Administrative Law Cases

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES
INTRODUCTION / GENERAL CONSIDERATION
1.Malaga vs. Penachos, 213 SCRA 516
Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al. GR No. 86995 03 September 1992 Chartered
Institution and GOCC, defined. FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualificati
ons, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues
of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for th e construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF.
The notice announced th at the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on Dece mber
2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 198 8 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built
Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification do cuments at two o'clock in the afternoon of
December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them
were not allow ed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late. On December 12,
1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC agai nst the officers of PBAC for their refusal without
just cause to accept them res ulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the
resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their d ocuments. They also asked that if
the bidding had already been conducted, the d efendants be directed not to award the project pending
resolution of their compl aint. On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC
fro m conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order
on the ground that the court is prohibited from issu ing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction in g overnment infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that
the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served a fter the bidding had been
awarded and closed. On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure
project of the government fallin g within the coverage of the subject law. ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a
government instrumentality subject to the provi sions of PD 1818? RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code
defines a government instrumentality as fol lows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction b y
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special fund s, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term inclu des regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
government-owned or control led corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions). The same Code describes
a chartered institution thus: Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a spec ial
charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutiona l policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges , and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
Provisions) . It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered
by P.D. 1818. There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumenta lity. First, it was
created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the
government to effect the socio-e conomic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the
Philipp ines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accoun ts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices
of the National Government a re authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the st ate
college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of suc h employees as can be spared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly , an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out
of the funds of the Na tional Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and mainte nance of
the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropria tions Law. Nevertheless, it does not
automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the proh ibition in the said decree as there are irregularities
present surrounding the t ransaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and th e
award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
2. De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 296
SUMMARY:
BP 129 was enacted, titled
An Act Reorganizingthe Judiciary, Appropriating Funds therefor and for OtherPurposes.
De la Llana is a judge that would be removedfrom his position because of this law, so he assailed thevalidity
of this law, because according to him, it goesagainst the constitutional provision on the security oftenure of
incumbent justices and judges.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not BP 129 is unconstitutional forgoing against Article X, Sec. 7 of the 1973Constitution.
FACTS:
(This case is made up of mostly rulings andseparate opinions; no other antecedent facts other thanthe one
above).
HOLDING:
In ruling on the case, the Supreme Court iterated 11points, all of which may or may not be directly necessaryto
justify the constitutionality of BP 129:1.
Petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers;2.
The Batasang Pambansa did not act arbitrarily inenacting the assailed law, but rather, in goodfaith. The law
was created after much study, andthe circumstances called for a pressing need tocreate a major reform in the
judiciary.3.
(zero relevance to tenure)4.

Cabinet Bill #42 was the basis for BP 129. The Billalleged that its enactment would result in, 1.)more efficiency
in the disposal of cases, 2.)improvement in the quality of justice, and 3.) thereform would fit the court system to
theexigencies of present- and future- Philippinesociety. The deliberations of the BatasangPambansa amounted
to 590 pages; this meansthat much discussion and research went into thislaw. It is not arbitrary.5.
The petition
s lack of merit is made even clearerbecause the abolition of offices as stated in BP129 is done in good faith.6.
Petitioners could not prove that BP 129 was NOTwithin the bounds of legislative authority.7.
(Irrelevant to tenure)8.
Removal is distinguished from termination byvirtue of the abolition of office. After abolitionof office, there is in
law no occupant, while inremoval, there is an occupant who could lose hisposition. THIS IS AN ISSUE OF
ABOLITION OFOFFICE. In this case, the question of security oftenure does not arise.
In the case of abolition of an inferior court (as inthe case at bar), there is no difference betweenremoval and
abolition of office.
In the choice of alternatives between twoconstructions where one would save and anotherwould invalidate a
statute, the former is to bepreferred.
9.
The Batasang Pambansa has express authorityto reorganize inferior courts and in the processto abolish
existing ones.
10-12. (have nothing to do with tenure)

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
1.Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential
Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal
Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annualtax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported
blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case
may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture
or audiovisual program.”
“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent
(50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the
tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.”
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms
including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have
greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a
sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of
sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at
P450 Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and
disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.
Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a
public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly
because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the
tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No.
1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund
movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair
competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by
the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally
violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention
the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of
Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
2.US vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1
Facts:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary
circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating
the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing
the price at which rice should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the
price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order. He
was charged in violation of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.
Issues:
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Discussions:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws
is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands.
As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which
palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without
the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law
must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and
nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in
form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
3. Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the
same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A.
A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the
carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to
rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but
it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in
asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that
The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not
properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving
him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
4.Marcos vs. Manglapuz,177 SCRA 668
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines
to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to
rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to
prove that they can stir trouble from afar
Honasan’s failed coup
Communist insurgency movements
secessionist movements in Mindanao
devastated economy because of
accumulated foreign debt
plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the
Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim
of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health.
Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process
and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to
Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined
& exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance
national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt,
dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at
153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the
president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or
of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which
are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the
part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It
is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her
decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
5. Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 1991
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them
the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and
highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had
time and again been brought to the latter’s attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.
ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
RULING: No.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and
definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and
subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may
take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or
not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the
power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,
i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the
merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political
rights had been transgressed.
6. LLDA vs. CA, 231 SCRA 292
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the
policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development
and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive
jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides:
“Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose
rental fees or charges therefore…” Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens
& fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate
grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby
aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that:

(1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are
declared illegal;
(2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and
Illegal Fishing; and
(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall
be effected.
Issue
Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
Held
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government
Code of 1991.
The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law.
The Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.
Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in
Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as
are by its charter vested on it.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and
developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to
municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of
1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
7. Rizal Empire Insurance Corporation vs. NLRC, 150 SCRA 565
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 14, 1985 Decision of Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz
which held that herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was illegally dismissed; and of the Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission which dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that the same was
filed out of time.
In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire
Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a
regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent
employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other
Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to
the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450,00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the
Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until
he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire
Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.
On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds
of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L.
Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was
dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition (Ibid, pp. 2-22).
In compliance with the resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated April 30, 1986 (Ibid., p. 94), private
respondent filed his Comment on May 23, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 97-101) and public respondent on July 2, 1986
(Ibid., pp. 120-124).
On June 6, 1986, petitioners filed their Reply to private respondent's Comment (Ibid, pp. 102-105) and on July
25, 1986, their Reply to public respondent's Comment (Ibid., pp. 126-131).
In a Resolution dated August 18, 1986, the Second Division of this Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda (Ibid., P. 132).
In compliance with the above mentioned Resolution, petitioners filed the,.r memorandum on November 10,
1986; while private respondent filed his Memorandum on October 17, 1986 (Ibid, pp. 139-144), and public
respondent on November 16, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 160-166).
Before going however, into the merits of the case, an important point to consider is whether or not it is still
within the jurisdiction of this Court to review.
Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed
to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect
an appeal shall be entertained.
The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on
April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed
the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor
Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15,
1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time (Rollo, pp. 31-32).
Petitioners claim, among other things, that respondent Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in arbitrarily dismissing petitioners' appeal on a technicality (Rollo, p. 9). It
invokes the Rules of Court provision on liberal construction of the Rules in the interest of substantial justice.
It will be noted however, that the foregoing provision refers to the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the
Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for
interpretation.
Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are
entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).
Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has
become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.
Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and
salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained
despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
QUASI – LEGISLATIVE POWER
1.Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil 234.
This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry,
requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter
thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation
of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.
Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine
Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the
Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate Bill No. 328 as
introduced in the Philippine Legislature, ... ." The Act in question reads as follows:
SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for the importation of
cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce
into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said
date, the Governor-General, with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such
prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign
cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the lands.
SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, March 8, 1924.
The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared
unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052
would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and
(2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to
file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.
The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the
petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason
that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective.
Act No. 3052 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven,
known as the Administrative Code, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. — It shall be
unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from
any foreign country. The Director of Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the department first had,
authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign
countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such as may be necessary for the
improvement of the breed, not to exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That the Director
of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle
for the manufacture of serum: Provided, further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation,
bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be submitted to regulations
issued by the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department, prior to authorizing its
transfer to other provinces.
"At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General shall issue regulations and others to provide
against a raising of the price of both fresh and refrigerated meat. The Governor-General also may, by
executive order, suspend, this prohibition for a fixed period in case local conditions require it."
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval.
Approved, March 14, 1922.
The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052 to show its nullity or
unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act No. 3155 the former act would make it
impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit for the importation
of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department.
An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by implication, since, being
void, it is not inconsistent with such former laws. (I Lewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction 2nd ed., p. 458,
citing McAllister vs. Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361; 23 Pac., 357; Orange Country vs. Harris, 97 Cal., 600; 32 Pac., 594;
Carr vs. State, 127 Ind., 204; 11 L.R.A., 370, etc.)
This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is
necessary to do so (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568; Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese
and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this case it is not necessary to pass upon the validity of the statute attacked
by the petitioner because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner would not be entitled to relief
inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue.
But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the opinion that Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. As
shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to protect the cattle
industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It
is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development
of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-
206 and decisions cited therein; Reid vs. Colorado, 187 U.S., 137, 147, 152; Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill.,
254). In this connection it is said in the case of Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial Board of Batangas (19
Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, did not have the effect of denying to the
Government of the Philippine Islands the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of
the general welfare and the public interest. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that
at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said
that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or
vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or
the best that might have been adopted. (6 R.C.L., 243 and decisions cited therein.)1awphil.net
In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in not holding that the power
given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in
the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers." We do not think that such is the case; as
Judge Ranney of the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad Co. vs.
Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88) said in such case:
The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves
a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that Act No. 3155 amends section 3 of the Tariff
Law, but it will be noted that Act No. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of cattle and it does
not add any provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the Attorney-General: "It is a
complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of
articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a
statute adopted under the police power of the Philippine Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an
àddition' to the Tariff Law. (See MacLeary vs. Babcock, 82 N.E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., 228 for distinction
between `supplemental' and àmendatory' and O'Pry vs. U.S., 249 U.S., 323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction
between àddition' and àmendment.')"
The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
2. Araneta vs. gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328
Facts:
San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, a part of the National
waters of the Philippines... is considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol
region.
Sometime in 1950, trawl1 operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this region most of
them settling at Sabang,... Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using this particular method of
fishing in said bay
On account of the belief of sustenance p fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion
of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor... among the majority of the inhabitants of
coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay.
League of
Municipal Mayors prayed the President to protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel Bay by banning
the operation of trawls therein
In response to these pleas, the President issued on April 5, 1954, Executive Order
No. 22 (50 Off. Gaz., 1421) prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, but said executive order was
amended by Executive Order No. 66, issued on September 23, 1954 (50 Off. Gaz., 4037), apparently in
answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur... recommending the allowance of trawl
fishing during the typhoon season only. On November 2, 1954, however, Executive Order No. 80 (50 Off. Gaz.,
5198) was issued reviving Executive Order No. 23, to take effect after December 31, 1954;
A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila... to declare the same null
and void, and for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
Issues:
(1) Whether the Secretary of an Executive Department and the Director of a Bureau, acting in their capacities
as such Government officials, could lawfully be required to post a bond in an action against them;
Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80,
banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay, or, said in other words,... Whether Executive Orders Nos.
22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly
delegated to the President.
But does the exercise of such authority by the President constitute an undue delegation of the powers of
Congress?
Ruling:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, granted; Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80 are declared invalid; the injunction prayed
for is ordered to issue; no pronouncement as to costs".
Passing upon the question involved in the second proposition, the trial judge extending the controversy to the
determination of which between the Legislative and Executive Departments of the Government had "the power
to close any definite area of the Philippine waters"... instead of limiting the same to the real issue raised by the
enactment of Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, specially the first and the last "absolutely prohibiting fishing
by means of trawls in all the waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay", ruled in favor of
Congress, and as the closing of any definite area of the Philippine waters is, according to His Honor, primarily
within the fields of legislation and Congress had not intended to abdieate its power to legislate on the matter,
he maintained, as stated before, that "until the... trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be
banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation", and that "the remedy for respondents and population
of the coastal towns of Camarines Sur is to go to the Legislature," and thus declared said Executive Orders
Nos.
22, 66 and 80 invalid".
We are of the opinion that with or without said Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing
from all Philippine waters come, under the law, within the powers of the Secretary... of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, who in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in
violation of his instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in Philippine waters.
For the foregoing reasons We do not hesitate to declare that Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of
1954, of the President, are valid and issued by authority of law.
From the provisions of Act No. 4003 of the Legislature, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 471, which
have been aforequoted, We find that Congress (a) declared it unlawful "to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the
territorial waters of the Philippines;
In the light of these facts it is clear to Our mind that for the protection of fry or fish eggs and small and
immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to prohibit the use of any fish net
or fishing device like trawl nets that could endanger and... deplete our supply of sea food, and to that end
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations such restrictions as he
deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. Consequently, when the President,
in response... to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80
absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did
nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said... coastal-province and dispose of
issues of general concern (Sec. 63, R.A.C) which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.
3. People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 250
People vs. Maceren
79 SCRA 450
FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in
fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law. On March 7, 1969 Jose
Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario
were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with
having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.It was alleged in the complaint that the
five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio
San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz. Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the
complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order
of dismissal. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric
current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in Section 11 of the
Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted
by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro
fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. It is noteworthy that
the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing. Notwithstanding the silence of the
law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84, prohibiting
electro fishing in all Philippine waters. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting
the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing,
are devoid of any legal basis. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep-sea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking
of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the
kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing
specifically punished. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned. Thus, the lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the
power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of
regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself
4. Bautista vs. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329
5.Maceda vs. ERB, 192 SCRA 363
Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board
G.R no. 96266
FACTS: Private respondents filed an application for oil price increase was granted by public no.
the provisional increase. On December 18, 1990 the court dismissed the petition and reaffirm
ERB’s provisional increase without hearing pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O no. 172. Prior to the
issuance of said order, a hearing was conducted but the petitioner failed to appear at said
hearing .The petitioner contends that the provisional increase in the prices of petroleum violated
due process for having been issued without notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not ERB orders granting provisional oil increase without prior notice is valid.
HELD: Yes, it is valid. While E. O 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the
board from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase, subject to final disposition of whether or
not: to make it permanent; to reduce or increase it further; to deny the application. Sec. 3, par. e
is akin to temporary restraining order. It outlines the jurisdiction of the grounds for which it may
decree a price adjustment, subject of notice and hearing. However, under Sec. 8, it may order
the price increase provisionally, without need of hearing, subject to final outcome of the
proceeding. The Board is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional
authority, however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one
G.R no. 96266

G.R no. 96266
6. PCF vs. DECS, 153 SCRA 622

7. CIR vs. CA, 261 SCRA 236
Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes.

On various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademark
registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
The CIR initially classified 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in the World
Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune changed the names of 'Hope' to
Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand category.
Fortune also submitted proof the BIR that 'Champion' was an original register and therefore a local brand. Ad
Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands.
RA 7654 was passed in it was provided that 55% ad valorem tax will be imposed on local brands carrying a
foreign name. Two days before the effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
37-93, in which Fortune was to be imposed 55% ad valorem tax on the three brands classifying them as local
brands carrying a foreign name.
Fortune filed a petition with the CTA which was granted finding the RMC as defective. The CIR filed a motion
for reconsideration with the CTA which was denied, then to the CA, an appeal, which was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether the RMC was valid.
RULING:
NO. The RMC was made to place the three brands as locally made cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to
thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions
applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing
foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the RMC, the brands were subjected to 45% ad valorem tax. In so
doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law but it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due
observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.
The Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective
administrative issuance.
8. Taxicab Operators of Metro manila vs. BOT 117 SCRA 597
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than
six years old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only
enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry.
Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the riding
public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.
ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid
exercise of police power.
HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety and
general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it is
common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use,
creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places.
9. US vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil 608
Doctrine:
The orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a statute havethe
force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not a offense punishable by law unless
the statute expressly penalizes such violation.
FACTS:In Feb. 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to accused, Panlilio having been exposed to the
dangerousand contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-
authorizedagent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat,
Pampanga;that, on said place, Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to do, and
whilethe quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to betaken
from the corral in which they were then quarantined and conducted from one place to another;that by virtue of
said orders of the accused, his servants and agents took the said carabaos from thesaid corral and drove them
from one place to another for the purpose of working them.The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760
relating to the quarantining of animals sufferingfrom dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 withsubsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs
of trial. The accused contendsthat the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute
a violation of Act No. 1760ISSUE:Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of
Agriculture?HELD:NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited
or madeunlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No.1760
provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, bepunished.
However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawfulare Sections 3, 4
and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of theBureau of Agriculture, as
authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. Theorders of the Bureau of Agriculture,
while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, arestatutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a
violation of such orders is not a penal offenseunless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof
unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere inAct No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
made a penal offense, nor is suchviolation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art.
581, par 2 of the PenalCode which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference
to epidemicdisease among animals.
10. Holy Spirit Homeowner Association vs. Defensor G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006
Facts :
A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized the creation
anddevelopment of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC).On March 5, 1972, former
President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcelof land in Constitution Hills,
Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to beknown as the NGC.On
August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the440
hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead
thedisposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein.In view of the rapid
increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 fromthe coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September7, 1993,
authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can
effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing progra
m.On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner Holy
SpiritHomeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side of the
NGC. It isrepresented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal
capacity and onbehalf of the association. The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure,with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeks toprevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act No. 9207,otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land
Utilization Act of 2003."Issue :Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee
was not exercising judicial,quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared null and void for being
arbitrary, capricious andwhimsical.Held:Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial oradministrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules andregulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and thedoctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, aparty need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only wherethe act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and notwhen the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to
the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expresslyauthorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly
on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committeeis invalid on the ground that it is not germane to
the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement.Where what is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agencyin the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.Since the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by theCommittee in the exercise of its quasi-
legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow thedoctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts haveconcurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus andinjunction, such concurrence
does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum
11. Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141
Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a
petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He contends that the order must be
invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it
intrudes the citizen’s right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?
Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of Administrative Order No 308
is a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that the Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking
domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to
make laws and the power of executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be
allowed.
12.PSDSA vs. De Jesus, GR.No. 157299, June 19, 2006
Ever since DepEd was founded, its management had been so centralized in the Manila office. Schools in the
national, regional, and division levels merely followed and implemented the orders and memoranda issued by
the Education Secretary. Due to the evolution of the learning process and the onset of information technology,
there was a need for a radical change in the governance of the DepEd. Thus, a study on how to improve the
management of the Department was conducted, and one of the proposals was the abolition of the office of the
district supervisor.
Then Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta, the Chairman of the Committee on Education, authored Senate Bill No.
2191, the thrust of which was to change the existing management style and focus on the schools where the
teaching-learning process occurs. The bill was intended to highlight shared governance in the different levels in
the DECS hierarchy and establish authority, accountability, and responsibility for achieving higher learning
outcomes.
RA 9155 (Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001) became a law in accordance with Sec. 27(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. Under the law, each regional office shall have a director, an assistant director, and an office
staff for program promotion and support, planning, administrative and fiscal services.
The office of the schools district supervisor has been retained under the law. Each district is headed by a
school district supervisor and an office staff for program promotion. However, the responsibilities of the schools
district supervisor were limited.
The schools district supervisors have no administrative, management, control or supervisory functions over the
schools and learning centers within their respective districts.
Under Sec. 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to “promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations within 90 days after the approval of the Act, provided that the principle of shared governance shall
be fully implemented within 2 years” after such approval.
Before the DepEd could issue the appropriate implementing rules and regulations, PSDSA sought the legal
assistance of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) National Committee on Legal Aid to make
representations for the resolution of the following administrative issues:
Restoration of the functions, duties, responsibilities, benefits, prerogatives, and position level of Public Schools
District Supervisors.
Upgrading of Salary Grade level of Public Schools District Supervisors from Salary Grade Level 19 to Salary
Grade Level 24 under DBM Circular No. 36, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification
Rules and Regulation.
PSDSA thus requested the DepEd Secretary to call an immediate consultation with the district supervisors
nationwide through a convention, and their valid inputs be considered in formulating the rules and regulations
to be urged by the DepEd. However, the Secretary failed to reply.
DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus thereafter issued DECS Office Order No. 1 which constitutes the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9155.
PSDSA led a petition for prohibition and mandamus with SC.
Contentions of the PETITIONERS (PSDSA):
IRR of RA 9155 expanded and modified provisions which are diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of
the subject law. They argue that the said law should be read in harmony with the existing educational laws.
The act of the DepEd in removing the petitioners’ administrative supervision over elementary schools and its
principals within his/her district and converting his/her administrative function to that of performing staff for the
division is a gross violation of RA 9155;
Ultimately, petitioners allege that by the implementation of the IRR they are stripped of their administrative
functions.
Contentions of the Private RESPONDENT (SolGen):
7(D) of R.A. No. 9155 shows that the district supervisor has limited responsibilities, and that the power to
exercise administrative supervision over the ESPs is not covered by any of those responsibilities. The
Education Secretary is the disciplining authority in the DepEd, with the regional directors acting as the
disciplining authority in their respective regions.
As to petitioners’ gripe that the IRR deleted district supervisors from among those school heads who should
report when “[a]ccepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants x x x” the OSG avers that this reportorial
function is “directory” and merely for “convenience.”
ISSUE: Whether the IRR extended RA 9155. – NO
RULING:
Administrative bodies are allowed to implement policies.
It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a
statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. The implementing rules and
regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is
vested in the legislature.
It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies are allowed under their power of subordinate legislation
to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details. All that is required is that the
regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but
conforms with the standards prescribed by law.
Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of
administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction. The
rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing
society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it
also relates to the accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative
agency charged with implementing a particular statute.
Disposition: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition for prohibition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Joint
Circular No. 1, Series of 2003 is declared valid, except Section 6.2(11), Rule VI thereof which provides that
“donations or grants shall be reported only to the division superintendents.” Such donations or grants must also
be reported to the appropriate school district supervisors, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9155. Petitioners’
prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.
OTHER ISSUES:
Whether the IRR for RA 9155 is a valid exercise of quasi-legislative power of DepEd. – PARTLY YES(except
Sec. 2(11), Rule VI regarding the reporting of donation)
Definition of Administrative supervision
Administrative supervision means “overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that their
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such
action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
QUASI – JUDICAL POWER
1.Syquia vs. Board of Power, 72 SCRa 212
Facts: Petitioners Pedro, Gonzalo and Leopoldo Syquia are joint owners of properties in Manila, namely, the
North Qyauia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. In 1945, they executed contracts
for lease of the apartments to USA, with the term being until the war has ended and six months after, or unless
terminated sooner by USA, as the buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of te US armed
forces stationed in the Manila Area. George Moore, a Commanding General of the US Army, and Erland
Tillman, Chief of the Real Estate Division to the US Army in Manila who was under the command of Moore,
was said to be in control of the apartment buildings and had authority in the name of USA to assign officers of
the army to the buildings or order them to vacuate the same. When Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945,
the lease would be terminated six months after. The petitioners approached the predecessors of Moore and
Tillman and requested the buildings to be returned to them, as per contract agreement. However, they were
advised that the US Army wanted to continue their occupancy of the buildings, and refused to execute new
leases but advised that they will vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, not the original terms of the
contract agreement. Petitioner-plaintiffs sued before the Municipal Court of Manila with the demand to get the
properties as their agreement supposedly expired, and furthermore asked for increased rentals until the
premises were vacated. Respondent-defendants were part of the armed forces of the US moved to dismiss the
suit for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. The MC of Manila granted the motion to dismiss the suit,
sustained by the CFI of Manila, hence the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the Philippine Courts have a lack of jurisdiction, considering, under the doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity, that USA has not given their consent to be a respondent.
Ruling: The case was dismissed, the Supreme Court affirming in majority the decision of the Municipal Court of
Manila.
Reason: Considering the circumstances, the real defendant party is the United States of America, as it was the
U.S. Army who were occupying the buildings, with the rent being paid for by their government. USA has not
given their consent to be sued in this case, and any action against them without the consent would constitute a
lack of jurisdiction.
2.Globe Wireless vs. Public Service Commission, 147 SCRA 269
G.R. No. 27520 [Globe Wireless Ltd., vs. Public Service Commission and Antonio B. Arnaiz]. — Challenged in
this petition for certiorari is the jurisdiction of the defunct Public Service Commission [PSC] under Section 21 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, to discipline and impose a fine upon petitioner, Globe Wireless,
Ltd., a duly organized Philippines corporation engaged in ;international telecommunication business under a
franchise granted by Public Acts Nos. 3495, 3692 and 4150 as amended by Republic Act No. 4630.
A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30, Madrid, Spain, filed by private respondent Antonio B.
Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was transmitted to the
Bureau of Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd. for transmission to
Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and Radio Corporation in New York, which, in turn,
transmitted the same to the Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however,
mislaid said message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee.
After being informed of said fact, private respondent Arnaiz, sent to then Public Service Commissioner Enrique
Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating the incident. The complaint was docketed as PSC Case No. 65-
39-OC and petitioner was required to answer the same. Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery of the message to
the addressee.
Hearing ensued, after which the PSC issued an order finding petitioner "responsible for the inadequate and
unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act" and ordering it "to pay a fine of
TWO HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS under Sec. 21 of Com. Act 146, as amended." petitioner was likewise
required to refund the sum of P19.14 to the remitter of the undelivered message. [Annex "C", petition, .
23, Rollo].
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner instituted the instant petition.
We find for petitioner.
Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended otherwise known as the Public Service Act,
vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all Public services and their
franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative
franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission's jurisdiction over petitioner
only to the rate which petitioner may charge the Public. Thus,
Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the grantee only with respect to the
rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to international commitments made or adhered to by the
Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the telegraphic message of
private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed negligence had nothing
whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.
Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an
administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a Public service to comply with the terms and conditions
of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. petitioner operated under a
legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to
violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that
the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of
administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily
implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such
jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby granted and the order of respondent Public Service Commission
in PSC Case No. 65-39-OC is set aside for being null and void.
3.Philippine Association of Lawyers vs. Agrara, 105 Phil 173
FACTS:
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an examination for
the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent
Office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient
scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. The petitioner contends that one who
has passed the bar examination sand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and
who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the
respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation
of the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or
purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a
matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can
practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the
first time that his right has been questioned formally.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent,
their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the
patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the
existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law
is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with
the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions.
Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision
of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical
and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body,
but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
4.Guevarra vs. COMELEC, 104 Phil 268
FACTS:
Guevara was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having
published in the newspaper an article which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC awarding the
contracts for the manufacture and supply of ballot boxes; and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring
into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive constitutional function of this Commission and its Chairman
Petitioner, filed a motion to quash on the following ground that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as
contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the
Commission granted a power to so punish the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against
Guevara in connection with the publication of an article.
RULING:
Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers,
that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative
capacity. It only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it
could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently
judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice". We are therefore
persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to
contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in
the charge under consideration.
5. Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil 655
Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army.
Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU
averred that Toribio’s act is not valid. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the SC, but a motion for
new trial was raised by the NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
Issue: What is the function of CIR as a special court?
Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more
an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a
mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only
when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising
between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean that it can in justiciable
cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process
in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and submit evidence in support
thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected
by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such
evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.
6. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department of Justice
received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to
the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said
extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
Attempt to evade or defeat tax
Fraud by wire, radio, or television
False statement or entries
Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and
assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent,
then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given
ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following grounds:
He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the
DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069
Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases
making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.
The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request, as
Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored
Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further
proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or
statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of
incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
1.Abejo vs. Dela Cruz , 149 SCRA 654
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
These two cases, jointly heard, are jointly herein decided. They involve the question of who, between the
Regional Trial Court and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the dispute between the principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell Philippines,
Inc. (Pocket Bell), a "tone and voice paging corporation", namely, the spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo
(hereinafter referred to as the Abejos) and the purchaser, Telectronic Systems, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Telectronics) of their 133,000 minority shareholdings (for P5 million) and of 63,000 shares registered in the
name of Virginia Braga and covered by five stock certificates endorsed in blank by her (for P1,674,450.00),
and the spouses Agapito Braga and Virginia Braga (hereinafter referred to as the Bragas), erstwhile majority
stockholders. With the said purchases, Telectronics would become the majority stockholder, holding 56% of
the outstanding stock and voting power of the corporation Pocket Bell.
With the said purchases in 1982, Telectronics requested the corporate secretary of the corporation, Norberto
Braga, to register and transfer to its name, and those of its nominees the total 196,000 Pocket Bell shares in
the corporation's transfer book, cancel the surrendered certificates of stock and issue the corresponding new
certificates of stock in its name and those of its nominees.
Norberto Braga, the corporate secretary and son of the Bragas, refused to register the aforesaid transfer of
shares in the corporate books, asserting that the Bragas claim pre-emptive rights over the 133,000 Abejo
shares and that Virginia Braga never transferred her 63,000 shares to Telectronic but had lost the five stock
certificates representing those shares.
This triggered off the series of intertwined actions between the protagonists, all centered on the question of
jurisdiction over the dispute, which were to culminate in the filing of the two cases at bar.
The Bragas assert that the regular civil court has original and exclusive jurisdiction as against the Securities
and Exchange Commission, while the Abejos claim the contrary. A summary of the actions resorted to by the
parties follows:
A. ABEJOS' ACTIONS IN SEC
1. The Abejos and Telectronics and the latter's nominees, as new majority shareholders, filed SEC Cases Nos.
02379 and 02395 against the Bragas on December 17, 1982 and February 14, 1983, respectively.
2. In SEC Case No. 02379, they prayed for mandamus from the SEC ordering Norberto Braga, as corporate
secretary of Pocket Bell to register in their names the transfer and sale of the aforesaid 196,000 Pocket Bell
shares (of the Abejos[1] and Virginia Braga[2]), cancel the surrendered certificates as duly endorsed and to
issue new certificates in their names.
3. In SEC Case No. 02395, they prayed for injunction and a temporary restraining order that the SEC enjoin
the Bragas from disbursing or disposing funds and assets of Pocket Bell and from performing such other acts
pertaining to the functions of corporate officers.
4. Pocket Bell's corporate secretary, Norberto Braga, filed a Motion to Dismiss the mandamus case (SEC Case
No. 02379) contending that the SEC has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since it does not involve
an intracorporate controversy between stockholders, the principal petitioners therein, Telectronics, not being a
stockholder of record of Pocket Bell.
5. On January 8, 1983, SEC Hearing Officer Joaquin Garaygay denied the motion. On January 14, 1983, the
corporate secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On March 21, 1983, SEC Hearing Officer Joaquin
Garaygay issued an order granting Braga's motion for reconsideration and dismissed SEC Case No. 02379.
6. On February 11, 1983, the Bragas filed their Motion to Dismiss the injunction case, SEC Case No. 02395.
On April 8, 1985, the SEC Director, Eugenio Reyes, acting upon the Abejos' ex-parte motion, created a three-
man committee composed of Atty. Emmanuel Sison as Chairman and Attys. Alfredo Oca and Joaquin
Garaygay as members, to hear and decide the two SEC cases (Nos. 02379 and 02395).
7. On April 13, 1983, the SEC three-man committee issued an order reconsidering the aforesaid order of
March 21, 1983 of the SEC Hearing Officer Garaygay (dismissing the mandamus petition SEC Case No.
02379) and directing corporate secretary Norberto Braga to file his answer to the petition therein.
B. BRAGAS' ACTION IN SEC
8. On December 12, 1983, the Bragas filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the SEC en
banc, SEC Case No. EB #049, seeking the dismissal of SEC Cases Nos. 02379 and 02395 for lack of
jurisdiction of the Commission and the setting aside of the various orders issued by the SEC three-man
committee in the course of the proceedings in the two SEC cases.
9. On May 15, 1984, the SEC en banc issued an order dismissing the Bragas' petition in SEC Case No. EB
#049 for lack of merit and at the same time ordering the SEC Hearing Committee to continue with the hearings
of the Abejos and Telectronics SEC Cases Nos. 02379 and 02395, ruling that the "issue is not the ownership
of shares but rather the non-performance by the Corporate Secretary of the ministerial duty of recording
transfers of shares of stock of the corporation of which he is secretary."
10. On May 15, 1984 the Bragas filed a motion for reconsideration but the SEC en banc denied the same on
August 9, 1984.
C. BRAGAS' ACTION IN CFI (NOW RTC)
11. On November 25, 1982, following the corporate secretary's refusal to register the transfer of the shares in
question, the Bragas filed a complaint against the Abejos and Telectronics in the Court of First Instance of
Pasig, Branch 21 (now the Regional Trial Court, Branch 160) docketed as Civil Case No. 48746 for: (a)
rescission and annulment of the sale of the shares of stock in Pocket Bell made by the Abejos in favor of
Telectronics on the ground that it violated the Bragas' alleged pre-emptive right over the Abejos' shareholdings
and an alleged perfected contract with the Abejos to sell the same shares in their (Bragas) favor, (1st cause of
action); plus damages for bad faith; and (b) declaration of nullity of any transfer, assignment or endorsement of
Virginia Braga's stock certificates for 63,000 shares in Pocket Bell to Telectronics for want of consent and
consideration, alleging that said stock certificates, which were intended as security for a loan application and
were thus endorsed by her in blank, had been lost (2nd cause of action).
12. On January 4, 1983, the Abejos filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that it is the SEC
that is vested under PD 902-A with original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving,
among others, controversies "between and among stockholders" and that the Bragas' suit is such a
controversy as the issues involved therein are the stockholders' alleged pre-emptive rights, the validity of the
transfer and endorsement of certificates of stock, the election of corporate officers and the management and
control of the corporation's operations. The dismissal motion was granted by Presiding Judge G. Pineda on
January 14, 1983.
13. On January 24, 1983, the Bragas filed a motion for reconsideration. The Abejos opposed. Meanwhile,
respondent Judge Rafael de la Cruz was appointed presiding judge of the court (renamed Regional Trial
Court) in place of Judge G. Pineda.
14. On February 14, 1983, respondent Judge de la Cruz issued an order rescinding the January 14, 1983
order and reviving the temporary restraining order previously issued on December 23, 1982 restraining
Telectronics' agents or representatives from enforcing their resolution constituting themselves as the new set
of officers of Pocket Bell and from assuming control of the corporation and discharging their functions.
15. On March 2, 1983, the Abejos filed a motion for reconsideration, which motion was duly opposed by the
Bragas. On March 11, 1983, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration.
D. ABEJOS' PETITION AT BAR
16. On March 26, 1983, the Abejos, alleging that the acts of respondent Judge in refusing to dismiss the
complaint despite clear lack of jurisdiction over the action and in refusing to reconsider his erroneous position
were performed without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, filed their herein Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction. They prayed that the challenged orders of respondent
Judge dated February 14, 1983 and March 11, 1983 be set aside for lack of jurisdiction and that he be ordered
to permanently desist from further proceedings in Civil Case No. 48746. Respondent judge desisted from
further proceedings in the case, dispensing with the need of issuing any restraining order.
E. BRAGAS' PETITION AT BAR
17. On August 29, 1984, the Bragas, alleging in turn that the SEC has no jurisdiction over SEC Cases Nos.
02379 and 02395 and that it acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously in dismissing their petition (in SEC
Case No. EB #049) for dismissal of the said cases, filed their herein Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction or TRO. The petitioner seeks the reversal and/or setting aside of the SEC Order dated
May 15, 1984 dismissing their petition in said SEC Case No. EB #049 and sustaining its jurisdiction over SEC
Cases Nos. 02379 and 02395, filed by the Abejos. On September 24, 1984, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order to maintain the status quo and restrained the SEC and/or any of its officers or hearing
committees from further proceeding with the hearings in SEC Cases Nos. 02379 and 02395 and from
enforcing any and all orders and/or resolutions issued in connection with the said cases.
The cases, having been given due course, were jointly heard by the Court on March 27, 1985 and the parties
thereafter filed on April 16, 1985 their respective memoranda in amplification of oral argument on the points of
law that were crystallized during the hearing.
The Court rules that the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between the principal
stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell, namely, the Abejos and Telectronics, the purchasers of the 56%
majority stock (supra, at page 2) on the one hand, and the Bragas, erstwhile majority stockholders, on the
other, and that the SEC, through its en banc Resolution of May 15, 1984 correctly ruled in dismissing the
Bragas' petition questioning its jurisdiction, that "the issue is not the ownership of shares but rather the non-
performance by the Corporate Secretary of the ministerial duty of recording transfers of shares of stock of the
Corporation of which he is secretary."
1. The SEC ruling upholding its primary and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute is correctly premised on,
and fully supported by, the applicable provisions of P.D. No. 902-A which reorganized the SEC with additional
powers "in line with the government's policy of encouraging investments, both domestic and foreign, and more
active public participation in the affairs of private corporations and enterprises through which desirable
activities may be pursued for the promotion of economic development; and, to promote a wider and more
meaningful equitable distribution of wealth", and accordingly provided that:
"SEC. 3. The Commission shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations,
partnerships or associations, who are the grantees of primary franchise and/or a license or permit issued by
the government to operate in the Philippines; x x x
"SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission
over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under
existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associations, its officers or
partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission.
b) Controversies arising out of intracorporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders,
members, or associates; between any and/or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of
which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership
or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;
c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such

corporations, partnerships or associations."[3]
Section 6 further grants the SEC "in order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction", the power, inter alia, "to
issue preliminary or permanent injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases in which it has
jurisdiction, and in which cases the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall apply."
2. Basically and indubitably, the dispute at bar, as held by the SEC, is an intracorporate dispute that has arisen
between and among the principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell due to the refusal of the
corporate secretary, backed up by his parents as erstwhile majority shareholders, to perform his "ministerial
duty" to record the transfers of the corporation's controlling (56%) shares of stock, covered by duly endorsed
certificates of stock, in favor of Telectronics as the purchaser thereof. Mandamus in the SEC to compel the
corporate secretary to register the transfers and issue new certificates in favor of Telectronics and its nominees
was properly resorted to under Rule XXI, Section 1 of the SEC's New Rules of Procedure,[4] which provides
for the filing of such petitions with the SEC. Section 3 of said Rules further authorizes the SEC to "issue orders
expediting the proceedings x x x and also [to] grant a preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
the parties pending such proceedings."
The claims of the Bragas, which they assert in their complaint in the Regional Trial Court, praying for rescission
and annulment of the sale made by the Abejos in favor of Telectronics on the ground that they had an alleged
perfected pre-emptive right over the Abejos' shares as well as for annulment of sale to Telectronics of Virginia
Braga's shares covered by street certificates duly endorsed by her in blank, may in no way deprive the SEC of
its primary and exclusive jurisdiction to grant or not the writ of mandamus ordering the registration of the
shares so transferred. The Bragas' contention that the question of ordering the recording of the transfers
ultimately hinges on the question of ownership or right thereto over the shares notwithstanding, the jurisdiction
over the dispute is clearly vested in the SEC.
3. The very complaint of the Bragas for annulment of the sales and transfers as filed by them in the regular
court questions the validity of the transfer and endorsement of the certificates of stock, claiming alleged pre-
emptive rights in the case of the Abejos' shares and alleged loss of the certificates and lack of consent and
consideration in the case of Virginia Braga's shares. Such dispute clearly involves controversies "between and
among stockholders", as to the Abejos' right to sell and dispose of their shares to Telectronics, the validity of
the latter's acquisition of Virginia Braga's shares, who between the Bragas and the Abejos' transferee should
be recognized as the controlling shareholders of the corporation, with the right to elect the corporate officers
and the management and control of its operations. Such a dispute and case clearly fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC to decide, under Section 5 of P.D. 902-A, above-quoted. The restraining order
issued by the Regional Trial Court restraining Telectronics agents and representatives from enforcing their
resolution constituting themselves as the new set of officers of Pocket Bell and from assuming control of the
corporation and discharging their functions patently encroached upon the SEC's exclusive jurisdiction over
such specialized corporate controversies calling for its special competence. As stressed by the Solicitor
General on behalf of the SEC, the Court has held that "Nowhere does the law [PD 902-A] empower any Court
of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] to interfere with the orders of the Commission",[5] and
consequently "any ruling by the trial court on the issue of ownership of the shares of stock is not binding on the
Commission"[6] for want of jurisdiction.
4. The dispute therefore clearly falls within the general classification of cases within the SEC's original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, under the aforequoted governing section 5 of the law. Insofar as the
Bragas and their corporate secretary's refusal on behalf of the corporation Pocket Bell to record the transfer of
the 56% majority shares to Telectronics may be deemed a device or scheme amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation employed by them to keep themselves in control of the corporation to the detriment of
Telectronics (as buyer and substantial investor in the corporate stock) and the Abejos (as substantial
stockholders-sellers), the case falls under paragraph (a). The dispute is likewise an intra-corporate controversy
between and among the majority and minority stockholders as to the transfer and disposition of the controlling
shares of the corporation, falling under paragraph (b). As stressed by the Court in DMRC Enterprises v. Este
Del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc.,[7] "Considering the announced policy of PD 902-A, the expanded jurisdiction
of the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission under said decree extends exclusively to matters
arising from contracts involving investments in private corporations, partnerships and associations." The
dispute also concerns the fundamental issue of whether the Bragas or Telectronics have the right to elect the
corporate directors and officers and manage its business and operations, which falls under paragraph (c).
5. Most of the cases that have come to this Court involve those under paragraph (b), i.e. whether the
controversy is an intra-corporate one, arising "between and among stockholders" or "between any or all of
them and the corporation." The parties have focused their arguments on this question. The Bragas' contention
in this field must likewise fail. In Philex Mining Corp. v. Reyes,[8] the Court spelled out that "an intra-corporate
controversy is one which arises between a stockholder and the corporation. There is no distinction,
qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all kinds of controversies
between stockholders and corporations. The issue of whether or not a corporation is bound to replace a
stockholder's lost certificate of stock is a matter purely between a stockholder and the corporation. It is a
typical intra-corporate dispute. The question of damages raised is merely incidental to that main issue." The
Court rejected the stockholders' theory of excluding his complaint (for replacement of a lost stock [dividend]
certificate which he claimed to have never received) from the classification of intra-corporate controversies as
one that "does not square with the intent of the law, which is to segregate from the general jurisdiction of
regular Courts controversies involving corporations and their stockholders and to bring them to the SEC for
exclusive resolution, in much the same way that labor disputes are now brought to the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and not to the Courts."
(a) The Bragas contend that Telectronics, as buyer-transferee of the 56% majority shares is not a registered
stockholder, because they, through their son the corporate secretary, appear to have refused to perform "the
ministerial duty of recording transfers of shares of stock of the corporation of which he is the secretary", and
that the dispute is therefore, not an intracorporate one. This contention begs the question which must properly
be resolved by the SEC, but which they would prevent by their own act, through their son, of blocking the due
recording of the transfer and cannot be sanctioned. It can be seen from their very complaint in the regular
courts that they with their two sons constituting the plaintiffs are all stockholders while the defendants are the
Abejos who are also stockholders whose sale of the shares to Telectronics they would annul.
(b) There can be no question that the dispute between the Abejos and the Bragas as to the sale and transfer of
the former's shares to Telectronics for P5 million is an intracorporate one under section 5(b), prescinding from
the applicability of section 5(a) and (c). (supra, par. 4) It is the SEC which must resolve the Bragas' claim in
their own complaint in the court case filed by them of an alleged pre-emptive right to buy the Abejos' shares by
virtue of "on-going negotiations", which they may submit as their defense to the mandamus petition to register
the sale of the shares to Telectronics. But asserting such pre-emptive rights and asking that the same be
enforced is a far cry from the Bragas' claim that "the case relates to questions of ownership" over the shares in
question.[9] (Not to mention, as pointed out by the Abejos, that the corporation is not a close corporation, and
no restriction over the free transferability of the shares appears in the Articles of Incorporation, as well as in the
by-laws[10] and the certificates of stock themselves, as required by law for the enforcement of such restriction.
See Go Soc & Sons, etc. v. IAC, G.R. No. 72342, Resolution of February 19, 1987.)
(c) The dispute between the Bragas and Telectronics as to the sale and transfer for P1,674,450.00 of Virginia
Braga's 63,000 shares covered by street certificates duly endorsed in blank by her is within the special
competence and jurisdiction of the SEC, dealing as it does with the free transferability of corporate shares,
particularly street certificates,[11] as guaranteed by the Corporation Code and its proclaimed policy of
encouraging foreign and domestic investments in Philippine private corporations and more active public
participation therein for the promotion of economic development. Here again, Virginia Braga's claim of loss of
her street certificates or theft thereof (denounced by Telectronics as "perjurious"[12]) must be pleaded by her
as a defense against Telectronics' petition for mandamus and recognition now as the controlling stockholder of
the corporation in the light of the joint affidavit of General Ceferino S. Carreon of the National
Telecommunications Commission and private respondent Jose Luis Santiago of Telectronics narrating the
facts and circumstances of how the former sold and delivered to Telectronics on behalf of his compadres, the
Bragas, Virginia Braga's street certificates for 63,000 shares equivalent to 18% of the corporation's outstanding
stock and received the cash price thereof.[13] But as to the sale and transfer of the Abejos' shares, the Bragas
cannot oust the SEC of its original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, by blocking through
the corporate secretary, their son, the due recording of the transfer and sale of the shares in question and
claiming that Telectronics is not a stockholder of the corporation which is the very issue that the SEC is called
upon to resolve. As the SEC maintains, "There is no requirement that a stockholder of a corporation must be a
registered one in order that the Securities and Exchange Commission may take cognizance of a suit seeking to
enforce his rights as such stockholder."[14] This is because the SEC by express mandate has "absolute
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations" and is called upon to enforce the provisions of the
Corporation Code, among which is the stock purchaser's right to secure the corresponding certificate in his
name under the provisions of Section 63 of the Code. Needless to say, any problem encountered in securing
the certificates of stock representing the investment made by the buyer must be expeditiously dealt with
through administrative mandamus proceedings with the SEC, rather than through the usual tedious regular
court procedure. Furthermore, as stated in the SEC order of April 13, 1983, notice given to the corporation of
the sale of the shares and presentation of the certificates for transfer is equivalent to registration: "Whether the
refusal of the (corporation) to effect the same is valid or not is still subject to the outcome of the hearing on the
merits of the case."[15]
6. In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative commissions and
boards the power to resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in corporations, public transportation
and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in the resolution of labor-
management controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although
it did not so expressly state in the law. The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine
of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with
the purposes of the regulatory statute administered."[16]
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the
special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable. Thus, in 1984, the Court noted that "between the power lodged in an administrative body and a
court, the unmistakable trend has teen to refer it to the former. 'Increasingly, this Court has been committed to
the view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocably, the choice should fall on [an administrative
agency.]'"[17] The Court in the earlier case of Ebon vs. De Guzman,[18] noted that the lawmaking authority, in
restoring to the labor arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in labor cases, as
against the previous P.D. amendment splitting their jurisdiction with the regular courts, "evidently, . . . had
second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in
labor cases because that setup would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible
conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim."
7. Thus, the Corporation Code (B.P. No. 178) enacted on May 1, 1980 specifically vests the SEC with the
Rule-making power in the discharge of its task of implementing the provisions of the Code and particularly
charges it with the duty of preventing fraud and abuses on the part of controlling stockholders, directors and
officers, as follows:
"SEC. 143. Rule-making power of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities and Exchange
Commission shall have the power and authority to implement the provisions of this Code, and to promulgate
rules and regulations reasonably necessary to enable it to perform its duties hereunder, particularly in the
prevention of fraud and abuses on the part of the controlling stockholders, members, directors, trustees or
officers." (Italics supplied)
The dispute between the contending parties for control of the corporation manifestly falls within the primary and
exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC in whom the law has reserved such jurisdiction as an administrative agency of
special competence to deal promptly and expeditiously therewith.
As the Court stressed in Union Glass & Container Corp. v. SEC,[19] "This grant of jurisdiction [in Section 5]
must be viewed in the light of the nature and functions of the SEC under the law. Section 3 of PD No. 902-A
confers upon the latter 'absolute jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all corporations, partnerships or
associations, who are grantees of primary franchise and/or license or permit issued by the government to
operate in the Philippines x x x.' The principal function of the SEC is the supervision and control over
corporations, partnerships and associations with the end in view that investment in these entities may be
encouraged and protected, and their activities pursued for the promotion of economic development.
"It is in aid of this office that the adjudicative power of the SEC must be exercised. Thus the law explicitly
specified and delimited its jurisdiction to matters intrinsically connected with the regulation of corporations,
partnerships and associations and those dealing with the internal affairs of such corporations, partnerships or
associations.
"Otherwise stated, in order that the SEC can take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of
the following relationships: [a] between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; [b] between
the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; [c] between the
corporation, partnership or association and the state in so far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is
concerned; and [d] among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves."[20]
Parenthetically, the cited case of Union Glass illustrates by way of contrast what disputes do not fall within the
special jurisdiction of the SEC. In this case, the SEC had properly assumed jurisdiction over the dissenting
stockholders' complaint against the corporation Pioneer Glass questioning its dacion en pago of its glass plant
and all its assets in favor of the DBP which was clearly an intra-corporate controversy dealing with its internal
affairs. But the Court held that the SEC had no jurisdiction over petitioner Union Glass Corp., impleaded as
third party purchaser of the plant from DBP in the action to annul the dacion en pago. The Court held that such
action for recovery of the glass plant could be brought by the dissenting stockholder to the regular courts only if
and when the SEC rendered final judgment annulling the dacion en pago and furthermore subject to Union
Glass' defenses as a third party buyer in good faith. Similarly, in the DMRC case, therein petitioner's complaint
for collection of the amounts due to it as payment of rentals for the lease of its heavy equipment in the form
mainly of cash and part in shares of stock of the debtor-defendant corporation was held to be not covered by
the SEC's exclusive jurisdiction over intracorporate disputes, since "to pass upon a money claim under a lease
contract would be beyond the competence of the Securities and Exchange Commission and to separate the
claim for money from the claim for shares of stock would be splitting a single cause of action resulting in a
multiplicity of suits."[21] Such an action for collection of a debt does not involve enforcement of rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code nor the internal or intracorporate affairs of the debtor corporation. But
in all disputes affecting and dealing with the interests of the corporation and its stockholders, following the
trend and clear legislative intent of entrusting all disputes of a specialized nature to administrative agencies
possessing the requisite competence, special knowledge, experience and services and facilities to
expeditiously resolve them and determine the essential facts including technical and intricate matters, as in
labor and public utilities rates disputes, the SEC has been given "the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide" them (under Section 5 of P.D. 902-A) "in addition to [its] regulatory and adjudicative functions"
(under Section 3, vesting in it "absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations" and the Rule-
making power granted it in Section 143 of the Corporation Code, supra.). As stressed by the Court in
the Philex case, supra, "(T)here is no distinction, qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is
broad aid covers all kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations."
It only remains now to deal with the Order dated April 15, 1983 (Annex H, Petition)[22] of the SEC's three-
member Hearing Committee granting Telectronics' motion for creation of a receivership or management
committee with the ample powers therein enumerated for the preservation pendente lite of the corporation's
assets and in discharge of its "power and duty to preserve the rights of the parties, the stockholders, the public
availing of the corporation's services and the rights of creditors," as well as "for reasons of equity and justice . .
. (and) to prevent possible paralization of corporate business." The said Order has not been implemented
notwithstanding its having been upheld per the SEC en banc's Order of May 15, 1984 (Annex "V", Petition)
dismissing for lack of merit the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for restraining order
or injunction filed by the Bragas seeking the disbandment of the Hearing Committee and the setting aside of its
Orders, and its Resolution of August 9, 1984, denying reconsideration (Annex "X", Petition), due to the Bragas'
filing of the petition at bar.
Prescinding from the great concern of damage and prejudice expressed by Telectronics due to the Bragas
having remained in control of the corporation and having allegedly committed acts of gross mismanagement
and misapplication of funds, the Court finds that under the facts and circumstances of record, it is but fair and
just that the SEC's order creating a receivership committee be implemented forthwith, in accordance with its
terms, as follows:
"The three-man receivership committee shall be composed of a representative from the commission, in the
person of the Director, Examiners and Appraisers Department or his designated representative, and a
representative from the petitioners and a representative of the respondent.
"The petitioners and respondent are therefore directed to submit to the Commission the name of their
designated representative within three (3) days from receipt of this order. The Commission shall appoint the
other representatives if either or both parties fail to comply with the requirement within the stated time."
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Granting the petition in G.R. No. 63558, annulling the challenged Orders of respondent Judge dated
February 14, 1983 and March 11, 1983 (Annexes "L" and "P" of the Abejos' petition) and prohibiting
respondent Judge from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 48746 filed in his Court other than to dismiss the
same for lack or jurisdiction over the subject-matter;
(b) Dismissing the petition in G.R. Nos. 68450-51 and lifting the temporary restraining order issued on
September 24, 1984, effective immediately upon promulgation hereof;
(c) Directing the SEC through its Hearing Committee to proceed immediately with hearing and resolving the
pending mandamus petition for recording in the corporate books the transfer to Telectronics and its nominees
of the majority (56%) shares of stock of the corporation Pocket Bell pertaining to the Abejos and Virginia Braga
and all related issues, taking into consideration, without need of resubmittal to it, the pleadings, annexes and
exhibits filed by the contending parties in the cases at bar; and
(d) Likewise directing the SEC through its Hearing Committee to proceed immediately with the implementation
of its receivership or management committee Order of April 15, 1983 in SEC Case No. 2379 and for the
purpose, the contending parties are ordered to submit to said Hearing Committee the name of their designated
representatives in the receivership/management committee within three (3) days from receipt of this decision,
on pain of forfeiture of such right in case of failure to comply herewith, as provided in the said Order; and
ordering the Bragas to perform only caretaker acts in the corporation pending the organization of such
receivership/management committee and assumption of its functions.
This decision shall be immediately executory upon its promulgation.
SO ORDERED
2.Bernardo vs. Abalos GR No. 137266, Dec 5, 2001

FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Abalos, Sr. was the mayor of Mandaluyong City and his son,Benjamin Abalos
Jr. was a candidate for city mayor of the same city for the May 1998 elections.Petitioners herein interposed
that respondents conducted an all-expense-free affair at a resort inQuezon Province for the Mandaluyong City
public school teachers, registered voters of the saidcity and who are members of the Board of Election
Inspectors therein. The said affair wasalleged to be staged as a political campaign for Abalos Jr., where his
political jingle was playedall throughout and his shirts being worn by some participants. Moreover, Abalos Sr.
also madean offer and a promise then to increase the allowances of the teachers. In this regard,petitioners
filed a criminal complaint with the COMELEC against Abalos Sr. and Abalos Jr. for vote-
buying, further alleging that they conspired with their co-respondents in violating theOmnibus Election Code.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Director of the Law Departmentof the COMELEC, the COMELEC en
banc dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.Hence, this petition for certiorari.ISSUE: Whether
the petition before the Supreme Court must be given due course without thepetitioners first submitting a motion
for reconsideration before the COMELEC.HELD: NO. The Court ruled that a petition for certiorari can only be
resorted to if there is noappeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the
instantcase, it was said that filing of the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC is the
mostexpeditious and inexpensive recourse that petitioners can avail of as it was intended to give
theCOMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. As the petitioners then did notexhaust all the
remedies available to them at the COMELEC level, it was held that their instantpetition is certainly premature.
Significantly, they have not also raised any plausible reason for their direct recourse to the Supreme Court. As
such, the instant petition was ruled to fail.
4.Industrial Enterprises vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426
Concept: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Facts:
· Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy
Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the Ministry of Energy
for another to contract for the additional three coal blocks.
· IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation
(MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights and interests
to MMIC.
· IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of Energy
Geronimo Velasco before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal blocks prior to
finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights for the operation be granted back.
· Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they have mortgages in favor of MMIC.
It was dismissed
· Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.
· RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI.
· CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.
Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?

Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract
cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived
from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the
determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI
would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-development and with the objective of
rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the
rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its
Decision ordering the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of
the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application for three
(3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the BED.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases
involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court
has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in
character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view"
Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas
should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said
areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the
specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters
concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources
like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even
when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an
administrative agency
GSIS vs. CSC, 204 SCRA 826
FACTS
The GSIS dismissed six government employees on account of irregularities in the canvassing of supplies. The
employees appealed to the Merit Board. Said board found for the employees and declared the dismissal as
illegal because no hearing took place. The GSIS took the issue to the Civil Service which then ruled that the
dismissal was indeed illegal. The CSC thereafter ordered the reinstatement of the employees and demanded
the payment of backwages. The replacements of the dismissed employees should then be released from
service.
The GSIS remained unconvinced and raised the issue to the SC. SC affirmed the Civil Service ruling saying o
The CSC acted within its authority o Reinstatement was proper o However, the SC modified the requirement of
backpay. Said backpay should be made after the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings.
Heirs of the dismissed employees filed a motion for execution of the Civil Service resolution so that backwages
can be paid. GSIS however denied the motion saying that the SC modified that part of the ruling.
CSC nonetheless thumbed its nose to the GSIS and granted the motion. GSIS was made to pay. Backed
against the wall, GSIS filed certiorari with the SC asking that the CSC order be nullified. The GSIS contends
that the CSC has no power to execute its judgments.
ISSUE
Whether the Civil Service has the power to enforce its judgments
HELD
YES. The Civil Service Commission is a consitutional commission invested by the Constitution and
relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has
the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on
appeal. It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice
before it or before any of its offices, which rules should not however diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.
In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil
Service Commission the power or authority or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders. It would
seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that
what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the
authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority
to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
Therefore, the GSIS must yield to the order of the CSC.
5.Paat vs. CA, 266 SCRA 167
Facts:
· May19, 1989. The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR because the driver of the truck
was not able to produce the required documents for the forest products.
· Jovitio Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), issued an order of
confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days to submit an explanation. Owner was not able to sumbit
an explanation and the order of the CENRO was enforced.
· The issue was brought to the secretary of the DENR. While pending, the owner filed a suit for replevin
against the Layugan. Layugan filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the owner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. Trial court ruled in favor of the owner. CA sustained Trial Court’s decision
Issue: W/ON the trial court has jurisdiction?
Held. No. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.
6.Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to
information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective
loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986,
apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy
General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply,
"(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our
desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest
loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should
be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the
government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers
themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they
were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible
positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions
being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the
framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by
the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
7.Mangubat vs. Osmena, 165 Phil 1305

On 21 May 1957 Alipio Gonzales filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu praying for a writ to
declare null and void the abolition by the respondent municipal board of his position as deputy detective
inspector in the Cebu City Police Department and the termination by the respondent city mayor of his services
as such; to order the respondent city mayor to reinstate him to his position as deputy detective inspector; the
respondent municipal board to appropriate the corresponding amount for the payment of back salaries to the
petitioner from 1 January 1957 until his reinstatement; the respondent city auditor to pass in audit the voucher
for the payment of the petitioner's back salaries and the city treasurer pay him his back salaries; the
respondent city mayor to pay him (the petitioner) P10,000 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P5,000 as attorney's fees; and for other just and equitable relief. In support of his prayer, the
petitioner alleged that he is a civil service eligible, having passed the examination for patrolman with a rating of
83.5%, and held the position of deputy detective inspector in the Cebu City Police Department with
compensation at the rate of P1440 per annum; that on or about 28 December 1956 he was served with a letter
signed by the respondent city mayor informing him that pursuant to the provisions of Ordinance No. 220,
abolishing the position he holds, his services were "terminated effective at the close of office hours on
December 31, 1956;" that as of the last mentioned date he has served in various capacities in the Cebu City
Police Department for a period of 19 years, 9 months and 2 days; that the respondent city auditor and the
respondent city treasurer have refused to pass in audit the voucher for the payment of the petitioner's salary
and to pay his salary from 1 January 1957; that on 3 April 1957 he sought in writing his reinstatement with back
salaries but the respondents refused to accede to his demands despite the fact that he was willing and anxious
to return to his position and physically fit to discharge the duties thereof; that by the abolition of his position
without the approval of the department head and the termination of his services as deputy detective inspector
he has been unlawfully excluded from the use and enjoyment of an office to which he is lawfully entitled; that
the respondents, with grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice and in violation of law, have unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from their respective offices; that
the respondents have discriminated against the petitioner because others with efficiency ratings lower than his
have been retained in the service; and that because of the respondents' unlawful acts the petitioner has
suffered mental anguish and untold worries for which the former are liable to pay to the latter moral and
exemplary damages (civil No. 5085).
On 18 June 1957 the respondents filed an answer to the petitioner's complaint stating that while it is true that
the petitioner was served with notice terminating his service as deputy detective inspector in the Cebu City
Police Department due to the abolition of his position, yet he was simultaneously extended another
appointment to a position in the uniformed division of the same Department, with the same rank and a higher
salary, but the petitioner refused to accept the position; that the petitioner could not be reinstated to his former
position with back salaries because it had been abolished by the respondent municipal board in the lawful
exercise of its legislative power; and that the abolition of the said position need not be approved by the
department head because the Chief Executive only has general supervision over local governments; and
setting up the following affirmative defenses; that the abolition of positions in the detective division and creation
of positions in the uniform division of the Cebu City Police Department, upon recommendation of the chief of
police, was resorted to meet the public demand for more uniformed police officers and to make more
systematic and efficient the reorganization and function of the detective division; that the city government of
Cebu has the power to create and abolish positions in its various departments; that the abolition of positions
and creation of new ones in the city budget do not need the approval of the department head; that the abolition
of positions and creation of new ones were done in good faith and without any personal or political regard to
the persons occupying them; that the respondent city mayor never intended to separate the petitioner from the
service because simultaneously with the termination of his services as deputy detective inspector he was
extended an appointment in the uniformed division with the same rank and higher salary but he refused to
accept the appointment; and that there is a defect of parties; and that the petitioner has other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As counterclaim the respondents alleged that the
petitioner had no valid cause of action and instituted the suit against them to harass and prejudice them; and
that by reason of such unjust, malicious and illegal act, the respondents have suffered compensatory, moral
and exemplary damages in the total amount of P25,000. They prayed that the petition be dismissed; that the
petitioner be ordered to pay to them compensatory, moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of
P25,000 and double costs of the suit; and that they be granted other just and equitable relief.
On 27 June 1957 the petitioner filed a reply to the respondents' answer and answer to their counterclaim,
alleging that new appointment extended to him in the uniformed division is tantamount to a demotion because
there were other deputy detective inspectors whose efficiency ratings were below his and were new in the
service but were retained in that capacity; that the appointment extended to him was temporary in nature
because it was subject to the condition that it was "good until revoked" by the respondent city mayor; that there
is no defect in the parties because the respondent city mayor is sued personally for the payment of back
salaries; that he had sought relief from the administrative branch of the government but the latter had failed to
act on his respect, thus depriving him of other remedies in the ordinary course of law except this action for
mandamus; that he has a valid cause of action against the respondents; that this suit is not merely to harass
and prejudice the respondents, hence they could not have suffered any damages; and that he is merely
seeking redress against the unlawful acts of the respondents; and praying for the dismissal of the respondents'
counterclaim.
On 9 July 1958 the petitioner filed a "motion to amend petition" to implead the incumbent city mayor, the chief
of police and the City of Cebu and to substitute the former city auditor by the incumbent, Sulpicio Paredes, as
respondents. Attached to the motion was the amended petition. On 11 July 1958 the respondents filed a
motion stating that they do not object to the inclusion of the incumbent city mayor and city auditor, but object to
the inclusion of the City of Cebu and the Chief of Police as new parties because the period of one year from
the date of dismissal from office on 31 December 1956 to the filing of the amended petition on 9 July 1958, to
include the City of Cebu and Chief of Police as respondent, already had elapsed, and prayed for the dismissal
of the case for non-joinder of the City of Cebu as a party respondent in the original petition.
On 12 July 1958 the petitioner filed a "reply to respondents' opposition" and on 14 July 1958 "additional
arguments in support of motion to amend petition and in support of reply to opposition."
On 15 July 1958 the Court entered an order denying the petitioner's motion to admit the amended petition
impleading the City of Cebu and the Chief of Police as respondents, but allowing the inclusion of the incumbent
city mayor and city auditor as respondents.
At the hearing of the case on 18 February 1959 the parties agreed to submit a stipulation of facts and the Court
postponed the hearing to 23 February 1959. On the last mentioned date, the parties submitted the stipulation
of facts and the Court granted the parties three days within which to submit their respective memoranda
simultaneously. On 24 February 1959 the parties submitted an amended stipulation of facts superseding the
original stipulation. The amended stipulation of facts reads, as follows:.
COME now both parties, by their respective counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the
following REVISED AGREED STIPULATION OF FACTS;
1. That petitioner is of legal age and resident of the City of Cebu; that respondent Hon. Sergio Osmeña, Jr., is
of legal age, and resident of the City of Cebu; that he is being sued in his private and/or official capacity as
then City Mayor of the City of Cebu; that respondent Ramon Duterte is now the incumbent City Mayor by
operation of law, succeeding respondent Sergio Osmeña, Jr., when the latter vacated the position to run for
Congress in 1957;
2. That respondent Municipal Board is the duly constituted and incumbent municipal board of the City of Cebu
and is composed of the following: Hon. Ramon Abellanosa, Vice-Mayor and presiding officer, who succeeded
respondent Ramon Duterte when the latter succeeded respondent Sergio Osmeña, Jr., as City Mayor;
Honorables Casimiro V. Madarang, Joaquin L. Panis, Carlos J. Cuizon, Osmundo J. Rama, Florencio S. Urot,
Ceferina U. del Rosario, Pedro V. Clavano, Generoso Jaca, and Cecilia de la Victoria, as members;
3. That respondents City Treasurer Felipe B. Pareja is of legal age and the incumbent City Treasurer; that
respondent City Auditor Restituto B. Cantos has been replaced already by Atty. Sulpicio Paredes;
4. That petitioner is a civil service eligible for patrolman with a rating of 83.5%; that he has served in the police
department of the City of Cebu in various capacities for 19 years, 9 months and two days until December 31,
1956, when he was served notice of termination of his services in the police department as deputy detective
inspector, which position he held under a permanent appointment and with compensation at the rate of
P1,440.00 per annum, which termination order is literally as follows:
In view of the abolition of your position pursuant to Ordinance No. 220, as published in two (2) Cebu
newspapers of general circulation in the City, please be advised that your services are hereby terminated
effective at the close of office hours on December 31, 1956. Very respectfully, (SGD) SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR.,
Mayor, City of Cebu.
and that simultaneously he was extended a new appointment for the position provided for him in the uniformed
division of the same Department as police sergeant, which appointment is literally as follows:
By virtue of the powers vested in me by Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 58, as amended by Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 129, you are hereby appointed as Police Sergeant in the office of Police Department,
City of Cebu, with compensation at the rate of ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY (P1,680.00) PESOS
per annum effective January 1, 1957, and good until revoked. Very respectfully, (SGD) SERGIO OSMEÑA,
JR., Mayor.
Chargeable to: Police
Item No. 6, Dept.
Gen. Fund Budget, 195—5—.
5. That by reason of the aforequoted letter of the respondent City Mayor, terminating petitioner's services,
respondents City Treasurer and City Auditor refused and failed and still refuse and fail to pay petitioner's salary
since January 1, 1957, as deputy detective inspector;
6. That petitioner refused to accept the new appointment tendered to him by respondent City Mayor, which
appointment is quoted above; and that on April 3, 1957, petitioner, through his counsel, sought in writing a
reinstatement to his position as deputy detective inspector with back salaries, which written demand is as
follows:
In behalf of my client, Mr. ALIPIO GONZALES, I have the honor to request that he be reinstated to his position
as deputy detective inspector in the Cebu Police Department.
It appears that the termination of his services was without the previous approval of the President of the
Philippines or the Department Head as required by Executive Order No. 506, s. 1934; Executive Order No.
175, s. 1938; Provincial Circulars dated January 11, 1952, and April 3, 1954; consequently such termination is
null and void in accordance with the Supreme Court decision in the case of Pulutan v. Dizon, et al., 52 Off.
Gaz. 3047. It also appears that, as may be seen in the semi-annual efficiency report as of December 31, 1956,
submitted by the Chief of Police, Mr. Gonzales ranks third in efficiency among the seven deputy detective
inspectors; hence, he has a better right to the position than those he has outranked.
It is most respectfully reiterated that he be reinstated to his position, with back salaries since January 1, 1957,
within a period of five (5) days from receipt of this letter, otherwise, my client will be compelled to file the
corresponding action for a writ of mandamus and to avail of such other remedies and damages as provided by
law.
Thanking you for your kind and immediate attention to this request, I am Very respectfully, (SGD) ANTONIO
ABAD TORMIS.
but respondents refused and failed and still refuse and fail to reinstate the petitioner to his position; and that
petitioner is ready, willing and able to return to his position and is physically fit to discharge the duties
appertaining thereto;
7. That the abolition of petitioner's position was made without the consent of the proper department head;
8. That failing to get favorable action on his demand for reinstatement, petitioner, through counsel wrote and
sent the following letter to the President of the Philippines on April 30, 1957:
In behalf of my client, Mr. Alipio Gonzales, I have the honor to request and appeal to your Office to intercede in
his behalf in the name of justice and law. As of December 31, 1956, the Honorable Mayor of Cebu City,
alleging abolition of his position as deputy detective inspector, terminated his services, discriminating against
him in favor of those whose services are less efficient and who have been in the government shorter in period
he had been than he had been. Mr. Gonzales has been in the government for 19 years and devoted the best
years of his life as a humble public servant. Last April 3, 1957, I wrote His Honor, the Municipal Board, the City
Treasurer and the City Auditor requesting the reinstatement of my client with back salaries. Except the
Municipal Board all these officials ignored my letter. The Board, however, through its secretary informed me in
writing that my letter was being referred to the municipal board, but to date no action has been taken, at least, I
have not been informed of any action whatsoever. I am enclosing herewith a copy of this letter.
In view of the fact that my appeal for reinstatement of my client had been ignored, I am appealing to Your
Excellency. Hoping Your Excellency will heed my appeal and order the reinstatement of my client, and
thanking Your Excellency for an early and favorable action, I remain, very respectfully, (SGD) ANTONIO ABAD
TORMIS.
but up to the present the President has taken no action on said appeal whatsoever;
9. That as per certificate of the respondent City Treasurer based on the semi-annual efficiency report
submitted Chief of Police, the efficiency ratings of the seven deputy detective inspectors as of December 31,
1956, are as follows:
Enrique Villaflor 92%
Alipio Gonzales 89%
Terencio Garciano 86%
Manuel Bacud 84%
Teodoro Abesia 88%
Rafael Navaja 82%

Vicente Basak 93%
10. That there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except this action for a
writ of mandamus;
11. That petitioner was extended a new appointment as sergeant in the uniformed division of the police
department of Cebu City after his position as deputy detective inspector in the detective division was abolished
by the city budget approved during the administration of the then City Mayor Jose V. Rodriguez, this after the
city fiscal of Cebu had opined that a new appointment is necessary to adjust to the said city budget.
WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court is most respectfully prayed to render judgment in accordance with the
foregoing REVISED AGREED STIPULATION OF FACTS. The parties hereto have mutually agreed to
withdraw, as it is hereby withdrawn, the first agreed stipulation of facts, dated February 23, 1959.
Respectfully submitted on this 24th day of February, 1959.
After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, on 27 February 1959 the Court rendered
judgment holding that following the case of Gacho vs. Osmeña, 55 Off. Gaz. 10079, the petitioner should be
reinstated to his former position and should be allowed "to continue holding the same with all the rights
appurtenant thereto, in accordance with law;" but, relying on the case of Angara vs. Gorospe, 53 Off. Gaz.
4480, not entitled to back salaries, because "The City of Cebu should be made a party respondent, if it is
sought to make it pay with its funds for back salaries of the petitioner," and directing the respondent city mayor
to reinstate him to his former position, with costs against the respondent city mayor.
On 4 March 1959 the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of the judgment denying his claim
for back salaries from 1 January 1957 until his reinstatement and prayed that the respondents be ordered to
pay him his back salaries from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement or, in the alternative,
the respondent Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be ordered to pay him out of his own funds. On 5 March 1959 the
respondents filed an objection to the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On 7 March 1959 the Court denied
his motion for reconsideration. On 16 March 1959 the petitioner filed a notice of appeal from that part of the
judgment which denies "his claim for back salaries" and a "motion for immediate execution of judgment
pending appeal" and a "motion for approval of appeal bond after resolution of motion for immediate execution
of judgment." On 19 March 1959 the respondents filed an "opposition to motion for immediate execution of
judgment." On 21 March 1959 the Court entered an order granting the petitioner's motion for execution of the
judgment pending appeal "insofar as it orders the petitioner's reinstatement only." On 31 March 1959 the Court
approved the appealed bond filed by the petitioner.lawphil.net
The respondents have not appealed.
The recent case of Mangubat vs. Osmeña, Jr., G.R. No. L-12837, 30 April 1959, upholds the appellant's claim
for back salaries. Said this Court in that case —
In support of the first proposition (that the case must dismissed for lack of an indispensable party), appellants
assert that the City of Cebu is an indispensable party on account of petitioners' claim for back salaries, and
that in view of the fact that said City has not been made a respondent in this case, the same should be
dismissed. ....
xxx xxx xxx
The necessity of making the City a respondent herein is based upon its right to defend itself, as demanded by
the requirements of due process. However, those requirements have been substantially complied with in the
case at bar. The parties therein have handled the case, and the same was heard and decided in the lower
court, as if the City had been named respondent in the pleadings. The officer required by law "to cause to be
defended all suits against the City", namely, its mayor (Sec. 8, Commonwealth Act No. 58), is respondent in
his official capacity. The officer charged with the duty to represent the City "in all civil cases wherein the city ...
is a party" — to wit, its City Attorney (Sec. 17, Commonwealth Act No. 58) — is counsel for respondents
herein. In addition thereto, the auditor, the treasurer and even the municipal board of the City of Cebu, are
parties respondents.
There is no reason to believe that these officers and the City Mayor would have exerted greater efforts, than
those already displayed by them, in protecting the interests of the City of Cebu, were it formally a respondent
herein. Indeed, it is only logical to expect that, having been individually named as respondents, said officers
must have taken as much concern, if not more, in warding off petitioner's claim. Under the foregoing
circumstances, we would be subordinating the substance to the form if the action for mandamus — insofar as
the claim for back salaries is concerned — were, either dismissed, or remanded to the lower court, for the
corresponding amendment of the pleadings and a repetition of the proceedings held for the last five (5) years,
in order to reach the same decision rendered by the lower court and the same conclusions set forth in decision,
as regards the substantive rights of the parties. It is our considered opinion, therefore, that the ends of justice
and equity would be served best if the inclusion of the City of Cebu, as one of the respondents herein, were
considered a mere formality and deemed effected as if a formal amendment of the pleadings had been made.
In the case at bar the incumbent City Mayor, the municipal Board, City Auditor and City Treasurer have been
named as respondents and it will be recalled that the appellant had sought the inclusion of the City of Cebu as
a respondent in these proceedings. For the same reasons given in Mangubat vs. Osmeña, Jr., supra, "the
ends of justice and equity would be served best if the inclusion of the City of Cebu, as one of the respondents
herein, were considered a mere formality and deemed effected, as if a formal amendment of the pleadings had
been made."
The appellees contend that the appellant's refusal to accept the promotional appointment of police sergeant
precludes him from demanding back salaries. The appointment foisted upon the appellant was temporary only
because it was "good until revoked," and being a civil service eligible holding a permanent position, he had all
the right to decline it.
The part of the judgment appealed from is reversed and the respondents directed to pay the appellant back
salaries from 1 January 1957 until his reinstatement in the service, without pronouncement as to costs.
8.Pros. Tabao vs. Judge Lilagan, AM no. RTJ-01-1651, September 4, 2001
On February 24, 1998, a water craft M/L Hadja, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the port area of
Tacloban City with a load of 100 tons of tanbark. Robert Hernandez was the consignee to said cargo. While
the cargo was being unloaded, the NBI decided to verify the shipment's accompanying documents where it
was found to be irregular and incomplete. Consequently, the NBI ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped.
As a result, the tanbark, the boat, and three cargo trucks were seized and impounded.
On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO 8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a Criminal Complaint for the violation
of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D. 705, The Forestry Code of the Philippines as amended, against the
captain and crew of the M/L Hadja, Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion, Alejandro K. Bautista, a forster, and
Marcial A. Dalimot, a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer of the DENR. Bautista and
Dalimot were also charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The
complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98-296 at the Prosecutor's Office of Tacloban City.
On March 10, 1998, DENR took possession of the cargo, the boat and the three trucks, through the previous
direction of the complainant. Due notice were issued to the consignee, Robert Hernandez and the NBI
Regional Director.
On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the RTC of Leyte a case for replevin to recover the items seized by the
DENR and was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-03-42.
On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S. No. 98-296 and on March 17, 1998,
confiscation proceedings were conducted by the PENRO-Leyte, with both Hernandez and his counsel present.
On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and directed Sheriff IV
Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez
after the expiration of five days. Respondent Sheriff served a copy of the writ to the Philippine Coast Guard
station in Tacloban City at around 5:45 p.m. of March 19, 1998.
Thus, the filing of this Administrative complaint against respondent via a letter addressed to the Chief Justice
and dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.
Complainant avers that replevin is not available when properties sought to be recovered are involved in
criminal proceedings. He also submits that respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the law and
jurisprudence or purposely disregarded them.
Complainant states that the respondent sheriff had the duty to safeguard M/L Hadja and to prevent it from
leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had served a writ of seizure therefor on the Philippine Coast Guard.
According to the complainant, on March 19, 1998, the vessel left the port of Tacloban City, either through
respondent sheriff's gross negligence or his direct connivance with interested parties. Moreover, complainant
pointed out that respondent sheriff released the seized tanbark to Hernandez within the five day period that he
was supposed to keep it under the terms of the writ, thereby effectively altering, suppressing, concealing or
destroying the integrity of said evidence.
Respondent judge claim that the charge of gross ignorance of the law was premature since there is a pending
motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the replevin case. Further, he claimed that he was unaware of the
existence of I.S. No. 98-296 and upon learning of the same, he issued an order dated March 25, 1998,
suspending the transfer to Hernandez of possession of the subject items, pending resolution of an urgent
manifestation by the complainant. Respondent judges stresses that the writ of replevin was issued in strict
compliance with the requirements laid down in Rule 60 of the Revised Rule of Court. He also pointed out that
no apprehension report was issued by the NBI regarding the shipment and neither did the DENR issue a
seizure report.
Respondent sheriff submits that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast Guard to prevent the departure of
subject vessel since he does not have the means to physically prevent the vessel from sailing. He further
claimed that he verified the status of the cargo with DENR and that it came from a legitimate source except
that the shipment documents were not in order. Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to
serve the writ of replevin, absent any instruction to the contrary.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in a report dated April 8, 1999, recommended that the judge be fined in
the amount of P15,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and that the charges against respondent sheriff be
dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence for issuing the writ of
replevin.
RULING:
The complaint for replevin states that the shipment of tanbark and the vessel on which it was loaded were
seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also stated that the NBI turned over the seized
items to the DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action". These allegations would have been
sufficient to alert the respondent judge that the DENR had custody of the seized items and that administrative
proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence. Also, the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the
shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. Prudent thing for the
respondent judge to do was to dismiss the replevin outright.
Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his representatives may order the
confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed or abandoned, including the
conveyances involved in the offense.
It was declared by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals the that enforcement of forestry laws, rules and
regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the DENR. The DENR should be given free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to
determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The court held that the assumption of the trial court
of the replevin suit constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative ageny's
prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged within an administrative body of special
competence.
The respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of
the law. He has fallen short of the standard set forth in Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that
a judge must be an embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. To measure up to this standard,
justices are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal
commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.
On the charges against respondent sheriff, the Court agreed with the OCA that they should be dismissed.
Respondent sheriff merely complied with his material duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and to
execute it promptly in accordance with the mandates.
Respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan was found liable for gross ignorance of the law and is accordingly ordered
to pay a fine of 10,000. 00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt more
severely. The complaint against respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is dismissed for lack of merit.
9. Arrow Transportation vs. BOT, 63 SCRA 193
FACTS
Petitioner Arrow and private respondent Sultan are both domestic corporations. Petitioner is a holder of
a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate a public utility bus. Private respondent applied for the issuance
of a CPC to operate a similar service. Without the required publication, public respondent Board granted a
provisional permit to operate. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and cancellation of the provisional permit.
Before resolution of the motion, petitioner filed for herein petition arguing that there must be publication before
a provisional permit can be issued, with reference made to PD 101, which authorized the Board to grant
provisional permits when warranted.
ISSUE
Whether or not the issuance of the provisional permit was legal.
HELD
The Court held in the affirmative. For a provisional permit to operate a public utility, an ex parte hearing
would suffice. The decisive consideration is the existence of public need. That was shown in this case,
respondent Board, on the basis of demonstrable data, being satisfied of the pressing necessity for the grant of
the provisional permit sought.
Petition dismissed.
10. KBMPBM vs. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 193

11.National Development Corp. vs. Hervilla, 151 SCRA 200
FACTS
The customs authorities found that the vessel carried on board an unmanifested cargo consisting of
one television set, and respondent Collector of Customs sent a written notice to the operator of the vessel and
the latter answered stating that the television set was not cargo and so was not required by law to be
manifested. The operator requested an investigation and hearing but respondent finding the operator’s
explanation not satisfactory imposed on the vessel a fine of P5,000.00, ordering said fine to be paid within 48
hours from receipt, with a threat that the vessel would be denied clearance and a warrant of seizure would be
issued if the fine will not be paid.
NDC, as owner, and operator AV Rocha filed for special civil action for certiorari before the CFI of
Manila against the respondent. Respondent contended that petitioners have not exhausted all available
administrative remedies, one of which is to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contention of respondent is correct.
HELD
The Court held in the negative. Respondent Collector committed grave abuse of discretion because
petitioner NDC was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set involved is not a cargo that needs
to be manifested. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the appeal to the administrative
superior is not a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as where it is undisputed that
the respondent officer has acted in utter disregard of the principle of due process.
12. Atlas Consolidated Mining vs. Factoran ,154 SCRA 43
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to set aside the decision rendered by public respondent
Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., by authority of the President, reinstating and confirming
the decision dated April 17, 1978 of the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences, and setting aside the decision of
the Minister of Natural Resources.
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
On February 9, 1972, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation registered the location of its
"Master VII Fr." mining claim with the Mining Recorder of Toledo City. On September 10, 1973, private
respondent Asterio Buqueron registered the declarations of location of his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr."
mining claims with the same Mining Recorder. On October 15, 1973, Atlas registered the declarations of
location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V. Fr. " with the same Mining Recorder.
Buqueron's "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the survey plans thereof were duly approved
by the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease application was published in the
February 22 and 28, 1977 issues of the Evening Post.
During the said period of publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim against private respondent's mining
claims on the ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.
After hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision, dated April 17, 1978, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, respondent (Buqueron) is hereby given the
preferential right to possess, lease, explore, exploit and operate the areas covered by his "St.
Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims, except the area covered thereby which is in
conflict with adverse claimant's (Atlas) "Master VII Fr." Adverse claimant (Atlas) on the other
hand, is given the preferential right to possess, lease, explore, exploit and operate the area
covered by its "Master VII Fr." case.
Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources who rendered a decision dated November 10, 1978, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the derision of the Director of Mines dated April 17, 1978, should
be, as hereby it is, set aside. In lieu thereof, it is hereby decision that the "St. Mary Fr." and "St.
Joseph Fr." mining claims of Asterio Buqueron are null and void, that the "Carmen I Fr. " to
"Carmen V. Fr. " mining claims of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation are
valid, and that it be given the preferential right to possesses, explore, exploit, lease and operate
the areas covered thereby. (Decision, Office of the President; Rollo, pp. 52-57; Decision of the
Minister of Natural Resources, Rollo, pp. 47-51; Comment of Public Respondent, Rollo, pp. 88-
90; Decision, Director of Mines, Rollo, pp. 157-160).
As aforestated, on further appeal, the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President, reversed the
decision of the Minister of Natural Resources and reinstated the decision of the Director of Mines and Geo
Sciences.
Hence, this petition.
Briefly stated, petitioner's assignment of errors may be combined into the following issues:
(1) Whether or not private respondent's appeal to the Office of the President was time-barred;
(2) Whether or not there was a valid location and discovery of the disputed mining claims.
The Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition, required respondents to comment
in the resolution of October 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 76). Both private respondent and public respondent filed their
respective comments on November 17, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 81-86; pp. 88-95).
On December 8, 1986 (Rollo, p. 104) this Court required the respondents to file a rejoinder to the consolidated
reply filed by counsel for petitioner dated November 4, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 97-102). Said rejoinder was filed on
February 6, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 108-111), by the Solicitor General for public respondent, after which petitioner
filed a sur-rejoinder thereto on March 13, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 113-116). Thereafter the Court in the resolution of
March 30, 1987 gave due course to the petition and required both parties to file their respective memoranda.
Counsel for public respondent filed a Manifestation/Motion praying to be allowed to adopt its comment dated
November 2, 1986 and Rejoinder dated February 4, 1987 as the memorandum for public respondent.
Petitioner filed its memorandum on May 25,1987 (Rollo, p. 136).
The petition is devoid of merit.
I.
It is not disputed that private respondent received a copy of the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources
dated November 10, 1978 on November 27, 1978 and that under Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 463,
the decision of the Minister is appealable to the Office of the President within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
In the case at bar, the 5-day period expired on December 2, 1978, a Saturday, private respondent filed his
appeal on December 4, 1978, a Monday.
Petitioner contends that the appeal was filed out of time and therefore, the Office of the President did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case and should have dismissed the same outright (Rollo, pp. 20-21).
This contention is untenable.
Petitioner and private respondent are in accord on the fact that at the time of the filing of the questioned
appeal, Saturday was observed as a legal holiday in the Office of the President pursuant to Section 29 of the
Revised Administrative Code as amended.
The same law provides:
Section 31. Pretermission of holiday. — Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act
required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding
business day.
Apart from the fact that the law is clear and needs no interpretation, this Court in accordance therewith has
invariably held that in case the last day for doing an act is a legal holiday, it does not have the effect of making
the preceding day, the last day for doing the same; the act may be done on the next succeeding business day
(Gonzaga vs. Ce David, 110 Phil. 463-464 [1960]; Calano vs. Cruz, 91 Phil. 247 [1952]; Austria, et al. vs. The
Solicitor General, et al., 71 Phil. 288 [1941]).
Coming back to the case at bar, as the next working day after December 2,1978 was December 4, 1978 — a
Monday, it is evident that private respondent's appeal was filed on time.
II.
It is apparent that the second issue as to whether or not there was a valid location and discovery of the
disputed mining claims is a question of fact best left to the determination of the administrative bodies charged
with the implementation of the law they are entrusted to enforce. As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient
that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings
of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an
administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642;
Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 762 [1984]).
In the case at bar, the record amply shows that the Director of Mines' decision was supported by substantial
evidence.
Petitioner claimed that it is a registered surface land owner and locator of six (6) lode claims duly registered
with the Office of the Mining Recorder as above stated and that in derogation of its permission, caused the
"table" location and survey and applied for the lease of his alleged mining claims known as "St. Mary Fr." and
"St. Joseph Fr. " lode claims.
In his answer, private respondent denied the material allegations of the adverse claim and by way of
affirmative defense alleged that all of petitioner's claims including a portion of Master VII Fr. are null and void
for having been located in areas which were closed to mining location in open and gross violation of paragraph
1 (d) of Section 28 and of Section 60 of the Mining Act as amended.
The main thrust of petitioner's claim is that all of the mining claims of both petitioner and private respondent are
located inside the premises or properties of the former, so that it is hardly possible for private respondent to
have conducted the requisite location and survey without having been seen or noticed by petitioner and its
personnel.
The Director of Mines established that there is in fact an overlapping of mining claims of petitioner and private
respondent and that as a matter of record petitioner's mining claims were registered subsequent to those of
private respondent with the exception of Master VII Fr. which was registered on February 9, 1972 or prior to
the registration of the mining claims of private respondent.
In ruling as to who, between the parties shall be given preferential right to lease the area in question, the
Director of Mines' findings are as follows:
Adverse claimant in its attempt to impugn the validity of the mining claims of respondent alleged
that said mining claims were the result of table locations and survey and in support thereof
submitted the sworn statements of its Chief Geologist and Chief Security.
On the other hand, respondent asserted that he, through his authorized representative actually
and validly performed all the acts of discovery and location required by law and the field survey
of his mining claims was actually conducted by Geodetic Engineer Salvador Aligaen from
December 16 to 18, 1974. In support of this assertion, respondent submitted in evidence
affidavit of the authorized agent (Annex "D" of the answer) and another affidavit of Geodetic
Engineer Salvador Aligaen (Annex "F" of the answer). Respondent also submitted in evidence
Bureau of Forestry map and Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey map of the total area (Exhs.
"9" to "10") which embraces the area in question. These maps tend to prove that the Atlas main
gate is not the only point of ingress and egress such that one can enter the area in question for
the purpose of mining location and survey without being noticed by any of the personnel of
Atlas.
After a careful appraisal of the evidence submitted, and cognizance as we are of the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 99-A, we are of the view that adverse claimant failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to nullify the prior claims of respondent. Stated differently, the evidence
submitted are not sufficient to destroy the prima facie character of the sworn declarations of
location of respondent's mining claims which were duly registered on the date herein before
stated. Thus "A location notice certificate or statement when re-examine accorded is prima
facie evidence of all the facts the statute requires it to contain and which were sufficiently set
forth" (40 C.J. pp. 811-812) and constitute notice to all persons and to the whole world of the
contents of the same (Sec. 56 of the Mining Act, as amended).
It is, therefore, pertinent to quote hereunder Sections 28(d) and 60 of the Mining Act, as
amended, as well as Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 99-A:
SEC. 28 — No Prospecting shall be allowed:
(d)-In lands which have been located for mining leases by other
prospectors under the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 60. — No valid mining claim or any part thereof, may be

located by others until the original locator or his successors in
interest abandons the claim or forfeits his rights on the same
under the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 1 — Whenever there is any conflict between claim owners

over any mining claims whether mineral or non-mineral, the
locator of the claim who first registered his claim with the proper
mining registrar, notwithstanding any defect in form or technicality,
shall have the exclusive right to possess, exploit, explore, develop
and operate such mining claims. ...
In the light of the aforequoted provisions of law applicable on the matter, and in
view of our findings, earlier discussed, the subsequent mining claims of adverse
claimant insofar as they conflict the prior claims of respondent are hereby
declared nun and void.
On the other hand, it is also our view that respondent failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove that the prior claim of adverse claimant (Master VII Fr.) is null
and void. Considering that this mining claim is prior in point of location and
registration, it follows that this claim will have to prevail over that of respondent.
For the same reason, therefore, that the subsequent claims of adverse claimant
were declared null and void insofar as they conflict with the prior claims of
respondent, the mining claims of respondent insofar as they conflict with "Master
VII Fr." claim of adverse claimant are likewise declared null and void. (Decision,
Director of Mines; rollo pp. 157-160).
As earlier stated the above findings, although reversed by the Minister of Natural Resources, were affirmed by
the Office of the President.
However, petitioner would have this Court look into the said findings because of the open divergence of views
and findings by the adjudicating authorities in this mining conflict involving highly contentious issues which
warrant appellate review (Rollo, p. 18).
This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an administrative official is of course
subject to certain guide posts laid down in many decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings of fact in such
decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is justified when there has
been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative
proceeding (L-21588-Atlas Development and Acceptance Corp. vs. Gozon, etc. et al., 64 O.G. 11511 [1967]),
where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest (Ateneo de Manila University vs. CA,
145 SCRA 100-101 [1986]; International Hardwood and Veneer Co., of the Philippines vs. Leogardo, 117
SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557;
Sichangco vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61; and Eusebio vs. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16
SCRA 569).
A careful study of the records shows that none of the above circumstances is present in the case at bar, which
would justify the overturning of the findings of fact of the Director of Mines which were affirmed by the Office of
the President. On the contrary, in accordance with the prevailing principle that "in reviewing administrative
decisions, the reviewing Court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted
therein, and receive additional evidence, that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the
findings of fact in this case must be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant (Police Commission vs.
Lood, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Office of the
President, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
13. Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290
o power of administrative control

o power of executive control
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition, questioning
the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.
RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES,” allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: “The State shall establish and
maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and
controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their
jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
ISSUEs:
o Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution

o Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by
the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers”
HELD:
Power of Administrative Control
NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.
SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential
power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet
Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means “the
power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at
the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”
As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to
delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive.
Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in
turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the
executive department.”
The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that
would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the
integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.
Power of Executive Control
Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition
period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding
the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war
powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-
Chief provision “represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly
civil in nature.” His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the
constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”
14. Heirs of Eugenio vs. Roxas, 173 SCRA 581
15. Industrial Power Sales vs. Sinsuat, 160 SCRA 19
FACTS
Two invitations to bid were advertised by the Bureau of Supply Coordination of the Department of General
Services. The first called for eightunits of truc for the use of the Bureau of Telecommunications. The invitation
to Bid as well as the re!uisition itself contained a proviso limiting the offersto foreign made products on a C"#
basis, $ort of %anila. The second invitation to Bid announced that both C"# $ort of %anila and #&B %anila
!uotationswould be accepted and made part of bid re!uirements. 'mong the bidders were "ndustrial $ower
Sales, "nc ("$S") and Delta %otor Corporation (Delta). The bids were deliberated by the Committee on
'wardsand was awarded to "$S". Delta protested the award to "$S" to the Bureau of Telecommunications
claiming that the truc s offered by "$S" were not
factory built,
as stipulated in the re!uisition and invitation to bid. The Director ruled that the bidding has been made in strict
compliance with technicalspecifications and re!uirements stated by the Bureau of Telecommunications.Delta*s
ne+t move was to file with the &ffice of the Secretary of General Services (Sinsuat). The latter informed the
'cting Director of Supply that theDepartment had already approved Delta*s price, and categorically direct him to
award to Delta the purchase order of the eight truc s with the leastpossible delay. This notice was given
notwithstanding all the Government agencies concerned already agreed on the correctness of the award to
"$S" Bureau of Telecommunications, the Department of $ublic or s Communications to which
said Bureau of Telecommunications pertains, the Bureau of Supply, which had direct supervision and control of
the bidding, and of course, the Committee on 'wards."$S" appealed from the Secretary*s decision to award the
purchase contract Delta to the &ffice of the $resident as well as the &ffice of the 'uditorGeneral. The appeal
notwithstanding, the /etter-&rder in favor of Delta was released. "$S" then filed with the C#" a petition certiorari
and mandamus,with application for preliminary and mandatory in0unction. The verdict wen against "$S". #rom
the 0udgment of the C#", "$S" appealed to the Court. Theplea made in behalf of Secretary Sinsuat claims that
"$S" had gone to Court without first e+hausting all administrative remedies.
ISSUE&
hether or not there was an e+haustion of 'dministrative 1emedies.
HELD&
Certain universally accepted a+ioms govern 0udicial review through the e+traordinary actions of
certiorari
or prohibition of determinations ofadministrative officers or agencies2 first, that before said actions may be
entertained in the courts of 0ustice, it must be shown that all the administrativeremedies prescribed by law or
ordinance have been e+hausted3 and second, that the administrative decision may properly be annulled or set
aside onlyupon a clear showing that the administrative official or tribunal has acted without or in e+cess of
0urisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
1
Thereare however e+ceptions to the principle nown as e+haustion of administrative remedies, these being2
(4) where the issue is purely a legal one, (5)where the controverted act is patently illegal or was done without
0urisdiction or in e+cess of 0urisdiction3 (6) where the respondent is a departmentsecretary whose acts as an
alter ego
of the $resident bear the latter7s implied or assumed approval, unless actually disapproved3 or (8) where
there arecircumstances indicating the urgency of 0udicial intervention."n view of these doctrines, there is no
need for the e+haustion of administrative remedies in the case at bar because Secretary Sinsuat indeed acted
withgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lac or e+cess of 0urisdiction.
16. National Development Co. vs. Collector of Custom, 9 SCRA 423

FACTS
The customs authorities found that the vessel carried on board an unmanifested cargo consisting of one television
set, and respondent Collector of Customs sent a written notice to the operator of the vessel and the latter answered
stating that the television set was not cargo and so was not required by law to be manifested. The operator requested an
investigation and hearing but respondent finding the operator’s explanation not satisfactory imposed on the vessel a fine
of P5,000.00, ordering said fine to be paid within 48 hours from receipt, with a threat that the vessel would be denied
clearance and a warrant of seizure would be issued if the fine will not be paid.
NDC, as owner, and operator AV Rocha filed for special civil action for certiorari before the CFI of Manila against
the respondent. Respondent contended that petitioners have not exhausted all available administrative remedies, one of
which is to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contention of respondent is correct.
HELD
The Court held in the negative. Respondent Collector committed grave abuse of discretion because petitioner
NDC was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set involved is not a cargo that needs to be manifested.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the appeal to the administrative superior is not a plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as where it is undisputed that the respondent officer has acted
in utter disregard of the principle of due process.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES

INTRODUCTION / GENERAL CONSIDERATION

1.Malaga vs. Penachos, 213 SCRA 516

2. De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 296

BP 129 was enacted, titled

An Act Reorganizingthe Judiciary, Appropriating Funds therefor and for OtherPurposes.

Petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers;2.

(zero relevance to tenure)4.

10-12. (have nothing to do with tenure)

1.Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208

(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

2.US vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1

3. Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

4.Marcos vs. Manglapuz,177 SCRA 668

failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists

Honasan’s failed coup

Communist insurgency movements

secessionist movements in Mindanao

devastated economy because of

accumulated foreign debt

plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

5. Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 1991

6. LLDA vs. CA, 231 SCRA 292

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that:

7. Rizal Empire Insurance Corporation vs. NLRC, 150 SCRA 565

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.

QUASI – LEGISLATIVE POWER

1.Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil 234.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, March 8, 1924.

Approved, March 14, 1922.

2. Araneta vs. gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328

22, 66 and 80 invalid".

3. People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 250

People vs. Maceren

current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in Section 11 of the

Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84, prohibiting

the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries.

Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the Fisheries Administrative

Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1.

specifically punished. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a

4. Bautista vs. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329

5.Maceda vs. ERB, 192 SCRA 363

Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board

G.R no. 96266

authority, however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one

Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board

G.R no. 96266

authority, however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one

Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board

authority, however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one

6. PCF vs. DECS, 153 SCRA 622

Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes.

ISSUE: Whether the RMC was valid.

8. Taxicab Operators of Metro manila vs. BOT 117 SCRA 597

9. US vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil 608

effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing progra

11. Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141