Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)

Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to
them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason
alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to
believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the
losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the
faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which
might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the
delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as
an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting,
or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or
crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful
assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions:
(1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant
permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other
public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by
overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second
construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets.
Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any
officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.
The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to
justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

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MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO [129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984]

Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought
and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on
August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at
the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit,
not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they
manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute
of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the Life Science
Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied
beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held
liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were
under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity
thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private
respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found
petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit
granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one
academic year. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed,
there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a
rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place
in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is
discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to
be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and
present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost
leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable
character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent,
whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the
assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are
devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may
be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work
of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred
should not be disproportionate to the offense.

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ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent

A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a
man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well.
Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The
free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As
Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a
free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between
public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it
has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right
to freedom of religion.