G.R. No.

188801 October 15, 2014

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO and JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO"
and "JAYROSE M. CASTRO", Petitioners vs. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO and ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO,
Respondents

Doctrine: The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of notice and consent. This cannot
be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock,
the other spouse and other legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough
that they be deemed notified through constructive service.

Facts:
 The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio
(Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of
Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her
nickname, "Jayrose."
 Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child but died at an
early age. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between them. 4
 Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived
as husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila
during weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies.
 Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the RTC. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children
with (Lilibeth),8whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.
 At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old.
 Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily and that the children have allegedly been in his custody since
Lilibeth’s death in July 1995.
 RTC – approved the adoption.
 Rosario filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose with IBP. She alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support for
their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36 years. She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to
Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, (Larry), and even went to the extent of adopting
Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne’s knowledge and consent. She also alleged that Jose made blatant
lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Larry’s wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his
homosexual relationship with Larry.
 Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with CA, seeking
to annul the decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina’s adoption, it being without their consent.
 CA – denied the petition. “While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, the
appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should
be personally notified of the hearing."
Issue: WON CA erred in denying the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
Petitioner’s argument – CA erred in its application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a judgment. Because of the
fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false information shown in the birth certificates presented as evidence before
the trial court, they were not given the opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were concealed from them.
They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires the consent, not only of the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10
years or over of the adopter, and such consent was never secured from Joanne.
Respondent’s argument – there was constructive notice through publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also notice to the world of the adoption proceedings. They argue that since
the alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for
annulment of judgment. They also argue that petitioners were not indispensable parties because adoption is an action in rem and,
as such, the only indispensable party is the state.
Held: The petition is granted.
 Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed
of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is
barred by estoppel or laches.
 Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction
over the parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is "[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his
entire case to the court, or [that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it
is procured.”
 The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the
proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
 Petitioners are correct in arguing that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws
require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
 It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action."
 As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the proceedings. The
law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but
also the consent of his legitimate children.
 Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt
his own children born out of wedlock.
 The provision is mandatory.
 As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption.
 Rationale (In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim): “The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that
joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over
the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The law provides for several exceptions
to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance,
joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.”
 The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older.
 The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently
puts the other children on notice that they will have to share their parent’s love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with
another person.
 It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old at the time of the
adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
 To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby
preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not
valid.
 For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should
have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough
to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive
statutory rights.
 Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired
jurisdiction.
 An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years from discovery. 61 Petitioners alleged that
they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed
by the rules.
 The badges of fraud are present in this case.
 First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to any of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City,
Ilocos Norte. Larry and Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City. Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte. Rosario and Joanne were residents of Parañaque City, Manila. The petition for adoption, however, was filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. The trial court gave due course to the petition on Jose’s bare allegation in his petition
that he was a resident of Batac, even though it is admitted in the Home Study Report that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag
City.
 Second, using the process of delayed registration, Jose was able to secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to
be the father and Larry as merely the informant. Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent certificates were procured: one
showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila, and another wherein the portion for the mother’s
name was not filled in at all. The birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the National Statistics Office, however, show that their
father was Larry R. Rentegrado. These certificates are in clear contradiction to the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial
court in support of his petition for adoption.
 Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario,
were childless, to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario
and alleged to be fraudulent.
 All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario
and Joanne from participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.
 When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested party, as in this case, then the
fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony
during the trial.
 Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and
Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted
the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA
CLAVANO, respondents.

Facts:
 Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3,
1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
 Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
 Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente
lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint
manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board." They
further agreed that the children shall be entitled to monthly support of Php1,000 and that the plaintiff is entitled to enter
into any contract/agreement with any person without the written consent of the husband.
 Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie. Said court issued the divorce decree
that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation at all reasonable
times and places" to petitioner.
 While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month a
portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his children's expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the
name of his children.
 Private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of
Anna Marie, filed for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the RTC. The petition bears the signature of
then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that
her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V.
Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the United States to
attend to a family business, "leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking
venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children.
 Petitioner filed an opposition alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially
capable of supporting the children while his finances were "too meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience,
allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children."
 RTC – issued an order finding that Anna Marie, in effect, relinquished custody over the children, and, therefore, such
custody should be transferred to the father. . The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to
petitioner.
 RTC – petition for adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the petitioner-
spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted and approved.
 Petitioner’s contention – the lower court erred in holding that it would be in the best interest of the three children if they
were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was
fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to the
adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and
(d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development who made the case study report required by law.
 CA – affirmed the decree of adoption.
Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has
abandoned them?
Held:
 The written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
 The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the
requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane
or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of the
parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from
compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of
adoption.
 Here, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as
the natural father is lacking.
 The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently
vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances
under which our statutes and jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.
 However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the
matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by
the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of the
 oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for
adoption be considered on its merits.
 In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace
this word to the root idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body
is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's
rights or interests.
 In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
 In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically
absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone.
He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
 In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could
give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent.
 Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in
deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the
matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.
 A close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to
the inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to keep the children away from their father. One of the overriding
considerations for the adoption was allegedly the state of Anna Marie's health — she was a victim of an almost fatal
accident and suffers from a heart ailment. However, she herself admitted that her health condition was not that serious
as she could still take care of the children.
 That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his
inherent right to parental authority over the children. Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his children
when he took the trouble of sending a telegram to the lower court expressing his intention to oppose the adoption
immediately after learning about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify about his love for
his children and his desire to unite his family once more in the United States.
 The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity;
deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family
Code states: ". . . in case of legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated
by the court." In awarding custody, the court shall take into account "all relevant considerations, especially the choice of
the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit."
 If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the "exercise" of parental authority. Having
custody of the child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights with respect to his rearing and care.
The innocent spouse shall have the right to the child's services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities and
make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and religion. 50
 In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise of which is vested by the law upon
the parents.
 As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely deprived of parental authority,
notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at
by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the spouses.
 While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise, there was no factual finding in the
legal separation case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his children
or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority.
 The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was
established in the legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had
abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is
one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because,
as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his
family was based on a misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
 Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes with respect to children is the
overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented
in derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis-
à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the
fullest extent possible.
G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO
as publisher of "Balalong," respondents.

Facts:
 Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed
Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and
the deceased.
 Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented
an Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased
Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.1âwphi1.nêt
 During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to
intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro
questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
 Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages questioning appellee's
claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
 RTC observed the following irregularities in the execution of the reconstructed Marriage Contract: 1. No copy of the Marriage
Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer; 2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob
merely placed his "thumbmark" on said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage); 3. The affiant Msgr.
Yllana never mentioned that he allegedly "gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration"; 4.
Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church
where the marriage was allegedly solemnized.
 Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago
when he was then presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma".
 CA – affirmed the decision of the RTC. Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article 6, par. 1
of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall
be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage."
Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. In the case at bench, proof
of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of the marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of
secondary evidence of the contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently establish the circumstances
of the loss of the original document. With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the questioned
Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and
convincing proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his
regular duties.
Issues: WON defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.7
Held: The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but respondent’s adoption has not been sufficiently established.
 In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of Judge Moya appearing on the
Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance
of his duties. The appellate court also gave credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert, for "the assessment
of the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court . . . "
 We disagree.
 Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten
the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial
court relied mainly on respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself.38 Respondent Pilapil
justifies the trial judge’s action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya could not remember
whether the signature on the Order was his.
 Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature
over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.
 The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. At the time, he could with
medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a document shown to him. Indeed,
we find no reason – and the respondent has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
 Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his
Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in
open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.
 Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet
the questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his
own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter.
 In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of
Records Management47 in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that
there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate
the alleged adoption of respondent.49
 The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do.
G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P.
CARANTO, respondents.

Facts:
 The petition below was filed by private respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption
of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was
seven years old.
 When private respondents were married, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody.
Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes;
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name which was
mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL."
 SolGen opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He
argued that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because
the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108.
 RTC – dismissed the opposition of the SolGen on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons.
It cited Rule 108, §1, which provides that any person interested in an act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction
of any entry relating thereto." It held that the correction of names in the civil registry is not one of the matters enumerated
in Rule 108, §2 as "entries subject to cancellation or correction." According to the trial court, the error could be corrected
in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners.
 SolGen’s additional argument – RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption because in the notice
published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael," instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in
his Certificate of Live Birth.
 CA – affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
1st Issue: WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents’ petition for adoption.
Held:
 The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. In this
case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael"
as given name would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing
the name of the child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both
names "can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The purpose of the
publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection
known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case.
 For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the
Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly did so.
2nd Issue
 With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court
erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry.
 Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was
not complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and
without force or effect.
 The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil
status of persons. This case falls under letter "(o)," referring to "changes of name."
 The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom
no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the
proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence
of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint
including the judgment.
 While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with
Rule 99, §4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition
the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice
and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard
 The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by
publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of
entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.
G.R. No. 175080 November 24, 2010
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES,
and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, Petitioners, vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F.
MAURICIO, Respondents.

Facts:
 (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Bulacan, with an area of (4,527) square meters
registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to
Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents.
 The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB (Librada), now deceased, and her alleged daughter
(Leonida) for annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as parties.
Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their peaceful possession with damages.
 Respondents’ allegations – they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and
registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his death in
May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing
trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and
other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan to eject respondents
from the subject property; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to
her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of
Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all
illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property.
 Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s
occupation of the subject premises was based on the former’s mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied
signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada,
accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents
of the document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the
Kasunduan.
 Provincial Adjudicator – Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be
maintained in peaceful possession of the subject land.
 DARAB – Mauricio’s are former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses Reyes died, siblings Eufracia,
Susana and Eugenio, among others inherited the subject property. Under the law, they were subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the "obligations" of their late parents as the agricultural lessors over the farmholding tenanted by
respondents. DARAB banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan or the leasehold contract executed by Susana in
favor of Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB declared the other Kasunduan as void
by relying on the evaluation of the Provincial Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter into such a contract.7
 CA – affirmed DARAB’s decision.
Held:
 Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is void, our conclusion remains. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that a tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a leasehold
contract; or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the landholding.
 As an incidental issue, Leonida’s legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the
complaint was rendered moot with the death of Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that
Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.
 We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida
in the instant petition.
 It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.
 The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose.
 "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void."
 Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of Leonida from the case for annulment of the
"Kasunduan" that supposedly favors petitioners’ cause.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

Facts:
 Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
 He alleged that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her
mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his
surname.
 RTC – granted the adoption. This Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided
for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant
of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that
the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the
requirement of Article 35 of PD No. 603.
Issue: WON an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural
father or May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?
Petitioner’s argument – trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law
prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to
have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the
benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use
the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle
name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
Held: We find merit in the petition.
 Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
 For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives
and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also,
as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with
him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
 The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper
name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name
is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by
the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
 As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
 The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and
surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
 Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
 However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint
Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus
 "Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and that of the child because the
father’s surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s surname
by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
 In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether
he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of
the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14
 Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results
from legitimate paternity and filiation.The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity
and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.
 One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes.
 Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
 Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
future.
 Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan.
Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa".
Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only
sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
 It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, 26 hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.27
 Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

Facts:
 Petitioner married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted
to them by a certain (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to
make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael
Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. Michael was 11 days
old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic.
 The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools.
They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Lim died. Petitioner married (Olario), an American
citizen.
 Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under (RA 8552) to those individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
 Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption. Petitioner’s
husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent 9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
 RTC – dismissed the petitions. Since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new
husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. As to the argument that the
adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court
ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires
certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Issue: WON petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
Petitioner’s contention – rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the
paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not
applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the
petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental
authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
Held: We deny the petition.
 It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the
petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s
decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit.
 The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation.
As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
 The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband,
Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
 Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted
are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children
of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
 The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity
to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child.
None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
 These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant
to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner
or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
 Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated
having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
 Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development
of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
 parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property
of the children.
 It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years
of age — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified
and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
 Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except
when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
(3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter
and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the
adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive
support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as
support and successional rights.
 We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child
to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate,
needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
 Republic v. Vergara – We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the
welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat
said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is
intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position
to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified
without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is
amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption. phi1.zw+
 Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her
husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.
 Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible
because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
 We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not
equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the
marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
A.C. No. 10196 September 9, 2014
MELODY R. NERY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, Respondent.

Facts:
 Nery alleged that she engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an
alien adopter.
 The petition for annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid ₱200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption,
Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then
gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana
₱100,000.00, in installment: (a) ₱10,000.00 on 10 September 2008; (b) ₱50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and (c)
₱40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer asked for receipts since she trusted Sampana.
 Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed the petition for adoption and it was already published.
Sampana further informed Nery that they needed to rehearse before the hearing. When Nery asked why she did not
receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer necessary because the hearing was
only jurisdictional.
 Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there
was no such petition filed in the court. Nery met Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the ₱100,000.00 she paid
him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct the filing fee worth ₱12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee
should not be deducted, since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the
reimbursement of the ₱100,000.00 from Sampana, but the demands were left unheeded.
 Sampana admitted receiving "one package fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and adoption.
Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption because of the old age, civil status and nationality
of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that "if the [alien] adopter would be
married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien] could be possible." Sampana, then, required Nery
to submit the documents, including the marriage contracts and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt from
the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification. Sampana
alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because he was still waiting for the certification.
 IBP – found Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for
failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees.
 IBP Board of Governors – affirmed IBP’s recommendations.
Held: The recommendation of IBP Board of Governors is well-taken.
 In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of annulment and adoption.
Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence
and candor to his client. Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption
is disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her
close relative, the intended adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana
suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her
Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.
 Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of the petition.
 He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal
matter entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in violation of the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s
funds upon demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public
confidence in the legal profession.
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.

Facts:
 (John) was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville. As such,
he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, an accident occurred
on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day. 4
 John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried.
 Petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits under PD 626 with the (SSS). However, the SSS denied the claim, stating: “We regret to inform you that
wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he
was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.”
 ECC – affirmed the ruling of SSS.
 In denying the claim, both the SSS and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after
under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the records,
John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio),
which decree of adoption attained finality. Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s
primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary
even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away.
 ECC ratiocinated: “Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent
spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent
parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a
primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the covered member, as
provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes
that the appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr.
Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased. In
effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting
parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right
to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant.”
Issue: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus,
entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
Held: The petition is meritorious.
 The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record.
 To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is
John’s biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive.
 We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
 Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only less than
three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. As such, it was error for the
ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
 The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law.
 This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-
related demise.
 The term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and
ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The
phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature
or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.
 The same Article 167 (j) clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely
legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are
secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would
have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was
crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate
or parents by nature or adoption.
 In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the
above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the
 test of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing
government concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one
hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy
of PD 626 – that employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of work-connected
disability or death - will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
 True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was
severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the
adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of
age.
 John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance,
parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account
Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
 To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept.
Section 20 of the Domestic Adoption Act, provides: “Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of
adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.”
 The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned. The manner
herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested
rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in
favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself
at such a tender age.
 To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death.
 Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552 24 wherein the paramount
consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest
of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered
incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the
absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a
parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.
 Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the
ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents,
in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted.
 From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their child
who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part
of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the
rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same
way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include
the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We
cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive
parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been
better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death
at the time of John’sminority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
 On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on John can be established from the
documentary evidence submitted to the ECC.
 Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan,
Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in John’s Death Certificate 25 executed in
Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by
John.26 Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed Decision.27Similarly, this same address was
used by petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence,
it can be assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually execised
the same, and that they lived together under one roof.
 Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282,
otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or
injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626,
John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as
his dependent.