RULE 23—DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION Petitioner: Taking the deposition through written interrogatories would
deprive the court of the opportunity to observe the general bearing and
1. San Luis vs. Rojas, G.R. No. 159127, March 3, 2008
FACTS: Berdex International, Inc. (private respondent) filed a
complaint for a sum of money against petitioner, alleging that: it is a
foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of USA;
petitioner received from it certain amounts of money which were meant
partly as advances or loan and partly for the purchase of 40% shares in
both Seanet and Seabest Corporations, however, not a single share in
those corporations was transferred to private respondent by petitioner
and the shares were retained by the latter; the parties then agreed to treat
all the payments/advances made by private respondent to petitioner as
the latter's loan; petitioner proposed the payment of the loan within a
period of three years, petitioner refused to sign a formal contract of loan.
Petitioner: He is a businessman engaged in the trading of seafoods; he
received from private respondent the total amount of US$141,944.71
with instructions that petitioner first deduct therefrom the amount of
US$23,748.00 representing the latter's commission from private
respondent in their other transaction; the money was intended to be used
to buy 70% of the outstanding shares of Seanet Corporation on behalf of
private respondent; in view, however, of subsequent substantial losses
incurred by Seanet and petitioner's desire to maintain good business with
private respondent, petitioner offered that the amounts he received from
private respondent be paid by Fuegomar Traders, Inc. (Fuegomar), a
company which he subsequently put up and which he substantially
owned and engaged in the same line of business
as Seanet; Fuegomar will purchase at cost the stock investment of private
respondent in Seanet; while the documentation of such agreement was
being finalized, petitioner then gave US$20,000.00 to private respondent
on behalf of Fuegomar; however, private respondent then claimed that its
investment in Seanet was petitioner's personal loan and the amount of
US$20,000.00 paid on behalf of Fuegomar was maliciously interpreted
as petitioner' admission of personal liability.
PR: Private respondent filed a MOTION (To Authorize Deposition-
Taking Through Written Interrogatories) alleging however that, all of its
witnesses are Americans who reside or hold office in the USA; that one
of the witnesses is already of advanced age and travel to the Philippines
may be extremely difficult if not dangerous; and there is a perceived
danger to them in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2002.
demeanor of witnesses. Petitioner's right to cross-examine the witnesses
will be prejudiced, since he will be limited to cross-interrogatories which
will severely limit not only the scope but the spontaneity of his cross-
examination. It is doubtful whether the witnesses will give their
deposition under sanction of the penalties prescribed by Philippine law
for perjury. The claim that travel to the Philippines would be dangerous
for the witnesses who are all Americans is frivolous, since respondent
has not presented evidence that the US government has prohibited its
citizens from traveling to the Philippines; and if ever there was such
prohibition, it was not binding on our own legal system. Old age was not
a valid reason. RTC granted private respondent's Motion.
Petitioner’s MR is denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The CA dismissed the
petition for non-compliance with the requirements under Section 3, Rule
46 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1994 Rules of Civil Procedure.
MR is also denied. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court allows a non-
resident foreign corporation the privilege of having all its witnesses, all
of whom are foreigners, to testify through deposition upon written
interrogatories taken outside the Philippines to prove an oral contract, in
order to avoid further delay.
RULING: YES. Unequivocally, the rule does not make any distinction
or restriction as to who can avail of deposition. The fact that private
respondent is a non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial.
Depositions serve as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to the
issues of the case. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a
means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not
therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in
open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be
presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This
is a requirement of the rules of evidence. It matters not that opportunity
for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition;
for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a
party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented
against him during the trial or hearing.
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken
wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness
is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken before any judge,
municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a
foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice
before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before
such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under
letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24). Thus, we find no grave abuse
of discretion committed by the RTC in granting private respondent's
MOTION (To Allow Deposition-Taking Through Written
Interrogatories) considering private respondent's allegation in its
MOTION that its witnesses are all Americans residing in the U.S. This
situation is one of the exceptions for its admissibility under Section
4(c)(2), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the witness resides at a
distance of more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of
trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition. Furthermore,
the petitioner may submit cross-interrogatories upon private respondent
with sufficient fullness and freedom. Finally, petitioner contends that
since private respondent will have the testimonies of its witnesses in
another jurisdiction, the sanction of penalty for perjury under our laws
would not apply to them. We will not venture to make any determination
on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory. We
must only deal with an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for judicial determination.
2. Rosete vs. Lim, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2007
FACTS: Respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed before the RTC of
Quezon City a Complaint for Annulment, Specific Performance with
Damages against, among others, AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits, Espreme Realty, and Register of Deeds of the Province of
Mindoro Occidental. It asked, among other things, that the Deed of Sale
executed by AFP-RSBS covering certain parcels of lands in favor of
Espreme Realty and the titles thereof under the name of the latter be
annulled; and that the AFP-RSBS and Espreme Realty be ordered to
execute the necessary documents to restore ownership and title of said
lands to respondents, and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel
the titles of said land under the name of Espreme Realty and to transfer
the same in the names of respondents.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit and that venue
has been improperly laid—all were denied. Petitioners manifested that
they filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in the Court of
Appeals, challenging the trial court’s Orders that denied their Motions to
Dismiss and Reconsideration, respectively. Respondents filed a Notice to
Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination giving notice that on June 18
and 20, 1997 at 9:00 a.m., they will cause the deposition of petitioners
Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete. Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion and Objection to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination.
Petitioner: The deposition may not be taken without leave of court as no
answer has yet been served and the issues have not yet been joined since
their Answer was filed ex abudanti cautela, pending resolution of the
Petition for Certiorari challenging the orders that denied their Motions to
Dismiss and for Reconsideration. Moreover, they contend that since
there are two criminal cases pending before the City Prosecutors of
Mandaluyong City and Pasig City involving the same set of facts as in
the present case wherein respondent Juliano Lim is the private
complainant and petitioners are the respondents, to permit the taking of
the deposition would be violative of their right against self-incrimination
because by means of the oral deposition, respondents would seek to
establish the allegations of fact in the complaint which are also the
allegations of fact in the complaint-affidavits in the said criminal cases.
The lower court denied the petition. Petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the Orders of
the lower court. Petitioners assail the ruling of the Court of Appeals via a
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the taking of the depositions in the civil case is
violative of the right of the petitioners against self-incrimination in the
criminal cases because the testimony that would be elicited from them
may be used in the criminal cases.
RULING: NO. In order to resolve this issue, we must determine the
extent of a person’s right against self-incrimination. A person’s right
against self-incrimination is enshrined in Section 17, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which reads: "No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself."
The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who
gives evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in
any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding. The right is not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself. It secures to a witness,
whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular
incriminatory question. However, the right can be claimed only when the
specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness
the right to disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the
time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. As to an accused in a
criminal case, it is settled that he can refuse outright to take the stand as a
witness. In other words – unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil
action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the
right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it
is put to him – the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify
altogether.
Exception: This Court applied the exception – a party who is not an
accused in a criminal case is allowed not to take the witness stand – in
administrative cases/proceedings that partook of the nature of a criminal
proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. It is likewise the
opinion of the Court that said exception applies to parties in civil actions
which are criminal in nature. As long as the suit is criminal in nature, the
party thereto can altogether decline to take the witness stand. It is not the
character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that
controls. In the present controversy, the case is civil it being a suit for
Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages. The fact that there are
two criminal cases pending which are allegedly based on the same set of
facts as that of the civil case will not give them the right to refuse to take
the witness stand and to give their depositions. They are not facing
criminal charges in the civil case. Like an ordinary witness, they can
invoke the right against self-incrimination only when the incriminating
question is actually asked of them.
Leave of court: On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that
the taking of their oral depositions should not be allowed without leave
of court as no answer has yet been served and the issues have not yet
been joined because their answers were filed ex abudanti cautela pending
final resolution of the petition for certiorari challenging the trial court’s
Orders. Ex abudanti cautela means "out of abundant caution" or "to be on
the safe side."
An answer ex abudanti cautela does not make their answer less of an
answer. A cursory look at the answers filed by petitioners shows that
they contain their respective defenses. An answer is a pleading in which
a defending party sets forth his defenses and the failure to file one within
the time allowed herefore may cause a defending party to be declared in
default. Thus, petitioners, knowing fully well the effect of the non-filing
of an answer, filed their answers despite the pendency of their appeal
with the Court of Appeals.
3. Jonathan Landoil Int. Co. Inc. vs. Mangudadatu, 2004
FACTS: Respondent-Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu
filed Complaint for damages against Petitioner Jonathan Landoil
International Co., Inc. (JLI). Initially, petitioner had countered with a
Motion to Dismiss; but when this was denied, it filed its Answer.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective Pretrial Briefs. Trial
proceeded without the participation of petitioner, whose absence during
the pretrial on had led the trial court to declare it in default. Petitioner
received a copy of the RTCs adverse Decision then filed an Omnibus
Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue. This Motion was denied.
Petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution. Alleging that it had yet
to receive a copy of an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New
Trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution. By
reason of the immediate threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it
filed with the CA, a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash.
Petitioner received a copy of respondents Vigorous Opposition.
Attached to this pleading were two separate Certifications supposedly
issued by the postmaster of Tacurong City, affirming that the Order
denying the Motion for New Trial had been received by petitioner’s two
previous counsels of record. Petitioner personally served counsel for
respondents a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination of
Attys. Mario and Peligro. The Deposition was intended to prove that
petitioner had not received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus
Motion for New Trial. During the day of the deposition-taking,
respondents sent petitioner a fax message via JRS Express, advising it
that they had filed a Motion to Strike Off from the records the Notice to
Take Deposition; and asking it not to proceed until the RTC would have
resolved the Motion.
During the hearing on the Motion to Quash, petitioner submitted its (1)
Formal Offer of Exhibits, together with the documentary exhibits marked
during the deposition-taking. Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution
denying the Petition for Prohibition filed by the petitioner. The RTC
denied the Motion to Quash and granted the Motion to Set Auction Sale
of Defendants Levied Properties. Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition, seeking to hold in abeyance the RTC
Resolution and the Writ of Execution. Petitioner alleged that since it had
not received the Order denying its Motion for New Trial, the period to
appeal had not yet lapsed. It thus concluded that the judgment, not being
final, could not be the subject of a writ of execution.
Court of Appeals: The CA issued the assailed Decision denying JLIs
Petition. It ruled that petitioner could no longer avail itself of a
deposition under Rule 23 of Rules of Court, since trial had already been
terminated. Finally, it ruled that between the denial of a lawyer and the
certification of a postmaster, the latter prevails. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether the taking of oral depositions was proper under the
circumstances.
RULING: NO. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not
restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery
before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it
may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without
the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. Depositions may
be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever
necessary or convenient. The present case involved a circumstance that
fell under the Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23—the witnesses of petitioner in
Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the
place of hearing. Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its
Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving
that the trial courts Decision was not yet final. As previously explained,
despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can
still be properly taken. The Court, however, noted that the RTC did not
totally disregard petitioner’s depositions. The trial court considered and
weighed—against all other evidence—that its Order denying the Motion
for New Trial filed by petitioner had not been received by the latters
counsels. Despite their depositions, petitioner failed to prove
convincingly its denial of receipt.
4. Dasmarinas Garments vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 108229, 1993
FACTS: American President Lines, Ltd. sued Dasmariñas Garments,
Inc. to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses. In its, Dasmariñas specifically denied any liability to
the plaintiff and set up compulsory counterclaims against it. The case
was in due course scheduled for trial. At the hearing, instead of
presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to
take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan
and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory (a
formal request from a court to a foreign court for some type of judicial
assistance) be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular
agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei" Five (5) days later
APL filed an amended motion stating that since the Philippine
Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one China
policy,". It was necessary — and it therefore prayed — "that commission
or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces,
Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc., to hear and
take the oral deposition of the aforenamed persons”.
Petitioner: The motion was opposed by Dasmariñas. It contended that
(a) the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . . that a
foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of
letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be examined
before the Philippine Court;" and (c) the Rules of Court "expressly
require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally in open court
and not by deposition." By Order dated the Trial Court resolved the
incident in favor of APL.
RTC: The Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces
is hereby COMMISSIONED to take down the deposition. Compliance
with the Rules on the taking of testimony by deposition upon written
interrogatories under Sections 25-29 of Rule 24, Rules of Court is
enjoined. The Court opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being
the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take the
testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses residing there by deposition, but only
upon written interrogatories so as to give defendant the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-examination.”
CA: Dasmariñas instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court
of Appeals to nullify the orders of the Trial Court just described. After
due proceedings, the Court of Appeals 3rd Division rendered a judgment
denying Dasmariñas petition for certiorari and upholding the challenged
orders of the Trial Court. Once again Dasmariñas has availed of the
remedy of appeal. It has come to this Court and prays for the reversal of
the Appellate Court's Decision.
ISSUE: Whether the taking of oral depositions was proper under the
circumstances.
RULING: YES. Petitioner would however prevent the carrying out of
the commission on various grounds.
First: The first is that the deposition-taking will take place in "a foreign
jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-China
policy.'" This is inconsequential. What matters is that the deposition is
taken before a Philippine official acting by authority of the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued
by the Philippine Court in which the action is pending, and in
accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of
Court pursuant to which opportunity for cross-examination of the
deponent will be fully accorded to the adverse party.
Second: Dasmariñas also contends that the "taking of deposition is a
mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action comes to
trial." Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution
of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. The Regional Trial
Court saw fit to permit the taking of the depositions of the witnesses in
question only by written interrogatories, removing the proponent's option
to take them by oral examination. The imposition of such a limitation,
and the determination of the cause thereof, are to be sure within the
Court's discretion. The statement implies that opportunity to cross-
examine will not be accorded the defendant if the depositions were to be
taken upon oral examination, which, of course, is not true. For even if the
depositions were to be taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse
party is still accorded full right to cross-examine the deponents by the
law, either by proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the cross-
examination orally, or opting to conduct said cross-examination merely
by serving cross-interrogatories.
5. Koh vs. IAC, G.R. No. 71388, September 23, 1986
FACTS: Respondent Bank filed a Complaint against petitioner to
recover the sum of US-$7,434.90 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency
which, due to a computer error, it had overpaid to her. The Complaint
alleged that petitioner's father sent her US-$500.00 through the
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company which was the remitting bank of
respondent Bank. But due to computer mistake, respondent Bank's Los
Angeles Office erroneously overstated the amount to US-$8,500.00
instead of US-$500.00, and as a consequence respondent Bank issued
and delivered to petitioner a Cashier Check amounting to US-$8,500.00
which petitioner deposited to her account and subsequently withdrew.
Petitioner admitted the above-stated allegations in the Complaint and
alleged that immediately after receipt of a formal demand letter to return
the overpayment, she offered to pay respondent Bank through its lawyer
in installments of $100.00 a month but the offer was unreasonably
rejected. It is significant to note that it was only in the Comment of
respondents' counsel filed with this Court that a copy of said Answer was
attached thereto. No manifestation was filed by the parties' lawyers. The
presiding Judge (not respondent Judge) dismissed the case for non-
compliance with the Order (Notice of Case Status).
Respondent Bank, through a new counsel, refiled its complaint which
was assigned to Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
presided over by respondent Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of res adjudicata, as well as a supplement
thereto, which was opposed by respondent Bank. Respondent Judge
denied the motion to dismiss because the dismissal was too drastic and
was tantamount to depriving the plaintiff of its day in court.
CA: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate
Appellate Court praying that the orders denying the motion to dismiss
and the motion for reconsideration be set aside as null and void and that
the complaint be ordered dismissed. The appellate court, finding no merit
to the petition, resolved not to give it due course. It ruled that since the
order of dismissal was null and void, it did not have the force of a
judgment. It did not constitute a bar to the refiling of the bank's
complaint. Petitioner has appealed by certiorari to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether the order dismissing the first complaint constituted a
bar to the second complaint.
RULING: NO. The Court cannot find any justification for ruling that the
order dismissing the first complaint operated as adjudication on the
merits or constituted a bar to the second complaint. In fact, the trial court
could have, on motion, rendered a judgment on the pleadings in the first
case in favor of respondent Bank. True it is that respondent Bank's
counsel should have taken the precaution of complying with the
instructions contained in the "NOTICE OF CASE STATUS" if only to
avoid the consequent delay resulting from non-compliance; that
respondent Bank's counsel was negligent in not seeking a reconsideration
or clarification of the order of dismissal or appealing therefrom. But,
fortunately for respondent Bank, the omissions of its counsel are not fatal
to its cause in view of the defective procedure which culminated in the
dismissal of the first complaint.
The rules on discovery of the Revised Rules of Court are intended to
enable a party to obtain knowledge of material facts within the
knowledge of the adverse party or of third parties through depositions to
obtain knowledge of material facts or admissions from the adverse party
through written interrogatories. Trial judges should, therefore, encourage
the proper utilization of the rules on discovery. However, recourse to
discovery procedures is not mandatory. If the parties do not choose to
resort to such procedures, the pre-trial conference should be set pursuant
to the mandatory provisions of Section 1 of Rule 20.
Petitioner argues that respondent Judge was wrong in stating that a pre-
trial order should have been issued since the last pleading had been filed,
because the "notice of case status" was issued on August 19, 1983, while
the last pleading or the answer to petitioner's counterclaim was filed
much later. As the appellate court correctly held, the "notice of case
status" was not an order of the court. It was signed by Mr. E.R. Belen,
officer-in-charge. Even the warning in the notice (that if no such
manifestation has been filed after 30 days from receipt the case shall be
archived or dismissed as the case may be) was ambiguous. The failure of
the parties to heed the warning did not constitute disobedience of a
lawful order of the court. There is no rule authorizing the issuance of the
"notice of case status" in question signed by an officer-in-charge.
6. Delos Reyes vs. CA, G.R. No. L-27263, March 17, 1975
FACTS: Petitioners Rogelio de los Reyes and Aurelio de los Reyes filed
two separate complaints against the herein private respondents. Private
respondents filed their respective Answers with counterclaims to the
complaints, and petitioners filed their respective Replies and answers to
counterclaims. Thereafter, before the trial court set a date for the hearing
of the above-mentioned civil cases, petitioners served notice upon the
counsel of respondent Wong Chu King that they would take the
deposition of defendant-respondent Wong Chu King, upon oral
examination on August 8, 1966 at 9:30 a.m., at the Office of the
Municipal Secretary of Makati, Rizal. On August 1, 1966, petitioners
caused the issuance by the trial court, of a subpoena to defendant-
respondent Wong Chu King and a subpoena duces tecum to the President
of respondent La Campana Fabrica de Tabacos, Inc., or his duly
authorized representative, commanding them to appear on said date,
time, place before the Notary Public mentioned.
On August 8, 1966, the date set for the taking of the deposition, at
around 10:00 a.m. while counsel for the petitioners was waiting for the
prospective deponent in the Office of the Notary Public before whom the
deposition would be taken, he (counsel for petitioners) received from one
of the lawyers for the private respondents an Ex Parte Urgent Motion
asking the trial court to relieve the defendants-respondents from
attending the taking of the deposition scheduled on the same date and for
the court to provide safeguards for the immediate return of all documents
produced or examined right after any day's proceeding.
Petitioners filed a motion citing defendants-respondents for contempt for
their failure to appear during the scheduled taking of deposition and an
Opposition to the ex-parte urgent motion. While the ex-parte urgent
motion and the motion for contempt were still pending resolution by the
trial court, private respondents filed their Motion To Set two Civil Cases
for trial, there being already a joinder of issues in those cases. The trial
Judge denied the motion to declare the defendants-respondents in default
and in contempt of court and at the same time directed the plaintiffs-
petitioners to submit instead written interrogatories before the Court
would determine the date when the deposition could be held and taken.
CA: It appearing from the record that defendant Wong Chu King thru
counsel filed a motion to postpone the taking of the deposition dated
August 4, 1966, the Court feels that the absence of the defendant at the
scheduled taking of the deposition on August 8, 1966, did not constitute
a deliberate and willful act of disobeying the order of this Court.
With respect to the request of the defendant Wong Chu King that he be
relieved from attending the taking of the deposition, the Court is of the
opinion and so holds that it cannot deprive the plaintiff from exercising a
right where the Rules of Court grant him, especially where, as in the case
at bar, the petition to take deposition of defendant was filed before any
petition to set the case for hearing was initiated.
7. Ayala Land Inc. vs. Tagle, G.R. No. 153667, 2005
8. Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing vs. Ley Construction and
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 147143, 2006
9. Fortune Corporation vs. CA, G.R. No. 108119, 1994
10. People vs. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, 1989
11. Cabal vs. Kapunan Jr. 116 PHIL 1361
12. Pascual Jr. vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 138 PHIL 361
13. Galman vs. Pamaran, G.R. Nos. L-71208-09, 1985
14. Vda. De Manguera vs. Risos, G.R. No. 152643, 2008
15. Go vs. People, G.R. No. 185527, 2012
16. People vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-41166, 1976

CA: Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an action for certiorari
with preliminary injunction against the Order of the trial court, insofar as
it direct the herein petitioners to submit written interrogatories before it
could determine the date of the taking of the deposition of herein
respondent Wong Chu King. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction or
authority when he issued the Order directing the petitioners to submit
instead written interrogatories within 10 days from receipt of the order
before the Court could definitely determine the date when the deposition
would be held.

RULING: NO. We cannot subscribe to the petitioners' view that the

choice as to the mode of taking the testimony of a deponent, whether
upon oral examination or written interrogatories, rests exclusively upon
the party exercising such right. If the theory advanced by the petitioners
were to be adopted, the exercise of this right is bound to be abused and
utilized for harassment. It is for this reason that Sections 16 and 18, Rule
24, of the Rules of Court, were incorporated to serve as safeguards and
protection from abuse. A trial Judge must possess certain measure of
control over the right of parties in the taking of depositions in order to
prevent abuse. Under Section 16 of the Rules of Court, the court in
which the action is pending may, among others, make an order that the
deposition be taken only on written interrogatories. Evidently the trial
court exercises a certain degree of discretion in connection with the
taking of a deposition.