Manahan Doctrines

MANAHAN DOCTRINES
Philippine Civil Procedure
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO

G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, Bersamin, J.,
DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that
cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive
act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and
circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act,
but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where
extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met
the stringent conditions that will permit its application.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISION v. RIZAL POULTRY and LIVESTOCK ASSOCIATION, INC.

G.R. No. 167050 June 1, 2011, Perez, J.,
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39,
Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39,
Section 47(c) There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. But where there is identity of parties in the
first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only
as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters
merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of
judgment. Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot
again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. Thus, if a particular point or question
is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will
be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of
issue.
MANUEL LUIS QUEZON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 1

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two
cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a bar by prior judgment would apply. If as between the
two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res
judicata as conclusiveness of judgment applies.
NANCY L. TY v. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK

G.R. No. 188302, June 27, 2012, Brion, J.,
DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS or ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENCE
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means "to adhere to precedents, and
not to unsettle things which are established.” Under the doctrine, when this Court has once
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of
whether the parties and property are the same. The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the
legal principle or rule involved and not upon the judgment, which results therefrom. In this
particular sense, stare decisis differs from res judicata, which is based upon the judgment. The
doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions.
DOMINGO NEYPES v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005, Corona, J.,
RIGHT OF APPEAL
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is
merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[10] The
period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129,[11] as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the
period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment
appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or
final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an
order or judgment that dismisses an action.
FIFTEEN DAY FRESH PERIOD RULE
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution.

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE v. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012, Bersamin, J.,
FINAL AND INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by
the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final
order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory
orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well

known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to
enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided
upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in
the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or
judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
DENIED MR IS FINAL AND APPEALABLE
Whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or
not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable;[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but
a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given
in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to

avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the
hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the
appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits
of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party
to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many
appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory
order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been
rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal
of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory
order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration
of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and
has expressly clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory
order.
FORUM SHOPPING
The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping in In Re: Reconstitution of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and Issuance of Owners
Duplicate Certificates of Title In Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse

judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil
action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or
more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of
action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the
dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such
as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical
causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where
different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were
raised, and two objectives were sought.

JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, Nachura, J.,
MD CANNOT BE QUESTIONED UNDER RULE 65
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor
finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to
dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed
to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to
dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a
number of cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of
the motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.
JURISDICTIONAL RULES ON SUMMONS
We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was necessary, in the first place, to
serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. In other
words, was the service of summons jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the
nature of petitioner’s action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is
directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a
person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which
concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or
correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided
that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the
law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective.
An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice

to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established.Through
publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.

If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose
of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.This is but proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect his interest if he so chooses. Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court
of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be
excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his
opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process requirement with respect to
respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the proceedings in this
case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
COMPLAINT; REQUIREMENTS
It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a
plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his
claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause
of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following
elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3)
the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to
the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to
constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion
must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other. The test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged,
the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint.
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and
correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and
require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the
assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.

RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction
and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the prescribed parameters on the
requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary
laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the
admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence. It
seeks to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized
effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall
continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the
public.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,
during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
The same condition precedent (The Supreme Court cited the Supreme Court of Louisiana)
should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits.
Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima
facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute
necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish
paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion,
disallow a DNA testing.

BAGUNO v. SPOUSES AGABAO
G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011, Brion J.,
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its
resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
MEGAN SUGAR CORPORATION V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO, BRANCH 68

G.R. No. 170352, June 1, 2011, Peralta J.,
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and
justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or
commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied
thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable principles and the equities in the
case. It is designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where without its aid injustice
might result. It has been applied by this Court wherever and whenever special circumstances of
a case so demand.
The rule is that the active participation of the party against whom the action was brought,
coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or administrative body where
the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or
body’s jurisdiction.

JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe J.,
FAMILY COURT
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997,"
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated
from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of
several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of
R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the
option of the complainant.
It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this
authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what the
valid and binding laws are by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." The
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or
validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts
should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue."
REPUBLIC ACT 9262
On March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore,
and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation
that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women's intimate partners, husband; former husband; or any person who has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child.5 The law
provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of
further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law
enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other
local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.

TERESITA G. FABIAN v, HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998, Regalado J.,
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES MUST BE APPEALED IN THE CA
This Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and
instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved by the
appellate court. Also, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgments and
orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not
include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the
decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that
quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on
appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because
they are what are referred to and already provided for, in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review
on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1
thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to
be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements
and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform
rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as
correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended
to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
would unnecessarily burden the Court.

GOMEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 187231, June 22, 2010, Bersamin J.,
JURISDICTION
It is well-settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. As such, jurisdiction cannot be fixed by

the will of the parties; nor be acquired through waiver nor enlarged by the omission of the
parties; nor conferred by any acquiescence of the court. The allocation of jurisdiction is vested
in Congress, and cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government.
The Rules of Court does not define jurisdictional boundaries of the courts. In promulgating
the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court is circumscribed by the zone properly denominated as
the promulgation of rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts;
consequently, the Rules of Court can only determine the means, ways or manner in which said
jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution and acts of Congress, shall be exercised. The Rules of
Court yields to the substantive law in determining jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION OVER ELECTION CASES
The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been vested in
the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). On the other hand,
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper venue where such cases may be filed and heard,
only spelled out the manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like
other rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly
administration of justice, and is permissive, because it was enacted to ensure the exclusive and
speedy disposition of election protests and petitions for quo warranto involving elective
municipal officials.
APPEAL; NOT A MERE TECHNICALITY
The period of appeal and the perfection of appeal are not mere technicalities to be so
lightly regarded, for they are essential to the finality of judgments, a notion underlying the
stability of our judicial system. A greater reason to adhere to this notion exists herein, for the
short period of five days as the period to appeal recognizes the essentiality of time in election
protests, in order that the will of the electorate is ascertained as soon as possible so that the
winning candidate is not deprived of the right to assume office, and so that any doubt that can
cloud the incumbency of the truly deserving winning candidate is quickly removed.

DE LEON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016, Mendoza J.,
EXPECTATION IN THE JUDICIARY RULE
Under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the
clerk of the court.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in arriving at a judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the
judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit.
The standard "expected of the judiciary" is that the decision rendered makes clear why either
party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is there any rigid
formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and
distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is
necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of
being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs.
It is understandable that courts, with heavy dockets and time constraints, often find
themselves with little to spare in the preparation of decisions to the extent most desirable.
Judges might learn to synthesize and to simplify their pronouncements. Nevertheless,
concisely written such as they may be, decisions must still distinctly and clearly express, at
least in minimum essence, its factual and legal bases.

BANARES v. BALISING
G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000, Kapunan J.,
A FINAL AND EXECUTORY ORDER
A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter
in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done
but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court. As distinguished
therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but
leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order
if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals, we stated thus:
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said
dismissal order was any less final. Such order of dismissal is complete in all details,
and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was
not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court’s
decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the
same.
After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond
the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. A final
judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for the
purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same.
After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore
becomes outside the courts power to amend and modify, a party wishes to reinstate the case
has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.

LIBRADA AQUINO v. ERNEST AURE
G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008, Chico-Nazaro, J.,
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW
The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing up the congestion
of cases in the judicial courts. This could be accomplished through a proceeding before
the barangay courts which, according to the concept or of the system, the late Chief Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in character, and to make it truly effective, it should
also be compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice system in mind, it
would be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508,
otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, and the policy behind it would be
better served if an out-of-court settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the parties.
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 is to reduce the number of court
litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the
indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To ensure this objective, Section 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 1508 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a precondition to filing a complaint in court
subject to certain exceptions which are inapplicable to this case. The said section has been
declared compulsory in nature. Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, which took effect on 1 January
1992.
CONCILIATION PROCESS IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section
412 of the Local Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5
of Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and
the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a
jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction
which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant.

As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by

P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make
his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent
jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it,
where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of
jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.
Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an

inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had
submitted themselves voluntarily.
By Aquinos failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she is deemed to
have already acquiesced or waived any defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino
cannot thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure Lendings
failure to resort to the barangay conciliation process, since she is already precluded from doing
so.

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) vs. UNITED
PLANNERS CONSULTANTS, INC. (UPCI)
G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe J,.
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT OF 2004
Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004," institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System (ADR System) in
the Philippines. The Act, however, was without prejudice to the adoption by the Supreme
Court of any ADR system as a means of achieving speedy and efficient means of resolving
cases pending before all courts in the Philippines.
KOPPEL, INC. vs. MAKATI ROTARY CLUB FOUNDATION, INC.,

G.R. No. 198075, September 4, 2013, Perez J.
ARBITRATION STIPULATED IN THE CONTRACT IS VALID AND BINDING
The application of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract in this case carries with it
certain legal effects. The arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract stipulates that "any
disagreement" as to the “interpretation, application or execution " of the 2005 Lease Contract
ought to be submitted to arbitration. To the mind of this Court, such stipulation is clear and is
comprehensive enough so as to include virtually any kind of conflict or dispute that may arise
from the 2005 Lease Contract including the one that presently besets petitioner and
respondent.
The disagreement between the petitioner and respondent falls within the all-encompassing
terms of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract. While it may be conceded that in
the arbitration of such disagreement, the validity of the 2005 Lease Contract, or at least, of
such contract’s rental stipulations would have to be determined, the same would not render
such disagreement non-arbitrable.
DOCTRINE OF SEPARABILITY
Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement is considered as independent of

the main contract. Being a separate contract in itself, the arbitration agreement may thus be
invoked regardless of the possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract.
Once again instructive is Cargill, wherein this Court held that, as a further consequence of the
doctrine of separability, even the very party who repudiates the main contract may invoke its
arbitration clause.

LEGAL AFFECT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE
R.A. No. 876 Section 7. Stay of civil action. - If any suit or proceeding be brought upon an issue
arising out of an agreement providing for the arbitration thereof, the court in which such suit or
proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration, shall stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement: Provided, That the applicant for the stay is not in
default in proceeding with such arbitration.
R.A. No. 9285, Section 24. Referral to Arbitration. - A court before which an action is brought in
a matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if at least one party so
requests not later that the pre-trial conference, or upon the request of both parties thereafter,
refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, in
operative or incapable of being performed.
The violation by the MeTC of the clear directives under R.A. Nos.876 and 9285 renders invalid
all proceedings it undertook in the ejectment case after the filing by petitioner of its Answer
with Counterclaim —the point when the petitioner and the respondent should have been
referred to arbitration. This case must, therefore, be remanded to the MeTC and be suspended
at said point. Inevitably, the decisions of the MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals must all be
vacated and set aside.
JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The JDR system is substantially different from arbitration proceedings.
The JDR framework is based on the processes of mediation, conciliation or early neutral
evaluation which entails the submission of a dispute before a "JDR judge” who shall merely”
facilitate settlement” between the parties in conflict or make a “non-binding evaluation or
assessment of the chances of each party’s case." Thus in JDR, the JDR judge lacks the authority
to render a resolution of the dispute that is binding upon the parties in conflict. In arbitration,
on the other hand, the dispute is submitted to an arbitrator/s —a neutral third person or a
group of thereof— who shall have the authority to render a resolution binding upon the parties.
Clearly, the mere submission of a dispute to JDR proceedings would not necessarily render the
subsequent conduct of arbitration a mere surplusage. The failure of the parties in conflict to
reach an amicable settlement before the JDR may, in fact, be supplemented by their resort to
arbitration where a binding resolution to the dispute could finally be achieved.

DEAN PEREZ ON THE ARBITRATION
A pivotal feature of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute resolution is that it is, first and
foremost, a product of party autonomy or the freedom of the parties to “make their own
arrangements to resolve their own disputes." Arbitration agreements manifest not only the
desire of the parties in conflict for an expeditious resolution of their dispute. They also
represent, if not more so, the parties’ mutual aspiration to achieve such resolution outside of
judicial auspices, in a more informal and less antagonistic environment under the terms of their
choosing. Needless to state, this critical feature can never be satisfied in an ejectment case no
matter how summary it may be.
This Court is not unaware of the apparent harshness of the Decision that it is about to make.
Nonetheless, this Court must make the same if only to stress the point that, in our jurisdiction,
bona fide arbitration agreements are recognized as valid; and that laws, rules and
regulations do exist protecting and ensuring their enforcement as a matter of state policy.
Gone should be the days when courts treat otherwise valid arbitration agreements with
disdain and hostility, if not outright “jealousy," and then get away with it. Courts should
instead learn to treat alternative means of dispute resolution as effective partners in the
administration of justice and, in the case of arbitration agreements, to afford them judicial
restraint. Today, this Court only performs its part in upholding a once disregarded state policy.

ROSENDO HERRERA vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother
G.R. No. 148220. June 15, 2005, Carpio J,.
DNA AS EVIDENCE
DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found
in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique.
Hence, a person’s DNA profile can determine his identity. DNA analysis is a procedure in which
DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is
processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is
taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.
PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA EVIDENCE

It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A
complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative
father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard
adopted in an American jurisdiction, trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum
value of the Probability of Paternity (W) prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical
estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a
random match of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference population database,
such as the Philippine population database, is required to compute for W. Due to the
probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%. However, the accuracy
of W estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and child are subjected to DNA
analysis compared to those conducted between the putative father and child alone.
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of
non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be
considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there
is refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be
subjected to the Vallejo standards.
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a
paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right
against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is communicative in
essence taken under duress. The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-
incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken
from his body when it may be material.

D.M. FERRER & ASSOCIATES CORPORATION, v. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
G.R. No. 189496, February 1, 2012, Sereno J,.
EXCEPTIONS ON SECTION 1, RULE 41 OF 1997 RULE ON CIVIL PROCEDURE
In Jan-Dec Construction Corp. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the dismissal of an action against one of the parties
while the main case is still pending. This is the general rule in accordance with Rule 41, Sec.
1(g). In that case, ruled thus:
Evidently, the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari

from the Order of the RTC dismissing the complaint against respondent. While
Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal may
be taken only from a final order that completely disposes of the case, it also
provides several exceptions to the rule, to wit:
(a) an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) an order
denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c)
an interlocutory order; (d) an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order
denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on
the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) an
order of execution; (g) a judgment or final order for or against one or more of
several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party
complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal
therefrom; and (h) an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In the foregoing
instances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65.
In the present case, the Order of the RTC dismissing the complaint
against respondent is a final order because it terminates the proceedings
against respondent but it falls within exception (g) of the Rule since the case
involves two defendants, Intermodal and herein respondent and the complaint
against Intermodal is still pending. Thus, the remedy of a special civil action for
certiorari availed of by petitioner before the CA was proper and the CA erred in
dismissing the petition.

ARTURO C. ALBA, v. RAYMUND D. MALAPAJO
G.R. No. 198752, January 13, 2016, Peralta J,.
COUNTERCLAIM: PERMISSIVE; COMPULSARY
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.
A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice,
arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the
jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an
original action before the Regional Trial Court, necessarily connected with the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim or even where there is such a connection, the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the claim or it requires for adjudication the presence of third persons
over whom the court acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in
the same action.
A permissive counterclaim does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be
filed separately in another case.
TEST TO DETERMINE THE KIND OF COUNTERCLAIM
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have devised the

following tests:
(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants’ claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs’ claim as well as the
defendants’ counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.

PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC v. FELIX PARAS AND INLAND TRAILWAYS,
INC., AND HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012, Bersamin J.,
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
Section 12, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, Third-party complaint. A third-party complaint
is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to
the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of his opponents claim.
Accordingly, the requisites for a third-party action are, firstly, that the party to be impleaded
must not yet be a party to the action; secondly, that the claim against the third-party
defendant must belong to the original defendant; thirdly, the claim of the original defendant
against the third-party defendant must be based upon the plaintiffs claim against the original
defendant; and, fourthly, the defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant
the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff.
The claim that the third-party complaint asserts against the third-party defendant must be
predicated on substantive law. It is settled that a defendant in a contract action may join as
third-party defendants those who may be liable to him in tort for the plaintiffs claim against
him, or even directly to the plaintiff.
PRAXEDES ALVAREZ, ET AL. vs. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R.No. L-45315 February 25, 1938
INTERPLEADER AND THE NATURE OF THE REMEDY
Under section120 of the Code of Civil Procedure the remedy provided for may be availed of by
bringing an "action", for no other meaning may be deduced from the phrase "such person may
bring an action against the conflicting claimants" used to indicate the procedure to be followed
by one who would avail himself of its provisions. The word "action" means the ordinary action
defined in section 1 of the same Code and should be commenced by complaint which may be
demurred to as provided in section 91 and upon the grounds the reinstated. The pleading
which commences an ordinary action cannot be correctly called an application or petition
because these, generally, are the pleadings used only to commence special proceedings.
The action of interpleader, under section 120, is a remedy whereby a person who has personal
property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any
right in both, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or
who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to
litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other
thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect
him against a double vexation in respect of one liability.

ORLANDO L. SALVADOR v. PLACIDO L. MAPA
G.R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007, Nachura J.,
OMBUDSMAN; RULE 65
We have ruled, time and again, that a petition for review on certiorari is not the proper mode by
which resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases are
reviewed by this Court. The remedy from the adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF R.A. 3019
The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (1991), thus:
[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions
were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or
conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree with the
COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the
discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Ombudsman Desierto (2000), wherein the Court explained:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the

February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we
ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the
violations at the time the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no
person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus,
the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery
of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad
Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME v NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998, Regalado J.,
IN LABOR CASES, APPEAL OF RULE 65 MUST BE MADE TO CA
All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to
the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in
the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of
certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use
of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been
a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both
modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between
them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil
action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of
Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court
are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in
the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
BARAIRO v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. No. 189394, June 15, 2011, Carpio-Morales J.,
APPEALED DECISION OF SECRETARY OF LABOR IS UNDER RULE 65,

APPEAL TO OP IF IT IS AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL INTEREST
Following settled jurisprudence, the proper remedy to question the decisions or orders of the
Secretary of Labor is via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, not via an appeal to the OP. For
appeals to the OP in labor cases have indeed been eliminated, except those involving national
interest over which the President may assume jurisdiction.

REPUBLIC v. FE ROA GIMENEZ
G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016, Leonen J.,
R.A. 1379; CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS
Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth
are also called civil forfeiture proceedings.
Republic Act No. 1379 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be
instituted against public officers or employees who "[have] acquired during his [or her]
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary
as such public officer or employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired."
To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No.
1379 is the same with other civil cases — preponderance of evidence.
SANDIGANBAYAN HAS A JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL FORFEITURE
This court has already settled the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil forfeiture cases:
. . . violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even
though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property
amounts to a penalty. In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,this court re-affirmed the doctrine that
forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 are civil in nature.
RULE 45 IS THE PROPER REMEDY
In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner correctly filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the
mode of appeal from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.

PAYUMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 151911 : July 25, 2011, Mendoza J.,
PONENTE MUST BE AN INCUMBENT MEMBER FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE DECISION
A judgment of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be promulgated by reading the judgment

or sentence in the presence of the accused and any Justice of the division which rendered the
same. Promulgation of the decision is an important part of the decision-making process.
Promulgation signifies that on the date it was made, the judge or justices who signed the
decision continued to support it which could be inferred from his silence or failure to withdraw
his vote despite being able to do so. A decision or resolution of the court becomes such, only
from the moment of its promulgation.
A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before. It is
an elementary doctrine that for a judgment to be binding, it must be duly signed and
promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who penned it. In this connection, the Court
En-Banc issued the Resolution dated February 10, 1983 implementing B.P. 129 which merely
requires that the judge who pens the decision is still an incumbent judge, that is, a judge of the
same court, albeit now assigned to a different branch, at the time the decision is
promulgated. In People v. CFI of Quezon, Branch X, it was clarified that a judge who died,
resigned, retired, had been dismissed, promoted to a higher court or appointed to another
office with inconsistent functions, would no longer be considered an incumbent member of the
court and his decision written thereafter would be invalid. Indeed, one who is no longer a
member of the court at the time the final decision or resolution is signed and promulgated
cannot validly take part in that decision or resolution. Much less could he be the ponente of the
decision or resolution. Also, when a judge or a member of the collegiate court, who had earlier
signed or registered his vote, has vacated his office at the time of the promulgation of the
decision or resolution, his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled.
Guided by the foregoing principles, the judgment of conviction dated November 27, 1998
penned by Justice Legaspi must be declared valid. Apparently, it was not necessary that he be
a member of the Fifth Division at the time the decision was promulgated since he remained an
incumbent justice of the Sandiganbayan. What is important is that the ponente in a collegiate
court remains a member of said court at the time his ponencia is promulgated because, at any
time before that, he has the privilege of changing his opinion or making some last minute
changes therein for the consideration and approval of his colleagues. After all, each division is
not separate and distinct from the other divisions as they all constitute one Sandiganbayan.
Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges or justices. Thus, when a case is filed in the
Sandiganbayan, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the division or justice alone, to
the exclusion of the other divisions.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PAMPANGA v. EDUARDO SORIANO
G.R. No. 153829, August 17, 2011, Villarama, Jr., J.,
RULE 65 WITH REGARD TO MD
Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the rule that the trial courts denial of a motion to dismiss
cannot be questioned in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. This is because a certiorari writ is a remedy designed to correct errors
of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The appropriate course of action of the movant in
such event is to file an answer and interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in
the motion to dismiss. If, later, the decision of the trial judge is adverse, the movant may then
elevate on appeal the same issues raised in the motion.
The only exception to this rule is when the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying
the motion. This exception is, nevertheless, applied sparingly, and only in instances when there
is a clear showing that the trial court exercised its judicial power in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Further, the abuse of the court's discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of, law.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, enumerates the grounds
for the issuance of preliminary injunction, viz:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction

may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part
of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or
acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts

complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting

to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

And as clearly explained in Ocampo v. Sison Vda. de Fernandez:
To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there exists a
right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be
enjoined. Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is
material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. The applicants right must be clear and
unmistakable. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Where the applicants right or title is
doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.
A clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be
shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or
future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never
arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There
must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the applicant that
there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to
be directed are violative of said right.
GUILLERMO SALVADOR v. PATRICIA INC.

G.R. No. 195834, November 09, 2016, Bersamin J.,
JURISDICTION
The power of a court to hear and decide a controversy is called its jurisdiction, which includes
the power to determine whether or not it has the authority to hear and determine the
controversy presented, and the right to decide whether or not the statement of facts that
confer jurisdiction exists, as well as all other matters that arise in the case legitimately before
the court. Jurisdiction imports the power and authority to declare the law, to expound or to
apply the laws exclusive of the idea of the power to make the laws, to hear and determine
issues of law and of fact, the power to hear, determine, and pronounce judgment on the issues
before the court, and the power to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to pronounce
the judgment.
But judicial power is to be distinguished from jurisdiction in that the former cannot exist
without the latter and must of necessity be exercised within the scope of the latter, not beyond
it.

Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law because it is conferred only by law, as distinguished
from venue, which is a purely procedural matter. The conferring law may be the Constitution,
or the statute organizing the court or tribunal, or the special or general statute defining the
jurisdiction of an existing court or tribunal, but it must be in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Jurisdiction cannot be presumed or implied, but must appear
clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist, but it may be conferred on a court or tribunal
by necessary implication as well as by express terms. It cannot be conferred by the agreement
of the parties; or by the court's acquiescence; or by the erroneous belief of the court that it had
jurisdiction;19 or by the waiver of objections; or by the silence of the parties.
The three essential elements of jurisdiction are: one, that the court must have cognizance of
the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs; two, that the proper parties must
be present; and, three, that the point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the
issue. The test for determining jurisdiction is ordinarily the nature of the case as made by the
complaint and the relief sought; and the primary and essential nature of the suit, not its
incidental character, determines the jurisdiction of the court relative to it.
Jurisdiction may be classified into original and appellate, the former being the power to take
judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions
provided by law, and the latter being the authority of a court higher in rank to re-examine the
final order or judgment of a lower court that tried the case elevated for judicial review.
Considering that the two classes of jurisdiction are exclusive of each other, one must be
expressly conferred by law. One does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other.
Jurisdiction is to be distinguished from its exercise. When there is jurisdiction over the person
and subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
that jurisdiction. Considering that jurisdiction over the subject matter determines the power of
a court or tribunal to hear and determine a particular case, its existence does not depend upon
the regularity of its exercise by the court or tribunal.
The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the court or tribunal had the power to enter on the
inquiry, not whether or not its conclusions in the course thereof were correct, for the power to
decide necessarily carries with it the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly. In a manner of
speaking, the lack of the power to act at all results in a judgment that is void; while the lack of
the power to render an erroneous decision results in a judgment that is valid until set aside.
That the decision is erroneous does not divest the court or tribunal that rendered it of the
jurisdiction conferred by law to try the case. Hence, if the court or tribunal has jurisdiction over
the civil action, whatever error may be attributed to it is simply one of judgment, not of
jurisdiction; appeal, not certiorari, lies to correct the error.

JURISDICTION OF RTC; INCLUDES INJUNCTION
The exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases is conferred and provided for in
Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), viz.:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate
exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now
provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
Based on the foregoing provision of law, therefore, the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of
action for injunction because it was one in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
JURISDICTION OF MTC; INCLUDES QUETING OF TITLE
The same was not true in the case of the cause of action for the quieting of title, which had the
nature of a real action — that is, an action that involves the issue of ownership or possession of
real property, or any interest in real property31 — in view of the expansion of the jurisdiction of
the first level courts under Republic Act No. 7691, which amended Section 33(3) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 effective on April 15, 1994,32 to now pertinently provide as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceeds (sic) Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x

AVERMENT OF THE ASSESSED VALUE NOT SET UP CAN LEAD TO DISMISSAL
As such, the determination of which trial court had the exclusive original jurisdiction over the
real action is dependent on the assessed value of the property in dispute.
The complaint of the petitioners did not contain any averment of the assessed value of the
property. Such failure left the trial court bereft of any basis to determine which court could
validly take cognizance of the cause of action for quieting of title. Thus, the RTC could not
proceed with the case and render judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Although neither the
parties nor the lower courts raised jurisdiction of the trial court in the proceedings, the issue
did not simply vanish because the Court can hereby motu proprio consider and resolve it now
by virtue of jurisdiction being conferred only by law, and could not be vested by any act or
omission of any party.
THE JOINDER OF THE ACTION FOR INJUCTION AND THE ACTION TO QUIET TITLE WAS
DISALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT
Another noticeable area of stumble for the petitioners related to their having joined two
causes of action, i.e., injunction and quieting of title, despite the first being an ordinary suit and
the latter a special civil action under Rule 63. Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court disallowed
the joinder, viz.:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action arc between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes
of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action arc principally for recovery of money, the
aggregate amount claimed shall he the test of jurisdiction.

MISJOINDER AND THE FAILURE TO INVOKE IT CAN LEAD TO DISMISSAL
Consequently, the RTC should have severed the causes of action, either upon motion or motu
proprio, and tried them separately, assuming it had jurisdiction over both. Such severance was
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which expressly provides:
Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. -- Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the
initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately. (n)
The refusal of the petitioners to accept the severance would have led to the dismissal of the
case conformably with the mandate of Section, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. - If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any
order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
BOUNDARY DISPUTE SHOULD NOT BE LITIGATED IN AN ACTION FOR THE QUIETING

THE TITLE
The invocation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court in order to enable the raising of the
boundary dispute was unwarranted. First of all, a boundary dispute should not be litigated in
an action for the quieting of title due to the limited scope of the action. The action for the
quieting of title is a tool specifically used to remove of any cloud upon, doubt, or unce1iainty
affecting title to real property; it should not be used for any other purpose. And, secondly, the
boundary dispute would essentially seek to alter or modify either the Torrens title of the City of
Manila or that of Patricia, Inc., but any alteration or modification either way should be initiated
only by direct proceedings, not as an issue incidentally raised by the parties herein. To allow
the boundary dispute to be litigated in the action for quieting of title would violate Section
48 of the Property Registration Decree by virtue of its prohibition against collateral attacks on
Torrens titles. A collateral attack takes place when, in another action to obtain a different
relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action.

THEODORE and NANCY ANG v. SPOUSES ALAN and EM ANG
G.R.No. 186993 - August 22, 2012, Reyes J.,
VENUE; RULE IF THE PLAINTIFF IS OUT OF THE COUNTRY
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience
of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the
venue of an action is not left to a plaintiff s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of
Court.
The petitioner’s complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal
action as it primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the
option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or
any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been
instituted at the time the action is commenced.
However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only
be filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides.
In this regard, it bears stressing that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed
by the Rules of Court to attain the greatest convenience possible to the litigants and their
witnesses by affording them maximum accessibility to the courts. And even as the regulation
of venue is primarily for the convenience of the plaintiff, as attested by the fact that the choice
of venue is given to him, it should not be construed to unduly deprive a resident defendant of
the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.
PARTIES IN INTEREST
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue
to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity
about the question involved. A real party in interest is the party who, by the substantive law,
has the right sought to be enforced. Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is
not a real party in interest in the case below as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any
judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the
limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents.

A REPRESENTATIVE IS NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. – Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended
by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included
in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real property in interest. A representative
may be a trustee of an expert trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party
authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the
contract involves things belonging to the principal. (Emphasis ours)
Nowhere in the rule cited above is it stated or, at the very least implied, that the representative
is likewise deemed as the real party in interest. The said rule simply states that, in actions
which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative, the beneficiary shall be
deemed the real party in interest and, hence, should be included in the title of the case.

SIMNY GUY v. GILBERT GUY
G.R. No. 189486, September 5, 2012, Perez J.,
INDISPENSABLE PARTY
The definition in the Rules of Court, Section 7, Rule 3 thereof, of indispensable parties as
“parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action” has been
jurisprudentially amplified. In Spouse Garcia v. Garcia, et.al. 36 this Court held that:
An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or

subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject
matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree
cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose
absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court
which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who
must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
JOINDER OF COMPULSARY PARTIES IS COMPULSARY
This was our pronouncements in Service wide Specialists Inc. v. CA, Arcelona v. CA, and Casals
v. Tayud:
Settled is the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is compulsory being a

sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power, and, it is precisely “when an
indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed” for such
absence renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
It bears emphasis that Gilbert, while suing as a stockholder against his co-stockholders, should
have also impleaded GoodGold as defendant. His complaint also prayed for the annulment of
the 2004 stockholders’ annual meeting, the annulment of the 2004 election of the board of
directors and of its officers, the annulment of 2004 GIS submitted to the SEC, issuance of an
order for the accounting of all monies and rentals of GoodGold, and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary and mandatory injunction. We have made clear that GoodGold is a separate
juridical entity distinct from its stockholders and from its directors and officers. The trial court,
acting as a special commercial court, cannot settle the issues with finality without impleading
GoodGold as defendant. Like Francisco, and for the same reasons, GoodGold is an
indispensable party which Gilbert should have impleaded as defendant in his complaint.

THE ABSENCE OF AN INDESPENSABLE PARTY IN A CASE RENDERS ALL SUBSEQUENT
ACTIONS OF THE COURT NULL AND VOID NOT ONLY AS TO THE ABSENT PARTIES BUT
EVEN AS TO THOSE PRESENT FOR WANT OF AUTHORITY TO ACT
Francisco, in both the 2004 and 2008 complaints, is an indispensable party without whom no
final determination can be had for the following reasons: (a) the complaint prays that the
shares now under the name of the defendants and Francisco be declared fraudulent; (b)
Francisco owns 195,000 shares some of which, Gilbert prays be returned to him; (c) Francisco
signed the certificates of stocks evidencing the alleged fraudulent shares previously in the
name of Gilbert. The inclusion of the shares of Francisco in the complaint makes Francisco an
indispensable party. Moreover, the pronouncement about the shares of Francisco would
impact on the hereditary rights of the contesting parties or on the conjugal properties of the
spouses to the effect that Francisco, being husband of Simny and father of the other
contesting parties, must be included for, otherwise, in his absence, there cannot be a
determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. ET AL. vs. HON. JOSE S. RODRIGUEZ, ET. AL
G.R. Nos. L-14059-62, September 30, 1959, Bengzon J.
DISMISSAL WHEN AN INDESPENSABLE PARTY IS NOT WITHIN THE COURT
Upon taking up the record for decision, we find that the petition should be dismissed because
the petitioners, disregarding section 5 of Rule 67, failed to join as party defendant the person
interested in sustaining the proceeding in the court, namely the accused Florentino C. Rafols. It
was he who asked for such investigation in the municipal court; he was interested in sustaining
the actuations of both judges.
Said section reads as follows:
SEC 5. Defendants and costs in certain cases. When the petition filed relates to the acts or
omissions of a court or judge, the petitioner shall join. as parties defendant with such court or
judge, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall
be the duty of such person or persons to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and
in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings, and costs awarded such
proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the person or persons in favor of the
petitioner shall be against in interest only and not against the court or judge.
It is fairly evident that the accused Rafols is indispensable party in this case. In fact, he is the
most interested party.. So much so that one of them did not defend himself, expecting the said
Rafols to sustain the order issued at his own request. Not having been impleaded and not
having had his day in court, Rafols could rightly complain if the cause be decided without his
intervention.
When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed.

SPOUSES CEFERINO C. LAUS AND MONINA P. LAUS, AND SPOUSES ANTONIO O. KOH
AND ELISA T. KOH v. OPTIMUM SECURITY SERVICES, INC.,
G.R. No. 208343, February 03, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe J.,
ACTUAL EXISTING RIGHT NEEDED TO BE ISSUED A WPI
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that
right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing
of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.
When the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal
right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper. Corollarily, preliminary
injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the possession and control of one
party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right is being disputed. After
all, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo or the last actual,
peaceable, and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy
To reiterate, preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the
possession and control of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right
is being disputed, as in this case. As earlier intimated, preliminary injunction is a preservative
remedy. Therefore, it should not create new relations between the parties, but must only
maintain the status quo until the merits of the case is fully heard.
As aptly pointed out by the CA, although petitioners appear to be the registered owners of
the subject properties, they nonetheless failed to establish that they were in actual physical
possession of the same at the time the incidents in August 2005 transpired. In fact, a
cursory perusal of the complaint readily shows that petitioners never alleged that they were
in prior possession of the subject properties.
INJUNCTION NOT AVAILABLE FOR FAIT ACCOMPLI
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that when the act sought to be enjoined has
become fait accompli, the prayer for preliminary injunction should be denied. Indeed, when the
events sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition had already happened, nothing
more could be enjoined or prohibited. An injunction will not issue to restrain the performance
of an act already done.
REFUSAL TO IMPLEAD INDISPENSABLE PARTY UPON THE ORDER OF THE COURT IS A

GROUND FOR DISMISSAL
Meanwhile, in Plasabas v. CA, it was held that "the non-joinder of indispensable AN parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed
to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses
to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss
the complaint/petition for the plaintiffs/petitioner's failure to comply therewith."

SPOUSE WILLIAM GENATO v. RITA VIOLA
G.R. No. 169706, February 5, 2010, Del Castillo J.,
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT PREVAILS OVER THE TITLE OF THE CASE
It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. The inclusion of the
names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court. However, the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the
substance. The non-inclusion of one or some of the names of all the complainants in the title of a
complaint, is not fatal to the case, provided there is a statement in the body of the complaint indicating
that such complainant/s was/were made party to such action. This is especially true before the HLURB
where the proceedings are summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in the
courts of law and where the pertinent concern is to promote public interest and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action, application or other proceedings.


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MANAHAN DOCTRINES

Philippine Civil Procedure

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FIFTEEN DAY FRESH PERIOD RULE

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REPUBLIC ACT 9262

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