112. Merciales vs.

CA 379 SCRA 345

Merciales v. Court of Appeals,59 the prosecution deliberately refused to present the sole eyewitness who
had availed of the Witness Protection Program, but who was not discharged by the court as one of the
accused. This resulted to the acquittal of all the accused. The Court ruled that the acquittal was without
regard to due process of law and was, therefore, null and void. Thus, the private complainant could bring
an action questioning the judgment of acquittal without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Criminal
cases for rape with homicide in connection of the death of Maritess Merciales were filed against private
respondents/accused. During the trial, the public prosecuter filed a motion for the discharge of accused
Nuada so that he could be a state witness but the prosecution contended that it was not required to present
evidence to warrant the discharge of Nuada because he was already under the Witness Protection Program
of the DOJ. But this was motion was denied for failure of prosecutor to present evidence provided in Sec
9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure . Prosecution then filed petition for certiorari [GR. No.
113273-78, another case] before the SC question such denial. The private respondents then filed a motion
to set the case for hearing based on their constitutional right to speedy trial which was granted and the
hearing was set on July 29, 1994

On that date, the prosecution filed an MR, instead of presenting of further evidence. The hearing was
postponed and set for another hearing (Aug 9). On that said date, prosecutor again filed for MR and invoked
its pending petition for certiorari with the SC but the respondents objected to reset the hearing again. The
judge called for recess to allow the prosecution to present the NBI agent would be presented to prove the
extrajudicial confession of the accused Nuada. But after the recess, the public prosecutor declined to
present the NBI agent and manifested that it would not anymore present further evidence. The defense
then moved that the cases be deemed submitted for decision and asked leave of court to file a DEMURRER
to evidence. The SG filed in the case before the SC a motion for issuance of a TRO to enjoin the judge but
was denied by the SC

RTC: dismissed the charge of rape with homicide based on demurrer to evidence filed by private
respondents/accused; hence, the accused were ACQUITTED and the criminal cases against them were
DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guild of the accused beyond reasonable doubt

Petitioner argued: reopening of the criminal case will not violate the accused’s right to double jeopardy.
There was judicial misconduct due to the prosecutions’ premature resting and trial court’s grant of the
demurrer to evidence even if the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has not been completed
(violation of due process)

Respondent’s argument: No extrinsic fraud, abuse of discretion and jurisdiction defect to warrant the
annulment or Reopening of the case will violate the accused’s right against double jeopardy

ISSUE: Could there be an acquittal by demurrer in this case? NO. There was grave abuse of discretion by
the trial court.

HELD: PETITION GRANTED, case remanded, RTC judge order to complete presentation of all available
witness for the prosecution. Nonfeasance on the party of the public prosecutor: The trial court required the
public prosecutor to present evidence to justify Nuada’s discharge as state witness but it insisted there was
no need to do so because Nuada was already under the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. Due to
this refusal to present the required evidence it prompted the trial court to deny the motion to discharge
Nuada. Again, the trial court the directed public prosecutor to present Atty. Caabay, the NBI agent who took
Nuada’s extrajudicial confession but the prosecutor declared that he was resting the prosecutions case,
knowing fully well that the evidence he previously presented was not sufficient to convict the accused. And
due to that, a demurrer to evidence was filed by the accused and was granted by the trial court It was then
clear that the public prosecutor was guilty of serious nonfeasance. It was his duty to take all steps to protect
the rights of the people in trial. He should have exhausted all available proof to establish the guilt of the
accused.
Grave abuse of discretion on the part of trial court: Due to the nature of the testimonies of the 7 prosecution
witness and and nature of the circumstances, the trial court (motu proprio) should have called additional
witnesses to question such them to satisfy his mind to the issues of the case. The petitioner was deprived
of her day in court. It is not only the State but also the offended party that is entitled to due process in
criminal cases. With regard the acquittal of the accused by the trial was done without regard to due process
of law, it is null and void as if there was no acquittal at all. It cannot be double jeopardy. HENCE, it was
very apparent that the public prosecutor violated the due process rights of the private complainant owing
to its blatant disregard of procedural rules and the failure to present available crucial evidence, which would
tend to prove the guilt or innocence of the accused therein. Moreover, we likewise found that the trial court
was gravely remiss in its duty to ferret out the truth and, instead, just “passively watched as the public
prosecutor bungled the case.”

Doctrine in this case: When there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in dismissing the criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the judgment of
the TC is considered VOID.

NOTES: “The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.”

As to effect, “the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because
it would place the accused in double jeopardy.

The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.”

When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.

The accused cannot be in double jeopardy because the lower court acted without jurisdiction (the trial judge
in this case acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for a judgment which is void for lack of due process is
equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction

“The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with great caution, because
not only the rights of the accused – but those of the offended party and the public interest as well – are
involved.”

“Demurrer to the evidence is “an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue.

To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove:

(a) the commission of the crime, and

(b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused.”

Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is
sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

113 Potot vs People 383 SCRA 449

FACTS: Petitioner Potot was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charge.
Thereupon, the trial court convicted Potot of homicide. The petitioner filed a manifestation with motion that
he is not appealing from the Decision. However, the wife of the victim, filed a motion for
reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside and that the case be heard again because
“there were irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused miscarriage of justice.” The
trial court granted private complainant's motion and set aside its Decision and ordered that the records of
the case be remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor “for re-evaluation of the evidence and to
file the corresponding charge”. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to issue the order as the Decision had become final, and that the said order “would place
the accused in double jeopardy.” This was denied for the reason that the State is not bound by the error or
negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does not attach.”

Issue: Whether or not the judgment has become final that the accused right against double jeopardy will
be violated upon re-trial of the same case.

HELD: Affirmative. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal,
or has applied for probation. Only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of
conviction. And this he must do before the said judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal.
Such judgment becomes final in any of the following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the
accused, except in case of automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; (b)when he has
partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to appeal the judgment,
except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he applies for probation. When one of these
circumstances is present, the trial court which rendered the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter,
modify or revoke it. In this case, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly waiving his right to appeal
therefrom. Such waiver has the effect of causing the judgment to become final and unalterable.

Thus, it was beyond the authority of the trial court to issue the order setting aside its Decision which had
attained finality. A judgment which has acquired the status of finality becomes immutable. Any error,
assuming one was committed in the judgment, will not justify its amendment except only to correct clerical
errors or mistakes. The assailed orders would violate the constitutional right of the petitioner against double
jeopardy.

Such right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been
acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring
the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against
him for the same offense. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be
present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused
has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

114. People vs. Astudillo

Effects of Aggravating or Mitigating Circumstances on Felonies by Indivisible Penalties

FACTS: Brothers Clarence, Crisanto and Hilario Astudillo, went to house of Alberto Damian who was
celebrating the eve of his birthday. Clarence greeted Alberto and thereafter asked the victim, Silvestre
Aquino, who was one of the visitors, to go with him. Silvestre acceded and the two walked towards Floras'
Store, where they were later joined by Crisanto and Hilario. While at the store, Crisanto and Silvestre had
an argument.

Prosecution eyewitnesses Manuel Bareng and Eduardo Bata, 12 and 11 years of age, respectively, were
selling balut in front of Floras' Store. They saw Clarence stab Silvestre with a bolo while Crisanto and Hilario
held him by the wrists. Clarence delivered several stab blows at the back and on the chest of the victim
until the latter fell to the ground. Thereafter, the three appellants fled on board a tricycle. Silvestre was
rushed to the Municipal Health Office of Bangued, Abra, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
RULING: The trial court correctly rejected the appellants' self-defense theory. It is evident that appellants'
collective and individual act of holding the victim's wrists and delivering several stab blows demonstrated
the existence of their common design to kill the victim. Direct proof of an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. Conspiracy, as in the instant case,
can be inferred from the acts of the three appellants which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills and a
common intent or design to commit a crime. As regards the generic aggravating circumstance of use of
motor vehicle, the trial court erred in appreciating the same inasmuch as the prosecution failed to show that
the tricycle was deliberately used by the appellants to facilitate the commission of the crime or that the
crime could not have been committed without it. The use of motor vehicle is not aggravating where the use
thereof was merely incidental. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was correctly appreciated
in favor of appellants. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the
offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and
(3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of
the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt,
or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture., In the
case at bar, appellants voluntarily surrendered to the authorities on the same night of the incident when
they learned that the authorities were looking for them. What matters is that they spontaneously, voluntarily
and unconditionally placed themselves at the disposal of the authorities. This act of respect for the law
indicates a moral disposition favorable to their reform.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Murder is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. With no generic aggravating circumstance and one generic mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty imposable on the appellants, in accordance with Article
63 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, should be the minimum period, which is reclusion perpetua.

RIGHT AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

115. Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru
falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged
involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and
culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teacher’s camp
in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations
of the teacher’s camp resulting in damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were
filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January
1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his
other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them. On Mach 16, 1982 Batas
Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.

Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law.

Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg 195, which includes the crime ofestafa through falsification of Public Documents as among crimes
subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court, is
a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law.
Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be considered as a
penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of ajudicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted
the official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed
to receive during suspension. And does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto
law. The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a position
diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that
any incumbentpublic officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA
3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The use of the word“office” applies to
any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was
charged.

116. People vs. Ferrer December 27, 19724432

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the
following: 1.)Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of
armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting,
instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating
Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress
usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP
without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being
members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved
20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and
for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines.
Section 4 provided that affiliationwith full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5
states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing
of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for
2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation
of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute
and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a
legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a
legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following
requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively
and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the case at bar, the
statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other
organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with
the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’sdirect participation. Why is
membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership
makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of
the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity
to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle
of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should
not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF
SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in
this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by
the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and
association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL
SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving
circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to
overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER.
Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts

2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly
done by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set
aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

117. Alejandro Katigbak vs. Epifanio Villegas

These cases were certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals for resolution on appeal, 1 since the central
issue involved is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379, "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the
State of Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing for the Proceedings Therefor. 2As posed by the referral resolution, 3 the question is whether or
not said statute.

The proceedings at bar originated from two (2) actions filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The first was Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes Katigbak.
In their complaint they prayed that: (1) the Solicitor General be enjoined from filing a complaint against them
for forfeiture of property under the above mentioned R.A. No. 1379; (2) said statute be declared
unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes forfeiture of properties acquired before its approval, or,
alternatively, a new preliminary investigation of the complaint filed against Alejandro Katigbak by NBI
officers be ordered; (3) properties acquired by Alejandro Katigbak when he was out of the government
service be excluded from forfeiture proceedings; and (4) the NBI officers and the Investigating Prosecutor
(Leonardo Lucena) be sentenced to pay damages.

The second action was Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by petition 4 filed by the Republic of the
Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking the forfeiture
in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro Katigbak allegedly gotten by him illegally, in accordance
with R.A. No. 1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired while Katigbak was holding various positions
in the government, the last being that of an examiner of the Bureau of Customs; and title to some of the
properties were supposedly recorded in the names of his wife and/or son.

The cases were jointly tried. The judgment thereafter rendered 5 (1) dismissed the complaint and the
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 30823, the first action; and (2) as regards Civil Case No. 31080, ordered
"that from the properties (of Katigbak) enumerated in this decision as acquired in 1953,1954 and 1955,
shall be enforced a lien in favor of the Government in the sum of P100,000.00. 6 The judgment also
declared that the "impatience of the Investigating Prosecutor" during the preliminary inquiry into the charges
filed against Katigbak for violation of R.A. No. 1379 did not amount to such arbitrariness as would justify
annulment of the proceedings since, after all, Katigbak was able to fully ventilate his side of the case in the
trial court; 7 that R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its objective not being the enforcement of a penal
liability but the recovery of property held under an implied trust; 8 that with respect to things acquired
through delicts, prescription does not run in favor of the offender; 9 that Alejandro Katigbak may not be
deemed to have been compelled to testify against his will since he took the witness stand voluntarily. 10 The
Katigbaks moved for reconsideration and/or new trial. The Trial Court refused to grant a new trial but
modified its decision by reducing the amount of "P 100,000.00 in the dispositive portion ... to
P80,000.00." 11

Appeal was taken from this verdict of the Court of Appeals by the Katigbaks which appeal, as earlier stated,
was certified to this Court.

No less than 18 errors have been attributed by the Katigbaks to the Court a quo. 12 They concern mainly
the character of R.A. No. 1379 as an ex-post facto law, principally because it imposes the penalty of
forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring properties allegedly in violation of said R.A. No. 1379 at
a time when that law had not yet been enacted. 13

Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried by the ruling on the issue of the learned Trial Judge in
1961, the fact is that the nature of R.A. No. 1379 as penal was in 1962 clearly and categorically pronounced
by this Court in Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr. 14 Citing voluminous authorities, the Court in that case declared that
"forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such ... and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... has
been held ... to partake of the nature of a penalty"; and that "proceedings for forfeiture of property although
technically civil in form are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal
cases from the obligation to be witnesses against, themselves is applicable thereto. 15The doctrine was
reaffirmed and reiterated in 1971 in republic v. Agoncillo. 16 And germane is the 1977 ruling of the Court
in de la Cruz v. Better Living, Inc. 17 involving among others the issue of the validity and enforceability of a
written agreement alleged to be in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices-Act to the effect that "the provisions of said law cannot be given retro active effect."

The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty; and it being
axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done before the passage of the
law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to regulate civil rights
and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful," it follows that penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions
made prior to its passage without running afoul of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto
laws or bills of attainder. 18 But this is precisely what has been done in the case of the Katigbaks. The Trial
Court declared certain of their acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be illegal under R.A. No. 1379
although made prior to the enactment of the law, and imposed a lien thereon "in favor of the Government
in the sum of P100,000.00." Such a disposition is, quite obviously, constitutionally impermissible.

As to the issue of whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal, Leonardo Lucena, should be made answerable
for damages because the filing of the forfeiture proceedings, Civil Case No. 31080, resulted from a
preliminary investigation which was allegedly conducted by Fiscal Lucena in an arbitrary and highhanded
manner, suffice it to state that the trial court found no proof of any intention to persecute or other ill motive
underlying the institution of Civil Case No. 31080. The trial court further found that during the preliminary
investigation by Fiscal Lucena on September 13, 19, 24, 25 and 26, 1956, Alejandro Katigbak was assisted
by reputable and competent counsel, Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez and Atty. Antonio Carag. The mere
fact that the preliminary investigation was terminated against the objection of Katigbak's counsel, does not
necessarily signify that he was denied the right to such an investigation. What is more, the Trial Court's
factual conclusion that no malice or bad faith attended the acts of public respondents complained of, and
consequently no award of damages is proper, cannot under established rule be reviewed by this Court
absent any showing of the existence of some recognized exception thereto.

The foregoing pronouncements make unnecessary the determination of the other issues.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court a quo, in so far as it pronounces the acquisitions of property by
the appellants illegal in accordance with Republic Act No. 1379 and imposes a lien thereon in favor of the
Government in the sum of P80,000.00 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, but is AFFIRMED in all
other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.

118. Wright vs. CA

FACTS: To suppress crimes, Australia and the Government of the Philippines entered into a Treaty of
Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. It was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became
effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the
entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality
approach" which provides for broader coverage of extraditable offenses between the 2 countries and
embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least 1 year. It also allows extradition for crimes
committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books of
the requesting State at the time of their commission.

Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite “persons wanted for prosecution of the
imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offense." A request for
extradition requires, if the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of either
a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the
relevant charge against the person sought to be extradited.

The Treaty defined extraditable offenses to include all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both
Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least 1 year, or by a more severe penalty." For the
purpose of the definition, the Treaty states that:

(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting States place the
offense within the same category or denominate the offense by the same terminology;

(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is requested shall be
taken into account in determining the constituent elements of the offense.

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to
the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of
Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy seeking to indict Paul Joseph
Wright, an Australian Citizen for:

a. 1 count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of
1958 because he and Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonestly obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and
Round Solicitors, secured by a mortgage on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven
Nominees Pty. Ltd., a company controlled by a Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the
relevant legal documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell

b. 13 counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act
of 1958 because he and Mr. John Carson Craker's received approximately 11.2 in commission (including
$367,044 in bonus commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., by submitting 215 false life insurance
proposals, and paying premiums thereon o the Australian Mutual Provident Society through the Office of
Melbourne Mutual Insurance, where he is an insurance agent

c. 1 count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian
Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's attempted to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission
to a bank account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting 1 false proposal for Life Insurance
to the AMP Society based on an inexistent policy-holder

d. 1 count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's
signed and swore before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession
Practice Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance
proposals of AMP Society and containing 3 false statements

In accordance to Section 5 of PD No. 1069 (September 10, 1990), an extradition proceedings was initiated
on April 6, 1993 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Regional Trial Court on June 14, 1993
granted the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australian concluding that the
extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense was committed. The extradition proceeding
resulted in an order of his deportation. The decision was sustained and Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals. Wright filed a review on certiorari to set aside the order of deportation
contending that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an
ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he argues that the
trial court's decision ordering his extradition is based on evidence that failed to show that he is wanted for
prosecution in his country.

ISSUES: a. Whether or NOT the Regional Trial Court committed an order in granting the extradition
proceeding.

b. Whether or NOT enforcement of Article 18 of the Treaty states a prohibition for the retroactive
application of offenses committed prior to the date of its effectivity

c. whether or not such retroactive application is in violation of the Constitution for being an ex post facto
law

HELD: AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
Complying with Article 2, Section 2 of the Treaty, the crimes for which the Mr. Wright was charged and for
which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were offenses in the Requesting State at the time
they were alleged to have been committed. The trial court correctly determined the offenses under our
penal laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false
testimony/perjury, respectively.

The provisions of the Treaty was properly complied with. The signature and official seal of the Attorney-
General of Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts
and Omissions, including the statement itself. The last requirement was accomplished by the certification
made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.

The relevant provisions merely requires "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of
the person sought to be extradited.” It does not limited the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to a person
charged with an information or a criminal complaint as it will render the Treaty ineffective over individuals
who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecution. Moreover, the “Charge and Warrant of
Arrest Sheets” shows that he is not only wanted for prosecution but has absconded to evade arrest and
criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only when appropriate
such as in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the Requesting State thereafter
absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender has already
absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed.

ii. YES. Article 18 states: “ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION. This Treaty shall enter into
force thirty (30) days after the date on which the Contracting States have notified each other in writing that
their respective requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty have been complied with.

Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and it shall cease to be
in force on the one hundred and eightieth day after the day on which notice is given.”

The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity and the second paragraph pertains
to its termination. There is no prohibition for its retroactive effect.
Furthermore, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that: “4. Extradition may be granted pursuant
to provisions of this Treaty irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is requested was
committed, provided that:

(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the offense;
and

(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the Requested State at
the time of the making of the request for extradition, have constituted an offense against the laws in force
in that state.”

iii. NO. Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept of ex post facto laws in our Constitution was
limited only to penal and criminal statutes which affects the substantial rights of the accused. As concluded
by the Court of Appeals, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime
which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified."

119. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and
petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder
against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-
intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations
before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under
the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to
Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher,
or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites.
However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A.
7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that
the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case
falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

RULING:

1.) RIGHTS NOT VIOLATED.

Petitioner and intervenors’ contention that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were
presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and
the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and
not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under
the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and
intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

2.) NOT EX POST FACTO LAW.

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal
laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character.
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the
Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which
courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

3.) RTC HAS JURISDICTION.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if
it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of
his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended
information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal
accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed
in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.