for the purpose of
acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at Pagalungan?
A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some lumber to be used to
build his house and he told me he will sell it for the repair of the bridge in
Pagalungan.

Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of materials for the
repair of the bridge in Pagalungan?
A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those specifications.

Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those specification?

A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the specifications and he let me
sign it.

Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?

A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.

Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony before, Aniano
Latayada delivered the lumber flitches you ordered on board the passenger jeep
of Camilo Sudaria?
A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the lumber were already
there. So, it was delivered.

Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?

A Boyatac.

Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay Bridge.

A Yes, Sir.

Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid Latayada the
compensation for the delivery of those lumber?
 A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.

Q To whom did you give the advance?

A To Latayada.

Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?

A No, Sir.

Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for the transportation of
the lumber from Tagpangi to Batinay bridge?
A Yes, Sir.

PROS. GALARRITA:
Q And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the lumber?
A Yes, Sir.

COURT:
Q Did you pay Latayada?
A Yes, Sir.

Q How much?
A P2,000.

Q And you gave this to the conductor?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did the conductor say?

A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the transporting of lumber
from Tagpangi.[52] (Underscoring ours.)

Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential

Decree No. 705, as amended, is
malum prohibitum.

As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such,
criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that
petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi) the timber.[53] Possession, under
the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the [object of the crime] is in the immediate physical control of
the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the [object of the
crime] is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to
exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.[54]
 There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timber
without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in
its procurement, delivery and storage without any license or permit issued by any
competent authority. Given these and considering that the offense is malum
prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession of the illegally cut timber was not
for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.

Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission

of the Crime

Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus
delicti had not been established. They assert that the failure to present the confiscated
timber in court was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.

We disagree. [C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the
ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person
murdered[55] or, in this case, to the seized timber. Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the
commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness uncorroborated
testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus
delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.[56]

Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established by the
documentary and testimonial evidence on record. The Tally Sheet, Seizure Receipts
issued by the DENR and photograph proved the existence of the timber and its
confiscation. The testimonies of the petitioners themselves stating in no uncertain terms
the manner in which they consummated the offense they were charged with were
likewise crucial to their conviction.

We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been established that
factual findings of a trial court are binding on us, absent any showing that it overlooked
or misinterpreted facts or circumstances of weight and substance.[57] The legal precept
applies to this case in which the trial courts findings were affirmed by the appellate
court.[58]

The Proper Penalty

 Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as qualified
theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The
pertinent portions of these provisions read:

Art. 310. Qualified Theft The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding
articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken
from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property
is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value
of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the
value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. x x x

The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of timber
without the requisite legal documents measuring 4,326 board feet were valued
at P108,150.00. To prove this allegation, the prosecution presented Pioquinto to testify,
among others, on this amount. Tally Sheets and Seizure Receipts were also presented to
corroborate said amount. With the value of the timber exceeding P22,000.00, the basic
penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in its
maximum, the range of which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten
(10) years. Since none of the qualifying circumstances in Article 310 of the RPC was
alleged in the Information, the penalty cannot be increased two degrees higher.

In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be deducted

from P108,150.00, which results to P86,150.00. This remainder must be divided
by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. Consequently, eight (8)
years must be added to the basic penalty. Thus the maximum imposable penalty ranges
from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to eighteen (18) years
of reclusion temporal.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty

should be taken anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, without
considering the modifying circumstances. The penalty one degree lower from prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, the range of which is from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. Thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erroneously fixed the
minimum period of the penalty at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.

Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise even
before the RTC rendered its Judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28,
2005 and the Resolution dated September 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioners Crisostomo Villarin and
Aniano Latayada are each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, eight
(8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The complaint against
Cipriano Boyatac is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 135-148; penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro and concurred in by Associate Justices
Arturo G. Tayag and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.
[3]
Records, pp. 162-173; penned by Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga.
[4]
CA rollo, pp. 158-159; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Mario V. Lopez.
[5]
Id. at 149-156.
[6]
Records, p. 4.
[7]
Dated July 25, 1987 and is entitled as AMENDING SECTION 68 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 705, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOR
THE PURPOSE OF PENALIZING POSSESSION OF TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS
WITHOUT THE LEGAL DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BY EXISTING FOREST LAWS, AUTHORIZING
THE CONFISCATION OF ILLEGALLY CUT, GATHERED, REMOVED AND POSSESSED FOREST
PRODUCTS, AND GRANTING REWARDS TO INFORMERS OF VIOLATIONS OF FORESTRY LAWS,
RULES AND REGULATIONS.
Section 1 thereof reads:
Section 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
 The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found.
[8]
Records, pp. 7-10.
[9]
Id. at 5-6.
[10]
Id. at 2-3.
[11]
Id. at 2.
[12]
Id. at 30-31.
[13]
Folder of Exhibits, p. 4; executed by Laurence Amiscaray, Roy Cabaraban, Pedro Morales, Jr. and Arthur Roda,
to the effect that their investigation revealed that the cutting of trees was done under the supervision of Boyatac
and Baillo.
[14]
Records, p. 34-A.
[15]
Id. at 2.
[16]
Id. at 75-76.
[17]
Id. at 53 and 56.
[18]
TSN, October 14, 1997, pp. 3-10.
[19]
TSN, October 16, 1997, p. 51.
[20]
Id. at 44.
[21]
Id. at 55.
[22]
She was a Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of
the crime subject of this case. She later succeeded petitioner Villarin as Barangay Captain.
[23]
TSN, October 16, 1997, pp. 13-14.
[24]
TSN, October 14, 1997, p. 25.
[25]
TSN, January 20, 1998, p. 6.
[26]
Joint Affidavit; supra note 13.
[27]
TSN, June 2, 1998, pp. 8-9.
[28]
Records, pp. 140, 145.
[29]
Id. at 173.
[30]
Id. at 172-173.
[31]
Id. at 181-186
[32]
Id. at 205-206.
[33]
CA rollo, p. 147.
[34]
Supra note 5.
[35]
Supra note 4.
[36]
Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[37]
Records, p. 3.
[38]
Id at 4.
[39]
Id. at 9.
[40]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(m).
[41]
Records, p. 75
[42]
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 899, 923 (2004).
[43]
Records, pp. 181-197.
[44]
Aquino v. Hon. Mariano, 214 Phil. 470, 474. (1984)
[45]
Aquino v. People, G.R. No. 165448, July 27, 2009, 594 SCRA 50, 58.
[46]
Exhibit A, Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
[47]
Exhibit B, id. at 2.
[48]
Exhibit C, id. at 3.
[49]
Exhibit J, id. at 11.
[50]
TSN, October 14, 1997, pp. 4-7; TSN, October 16, 1997, pp. 41-42.
[51]
See Reply to Peoples Comment, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 125-126.
[52]
TSN, June 2, 1998, pp. 4-12.
[53]
People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 177777, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 377, 391, citing People v. Tira, G.R. No.
139615, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 134.
[54]
Id.
[55]
Rimorin, Sr. v. People, 450 Phil. 465, 474 (2003).
[56]
Id. at 475.
[57]
Id. at 477.
[58]
Id.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002]

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES

(DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban City, Represented by Regional
Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO
DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C.
ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
32, Calbayog City, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation in favor of the government of, among others,
the vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision[1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused

GREGORIO DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime
charged, with costs de [o]ficio.

The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.

The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is
taking custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle St. Jude, with Plate No.
HAJ-848, to return the said vehicle to the owner thereof. [3]

The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last
paragraph of the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein
respondents.

The Facts
 In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with]
violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive
Order No. 277 in an information which is quoted herein below:

That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon, at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy
two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total volume of 72.93 board feet
valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY
CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from
the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not
guilty.

Thereafter trial was conducted.

The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:

That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a

Forest Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he
was in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named St. Jude with
Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the
said vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The
lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1 x 2 x 4, 16 pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x
2 x 4. In his estimate at the price of P10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber
would be P729.30. He asked the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and he was
informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed
him that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy
Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the vehicle and the
assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. B and
series. He also took photographs of the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. C and
series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest
Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for some papers for the assorted
lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not his. Daraman further
told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from
the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his
assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to
his (Asans) house in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City.

The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both
the prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that
the case would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion.
The prosecution rested its case with the admission of Exhs. A and B and their series.
Its Exhs. C and series were rejected because the photographer who took them did not
testify to identify [them].

For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused
would merely offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts
have been established:

That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed
him to procure some wood shavings (sinapyo) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the
service vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His companion[s]
were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went to barangay Blanca
Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood shavings from the
furniture shop owned by a certain Asan Abing. They loaded 20 sacks of wood
shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2 inches in circumference
as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were] being used by the Holy Cross
Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood shavings were
loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his
house in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was]
also located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle. The
subject assorted lumber were already in the furniture shop where they got the wood
shavings. On their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo Opinion stopped
him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired about the assorted lumber and
he told him that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop in Brgy.
Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his vehicle to be brought to his (Asans) house
in Barangay Obrero, CalbayogCity. He told Opinion also that Asan advised him that if
somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the person that Asan had the
papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San
Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead
impounded the vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon, the vehicle was still not returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and
returned to his employer at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about what
happened. [4]

After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed
vehicle to Lucenecio.
Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-
CENRO) of Catbalogan, Samar conducted administrative confiscation proceedings on
the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private respondents.[5] The two failed to
present documents to show the legality of their possession and transportation of the
lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the
Regional Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and
conveyance.[6] Atty. Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994,
concurring with the recommendation to forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from
private respondents. The Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus
L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region
VIII, Tacloban City.[7]
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the
reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the return of the said
vehicle to the owner thereof.[8] He contended that the vehicle had already been
administratively confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED
approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.[9]He further claimed that the DENR had
exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had been used in violation of the
Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence.

The unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood
shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latters house
in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also
located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the
authorization for the lumber were in the formers shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora.
Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC
considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was
untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign
of his disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by
the Court the owner of the vehicle in question, St. Jude, which is the Holy Cross
Funeral Parlor owned by accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of
P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that accused
Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of the motion
which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession of the subject forest
products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the
subject lumber. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has
long become final and executory.

Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by

the OIC DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the
lumber in question [was] found to be owned by Asan Abing. But notwithstanding this
fact, for reasons not known to the Court, the said Asan Abing was never made an
accused in the present case.

Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is
himself a violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any other
persons who committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of
his vehicle in violating the said law. In the present case as shown by the evidence,
neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has
committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by the Court in its decision
of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were
declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the decision has not been appealed. [10]

Hence, this Petition.[11]

Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts
consideration:

(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order

x x x the return of property already owned by the government.

(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions

of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No.
277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.

(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of
mistake, error or failure of its officers to perform their duties.
[12]

Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the
confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and
(3) whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from
confiscating the vehicle administratively.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

 First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle

Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the
return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government
property by virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The
DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as
amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of all conveyances --
by land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or
abandoning forest products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A comparison of the
provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the
jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as
the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the
confiscation of forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission
of the offense. Section 68 reads:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code: x x x.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber
or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found. [14]

Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:

SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or
other forest laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. [15]

If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal
meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording
correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently. [16]
 Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial
arts;[17] equipment covers physical facilities available for production, including buildings,
machineries and tools;[18] and implements pertains to whatever may supply a want,
especially an instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These terms do not include conveyances that
are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A
define conveyance in a manner that includes any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether
motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode
of transport used in the movement of any forest product.[20]
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same is vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) secretary or a duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary has
supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and
wildlife laws, rules and regulations.[21]
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-
93, amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides
the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in
violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to
private respondents to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess
seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and
obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, x x x. The
Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance
of illegally cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of
PD 705, as amended.

Confiscation Without Due Process

Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex C) is a

false, falsified and perjurious document. The Order was attached to and made part of
the record only when petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6,
1996, or only after the trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it
appear, according to the private respondents, that RED Momongan had approved the
Memorandum on January 26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because
Atty. Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division of Tacloban City,
signed the Memorandum recommending approval only on January 31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32)
ordered the provincial environment and natural resources officer to transfer the
confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in connection with the prosecution of Criminal
Case 1958.[22] Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not deliver the vehicle because
it was not in running condition.[23]
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls
outside the ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the
assailed Order to release the vehicle was private respondents acquittal of the charge of
violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR was
based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it.
Petitioner is questioning only the RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release
the confiscated vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the DENRs Order of
Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus be presumed.[24] The genuineness of the Order
and its proper service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this
Court, which is not a trier of facts.[25]
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the
main limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.[26] Under PD 705, the
actions and the decisions of the DENR are reviewable by the courts only through
special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.[27]

Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended

Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-
A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the
violator or was a conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54,
Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture of
the conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its
illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of
PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law
or conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her
vehicle in violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have
violated PD 705, and their acquittals were not appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal
case is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation,
movement or conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR
secretary or the authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus,
they are not capable of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts.
Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that
authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we
cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the accused before it
impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest
products without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an
injustice.[28]
We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private
respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry
laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve
the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future
generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only
through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws. [29] Strong
paramount public policy should not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that
frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.[30]

Third Issue:
Estoppel

In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioners
third issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to
hold that the assistant provincial prosecutors failure to comment on petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration was an implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutors
disapproval does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the
vehicle to private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

[1]
Penned by Judge Clemente C. Rosales; rollo, pp. 39-47.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 53-54.
[3]
Rollo, p. 47.
[4]
RTC Decision, pp. 1-5; rollo, pp. 39-42.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 33-35.
[6]
Rollo, p. 35.
[7]
Order of Forfeiture; rollo, p. 147.
[8]
Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 1-4; rollo, pp. 48-51.
[9]
Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, Annex C, rollo, p. 38; Annex 11, rollo, p. 147; and Annex
H, rollo, p. 177.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 53-54.
[11]
The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon this Courts receipt of the Memorandum for private
respondents on January 30, 2001. The resolution of this case was delayed by private
respondents failure/refusal to file their pleadings on time. The Court had to issue two separate
Orders of Arrest and Commitment against private respondents on April 20, 1998, for their failure
to submit their Comment on the Petition (rollo, pp. 71-72) and against Atty. Sisenando Fiel Jr. on
November 20, 2000 for his failure to file the Memorandum for private respondents (rollo, pp. 258-
259).
[12]
Rollo, p. 228. The Memorandum for Petitioner was signed by
Attys. Fiel I. Marmita and Chona S. Apostol-Octa.
[13]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, 247 SCRA 9, 18, August 2, 1995; Department of
Health v. National Labor Relations Commission, 251 SCRA 700, 707, December 29, 1995.
[14]
111 VLD 74.
[15]
Ibid, p. 75.
[16]
Globe-Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 701, March 3,
1992.
[17]
Federico B. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictonary, 2nd ed., p. 371, citing Kolambugan Lumber &
Development Co. v. Yia, 56 Phil 201, 203, October 15, 1931.
[18]
Ibid, p. 211, citing Lu Do & Lu Ym Corp. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 108 Phil. 566, 572, May 31,
1960.
[19]
Id., p. 290, citing Central Azucarera de la Carlota v. Coscolluela, 44 Phil. 527, 531, February 20, 1923.
[20]
1, DENR Administrative Order 54-93.
[21]
5 and 7 of PD 705 (25 YLD 6-7).
[22]
April 6, 1995 Order; rollo, p. 151.
[23]
Letter dated May 10, 1995; rollo, p. 152.
[24]
5 (m) and (n), Rule 131, Rules on Evidence.
[25]
San Miguel Foods, Inc. -Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Laguesma, 263 SCRA 68, 84, October 10, 1996.
[26]
De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 389, 393, August 7, 1996; Taedo v. Court of Appeals, 252
SCRA 80, 86, January 22, 1996.
[27]
9, PD 705.
[28]
Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995; Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404, 407, July 5, 1996.
[29]
111 VLD 73.
[30]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 376, 472, January 23, 1995.