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V Y TAU TA S M AG N US U N I V E R SI T Y

FAC U LT Y OF H U M A N I T I E S
DE PA RT M E N T OF PH I L O S OPH Y

Donatas Večerskis

Philosophical Anthropology
SYLLABUS

Kaunas, 2013
Translated and edited by UAB “Lingvobalt”

Publication of the syllabus is supported by the European Social Fund (ESF) and
the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Project title: “Renewal and Inter-
nationalization of Bachelor Degree Programmes in History, Ethnology, Philoso-
phy and Political Science” (project No.: VP1-2.2-ŠMM-07-K-02-048)

© Donatas Večerskis, 2013


© Vytautas Magnus University, 2013
Topic: Formation of Philosophical Anthropology
Sub-topics:
– Problem of a Human in Literature, Mythology
– Problem of a Human in Philosophy
– Formation of Philosophical Anthropology

The entire history of human thinking is marked by constant self-


reflection; this self-reflection is realized in different questions but
ultimately can be summarized into one – “What is a human?” The
concept of a human and its multiple layers reveal the complexity,
richness, and indeterminacy of the concept.

Myths. Philosophy is not the only discipline dealing with an un-


derstanding of what a human is. In ancient myths, next to the un-
derstanding of the world, the cosmos, and Olympians, one finds
reflections on how a human perceives himself. These concepts are
best explored if one analyses myths with the following questions
in mind – “Where does a human come from?” and “What is the
purpose of human life?”

Literature. Since its origins literature has also been permeated with
admiration, fear, and the question of what a human is. Already in
Sophocles’ Antigone, written in 442 BC, the choir chants that many
amazing creatures exist in the world but none of them are more
marvellous than man. Similarly, in the eighth psalm a psalm reader
expresses his perplexity over human nature when reflecting on the
greatness of all creations.

Therefore, the complexity of a creature we call a human – both hu-


man fragility (Adam in Hebrew relates to adama, a Hebrew word
for “the earth”, and the Lithuanian concept of a human is said to
originate from the impersonal form žmuo associated with the earth;

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man is fragile just as creations out of dirt or sand) and greatness –


pose the question of what a human is all over again.

Contemporary context, a variety of new circumstances, for exam-


ple, stem cell research, genetic manipulation, possibilities of human
cloning or clashes between civilizations and cultures, and disasters,
diseases or moments of happiness in personal lives, perturb or can-
cel clarity of the concept of a human; hence, we are forced to define
what a human is, what humanity is and similar anew.

Philosophy. “The problem of a human in philosophy exists as long


as the discipline of philosophy itself. When one asks about the
meaning of being, the world as a whole, the ultimate reasons for
everything in existence, and possibilities of cognition, one is forced
to constantly reflect on the possibility and meaningfulness of the
question itself. The cognition of human being is implied in every
philosophical discourse that seeks to uncover not only the structure
of the world-in-itself but also its meaning. /…/ On the one hand,
philosophy stems from human life, but on the other hand, it guides
human life in a certain direction thus bringing sense to it.” (Jonkus,
D. 2003. Filosofinė antropologija. Mokomoji knyga (Philosophical
Anthropology. Textbook). Kaunas: VDU (hereinafter – Jonkus, D.).

Thus philosophy, since its beginning, constitutes reflection on a


human making it anthropological in nature. A human, contrary
to other creatures, not only exists but also constantly asks himself
about the self and tries to understand the self. This question is not
a mere theoretical speculation as it stems from the need to under-
stand – what I want, can and should be.

Philosophical anthropology as a separate area of philosophy crys-


tallized only in the 20th century. Its progenitors were Max Scheler
(died in 1961), Helmuth Plessner (died in 1985) and Arnold Gehlen

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(1976). Philosophical anthropology as a branch of philosophy not


associated with any one specific school of philosophy.
Discussion and test questions:
– Myths and imagery of the origin of a human. Main features
of early concepts of a human – ethnocentricity, mythologiza-
tion.
– Philosophical explications of human being: a human is a
creature characterized by logos, i. e. language and rationality.
– Why is a human always the problem of philosophy? Why does
one need to find man’s place in the world to know the world?
– The preconditions for the formation of philosophical anthro-
pology.

Topic: Object and Method of


Philosophical Anthropology
Sub-topics:
– Object of Philosophical Anthropology and Its Specifics
– Method of Philosophical Anthropology and Its Problems
– Relationship between Philosophical, Biological, and Cultural
Anthropology

As with every science, philosophical anthology has to have its object


and a method to study that object in order to be a science. As the
word “antropo + logy” itself implies, it seems to be self-explanatory
that the object of this branch of philosophy is a human. Yet objec-
tivity of such an object poses several problematic questions. First
of all, as the word “object” implies, it has to be something that is
“displayed + in front”, in other words, the object is something that
is in front of me, detached from me, an item at a certain distance
from me. But in anthropology the inquirer himself is the object of
inquiry, therefore, the concept of the object in philosophical an-

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thropology is disputed. Secondly, a scientific method demands that


inquiry is an objective one, but if there are problems regarding the
existence of the object of this discipline, impossibility of the inquir-
er to detach oneself from the object of inquiry, inevitably questions
arise as to the academic and objective nature of the discipline.

Object of Philosophical Anthropology


“Philosophical anthropology does not have an object if one under-
stands that the object as a factual and fully controlled area of beings.
Kant’s turn to transcendental reflection in philosophy further an-
chors the pursuit of cognition of objects not a priori, but how one or
another thing becomes the object of our experience. In other words,
one seeks to figure out the conditions of the possibility of object
giveness by focusing not on what one or another object is, but how
it manifests. /…/ Philosophical anthropology studies not the meta-
physical nature of a human and not its substantial identity, but be-
ing of a human. Human being cannot be reduced down to either
objectivity or biological manifestations of life. A human cannot be
understood and just as an abstract cogito  – uniform throughout
epochs and cultures. A human is not the kind of the object that
can be understood from sidelines by turning one into the object
of cognition because turning a human into an object takes away
his personality. Understanding of a human is only possible because
one is in contact with a human and that is evidenced by my rela-
tionship with the self and with others. A human in general exists by
understanding and an understanding is a constant consideration
of oneself, of others and the world. /…/ The experience of the self-
hood that I always have with regard to “me” is the source of that the
object of inquiry is known to me a priori. It is impossible to move
beyond that what it allows. In this regard Husserl talks about the
“absolute consciousness”. I, always existing as this individual, am
the “subject” of this experience. We talk about a human in gen-
eral, because experience is “just like ours”, but the saying “just like

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ours” gives priority to “just like mine” and at the same time “me”…
Hence the topic of the philosophical problem of a human is not that
of a being which belongs to a specific region of beings, and not of
the unity in type or essence, but that what always exists as “my self”.
That what is asked is not a general “Who”, essence, but the one who
asks in their own individual existence”1. (Jonkus, D.).

Method of Philosophical Anthropology


“A human defines himself in the social and cultural realms. Self-
definition is a way of relating to the self which gives birth to the
understanding of the selfhood. The selfhood is not a natural give-
ness, but rather social and cultural self-interpretation. Thus, the
selfhood exists insofar it is retained in new interpretations. Human
selfhood is maintained not by determining it, but by interpreting.
Such a non-objective mode of human being does require a particu-
lar method: “A method must always fit the object of inquiry and
obtain its instructions from itself, i. e. from the way in which the
object as a giveness is always known to us a priori. But in this case
“What is the object inquiry?” and “What are the particulars of a
priori cognition of that object which should serve as a foundation
for the project of a method?” When one talks about “a human”, one
implies not any type of beings among other objects of cognition,
but includes oneself in this totality of “a human” and “human kind”
in a manner that the inquirer becomes the object of inquiry. This
ensures that the object of inquiry is known a priori and serves as
a basis for establishing the method of inquiry. This self-reflection
validates the nature of a human problem which Kant called “prag-
matic”. So the main question of anthropology is not a theoretical
one, but stems from the interest of finding the answer to the ques-
tion “What ought I to do?” (Jonkus, D.).

1. Ludwig Landgrebe, Ar filosofinė antropologija yra empirinis mokslas? (Is


Philosophical Anthropology an Empiric Science?) // Žmogus ir žodis, 2001,
No 4, p. 70.

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Summary. Hence if one takes a transcendental approach to the ob-


ject of philosophical anthropology, one sees that it does not have the
object if the object is understood as an item in front of us. On the
other hand, philosophical anthropology does have its object, that is,
the question “How am I given to myself?” and “How is the Other
given to me as a human being?” These questions turn into the ques-
tion of how an understanding of a human forms within me and
what structure and elements this understanding has. Philosophical
anthropology is also characterized by the knowledge and cognition
of that what we inquire into, because we ask about ourselves, more-
over, the question we ask ourselves is a pragmatic one, i. e. it links
with the question “What ought I to do?” and “How ought I to live
to become a human?”

Discussion and test questions:


1. Does philosophical anthropology have an object? Can a hu-
man being be understood as an object?
2. Method of philosophical anthropology. What difficulties do
we face in trying to understand ourselves and our experi-
ence? How does one overcome relativism, egocentricity, and
“dirty consciousness”? Is it possible to move beyond the de-
pendence on the culture and epoch of an inquirer? Why does
a philosopher inevitably turn to oneself and to others in try-
ing to understand a human?
3. What does a claim that a human is not a substance but self-
interpretation mean?

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Topic: Tasks of Philosophical Anthropology


Sub-topics:
– Critical Function
– Theoretical Function
– Moral Function

It is possible to separate the following tasks of philosophical an-


thropology: critical, theoretical and practical or moral. Of course
all of them are intertwined and influence each other.

Critical function. When one reflects on the understanding of a hu-


man, thinks about human life, one constantly encounters a criti-
cal view towards a human and towards oneself. This critical view
can already be found in cultural anthropology when comparing
humanity realized in different cultures. In philosophical anthro-
pology a critical function starts with reflections on the method of
anthropology. Philosophical anthropology itself is born as a critical
philosophical thought since it is understood that the scientific dis-
course is unable to answer the philosophical question of what a hu-
man is within the limits of its method. Therefore, a critical function
of philosophical anthropology manifests as a reflection on both sci-
entific methods and its own method.

Theoretical function. A critical function of philosophical anthro-


pology is connected with another – theoretical – function since ev-
ery critique is always based on the knowledge already available. In
other words, we can critique one or another concept of interpreta-
tion of humanity or life because we already have cognition of what
a human is. In his The Letter on Humanism Heidegger notes that
even a simple concept, such as “life”, is already a metaphysical one.
These words express an insight that even things we take for granted,
such as living, life, humanity, animalism, are associated with a lot

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broader realm of understanding, have a horizon of metaphysical


meanings beyond them. Thus existing human understanding is
modified thanks to the critical function and formulates a new un-
derstanding of a human once again.

Moral function. Back in the age of Romanticism travellers very


clearly faced the question “How to treat all these strange creatures
that are both similar and different to us?” This question revealed
that in order to speak of something as a human, one needs to rec-
ognize a being as a human. This recognition is not only a decision
theoretical in nature, but also constitutes ethical recognition as it
creates an imperative prohibiting the treatment of another living
being as a means to reach an aim. Alfonsas Lingis radicalizes this
aspect of recognition claiming that one addresses someone else not
because one wants to make sure of their humanity but because one
already sees him or her as a human being. In addition to the recog-
nition of another being as a human already mentioned here, there
is another aspect to philosophical anthropology that witnesses its
practicality – the concept of a human is a normative one. This nor-
mative nature could already be found in the critical function when
one gives priority to one concept of a human by criticising the other.
Moreover, a percept of a human and humanity is a normative one
in another sense, that is, by formulating a certain concept of a hu-
man we create an ideal of a human – this is what a human is ought
to be like. To add, the aim itself to understand what a human is is
also a moral, practical obligation  – if we know what a human is
ought to be like, we strive to become one, since we experience hu-
manity as a value.

Summary. We have to understand that it is an unusual fact that


human understanding of what a human is influences human exis-
tence. Normally, as one knows, cognition does not cause change
in the object that is known. In the case of a human it is the other

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way around! A human creates himself, but he did understand this


rather late in the course of history. Thus a human is a being that still
has work to do in creating himself. Moreover, a human has not only
a lot to do but also has to decide what kind of a human he will be.
Of course, different non-humanist positions are possible, some-
times even passed on as human ideals  – pure race, man without
prejudice, etc. These positions reveal both moral and anthropologi-
cal crisis since, given what has been said about spontaneous, im-
mediate recognition of humanity when one meets another human
being, the treatment of a human as a means attests to the loss of
the value aspect to the understanding of what humanity is. So a
non-humanist attitude shows non-humanity of approach which is
nothing less than a withered understanding of the self.

Discussion and test questions:


1. What are the tasks of philosophical anthropology?
2. How does an existing concept of a human interact with and
influence the formation of an understanding of a human?
3. The relationship between human being and understanding.

Topic: Concept of a Human in Ancient Philosophy


Sub-topics:
– Concept of a Human in Pre-Socratic Philosophy
– Socratic Concept of a Human
– Platonic and Aristotelian Concept of a Human

As I’ve already mentioned in my introductory lectures, from the


early days philosophy has been anthropological in nature since
many questions, even though indirectly, are tied to both the ques-
tion of what a human is and the question of how one needs to be-
have, live, etc. Even though, as Cicero claimed, “Socrates however
(was the) first (who) called philosophy down from heaven”, Socrates

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was not the first one to direct philosophy on the path of the anthro-
pological study. Sophists could be said to be the first philosophers
who made a human and not the cosmos or elements of the world
the focus of their thought. Sophists discuss a human in the light of
cultural philosophy. Michael Landmann claimed that “the sophists
were the first true philosophical anthropologists because the soph-
ists were the first to analyze culture.”

For example, Protagoras claimed that “of all things the measure is
Man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are
not, that they are not.” Man is put in an exceptional position as man
determines what is good and what is bad, and man decides what is
right and what is wrong, man himself defines the criterion. This
view of the sophists opened up new horizons for the criticism of
mythical imagery, values of traditional morality, and ultimately to
the criticism of human concepts themselves. In other words, even
though it had been long thought that cultural, social institutions
are a given or a gift of God, studies of different cultures, mores re-
vealed that their otherness stems from man because it is the fruit
and consequence of the human activity.

These sophist claims had an implication of not only negative assess-


ment and relativism, but also a positive notion that man himself
creates and forms everything, that man is the creator of his own
mores. In this way man was, for the first time ever, recognized as
the creator of his own culture.

Socrates
The maturity of the total sophist thought reaches its peak in the fig-
ure of Socrates. Socratic philosophy first of all manifests itself as an
understanding, recognition of one’s own ignorance. This seemingly
banal phrase essentially reveals the view of a Socratic philosopher
both to oneself and to other people  – I must constantly critically

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self-examine, doubt what I think I know, and a dialogue constitutes


that space were images, percepts, and opinions clash and are tested.

Socratic philosophy of man is concerned with ethical questions, i. e.


the main concern, in the words of Socrates himself, “is never to
do anything that is wrong and non virtuous.” In his book What is
Ancient Philosophy? Pierre Hadot holds that in Antiquity philoso-
phy was primarily understood as a “concrete practical activity”, as
the transformation of the world-view and a way of life. P. Hadot
also expresses the essence of the Socratic phenomenon, “And so
the practice of philosophy No longer meant, as the sophists would
claim, the attainment of knowledge or a skill called sophia, but
rather doubting oneself because of a sense that we were not who we
ought to be.” Pay particular attention to the last words of having “a
sense that we were not who we ought to be”. This comes as a break
of that what seemed a given and beyond questioning – a human is
questioned; we have a sense of what a human is, therefore, we real-
ize that definitions of a human hide more than they reveal.

This attitude also means that there is trust in human reason, the
correctness of thinking, because knowledge, according to Socrates,
gives man a possibility to avoid that what is not virtuous and brings
harmony and bliss to a human soul.

In Apology, which we have already mentioned, Socrates talks about


a voice inside him that has always deterred him from what he was
about to do. Thus to Socrates understanding, first of all, meant the
act of listening. Only the act of listening to oneself helps to under-
stand what one is ought to do.

Plato
Plato’s anthropology cannot be separated from the theory of ideas and
from the dualistic understanding of the world. Man is a dualistic be-

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ing made of a body and a soul. Even before Plato there had been talks
about the soul as an essence of a human most often associated with
reason, logos, and reasonable nature. Plato also assumes this idea of
an immortal soul – a soul exists before it merges with a body and it
remains in existence after the body dies. A human body, even though
bound to a human, is in principal just a grave, a grave stone for the soul.
Plato divides the human soul into three parts: the divine part, reason,
and parts that belong to the sensory world. In Platonic anthropology a
human body is depreciated, and priority is given to the rational world
of spirit (as in the case of reflections of ideas priority is given to ideas).

To sum up, we see that anthropological topics and concepts become


better formulated in Platonic philosophy. Human inquiry moves
away from the ethical context (so characteristic of earlier thinkers) to
inquiry into a human in the light of the metaphysical theory of ideas.

Aristotle
As in the case with Platonic philosophy, Aristotelian anthropology
inquires into a human in the context of metaphysical categories,
specifically, in the light of dichotomies of potentiality/actuality,
substance/accident, form/matter. Aristotle’s inquiry into a human
uses schemes of metaphysics which he calls the first philosophy.
Similar to Plato, Aristotle claims that a human is a construct of a
body and a soul and that thanks to the rational element of the soul
a human is what it is. Hence, the soul is the essence of a human.
But if for Plato the body was just an accident, for Aristotle a human
soul and body were bound in essence – just as a form and matter
were dependent one each other. Based on this metaphysical scheme,
rehabilitation of sensations and corporeity takes place because the
act of thinking occurs only when reason merges with sensations. A
soul cannot exist without a body just as a form cannot exist without
matter. A soul is the first element which makes us living beings, al-
lows us to move, feel, and think.

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Aristotle also noticed that man by nature is a political being, i. e.


man by nature and not by weakness understands friendship as
good and strives to achieve it. Hence, man is a social animal.

Discussion and test questions:


1. How does an understanding that man is the source of his
own culture change the self-concept of man?
2. How do rational modules of human cognition relate to myth-
ical models of human cognition?
3. The dualistic concept of a human and its causes. The rela-
tionship between a body and a soul in ancient philosophy.
4. Is the approach of applying the same method of inquiry into
man as is applied to other objects adequate to the object of
inquiry?

Topic: Philosophical Anthropology and


Scientific Anthropology
Sub-topics:
Relationship between Philosophy and Science
Relationship between Philosophical and Scientific Cognition
of a Human

If one remembers claims that a human giveness takes place in the


modality of “I”, and simultaneously has to deal with different sci-
entific narratives of a human, one inevitably is faced with the ques-
tion “What type of cognition provides the best understanding of a
human?”

“Philosophy does not solve problems of our everyday life; hence, it


might seem to be an abstract discipline. Yet philosophical theory
functions as a practical guidance to find one’s place. In answering

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questions about the meaning of the world and human life we are
not resolving immediate problems of our routine life but these the-
ories are practical ones as they link our life with certain ideals. The
search for a universal meaning constitutes a selection of the con-
crete action. /…/ Different sciences focus not on the knowledge of
the world and life as a whole but on the study of their own specific
areas. This means that all sciences are forced to establish clearly
their limits of competence and define the object of their study. /…/
Philosophy seeks not so much as to uncover concrete truths but
to examine truth-in-itself, in other words, to uncover that realm
without which No concrete truth would have meaning. /…/ When
Merleau-Ponty discusses the relationship between philosophy and
sociology, he notes that “every time a sociologist goes back to the
source of his life knowledge, to that which helps him to understand
cultural, most distant from him, constructs, he without even know-
ing becomes a philosopher … Philosophy is not concrete knowing.
It is constant vigilance that does not let one to forget the source of
any knowledge”2. /…/Scientific definitions of a human are based on
human life itself, cognition of the world whose secondary expres-
sion is science.” (Jonkus, D.).

Discussion and test questions:


1. How do daily and scientific experience and different cogni-
tions interact?
2. Do different scientific discourses become one narrative of
the world and man?
3. Why does philosophy strive for commonality and does not
allow forgetting experience as a source of any meaning?

2. Мерло-Понти Морис (Maurice Merleau-Ponty), Философ и социология


(Philosopher and Sociology). // Мерло-Понти М (Maurice Merleau-Ponty).
В защиту философии (In Praise of Philosophy), Москва, Издательство
гуманитарной литературы, 1996, p. 81.

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Topic: Philosophical Anthropology and


Anthropology of Religion
Sub-topics:
Main Elements of the Religious Concept of a Human
Main Elements of the Christian Concept of a Human
The Problematic of the Concept of a Human as a Religious Being

I would like to distinguish five main theses of anthropology of religion.

Theocentricity: the belief that man is a creation of God, therefore,


the entire human self-concept; the entire understanding of human
life is centred on God who is both the point of departure and the
measure of any assessment. Yet in many religions one might find
humanized images of God. Thus God becomes the object of anthro-
pology of religion because God draws the projections (sometimes
even objectionable) of an ideal human, i. e. God is often depicted as
a human ought/ought not to be.

Anthropocentricity: even if God is depicted in religion as the centre


of human life, man himself becomes the centre of all creations – ev-
erything on earth takes place because of man. Hence in anthropolo-
gy of religion man is the peak of all creation, and as a being acquires
a privileged place and exceptional value with regard to other beings.

The thesis of the fall of man or sin: the majority of religions in one
way or another talk about the beginning of human history being
marked by the fall of man. The assertion of sinfulness of man forms
peculiar anthropology of a human. Firstly, man and an under-
standing of man’s actions is burdened by guilt – human behaviour
inevitably becomes the object of moral valuation, hence human ac-
tions, intentions and goals are exclusively interpreted in categories
of good and evil. Secondly, human understanding is formed in the

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context of weakness – man is a weak, being prone to sin. Thirdly,


since there is the fall of man, man should also have the chance to
rise, i. e. a certain idea of man’s perfection exists. In other words,
the thesis of sin is tied to not only a negative statement about man,
but also to the imagination of man without flaws.

The doctrine of pardon, atonement: in anthropology of religion


salvation of man from sin and damnation comes through pardon,
God’s intervention. Of course, one may find different conceptions
of man’s participation in atonement; it is debated as to what role
human actions play in atonement.

The thesis of immortality: human self-concept is permeated by


conviction that a human soul is immortal. It leads to an under-
standing of value of man: as the essence of me as an individual is
immortal, I will continue living even after my body dies. It is also
connected with an understanding of reward, i. e. that my life here
on earth will in one way or another determine my life in eternity.
Finally, the idea of eternity ties anthropology with hope that there
is a better life and perfect being for man beyond death.

Summary. There is one thing common to all these theses of an-


thropology of religion: man is perceived as a religious being, man
exists in the relationship with God. Thus relationship becomes the
essential definition of a religious human.

Discussion and test questions:


1. What are the main claims of anthropology of religion?
2. What “remnants” of anthropology of religion can be found
in the self-concept of contemporary man?
3. How do anthropology of religion and philosophical anthro-
pology interact?
4. Is anthropology free of a religious element possible?

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Topic: Concept of Anthropology in


Philosophies of Kant and Heidegger
Sub-topics:
Three Levels of Anthropology in Kant’s Philosophy
Heidegger’s Criticism of Kant’s Anthropology
Heidegger’s Anthropology: Reflection on the Essence of a
Human in the Light of Being

In Heidegger’s philosophy one encounters a particular philosophy


of a human and subsequent criticism of Kant’s attempts to develop
philosophical anthropology.
“A human in Heidegger’s philosophy is understood not as an ob-
ject of understanding but as a being which is concerned about its
being and which through the understanding of self asks about the
meaning of being. Understanding in this case is a mode of being
which is revealed in the relationship with the world as being in the
world. In his book Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger
inquires into the status of philosophical anthropology and its possi-
bilities. Heidegger holds that the Kantian validation of metaphysics
is based on the question of a human. Three questions posed by Kant
(What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope?) are
interpreted as the disciplines of special metaphysics, namely, cos-
mology, psychology, and theology. The fourth question “What is a
human?” should become general metaphysics or the justification of
all philosophy in philosophical anthropology. Truth be said though,
this philosophical anthropology should be transcendental as op-
posed to empirical. Since anthropology developed by Kant himself
was, according to Heidegger, empirical in nature, hence the task
of contemporary philosophy was to develop transcendental philo-
sophical anthropology. /…/ Scientific cognition of a human, though
admittedly provides new data, fails completely to uncover the es-
sence of a human. Heidegger comes to conclude, just as Scheler did,

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that No  epoch knew as much about a human as the present one
and at the same time No epoch knew so little about a human as the
present one does. According to Heidegger, anthropology becomes
philosophical anthropology only if it is successful in uncovering
the essence of a human. Right from the beginning Heidegger ties
the examination of human being to the problem of human finitude:
“Finitude and the particularity of the question about it essentially
determine the internal form of transcendental analytics of the sub-
ject’s subjectivity.” (Jonkus, D.).
Thus Heidegger seeks to release philosophical anthropology from
a metaphysical veil and understand it as “fundamental ontology”, i. e.
reflect on a human “in the horizon of thinking about being.”

Discussion and test questions:


1. The idea of Kant’s anthropology. Why does it lack definite-
ness?
2. Why is the regional aspect a flaw in philosophical anthropol-
ogy? What is the difference between regional and fundamen-
tal ontology?
3. Can the prospect of being become the prospect of uncover-
ing the essence of a human?

Topic: Essential Features of Human Being


Sub-topics:
– Language
– Sociability
– Historicity

Language: what the ability to speak means to man and how this
ability relates to the realization of humanity. In his book The Hu-
man Situation Gerd Haeffner distinguishes three anthropological
functions of language.

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Philosophical Anthropology

The representative function is, first of all, realized as the act of intro-
duction, presentation. Through language a person participating in
a conversation can be familiarized with that what cannot be known
without language. Another shocking understanding of language as
a representative function comes when the speaker himself tries to
understand how his own experiences become known to him, how
“thoughts get around in the mind”. Thanks to the representative
function of language things acquire form, sense and existence both
to the listener and the speaker.

Communication: obviously there is a variety of forms of human


communication but verbal communication is the most developed
means of communication by humans. What would we know about
the world and each other if we were not linked through verbal
communication? Moreover, our entire social structure and social
relationships are also verbalized, i.  e. defined, with established
meanings of relationships. Not only does language express, rep-
resent, and retell, it also builds and maintains relationships, and
gives form to them. In a broader sense language shows man’s be-
longing to the world and defines our relationship with it. Language
is man’s home.

Language as self-realization in expression – language helps man to


realize himself through expression. Hence language becomes not
only a tool to represent, but also a medium for human self-real-
ization; every expression becomes a way of my existence. Also this
self-realization is not just one of the luxury adornments of human
being, but an essential human need for self-realization – man seeks
self-expression because he wants to be himself.

Sociability is another dimension of human self-realization, being


what a human wants to be. In philosophical anthropology sociabil-
ity is explored as a dimension of humanity. In other words, sociabil-

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Philosophical Anthropology

ity is a way, tool, and the possibility of being human. If we were to


attempt to list what links one human being to another, we could list
numerous types of human relationships, such as love, hatred, obedi-
ence, envy, goodwill, control, meaning that a relationship in human
life is a diverse, multicoloured phenomenon. But if one wants to
recognize human sociability as one of the human dimensions, one
needs to show that the relationship between “I” and “You”, and be-
tween “I” and “This”, which allows us to talk about “We”, is not a co-
incidental one. Sociability is a dimension of human being because:
Firstly, the relationship between “I” and the “Other” is not only
inevitable, but also pervades human self-concept, that is, that I un-
derstand myself as the other – I am also the other, I see myself from
the port of view of the “Other”, I depend on the “Other”.
Secondly, “I” lives not in its own individual world, but in the
world of “we”.
Thirdly, social forms become the realms of human life and real-
ization – “I” can become a mother, farther, boss, slave, beggar, lec-
turer, student and so on only together with another human being.
Fourthly, a certain form of social relationship may be expressed
by a subject’s understanding that “it is so good that “You” are”,
which means that the subject perceives oneself as a part of a couple –
both “I” and the “Other” live “Our” life.

Sociability in its concrete culturally developed forms determines


what a person will be like, and concrete forms of sociability and
fruition become ways of human self-realization.

Historicity in philosophical anthropology is studied as a dimen-


sion of human existence.

When time is liberated from the linear, objective understanding,


room opens up for an anthropological analysis of historicity as a
dimension of human presence  – man understands the presence

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Philosophical Anthropology

of his being in relation to the future and the past. Man does not
perceive his life ex nihilo; man originated from other men; man’s
creation is also a continuation and will also be carried on. There-
fore, man is a being in time, which exists and understands its ex-
istence as being in time, as being with the past and being towards
the future.

Discussion and test questions:


1. What is the anthropological meaning of language and func-
tions of language in human life?
2. What is the anthropological meaning of sociability? Would a
human be a human if he were to live alone?
3. What is the anthropological meaning of historicity? Does
time change an individual?

Topic: Body
Sub-topics:
Objectivist and Phenomenological Concept of a Human Body
Anthropological Role of a Body
Body and Intersubjectivity

Body – in all our everyday experiences our body most of the time
remains concealed, just like the dimension of the body itself. Even
though, as Merleau-Ponty notes, a body is an agent between us and
our world, the agent remains little talked about. “A body is a fun-
damental human attribute because a body, just as time or language,
constitutes all other phenomena. A body is not a separate realm of
human being but rather a way in which my self, the world and oth-
ers are given to me. Experiences of the self, the world, and the for-
eign are intertwined in the body” (Jonkus, D., Metodinė medžiaga
[Methodical Aid]).

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Philosophical Anthropology

Specifics of bodily experience:


A body is a starting point of departure, the centre; it is always
“here”.
I experience the body as freely moving – its movement is subor-
dinate to “I can”.
Our senses are localized in the body, I experience the body im-
mediately.
I experience the body in two ways, that is, both as an item in the
sequence of cause and effect and as something which experiences.
The body is an imperfectly constituted thing; it undermines or ex-
pands the understandings of both objective being and rationality
or intentionality.

The phenomenological analysis of a body reveals that a body is an


intentional thing; a body allows the first contact with the world,
first meanings of experiences. Also, the body has a gender, i. e. it
exists in a way similar to that of our consciousness, our body also
constantly exists by overstepping itself towards the Other. In this
tension of direction all our actions and relationships are incepted.
Finally, a body is capable of expression  – a human body is not a
thing, it can be expressive, i. e. a body is capable of establishing and
expressing meanings of our experiences.

Both gender and ability of expression reveal that a body is not just
a simple thing in which I exist. A living body is not a formation of
molecules – it is a dimension of human life. Thanks to a body man
exists in the world, interacts with the world, and experiences the
world. Thanks to a body man is directed towards the Other. Thanks
to the ability of expression and ties with other bodies man is self-
expressive and understands these expressions. In summary, a body
is a dimension of human existence; saying that I have a body means
that the identity of “I” has a body.

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Philosophical Anthropology

Discussion and test questions:


1. Dualistic understanding of a body and the attempts to over-
come it.
2. How does a living body open up in experience? What makes
it the object and the subject?
3. Anthropological meaning of a body.

Topic: Fundamental Phenomena of Human Life


Sub-topics:
– Work
– Fight
– Love
– Game
– Death

For a philosopher human being is revealed in its specificity, in what


a human is present. Expression of presence attests to the being en-
tity itself.
Work  – one could say that the fundamental element to this
phenomenon is the change of the form of a substance. But then
we lose a sight of another side of the phenomenon of work that is
No less important, i. e. work is work with its spirit, its self. When
working, man works with his idea, works with his goals, fights
against his dependence on nature. In other words, when man
works, he establishes his relationship to his environment. Finally,
when working man creates himself as an inventor, he becomes the
Creator!

Fight: Heraclitus once said, “War is the father of all and king of all,
who manifested some as gods and some as men, who made some
slaves and some freemen.” War (power relations) is not a coinciden-
tal feature of human being; we are, as Fink said, fighters as much as

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Philosophical Anthropology

we are mortal or working. Fight can be understood as a scheme of


our relations; war is the father of all not because I conquer ones and
rule myself, but because through contending a community of war
with its internal structure emerges.
Love: when asked why love was so important Julia Kristeva re-
sponded, “Because love addresses that primordial foundation of
man, his deepest foundation, and at the same time his ideal. /…/
It allows the realization of my whole self.” 3 Human love is not so
much a flight Plato was talking about but an invitation – love calls
for mutuality. This is why love, with all its codes, is the most pri-
mordial creator of the sense of belonging. Finally, love is not only
the source of desire, but also the source of courage, resilience, re-
laxation, sense of freedom, fertility. Thus, love is one of the funda-
mental phenomena of human life because by rising from the depths
of life itself it realizes the openness of human being and being with
the Other.

A game: first of all, a game questions reality itself. In everyday life


reality is understood as a phenomenon-in-itself, a phenomenon to
the birth of which we do not contribute at all. The game reveals the
fact that the world (of a game) exists as long as the player plays the
game. The player is a supporter and a spring of reality of the game.
Does such an understanding not change everyday reality? Does it
not in a sense teach to look playfully at our own biography, identity,
and concepts and ideologies? But at the same time isn’t a game the
kind of school where I understand that in order to be a player I have
to play and play as if there were nothing more important than this
game. Performance means saying “Yes” to life, saying that, despite
terror or compassion, identifies with a triumph of becoming, a tri-
umph which includes even joy of destroying.

3. Dvi sielos (Two Souls), p. 85.

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Philosophical Anthropology

Death: this topic opens up a truly phenomenological field, i. e. the


whole problematic revolves around the question of how a human
understand his own mortality. The death of every dying person a
priori indicates my inevitable mortality – we are all in being head-
ing towards death. Mortality becomes the founder of a new com-
munity – a community in which, essentially, the only thing com-
mon to all members of the community is death. An understanding
of mortality and the death of the Other is a phenomenon of human
life related to all phenomena of human life.
Finally, a human is not just a passively waiting being; sometimes
a human goes as far as welcoming or even playing with death. All
this comes from the surplus of life, from the sense of carnival time.

Discussion and test questions:


1. What is the meaning of fundamental phenomena of human
life?
2. How does a phenomenon of a game relate to other phenom-
ena?
3. What other phenomena of human life can be attributed to
the fundamental phenomena?
4. Isn’t death without the belief in an afterlife a humanity-
crushing phenomenon?

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