Berlin’s Reading of

Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom

Wenjing Bai
M.A. Zhejiang University, 2009

This thesis is presented for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy of
The University of Western Australia

School of Humanities

2014
 Abstract

This thesis examines Isaiah Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom.

Existing studies either focus on Berlin’s explanation of Rousseau’s moral thought or

on his reading of Rousseau’s idea of freedom. This study combines these two aspects

and systematically explores the intellectual bases of Berlin’s account. I also aim to

assess Berlin’s reading.

Reader-response theory is applied as a methodology for understanding and assessing

Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of freedom. Reader-response theorists hold that

whenever a text is read, the reader’s preconceptions are brought to the act of

interpretation. They argue that meaning is produced through the interaction between

the reader’s preconceptions and the texts. I identify three preconceptions determining

the logic of Berlin’s reading, namely, his notion of human nature, his doctrine of three

forms of positive freedom, and his theory of pluralism. I examine the meaning of

Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau through the perspective of an encounter of these

preconceptions and Rousseau’s texts. In addition, in order to assess Berlin’s reading, I

draw on the research of contemporary scholars of Rousseau to show how other readers

of Rousseau interpret his works.

The argument is structured in the following way. Chapter one deals with Berlin’s

account of human nature and his characterisation of Rousseau’s doctrine of human

nature. Chapter two treats Berlin’s analysis of negative and positive freedom, in the

context of his reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense. Chapter

three focuses on Berlin’s theory of pluralism. Building on this preconception, chapter

four explores his reading of Rousseau’s thought on morality. Chapter five draws these

strands together to form conclusions about Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of

freedom in its political sense.

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 The thesis comes to four conclusions from its reader-response analysis of Berlin’s

reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom. In the first place, it concludes that the way

Berlin reads Rousseau fails to account for complex and subtle aspects of Rousseau’s

notion of freedom for the sake of his own theoretical consistency. In the second place,

Berlin’s reading preconceptions, and his experience and reflection on 20th century

totalitarianism determine the way he reads Rousseau. This way of reading also reveals

the inner tension within Rousseau’s doctrine of freedom and the possible abuse and

distortion when this doctrine is applied to reality. Thirdly, it concludes that Rousseau’s

notion of freedom in its individual sense takes the moral sentiment of conscience into

consideration, which Berlin leaves aside. Finally, Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its

political sense ought to be understood not only as positive freedom, as Berlin portrays

it, but also as negative freedom.

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 Acknowledgement

To write a PhD thesis in English is a tough challenge for a student from mainland
China, which I did not realize until I embarked on my research in Australia. I believe
that this thesis could not have been completed without the help of many people.

Foremost among my debts are those to my supervisor Professor Kieran Dolin and
my dear friend Dr. Erika Gaudlitz. Dolin has provided me with consistent support and
encouragement throughout my four years’ study and research for this project. He has
accompanied me in the slow, and at times rocky, development of this thesis with
patience, sound advice, and accurate guidance. As an international student, I have
come across many unforeseen difficulties, and Dolin has tried his best to help me
overcome them. He has also encouraged me to seize the opportunity to go to England
for two academic conferences in 2011, and to attend a conference in continental
philosophy in Melbourne, Australia.

I take Gaudlitz not only as a dear friend of mine but also as a teacher. She has given
me her unfailing support and encouragement, specifically in the last year of my thesis
with the process of writing and revision. She has helped me so much; and her kindness,
intellectual acuity, scholarly talents and determination have inspired me, that words fail
to express my gratitude for what she has done for me and brought into my life.

I am also grateful to Dr. Miriam Bankovsky, Dr. Amy Shuster, Mrs Noelene
Bloomfield, Associate Professor Judith Berman, Dr. Yi Wang, Associate Professor Jie
Chen and Professor Ian Saunders. Bankowsky has helpfully introduced me to Shuster
to read my thesis before its submission. As an expert in political philosophy, Shuster
has given me constructive and intriguing feedback, which not only has improved the
quality of this current study but will also benefit me in my future career.

Bloomfield has generously helped me to correct the grammar mistakes in my thesis.

As a teacher and a friend, Berman has read chapter two and offered me good guidance

iv
to improve it. Wang has advised me on how to do research in a western country and get
accustomed to Australian culture. Chen and Saunders have offered me encouraging
counsel in the early stage of my PhD.

I must also express my thanks to the China Scholarship Council, The University of
Western Australia (UWA) and, in particular, the School of Humanities. The China
Scholarship Council and UWA have provided me with a living allowance and free
tuition, which enabled me to concentrate on my study and research. The School of
Humanities has offered me research funding to travel to England for two conferences.

Finally, I must give my thanks to my parents, my grandmother and my good friends.

My parents have been supporting me all through my life with their love and patience;
and my grandmother’s intelligence, her strong will and her compassion have left a
profound impression on me. My lovely friends have brought me so much happiness
that makes my life enjoyable.

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 Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................1

The Research Topic of the Thesis ......................................................................1

The Methodology of the Thesis ..........................................................................9

The Structure of the Thesis ...............................................................................12

The Line of Argumentation ..............................................................................12

Expected Outcomes ..........................................................................................23

Part One: Berlin’s Account of Human Nature

Chapter One: A Critique of Rousseau’s Idea of Human Nature .........25

1.1 Examining Berlin’s Idea of Human Nature ......................................................25

1.1.1 Considering the Act of Reading: Gadamer and Jauss ..........................25

1.1.2 A Changeable View of Human Nature .................................................27

1.2 Critiquing Fixed Human Nature in Rousseau ...................................................36

1.2.1 A Reading of the Inner World ..............................................................36

1.2.2 Charging a Fixed View of Human Nature ............................................39

Part Two: Berlin’s Analysis of Two Types of Freedom

Chapter Two: Reading Positive Freedom in the Individual Sense ......48

2.1 A Reconstruction of Rousseau’s Idea of Human Nature ..................................51

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 2.1.1 The Natural Goodness of Man and its Problematic ..............................52

2.1.2 Taking Berlin’s Position .......................................................................59

2.2 Negative and Positive Freedom and the Validity of their Distinction ..............64

2.2.1 Defining Negative and Positive Freedom .............................................65

2.2.2 The Validity of Negative and Positive Freedom ..................................67

2.2.3 Positive Freedom in a Collective Sense ................................................73

2.3 Deducing Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom in the Individual Sense ..................75

2.3.1 Reading of Rousseau’s Freedom – ‘Aesthetic Response’ ....................75

2.3.2 Critiquing Berlin’s Version of Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom ...........78

Part Three: Berlin’s Theory of Pluralism

Chapter Three: Berlin’s Theory of Pluralism .............................................83

3.1 The Plurality of Values .....................................................................................85

3.1.1 Berlin’s Reading of Vico ......................................................................86

3.1.2 Berlin’s Reading of Herder ...................................................................91

3.1.3 The Generic Nature of the Plurality of Values and Berlin’s Response ..94

3.2 Berlin’s Justification: The Objectivity of Values .............................................97

3.2.1 The Notion of ‘Human Horizon’ ..........................................................98

3.2.2 A Non-Sociological Account ..............................................................100

3.2.3 A ‘Central Core’ of Values and its Problematic .................................103

3.3 The Conflict and Incommensurability of Values ............................................105

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 3.3.1 Consulting Vico and Herder ...............................................................105

3.3.2 The Knowledge of the Observable and Berlin’s Response ................111

Part Four: Drawing Conclusions: The Encounter of Two Minds

Chapter Four: Berlin’s View of Rousseau’s Moral Presuppositions ...116

4.1 Portraying Rousseau as a Utopian Moralist ....................................................118

4.1.1 Reading the Monistic Nature of Rousseau’s Moral Thought .............119

4.1.2 The Normative and the Empirical in Rousseau ..................................127

4.2 An Assumed Harmony of Values ...................................................................131

4.2.1 Portraying Rousseau as a Value Harmonist ........................................131

4.2.2 The Monistic and the Plural in Rousseau ...........................................139

4.3 Individual Freedom: A Supreme Value ..........................................................144

4.3.1 Reading Rousseau as Taking Freedom as the Highest Value .............144

4.3.2 Linking Freedom with the Sentimental Dimension of Morality ........150

Chapter Five: Reading Positive Freedom in the Political Sense .........154

5.1 The Problematic of the State of Nature ..........................................................154

5.1.1 The Conflict between Individual Freedoms ......................................154

5.1.2 The Conflict between Individual Freedom and Political Power .........157

5.1.3 The Problematic of Psychological Injuries .........................................159

5.2 The Notion of the General Will ......................................................................164

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 5.2.1 The Principle of Rousseau’s Political Solution ..................................164

5.2.2 Berlin’s View of the General Will ......................................................170

5.3 Positive Freedom in its Political Sense ...........................................................176

5.3.1 Reading Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom with a Formed Horizon .........176

5.3.2 Civil Freedom in Rousseau ....................................................................182

Conclusion ..............................................................................................................186

References ...............................................................................................................196

ix
Introduction

The Research Topic of the Thesis

The contemporary British philosopher and historian of ideas, Isaiah Berlin, is

renowned for the conceptual distinction between negative freedom and positive
freedom, and the analysis of their different philosophical and moral grounds. Berlin’s
essay, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ delivered in 1958 is viewed as one of the most
important essays of contemporary political thought.1 Later in his life, Berlin’s
numerous essays were edited and published by one of his trustees, Henry Hardy; and
his distinction and discussion of pluralism and monism in these essays has become a
central theme in contemporary moral philosophy.

Throughout Berlin’s long intellectual life, Rousseau never ceased being a moving
target. In 1952, Berlin delivered a lecture on BBC radio, and the essay ‘Rousseau’,
published in 1992, is a modified version of this lecture.2 In this essay, Berlin presents
an insightful reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual and its political
dimension, and justifies their inner connection by way of defining Rousseau’s moral
thought as monism. Here Berlin first advances the view that Rousseau’s notion of
freedom in theory and in practice leads to its opposite, namely the illiberal.

A further evidence of Berlin’s engagement is his discussion of Rousseau in one of

the Mary Flexner Lectures, ‘The Idea of Freedom’, held in Pennsylvania in 1952, and
edited and published in 2006. In this essay, Berlin situates his reading of Rousseau’s
notion of freedom in the context of a discussion of negative and positive freedom. In
particular, Rousseau appears to be selected by Berlin to demonstrate the inner logic of
the notion of positive freedom.3 In Berlin’s famous essay, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’,
the examination of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual and its political

1
R. Wokler, ‘Isaiah Berlin’s Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment’, in J. Mali and R. Wokler (eds.), Isaiah
Berlin’s Counter-Enlightenment [Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 93, no. 5], Philadelphia,
American Philosophical Society, 2003, p. 13.
2
H. Hardy, ‘Editor’s Preface’, in H. Hardy (ed.), Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty,
Princeton, Princeton U.P., 2002, pp. x-xi.
3
I. Berlin, ‘The Idea of Freedom’, in H. Hardy (ed.), Political Ideas in the Romantic Age: Their Rise and Influence
on Modern Thought, London, Pimlico, 2006, pp. 103-154.

1
sense, – with an emphasis on their relationship –, is demonstrated as one of the main
threads throughout the essay.4

The thesis will mainly consult the three essays, ‘Rousseau’ [1952; 1990], ‘The Idea
of Freedom’ [1952; 2006], and ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ [1958], for they
demonstrate Berlin’s intense engagement with Rousseau, and are published during the
peak of Berlin’s intellectual life. However, an important issue arises, as to whether a
potential shift in Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom can be detected.

While examining the above problematic, in terms of the chronology, two points are
worthy addressing. Firstly, we notice that ‘Rousseau’ and ‘The Idea of Freedom’
appeared in the form of public lectures in the same year, namely in 1952, although they
are edited and published in different years, in 1990, respectively in 2006, by one of
Berlin’s trustees, Henry Hardy. Secondly, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ was delivered in
1958, that is, six years after ‘Rousseau’ and ‘The Idea of Freedom’.

The essays, ‘Rousseau’ and ‘The Idea of Freedom’, do not contain, in my view, an
obvious and important shift. For one reason, Berlin’s attitude toward Rousseau is
unlikely to have sharply changed within a short period. The time gap between the two
essays is no more than eight months; ‘The Idea of Freedom’ was given between
February and March,5 whereas the BBC version of ‘Rousseau’ was delivered between
October and November.6 Berlin’s own words confirm the relationship between the
two essays; in a letter to President Katharine E. McBride of Bryn Mawr College, he
writes:

I have thought of Bryn Mawr often when I delivered lectures substantially identical
with those given under the auspices of Mary Flexner, over the radio in London,
when instead of being faced with 100 faces, I looked at a neat functional table and
corked-lined walls […].7

4
I. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in H. Hardy (ed.), The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays,
London, Pimlico, 1998, pp. 208-236.
5
M. Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life, London, Vintage, 2000, p. 201.
6
Ibid., p. 204.
7
I. Berlin, ‘To Katharine McBride’, in H. Hardy and J. Holmes (eds.), Enlightening: Letters 1946-1960, London,
Chatto & Windus, 2009, [unpaginated].

2
 As further evidence one could count that ‘Rousseau’ is a re-worked version of ‘The
Idea of Freedom’.8 If one follows the logical line, and the content, of Berlin’s version
of Rousseau in ‘The Idea of Freedom’ and in ‘Rousseau’, they remain similar, but they
are by no means simple repetitions of each other. In fact, the two essays supplement
each other; in particular with regard to the analysis of specific points, such as Berlin’s
comment on Rousseau’s view of the state of nature, and his reading of Rousseau’s
moral thought. Thus, in this thesis I shall use ‘The Idea of Freedom’ and ‘Rousseau’ to
supplement one another, in order to present a distinct picture of Berlin’s vision of
Rousseau.

With regard to the relationship between ‘Rousseau’, ‘The Idea of Freedom’, and
‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, I consider ‘The Idea of Freedom’ and ‘Rousseau’ as
elaborations of what Berlin later presents in a highly abstract version of Rousseau in
‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. This later essay represents Berlin’s mature thought of
negative and positive freedom; and his view of Rousseau, embodied into this essay,
demonstrates the essential points of Rousseau’s thought of freedom while lacking in
detailed explanation, compared to ‘The Idea of Freedom’ and ‘Rousseau’.

Although ‘The Idea of Freedom’ and ‘Rousseau’ offer more detail than the abstract
version of Rousseau in ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, this does not mean that Berlin’s
view of Rousseau does not contain contradictory points within these three essays, –
and his other essays –, a problematic, which I shall explore throughout this thesis, but
the inconsistencies do not change Berlin’s fundamental view of Rousseau, which is
constantly and coherently constructed with regard to its meaning.

Apart from the three essays mentioned above, Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s
doctrine of freedom, and the analysis of its moral and philosophical foundations, are
scattered in his many other essays, which will be demonstrated throughout this thesis.
It needs to be clarified that I am not considering all of Berlin’s works, but focus on
those essays that have relevance to his view of Rousseau. Whether and when Berlin’s
position undergoes changes in these or other writings require further inquiry.

8
Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life, p. 204.

3
 In fact, Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom occupies a significant
status in Berlin’s moral and political thought, and is, as I shall argue, an
unacknowledged positive force in determining his vision. Berlin’s thought can be
considered as founded on two assumptions. First, the past speaks to the present; and in
order to know the present, one has to get a clear picture of its past; second,
philosophical and political ideas have enormous power, and they shape the actual
political and social conditions.9 Thus, in order to know the present, the history of ideas
prepares the way for a critical view of its very conditions. In this manner, Berlin’s
study of Rousseau’s notion of freedom presents his intellectual position, namely,
drawing on the ideas of the past to examine the present.

Berlin’s second assumption, namely, that philosophical and political ideas have
enormous power, is clearly demonstrated in Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of
freedom, and his reflection on it. To begin with, Berlin is critical of this notion, and
identifies Rousseau as ‘one of the most sinister and most formidable enemy of liberty
in the whole history of modern thought’.10 In particular, in Berlin’s words, the new
theme of popular sovereignty in contemporary political practices can be traced back to,
and is best expressed by, Rousseau’s famous phrase, ‘force people to be free’, from the
Social Contract, published in 1762.11 The crisis of Rousseau’s notion of freedom, as
viewed by Berlin, is, that it dissolves individual liberty into authority, thus freedom is
determined by a collective aim.12 This type of freedom is defined by Berlin as positive
freedom, namely, to be free is to realise a purpose,13 which stands in opposition to the
idea of negative freedom, characterised and defended by Berlin, as to pursue one’s life
as one likes, unless one breaks the laws.14

Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom, and his examination of its moral
and philosophical foundation, have evoked, and encouraged, discussions in Rousseau
scholarship, and among theorists, whose focus is mainly on the idea of freedom in the

9
I. Berlin, ‘Introduction’, in H. Hardy (ed.), Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty, pp. 2-3.
10
I. Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, in H. Hardy (ed.), Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty, p. 49.
11
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp. 233-234.
12
Ibid., pp. 209-210.
13
Ibid., p. 219.
14
Ibid., p. 194.

4
history of political thought. Critics have replied to Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau’s
notion of freedom from different perspectives, whereby two opposing views have
dominated in this debate. The first view is the critic Wokler who has argued, that
Rousseau’s notion of freedom is negative. Wokler’s comments on Rousseau’s theory
of freedom in the ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’ follow these lines:

I think it appropriate to speak of Rousseau’s conception of freedom in this context as

negative, in so far as it introduces no substantive aim or purpose to which freedom is
or ought to be directed and neither entails or implies any moral claim about the
manner in which it should be exercised.15

In the assessment of Rousseau’s notion of political freedom, as expressed in the

Social Contract, Wokler argues that the notion is even more consistently negative in its
formulation:

[…] Rousseau’s social contract was designed to provide safeguards against the
exercise of just such predominant power, to protect each individual from all forms of
personal dependence, as he puts it several times in the text, including the passage
about forcing men to be free. In this sense of a lack of dependence upon other men
his conception of our political freedom is as negative as his conception of liberty in
terms of our lack of dependence on Nature appears in the Discours sur l’inégalité.16

Miller’s reading of Rousseau’s freedom is the second opposing view, he suggests,

that Rousseau’s idea of freedom is an amalgamation of republican and ‘idealist’
freedoms:

Jean-Jacques Rousseau drew heavily upon the republican tradition in developing a

view of liberty under the social contract. A person is free, he argued, when he is
subject to laws that he has imposed on himself by participating in the formation of
the general will – the collective view of his society about what is just or in the
common interest. Here, then, is the republican view of freedom with a strongly
democratic twist to it […]. But he added to this an idealist claim: when a person is
subject to the guidance of the general will, he achieves moral liberty […].17

If we were to summarise the two opposing interpretations of Rousseau’s notion of

freedom, Wokler’s reading suggests that Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s doctrine
of freedom is misleading, whereas Miller’s reading maintains that Berlin contracts
Rousseau’s notion of freedom. These critical assessments demonstrate the importance

15
R. Wokler, ‘Rousseau’s Perfectibilian Libertarianism’, in A. Ryan (ed.), The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour
of Isaiah Berlin, Oxford, Oxford U.P., 1979, p. 237.
16
Ibid., pp. 249-250.
17
D. Miller, ‘Introduction’, in D. Miller (ed.), Liberty, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 5.

5
of clarifying Berlin’s intellectual portrait of Rousseau, and assessing this portrait.
Accordingly, the current study meets two purposes: firstly, it aims to expose the inner
logic, and the reason, of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom; secondly, it
intends to assess this reading.

The existing studies have dealt with different aspects of Berlin’s reading of
Rousseau’s notion of freedom, which can be divided into two types; one emphasises
Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s theory of moral values, the other examines
Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s freedom.

In terms of the first type, David Lay Williams claims18 that, with regard to Berlin’s
view of Rousseau as a monist, Rousseau is viewed as a monist and a pluralist. On the
one hand, Williams argues that Rousseau holds a view similar to Montesquieu, with
regard to moral pluralism, – that is to say, each civil society has its own moral codes
deriving from local conditions and the character of the inhabitants. The particular law
and the institution in a state are good, not perhaps in themselves, but in a specific
situation. One the other hand, Williams claims that both Montesquieu and Rousseau
believe in moral truth that is universal and immune to conventions, which
demonstrates the monistic nature of Rousseau’s moral thought.

Compared to the first argument, that Rousseau is both a monist and a pluralist, the
second reading suggests that Rousseau is rather a pluralist.19 Graeme Garrard views
that if Berlin qualifies Machiavelli as a pluralist, – on the grounds of Machiavelli’s
view of the relationship between the Christian and the republican value systems –, then
Berlin would make the same claim, that Rousseau is a pluralist, because Rousseau
argues, as Machiavelli does, that a patriotic civil religion is contrary to the belief of
Christianity.

Williams’s argument intends to demonstrate the incompleteness of Berlin’s portrait

of Rousseau’s moral thought, whereas Garrard aims to expose the fallacy of this

18
D.L. Williams, ‘Political Ontology and Institutional Design in Montesquieu and Rousseau’, American Journal of
Political Science, vol. 54, no. 2, 2010, pp. 525-526.
19
G. Garrard, ‘Strange Reversals: Berlin on the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment’, in G. Crowder and
H. Hardy (eds.), The One and the Many: Reading Isaiah Berlin, Amherst, Prometheus Books, 2007, pp. 148-149.

6
portrait. In my view, both arguments are problematic; yet both, – in different ways –,
contribute to my analysis of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of moral values,
that is, Berlin’s theoretical perspective determines the plausibility of his qualification
of Rousseau’s moral thought, while also revealing its limitations.

While the first type of studies emphasises Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s

theory of moral values, the second type of studies concerning Berlin’s reading of
Rousseau’s notion of freedom offers two contrasting views. Wokler holds the view,
that Rousseau’s idea of freedom is negative, whereas Miller defines Rousseau’s notion
of freedom as a combination of the republican and the ‘idealist’ freedoms. Wokler’s
position suggests that Berlin’s Rousseau should be viewed as distorted, while Miller’s
interpretation aims to demonstrate the incompleteness of Berlin’s Rousseau.

Mathew Simpson’s interpretation of Rousseau’s notion of freedom suggests that

Rousseau’s idea of freedom is more complex and subtle than Berlin’s portrait allows
for.20 Simpson argues that in order to understand Rousseau’s notion of freedom, one
has to have a distinct idea of the social contract which Rousseau constitutes, for the
nature and the meaning of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its political and its
individual sense is defined within the frame of the social contract. By explaining
Berlin’s notion of negative freedom as the absence of obstacles to one’s actual and
potential choices, Simpson claims that Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its political
sense is negative freedom:

This [Berlin’s definition of negative freedom] is precisely what Rousseau means by

the term of civil freedom, which consists in legally protected options for living one
kind of life or another according to one’s wishes.21

Agreeing with Berlin’s definition of Rousseau’s notion of moral freedom as positive

freedom in the sense of living one’s life in a rationally formed way, Simpson argues
that, nevertheless, Berlin’s reading puts aside two crucial points. Firstly, Rousseau’s
idea of moral freedom gains its nature and meaning through his notion of the social
contract, – that is to say, moral freedom defines one’s behaviour in accordance with

20
M. Simpson, Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, London, Continuum, 2006, p. 7.
21
Ibid., p. 93.

7
the terms of the social contract. Secondly, the terms of the social contract are not
formed by coercion but by each associate’s rational realisation.22 Thus, Simpson
claims that Berlin’s critique, that Rousseau’s moral freedom can easily lead to the
justification of oppressive government, undervalues the point that moral freedom is
formed by voluntary agreement through the rationality of each associate.23

In the above critical assessments of Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau’s notion of

freedom, Miller and Simpson hold a similar point with regard to Rousseau’s notion of
freedom; both maintain that Rousseau’s idea of freedom can only be realised within a
certain political constitution, and both evaluate Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its
individual sense as positive freedom. However, Miller argues that Rousseau’s notion
of freedom in its political sense should be viewed as republican, – in the sense, that
citizens are required to make the law in order to guarantee the validity of their political
freedom. Simpson argues that Rousseau’s civil freedom should be evaluated as
negative freedom, – in the sense, that citizens enjoy their civil rights on the condition
of obeying the terms of the social contract. By contrast to these positions, Wokler
holds the point of view that Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its political and its
individual sense should be viewed as negative freedom.

Thus, the existing studies of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom

present what Berlin discards in his portrait of Rousseau, and in this sense, Rousseau’s
notion of freedom turns out to be more complex and subtle than Berlin’s reading
appears to allow for. On the other hand, these studies either focus on Berlin’s
explanation of Rousseau’s moral thought or his reading of Rousseau’s notion of
freedom. No studies exist that synthesize these two aspects, and therefore
systematically explore the inner logic of Berlin’s intellectual depiction of Rousseau’s
notion of freedom in its individual and its political sense.

I propose that to combine Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral thought, and his
reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom, is of crucial importance, for these two parts

22
Ibid., p. 96.
23
Ibid., p. 94.

8
are logically connected; in fact, Berlin’s understanding of Rousseau’s notion of
morality is one of the foundations of his reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its
political sense. This thesis examines Berlin’s reading by demonstrating that it is
grounded in his doctrine of human nature, his analysis of two types of freedom, and his
theory of pluralism. This thesis also attempts to assess Berlin’s reading by turning to
Rousseau’s texts and their critical interpretation.

The Methodology of the Thesis

In the previous section, ‘The Research Topic of the Thesis,’ I have addressed the
focus of the thesis, namely, that the thesis concentrates on taking Berlin as a reader of
Rousseau. I have also stated the two purposes the current study aims to achieve, firstly,
it aims to expose the inner logic, and the reason, of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s
notion of freedom; secondly, it intends to assess this reading.

With the above research scope and purpose in mind, I draw on Berlin’s published
writings, not on archival research into his manuscripts and library, however I consult
conversations held and some letters. This thesis also proposes to draw on
reader-response theory as a methodology to fulfil these tasks. Reader-response theory
developed in the field of literary studies as an attempt to understand the process of
interpreting text. What is the role of the reader in understanding a text?
Reader-response theory argues that the reader has an active and constructive role in
interpreting meaning. The major claim of this approach is that the meaning of a text is
the result of an encounter between the text and a reader or readers: literary critic
Andrew Bennett begins an anthology of reader theory by arguing that it raises two
questions, ‘who reads?’ and ‘what is reading?’24 It is my belief that reader-response
theory can apply to the understanding of texts in political theory. Condren says that
‘Great books are less written than they are read’.25 With this in mind, this thesis
examines Berlin as a reader, who comes to the writings of Rousseau, Vico, Herder and
24
A. Bennett, Readers and Reading, London, Longman, 1995, p. 1.
25
C. Condren, The Status and Appraisal of Classic Texts: An Essay on Political Theory, Its Inheritance, and the
History of Ideas, Princeton, Princeton U.P., 1985, p. 3.

9
others in the twentieth century. The thesis also draws on particular aspects of
reader-response theory from Germany, namely the work of Gadamer, Jauss and Iser, to
reveal what happens when we read and how readers make sense of a text.

In the first place, with regard to the conditions of reading, I turn to Gadamer and
Jauss’s insight, that a text is always read with the reader’s preconceptions, because the
conditions under which the text is produced, are no longer those under which the
reader later comes across the text.26 Using this methodological key point to unfold the
inner logic of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom, I identify two
preconceptions determining the process of Berlin’s reading, namely, his doctrine of
human nature and his theory of pluralism.

Further, in the light of Gadamer’s idea that a reader’s horizon is constituted by his
presuppositions, which enables the reader to situate himself within a text and makes
the meaning of the text,27 I establish Berlin’s distinction between negative and
positive freedom, and his discussion of the three forms of positive freedom, as a
horizon of his understanding of freedom, which serves as a theoretical tool for Berlin
to examine Rousseau’s notion of freedom and make meaning of it.

In the second place, with regard to the process of meaning-production in Berlin

engaging with Rousseau’s texts, I draw on Gadamer’s view, that meaning is produced
through the interaction between reader’s preconceptions and texts.28 That is to say, the
production of meaning is a fusion of a reader’s fore-meanings with the ideas embodied
in a text. With this method in mind, I examine the meaning of Berlin’s portrait of
Rousseau through the perspective of a blending of Berlin’s preconceptions and
Rousseau’s texts.

The production of the meaning in Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau brings about a

further problematic, that is, how to assess the resulting portrait. Two methodological
points need to be clarified, before I turn to address this question. Firstly, because the
principal aim of this thesis is to unfold the logic of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s
26
H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, London, Sheed & Ward, 1975, p. 263; H.R. Jauss, Towards an Aesthetic of
Reception, Brighton, Harvester, 1982, p. 23.
27
Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 269-272.
28
Ibid., p. 235.

10
notion of freedom, and to explain its reasons, I evaluate this reading by following
Berlin’s logical line of reading Rousseau. Secondly, although assessing Berlin’s
portrait of Rousseau is confined by Berlin’s selective framework, this does imply, that
we cannot analyse Rousseau’s philosophical and political ideas, that Berlin addresses
through the perspective of Rousseau’s texts; to the contrary, such turning to
Rousseau’s texts will put us in a position to critically view Berlin’s portrait of
Rousseau.

To interpret Rousseau’s ideas within Berlin’s frame of reading Rousseau, I firstly

turn to Rousseau’s texts and situate his ideas against the contexts he draws on; then,
secondly, I turn to the interpretations of contemporary scholars of Rousseau, to
critically perceive, how they interpret Rousseau. This double-pronged process would
reveal certain aspects that Berlin discards or puts aside, when he reads Rousseau
through his theoretical perspectives.

Finally, with the purpose of exploring the reasons for Berlin’s reading, and
defending its plausibility, I shall again draw on reader-response theory. In particular, I
turn to two aspects. Firstly, I draw on Iser’s concept of ‘consistency-building’ of
meaning, as selective decisions of choosing textual signs by the reader to make the
textual meaning coherent.29 The principle of ‘consistency-building’ of meaning
demonstrates how a reader selectively emphasises some aspects of a text to serve his
interpretative purpose. Secondly, I turn to Iser’s conception of ‘aesthetic response’,
that is, the reader actualises the potential meaning of a text, by purposively selecting
functional structures of the text.30 That is to say, it is the reader who responds to a text,
and actualises its meaning, by situating himself in his chosen contexts of the text. I
apply these two ideas throughout this thesis, to explain the reason of Berlin’s reading
of Rousseau’s notion of freedom, while at the same time defending its plausibility.

29
W. Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins U.P., 1978, p. 123.
30
Ibid., p. 21.

11
The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis sets out Berlin’s theoretical frame of reading Rousseau in three parts. The
first part deals with Berlin’s Account of Human Nature; the second part, Berlin’s
Analysis of Two Types of Freedom, treats his analysis of negative and positive
freedom, – however particularly his examination of positive freedom –; and the third
part attends to Berlin’s Theory of Pluralism.

The above three parts are set out to reflect the inner logic, and the deeper reason, of
Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s freedom, that is, in which manner, and for what reason,
Berlin approaches Rousseau’s notion of freedom through reading Rousseau’s doctrines
of human nature and morality. This approach is formed by Berlin’s preconceptions of
human nature, positive freedom and value pluralism, and these preconceptions lead to
his particular reading of Rousseau. The analysis of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s
notion of freedom in its individual sense is explored and embodied in the first part of
Berlin’s account of human nature, and in the second part of his analysis of negative
and positive freedom.

The fourth part, Drawing Conclusions: The Encounter of Two Minds, comprising
chapters four and five, ‘Berlin’s View of Rousseau’s Moral Presuppositions’,
respectively, ‘Reading Positive Freedom in the Political Sense’, draw the conclusions
from the discussions pursued in the first three parts of the thesis; namely, Berlin’s
account of human nature; his analysis of negative and positive freedom, and his
reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense; and his theory of
pluralism. Drawing on Berlin’s theoretical perspective of pluralism, as examined in
chapter three, chapter four explores Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s thought of morality.
Derived from Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense,
and his reading of Rousseau’s theories of morality, chapter five draws the conclusion
of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its political sense.

12
The Line of Argumentation

The thesis is divided into five chapters. In chapter one, ‘A Critique of Rousseau’s
Idea of Human Nature’, I aim to explore the manner, in which Berlin reads Rousseau’s
notion of human nature, and to detect his reasons for doing so. In the first section,
‘Considering the Act of Reading’, I shall establish the methodology of the thesis,
namely, outlining reader-response theory. In the second section, ‘Examining Berlin’s
Idea of Human Nature’, I shall analyse Berlin’s theory of human nature. This will
provide an outline of the assumptions, which Berlin brings into his reading of
Rousseau. I argue that in Berlin the nature of human beings is intelligible in its
historical and cultural dimensions while history and culture undergo change. I shall
propose that Berlin’s position on human nature is determined by this vision, and that,
in this sense, he views human nature as dynamic and changeable but not fixed.

In section three, ‘Critiquing Fixed Human Nature’, I shall trace the way in which
Berlin reads Rousseau’s theory of human nature, and attempt to answer the question,
why Berlin reads Rousseau the way he does. I shall argue that by applying an ‘inside
view’31 to explore Rousseau’s personality, Berlin connects Rousseau’s notion of
natural man with Rousseau’s personality, and characterises such a notion as fixed, in
the sense of dismissing historical and cultural changes. I shall explore the second
question, as to why Berlin reads Rousseau the way he does, in the light of Gadamer’s
view, that the meaning of a text is a result of the interaction between the reader’s
preconceptions, and the text he is reading.32 I demonstrate that the meaning Berlin
produces of Rousseau’s doctrine of natural man, is filtered through Berlin’s own
theory of human nature. In section three, ‘Critiquing Fixed Human Nature’, I shall
argue that Rousseau’s theory of human nature is not a description of human nature, as
found in reality, but that his notion derives from a hypothesis. I shall propose, that,
viewed in this light, Rousseau’s account of human nature enables us to become aware

31
I. Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’, in H. Hardy (ed.), Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays,
London, Hogarth Press, 1978, p. 168.
32
Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 235.

13
of the distance between the actual human nature, as found in reality and the principles
of human nature, which Rousseau sets up in theory.

In chapter two, ‘Reading Positive Freedom in the Individual Sense’, I aim to

examine how Berlin reads Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense, and to
evaluate whether this reading is open to questioning. In the first section, ‘A
Reconstruction of Rousseau’s Idea of Human Nature’, I shall build upon, and enlarge,
Berlin’s characterisation of Rousseau’s notion of human nature, as laid out in chapter
one, and examine how Berlin interprets the content of this notion, that is, the idea of
natural goodness. I shall argue that Rousseau’s concept of the natural goodness does
not rest within the dimension identified by Berlin, as primitive and simple, but reveals
a deeper level of the origin of humanity, in terms of amour de soi and pitié.

In the second section, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom and the Validity of Their
Distinction’, I shall establish the horizon of Berlin’s understanding, namely, his
analysis of negative freedom and positive freedom, – however I turn particularly to his
examination of the three forms of positive freedom. I shall propose that, on this
horizon, Berlin is able to construct Rousseau’s idea of freedom. In this section I shall
ask two questions; firstly, whether Berlin’s analysis of the idea of positive freedom is
sufficient, to separate it from the concept of negative freedom; and secondly, whether
Berlin’s definition of positive freedom captures this idea effectively.

While drawing on the critic MacCallum, – that negative freedom and positive
freedom can be put into one formula, that is, one is free from any constraint or obstacle
either to do or not to do –,33 I shall argue that Berlin’s formula of negative freedom
differs from the one of positive freedom; assuming that negative freedom has two
elements, – namely, an agent and a constraint, and can be formulated in the way, that
an agent is free from constraint.

With regard to my second question, as to whether Berlin’s definition of positive

freedom captures this idea effectively, I shall draw on Skinner’s view that the three

33
G.C. MacCallum, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’, in D. Miller (ed.), Liberty, p. 102.

14
forms of positive freedom cannot effectively be separated from negative freedom.34
Skinner argues that the first formula, ‘to follow a certain form of life’, fails to be
distinguished from negative freedom, because the phrase ‘being free from constraint’
can be equally changed into the expression ‘being free to do something’.35 I shall
argue that Berlin’s distinction of positive freedom, as ‘to follow a certain form of life’,
from negative freedom is valid, on the grounds that negative freedom is only
concerned with the extent of the opportunity of free action, not with action itself.

With respect to the second formula, according to Skinner’s reading, that the
situation of being one’s own master is that of someone who possesses negative
freedom, – for the phrase ‘being one’s own master, as opposed to being acted upon by
external forces’, can be equally changed into the expression, ‘being in a state free from
external hindrances’ –,36 I shall argue, that we encounter a misunderstanding on
Skinner’s side, since ‘being in a state free from external hindrances’ does not mean
that one is in a state of being one’s own master.

Skinner argues that the third formula, – that the idea of ‘mastering your self’ fails to
be distinguished from negative freedom, since it presupposes that obstacles to acting
freely may be internal; thus to be free is to say ‘free from any internal constraint’, but
when the notion of an internal constraint extends to the range of things that can be
identified with external constraints –,37 I shall suggest that the identification of an
obstacle as either being internal or external depends on the referential bearer. I shall
propose that in the case of positive freedom, it is the agent, who bears his internal
hindrance, while in the case of negative freedom, it is others who impose an obstacle
on the agent. If we were to accept this line of argumentation, then we could say, that
Berlin’s definition of positive freedom as ‘mastering your self’ appears as valid.

In the third section, ‘Deducing Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom in the Individual

Sense’, I shall draw the consequences from my discussions with regard to Berlin’s

34
Q. Skinner, ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’, Proceedings of the British Academy 117: 2001 Lectures, Oxford,
Oxford U.P., 2002, pp. 239-240.
35
Ibid., p. 239.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.

15
reconstruction of Rousseau’s theory of human nature, and his theory of freedom, in
analysing and critiquing Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its
individual sense. Methodologically, in this section, I shall apply Iser’s conception of
‘aesthetic response’,38 to trace the reasons for Berlin’s reading of Rousseau. I shall
propose that Berlin does not anchor his reading of Rousseau’s freedom totally within
the structures of Rousseau’s texts, but that he selectively makes his purposive choice
of certain structures, while at the same time situating his reading of Rousseau’s
freedom within his understanding of positive freedom. I shall argue that, through the
above lens, Berlin’s reader can gain a new insight with regard to his portrait of
Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual sense. I shall propose that this portrait
sacrifices part of the structures of Rousseau’s texts, which may hinder us to see the
logical lines of Rousseau’s way of expressing his idea of freedom, and that it is
perhaps wise to keep the implications in mind, when we approach Rousseau through
Berlin.

With regard to assessing Berlin’s reading, I shall propose that the content of Berlin’s
interpretation of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual sense, – as realising a
rational self –, has a close association with the term of moral freedom used by
Rousseau in the Social Contract.39 I shall argue that moral freedom can be considered
containing two aspects; one aspect requires the strength of will to control one’s passion,
and the ability to shape one’s life based on reason; the other aspect demands certain
moral and political conditions. Since I shall follow here Berlin’s line of reading of
Rousseau’s freedom in the individual sense, I do not intend to examine these
conditions in chapter two, in the frame of ‘Reading Positive Freedom in the Individual
Sense’, but later in chapter five, in the frame of ‘Reading Positive Freedom in the
Political Sense’.

Turning to the discussion of the other aspect, – one’s inner power of acting
according to one’s prescribed rational principles –, I shall argue that the concept of

38
Iser, The Act of Reading, pp. 21-26.
39
J.-J. Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, in D.A. Cress (ed. and trans.), Basic
Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1987, p. 151.

16
reason is crucial in understanding this aspect of Rousseau’s moral freedom; I shall
propose that reason is not only to know things, but to intellectually guide the other
faculties of human nature to develop in a state of harmony and order; that is to say, in a
normative sense, reason ought to guide one’s behaviour in accordance with one’s
conscience. I shall conclude, that Berlin puts aside Rousseau’s emphasis on the
dimension of moral sentiment in shaping the content of freedom, and Rousseau’s
qualification of reason as the faculty to function in line with our moral sentiment,
which purposively restricts Berlin’s interpretation.

Applying the view of reader-response theory, mainly proposed by Gadamer and Iser,
that a text is always read with the reader’s preconceptions,40 and beyond Berlin’s
doctrine of human nature, which I established in the first chapter as one of his
preconceptions, in chapter three I shall examine another preconception Berlin holds in
reading Rousseau. In chapter three, ‘Pluralism – A Second Interpretative Frame’, I aim
to examine Berlin’s three claims of pluralism, and to analyse what distinguishes
pluralism from relativism.

In the first section, ‘Berlin’s First Claim: The Plurality of Values’, I shall propose
that the claim of the plurality of values arises from Berlin’s explanation of Vico’s
method of ‘imaginative insight’,41 and Herder’s emphasis on the distinctiveness of
each culture;42 and I shall attempt to evaluate the scope and the limitation of such a
claim. I am aware that other writers, especially Alexander Herzen, were influential on
Berlin's thought. However, that influence was political rather than theoretical, and so
this thesis does not engage with Herzen's writings.

I shall argue that Berlin’s thesis of the plurality of values develops from his reading
of cultural pluralism in Vico, as one important aspect of the knowledge of the past.43 I
shall be following the notion of cultural pluralism in its three aspects; firstly,
concerning a plurality of values; secondly, proposing that each culture should be

40
Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 263; Jauss, Towards an Aesthetic of Reception, p. 23.
41
I. Berlin, ‘Giambattista Vico and Cultural History’, in H. Hardy (ed.), The Crooked Timber of Humanity, London,
John Murray, 1990, p. 59.
42
I. Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, in H. Hardy (ed.), The Proper Study of Mankind, p. 359.
43
Berlin, ‘Giambattista Vico and Cultural History’, pp. 59-60.

17
viewed as centred on certain core values; and thirdly, maintaining that each culture
should be regarded as the expression of these values. However, I shall also consider
the fact, that Berlin’s notion of the plurality of values could be seen as anchored in
Herder’s thinking, in the sense, that Herder’s belief in situating our thought, and
exercising sympathetic insight, leads him to his articulation of cultural
distinctiveness.44

Further, I shall argue that Berlin’s notion of the plurality of values should not be
read as generalising an empirical fact, but as having an inner connection with the
nature of human beings, as well as manifesting the nature of the psychological world.
Finally, I point to the limitation of Berlin’s claim of the plurality of values, in that it
needs to be evaluated as generic, since it does not specify the number or the substance
of values; thus, as I shall propose, we cannot use such a claim to evaluate whether a
cultural practice bears an intrinsic value or not.

In section two, ‘Berlin’s Justification: The Objectivity of Values’, I shall examine

how Berlin proves the objectivity of values with the help of the concept of ‘human
horizon’,45 and the notion of a ‘central core’ of values;46 and I shall also raise the
question, whether Berlin’s argument may be called sufficient to prove the universality
of values. In the sense that the concept of ‘human horizon’ proposes the idea that
people’s understanding forms a boundary for accepting or rejecting certain human
behaviours, I shall argue that such a concept cannot prove the objectivity of values
specifically, but can merely draw a boundary within the wider frame of value pluralism.
With regard to the notion of ‘a central core’ of values, as meaning that certain values
are shared by all human beings regardless of the cultural differences, I shall argue that
such a notion is not sufficient to prove values as objective, for commonality differs
from objectivity.

44
Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 359.
45
I. Berlin, ‘Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought’, in H. Hardy (ed.), The Crooked Timber
of Humanity, p. 80.
46
G. Crowder and H. Hardy, ‘Appendix: Berlin’s Universal Values - Core or Horizon?’, in G. Crowder and H.
Hardy (eds.), The One and the Many, pp. 293-295.

18
 In section three, ‘Berlin’s Second Claim of Conflict of Values and Third Claim of
Incommensurability of Values’, I shall examine, firstly, how Berlin’s thesis of the
conflict of values emerges from his readings of Vico and Herder, and secondly, how
Berlin distinguishes pluralism from relativism through his assessments of Vico and
Herder’s thoughts. Regarding the first issue, I shall propose that Berlin’s notion of the
nature of values emerges in the context of Vico’s theory of historical coherence,47 –
where history is shown as an unfolding mental process of contradiction, representation
and development –, which in turn leads to the two claims of Berlin’s theory of
pluralism, namely, the conflict of values, and the incommensurability of values.

On the other hand, I shall propose that Berlin’s thesis of the incommensurability of
values can be considered as derived from his portrait of Herder, in the sense that a
culture cannot only be viewed as an expression of a certain type of personality, but as a
manifestation of certain values;48 thus, the uniqueness and difference rooted in
cultures lead to the definition of the idea of the incommensurability of values, and this
in turn, as I shall argue, establishes the third claim in Berlin’s theory of pluralism. I
shall propose that the second claim of pluralism concerning the idea that values
conflict can be derived from the third thesis of the incommensurability of values, – that
is, that cultures can coexist with one and another, while their embodied values may
conflict.

Regarding the second issue, ‘Berlin’s Second Claim of Conflict of Values and Third
Claim of Incommensurability of Values’, namely, as to how Berlin distinguishes
pluralism from relativism through his assessments of Vico and Herder’s thoughts, I
shall propose that Berlin’s portrait of Vico and Herder can be viewed as non-empiricist;
accordingly, I shall argue that Berlin wishes to find a middle ground between the
‘knowledge of the ought’49 and relativism, which determines the unsettling nature of
his theory of pluralism.

47
I. Berlin, ‘Vico and the Ideal of the Enlightenment’, in H. Hardy (ed.), Against the Current: Essays in the History
of Ideas, London, Hogarth Press, 1979, p. 122.
48
Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 368.
49
L. Strauss, ‘Relativism’, in H. Schoeck and J.W. Wiggins (eds.), Relativism and the Study of Man, Princeton, Van
Nostrand,1961, p. 136.

19
 In the fourth part of the thesis, comprising chapters four and five, ‘Berlin’s View of
Rousseau’s Moral Presuppositions’, respectively, ‘Reading Positive Freedom in the
Political Sense’, I shall draw the conclusions from the discussions pursued in the first
three parts of the thesis, namely, Berlin’s account of human nature, his analysis of
negative and positive freedom, and his theory of pluralism.

Once I have established Berlin’s theory of pluralism, that demonstrates the process
of his reading of Rousseau’s moral ideas, I aim to explore in chapter four, ‘Berlin’s
View of Rousseau’s Moral Presuppositions’, how Berlin reads Rousseau’s moral
thought, and I shall attempt to assess this reading. In terms of the manner of Berlin’s
reading, I shall apply Gadamer’s insight regarding the reading process, where readers’
presuppositions shape the method with which they approach the relevant idea in a text,
and thus determine the production of meaning, as filtered through the readers’
understanding.50 I shall propose that Berlin, with his conceptual framework of
pluralism, approaches Rousseau’s moral thought with the measure of two dimensions,
namely, firstly, whether Rousseau’s moral thought is plural or monistic; secondly,
whether Rousseau holds the view that values are conflicting or not, and whether he
holds the idea that values can be ranked or not.

In section one, ‘Rousseau as a Utopian Moralist’, I shall examine the first dimension,
and in sections two and three, ‘An Assumed Harmony of Values’, respectively,
‘Individual Freedom: A Supreme Value’, I shall address the second dimension.
Regarding the first dimension, I shall propose, that Berlin characterises the nature of
Rousseau’s moral thought through his identification of the three assumptions of
monism, rather than systematically unpacking the character of Rousseau’s moral
thought. I shall argue that this reading provides a purposively generalised picture of
Rousseau’s text. Turning to Rousseau’s texts, I shall propose that Rousseau’s moral
thought can be considered as containing at least two principal layers, namely, the
normative and the empirical, and that the normative aspect should be viewed as

50
Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 9.

20
manifesting its monistic nature, whereas the empirical aspect should be regarded as
demonstrating a plural dimension.

Still considering Berlin’s conceptual framework of pluralism, regarding the second

dimension of Berlin’s approach to Rousseau’s moral thought, whether Rousseau holds
the view that values are conflicting or not, and whether he holds the idea, that values
can be ranked or not, I shall suggest that Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau as a value
harmonist can be considered along two lines; firstly, that Berlin can be viewed as
selectively emphasizing some aspects of Rousseau’s moral thought, which serve
Berlin’s interpretative purpose; secondly, that Berlin can be considered as choosing his
specific perspective, which delivers a distinct view of Berlin’s encounter with
Rousseau’s moral thought. By applying Gadamer’s insight of the production of
meaning, – as a fusion of the reader’s fore-meaning with the ‘horizon of the
understanding’ of the text, I shall demonstrate that Berlin’s assessment of Rousseau’s
moral thought can be considered as reasonable, since, in my view, Rousseau promotes
a kind of value-harmonious state in his political treatise, but I shall argue that
Rousseau’s notion of the relationship between normative values should be regarded,
nevertheless, as more complex than Berlin’s reading allows for, that is, that Rousseau
also views values as conflicting.

In the third section, ‘Individual Freedom: A Supreme Value’, I shall address the
question, how Berlin reads Rousseau as the one who ranks freedom in its individual
sense as the highest value, and I shall attempt to assess such a reading. Considering
that Berlin offers two arguments to prove his evaluation of Rousseau’s ranking of
freedom, the first argument in the form of an assessment, the second delivered through
the connection of freedom with being human, I shall propose that Berlin’s argument
for Rousseau’s reasons to rank the value of freedom, should be considered as a
consisting building of meaning, based on his characterisation of the nature of
Rousseau’s moral thought. However, I shall contend that Berlin’s portrait is presented
in a non-persuasive manner, since Rousseau can be viewed as proving that the value of

21
freedom is connected to the freedom of will, and to morality, which, in my reading,
appears more subtle and complex.

In chapter five, ‘Reading Positive Freedom in a Political Sense’, I shall aim to

examine how Berlin reads Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its political sense, and to
assess his reading. Specifically, in this chapter I shall discuss three issues, namely,
‘The Problematic of the State of Nature’; in the second section, ‘The Principle of
Solution: The General Will’, Rousseau’s proposed solution in the form of the general
will; and ‘Positive Freedom in Its Political Sense’ in the third and concluding section.

Regarding the first issue, the problematic of the state of nature, I shall propose that
Berlin’s exposition can be considered as containing two layers, that is, the conflict
between individual freedoms among people, and the contradiction between individual
freedom and political power. I shall argue that both layers can be read as capturing the
essential issue, as presented by Rousseau, but both appear to discard the contextual
setting of the problematic, namely, that for Rousseau the conflict between individual
freedoms, as I read it, arises on the background of the conflicting state of nature, and
that the problematic between freedom and authority, as I read it, emerges in the context
of Rousseau’s rejection of legitimating the existing material and moral inequalities in
the state of conflict. I shall also argue that Berlin deliberately leaves aside the other
aspect of the problematic, that is, the psychological and moral injuries diagnosed by
Rousseau, which can be considered as offering a psychological perspective of
understanding Rousseau’s notion of the general will.

Regarding the second issue, namely, Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s proposed

solution in the form of the general will, I shall argue that Berlin can be viewed as
proposing two ways of reading Rousseau’s idea; firstly, that the general will should be
imagined to combine the value of freedom in its individual sense, and the value of
authority; secondly, that the general will should be viewed as a compound, made up of
each individual’s rational will, which in turn represents the common good of a society.

Applying Gadamer’s insight – that the production of meaning in a text is a blend

between the reader’s preconceptions and the ideas embodied in the text –, to Berlin’s

22
reading of the first aspect of Rousseau’s notion of the general will, I shall argue that
Berlin’s preconceived ideas play a dominant role, in that he does not compromise his
theoretical position when confronted with Rousseau’s ideas. I shall propose that in this
manner, the meaning Berlin produces through reading Rousseau’s texts is filtered
through Berlin’s theoretical lens, which puts aside Rousseau’s concern with offering
the idea of general will as a cure for man’s deficiencies.

In terms of the second aspect of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of the general
will, I shall argue that it needs to be situated in the context of Berlin’s reading of
Rousseau’s theory of human nature, which demonstrates a ‘consistency-building’ of
meaning,51 but arguably fails to do full justice to the depth of Rousseau’s thought,
specifically Rousseau’s subtle and complex consideration of the concept of will.

Regarding the third issue, namely, Berlin’s examination of the inner logic of
Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its political sense, I shall contend that Berlin reads
this idea as the suppression of individual freedom. In the perspective of taking Berlin
as reader, I shall argue, that Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its
political sense should be viewed as a purposive construction of meaning; and that this
reading unfolds the implicit connection between Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion
of positive freedom in its individual dimension, and the one in a collective dimension,
namely, through Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s moral thought and its expression
of the idea of the general will. I shall argue that this reading in fact examines the
question, how to realize the general will, but, purposively, does not enter into the
subtle meaning of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its political sense. I shall propose
that in Rousseau, the notion of civil freedom should be viewed both as negative
freedom and also as positive freedom; more specifically, the positive aspect of civil
freedom in Rousseau’s political philosophy should be considered as a sufficient
condition for negative freedom.

51
Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 123.

23
Expected Outcomes

The thesis has three expected outcomes. In the first place, by applying
reader-response theory, the thesis aims to demonstrate the inner logic of Berlin’s
reading of Rousseau’s freedom in its individual and its political sense.

In the second place, assuming Berlin’s position, and taking into consideration the
historical context of his intellectual growth, and his personal experience, the thesis
expects to explain the plausibility of Berlin’s reading; that is, the approach Berlin takes
in reading Rousseau, unfolds the inner tension of Rousseau’s doctrine of freedom, and
the possible abuse and distortion, when this doctrine is applied to reality.

Finally, by exploring Rousseau’s texts, in particular, the ‘Second Discourse’ and the
Social Contract, and following the logic of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of
freedom, the thesis attempts to lay open what Berlin has left aside in his reading, and
thus to demonstrate that Rousseau’s concept of freedom in its individual and political
senses appears as arguably more complex and subtle than Berlin’s portrait allows for.
In particular, by demonstrating that Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual
sense should be considered as based on Rousseau’s doctrine of human nature, the
thesis attempts to achieve the outcome, that Berlin’s theoretical perspective of his
understanding of positive freedom impacts on the way, he assimilates Rousseau’s idea
of freedom; what Berlin actualises as the potential meaning in Rousseau’s texts
through his reading process, ought to be read as much as telling his story about
positive freedom, as telling Rousseau’s.

By demonstrating that Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of political freedom

should be considered as built upon his reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its
individual sense, Rousseau’s ideas of morality and the general will, and by qualifying
the terms of the social contract and the notion of the general will in Rousseau’s Social
Contract, the thesis attempts to maintain the conclusion that Rousseau’s idea of
freedom in its political sense should be read as containing both a positive and a

24
negative aspect, which markedly differs from Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau as a thinker
holding up positive freedom.

25
Part One: Berlin’s Account of Human Nature
Chapter One:

A Critique of Rousseau’s Idea of Human Nature

In Berlin’s view, Rousseau’s idea of human nature reflects the tradition of rationalist

thought, because it holds that the nature of human being is fixed,1 which is a view

worthy reflecting on. However, Rousseau’s thought on human nature never becomes a

positive force in determining Berlin’s view of human nature. To the contrary,

Rousseau’s understanding of the notion serves as a mirror, that Berlin uses to reflect

on the plausibility of viewing human nature as fixed, which in turn deepens Berlin’s

own position. So as to answer, how and why Berlin reads Rousseau’s notion of human

nature, I draw on reader-response theory as methodology, and turn to two important

influences on Berlin’s thinking about human nature, – that is, Vico’s ‘philosophy of

man’,2 and Herder’s idea of cultural pluralism.3

1.1 Examining Berlin’s Idea of Human Nature

1.1.1 Considering the Act of Reading: Gadamer and Jauss

Before I enter the discussion of these two influences on Berlin’s thought, and how

and why Berlin reads Rousseau’s notion of human nature, I shall reflect on the process

of reading texts, by turning to Gadamer and Jauss, as proponents of the methodology I

am employing. Reading is a process of interaction between the reader and the author; a

text is always read with the reader’s preconceptions, because the conditions under

which the text is produced are no longer those under which the reader later comes

across the text.4 In other words, the reader’s encounter with the text involves historical

and socio-political transactions, with the difference of time, space, and the change of

1
I. Berlin, ‘A Letter on Human Nature’, in B. Polanowska-Sygulska, Unfinished Dialogue: Sir Isaiah Berlin and
Polanowska-Sygulska, New York, Prometheus Books, 2006, pp. 41-42.
2
I. Berlin, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas, London, Hogarth Press, 1976, p. 29.
3
Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 368.
4
Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 263.

25
values. In such a trans-cultural and trans-historical procedure, it is unavoidable, that

the reader – consciously and unconsciously – brings his presuppositions of certain

ideas to the text, because his presuppositions are formed in the first place by his own

historical and social locations.

The kind of meaning in the text emerges from the above encounter. Jauss, reflecting

on the problematic of the reception of texts, and of reading texts as such, has the view

that a text is always read with the reader’s stored knowledge, his familiar experience,

and his feelings.5 From the perspective of the reader, the possibility of reading and

understanding is defined, and limited, by the horizon of his existing knowledge and

values. In my view, this does not imply that the reader is unfaithful to the text, on the

grounds, that he is not in total control of his existing knowledge and values – formed

by his specific historical and the cultural contexts –, rather, it emphasises the

indeterminacy of a text, the possibilities, and the limits, of reading and understanding.

Although reader-response theory does not necessarily imply that the reader is

unfaithful to the text, in my analysis of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau, I try to

demonstrate that his reading is unfaithful and misses some important aspects of

Rousseau’s thought.

I am returning now to my earlier questions, with regard to Berlin’s interaction with

Rousseau’s thought, with these methodological points in mind. Rather than responding

to Rousseau’s idea of human nature negatively, Berlin’s engagement with Rousseau is

an active interaction, – that is to say, as a reader he brings his preconceived idea of

human nature to the encounter with the written texts, that Rousseau produced almost

three hundred years ago. In this way, meaning is produced from this encounter. To

underline this approach, I draw on Gadamer, who methodologically describes the

interaction between reader and text as a ‘hermeneutic circle’,6 where the meaning of

the text is understood as openness, in the sense, that we place the other meaning – the

meaning of the text – in a relation to the whole of our own meanings or ourselves in a

5
Jauss, Towards an Aesthetic of Reception, p. 23.
6
Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 261.

26
relation to it.7 Thus to understand, how Berlin reads Rousseau’s theory of human

nature, and why he reads this theory in the way he does, one must contemplate on how
8
this reading emerges from the horizon of his understanding of human nature; this

forms the first ‘hermeneutic circle’ of Berlin’s encounter with Rousseau, from which

the meaning of Berlin’s characterisation of the nature of Rousseau’s doctrine of human

nature emerges.

With these two purposes in mind, i.e. the how and why of Berlin’s reading, the first

section in this chapter, approaches Berlin’s theory of human nature. This will provide

an outline of the assumptions which Berlin brings into his reading of Rousseau. The

second section traces the way in which Berlin reads Rousseau’s theory of human

nature, and answers the question, why Berlin reads Rousseau in the way he does. This

in turn then will lead me to evaluate the outcome of Berlin’s reading process.

1.1.2 A Changeable View of Human Nature

In Berlin’s system of political and philosophical thought, his theory of human nature

is of central importance. For one reason, it supports the theory of value pluralism,9 and

is an important factor that distinguishes value pluralism from ethical relativism.10 For

another reason, it is the theoretical starting point from which Berlin reads Rousseau’s

idea of liberty. Thus, an examination of Berlin’s theory of human nature provides a

salient clue to his reading of Rousseau. The most relevant point to Berlin’s reading of

Rousseau is answering the question of the theoretical foundation of its formulation,

and then defining its characteristics.

7
Ibid., p. 238.
8
I am aware, that Vico and Herder are not the exclusive sources, which shape Berlin’s ‘prejudices’ of reading
Rousseau, but they are the main sources, that form Berlin’s notion of human nature. Berlin’s notion of freedom, of
pluralism and his experience with twentieth-century totalitarianism, are other dominant sources, that define his
reading ‘prejudices’. I will draw on these sources, respectively, in the following chapters.
9
‘Value pluralism’, as a theory, is developed by Berlin mainly through his reading of Vico and Herder. It contains
two core ideas: that there is a plurality of values, and that values are incommensurable. This theory will later be
discussed in detail.
10
‘Ethical relativism’ is a theory, that views morality in a normative sense and argues, that moral judgement is
illegitimate, because what is actually right, varies in different societies. For a detailed commentary of relativism, see
P.W. Taylor, Principles of Ethics: An Introduction, Belmont, Wadsworth, 1975, pp. 38-39.

27
 Berlin’s specific manner of reading Rousseau can be gleaned from some of his

writings. In the essay, ‘The Purpose of Philosophy’, Berlin argues that the study of

human nature cannot be attained by the approach of positivism, or answered from a

priori.11 In his view, as stated by Berlin in ‘Empirical Propositions’, the nature of

human society is rooted in ordinary life, which is illogical most of the time, but, on the

other hand, makes life meaningful.12 Experience in the sense of positivism is

experience which can only be testified by experiment; however, what Berlin means by

experience differs from this positivist sense. Ordinary experience, in Berlin’s view, is

‘vagueness’, ‘indefiniteness’, and ‘ambiguity’;13 his theory of human nature is in the

first place defined on this level.

The basic categories (with their corresponding concepts) in terms of which we

define men – such notions as society, freedom, sense of time and change, suffering,
happiness, productivity, good and bad, right and wrong, choice, effort, truth, illusion
(to take them wholly at random) are not matters of induction and hypothesis. To
think of someone as a human being is ipso facto to bring all these notions into
play.14

The above passage demonstrates Berlin’s view of human nature in at least two

aspects. On the one hand, human nature is expressed in the realm of ordinary

experience. This realm is a world contained in categories and concepts of values,

choices, and needs. These categories are not exclusively empirical, but a mixture of

normative and empirical categories; and they are defined, in the first place, on a

conventional level. So, once the nature of human beings is understood in the

conventional dimension, its nature is alterable, for the reason that social conventions

change in reality. On the other hand, the nature of human beings is embodied in its

specific historical and social contexts. The kind of terms we use to define the nature of

human beings has its specific meaning in its contexts; therefore, to characterise human

nature is to bring historical and social factors into consideration, but not to start from a

priori, which separates certain parts of these factors, or ignores these factors. Once the

11
I. Berlin, ‘The Purpose of Philosophy’, in H. Hardy (ed.), Concepts and Categories, pp. 7-9.
12
I. Berlin, ‘Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical Statements’, in H. Hardy (ed.), Concepts and Categories, p. 34.
13
I. Berlin, ‘Verification’, in H. Hardy (ed.), Concepts and Categories, p. 13.
14
Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’, p. 166.

28
contexts change, the terms we use to define human nature change. With regard then to

the two essays by Berlin, ‘The Purpose of Philosophy’ and ‘Empirical Propositions’, a

shift from a positivist to an empiricist thinking can be observed.

Now I am turning to the two major influences on Berlin, the eighteenth-century

Italian professor of Latin eloquence and jurisprudence, political philosopher and

historian, Giambattista Vico, and the German eighteenth-century philosopher,

theologian, and literary critic, Johann Gottfried Herder, as indicated before, to further

clarify Berlin’s position. In the essay, ‘My Intellectual Path’, Berlin states, that Vico’s

idea of ‘philosophy of man’, and Herder’s theory of cultural pluralism, underwrite his

notion of the nature of human beings.15 According to Berlin, Vico’s ‘philosophy of

man’ is the view that human nature does not have a static kernel. Human beings are

creators of their history, and actors that change history, according to the transformation

of their physical and spiritual needs through time and place.16 In other words, human

nature is not identical with a central kernel; it manifests itself through change.

From Vico’s notion of ‘philosophy of man’, Berlin deduces that human nature alters,

as history changes, and the positive role that human beings play in changing history.

Thus Berlin concludes that:

[…] to leave out history is to render the model of man too remote from reality to be
of use. When, in addition, the plasticity of men, and especially their capacity for
transforming themselves by their own creative activity, is omitted from the model, it
becomes a caricature, and if applied to reality, leads only to errors and absurdities.17

This passage shows Berlin’s view of human nature from a historical aspect. To think

of human nature, is to bring history into consideration. On the other hand, Berlin adds

creativity to the model of human nature, – that is to say, human beings have the

capacity to change their history, which is a relevant feature of human nature.

On the other hand, Herder’s notion of a diversity of cultures also forms Berlin’s idea

of the nature of human beings. Berlin views Herder as one of the first philosophers to

15
I. Berlin, ‘My Intellectual Path’, in H. Hardy (ed.), The Power of Ideas, New Jersey, Princeton U.P., 1978, pp. 7-9.
16
Berlin, Vico and Herder, p. xvi.
17
Ibid., p. 39.

29
recognise the existence of a diversity of cultures in history; each culture is the

expression of the quality of the personalities of its members. Thus, he states that:

[…] the way in which Germans spoke or dressed or moved had more in common
with the way in which they built their cathedrals or organised their civic lives – a
central German essence, as it were, an identifiable pattern and quality – than it had
with analogous activities among inhabitants of China or Peru.18

The above passage demonstrates Berlin’s point of view of human nature from a

cultural aspect. Through expounding Herder, Berlin shows that each form of culture is

reasonable in its specific time and space, and differs from other forms of cultures. This

diversity suggests that people live differently, and live for different purposes at

different times and places. From the notion of the variety of cultures, Berlin draws the

claim that human nature is culturally formed.

What conclusions, then, can we draw from these reflections by Berlin on Vico and

Herder, and, – in particular –, how does this set the scene for Berlin’s own position

with respect to the nature of human beings? The nature of human beings is intelligible

in its historical and cultural dimensions, and in this sense, cultural differences shaped

in historical contexts become more important than cultural similarities. Moreover,

history and culture change, thus to view human nature in its historical and cultural

dimensions, one ought to take the changes into consideration. Berlin’s position on

human nature is determined by the above two reflections; he views human nature as

dynamic, changeable and creative, but not fixed in history and culture.

However, there is a problem in Berlin’s position of human nature: if the nature of

human beings changes, and becomes diverse through history and culture, then do

human beings have some qualities, which distinguish them from animals? To answer

this question is important, because, if human nature changes through history and

culture, and varies in different historical and cultural contexts, then this implies, that

human nature does not share certain common features; – thus, human beings cannot

have a shared standard used in moral judgement among cultures. Also, if Berlin does

18
I. Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, in H. Hardy (ed.), The Crooked Timber of Humanity, p. 10.

30
not have a theory of what constitutes human nature as common, his account of human

nature would be a purely empirical account. As I have indicated before, the basic

categories and concepts, Berlin uses in defining human nature, are neither empirical

nor formal; – they neither start from a priori nor a posteriori. In other words, though

Berlin holds the view that historical and social context shape the nature of human

beings, we cannot infer that he has the view that the nature of human beings is totally

bound to its specific context. On the contrary, this only comprises one facet of his

theory of human nature.

To answer the above query, I shall first turn to Berlin’s discussion of a common

human nature, and then to some major modern critics of Berlin, namely, Kocis,

Jahanbegloo, Mali, and Gray. To draw here on Berlin’s essay, ‘Does Political Theory

Still Exist?’, the following thoughts reveal his position with regard to a common

human nature:

This will hold of values too (among them political ones) in terms of which men are
defined. Thus if I say of someone that he is kind or cruel, loves truth or is indifferent
to it, he remains human in either case. But if I find a man to whom it literally makes
no difference whether he kicks a pebble or kills his family, since either would be an
antidote to ennui or inactivity, I shall not be disposed, like consistent relativists, to
attribute to him merely a different code of morality from my own or that of most
men, or declare that we do not agree on essentials, but shall begin to speak of
insanity and inhumanity; I shall be inclined to consider him mad; which is a way of
saying that I do not regard such a being as being fully a man at all. It is cases of this
kind, which seem to make it clear that ability to recognise universal – or almost
universal – values into our analysis of such fundamental concepts as ‘man’,
‘rational’, ‘sane’, ‘natural’ etc.19

The above passage demonstrates that, apart from addressing the point of view that

human nature is diverse and alterable, Berlin’s theory of human nature contains

another facet, which shows, that there is a common human nature, which is universal

in different cultural and historical settings. As Berlin states with regard to the idea of

human nature, value judgement must prevail over discussion; he seems to think, in my

view, that we have a natural repugnance towards certain behaviour, such as a man who

19
Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’, p. 166.

31
is indifferent to either killing his family or kicking a pebble, otherwise there would be

no essential difference between human beings and animals.

Moreover, Berlin has the view, drawing here on his essays, ‘Giambattista Vico’ and

‘The Concept of Scientific History’, that a common human nature is defined, in the

first place, as sharing a common moral sentiment about what is right and what is

wrong among human beings; – the sentiment is innate and universal, it comes before

any rational moral judgement.20 In other words, if we do not assume a common moral

sentiment, it is impossible to understand others’ behaviour. To make sense of our

experience, we seem to need an a priori ground. The common moral sentiment is a

most spontaneous sentiment; and it enables us to take up other people’s position, and

to understand from the perspective of sentiment, and not, in the first place, of reason.

Now I turn to the critic Kocis, who focuses on the common nature of human beings

with regard to the notion of Natural Law within Berlin’s political philosophy. Kocis

characterises the common nature of human beings as a priori grounds, rather than

defining the a priori grounds in terms of rationality. He defines these grounds as

universal moral experiences: ‘the external and universal prescriptives of (say) Natural

Law are not the universals of ethics (simply) but rather the universals of psychology.’21

In other words, the way we sense and feel are a priori grounds, and they serve as one

of the moral criteria of judgement. While, in my view, Kocis has captured the

psychological dimension of Berlin’s idea of a common human nature, he only points

out one aspect of what constitutes the psychological dimension; there are other aspects.

To further clarify Berlin’s position, I shall draw on a dialogical source which affords

specific authenticity. In a conversation with Jahanbegloo, Berlin states that our natural

repugnance occurs when communication breaks down. If we try to understand the

plausibility of a kind of behaviour with empathy by an effort of imagination, we still

fail to understand its intelligibility. In such a situation, we would regard such

20
Berlin, ‘Giambattista Vico and Cultural History’, p. 58; I. Berlin, ‘The Concept of Scientific History’, in H. Hardy
(ed.), Concepts and Categories, p. 139.
21
R. Kocis, A Critical Appraisal of Sir Isaiah Berlin’s Political Philosophy, Lewiston, E. Mellen Press, 1989, p. 93.

32
behaviour as inhuman.22 Our moral sentiment about right and wrong forms the other

part of the psychological dimension of a common human nature; when it breaks down,

we would not assume such behaviour as human, because we cannot fill the gap by our

most spontaneous and universal moral sentiment. To conclude, apart from Berlin’s

view, that human nature varies and changes, he concedes, that there is a common

human nature, – with this view constituting the other facet of his theory of human

nature.

In my view, moral sentiment is subjective, – and it may differ from one person to

another –, thus could be inaccurate, when it judges alone. Berlin does not fail to realise

this. Apart from addressing the point, that we, as human beings, share common moral

experiences and moral sentiments, Berlin also brings the rationality of human thinking

into his discussion of a common human nature. In order to illustrate what Berlin means

by the rationality of human thinking, I turn to his comments on Kant in ‘Does Political

Theory Still Exist?’

Berlin discusses Kant’s distinction between ‘questions of facts’ and ‘questions about

the patterns in which these facts presented themselves to us’. Berlin explains

‘questions of facts’ as ‘the data of experiences as it were, the things, persons, events,

qualities, relations, that we observed or inferred or thought about.’23 The questions of

facts refer to questions that can be answered through observation. In terms of

‘questions about the patterns in which these facts presented themselves to us’, they

refer to ‘the categories in terms of which we sensed and imagined and reflected on

them (facts).’24 The patterns, in which facts are presented to us, are the methods with

which we organise, observe and contemplate facts. From the above distinction, Berlin

infers that certain basic ‘concepts and categories’ of human existence are ‘questions

about the patterns in which facts presented themselves to us’, – and they must prevail

for us to preserve a common human nature. These ‘concepts and categories’ are the

22
I. Berlin and R. Jahanbegloo, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin, London, Halban, 1992, pp. 104-105.
23
Berlin, ‘The Purpose of Philosophy’, p. 7.
24
Ibid.

33
patterns through which we organise our thinking and act accordingly.25 As I have

indicated before, in discussing Berlin’s view of human nature as diverse and alterable,

these ‘concepts and categories’ are concepts and categories in terms of defining human

nature, they are the concepts of value, choice and need. These ‘concepts and

categories’ are innate, and form a common ground among human beings, if we are to

have knowledge of cultural life, and understand other forms of cultural life.

To clarify Berlin’s reading of ‘concepts and categories’ further, I turn to another

critic, who, in my view, offers a plausible understanding. Mali views Berlin in the

context of Vico, which sets up the framework of Berlin’s position of Counter-

Enlightenment. Mali points out that the ‘concepts and categories’ in Berlin are similar

to those in Vico’s lexicon. According to Mali, Vico observes, that certain absolute

principles prevail among nations, – underneath the differences of appearance in these

nations. These principles are established based on certain natural and common

tendencies in human beings, such as the tendencies of having some religion,

contracting solemn marriage, and burying the dead.26 In Berlin, the natural and

common tendencies presuppose the existence of certain basic ‘concepts and categories’

of human experience, rendering our knowledge of human affairs possible. Berlin

claims that these tendencies are relevant to experience, but different from experience.

At this point of my query, it becomes obvious that Berlin’s position on the nature of

human beings involves several at times competing, if not contradictory, aspects which

need further exploration.

To conclude this first part of the chapter, dealing with the exploration of Berlin’s

theory of human nature, – with the aim of examining the theoretical foundation of its

formulation, and then defining its characteristics –, I shall draw on a comment from

Berlin’s essay, ‘A Letter on Human Nature’, which attempts to tease out the double

nature of the problematic. In Berlin’s view, the characteristics of the common nature of

25
Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’, pp. 162-163.
26
J. Mali, ‘Berlin, Vico and The Principles of Humanity’, in R. Wokler and J. Mali (eds.), Isaiah Berlin’s Counter-
Enlightenment, pp. 65-67.

34
human beings as alterable, is best understood in the light of Wittgenstein’s concept of

‘family face’.27 According to Berlin, there is not a ‘central face’ in Wittgenstein’s

concept of ‘family face’, but ‘family face’ is an identifiable modification of different

faces. The identifiable modification derives from the resemblances among one and

another. By analogy, the ‘concepts and categories’ of existence among human beings

are identifiable modifications.28 This identity determines the range within which

various forms of existence can be recognised as human. This then shows that the

‘concepts and categories’ in Berlin’s theory of a common human nature are not

Kantian categories of time and space, – which are viewed by Kant as fixed principles

for the possibility of the knowledge of the physical world. To the contrary, these

‘concepts and categories’ are subject to change.

If it is thought in this way, the critic Gray claims that the ‘concepts and categories’

of human experience are neither determined in some specific content, nor are they

conceptually fixed, but are something existing between the two.29 To conclude my

observations, it can be said, that Berlin’s thought about human nature – between a

priori and a posteriori – is mixed with sociological and historical statements, and

psychological insight. The ‘concepts and categories’ of human experience in Berlin are

prior to experience, and relevant to experience, because Berlin emphasises the innate

characteristic of the ‘concepts and categories’; our natural notions about right and

wrong, as stated by Berlin, will not allow us to be indifferent to a person who views

killing his family as kicking a pebble.30 These notions about right and wrong are

different from some notions we gain from mere experience, but relevant to the

knowledge of experience, because intuitive moral judgements, as stated by Berlin in

‘The Concept of Scientific History’, are based on a contextual understanding of action

and sentiment.31 Berlin places the emphasis on the ability to transfer ourselves by

imagination to the world of others; by means of this transference we can understand

27
Berlin, ‘A Letter on Human Nature’, pp. 38-39.
28
Ibid.
29
J. Gray, Isaiah Berlin, Princeton, Princeton U.P., 1996, p. 69.
30
Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’, p. 166.
31
Berlin, ‘The Concept of Scientific History’, p. 139.

35
the actions of others from their perspective with empathy. The purpose of this is that

we try to direct our effort, in order to understand the historical and cultural conditions

of context. To conclude, Berlin does not only think that human nature is changeable

and dynamic, but he also claims that there is a common nature shared by all human

beings, – namely, human beings share similar moral sentiments, and have similar

‘concepts and categories’.

1.2 Critiquing Fixed Human Nature in Rousseau

1.2.1 A Reading of the Inner World

In the first section of this chapter, I have explored Berlin’s theory of human

nature and its characteristics. This provides an outline of the assumptions which

Berlin brings into his reading of Rousseau. Now I am turning to section two, which

traces the way Berlin defines the nature of Rousseau’s theory of human nature, and

concerns answering the question, why Berlin reads Rousseau in the specific way he

does. This in turn then will lead me to evaluating the outcome of Berlin’s reading

process.

According to Berlin’s theory of the nature of human beings, the human mind

undergoes changes; thus to examine history, one must take the point of view of its

maker. Berlin believes, as stated in ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’, that the world

of written texts belongs to the realm of past experience; the written texts produced by

an author are based on the kind of experience intrinsic to him. With imagination and

empathy, the understanding reader needs to penetrate into the author’s inner world, and

his historical and social conditions, to examine the instigating motives and the

prevailing historical and social conditions, from which the meaning of the texts might

emerge.32 Berlin adopts what can be called an ‘insight view’ to a thinker’s world of

experience, which implies a focus on the world of written texts; Berlin integrates both

32
Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’, p. 168.

36
facets, and thus he is able to grasp the connection between the activity of the author’s

inner world and the ideas the author produces, as well as the influence of the author’s

historical and social contexts on the formulation of his ideas.

This method of studying a thinker’s idea enables the writer to present the idea

through an effort of exposing the person’s intention and emotion, – in particular, the

kind of experience which is genuine to the person. Such a method turns the focus from

the study of the history of an idea as textual interpretation, to the study of the text and

its connection with the kind of experiences intrinsic to an author’s life, and the kind of

genuine feelings and intentions evoked by the author’s life experience. By putting

oneself into the author’s position through an effort of imagination and empathy, the

reader may form an intelligible and respectful communication with the author.

By employing an ‘insight view’, Berlin tries to bring forth Rousseau’s motives and

intentions in producing the notion of natural man; consequently, Rousseau is depicted

by Berlin as eccentric, and shown in a resentful light. Berlin has a remarkable passage

expressing his attitude towards the nature of Rousseau’s inner world, which is vividly

presented in the essay, ‘The Idea of Freedom’:

Some of the most influential trends of thought of the next century, romanticism,
democracy, naturalism, socialism, nationalism, fascism, appeared to have originated
or been transformed or at least violently affected in the vast and turbulent mixture of
light and darkness, pedantic argument and fervid emotional eloquence, envious
philistine resentment and moving indignation with cruelty and injustice, persecuted
puritan fanaticism and disarming childlike fantasies which jostle each other page by
page and sometimes line by line in Rousseau’s writing.33

Berlin’s phrase ‘vast and turbulent mixture of light and darkness’ suggests an image

of Rousseau, who is internally divided, changeable, and deeply flawed. The above

passage I am drawing on nevertheless accepts Rousseau’s importance in the history of

political theory, and the history of political ideologies, yet is very critical of the world

of Rousseau’s feelings, fantasies, and desires. It accuses Rousseau of being

‘emotional,’ ‘resentful’, ‘fanatical’, and ‘childlike’. The passage presents a vivid and

33
Berlin, ‘The Idea of Freedom’, p. 104.

37
engaging portrait, which is typical of Berlin’s method of working imaginatively, so as

to understand the world Rousseau inhabited from the inside.

Indeed, in Berlin’s view, as stated in his essays, ‘The Idea of Freedom’ and

‘Rousseau’, Rousseau lives in his fantasy, with the belief, that the rough state of

primitiveness guarantees the essentiality of human nature. Rousseau withdraws from

city life and roams in the natural domain, in order to find answers to social and

political problems, which seems a contradiction in itself. However, this way of living

is due to the author’s tormented nature. Rousseau does not like city life, because he

thinks that the sophistication and refinement of civilisation corrupts people.34 Based on

the examination of Rousseau’s wishes and needs, Berlin ironically views the notion of

natural goodness in the nature of natural man as a primitive, somewhat mythic form of

civilisation, and as a manifestation of the author’s conflicting nature, where his

psychological world is mixed up with fantasies.

Here a critical comment is due with regard to Berlin’s employed methodology. In

Said’s view, applying the method of an ‘insight view’ to the study of a thinker, has the

shortcoming, that the line between actual experience, and the modification of the

experience by a reflective mind, is blurred, for instance in Vico.35 It can be concluded,

that what appears in the above passage, is the unresolved problematic, that the

reconstruction of past experience by way of a mental process can neither be excluded

from, nor squeezed into, ‘what was real’ in the past of another person’s experience. It

could be argued, that this appears to happen in Berlin as a follower of Vico.

In my view, the approach of an ‘inside view’ requires a special skill, and careful

insight, so as to examine an author’s personal and social contexts. Apart from an

exploration of Rousseau’s feelings and wishes to examine its connection with his idea

of human nature, the ‘inside view’ requires a careful study of the social contexts,

because political theory is not purely personal, it is historically situated, and should be

34
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, pp. 40-41; Berlin, ‘The Idea of Freedom’, p. 105.
35
E.W. Said, Humanism and Democratic Criticism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 92.

38
understood against its backgrounds. As stated in his essay, ‘Rousseau’, Berlin locates

Rousseau’s idea of natural man in Rousseau’s personal background. Born into a lower

middle class family in Switzerland, Rousseau was, – in Berlin’s evaluation –, an

adventurer without a fixed occupation. This is identified, in Berlin’s words, with

Rousseau exhibiting ‘inferiority complexes’.36 Still drawing here on Berlin’s essay

‘Rousseau’, through the perspective of his inferiority, Rousseau views civilisation, and

the existing values in society, with an attitude of hatred and revolt, as Berlin states:

‘the kind of state of nature in Rousseau’s works is not identified with any realistic

record of human history, but with a loathing of the existing values in society.’37

Grounded in such an attitude towards the existing values in society, what Rousseau

demands is not the development of civilisation, but the reversal of civilisation to the

state of nature. To conclude, in Berlin’s view, the world of Rousseau’s feelings,

fantasies and desires, and his social background, manifests itself in the way in which

Rousseau constructs his idea of natural man. In other words, through his approach of

applying an ‘inside view’ to explore Rousseau’s personality, Berlin connects

Rousseau’s notion of natural man with Rousseau’s personality.

1.2.2 Charging a Fixed View of Human Nature

This section looks in more detail at Rousseau’s writing, to examine whether

Rousseau holds a fixed view of human nature, and the reasons for forming such a view.

Berlin connects Rousseau’s idea of natural man with the author’s inner world and his

personal background, and has the view that such a vision of natural man is a mental

manifestation of Rousseau’s inner world. However, if we take Rousseau at his word, –

as expressed in his Confessions –, one version of the purified nature of human beings,

as manifested in natural man, derives from the illumination he experienced, and as a

36
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 41.
37
Ibid., p. 42.

39
result of his deep meditation in the forest of St. Germain.38 In his Confessions,

Rousseau affirms the nature of his illumination, – under a tree on the road to

Vincennes –, while contemplating the question set out for a competitive essay leading

to the writing of his first discourse, and its effect on the rest of his life.

In Rousseau’s autobiographical Confessions of 1782, he recalls the moment when he

was suddenly inspired by the contest question posed by the Academy of Dijon: ‘the

moment I read this [‘Has the progress of sciences and arts done more to corrupt morals

or improve them’] I beheld another universe and became another man.’39 This is an

important moment, which changes Rousseau’s life, and puts him on the road to being a

thinker and philosopher. The importance of this life-changing event is confirmed, and

the question is answered in the ‘Letter to Malesherbes’, where he explains:

Everything I have been able to retain of these crowds of the great truth which
illuminated me under that tree in a quarter of an hour has been weakly scattered
about in my three principal writings, namely that first discourse, the one on
inequality, and the treatise on education, which three works are inseparable and
together form the same whole.40

What are the visions of great truth Rousseau claims that he sees at that moment? Of

the three writings, the ‘Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality’,

published in 1755, – called ‘Second Discourse’ –, presents the most sustained account

of Rousseau’s theory of human nature. In the ‘Second Discourse’, Rousseau famously

makes the claim that human nature is everywhere the same, if we leave aside concrete

situations such as education, that have changed this nature.41 This is the idea of

viewing human nature as fixed, but how can this be? I am drawing here on the critic

Cassirer, who seems to think that self-knowledge and genuine self-examination in

Rousseau are the living source for the true knowledge of man.42 Such a comment

throws a different light on Rousseau’s intentions. Yet, by contrast, the critic Simpson
38
J.-J. Rousseau, ‘The Confessions’, in The Confessions and Correspondence, Including the Letters to Malesherbes,
C. Kelly, R.D. Masters and P.G. Stillman (eds.), trans. C. Kelly, Hanover and London, University Press of New
England [for] Dartmouth College, 1995, p. 329.
39
Ibid., p. 294.
40
J.-J. Rousseau, ‘Letter to M. de Malesherbes’, in The Confessions and Correspondence, p. 575.
41
J.-J. Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, in D.A. Cress (ed. and trans.), Basic Political Writings of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 39.
42
E. Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Bloomington, Indiana U.P., 1963, p. 50.

40
argues that the question of ‘how Rousseau produces such an idea of natural man?’

cannot be answered, – unlike geometric definitions and axioms which are clear and

transparent –, the principle of human nature is a more complicated phenomenon. Thus,

he concludes that what is left in Rousseau’s mind after the burning of his feelings, is

undetermined by facts; and even the best Rousseau scholars cannot agree with

Rousseau’s findings.43 In other words, the question of how Rousseau produces his

knowledge of human nature cannot have a definite answer, and each commentator

could answer it from different angles.

I am now returning to Berlin’s evaluation, who connects Rousseau’s idea of natural

man with the author’s inner world and his personal background, and has the view that

such a vision of natural man is a mental manifestation of Rousseau’s inner world. I

have earlier on commented on Jauss and Gadamer with regard to their methods in

reading texts, here I wish to expand their approach by drawing on Iser’s notion of

‘wondering view point’:

The wondering view point is a means of describing the way in which the reader is
present in the text. This presence is at a point where memory and expectation
converge, and the resultant dialectic movement brings about a continual
modification of memory and an increasing complexity of expectation. These
processes depend on the reciprocal spotlighting of the perspectives, which provide
interrelated backgrounds for one and another. The interaction between these
backgrounds provokes the reader into a synthetizing activity. […] These syntheses,
then, are primarily groupings that bring the interrelated perspectives together in an
equivalence that has the character of a configurative meaning.44

A text cannot be perceived as a whole, because reading as a process inheres in the

text. The reader has to situate himself in a specific location. The above passage I am

drawing on demonstrates the function of the ‘wondering view point’, and enables the

reader to find for himself a position in the text, whereby the position is a combination

of perspectives to be selected by the reader.

43
M. Simpson, The Logic Of Freedom in Rousseau’s Social Contract, PhD Thesis, Boston University, 2002, p. 36.
44
Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 118.

41
 In the light of Iser’s conception of ‘the wondering view point’, it could be argued

that the way Berlin examines the question, ‘how Rousseau produces such an idea of

natural man’, is formed by his ‘wondering view point’ of reading Rousseau’s theory of

human nature, whereby this view point is a combination of Berlin’s reading of

Rousseau’s personal life experience, his inner world of feelings, desires and fantasies,

and his social background. In particular, Berlin penetrates into Rousseau’s inner world

from the surface of the contradictions in the author’s attitudes. To support his view,

Berlin detects Rousseau’s innate resistance, motivated by his social background,

towards the upper class, and the intellectuals who are in Rousseau’s opinion the false

pioneers of civilisation. There is a significant passage in Berlin’s essay ‘Rousseau’,

which illustrates his reading of Rousseau’s inner world:

Rousseau’s tormented and tortured nature made him look with eyes of hatred upon
people like Diderot, d’Alembert and Helvétius in Paris, who seem to him fastidious,
sophisticated, and artificial, incapable of understanding those dark emotions, all
those deep and torturing feelings ravaging the heart of a true natural man torn from
his native soil. The natural man, for him, was somebody who possessed a deep
instinctive wisdom very different from the corruption of sophistication of the
towns.45

But on the other hand, Rousseau, in Berlin’s view, like most of his contemporaries,

condemns passions and feelings, and praises rationality.46 Through the obvious

contradictions in Rousseau’s attitude, Berlin shows the turmoil and the conflicts of

Rousseau’s inner world, and reveals Rousseau’s notion of natural man as produced by

his ‘wondering view point’.

The meaning Berlin produces in Rousseau’s texts is that Rousseau equates the

nature of natural man with the nature of human beings in reality, which Berlin

criticises in ‘A Letter on Human Nature’:

[...] There is no central, pure, natural being who emerges after you have scraped off
all the artificial beliefs, habits, values, forms of life and behaviour which have been,
as it were, superimposed on this pure, natural being. That is what I mean by denying

45
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 41.
46
Ibid., p. 28.

42
 a fixed human nature: I do not believe that all men are in the relevant respects the
same ’beneath the skin’, i.e., I believe that variety is part of human existence.47

Here then can we draw some conclusions. This critical reading of Rousseau’s idea

of human nature is based on Berlin’s account of human nature, which I have discussed

in the first section of this chapter, where I have shown that Berlin holds the belief that

the nature of human beings is diverse and alterable. This view contrasts with a view

that man’s nature is unchanged. Holding the view of an unchanged human nature

excludes the creativity and self-transformation of human beings, and the influence of

cultural and historical factors on the formulation of their nature. Berlin charges

Rousseau’s theory of human nature with ignoring the facts that history undergoes

coherent changes, and that cultures are diverse.48 This evaluation is consistent with

Berlin’s preconception of human nature.

However, this charge does not imply that Berlin ignores the meaning of Rousseau’s

written texts, rather, such a position emphasises that, as a reader of Rousseau’s texts,

Berlin may consciously, or unconsciously, filter Rousseau’s theory of human nature

through his own lens of the idea of the nature of human beings.

In the beginning of this chapter, drawing on Gadamer and Jauss’s view of the act of

reading, and the production of meaning, I have laid down two points. Firstly, the

reader himself cannot analyse a written text neutrally, since he brings his

preconceptions of an issue to the interpretation of a text; secondly, the meaning of a

text is a result of the interaction between reader and text. Furthermore, by following

Gadamer’s insightful description of the interaction between reader and text as a

‘hermeneutic circle’, I have identified the interplay between the horizon of Berlin’s

understanding of human nature and Rousseau’s text as the first ‘hermeneutic circle’ of

Berlin’s encounter with Rousseau. These points then throw a light on Berlin’s reading

of Rousseau and the meaning-production in this reading. When Berlin approaches

Rousseau’s idea of human nature, he does not encounter this idea in a state of purity,

47
Berlin, ‘A Letter on Human Nature’, p. 40.
48
Ibid.

43
untouched by the knowledge with which it is read. On the contrary, the encounter is

historically and socially situated, and involves Berlin’s preconception of human nature,

– that is to say, as a reader, Berlin brings his theory of human nature to the encounter

with the idea of human nature in Rousseau’s texts –, and the meaning Berlin produces

is filtered through his theory of human nature.

Moreover, Berlin has the view that the intellectual tendency in Rousseau’s era

shaped the way he studied the nature of human beings. It has to be pointed out though,

that Berlin has made inconsistent remarks about Rousseau’s method of the study of

human nature. For instance, in one essay, ‘My Intellectual Path’, Berlin claims, that

Rousseau applies the method of introspection to the study of human nature,49 while in

another essay, ‘Rousseau’, Rousseau’s method seems to be identified with the

intellectual tendency in his era, which applied deductive reasoning to the study of the

areas of politics and morality.50 Although Berlin shifts his position from time-to-time,

at the surface level, his true stance is consistent, in that he criticises the effort of

applying scientific methods to the study of politics and morality. In ‘Rousseau’, Berlin

states:

[Rousseau] has a great tradition behind him – that sentiments divide people, whereas
reason unites them. Sentiments, feelings are subjective, individual, vary from person
to person, country to country, clime to clime; whereas reason alone is one in all men,
and alone is always right.51

In this instance, in Berlin’s view, Rousseau applies reason to study human nature.

With the growing popularity of the scientific outlook in the eighteenth-century, the

method that natural scientists adopted in dealing with the natural world influenced the

way philosophers studied ethics and political areas.52 Following this intellectual

tendency, Rousseau tries to clarify his method by an analogy to the natural sciences,

and claims in his ‘Second Discourse’ that he is following the method of physicists, to

49
Berlin, ‘My Intellectual Path’, p. 5.
50
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 43.
51
Ibid., p. 28
52
N. Bloomfield. Almost a French Australia: French - British Rivalry in the Southern Oceans, Ultimo, N.S.W.,
Halstead Press, 2012, p. 33.

44
offer hypothetical speculations rather than historical ones to examine the principles of

the nature of human being.53 Facts are the foundations of the natural sciences;

hypotheses made by the leading scientists, derived from their examinations of the

physical world, are testified by facts. In following this method, the facts are not set

aside. Although Rousseau consults the most up-to-date literature on the subject of

human nature at the time and invokes it to support his account of man in his natural

state,54 facts themselves may not be able to confirm or falsify Rousseau’s speculations

about the nature of human beings. Thus, the method that Rousseau claims to apply in

studying human nature may not be called purely scientific by comparison to the way

physicists deal with the physical world.

In discussing the question of what method Rousseau uses in establishing his theory

of human nature, the critic Shklar, in her study of Rousseau’s social theory, answers

this question from two perspectives. In the first place, she argues that Rousseau sets up

a stage by formulating a historical hypothesis, the purpose of which is to examine the

action of the soul’s response and inspiration, in the conjectured events of history.55 In

other words, we should not take Rousseau’s account of history as fact, rather, take it as

specific scenes set up by Rousseau, in which he intends to examine how human nature

responds in these circumstances. Through these responses, Rousseau wants to reveal

human nature. In the second place, Shklar maintains that it is through Rousseau’s very

uniqueness that he finds human nature:

By looking into himself to uncover those first traits which have now disappeared in
most men, he was able, he felt, to paint the picture of primitive men. In him, and
perhaps in him alone, natural man still survived.56

In other words, Shklar proposes that Rousseau’s unique personality plays a

determining role in developing his theory of human nature.

53
Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, pp. 38-39.
54
J.-J.Rousseau, ‘Second Discourse’, in V. Gourevitch (ed.), Rousseau: The Discourses and Other Early Political
Writings, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1997, pp. 190i-191.
55
J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1969, p. 34.
56
Ibid., pp. 41-42.

45
 By contrast, in Simpson’s view, the action of the intellect serves as the method

Rousseau uses in constructing his theory of human nature. He claims that by way of

the action of the intellect, Rousseau is able to separate the purified nature of human

beings from the nature of human beings in reality, and thus to find the underlying

principles of human nature.57 Though Shklar’s view differs from Simpson’s, regarding

the approach Rousseau takes in developing his theory of human nature, they both agree

on the point that Rousseau’s depiction of the state of nature is not a historical account,

rather, it is a hypothesis; and the purpose of establishing such a hypothesis is to shed

light on the principles of the nature of human beings. In following the above point of

view, Rousseau’s theory of human nature is not a description of human nature in

reality, rather, it derives from a hypothesis. If Rousseau’s account of human nature is

viewed in this light, it enables us to be aware of the distance between the actual human

nature in reality, and the principles of human nature, that Rousseau sets up in theory.

In my view, Berlin’s critique of Rousseau’s method in studying the nature of human

beings is not implausible. As a reader, Berlin’s thought was also anchored in the

intellectual tendency of his own era. He started his professional philosophical writings

at Oxford in the 1930s, when philosophy’s most pressing questions were formulated,

in some part, by logical positivism. Logical positivism concerns itself with the

meaning of sentences, and the logical connection between meaning and verification.

The meaning of sentences is carried out by their conditions, and the verification was

construed in terms of logic and sense-perception.58 In this sense, logical positivism

reduces the study of philosophy to the areas of empiricism and linguistic logic by

adopting a strictly scientific method, which is a detached and impersonal approach.

Although Berlin’s thought was anchored in the intellectual tendency of his own era, he

departs from this tendency, and it is hardly surprising that Berlin was not a positivist.

He was increasingly sceptical of the approaches of logical positivism, as he engaged

with it more deeply. Berlin opposes the technique of applying a detached, impersonal

57
M. Simpson, The Logic Of Freedom in Rousseau’s Social Contract, pp. 31-35.
58
B. Williams, ‘Introduction’, in H. Hardy (ed.), Concepts and Categories, p. xii.

46
method to study philosophy, because it fails to capture a richer sense of experience,

namely the ‘irreducible categorical element’59 in a psychological dimension.

The missing element in logical positivism, as stated by Berlin, refers to ‘the

legitimate demand for the kind and degree of vagueness, indefiniteness, and rich

ambiguity of speech needed by the plain man for his normal, everyday purposes.’60 It

shows Berlin’s insight that experience is richer and far more complicated. This

position strengthens Berlin’s critical view of the method Rousseau uses in studying

reality.

The intellectual tendency of applying a scientific method to studying philosophy can

be traced back to the eighteenth-century era of the Enlightenment. In Berlin’s view, as

stated in his essay ‘Rousseau’, Rousseau is marked by this era, in that he tries to use a

rational and deductive method to examine and explain reality, which cannot be

attained.61 Berlin as a contemporary reader of the twentieth century, reading Rousseau,

a thinker of the era of Enlightenment, results in a process in which the meaning Berlin

discovers in Rousseau’s texts emerges from an interactive dialogue; and this dialogue

is bound by, and filtered through, the reader’s preconception. This is not something to

regret, rather, in the words of Gadamer: ‘the historicity of our existence entails that

prejudices, in the literal sense of the word [prejudgement], constitute the initial

directness of our whole ability to experience.’62 Berlin’s characterisation of Rousseau’s

idea of human nature as fixed emerges from his own theory of human nature; and this

is the starting point that defines Berlin’s reading perspective. This in turn is also the

theoretical foundation that enables Berlin to critically characterise Rousseau’s notion

of human nature.

59
Berlin, ‘Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical Statements’, p. 34.
60
Ibid.
61
Berlin, ‘Rousseau,’ p. 37; p. 43.
62
H.-G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, D.E. Linge (ed. and trans.), Berkeley, University of California Press,
1976, p. 9.

47
Part Two: Berlin’s Analysis of Two Types of Freedom

Chapter Two:

Reading Positive Freedom in the Individual Sense

Berlin pondered on Rousseau’s idea of freedom for a long time. It is intriguing to

look at this engagement. In 1958, he published the essay, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’,

which has, according to Swift, become the most influential essay on contemporary

political thought.1 As the title indicates, Berlin’s discussion of liberty focuses on two

notions of liberty, namely, negative liberty and positive liberty. Negative freedom is

the idea of being free from external coercion, imposed by other people, or the state.2

Positive freedom is more complicated; basically it means, to be free is to achieve a

purpose.3 In ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin discusses Rousseau’s idea of liberty

with a deep engagement. The terms freedom and liberty are not interchangeable, but, –

since Berlin uses them synonymously –,4 I follow Berlin, and use them

interchangeably.

Yet, Berlin’s engagement with Rousseau reaches further back than the publication

of the essay, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. In 1952, – that is six years before the

publication of ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ –, Berlin delivered six lectures on BBC radio;

and the essay ‘Rousseau’, published in 1990, is a modified version of one of these

lectures. Further evidence of Berlin’s engagement is his discussion of Rousseau in one

of the Mary Flexner Lectures, named ‘The Idea of Freedom’, at the Bryn Mawr

College in Pennsylvania in 1952. This lecture was edited and published in 2006 by one

of Berlin’s trustees, Henry Hardy.

Now turning to what these essays have in common, I shall propose, that the idea of

freedom is the common theme of these works. In the three essays, – namely, ‘Two

1
A. Swift, Political Philosophy: A Beginner’s Guide for Students and Politicians, Cambridge, Polity, 2001, p. 51.
2
Ibid., p. 194.
3
Ibid., p. 203.
4
Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life, p. 222.

48
Concepts of Liberty’, ‘Rousseau’ and ‘The Idea of Freedom’ –, Berlin maintains a

comparable essayistic style of criticism with regard to Rousseau’s idea of liberty. He

begins with a conceptual distinction between his proposed two types of freedom,

which is immediately followed by a historical examination of both negative freedom

and positive freedom; then he selects a few thinkers, such as Rousseau and Kant,

whose ideas of freedom, in Berlin’s view, typically represent the idea of positive

freedom. These thinkers are finally critically analysed.

Throughout these essays, Berlin’s discussion of Rousseau’s concept of freedom

occupies a considerable space, while being mixed with discussions of its ethical and

philosophical foundations. This in turn develops a set of insightful comments about the

connections between the idea of human nature, the notion of liberty, and the theory of

pluralism.

In chapter one, I have explored Berlin’s characterisation of the idea of human nature.

In this chapter, I shall explore the notion of liberty, and examine Berlin’s interpretation

of the content of this idea; the idea of human nature provides a foundation for Berlin’s

reflections on liberty, and his ethical deliberations on pluralism. I shall explore the

theory of pluralism in the following chapter.

Now looking at the content of the above essays, I propose that Berlin’s historical

and philosophical reconstruction of Rousseau’s idea of the nature of natural man

demonstrates, that he has the view that Rousseau’s theory of human nature is

rationalist in its essence, since this theory not only holds the point of view, that the

nature of human beings is unchanged, but also claims that the essence of human nature

is reason. This conception of human nature is the philosophical ground for Rousseau’s

concept of freedom, while, by contrast, Berlin’s notion of human nature proposes an

alterable and dynamic status. We can conclude then that the difference in the

philosophical grounding of human nature should lead to different views of freedom.

Not only are Rousseau’s and Berlin’s philosophical foundations different, but

Berlin’s reading, and interpretation, of Rousseau’s concept of freedom is distinguished

49
as having two dimensions. Berlin’s first axis analyses, and characterises, freedom as

positive liberty in the individual sense; the second axis examines, and qualifies,

freedom as positive liberty in the collective sense. These two dimensions then provide

the larger framework of my thesis, – namely, that I consider positive freedom

interpreted in the individual sense (in chapter two), by contrast to positive freedom

read in the political sense (in chapter five).

After establishing the first ‘hermeneutic circle’ of Berlin’s encounter with Rousseau,

and analysing the meaning of Berlin’s characterisation of the nature of Rousseau’s

doctrine of human nature that emerges from the circle, chapter two moves to an

examination of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its first dimension,

by asking how Berlin reads the content of Rousseau’s idea of freedom, and

characterises its nature. Building upon the first ‘hermeneutic circle’, – that is, Berlin’s

characterisation of the nature Rousseau’s theory of human nature –, in the first section

of this chapter I shall analyse and critique Berlin’s historical and philosophical

reconstruction of the content of Rousseau’s theory of human nature.

In the second section of this chapter, I shall examine Berlin’s analysis of negative

freedom and positive freedom, – in particular his examination of positive freedom.

Berlin’s discussion of the three forms of positive freedom establishes the horizon of

his understanding of the idea of freedom, and shapes the second ‘hermeneutic circle’

of his encounter with Rousseau. The second circle functions to lay the theoretical

ground for the third section of this chapter, and the meaning of Berlin’s interpretation

of Rousseau’s notion of freedom arises from this circle. In the third section, I shall

draw the consequences of the first two sections, – i.e. of Berlin’s reconstruction of

Rousseau’s theory of human nature and his theory of freedom –, by analysing and

critiquing Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual sense.

50
2.1 A Reconstruction of Rousseau’s Idea of Human Nature

In this first section, I am concerned with the question of how Berlin interprets

Rousseau’s idea of the natural goodness of man, which follows from my

considerations in chapter one.5 The aim of my analysis is to assess whether Berlin’s

reading is open to questioning.

As I have discussed in the first section of chapter one, – under the heading of

‘Berlin’s Idea of Human Nature’ –, the presupposition of holding an idea of a fixed

human nature is that human nature has a fixed essentiality; and it does not change,

even though its social and historical context does. Berlin claims that Rousseau holds

such a view of human nature, as manifested in the concept of natural man.6 Based on

Berlin’s qualification of Rousseau’s theory of human nature, this section attempts to

understand Berlin’s interpretation of the content of Rousseau’s concept of natural man.

My attempt at critiquing Berlin’s evaluation shall focus on two questions: first, I

shall explore Berlin’s two contradictory readings of Rousseau’s notion of natural man.

Second, I shall examine in which manner Berlin attenuates these contradictions. I

attempt to unfold the first problematic by means of an analysis of Rousseau’s notion of

natural man in his texts, for which I have already provided some textual evidence in

chapter one, followed by an examination of Berlin’s interpretation of these instances.

To answer the second question, – with regard to Berlin’s discursive strategies to

attenuate the contradictions in Rousseau’s text –, I also attempt to take up Berlin’s

7
position in the light of Iser’s concept of ‘consistency- building’ of meaning, which

follows my intent from chapter one.

5
In chapter one, I have explained how Berlin characterises Rousseau’s notion of human nature, based on a dynamic
and changeable view of human nature. In the first section of chapter two, I explore, how Berlin reads the content of
Rousseau’s doctrine of human nature, anchored in his characterisation of Rousseau’s idea of human nature. This
exploration prepares for the next two sections, namely, how Berlin reads Rousseau’s notion of individual freedom,
based on his reading of the content of Rousseau’s notion of human nature, and his notion of two types of freedom;
the exploration also makes us aware of how Berlin fits his reading of Rousseau into his understanding of freedom.
6
Berlin, ‘A Letter on Human Nature’, pp. 41-42.
7
Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 119.

51
2.1.1 The Natural Goodness of Man and its Problematic

First I turn to the question of how Berlin interprets the concept of human nature in

Rousseau. Natural man is the term which Rousseau uses in his ‘Second Discourse’ to

describe a purified man without historical, cultural and social influence. The term is

based on Rousseau’s theory of the state of nature, in other words, Rousseau’s

description of the state of nature is the context in which the properties of human nature

are mirrored in natural man. Thus in order to understand Rousseau’s idea of human

nature, one has to turn, in the first instance, to his analysis of the state of nature.

To follow this interlinking, and interdependence, of the state of nature and the idea

of human nature in Rousseau, I draw on the critic Gourevitch, in separating the state of

nature described in the ‘Second Discourse’ into two types, that is, the pure state of

nature and the state of nature.8 This distinction helps to understand Rousseau’s theory

of human nature. I should like to point out, that in the ‘Second Discourse’, Rousseau

does not distinguish two types of the state of nature –, though he uses the term of the

pure state of nature, which causes, in my view, some ambiguity of understanding.

However, Rousseau describes an accident in the ‘Second Discourse’, which might shed

some light on his proposition.

When men are gathered together, accidentally, for the purpose of mutual amusement,

we are encountering in this instance a watershed between the pure state of nature and

the state of nature. On the one hand, the pure state of nature, which is a state where no

communication is involved among natural men, is transformed into a living condition,

which possesses a basic characteristic of society, that is, mutual reliance. The state of

nature in this context already embodies a basic form of society. On the other hand, an

unnatural feeling, called amour-propre,9 is produced in natural man’s heart as his

living conditions change. The concept of amour-propre is a complicated concept in

Rousseau’s works, which can be translated as a social feeling of vanity. More

8
V. Gourevitch, ‘Introduction’, in V. Gourevitch (ed.), Rousseau: The Discourses and Other Early Political
Writings, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1997, pp. xviii-xix.
9
The concept of amour-propre is an important psychological term, used by Rousseau in specific ways; it will be
examined in detail in chapter five.

52
importantly, this social feeling indicates a transformation from a pure nature of human

beings, as mirrored in the notion of natural man, to a socially and culturally formed

human nature, as mirrored in human beings in reality.

From the analysis so far pursued, I propose that the basic characteristic that

separates the pure state of nature from the state of nature is that man in the former state

lives in a condition without any acknowledged bonds, therefore without emotional

needs. The properties of human nature are here then understood, and defined, against

the condition of the pure state of nature, as described in the ‘Second Discourse’, rather

than that of society, which is, in my view, what Rousseau intends, and Berlin does not

concede.

After clarifying the point that Rousseau’s idea of human nature should be

understood against the context of the pure state of nature, I turn to Berlin. In the first

instance, Berlin does not make a distinction between the pure state of nature and the

state of nature. In the second place, Berlin does not offer a systematic account of the

characteristics of Rousseau’s description of the state of nature, rather his comments are

scattered across different essays.

Before entering into the discussion of Berlin’s scattered remarks on Rousseau’s

account of the state of nature, it is worth mentioning one point I have made in the

second section of chapter one, which will allow for a better understanding of how

Berlin critically views Rousseau’s account of the state of nature. I have shown that

Shklar’s and Simpson’s views of Rousseau’s description of the state of nature agree,

that the state of nature is a hypothesis which may be verified by empirical facts.

However, I propose that Berlin’s views of Rousseau’s state of nature are different

from Shklar’s and Simpson’s. In ‘The Idea of Freedom’, Berlin suggests that the state

of nature is either a lie or a utopian fantasy made by Rousseau.10 The statement is

succinct, but it clearly demonstrates two critical points of view. The

expression ’utopian fantasy’ reveals that Berlin does not regard Rousseau’s account of
10
Berlin, ‘The Idea of Freedom’, p. 107.

53
the state of nature as historical. In choosing the word ‘lie’, Berlin sharply expresses

that he does not view the state of nature as a hypothetical construction either. On the

contrary, the word ‘lie’ embodies Berlin’s personal judgement, and his rejection of

Rousseau’s intention.

Berlin’s critical assessment of Rousseau’s account of the state of nature is consistent.

In ‘Rousseau’, Berlin claims that the kind of state of nature in Rousseau’s works is not

identified with any realistic record of human history, but rather with a loathing of the

existing values in society.11 Berlin does not elaborate the elements of the state of

nature. He simply points out that the content of the state of nature Rousseau

conjectures carries a radical rejection of reality. This statement reflects, in my view,

Berlin’s critical attitude towards Rousseau’s account of the state of nature.

I have shown Berlin’s comments on Rousseau’s account of the state of nature in

‘The Idea of freedom’ and ‘Rousseau’. Berlin obviously disagrees with Rousseau, and

rejects his position. Yet, Berlin’s comments typically reveal his philosophical position

in his approach to Rousseau’s account of the state of nature. If we were to take up

Berlin’s position, we could assume a sympathetic attitude towards his critique of

Rousseau. As a historian and a thinker of the history of political ideas, Berlin tends to

take a historical, and an empirical, perspective to examine philosophical and political

ideas. Further, these two dimensions are marked by the psychological approach of ‘an

insight view’12 into the world of intentional movements, as discussed earlier in chapter

one, which shape his dismissal of Rousseau’s works and of his intentions.

I have demonstrated that Rousseau’s idea of human nature should be understood

against the background of the pure state of nature. Based on the above point, what

Berlin’s reader may expect is a logical connection between his comments on

Rousseau’s state of nature and his interpretation of Rousseau’s theory of human nature;

however, Berlin does not establish this logical link.

11
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 42.
12
As I have demonstrated, ‘insight view’ is the approach, in which the reader takes up an author’s position, and
understands the author’s ideas from his personal experiences and emotions. See Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still
Exist?’, p. 166.

54
 I have shown in earlier discussions, that the properties of human nature are mirrored

in Rousseau’s account of natural man. The question then is, what exactly the properties

of human nature are. Perhaps a letter from Rousseau to Malesherbes offers an answer.

In the second section of chapter one, I have addressed an important event, which

happened in Rousseau’s life on the road to Vincennes. In 1762, Rousseau wrote to

Malesherbes to express his intense feelings and inspirations after this important event:

‘that man is naturally good and that it is from these [our] institutions alone that men

become wicked.’13 The central claim of the above statement is an argument for the

natural goodness of man. This is a famous statement, in which Rousseau qualifies a

fundamental principle of morality as the basis of all his works.14

Since Rousseau situates natural man on the background of the pure state of nature,

the first impression, that his readers may get is the simplicity of the qualities expressed

in natural man. Berlin acknowledges this feature, and seems to rest on this level of

understanding. In his essay ’Rousseau’, Berlin identifies the natural goodness of man

as primitive and rough.15 Elsewhere in the same essay, he explains this argument in

the following manner: ‘the natural man for him [Rousseau] was somebody who

possessed a deep instinctive wisdom very different from the corrupt sophistication of

the towns.’16 Although Berlin does not explain in detail his expression of natural man

as having ‘instinctive wisdom’, this comment reveals his understanding of natural man

as endowed with instincts different from socialised human beings.

I propose that Berlin’s interpretation of the idea of the natural goodness of man

seems to focus on the surface meaning. Berlin does not unfold the depth of this

argument, which, in my view, is an important omission. As readers we may not be

satisfied with Berlin’s treatment of glossing over Rousseau’s idea of the natural

13
Rousseau, ‘Letter to M. de Malesherbes’, p. 575.
14
J.-J. Rousseau, ‘Letter to Beaumont’ in C. Kelly and E. Grace (eds.), Letter to Beaumont, Letters Written from the
Mountain, and Related Writings, trans. C. Kelly and J. R. Bush, Hanover, University Press of New England, 2001, p.
28.
15
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 40.
16
Ibid., p. 41.

55
goodness of man. In my view, Rousseau’s thought on this issue seems to be more

interesting and subtle than the reading Berlin presents to us.

To open another perspective on Berlin’s sharp critique, I am turning to Rousseau’s

texts themselves. In the ‘Second Discourse’, Rousseau expresses two features that

define natural man. One feature is the freedom of will, and he states:

I am aware of precisely the same things in the human machine [nature has given
senses to the machine in order for it to renew its strength and to protect itself] with
the difference that nature does alone everything in the operations of an animal,
whereas man contributes, as a free agent, to his own operations.17

The passage shows, that the freedom of will enables human beings to follow their

choices, rather than the commands of their senses, as animals do. Thus, the freedom of

will distinguishes human beings from animals.

The other feature Rousseau expresses in natural man is the gift of perfectibility. In

Rousseau’s mind, perfectibility is a faculty which develops through circumstance. It

enables man to surpass his condition, but also to degrade himself.18 In other words,

perfectibility is the faculty that is open to change. Together with the freedom of will,

perfectibility allows us either to become masters of our condition or to lower ourselves

beneath our condition.

Rousseau states the above two features in the context of his description of natural

man. The critic Cooper maintains that the nature of natural man is not different from

that of a beast, for which he offers two reasons. First, he proposes that natural man acts

only in accordance with his impulses. In other words, natural man does not behave

consciously by following certain principles. These principles are discovered either

from the nature of things, or are established by reason. Second, Cooper points out that

natural man possesses freedom of will and perfectibility, but he argues that these two

attributes remain dormant in natural man.19 Natural man acts unwittingly, in line with

17
Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, p. 44.
18
Ibid., p. 45.
19
L.D. Cooper, Rousseau, Nature, and the Problem of the Good Life, University Park, Pennsylvania State U.P.,
1999, p. 54.

56
his instinctive impulses; thus natural man remains ignorant of his two precious

faculties, namely, freedom of will and perfectibility.

Not agreeing with Cooper’s point that natural man is a beast, I argue that natural

man is a purified human being which Rousseau depicts to reveal the potential nature of

human beings in reality. With this point in mind, I argue that freedom of will and

perfectibility mirrored in natural man are qualities belonging to human beings in

reality. I have demonstrated that the pure state of nature is the state without social

bonds, and therefore without emotional needs. Thus natural man does not have the

right circumstances to use his freedom of will, and to develop his gift of perfectibility,

even though he possesses the two qualities.

After clarifying the point that the properties of freedom of will and perfectibility are

dormant in natural man, I now intend to look deeper into Rousseau’s texts to examine

the question of what Rousseau means by the natural goodness of man. I suggest that

two principles of behaviour constitute Rousseau’s theory of the natural goodness of

man, namely, amour de soi and pitié.

According to Rousseau, amour de soi is not a selfish love of oneself. To the contrary,

this love of oneself is natural, for it does not have any intentions of bringing harm to

others.20 To love oneself is also the spring of the sentiment of loving others. In terms

of the sentiment of pitié, Rousseau characterises it as ‘an innate repugnance to seeing

his fellow men suffer’.21 According to this characterisation, pitié is a spontaneous

sentiment; it is pure in the sense that it does not involve any rational calculations. As I

read Rousseau, amour de soi and pitié originate in the status of humanity, and function

to preserve it.

To conclude the pursued discussion, Rousseau’s concept of the natural goodness of

man does not rest within the dimension identified by Berlin as primitive and simple. I

propose that Rousseau investigates, at a deeper level, the origin of humanity. In this

20
Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, p. 106.
21
Ibid., p. 53.

57
regard then, Berlin’s interpretation might be deemed is taking a very different

trajectory.

Apart from his analysis of the natural goodness of man, Berlin also presents another

version of his interpretation of Rousseau’s theory of human nature. However, at this

point, inconsistencies and tensions appear between the two versions. Berlin states:

It [the free individual] is a prior version, it is a form of secularized Protestant

individualism, in which the place of God is taken by the conception of rational life,
and the place of individual soul which strains towards union with Him is replaced by
the conception of the individual, endowed with reason, straining to be governed by
reason and reason alone, and to depend upon nothing that might deflect or delude
him by engaging his irrational nature.22

The passage demonstrates two points: first, Berlin considers that human nature is

constituted of a rational self and an empirical self; second, that the rational self is

ranked above the empirical self.

Now, it becomes clear that Berlin presents two conflicting versions of his

interpretations of Rousseau’s theory of human nature. This problematic could originate

in Rousseau texts which contain inner paradoxes or derive from the gap between the

interpretative intention of the reader and the text itself.

I turn to Rousseau’s texts with the aim of examining whether Rousseau presents two

contradictory versions of his argument of the natural goodness of man. In my reading,

Rousseau does not discuss rationality in his argument of the natural goodness of man,

quite to the contrary. He states that ‘[…] for lack of wisdom and reason, he [savage

man] is always seen thoughtlessly giving in to the first sentiment of humanity.’23

According to Rousseau, reason is not a fundamental principle for natural man’s

behaviour, and the sentiment of humanity generates natural man’s action. Wokler’s

reading confirms this line of reading:

22
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 138.
23
Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, p. 55.

58
 These attributes (amour de soi and pitié) must have been prior to reason and
sociability, for those later qualities would have taken a long time to mature, and
there could have been no manifest sign in our original state.24

If we were to take the above line of reading, – that is, the pure state of nature does

not offer the right condition for the qualities of reason and sociability to unfold and

develop –, Rousseau’s points of view in terms of the natural goodness of man are

consistent. Thus, Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of natural man as a rational being

does not seem conform to my reading of Rousseau’s point of view.

2.1.2 Taking Berlin’s Position

I have demonstrated the contradictory versions of Berlin’s interpretation of

Rousseau’s idea of human nature. Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of human nature

faces a grave difficulty, so that we may ask, how he reconciles the two different

versions of reading Rousseau. If we put ourselves into Berlin’s position, in the sense

explored earlier on, to understand why he reads Rousseau the way he does, we might

be more accepting of his approach. Viewed from this perspective, Berlin’s emphasis is

not to systematically discuss Rousseau’s idea of the natural goodness, rather he is

concerned with the historical reconstruction of an intellectual tradition, – namely, of

the idea of human nature in western philosophy –, and accordingly he situates his

interpretation of Rousseau’s idea of human nature within this philosophical

framework.

Looking at this philosophical framework then can enhance our understanding of

Berlin’s standpoint. The rationalist tradition assumes reason as the essence of human

nature. Plato’s classic work, The Republic, is perhaps the earliest work demonstrating

this point of view.25 Though the theme of Plato’s work does not deal with the nature

of human beings, nevertheless his discussion of ‘Justice in the Individual’ (in Part V)

refers to three qualities in the nature of human beings, namely, rationality, spirit, and

24
R. Wokler, Rousseau: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, Oxford U.P., 2001, pp. 54-55.
25
R. Hausheer, ’Introduction’, in H. Hardy and R. Hausheer (eds.), The Proper Study of Mankind, p. xxvi.

59
appetite. Plato’s central claim is that justice in the individual sense demands, that

reason should be in charge of spirit and appetite.26 This argument demonstrates the

typical assumption of the rationalist view of human nature, that reason is the essence of

human nature, and ought to be ranked over passion and desire.

Although thinkers of the Enlightenment do not necessarily hold the same view of

the nature of the human being, they share the belief that human beings have an

essential nature to be realised. In Berlin’s view, the principal tendency of the

Enlightenment inherits the rationalist tradition, which is to say, that reason is viewed

as constituting the essence of human nature.27 In establishing his thesis of

counter-Enlightenment, mainly represented by romanticism,28 Berlin expresses his

critique:

Man has no identifiable nature, whether static or dynamic, for he creates himself: he
creates his own values, and thereby transforms himself, and the transformed self
creates new values, so that we cannot ex hypothesi ever tell what the upshot will be
of his attempt to realise them, for he can only attempt – he cannot be answerable for
the consequences, or know whether he will succeed or not.29

The above critique is in line with Berlin’s theory of human nature. I have examined

this theory in the first section of chapter one, where I have shown the reasons, why

Berlin refuses an identifiable human nature, and affirms a self-transforming capacity of

human beings. This critique also reveals another aspect; to identify human nature with

reason willingly ignores its inherent uncertainty and vagueness of emotions, yet this

side of human nature is deeply rooted in human life. In contrast to such a view of

human nature, the rationalist view seems to be utopian, in the sense that it distorts the

realistic facets of human nature.

26
Plato, The Republic, trans. D. Lee, London, Penguin, 2007, pp. 150-151.
27
I. Berlin, ‘The Counter-Enlightenment’, in H. Hardy and R. Hausheer (eds.), The Proper Study of Mankind, p.
243.
28
Romanticism is a movement starting towards the end of the eighteenth-century, once the Enlightenment runs out.
See I. Berlin, ‘The Decline of Utopian Ideas in the West’, in H. Hardy (ed.), The Crooked Timber of Humanity, pp.
20-48.
29
I. Berlin, ‘The Romantic Revolution: A Crisis in the History of Modern Thought’, in H. Hardy (ed.), The Sense of
Reality: Studies in Ideas and Their History, New York, Strauss and Giroux, 1997, p. 186.

60
 To criticise the notion of the nature of human beings as held by the Enlightenment

in the light of romanticism implicitly demonstrates Berlin’s concern with the realistic

and emotional expressions of human nature, but this does not imply that Berlin’s view

of human nature is in line with the romantic attitude of it.30 What Berlin unfolds

through his expression of romanticism, is to bring other facets of human nature into

light, while guarding himself against exaggerated and out of control feelings.

To conclude the above discussion, we could say that Berlin is good at examining

ideas as part of a big picture of social and historical backgrounds, – the characteristic

perspective that shapes the way he views Rousseau. One could then maintain that

Berlin intends to put Rousseau’s theory of human nature against the general picture he

draws of the Enlightenment, and in particular, his critique of the rationalist view of

human nature.

Berlin aims to show that Rousseau’s idea of human nature is a mirror of the

rationalist view of human nature, typical of the Enlightenment. However, Berlin

simultaneously realises that Rousseau’s emphasis falls on the role of passion in

forming the nature of human beings. It is in this sense that Berlin comments that:

Rousseau claimed not that Hobbes had not seen certain relevant empirical,
psychological discoveries, facts, nor that he had argued incorrectly from what he
had seen – but that his account was in conflict with what, in thinking of human
beings as human, and distinguishing them, even the most degraded among them, not
only in explicit thought, but in our feelings and our action, from beings that we
regard as inhuman or non-human, we all know men to be. His argument is not that
the facts used to construct Hobbes’s model had gaps in them, but that the model was
inadequate in principle; it was inadequate not because this or that psychological or
sociological correlation had been missed out, but because it was based on a failure to
understand what we mean by motive, purpose, value, personality, and the like.31

Here then it becomes quite clear that Berlin realises the tension between Rousseau’s

emphasis on the role of passion in shaping human nature and his own interpretation of

Rousseau’s idea of human nature, but Berlin is not dismissing the discrepancy, rather

30
Ibid., pp. 187-189.
31
Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’, pp. 163-164.

61
he actively adjusts the inconsistency between the ideas contained in Rousseau’s text

and his own interpretative intentions.

Taking up here my earlier comments on the act of reading, Iser labels this process as

‘consistency-building’ or Gestalt. Iser identifies two stages within the

consistency-building process: the first stage consists of a connection formed by textual

signs, – which means that the text offers clues for the reader to connect them, and to

form a meaning; the second stage consists in selective decisions made by the reader.

This second stage requires the reader to select certain textual clues, and exclude others,

to complete and make the textual meaning coherent.32 The reader may confront

contradicting views in the text, but Gestalt is the underlying principle that helps the

reader to make meaning coherent. In this sense, it does not matter what ‘wondering

viewpoint’ a reader might take to interpret a text; his purpose is to produce a coherent

meaning from the text. Even if some points of view in the text deny the

consistency-building intention, the reader will still arrive at his aim by means of this

interpretative strategy.

If we transfer these insights from Iser’s theory of the act of ‘consistency-building’ of

meaning to Berlin’s approach of looking at Rousseau’s idea of human nature within

the historical context of the Enlightenment, then we could conclude that it is this

strategy that Berlin uses to mend the inconsistencies and tensions in his interpretation

of Rousseau. It leads Berlin to attenuate the contradictions occasioned by Rousseau’s

emphasis on the point that natural man does not have the faculty of reason. I propose,

that in deploying this strategy Berlin aims to make consistent meaning in his

interpretation of Rousseau. Berlin insists that Rousseau is a child of his era, and that

his view of human nature is not vastly different from the rationalist way of thinking

about human nature, – and accordingly, this attitude shapes Berlin’s general

assessment of Rousseau’s idea of human nature. He states that:

32
Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 123.

62
 Rousseau is not at all in favour of unbridled feeling. On the contrary, he says – and
he has a great philosophical tradition behind him – that sentiments divide people,
whereas reason unites them. Sentiments, feelings are subjective, individual, vary
from person to person, country to country, clime to clime; whereas reason alone is in
all men, and alone is always right.33

In my view, this passage demonstrates Berlin’s interpretative strategy, in that he

interprets Rousseau as an author who is in conformity with the spirit of the

Enlightenment, – in other words, that Rousseau dismisses the psychological sides of

human nature, and ranks reason as the highest quality in human nature. From this

perspective, as contradictory as this might appear, Berlin identifies the nature of

natural man as rational, which is a revealing instance of ‘consistency - building’ as

proposed by Iser.

Further conclusions then can be drawn. In the process of building a consistent

meaning, Berlin realises Rousseau’s focus on the importance of passion in forming

the nature of human beings. While this point is at odds with Berlin’s imagined

Gestalt, Berlin weakens the resulting tension. To some extent, the tension contained

in Berlin’s reconstruction of Rousseau’s idea of human nature demonstrates the

inherent inconsistency between the interpretative intention of a reader and the

information embodied in a text.

The above point does not imply that Rousseau’s text has a timeless meaning with

regard to the nature of natural man. I argue that Berlin’s focus is not on analysing

Rousseau’s idea of human nature in detail, but on sketching a big picture of the

Enlightenment, and interpreting Rousseau against this background. We can conclude

then, that the coherent meaning Berlin portrays of Rousseau demonstrates the

consistency of his interpretative intention.

How Berlin interprets Rousseau’s idea of natural man can be questioned, but in

order to follow the line of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of freedom, we need to

keep in mind that Berlin’s reconstruction of Rousseau’s theory of human nature is part

33
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 28.

63
of the theoretical basis for his examination of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its

individual sense. In the next section, I shall attempt to establish another theoretical

basis.

2.2 Negative and Positive Freedom and the Validity of their Distinction

This section examines Berlin’s analysis of negative freedom and positive freedom.

In particular, it analyses the validity of Berlin’s distinction between negative and

positive freedom, and his examination of positive freedom.

This section discusses three forms of positive freedom, namely, positive freedom as

being a state of mastering oneself;34 positive freedom as to master oneself;35 and

positive freedom as to coerce individuals to lead certain determinate forms of life.36

While on the surface level my discussion here may seem irrelevant to Berlin’s reading

of Rousseau’s idea of freedom, I shall argue that, quite to the contrary, the discussion

of the three forms of positive freedom establishes the horizon of Berlin’s

understanding of the idea of freedom, and shapes the second ‘hermeneutic circle’ of

his encounter with Rousseau, from which the meaning of Berlin’s reading of

Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense emerges.

In the first section of chapter one, ‘Examining Berlin’s Idea of Human Nature’, by

following Gadamer and Jauss, I have pointed out, that the reader brings his

presuppositions to his reading of a text. Built upon this point, Gadamer defines a

reader’s horizon as the range of vision constituted by his presuppositions, which

enables the reader to situate himself within a text, and to make the meaning of the

text.37 In other words, a reader’s presuppositions shape his horizon of reading a text;

the production of meaning, in the first place, is determined through this horizon.

34
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp. 207-208.
35
Ibid., pp. 214-215.
36
Ibid., p. 219.
37
Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 269-272.

64
 Applying the above insights to Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom, I

propose that the horizon of Berlin’s understanding of the notion of freedom enables

him to construct Rousseau’s idea of freedom, and to make meaning of it. On the other

hand, one should perceive, that Berlin uses his distinction between negative freedom

and positive freedom as a theoretical tool to examine Rousseau’s notion of freedom.

2.2.1 Defining Negative and Positive Freedom

In ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin formulates two different questions, namely,

first, what is the source of control to determine someone to act, or to be; and second,

what is the area within which someone is able to act, or to be, without interference by

other people.38 The first question is identified with the source of power to act, whereas

the second one is concerned with the limits of external power. In formulating these

questions, Berlin distinguishes the idea of freedom into two types, i.e. positive freedom

and negative freedom. Positive freedom refers to the first question. It is a complicated

idea, and proposes three forms of freedom, which share one fundamental idea, that is,

to be free is to do something in order to achieve a purpose. Negative freedom concerns

the second question; it is the idea that someone is left a space free from external

constraint.39

In order to explain in more detail how Berlin perceives the conceptual opposites,

one needs to consider that the area in the conception of negative freedom not only

covers the visible physical space, – where an individual is left either to do something

or not to act –, but also points to an invisible space, which in Skinner’s words is a

space free from the inhabitation of others’ will,40 – which is where an individual has

his freedom of will. I shall propose that this point can be inferred from Berlin’s

qualification of the concept of coercion:

38
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 194.
39
Ibid.
40
Q. Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 2008, p. 128.

65
 The criterion of oppression is the part that I believe to be played by other human
beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the intention of doing so, in frustrating
my wishes.41

This point needs further teasing out, to fully understand Berlin’s assumption. An

area of non-interference then does not only refer to the area which is free of coercion, –

where it is possible for us to exercise our powers at will –, but also points to the area

free from arbitrary manipulation, – where we are free in the sense of having the

freedom of will.

It is worth pointing out that being free from the constraint of physical space does not

infer as such, that one has negative freedom. According to Berlin’s reasoning, this is so,

because an individual may be controlled by someone’s will, while there exists a space

where the individual can do what he likes. For instance, in terms of slavery, a slave

may be left with a free space to act, but this does not mean he is free. To be free, one

also has to be free from the control of someone’s will. This is what Berlin adds to

Hobbes’ definition of freedom. In Leviathan, Hobbes defines freedom as a sufficient

state, where no external impediment stands in the way of one’s being free to move.42

Now further considerations have to be followed to understand Berlin’s thought more

completely. On the other hand, the area where someone is able to do something, or

simply to be, does not cover the subject’s internal condition. In other words, whether

someone has the ability to do something or not is irrelevant. Berlin states:

If I say that I am able to jump to more than ten feet in the air, or cannot read because
I am blind, or cannot understand the darker pages of Hegel, it would be eccentric to
say that I am to that degree enslaved or coerced.43

In this sense then, negative freedom only concerns external conditions, where these

render freedom of choice possible. Unlike negative freedom, positive freedom points

to the ability of action, in other words, a subject is capable of achieving certain

purposes through self-mastery.

41
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 195.
42
T. Hobbes, Leviathan, R. Tuck (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1996, p. 91.
43
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 194.

66
2.2.2 The Validity of Negative and Positive Freedom

A problem arises from Berlin’s conceptual distinction between negative freedom

and positive freedom, i.e. whether this dichotomy of freedom is valid. To discuss the

problematic, I turn to the critic MacCallum who, in his classic essay, ‘Negative and

Positive Freedom’, claims that the idea of freedom ought to be regarded as one formula,

and that one is free from any constraint or obstacle either to do or not to do. This

formula of freedom has three elements: an agent, a constraint, and an action. Thus the

idea of freedom is viewed by MacCallum as a triadic relation, where the existence of

an area free from constraint allows an agent to act or not to act, to become or not to

become.44 This is to say, that MacCallum’s definition of freedom dissolves the

distinguishing line between negative freedom and positive freedom.

In the ensuing discussion of the problematic, Berlin replies to MacCallum’s

challenge, that not necessarily being constituted of three elements, freedom can only

have two elements, namely, an agent and a constraint, thus it can be formulated in such

a way that an agent is free from constraint.45 Berlin elaborates his take of the idea in

the introduction to Four Essays on Liberty, where he states: ‘Freedom is the

opportunity to act, not action itself; the opportunity of action, not necessarily that

dynamic realisation of it.’46 Negative freedom is a state in which someone enjoys a

space free of interference; it points to the possibility of opportunities, which is, in

Berlin’s words, ‘the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities’.47 Here,

the idea of negative freedom is an ‘opportunity concept’, as Charles Taylor

characterises it, where being free is being free from external obstacles.48

Moreover, MacCallum raises another challenge in that he proposes that Berlin’s

distinction of freedom forces all views into two camps. To elaborate this challenge, I

44
MacCallum, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’, p. 102.
45
I. Berlin, Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty, H. Hardy (ed.), Oxford, Oxford U.P., 2006, p. 36.
46
I. Berlin, Four Essays On Liberty, H. Hardy (ed.), London, Oxford U.P, 1969, p. xlii.
47
Ibid.
48
C. Taylor, ‘What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty’, in D. Miller (ed.), Liberty, p. 144.

67
shall turn to Berlin’s texts. In ‘Two Concepts of Freedom: Romantic and Liberal’, he

states:

I do not propose to discuss either the history of this protean word (freedom) or the
more than two hundred senses of it recorded by historians of ideas. I propose to
examine no more than two of these senses – but they are central ones, with a great
deal of human history behind them.49

As I understand it, Berlin does not intend to generalise the many senses of the idea

of freedom by way of distinguishing two types of freedom; and read in this sense,

MacCallum’s claim seems to exaggerate the case. I wish to discuss a further point of

view on this problematic. In contrast to MacCallum’s challenges, the critic Skinner is

concerned with the question of whether Berlin’s definition of positive freedom

captures this idea effectively. In ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’, Skinner observes, that

Berlin uses three formulations to define the idea of positive freedom, – namely, as I

have already stated above: ‘to follow a certain form of life’; ‘being one’s own master

as opposed to being acted upon by external forces’; and ‘to master oneself’.50

However, in Skinner’s view, the three characterisations of positive freedom cannot

effectively separate the concept of positive freedom from the idea of negative freedom.

Regarding the first formula, – i.e. ‘to follow a certain form of life’ –, Skinner argues

that it fails to be distinguished from negative freedom, because Berlin defines negative

freedom as ‘being free from constraint’, and positive freedom as ‘being free to do

something’, but the phrase ‘being free from constraint’ can be equally changed into the

expression ‘being free to do’.51 Skinner explains his point with an example, namely,

the sentence ‘you will not be impeded from leaving this lecture if you don’t like it’ has

the same meaning, when the sentence is expressed as ‘you will be free to leave’; thus

Skinner argues, that Berlin’s definitions cannot be used to distinguish two types of

freedom.

49
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp. 193-194.
50
Skinner, ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’, pp. 239-240.
51
Ibid., p. 239.

68
 In my view, Skinner’s argument seems to be valid, because the idea that one is free

to do something means that one must be free from constraint. In this sense, negative

freedom and positive freedom express the same idea. However, this only happens

under the condition that the purpose of having negative freedom is to do something.

To resolve the problematic, I am returning to Berlin’s original definition of negative

freedom in ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, where negative freedom is defined as the

absence of obstacles to the fulfilment of man’s desire.52 This formula requires one to

act in order to satisfy one’s desire; thus it can be changed into the formula of positive

freedom, where one is free to act in order to satisfy one’s desire. Berlin’s definition of

negative freedom then is difficult to distinguish from his idea of positive freedom.

Berlin seems to be aware of the above problem. In his introduction to Four Essays

on Liberty, he corrects the missing clarity of his definition, while reinforcing his point

of view of negative freedom. He states:

The sense of freedom, in which I use this term, entails not simply the absence of
frustration (which may be obtained by killing desires), but the absence of obstacles
to possible choices and activities – absence of obstructions on roads along which a
man can decide to walk. Such freedom ultimately depends not on whether I wish to
walk at all, or how far, but on how many doors are open, how open they are, upon
their relative importance in my life, even though it may be impossible literally to
measure this in any quantitative fashion.53

As I read this statement, negative freedom is only concerned with the extent of

opportunity of free action, not with action itself. With this qualification, it seems to be

pointless to speak of action, when one talks about negative freedom.

At the beginning of this second section of chapter two, I set out Berlin’s proposal of

three forms of positive freedom, – namely, positive freedom as being a state of

mastering oneself;54 positive freedom as to master oneself;55 and positive freedom as

to coerce individuals to lead certain determinate forms of life.56 Now I am turning to

52
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp. 194-195.
53
Berlin, Four Essays On Liberty, pp. xxxix-xl.
54
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp. 207-208.
55
Ibid., pp. 214-215.
56
Ibid., p. 219.

69
Berlin’s second suggestion of positive freedom, as being one’s own master, as opposed

to being acted upon by external forces.57 This can be read as a state in which one is

free from external hindrances and internal desires. According to Skinner’s reading, the

situation of being one’s own master is that of someone, who possesses negative

freedom. If we were to take this reading on board, then Berlin’s second

characterisation of positive freedom still fails to separate it from negative freedom.

Skinner proposes, that the phrase ‘being one’s own master as opposed to being acted

upon by external forces’ can be equally changed into the expression ‘being a state free

from external hindrances’.58

However, as I argue, here we encounter a misunderstanding on Skinner’s side.

‘Being in a state free from external hindrances’ does not mean, that one is in a state of

being one’s own master. Conversely, the notion of being one’s own master arises from

the situation where the external constraint is so strong that the area of free action

shrinks, or is eliminated, – in other words, where ‘negative freedom’ gradually

disappears. This process can be extracted from the following statement by Berlin in

‘Two Concepts of Liberty’:

The tyrant threatens me with the destruction of my property, with imprisonment,

with exile or death of those I love. But if I no longer feel attached to property, no
longer care whether or not I am in prison. If I have killed within myself my natural
affections, then he cannot bend me to his will, for all that is left is no longer subject
to empirical fears or desires.59

Within Berlin’s model of three forms of positive freedom, I consider the notion of

being one’s own master as the first level of positive freedom, which arises from an

extreme condition, where negative freedom gradually shrinks or is eliminated. Under

such an extreme condition, the agent still has the ability to act and to decide for himself,

by way of a cultivation of his inner state. This, as the above passage demonstrates,

reaches the point of being free from ‘empirical fears or desires’. This is freedom in a

spiritual sense.

57
Ibid., pp. 214-215.
58
Skinner, ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’, p. 239.
59
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 207.

70
 To draw a conclusion from these reflections, I propose, that Berlin argues, that in

order to reach a state of being one’s own master, one needs to work with an effort of

self-direction. In other words, the effort of self-direction is an important step to move

from ‘being in a state free from external hindrances’, to ‘being in a state of being one’s

own master’. The concept of self-direction is a negative attitude, or invisible resistance,

towards an external disturbance, while also being a self-detachment from one’s

desires.60 In a conclusion to these complex issues, I propose, that one may –

consequently – attain a self-transformation with regard to one’s empirical fears and

desires.

With respect to the idea of self-direction, the critic C.B. Macpherson argues that

Berlin’s idea of self-directional freedom is an individual’s ability to live purposely, to

act and to decide independently.61 It can be viewed as a spiritual form of freedom,

which is demonstrated by the way, that it depends on the agent’s ability to control the

influence of any external and internal constraint by self-direction. One cannot act, or

decide, independently due to the prevailing conditions, but one can respond to these

conditions with a positive purpose to find inner peace. Understood in this sense,

positive freedom can be consistent with political despotism, while also being a form of

resistance the weak adopt to confront the strong. Being one’s own master does not

mean that one is free from any constraint; it means that one responds to irresistible

constraints by self-direction in order to be free. In my view, Skinner’s claim that ‘to be

one’s own master’ is changeable to ‘one is free from constraint’, does not seem to

capture the spirit of Berlin’s definition of positive freedom as ‘to be one’s own

master’.

Finally, I am now turning to Berlin’s third formula, and shall focus on Skinner’s

contrary point of view. Skinner critiques Berlin’s third formula, – to define positive

freedom as the idea of ‘mastering oneself’ –, which he claims to fail, as does the

second formula. In Skinner’s reading, the idea of ‘mastering oneself’ presupposes that

60
Berlin, Four Essays On Liberty, p. xxxviii.
61
C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973, pp. 108-109.

71
obstacles to acting freely may be internal; thus to be free is to say, ‘free from any

internal constraint’, but Skinner argues that when the notion of an internal constraint

extends to the range of things that can be identified with external constraints, we are

still speaking about the need to get rid of an element of constraint.62 We still discuss

freedom as free from obstacles within the scope of the idea of negative freedom.

I shall suggest that an important question arises from Skinner’s argument, namely,

under what conditions an internal obstacle could be counted as an external obstacle.

The identification of an obstacle with either being internal or external depends on the

referential bearer. For instance, a drug addict’s obstacle can be assumed as being

internal, – as self-indulgence to drug addiction –, but such an internal obstacle turns

into an external one, when it points to the influence of his family members. Skinner’s

statement then, of ‘while the notion of an internal obstacle extends the range of things

that can count as constraint’, changes the concept - bearer of the obstacle. By contrast,

Berlin’s conception of positive freedom points to an internal obstacle, while the

concept of negative freedom refers to an external constraint; the person who bears the

obstacle changes as the two concepts change. To come then to a conclusion for this

problematic, I propose that in the case of positive freedom it is the agent who bears his

internal hindrance, while in the case of negative freedom it is others who impose an

obstacle on the agent. If we were to accept this line of argument, then we could say

that Berlin’s definition of positive freedom as mastering oneself appears as valid.

2.2.3 Positive Freedom in a Collective Sense

Now I am turning to Berlin’s third formula, which carries his definition of positive

freedom in its second form. I have defined in my earlier discussion the notion of being

one’s own master as the first form of positive freedom, and the second form of positive

freedom as mastering your self. There is a crucial difference between these two forms

62
Skinner, ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’, p. 239.

72
of freedom. The first form is a state, where one has retreated into one’s inner serenity,

and become the master of one’s inner world, regardless of any external disturbance.

By contrast, positive freedom in its second form can be defined as a process, where

one struggles and fights with an external constraint, and an internal obstacle. This

process is often directed towards an aim to be realised. On the other hand, this type of

freedom is viewed by Berlin as based on the rationalist view of human nature, which is

its philosophical foundation.63 As I have discussed earlier, this founding thought

regards human nature as constituted by an empirical self and a rational self; – the

empirical self is here understood in the sense of demonstrating desire and passion,

whereas the rational self is here conceived as demonstrating reason. The central claim

of this philosophical foundation holds that the essence of human nature is reason.

Taking this approach as a guideline, thus freedom is to realise a form of rational life by

self-control over desire and passion. In conclusion, the first form of positive freedom

may not presuppose an essence to be realised, whereas its second form holds the belief

that there is an essence to fulfil.

I have already discussed the two different, and competing, notions of positive

freedom in the individual sense. Now shall I turn to an analysis of positive freedom in

its collective form. Berlin defines it as the idea of forcing individuals to lead certain

determined forms of life, which are normally regarded as forms of a collectively

rational life.64 In this manner, the idea of positive freedom in a collective sense, and

the idea of positive freedom as ‘mastering your self’, both hold the point of view that

to be free is to realise a rational form of life; the only difference lies in the fact that the

agent of a collective form of positive freedom is a collective agent, whereas the agent

of the latter idea, i.e. the idea of positive freedom as mastering oneself, is an

individual.

63
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 218.
64
Ibid., p. 233.

73
 Berlin identifies as the striking feature of positive freedom that it is attached to the

over-arching goal of fulfilling either a personal higher self or a collective self. Berlin is

here concerned with the idea’s authoritarian tendencies in political history, which he

strongly criticises. Berlin has made a unique contribution to our understanding of

positive freedom in this sense, as Skinner claims, that: ‘to see, therefore, where Berlin

has something challenging to add to the argument [of liberty], we need to turn to his

account of what he describes as positive liberty.’65

To sum up my discussion of the second section of chapter two, I shall demonstrate

Berlin’s discussion of negative freedom and positive freedom. In particular, I shall

propose that the positivity of the first form of positive freedom presents itself as being

exposed to an external constraint, by adjusting one’s inner self to the changes of outer

influences. However, to retreat into one’s inner life does not imply that its aim is to

realise reason. The other two forms of positive freedom share the idea, that to be free is

to realise reason, – with the only difference, that ‘positive freedom’ as ‘being one’s

own master’ is to fulfil reason in an individual sense –, whereas ‘positive freedom’ as

‘coercion into a determined form of life’ is to realise reason in a collective sense. The

above analyses serve as analytical and philosophical grounds. With these grounds in

mind, we shall have a clear picture of how Berlin examines Rousseau’s idea of

freedom in its individual sense, and in its collective sense. I shall turn to Berlin’s

examination of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual sense in the next section,

and explore Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its collective sense in

chapter five.

2.3 Deducing Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom in the Individual Sense

In the third section of this chapter, I shall draw the consequences from the first two

sections, – i.e. of Berlin’s interpretation of the content of Rousseau’s theory of human

nature and his theory of freedom –, in analysing and critiquing Berlin’s interpretation
65
Skinner, ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’, p. 238.

74
of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual sense. Methodologically, this section

applies Iser’s conception of ‘aesthetic response’ to trace the reasons for Berlin’s

reading of Rousseau. Finally, I also point to the uniqueness of Berlin’s reading in that

he situates his reading within his understanding of positive freedom.

2.3.1 Reading of Rousseau’s Freedom - ‘Aesthetic Response’

In the first section of chapter one, I have analysed and discussed a specific feature of

Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s theory of human nature, namely, the way Berlin reads it

as a historical construction, because Berlin situates his reading on the background of

the Enlightenment. I conclude, that Berlin’s interpretative strategy is directed at a

macro perspective without focusing on the details of Rousseau’s texts.

In the second section of this chapter, I have examined the philosophical basis of the

idea of positive freedom as to master ‘your self’. In Berlin’s view, the determining

feature of this approach is, that human nature is constituted by a rational self and an

empirical self, with the rational self being ranked above the empirical self. If we

examine the way in which Berlin interprets the idea of positive freedom in order to

master oneself, then this, I shall argue, points to another feature of Berlin’s

interpretative strategy, namely, that Berlin situates Rousseau’s theory of human nature

within his analysis of the philosophical ground of positive freedom. In ‘The Idea of

Freedom’, Berlin expresses this strategic move in the following terms:

his [Rousseau’s] assumption that men in some way own two natures – the higher
and the lower, of which so many religions and philosophies have spoken – and that
the suppression of the lower nature ‘liberates’ the higher for the performance of its
sacred task is a piece of mythology […].66

While situating Rousseau’s idea of human nature within the philosophical basis of

positive freedom, Berlin defines Rousseau’s idea of freedom as realising the higher

self through the process of determining the empirical self. Elsewhere, Berlin

66
Berlin, ‘The Idea of Freedom’, p. 136.

75
characterises the higher self in Rousseau’s theory of human nature as rational.67 In the

second section of this chapter, I have analysed Berlin’s idea of positive freedom. In

particular, I have pointed to the logical connection between positive freedom as to

master oneself and the rationalist view of human nature, which is here expressed.

In ‘Rousseau’, Berlin offers a powerful definition of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in

its individual sense:

A man is free who gets what he wants; what he truly wants is a rational end. If he
does not want a rational end, he does not truly want. If he does not want a rational
end, what he wants is not true freedom, but false freedom.68

Berlin interprets Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual sense as realising a

rational self. Such a claim is coherent with Berlin’s analysis of positive freedom as to

master one’s self.

In my view, Berlin develops his own idiosyncratic theories; thus one could argue,

that he is strongly guided by his theoretical perspectives during the reading of other

thinkers’ ideas. From the way Berlin connects his reading of Rousseau’s theory of

human nature with his definition of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual sense,

we can conclude that Berlin’s definition of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its

individual sense emerges from the second ‘hermeneutic circle’ of his encounter with

Rousseau, that is, Berlin’s analysis of positive freedom.

Clearly, Berlin cannot ignore the structure of Rousseau’s texts from which

Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual sense derives. But as a reader he absorbs

the structure selectively. In chapter one, I have already entered the problematic of

reading a text, and producing meaning, by examining the approaches by Gadamer and

Jauss. Through Gadamer and Jauss, I established the point that Berlin characterises

Rousseau’s theory of human nature through his own preconceived notion. Here, I turn

specifically to Iser’s theory of ‘aesthetic response’ in order to explain the phenomena

of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s freedom in its individual sense.

67
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 210.
68
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 47.

76
 According to Iser, our comprehension is directed by the structures of the text,

however, these structures cannot determine the complete control of meaning

production, because they do not fulfil their function, until the reader is affected by

them.69 It is the reader who chooses certain structures within a text that have an

affective influence on him. Based on this insight, Iser argues that the text is a skeleton

of a ’schematized aspect’, whereby the aesthetic response is defined as the actual

realisation of the meaning of the skeleton by the reader, with a purposive selection of

functional structures of the text.70

The above methodology has, in my view, the interpretative power to support

Berlin’s way of unfolding the logic of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual

sense. Berlin does not anchor his reading of Rousseau’s freedom totally within the

structures of Rousseau’s texts, but selectively makes his purposive choice of certain

structures, while at the same time situating his reading of Rousseau’s freedom within

his understanding of positive freedom.

Through the above lens, Berlin’s reader can gain a new insight with regard to his

portrait of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual sense. However, this portrait

sacrifices part of the structures of Rousseau’s texts, which may prevent us from seeing

the logical lines of Rousseau’s way of expressing his idea of freedom. It is perhaps

wise to keep this in mind when we approach Rousseau through Berlin.

2.3.2 Critiquing Berlin’s Version of Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom

In my view, the content of Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in

its individual sense as realising a rational self has a close association with the term of

moral freedom used by Rousseau in the Social Contract. Moral freedom is there

defined by Rousseau as autonomy or acting according to rational principles, which one

69
Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 21.
70
Ibid., pp. 21-26.

77
prescribes for oneself;71 it contains two aspects. One aspect is obvious, according to

the above definition; moral freedom requires the strength of will to control one’s

passion, and the ability to shape one’s life based on reason. The other aspect is implicit;

to realise moral freedom demands certain moral and political conditions. The critic

Simpson defines these conditions as the conditions within the social contract described

by Rousseau. That is to say, moral freedom becomes feasible and meaningful only in

the social pact. Simpson states:

The most unusual part of Rousseau’s view, and one that many scholars
misunderstand, is that he believed a person could achieve moral freedom only within
political society and, in particular, only within the social pact that he described; a
person cannot be autonomous on his own or independent of his circumstances. This
is the important difference between his philosophy and the familiar ethic of the
Stoics.72

Simpson has made an accurate judgement of the conditions determining Rousseau’s

idea of moral freedom. Rousseau’s personal experience offers an important clue for

confirming this.

In Confessions, Rousseau narrates his early experience as a secretary to the Venice

ambassador. This offers him the opportunity to observe the defects in the Republic of

Venice, and inspires him to have an original idea. He states: ‘I had seen that everything

is rooted in politics and that, whatever might be attempted, no people would ever be

other than the nature of their government made them.’73 The original idea eventually

developed, and was systematised in the Social Contract, twenty years after the

experience in Venice. In the opening paragraph of the Social Contract, Rousseau states:

‘I want to inquire whether there can be some legitimate and sure rule of administration

in the civil order, taking men as they are and laws as they might be’74

The experience in Venice is an opportunity that motivates Rousseau to ponder the

question concerning what renders political power legitimate. This is the core question,

71
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p. 151.
72
Simpson, Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, p. 94.
73
J.-J. Rousseau, The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. J.M. Cohen, London, Penguin, 1953, p. 377.
74
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p. 141.

78
that the Social Contract aims to answer, – and its concern is with the legitimacy of

political power rather than freedom. However, the assumption of Rousseau’s inquiry is

that freedom is determined by the legitimacy of political power, which, as Rousseau

demonstrates it in the Social Contract, defines the nature and the scope of freedom he

discusses. Thus, to examine Rousseau’s notion of moral freedom, one ought to firstly

analyse Rousseau’s idea of the legitimacy of government to understand how his idea of

moral freedom derives from the former condition.

The social pact Rousseau describes is the political condition, under which moral

freedom is stimulated to develop. Since I follow here Berlin’s line of reading of

Rousseau’s freedom in the individual sense, I do not intend to examine this condition.

This will be explored in chapter five. Here, I only want to point out that the missing

element in Berlin’s reading does not address the condition.

In an earlier discussion, I have pointed out two aspects of Rousseau’s notion of

moral freedom, and demonstrated one aspect, i.e., the political and moral condition of

moral freedom. Now I shall turn to the discussion of the other aspect, – i.e., one’s inner

power of acting according to one’s prescribed rational principles. The concept of

reason is crucial in understanding this aspect of Rousseau’s moral freedom, because to

control desire and passion is just one aspect of acting rationally; what is more

important is to act guided by the capacity of reason. Since Rousseau’s definition of

moral freedom is condensed in the Social Contract,75 in order to unfold this aspect,

one has to turn to his other works to comprehend, what he means by reason.

In ‘Moral Letters’, Rousseau states: ‘The art of reasoning is not reason at all, often it

is its abuse. Reason is the faculty of ordering all the faculties of our soul suitably to the

nature of things and their relations with us.’76 Clearly, for Rousseau reason is not only

to know things, but to intellectually guide the other faculties of human nature to

develop into a state of harmony and order.

75
Ibid, p. 151.
76
J.-J. Rousseau, ‘Moral Letters’, in C. Kelly (ed. and trans.), Autobiographical, Scientific, Religious, Moral, and
Literary Writings, Hanover, Dartmouth College Press, 2006, p. 182.

79
 Yet, reason does not only rest on the above intellectual dimension, but it has another

dimension. Rousseau states:

Man is by his nature sociable, or at least made to become so, he can be so only by
means of other innate sentiments relative to his species; for if we consider only
physical need, it ought certainly to disperse men instead of bringing them together.
It is from the moral system formed by this double relation to oneself and to one’s
fellows that the impulse of conscience is born. To know the good is not to love it;
man does not have innate knowledge of it, but as soon as his reason makes him to
know it, his conscience leads him to love it. It is this sentiment which is innate.77

To know what is good does not mean one would behave in line with this knowledge;

one’s behaviour can contradict the knowledge, one’s reason leads one to behave. Here,

Rousseau reinforces the relationship between conscience and reason in a normative

sense, that is to say, reason ought to guide one’s behaviour in accordance with one’s

conscience.

After clarifying the concept of reason in Rousseau’s moral philosophy, we must

acknowledge that Rousseau’s idea of moral freedom is subtle and complicated. Thus,

under the condition of the social pact Rousseau describes in the Social Contract, moral

freedom is possible. This condition is the outer element, that motivates the

development of moral freedom, but this does not imply that moral freedom can be

realised. The realisation of moral freedom also depends on one’s capacity to align

reason with conscience.

The critic Wokler captures Rousseau’s idea of moral freedom on its sentimental

level. He states:

The most distinctive feature of his [Rousseau’s] concept of moral liberty […] is its
element of self-prescription. For Rousseau, every morally free agent was required to
determine the rules that would guide him by looking inward into the depth of his
own conscience in a self-reliant manner, free from the influence of all other
persons.78

77
J.-J. Rousseau, Emile or On Education, trans. A. Bloom, New York, Basic Books, 1979, p. 290.
78
R. Wokler, ‘Rousseau and His Critics on the Fanciful Liberties We Have Lost’, in R. Wokler (ed.), Rousseau and
Liberty, Manchester, Manchester U.P., p. 196.

80
 The sentimental level of reason is a crucial aspect in understanding Rousseau’s

notion of moral freedom, and the above passage demonstrates Wokler’s accurate sense

of understanding moral freedom from the perspective of sentiment.

However, I argue that Wokler misses the other aspect of moral freedom, namely, the

intellectual aspect, and thus presents an incomplete understanding of Rousseau’s idea

of freedom. In my earlier analysis, I have demonstrated that the concept of reason is

crucial to understanding Rousseau’s moral freedom. I have qualified reason in

Rousseau’s account as acting in line with order through intellect, and guiding one’s

behaviour in accordance with one’s conscience through one’s moral sense. With this

understanding of reason, apart from Wokler’s interpretation of Rousseau’s idea of

moral freedom in its sentimental dimension, I argue that Rousseau’s concept of moral

freedom also has the requirement of using one’s intellectual ability to guide one’s

behaviour in line with order.

Thus, I shall propose that a combination of Simpson’s understanding of Rousseau’s

moral freedom, – in Rousseau’s theory of the social contract –, with the above

interpretations of moral freedom on the level of sentiment and intellect, will lead to a

better understanding of the character, and the content, of moral freedom, as articulated

in Rousseau’s works.

Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense seems

to rest at the surface; he interprets Rousseau’s freedom as to realise a rational self, but

sets aside Rousseau’s emphasis on the dimension of moral sentiment in shaping the

content of freedom. Berlin does not concede Rousseau’s qualification of reason as the

faculty to function in line with our moral sentiment. Because of resisting the alignment

of both aspects, Berlin does not appreciate the subtle details that Rousseau addresses in

the content of moral freedom.

Berlin does not fully analyse the condition from which Rousseau’s freedom in its

individual sense derives; we therefore cannot see the line of Rousseau’s thought of

freedom. Berlin’s theoretical perspective of his understanding of positive freedom

81
impacts on the way he assimilates Rousseau’s idea of freedom; what he actualises as

the potential meaning in Rousseau’s texts through his reading process ought to be read

as much as telling his story about positive freedom as telling Rousseau’s.

82
Part Three: Berlin’s Theory of Pluralism

Chapter Three:

Berlin’s Theory of Pluralism

I have addressed Gadamer’s definition that the interplay between the reader’s

preconceptions and the text forms a ‘hermeneutic circle’. Following Gadamer’s

definition of the ‘hermeneutic circle’, the theory of human nature constitutes my first

‘hermeneutic circle’ of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau, whereas the discussion of the

three forms of positive freedom shapes the second ‘hermeneutic circle’. The analysis

of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense is explored,

and embodied, in the first ‘hermeneutic circle’ and the second one. I shall propose in

this chapter, that pluralism is to be my third ‘hermeneutic circle’.

There are two reasons for establishing the third ‘hermeneutic circle’. First, positive

freedom in its individual dimension may not have a logical connection to positive

freedom in its collective sense, – that is, to be the master of oneself does not

necessarily lead to the wish of modelling others. However, Berlin claims that the two

types of freedom are in Rousseau’s thought logically connected, because, in Berlin’s

view, the logical link derives from, and is supported by, Rousseau’s theory of moral

values.1

Second, in the light of Berlin’s statement, I shall propose that an examination of

Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s theory of moral values provides a theoretical context,

with which we are able to understand how Berlin links Rousseau’s idea of freedom in

its individual sense with the concept in its collective sense. However, before

examining Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral thought, it is necessary to analyse

Berlin’s theory of pluralism. I propose that this theory, which I analyse in this chapter,

shapes the third ‘hermeneutic circle’; and within the third circle, I shall show that

1
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 216.

83
Berlin is able to characterise and interpret the nature and the content of Rousseau’s

moral thought, while I shall explore Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s thought of

moral values in chapter four.

Having said this with regard to the larger framework of my inquiry, this chapter then

focuses on an examination of three claims of Berlin’s theory of pluralism, which are a

plurality of values, conflicts among values, and an incommensurability among values.

Although such an analysis loses some of the merit that a close textual analysis carries

in order to comprehend the logic of Rousseau’s idea of freedom, yet we gain a new

perspective for assessing Rousseau’s notion of freedom from Berlin’s theoretical

standpoint. Rather than discussing Berlin’s theory of pluralism as a philosophical

theory, and his way of justifying the objectivity of values as true or false, my approach

taken here is to examine what the idea of pluralism means, when it serves as a lens to

interpret the moral foundation of Rousseau’s thought, and his idea of freedom in a

collective sense.

It has to be admitted that Berlin has few writings solely dedicated to his theory of

pluralism, but an apparent feature of the formulation of his theory is, that it is worked

out through his historiographical studies, in particular, those of Vico and Herder. This

is the reason why I turn to these studies to understand the meaning of pluralism.

In summary then, this chapter does not intend to discuss whether Berlin’s

presentations of Vico and Herder as moral pluralists are problematic or not. Rather, I

focus on Berlin’s interpretations of Vico and Herder to evaluate how he develops the

above stated three claims of pluralism, namely plurality, conflicts, and

incommensurability. This chapter also analyses the ways in which Berlin distinguishes

his notion of pluralism from relativism.

To examine the theoretical foundation of pluralism, – namely Berlin’s portraits of

Vico and Herder –, the way in which Berlin distinguishes pluralism from relativism is

necessary. In drawing on Gadamer and Jauss’s view regarding the condition of reading,

I have addressed one crucial point, that reading starts with the reader’s preconceptions.
84
With this insight in mind, the three claims of pluralism, – namely plurality, conflicts

and incommensurability –, function as three propositions that Berlin brings into his

reading of Rousseau’s moral thought, and therefore lead us to see the conditions of his

reading.

I have addressed Gadamer’s point that the production of meaning arises within the

‘hermeneutic circle’. With this point in mind, I shall propose that to examine pluralism,

in the first place, sets up a theoretical context for our understanding of the production

of meaning in Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral thought, which paves the way for

the examination of the interplay between the theoretical context, Rousseau’s texts, and

the resulting meaning-production, to be elaborated in chapter four. Apart from

justifying the relevance of pluralism to my study of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s

notion of freedom, I also propose that to distinguish pluralism from relativism, and

justify its validity from a normative level, enable us to understand the plausibility of

Berlin’s critique of Rousseau’s moral thought.

3.1 The Plurality of Values

To begin the discussion, I am now turning to the first thesis of Berlin’s theory of

pluralism, which claims that there exists a plurality of values. Since the proposition is

based on two theoretical perspectives, that is, Berlin’s interpretations of Vico and of

Herder, this section concerns this foundation, and more specifically will examine, in

the first place, Berlin’s explanation of Vico’s method of ‘imaginative insight’,2 and in

the second place, Herder’s emphasis on the distinctiveness of each culture.3 My

specific purpose for doing this is first to examine how the claim of the plurality of

values emerges and develops from such interpretations, and second, to evaluate the

scope and the limitation of the claim. The first aim influences the way of Berlin’s

reading of Rousseau’s moral thought; Berlin approaches his reading of Rousseau’s

2
Berlin, ‘Giambattista Vico and Cultural History’, p. 59.
3
Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 359.

85
moral thought in asking whether Rousseau’s moral thought is plural or monistic. The

second purpose paves the theoretical way for my critical assessment of Berlin’s

reading of Rousseau’s moral thought. The two impacts will be examined in chapter

four.

3.1.1 Berlin’s Reading of Vico

To start with, what concerns Berlin, and is most relevant in forming his idea of the

plurality of values are two issues, – namely, Vico’s division of knowledge,4 and the

hermeneutic method in the humanities and social sciences, namely ‘imaginative

insight’.5 First, I explore the former issue.

Vico is recognised as a forerunner in that he opposes Descartes and other

positivists.6 Against this background, Vico divides knowledge into two types. The first

type constitutes verum, namely, attainable knowledge through the creators’ knowledge

of what they have made. The second type constitutes certum, namely, knowledge

unattainable to human beings.7 As I understand it, the underlying principle of the

division between verum and certum is that we, as human beings, can only know what

we create. To know is to gain knowledge, and to gain knowledge is to know how a

thing is made and why it is made. To know how and why depends on the fact that we

make a thing in order to know its inner logic. In the light of this principle, Vico’s

principal point of view is, that we can fully attain the knowledge of verum, while our

realisation of the knowledge of certum is incomplete.8

Based on the above theory, physics represents the incomplete knowledge of certum,

for we are not the creators of nature. We can only discover principles from the

presented natural elements, but cannot know their inner logic, or the reason why a

4
I. Berlin, ‘Vico’s Concept of Knowledge’, in H. Hardy (ed.), Against the Current, p. 111.
5
Berlin, ‘Giambattista Vico and Cultural History’, p. 59.
6
Berlin, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas, pp. 8-12.
7
G. Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch, Ithaca, Cornell U.P., 1968, pp.
62-63.
8
Berlin, ‘Vico’s Concept of Knowledge’, pp. 111-113; Berlin, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas,
pp. 99-100.

86
physical thing is created. By contrast, we can demonstrate the inner logic of geometry,

because we make it.9 Through the comparison between physics and geometry, Vico

further classifies mathematics as knowledge belonging to verum, rather than as a

demonstration of the objective structure of the world. In Berlin’s view, this is what is

novel in Vico, for it lowers the status of mathematics, while at the same time,

unintentionally establishing the autonomy of the human studies, in particular the study

of history.10 According to Berlin, this realisation of the status of mathematics is

revolutionary. Almost on his own, Vico rejects the Cartesian view of applying the

geometric method to the field of the humanities.

In this context, Berlin develops his humanistic insight into the conception of history

that is the second issue mentioned above. History is the knowledge of the past. It is an

autonomous process of human creation. Thus we can gain a full knowledge of its inner

logic.11 This view is shared by other researchers such as Said, who captures this

insight as the core of humanism; he states: ‘the core of humanism is the secular notion

that the historical world is made by men and women, and not by God.’12 Human

beings are the creators of their history, not God, and to understand history in this way,

we could gain a sympathetic view of the intelligibility of the past.

To pursue this idea a little further, as Berlin reads Vico, knowledge of the past

comes to us in textual form. The traditional way of studying history is to take an

established text as an object to reconstruct the events of the past, in order to serve a

purpose or to verify the validity of the events it records. In this sense, Descartes’

characterisation of the knowledge demonstrated by a historian has no more value of

information than such as might have been possessed by Cicero’s servant girl, which is

not an unreasonable claim.13

9
Berlin, ‘Vico’s Concept of Knowledge’, p. 111; Berlin, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas, pp.
17-19.
10
Berlin, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas, p. 101.
11
Ibid., pp. 99-101.
12
Said, Humanism and Democratic Criticism, p. 11.
13
Berlin, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas, p. 101.

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 Having entered Berlin’s presentation of Vico’s ideas concerning the division of

knowledge, I am now moving to Berlin’s portrait of Vico’s method of studying history.

Unlike the traditional research perspective of history, in Berlin’s reading, Vico opens a

new door, and challenges Descartes’ view of history. Vico’s revolution consists in

taking the written text of the past as his starting point for reflecting on the art of

literary interpretation. He argues that to interpret history is to interpret its inner

causes.14 In this manner, the purpose of interpreting history is not merely to

reconstruct the past, and verify the validity of the reconstructed events, but to explain

the reasons how the past presents itself in its unique way, and thus to understand the

past in its own right. To understand the past in its own terms requires a specific

method of studying the past, which I will address in the following explanation and

analysis.

To gain a realisation of how human beings have made their past is connected with a

proper understanding of their literatures, pictures, and music, for these are the cultural

products that express the deeper needs of human beings under their specific living

conditions, and in their time. Here we reach some conclusions as to how Berlin’s

notion of the plurality of values is anchored in Vico’s thinking. Values are expressed

through culture. To understand the notion of value and its meaning is to understand its

manifestations and its underlying principles; this in turn means to grasp cultural

objects in their historical context. Thus, the interpretation of history converges with the

explanation of its culture, and to interpret a culture one has to look at its history.

Similarly, to understand a people’s history, one needs to turn to their specific culture,

as history and culture are interwoven.

These ideas need further examination, and I am drawing here on Berlin’s assessment

of Vico’s proposed method of studying history. To interpret the past is not to observe,

but to situate one’s mind in the past, namely, to penetrate into its culture, and to

14
Ibid., pp. 10-11.

88
interpret past history on its own term. This understanding requires a specific method,

as Berlin explains through Vico:

That, therefore, in addition to the traditional categories of knowledge – a

priori-deductive, a posteriori-empirical, that provided by sense perception and that
vouchsafed by revelation – there must now be added a new variety, the
reconstructive imagination. This type of knowledge is yielded by ‘entering’ into the
mental life of other cultures, into a variety of outlooks and ways of life which only
the activity of fantasia – imagination – makes possible. Fantasia is for Vico a way
of conceiving the process of social change and growth by correlating it with, indeed,
viewing it as conveyed by, the parallel change or development of the symbolism by
which men seek to express it; since the symbolic structures are themselves part and
parcel of the reality which they symbolize, and alter with it. This method of
discovery which begins with understanding of means of expression, and seeks to
reach the version of reality which they presuppose or articulate, is a kind of
transcendental deduction (in the Kantian sense) of historical truth.15

This passage presents three correlated views. The first view is clearly presented by

Berlin as the fact that the knowledge of ‘the reconstructive imagination’ exists as a

new type, with its difference from deductive knowledge, and empirical knowledge.

The second thesis is of crucial importance, because it reveals the method that Berlin

uses in obtaining the above new type of knowledge. As the passage suggests, in

Berlin’s mind, Vico’s proposed method of studying the past is not a fantasy without

object, rather, it is viewed by Berlin as a purposive construction of the past through

imagination.16 The idea of imagination is based on an understanding of the core

expression of the past, namely, the past culture. This again, as the third viewpoint, is

connected to a larger picture of grasping the realistic contexts from which the culture is

born.

With the above points of view in mind, the reason becomes clear, why Berlin

characterises the method as ‘a kind of transcendental deduction [in the Kantian sense]

of historical truth’, because the study of the past starts from the imagination applied by

the historian. The imagination has a reasonable scope, but differs from person to
15
Ibid, p. xix.
16
Here, I am aware of the difference between Berlin’s portrait of Vico’s method of studying past ideas and values,
and the approach I am applying in this thesis. Berlin’s portrait of Vico’s method emphasises a detachment of one’s
preconceptions, when situating oneself in the past by imagination, whereas reader-response theory proposes the
impossibility of the detachment of one’s fore-meanings in studying the past.

89
person, which is a given premise. In this sense, the method is not inductive as to

collect facts to present the past, nor deductive as to derive knowledge from certain

principles, but something that exists between the two methods, – that is, to present past

history through the individual historian’s capacity of imaginative construction.

Further conclusions can be drawn, namely, that derived from the above specific

method, one important aspect of the knowledge of ‘the reconstructive imagination’ is

captured by Vico; Berlin characterises it as the notion of cultural pluralism, he

maintains:

Vico is the true father both of the modern concept of culture and of what one might
call cultural pluralism, according to which each authentic culture has its own unique
version, its own scale of values, which, in the course of development, is superseded
by other versions and values, but never wholly so: that is, earlier value-systems do
not become totally unintelligible to succeeding generations.17

With Vico’s methodological point of the imaginative construction of a past, as read

by Berlin, what is conceived is a plurality of cultures made by human beings. From the

above passage, we can tell that the idea of cultural plurality contains three aspects.

First, there exists a plurality of values. Second, each culture is centred on certain core

values. Third, each culture is the expression of these values. On the other hand, Vico’s

proposed method also helps us to grasp the content of the plurality of cultures. Thus,

the knowledge of cultural plurality gained through the method is opposed to the

knowledge absorbed by us passively and reactively.

To take the view of the human maker of his culture, we understand his standpoint,

his way of articulating reality, the kind of discourse he formulates, and the values he

pursues. When one era succeeds another, what changes is its standpoint of viewing

things, and its way of thinking. Accordingly, its way of formulating reality also gains

new features. The difference in the change of culture, and its embodied values in

different historical ages, is neither a refutation nor a transcendence of the past, but a

17
Berlin, ‘Giambattista Vico and Cultural History’, pp. 59-60. Berlin expresses a similar point of view; see, for
instance, Berlin: Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas, p. xix.

90
demonstration of different ways of perceiving and thinking about the world among

people.

Vico’s characterisation of the nature of the world of history and culture, and the

method he applies to study this world, allow Berlin to perceive the different pursuits of

values at different stages of history. This in turn justifies values from historical and

cultural perspectives. I have demonstrated two points of view in my earlier discussion,

that Berlin views history and culture as creations of human beings; second, the

creations are expressions of man’s intention, emotion, and intellect.

In this sense, we can say, that Berlin’s thesis of the plurality of values does not

derive from an observation of the empirical world, but from an imaginative

reconstruction of the psychological worlds of historical and cultural creators, that is,

Berlin tries to grasp the inner reasons for the manifested plurality of values.

3.1.2 Berlin’s Reading of Herder

I have addressed one point, that the thesis of the plurality of values functions as a

theoretical lens with which Berlin approaches his reading of Rousseau’s moral thought,

in asking whether Rousseau’s moral thought is plural or monistic. By contrast to

Berlin’s interpretation of Vico, and more specifically, his explanation of Vico’s

method of imaginative insight, which I pursued in the previous subsection, I am now

moving to the second perspective that shapes Berlin’s thesis of the plurality of values,

namely, Herder’s theory of the distinctiveness of cultures.18 This will lead me further

into evaluating Berlin’s first claim of the plurality of values, its emergence as well as

its dimensions. This evaluation paves the theoretical way for my critical assessment of

Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral thought in chapter four.

Another aspect of Berlin’s notion of the plurality of values derives from his study of

Johann Gottfried Herder. The starting point Berlin takes to read Herder’s thought, as

18
Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 359.

91
with Vico, lies in what Berlin labels as truly original in Herder. It needs to be pointed

out, that there are certain similarities and differences between Berlin’s portrait of Vico

and Herder, and these similarities and differences inspire Berlin’s thesis of the plurality

of values from different angles. I will address the similarities and differences, and their

impact on Berlin’s view of the plurality of values, in the following analysis.

Berlin presents three innovative ideas in Herder’s thought, namely, populism,19

expressionism,20 and pluralism.21 Of Herder’s three innovative ideas I examine the

most relevant one to form Berlin’s thesis of the plurality of values, that is, cultural

distinctiveness, which constitutes a part of Herder’s thought on pluralism. This

examination will also be accompanied by an exploration of the method of studying

culture, as Herder proposes.

If we are to follow Berlin’s reading, Vico’s principle of dividing knowledge into

two types, namely the verum and the certum, is reproduced and taken by Herder as an

analytical tool for the study of cultures. For Herder, studying culture is not knowing

about it, but understanding it through situating oneself into the historical contexts

through which the culture is expressed. Berlin speaks through Herder:

Be a shepherd among shepherds, a peasant in the midst of an agricultural people, an

oriental among the primitive dwellers of the East, if you wish to enjoy these
creations in the atmosphere of their birth.22

This vividly shows, how Herder, in Berlin’s eyes, proposes a method of

understanding cultures, specifically foreign cultures, as an integral part of their larger

surrounding environments and life forms.

As I understand it, Berlin’s characterisation of the method Herder advocates for the

study of cultures appears very close to his characterisation of Vico’s approach to the

19
Populism is the idea of believing in the value of belonging to a group, which is not political but anti-political. See,
for instance: Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 367.
20
The core idea of expressionism, – as understood here –, is that human activity, specifically art, expresses the entire
personality of the group or the individual. See Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 367.
21
Pluralism contains three ideas. First, the multiplicity of values; second, the incommensurability of values; third,
the incompatibility of values. See Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 368,
22
Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, pp. 403-404.

92
study of history, because both thinkers, in Berlin’s portrait, address an ‘imaginative

insight’.23 There is one passage where Berlin reads Herder:

Herder, in this mood (to understand is not to apply a standard based on one’s own
culture but to grasp meaning which is expressed in concrete historical situations),
warns at any rate in 1774 in Auch eine Philosophie, against moral evaluation, and
urges the critic to understand above all if one must condemn or praise, this should be
done only after an exercise of sympathetic insight – of one’s capacity for Einfühlen
(‘empathy’).24

From this statement we can draw the conclusion that applying Herder’s method of

sympathetic insight allows the external observer to enter into concrete historical

situations from which civilisations grow, and thus to perceive the meaning of cultures

through others’ eyes, but not to make moral judgements in the first place.

Following here Berlin’s portrait of Herder’s method in studying culture, we can say

that to situate our thought in a specific cultural form requires of us as observers to

consider the surrounding environments and life forms, which partially shape the

feature of the culture; it also demands of us to have the capacity to capture subtle

psychic changes of the respective creators of a culture.

Vico inspires Berlin to perceive the plurality of cultures, and Herder opens the

perspectives that allow Berlin to capture the uniqueness of each culture. Berlin’s

central point then is that Herder’s belief in situating our thought, and exercising

sympathetic insight, leads him to his articulation of cultural distinctiveness, while the

distinction in turn demonstrates the diversity of civilisations with their embodied

values. Accordingly, Berlin theorises:

The ‘physiognomies’ of cultures are unique: each presents a wonderful exfoliation

of human potentiality in its own time and place and environment. We are forbidden
to make judgements of comparative value, for that is measuring the
incommensurable.25

If we take up this interpretation of Herder, we can argue that Berlin’s first claim of

the plurality of values should not be read as generalising an empirical fact, but as
23
Berlin, ‘Giambattista Vico and Cultural History’, p. 59.
24
Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, pp. 404-405.
25
Ibid., p. 426.

93
having an inner connection with the nature of human beings, as well as manifesting the

nature of the psychological world of human beings.

Considering Berlin’s portrait of Herder, I can conclude that within Berlin’s

interpretative frame of pluralism, values are embodied in their culture. However, given

that Berlin’s thesis of the plurality of values has been regarded as normative,26 in my

view, he sometimes seems to address the notion of understanding cultures by standing

in others’ position in a manner in which it is hard to tell whether his claim of the

plurality of values refers to normative values or descriptive values. For instance, in

‘Herder and The Enlightenment’, Berlin states ‘[T]hat one must not judge one culture

by the criteria of another; that different civilisations are different growths, pursue

different goals, embody different ways of living, are dominated by different attitudes

to life […].’27 Passages like this raise the question as to whether some universal moral

principles can be established, and applied to all cultures, as a way of allowing cultures

to coexist.

3.1.3 The Generic Nature of the Plurality of Values and Berlin’s Response

The above problematic in Berlin’s thesis of the plurality of values has been explored

by Neal in differentiating between descriptive and normative values. His purpose of

making this conceptual distinction is to define the character of value pluralism.

According to Neal, descriptive values, i.e., D-values, represent ends of life actually

pursued, whereas normative values, i.e., N-values, are setting standards or

benchmarks.28 Neal’s point reveals that what actually has been pursued does not

necessarily imply that it contains a normative value. To follow this question further,

Neal points to the consequences of the claim of the plurality of values, in that he notes

that, within the interpretative frame of pluralism, Berlin’s claim neither specifies the

26
Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 11.
27
Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 429.
28
P. Neal, ‘The Path Between Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Order: Questioning the Connection’, San Diego
Law Review, vol. 46, no. 4, 2009, p. 862.

94
number of values nor their substance, which tends to make Berlin’s thesis of the

plurality of values to be generic.

Consequently, the central question is, whether the notion of the plurality of values

can shed light theoretically. In particular, concerning the relationship between the

theory of value pluralism and politics in theory, Neal states:

The fact that there is a plurality of D-values in a society – say seven – does not
necessarily give us reason to affirm a set of familiar liberties designed to facilitate
choice amongst these alternatives. If we treat all of these D-values as N-values, then
it seems true that the state would lack of any obvious justification for limiting the
liberty of citizens to choose amongst them.29

The notion of the plurality of values must contain principles to qualify their alleged

values as normative. Otherwise, as the passage demonstrates, we would not use the

thesis of value pluralism for doing any real work.

Generally speaking, the presupposition of Neal’s criticism lies in differentiating

D-values and N-values. In my view, Neal’s challenge of value pluralism is not

unreasonable. When consulting Berlin’s essays, he does indeed not specify the number

of values. In fact, in his mind, he is not sure how many values there are within the

frame of value pluralism. He maintains that:

There is not an infinity of them – the number of human values, of values which I can
pursue while maintaining my human semblance, my human character, is finite – let
us say 74, or perhaps 122, or 26, but finite, whatever it may be.30

A lack in specifying the number of values renders the claim of the plurality of values

generic. Because of the generic nature, Berlin cannot articulate the content of the

values. Without knowing the content of values within the frame of pluralism, we

would not know how to use Berlin’s thesis of the plurality of values to shed light in

theory and in reality. In this respect, Neal’s criticism of Berlin’s theory might be

justified. If so, then the criterion of the plurality of values Berlin sets up in defining

29
Ibid., p. 863
30
Berlin, ‘My Intellectual Path’, p. 12.

95
and criticizing the nature of Rousseau’s moral thought would not seem to be rich

enough in meaning.

To pursue the above point further, as I have demonstrated, Berlin’s thesis of the

plurality of values should be considered as normative. It functions to shed light on the

phenomena of reality with the aim to assess them. Yet, we have to concede, that the

thesis of a plurality of values does not seem to help us much to tell the difference

between descriptive values and normative values. In my view, in a world of

phenomena with many new values emerging, what is important for us is how to

distinguish D-values from N-values, because the distinction guides us to shape life

with meaning.

However, if we do not know the number of values, – in other words, the range of

N-values –, then we do not know whether some values are within the range or not.

Assuming even that we know the number of N-values within the framework of

pluralism, we still need to understand the content of these N-values, for this helps to

shed light on the theory, and to assess the real world of diverse ways of living. We

could thus conclude that lacking knowledge of the number of values, and their content,

renders the theory of pluralism generic.

However, in my view, one point is worth addressing here. Berlin has his reason for

not articulating the number and the content of values within the frame of value

pluralism. What captures his mind is neither the content nor the number of values, but

the existing state of values, which he justifies, in particular, by way of his readings of

Vico and Herder. Berlin’s main focus is on the difference of values within a historical

succession, and between civilisations within nations. Because of such a focus, the

claim of the plurality of values does not intend to address the number and the content

of values, and it is thus not guilty of not doing this work. Yet, Neal’s criticism still has

a considerable force, since the claim of the plurality of values merely draws an outline

of the existing state of values, and taken in this sense, lacks depth, therefore, we cannot

use it efficiently to access reality.

96
 As a concluding point, we could argue, that Neal’s criticism ignores one important

point. Although Berlin does not have a substantive argument with regard to how many

values there are, and what the values are, within the frame of value pluralism, Berlin

justifies the nature of values from another angle, namely, through offering persuasive

accounts of the objectivity of values, i.e. pluralism defines the values it refers to as

normative.

Berlin develops an account to justify the objectivity of values, which becomes a

theoretical foundation for his theory of value pluralism, and qualifies the values within

the frame of value pluralism, and thus functions as a criterion to distinguish D-values

and N-values. Here, I do not aim to articulate Berlin’s justification for the objectivity

of values, which I shall analyse in the next section. I merely intend to point out that to

miss the point of Berlin’s way of qualifying the nature of values, seems to render the

criticism, that Berlin does not have a substantive argument to distinguish D-values

from N-values, unreasonable.

3.2 Berlin’s Justification: The Objectivity of Values

As discussed in the first section, ‘Plurality of Values’, Berlin’s claim of the plurality

of values is generic, i.e. it does not specify the number or the substance of values, thus

we cannot use such a claim to evaluate, whether a cultural practice bears an intrinsic

value or not. This is the problem that value pluralism has to solve. If the doctrine lacks

a moral judgement to tell descriptive values from normative values, then it is close to

moral relativism, since relativism holds a similar idea, – namely, that a value is internal

to its specific cultural and historical contexts, and no absolute moral criterion exists to

judge its validity.31

The problem we encounter here needs to be further examined. I shall propose that

the key to distinguishing pluralism from relativism lies in that pluralism needs to

31
Taylor, Principles of Ethics: An Introduction, pp. 38-39.

97
qualify the values within its frame as objective. Berlin indeed develops such an

account of the objectivity of values. This section then analyses, how he proves the

objectivity of values with the help of the concept of ‘human horizon’, which Berlin

sometimes names the ‘limits of humanity’,32 while pointing to the notion of a ‘central

core’ of values. This section therefore asks the question, whether Berlin’s argument

may be called sufficient to prove the universality of values. My approach taken here is

not to discuss whether the way Berlin justifies the objectivity of values within the

frame of pluralism may be persuasive or not, but rather to analyse the line of

argumentation he take in order to expose the problems in his argumentation. In this

manner, when I examine how Berlin characterises Rousseau’s moral thought through

his perspective of value pluralism, in the next chapter, I shall be aware of the features

of Berlin’s theoretical perspective.

3.2.1 The Notion of ‘Human Horizon’

To begin with, it has to be said that an obvious feature of Berlin’s account of the

objectivity of values is that it is not systematic. In order to examine his line of

argumentation, a sensible approach, in my view, is to gather his many scattered

remarks, and to establish their inner logic, if there is one. Berlin has two main lines of

argumentation to prove the objectivity of values. One line develops out of his theory of

human nature, and is supported by Berlin’s conception of understanding. The notion of

‘human horizon’ provides the key notion to make his account of the objectivity of

values.33 The other line derives from the idea of the commonality of cultures, whereby

the concept of a ‘central core’ of values underpins the objectivity of values.34

The above-mentioned concepts need some explanation. Generally speaking, the

concept of ‘human horizon’ derives from Berlin’s theory of human nature. In the essay

32
Berlin, ‘Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought’, p. 80.
33
Ibid., p. 80.
34
Crowder and Hardy, ‘Appendix: Berlin’s Universal Values - Core or Horizon?’, pp. 293-295.

98
of ‘Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought’, Berlin defines the

concept of ‘moral horizon’ as a limit of humanity. He states:

Incompatible these ends may be; but their variety cannot be unlimited, for the nature
of men, however various and subject to change, must possess some generic
character if it is called to be human at all. This holds, a fortiori, of difference
between entire cultures. There is a limit beyond which we can no longer understand
what a given creature is at [sic]; what kinds of rules it follows in its behaviour; what
its gestures mean. In such situations, when the possibility of communication breaks
down, we speak of derangement, of incomplete humanity. But within the limits of
humanity the variety of ends, finite though it is, can be extensive.35.

This passage demonstrates Berlin’s view of the concept of ‘moral horizon’ from two

angles. In the first place, to get a deep sense of Berlin’s notion of ‘moral horizon’, one

has to connect it with his theory of human nature. As discussed in the second section

of chapter one, ‘Examining Berlin’s Idea of Human Nature’, the central feature of

Berlin’s theory of human nature claims, that the dynamic nature of human beings is

confined by a common structure of moral thought, and this common human nature is

defined as sharing common moral experiences and moral sentiments and as having

innate concepts and categories that organise our thinking and acting.36 In this light, –

as I understand it –, the diversity of values is bound by some common qualities in the

nature of human beings, that is, Berlin’s theory of human nature presupposes a certain

limit of humanity.

In the second place, the idea of ‘moral horizon’ is formed by the concept of

understanding. As the above passage shows, the line of Berlin’s reason demonstrates

that when understanding fails to penetrate into the validity of certain human practices,

the values embodied in the practices are not perceived as objective values, which, in

Berlin’s words, is described as ‘derangement’, and ‘incomplete humanity’.

So as to gain a deep sense of Berlin’s concept of ‘human horizon’, I propose to

focus on his characterisation of understanding. As observers, we cannot simply accept

an account of what a phenomenon is in its appearance, rather, we need to move beyond

35
Berlin, ‘Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought’, p. 80.
36
Berlin, ‘Giambattista Vico and Cultural History’, p. 58; Berlin, ‘The Concept of Scientific History’, p. 139.

99
the relationship between the observer and the observed. This requires an effort of us, as

external observers, to understand from the inside in term of the agent’s experience.

This implies that we have to change our role from observers to participants through

imagination. In this context, Berlin elaborates:

Members of one culture can, by the force of imaginative insight, understand (what
Vico called entrare) the values, the ideals, the forms of life of another culture or
society, even those remote in time and space. They may find these values
unacceptable, but if they open their minds sufficiently they can grasp how one might
be a full human being, with whom one could communicate, and at the same time
live in the light of values widely different from one’s own, but nonetheless one can
see to be values, ends of life, by the realisation of which men could be fulfilled.37

As the passage demonstrates, in Berlin’s understanding, and ours, if we were to

share this view, the starting point of understanding is not to judge according to one’s

own value system, but to project a context by one’s imagination. The projection is to

situate our mind into specific contexts with imagination. In this way, we feel through

others’ experiences. Thus we can comprehend others’ value system with sympathy.

It needs to be noted that Berlin’s emphasis on understanding entails subjective

elements. This is recognised, as the mind is applied to understand others, for the

assumed experience of others is invariably modified by one’s own mind, – that is to

say, there is a gap between what the real of others’ experience is and what outside

observers understand of the experience. As I have qualified Berlin’s conception of

‘moral horizon’, there arises a problem with respect to whether the concept of ‘moral

horizon’, used to underpin the objectivity of values, is sufficient.

3.2.2 A Non-Sociological Account

I now turn to some of Berlin’s critics. Johnson and Magee, in the essay, ‘Berlin on

Liberalism and Objective Value’, criticise the validity of Berlin’s way of justifying the

37
Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 10.

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objectivity of values.38 They argue that there are two generally accepted ways of

proving the objectivity of values, one metaphysical, another epistemological. The

objectivity of values in the metaphysical sense expresses itself in that something is

valuable, whereas the objectivity of values in the epistemological sense should be

rationally justified. However, in the eyes of Johnson and Magee, Berlin justifies the

objectivity of values in a third sense. This is qualified by them as sociological, because

in Berlin’s line of argumentation, a value is proven as objective based on the

assumption that most people accept the validity of this value. Johnson and Magee note

that the way Berlin proves the objectivity of values fails, because the fact that many

people accept a value does not necessarily imply that the value is objective.

This problematic then needs further examination. In my earlier discussion, I

explored the meaning of Berlin’s notion of ‘moral horizon’. In his essay, ‘The Pursuit

of the Ideal’, Berlin established the logic of his argument about the objectivity of

values:

There is a world of objective values. By this I mean those ends that men pursue for
their own sakes, to which other things are means. I am not blind to what the Greeks
valued – their values may not be mine, but I can grasp what it would be like to live
by their light, I can admire and respect them, and even imagine myself as pursuing
them, although I do not – and do not wish to, and perhaps could not if I wished.
Forms of life differ. Ends, moral principles, are many. But not infinitely many: they
must be within the human horizon. If they are not, then they are outside the human
sphere.39

The line of Berlin’s reasoning has two aspects. One aspect is that values are

objective, because they are pursued not as instrumental but as ultimate. The other

aspect is that if some values fall within the ‘human horizon’, then these values are

objective. Regarding the first line of reasoning, it fails, because the fact that people

desire certain values for their own sake does not mean that these values are objective.

For instance, absolute power is pursued by people for its own sake, but this does not

mean that absolute power is objective.

38
G.R. Johnson and G.A. Magee, ‘Berlin on Liberalism and Objective Value’, Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 34, no.
4, 2000, pp. 404-406.
39
Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 11.

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 In terms of the second line of reasoning, it is not an empirical statement. To

understand this point, one has to get a clear picture of Berlin’s idea of understanding,

and his theory of human nature, for the concept of ‘human horizon’ needs to be

defined by these two notions. In my earlier discussion, I have demonstrated that the

concept of understanding was not an empirical account, but a psychological one.

Similarly, Berlin’s theory of human nature is neither a generalisation of empirical

observation nor a purely metaphysical thought which starts from a priori. Rather, it is

mixed with sociological, psychological, and philosophical accounts, open to empirical

observations, but it is not a generalisation of empirical facts. I have explored this point

of view in the second section of chapter one, ‘Examining Berlin’s Idea of Human

Nature’.

So as to draw the two insights together, I shall propose that the concept of ‘human

horizon’ shares the above characteristics. The notion of ‘human horizon’ is not a

purely empirical idea or a metaphysical one, but it stands between the two. With this

definition in mind, I can conclude, that Johnson and Magee’s critique may not be

considered reasonable, for they ignore the characteristics of Berlin’s concept of

understanding, and of his theory of human nature, and thus have an incomplete

understanding of Berlin’s way of proving the objectivity of values. Berlin’s account of

the objectivity of values is not a purely sociological statement.

In clarifying that Berlin’s way of proving the objectivity of values is not

sociological, it needs to be admitted that to use the concept of ‘human horizon’, as

Berlin does, to argue for the objectivity of values has its own problem. As pointed out

before, the claim of the plurality of values is generic, it does not specify the number

and the content of values within the frame of value pluralism; thus the horizon cannot

prove the objectivity of values specifically, but can merely draw a boundary within the

wider frame of value pluralism, – that is to say, the concept of ‘human horizon’ does

not have specific moral requirements, it only excludes what is not valuable within the

limit of humanity.

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 Crowder has analysed the above problem further, by applying the horizon to a real

example:

The horizon excludes only what is not recognizably human and consequently
permits almost anything. Someone who sees no difference between kicking a pebble
and killing his family is beyond the human pale, because his values or purposes are
literally incomprehensible. But the actions of the Nazis, although morally detestable
to most people, are not incomprehensible in this way. Rather, those actions are
performed in the pursuit of more remote ends that we can understand and so
acknowledge to be human, no matter how misguidedly in the case at hand.40

In arguable and complicated situations, the concept of ‘moral horizon’ can hardly

help shed light on the situations. In this sense, it is a minimal requirement of morality.

3.2.3 A ‘Central Core’ of Values and its Problematic

As I have stated earlier on, Berlin has two main lines of argumentation to prove the

objectivity of values. One line develops out of his theory of human nature for which

the concept of ‘human horizon’ or ‘limit of humanity’ provides the key notion of

justification. The other line derives from the idea of the commonality of cultures,

whereby the concept of a ‘central core’ of values underpins the objectivity of values.41

With regard to the way Berlin defines the notion of a ‘central core’ of values, it needs

to be pointed out, that he does not articulate the notion systematically. But his main

point attached to this notion is, that a ‘central core’ of values concerns the values that

all human beings share regardless of their cultures.42

With the above definition in mind, Berlin’s second line of argumentation of proving

the objectivity of values is that if values are embodied in the notion of a ‘central core’

of values, then they are objective.43 The logic in the reasoning is clear. Compared to

the idea of ‘human horizon’, the notion of a ‘central core’ of values seems narrower,

40
G. Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism, Cambridge, Polity, 2004, p. 133.
41
I. Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, H. Hardy (ed.), London, Pimlico, 2000, p.
277.
42
Ibid.
43
Crowder and Hardy, ‘Appendix: Berlin’s Universal Values - Core or Horizon?’, pp. 293-295.

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because it has certain moral requirements, – namely, that only if the values are

accepted by all people culturally and historically, then they are universal.

However, in my view, the second line of Berlin’s reasoning is not without a problem.

The core of values is not sufficient to prove values as objective. We could argue that a

value that is shared by all people does not mean that it is objective, because objectivity

means universality, and universality applies to everything in the world of phenomena.

Thus, the fact that many, or all, phenomena share a common feature does not mean,

that this feature is universal.

To elaborate the above argument, I give an example. For instance, when we discuss

a universal triangle, we are not discussing the common features that all triangles in the

world of phenomena share, – such as the feature that all triangles are composed of

three straight lines, or enclosed by three angles. This way of thinking is not the way to

prove a universal triangle, because commonality is different from universality. To

define a universal triangle is not to generalise all the common features that triangles

have in phenomena, but to rationalise it through the intellect.

After clarifying the difference between the concept of universality and the idea of

commonality, we can now have a more distinct version of the validity of Berlin’s

reasoning. To assess this validity, we have to analyse Berlin’s definition of a ‘central

core’ of values, for this is the criterion that qualifies values as objective. According to

Berlin’s definition of a ‘central core’ of values, these are the values that are shared by

all people, regardless of time and space. This means that values are recognised

commonly. This is the way to define some values as common values. However, as

shown above, when we keep to the premise that commonality is not universality, to use

the notion of a ‘central core’ of values, as Berlin does, to prove the objectivity of

values may not be sufficient.

We could also argue that, even as a generalisation and abstraction of the world of

phenomena, the concept of a ‘central core’ of values is not robust enough in meaning.

To take up here Crowder’s argument again, he comments with regard to the above
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feature: ‘The historical record provides little evidence of anything actually desired or

admired by all, or even most, human societies except goods or virtues described at the

very highest level of generality.’44 Even to qualify certain values as core values from a

historical dimension, the fact is, that this is hardly possible. If so, to follow Crowder’s

insight, the question is, how we could use Berlin’s concept of a ‘central core’ of values

to shed light on theory or to inform particular moral situations. Obviously, with regard

to the two lines of argumentations concerning the objectivity of values, the theory of

pluralism can hardly solve the above problem.

3.3 The Conflict and Incommensurability of Values

As stated, this chapter focuses on Berlin’s interpretation of Vico and Herder to

evaluate, how he develops from his specific reading the three claims of pluralism, –

namely, the plurality of values, conflicts among values, and the incommensurability

among values. I also analyse in which ways Berlin distinguishes his notion of

pluralism from relativism.

So far I have attended to Berlin’s first claim, the ‘plurality of values’, and his

approach to justifying the objectivity of values. I am now turning to his second and

third claims, ‘conflict of values’, and the ‘incommensurability of values’. This section

then examines how Berlin’s thesis of the conflict of values emerges from his readings

of Vico, as to how the mind generates historical change, and from his reading of

Herder’s view of culture. Apart from Berlin’s justification of objective values within

the dimension of rationality, as already pursued in the second section, ‘Objectivity of

Values’, this section focuses on how Berlin distinguishes pluralism from relativism

through his assessments of Vico and Herder’s thoughts.

3.3.1 Consulting Vico and Herder

44
Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism, p. 134.

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 To begin with, I shall propose that Berlin admires and accepts Vico’s notion of the

reconstruction of the past by imagination, as a research method, which consequently

underwrites his study of classical thinkers’ ideas, and generally his ethical and

philosophical thought. Berlin uses this approach to analyse Rousseau’s idea of freedom

in that he takes the perspective of the author’s position, which allows him to

understand the features of Rousseau’s emotional and intentional worlds, and thus to

comprehend the psychological roots of Rousseau’s notion of freedom. This will be

addressed in chapter four and chapter five.

Berlin also uses the method of the imaginative reconstruction of the past as a tool to

capture the features of people’s inner worlds in certain cultural and historical contexts.

This pursuit leads Berlin not only to perceive the historical phenomenon of value

conflicts, but also to behold the reason underneath the historical phenomenon.

The reason for Berlin’s approach to the study of history lies in his critique of the

eighteenth-century rationalist belief in transforming history into a natural science. In

particular, Berlin reveals the absurdity of one important assumption underwriting the

above belief. He remarks:

It seems to me that we call them [historical events] grotesque (and not merely
implausible or false) because they conflict, not with this or that fact or generalisation
which we accept, but with propositions which are entailed by our whole thinking
about the world – the basic categories that given such central concepts of our
thought as man, society, history, development, growth, barbarism, maturity,
civilisation and the like. These propositions may turn out to be false or misleading
(as, for example, teleology or deism are considered to have been by positivists or
atheists), but they are not refuted by experiment or empirical observation. They are
destroyed or transformed by those changes in the total outlook of a man or a milieu
or a culture which is the hardest (and the most important test) of the history of ideas
(and, in the end, of history as such) to be able to explain.45

The underlying assumption of turning the historical study into a scientific one is

characterized by Berlin as unreasonable, because it views history as a succession of

observable causes and effects. Berlin does not elaborate the characteristics of the

45
Berlin, ‘The Concept of Scientific History’, pp. 108-109.

106
propositions that govern the way in which we perceive the world, but he clearly refutes

the notion, that these propositions are empirically observable.

In the general context of Berlin’s critique of applying a scientific method to history,

Berlin’s notion of conflicting values is formulated by his interpretation of Vico’s thesis

in relation to how the mind and its living conditions govern historical change. This

thesis is established by Vico’s method of studying the past defined as fantasia. In

section one, ‘The Plurality of Values’, I have demonstrated how fantasia as a novel

method allowed Berlin to understand cultures in their contexts, and therefore to grasp

the plurality of values embodied in these cultures. Here, again, fantasia as a useful tool

allows Berlin to grasp more complicated issues, – that is, to penetrate into the

emotional worlds of historical activists. The reason for doing this is based on the

premise that people create their history as the expression of their particular character.

Yet, climate and living conditions influence the content and the level of peoples’

emotional needs, and these needs further shape the nature of the thinking patterns of

human beings. Through deciphering the poetic characteristics of the ancient

mythmakers’ mind, Vico – as portrayed by Berlin –, illustrates this insight. In the

primitive historical context, the natural phenomenon presents itself in the form of

myths, which gives rise to emotions such as fear and guilt, and ignorance. Unable to

explain the natural phenomenon, the mind under this condition forms fantastic images

of gods. Man living in the Homeric age recognises his imperfection while admiring

perfection. This is the characteristic of the mind in the primitive stage.46 In this

understanding, heroic spiritual attitudes such as courage and power are recognised as

essential qualities to reach perfection.47 The values of courage and power are

considered core values, and pursued by people in the primitive age.

However, the mentality of human beings is not totally confined by its conditions,

but possesses its own feature. It actively responds to its contexts, and actively changes

46
Berlin, ‘Vico and the Ideal of the Enlightenment’, p. 124.
47
Ibid., pp. 125-127.

107
the contexts, in order to serve certain purposes. This is clearly stated by Vico:

‘Because of the infinite nature of the human mind, wherever it is lost in ignorance man

makes himself the measure of all things.’48 The mind itself possesses the ability to

define things, and thus to endow them with meaning.

In fact, Berlin elaborates how the above ability of mind forces human beings to be

their own makers, in changing their conditions and developing their history and their

culture. This is demonstrated by Berlin through Vico’s theory of historical coherence.

Historical change is analogous to the change in individual human life, which takes us

through childhood, gradually develops into youth and maturity, then slowly descends

into old age, while then starting a new cycle, again based on the pattern of the three

ages.49 History evolves through human beings; it is not an objective process

independent of the activity of human beings, but is recognised as expressing our

mental qualities.

Berlin gives an example to illustrate the above theory. The era of Homer is founded

upon the nature of barbaric minds. When the barbaric nature of minds changes into a

new form, that is able to think in an abstract and logical way, it brings a new era into

being, namely a stage of youth.50 Against the changes, the old principle of courage

and power – which generated social and political practices in the Homeric era –, is

substituted by the principle of rationality.51 To interpret historical change from the

perspective of the nature of the human mind allows us to capture the reasons for the

change in the pursuit of values, which are thus perceived on the level of human

mentality.

Berlin’s notion of the nature of values emerges from the context of Vico’s theory of

historical coherence, and the insight of recognising the quality of mind as the

generating power to make history change:

48
Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, p. 60.
49
Berlin, ‘Vico and the Ideal of the Enlightenment’, p. 122.
50
Ibid., p. 126.
51
Ibid., pp. 126-127.

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 For change – unavoidable change – rules all human history, not determined by

mechanical causes, as he [Vico] thinks it is for the Stoics or Spinoza, nor due to

chance, as it is for Epicurus and his modern followers. For it follows a divinely

determined pattern of its own. But in the course of this process gains in one respect

necessarily entail losses in another, losses cannot be made good if the new values,

which are part of the unalterable historical process, are, as indeed they must be,

realised. If this is so, then some valuable forms of experience are doomed to

disappearance, not always to be replaced by something necessarily more valuable

than themselves. And this means that it must be always the case that some values are

not compatible, historically compatible, with others.52

History is shown as an unfolding mental process of contradiction, representation and

development. This embodies two claims of Berlin’s theory of pluralism, namely, the

conflict of values, and the incommensurability of values. The words, ‘losses’ and ’not

compatible’, are the core ones which define the two claims. The word ‘losses’ in this

context indicates that there is no substitution for certain value systems dominating in

one stage of history, once these values disappear. In other words, there is no criterion

to weigh against different value systems. This defines the notion of the

incommensurability of values.

On the other hand, the word ’not compatible’ reveals the idea of the conflict of

values; value systems may contain contradictions that refer to an incompatible discord.

Conflicting values can be compatible, that is to say, they may coexist with one another,

such as the possible conflict of values embodied in the cultures of different nations.

This point will be addressed in the following discussions of Berlin’s reading of Herder.

But from the perspective of historical change, Berlin’s focus is on the incompatible

state of conflicting values rather than on their compatible state.

The two notions of the conflict of values and the incommensurability of values rest

on two dimensions, namely a historical and a cultural one. The historical dimension is

52
Ibid., pp. 123-124.

109
vertical, that is, to understand history’s changes through time, whereas the cultural

dimension is horizontal, that is, to compare cultures in different nations. In the above

discussion, I have demonstrated the way Vico inspires Berlin with regard to the

historical dimension, now I am turning to Herder to analyse how he shapes Berlin’s

view with regard to the cultural dimension.

In section one, ‘Berlin’s Reading of Herder’, I have addressed the similarity

between Vico’s method of fantasia in studying history and Herder’s approach of

‘sympathetic insight’ in studying culture. If we look at Berlin’s writings on Herder,53

it is clear that the ‘sympathetic insight’ underwrites Herder’s thoughts of ‘populism’,54

‘expressionism’,55 and ‘pluralism’,56 and reveals the presupposition of Herder’s view

of culture. For Herder, each culture has its own personality. Cultural objects like

languages, poems, and legends are expressions of this personality.57 The ‘sympathetic

insight’ transposes us into specific situations to understand the expressed cultural

personality.

Consequently, Herder’s view of culture and his method of ‘sympathetic insight’ lead

him to establish his ideas about the conflict of values and the incommensurability of

values. Berlin states through using Herder’s words:

[…] every society had what he [Herder] called its own centre of gravity, which
differed from that of others. If, as he wished, we are to understand Scandinavian
sagas or the poetry of the Bible, we must not apply to them the aesthetic criteria of
the critics of the eighteenth-century Paris. The ways in which men live, think, feel,
speak to one another, the clothes they wear, the songs they sing, the gods they
worship, the food they eat, the assumptions, customs, habits which are intrinsic to
them – it is this that creates communities, each of which has its own ‘life style’.58

Berlin’s thesis of the incommensurability of values derives from his portrait of

Herder. A culture is not only an expression of a certain type of personality, but also a
53
Berlin’s first work on Herder, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, was a lecture delivered at Johns Hopkins
University in 1964. Later, this work was revised and reprinted several times; see Berlin, Vico and Herder: Two
Studies in the History of Idea; Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’; Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment:
Vico, Hamann, Herder.
54
Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 367.
55
Ibid., p. 367.
56
Ibid., p. 368.
57
Berlin, ‘Vico and the Ideal of the Enlightenment’, p. 373.
58
Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 10.

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manifestation of certain values. The uniqueness and difference rooted in cultures

define the idea of the incommensurability of values, – that is to say, no universal

standard can be established to rank values. This establishes the third claim in Berlin’s

theory of pluralism.

The second claim of pluralism concerns the idea that values conflict. Through

Herder, Berlin expresses this thesis in a succinct way, commenting: ‘Values can clash

– that is why civilisations are incompatible. They can be incompatible between

59
cultures, or groups in the same culture, or between you and me […]’ It is obvious

that cultures can coexist with one another, while their embodied values may conflict.

Deriving from Vico’s theory of historical coherence and Herder’s thought of culture,

the conflict and the incommensurability of values are for Berlin not between

descriptive values but between normative values.60 So we can conclude that the reason

for the incommensurability and the conflict results from the nature of values. However,

a problem arises from the two claims, – namely, whether they can be founded upon

Vico’s theory of historical coherence and Herder’s thought of culture.

To answer the above question one has to assess, whether there exist universal values

to determine the range in the variety and change of values. If the claim of the conflict

of values only implies a contradicting state without an account of certain values as

universal principles of humanity, then pluralism amounts to relativism. This is the

charge pluralism faces, and it also comprises the principal issue pluralism needs to

clarify.

3.3.2 The Knowledge of the Observable and Berlin’s Response

To attend to this problematic I turn to the critic Strauss, who in his essay

‘Relativism’ claims that Berlin’s theory of pluralism is a theory that takes the

knowledge of the observable as the knowledge of the Ought. This claim is based on

59
Ibid., p. 12.
60
Ibid., p. 11.

111
Strauss’s three observations. First, Berlin views history as an unfinished process,

which is born in its specific time. Second, certain pages of Berlin’s works indicate the

view that the idea of negative freedom is only valid in its historical era.

The third observation is specific and focuses on Berlin’s justification of negative

freedom. Strauss notices that Berlin justifies negative freedom as an ultimate value,

through demonstrating the absurdity of positive freedom. Strauss defines positive

freedom as: ’[…] men can be free only by participating in the just, the rational or the

perfect society in which all just or rational ends of all members of society are

harmoniously satisfied or in which everyone obeys only himself, i.e., his true self.’61

The presupposition of the above idea is the belief in a hierarchy, and hence a

harmonious system of human ends.

Berlin, Strauss tells us, attacks the presupposition of positive freedom in the name of

four empirical facts. First, the presupposition is based on a ’dogmatic and a priori

certainty’; second, the presupposition of positive freedom is not compatible with

empiricism, which is understood as ‘any doctrine founded on knowledge derived from

experience of what men are and seek’; third, the presupposition of positive freedom is

the foundation of ‘the metaphysical view of politics’ with a sharp difference from an

‘empirical’ view; finally, experience unfolds the multiplicity of values and their

incompatible nature; thus choice is a definite feature of the human condition which

further reveals that negative freedom is an end in itself.

In Strauss’s view, the fourth reason precisely reveals Berlin’s philosophical and

moral thought. Strauss points out that according to Berlin, knowledge of the empirical

leads to ‘knowledge of the Ought’, – that is to say, the assumption of Berlin’s idea of

negative freedom is the knowledge of the empirical. Strauss asks:

But can there be external principles on the basis of ‘empiricism’ of the experience of
men up to now? Does not the experience of the future have the same right to respect
as the experience of the past and the present?62

61
Strauss, ‘Relativism’, p. 136.
62
Ibid., p. 139.

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 This charge is based on a rejection. Knowledge of the empirical cannot sufficiently

lead to ‘knowledge of the Ought’. Viewed in this light, Berlin’s theory of pluralism

cannot escape its fate of becoming moral relativism, because it is rooted in the

knowledge of the empirical, and this knowledge is changeable as phenomena alter.

To answer the above charge against Berlin’s pluralism, one has to analyse the

question, whether Berlin’s theory of pluralism is, as Strauss alleges, formed by the

‘knowledge of the observable’. Since Berlin’s readings of Vico and Herder are the

sources of his theory of pluralism, to answer the above query I return to Berlin’s

assessments of respectively, Vico and Herder.

In Berlin’s essays on Vico, he never tires of warning his reader to distinguish Vico’s

thought from relativism, so too he does with regard to Herder. Berlin states:

Unlike such relativists as Spengler or Westermarck, Vico did not suppose that men
are encapsulated within their own epoch or culture, insulated in a box without
windows and consequently incapable of understanding other societies and periods
whose values may be widely different from theirs and which they may find strong or
repellent. His deepest belief was that what men have made, other men can
understand. It may take an immense amount of painful effort to decipher the
meaning of conduct or language different from our own. Nevertheless, according to
Vico, if anything is meant by the term of ‘human’, there must be enough that is
common to all such beings for it to be possible, by a sufficient effort of imagination,
to grasp what the world must have looked like to creatures, remote in time or space,
who practised such rites, and used such words, and created such works of art as the
natural means of self-expression involved in the attempt to understand and interpret
their worlds to themselves.63

The above passage reveals three points of view. First, there is something common in

humanity. This leads to the second point. Understanding is possible among human

beings, which can be acquired by what Berlin calls Vico’s interpretative method of

culture and history as ‘reconstructive imagination’. Based on the two points, Berlin

reveals that Vico is not an empiricist, who views culture and history as empirically

confined by their conditions. On the contrary, Vico’s knowledge of history and culture

63
Berlin, ‘Giambattista Vico and Cultural History’, p. 60.

113
is gained through ‘reconstructive imagination’, and is contested against the ‘knowledge

of the observable’.

Mali’s reading of Vico echoes the above point that Berlin holds. He remarks:

The validity of Vico’s concrete “principles” may be – and has been – contested on
empirical grounds. But such claims miss the essential point of Vico’s argument. For
what is really novel and important in his notion of “principles of humanity” is the
hermeneutical, not the empirical claim, namely his assertion that any cross-cultural
understanding, to be possible at all, must assume and presume certain absolute
norms, or, to use a modern phrase – ‘limiting notion’ of morality – which
determines the range within which various forms of life can be exercised and
recognised as human.64

According to Mali’s reading, Vico’s notion of the ‘principles of humanity’ does not

generalise the change and variety of values on empirical grounds. On the contrary, the

notion is interpretative. With this point in mind, the notion of the ‘principles of

humanity’ is an assumption which defines certain limitations for the manifestation of

values in the empirical sense.

Similar to Berlin’s evaluation of Vico, Herder is not a pure empiricist in Berlin’s

view.65 What Herder discovers in his thought about cultures derives from his method

of imaginative insight. I have addressed the features of this method in earlier

discussions. It is a method used to penetrate into man’s psychological world and to

capture its various features. In this sense, Herder’s thought about cultures is not

empirical. Herder addresses the importance of interpreting cultures with understanding,

and this ability of understanding underwrites the moral judgement of facts.

Thus, we can conclude that Strauss’s point, that Berlin’s account of pluralism is

grounded on the knowledge of the observable, is incomplete. The basis that Berlin

establishes for his theory of pluralism is not merely the knowledge of the empirical.

Vico and Herder’s theories, respectively, address the point that absolute principles

exist, regardless of time and space, thus constitute the core of the basis. In fact,

Berlin’s wish to find a middle ground between the ‘knowledge of the Ought’ and the
64
Mali, ‘Berlin, Vico and The Principles of Humanity’, p. 66.
65
Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 10.

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‘knowledge of the observable’ determines the unsettling nature of his theory of

pluralism. Taylor captures this nature vividly: ‘[Berlin’s thesis of pluralism] was

deeply unsettling to the moral theories dominant in his own milieu. It is one of the

paradoxes of our intellectual world, which will be increasingly discussed in the future

[…]’.66

A further conclusion can be drawn from the three sections discussing Berlin’s theory

of pluralism. Berlin does not establish principles of the good and the bad, nor right and

wrong with details, except by addressing the point that the common nature of human

beings serves as a boundary to distinguish the good and the bad, and right and wrong,

and thus justifying the objectivity of values by the concept of ‘human horizon’, and the

notion of ‘a core’ of values. In this sense, pluralism can be qualified as a theory with a

minimal requirement of morality. Pluralism does not amount to relativism, although as

discussed before, the way Berlin proves the universality of values is generic.

66
C. Taylor, ‘Plurality of Goods’, in M. Lilla, R. Dworkin and R. Silvers (eds.), The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin, New
York, New York Review Books, 2001, p. 117.

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Part Four: Drawing Conclusions: The Encounter of
Two Minds

Chapter Four:

Berlin’s View of Rousseau’s Moral Presuppositions

In chapter one, I have pointed out that Gadamer defines the ‘hermeneutic circle’ as

an interplay between reader and text. In chapter two, I have addressed Gadamer’s point

that the ‘hermeneutic circle’ functions as a formal condition of understanding. With

these insights in mind, in chapter three, I have identified Berlin’s theory of pluralism

as the third ‘hermeneutic circle’, and proposed that this circle sets up a theoretical

context for our understanding of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral thought. With

these points in mind, in this chapter, I examine the resulting meaning-production of

Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral thought that arises from the third ‘hermeneutic

circle’.

I have addressed three points of view in my foregoing examination in chapter one

and chapter two with regard to the act of reading. Firstly, as readers we are historically

situated, so we approach a text with pre-judgement and begin our understanding

accordingly; secondly, the reader’s formed presupposition shapes the method with

which he approaches the relevant idea in a text; finally, the meaning of a text arises

from the interaction between the reader’s presupposition and the text, that is to say, the

produced meaning is a result of the ‘hermeneutic circle’.

Now transferring and applying the above insights to the inquiry at hand, I shall

propose that Berlin, – with his assumed conceptual framework of pluralism –,

approaches Rousseau’s moral thought with the measure of two dimensions. I argue

that the first dimension embraces a general characterisation of Rousseau’s moral

thought, in asking whether this is pluralist or monistic. The second dimension then

involves the relationship between values in raising two questions, namely, first,

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whether Rousseau holds the view that values are conflicting or not; and, second,

whether he holds the idea that values can be ranked or not. As I have established

before, the way Berlin approaches Rousseau’s moral thought is a characteristic feature

of his writings on Rousseau; firstly, in giving a general characterisation of Rousseau’s

moral thought, then, secondly, exploring the details that inform its character. Both

these procedures, in turn, demonstrate Berlin’s reading strategy, while meeting his

interpretative purpose.

As stated above, my first point concerns Berlin’s specific theory of pluralism,

determining his method of reading Rousseau’s moral thought, while my second point

concerns Berlin’s own moral stance, determining his reading and his interpretation of

Rousseau’s moral thought. I am turning now to examining this second point.

In chapter three, I have established the theory of pluralism as the preconception of

Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral thought. Berlin’s theory of pluralism is the

theory that conceptualizes the state of moral values, and shows his moral position.

Although, as demonstrated in chapter three, Berlin’s conception of pluralism has its

limitations and remains a controversial doctrine in the intellectual world, the concept

still keeps its interpretative power, in the sense that it shapes the approach of Berlin’s

reading of Rousseau’s moral thought, and determines the produced meaning as

judgmental and critical.

Anchored in the two points of view spelled out above, this chapter analyses the

question of how Berlin interprets Rousseau’s idea of morality. Section one examines

the manner in which Berlin characterises the nature of Rousseau’s moral thought,

namely as monistic. Sections two and three address the particulars of Berlin’s critical

reading of Rousseau, – namely, respectively as a value harmonist, and as a thinker,

who ranks freedom as the highest value. In the concluding section I attempt to answer

the question, why Rousseau presents a monistic nature of morality, an aspect left open

by Berlin.

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4.1 Portraying Rousseau as a Utopian Moralist

This section focuses on Berlin’s characterisation of the nature of Rousseau’s moral

thought as monistic. I begin with reconsidering some aspects of pluralism, as

conceived by Berlin. In the light of reader-response theory that a reader approaches a

text with his preconceptions, I have stated above that pluralism is Berlin’s moral

position, and serves as the theoretical foundation for his critical reading and

interpretation of other thinkers’ moral ideas.

Pluralism, then, shall serve as my theoretical starting point in understanding the

theory of monism, for three reasons. The first two reasons concern how pluralism

helps to get an understanding of monism. The third reason attends to the function of

analysing monism in my project. One, monism is the term Berlin uses to define a

moral supposition in western philosophical and political thinking, contrasting it with

pluralism.1 Two, monism has a similar structure to pluralism, in the sense that both

contain the three claims for pluralism I have examined in the previous chapter,2 – with

the essential difference, that the three statements embodied in monism stand in a polar

opposition to the three statements in pluralism –; however, in this sense, pluralism

serving as a theoretical starting point helps in a deeper understanding of monism.

Third, I shall propose that there are strategic reasons for Berlin’s deployment of the

polarity of the conceptions of monism and pluralism. The dichotomy of the moral

supposition as plural and monistic is the analytical tool that Berlin uses to define the

nature of Rousseau’s moral thought. However, rather than systematically exposing the

character of Rousseau’s moral thought based on the dichotomy, Berlin uses his

analytical tool of polarity to define two traditions of moral supposition that underlie

the philosophical and political thinking in the history of western political philosophy,

1
Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, pp. 4-6.
2
The three claims as examined in chapter three are: Berlin’s first claim of the plurality of values; his second claim of
the conflict of values, and his third claim of the incommensurability of values.

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while putting Rousseau’s moral thought into this context, and giving it the meaning he

intends.

Having outlined Berlin’s procedure and strategy, I now follow the logic of Berlin’s

interpretation. I intend to examine the question of how Berlin defines, gives a general

character and a meaning to Rousseau’s moral thought. I also address Berlin’s reasons

for doing so.

4.1.1 Reading the Monistic Nature of Rousseau’s Moral Thought

To recapitulate, in chapter three I established the point of view, that pluralism

implies that there are various answers to a political and philosophical question. For

instance, in terms of the question of what a good life is, from the perspective of

pluralism, there are many answers to this question. This exposes the view that a

multiplicity of good lives exists. Apart from this point, there are different moral

grounds of justification regarding the question of a good life. This variation in

justifications and interpretations may contain irreconcilable contradictions of points of

view. The two points, – namely, a multiplicity of good life, and irreconcilable

contradictions within the multiplicity –, make up, in Berlin’s eyes, the meaning and the

force of political philosophy:

If men never disagreed about the ends of life, if our ancestors had remained
undisturbed in the Garden of Eden, the studies to which the Chichele Chair of Social
and Political Theory is dedicated could scarcely have been conceived. For these
studies spring from, and thrive on, discord.3

Opposed to the above spirit with regard to pluralism, the notion of monism, in

Berlin’s view, intends to offer ultimate answers to questions of political philosophy,

and to solve human problems in reality permanently. In the context of his examination

of the beliefs that Russian thinkers hold in viewing reality, Berlin states his view of

monism:

3
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 191.

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 What was common to all these outlooks was the belief that solutions to the central
problems existed, that one could discover them, and, with sufficient selfless effort,
realise them on earth. They [Russian thinkers] all believed that the essence of human
beings was to be able to choose how to live: societies could be transformed in the
light of true ideals believed in with enough fervour and dedication.4

With the above belief in mind, the consequence of the monist ambition is ruling out

the different and competing notions of the good life in the realm of political

philosophy. Berlin attributes this intellectual ambition of monism to three major

assumptions, – namely, first, all political and philosophical questions can be answered;

second, these answers can be discovered; and third, these answers are

commensurable.5

Berlin’s thought is unsystematic, and a noticeable feature of his account of the three

assumptions of monism reveals this, in the sense that he does not dedicate one single

essay solely to discussing them. Nevertheless, his view regarding this subject matter

can be reconstructed in drawing together his many scattered remarks; his position may

also be viewed as embodied in his discussion of other thinkers’ moral thought, as well

as in his analyses of themes dealing with different matters. For instance, in Berlin’s

early essay, ‘The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History’, his

comment on monism can be traced in his discussion of Tolstoy’s view of history. In

this essay, Berlin describes hedgehogs, figuratively, as having the quality similar to

monistic thinkers, since he states:

[hedgehogs] who relate everything to a single central version, one system, less or
more coherent or articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and feel – a
single, universal, organising principle in terms of which alone all that they are and
say has significance.6

4
Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 3.
5
Berlin, ‘My Intellectual Path’, p. 5.
6
I. Berlin, ‘The Hedgehog and the Fox’, in H. Hardy (ed.), The Proper Study of Mankind, p. 436. It is of course
possible to argue, that the self-absorption of hedgehogs may not apply to others; in this case, the figurative equation
of hedgehogs and monists shows its limitation. There may also be a point of irony in Berlin’s ‘strict’ depiction of
the hedgehogs.

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 The hedgehog has one version to generate understanding and feeling, which is also

assumed to be the principle that organises its complex reality, and serves as a standard

to weigh up against the relevant importance of other versions of reality.

In contrast to the above quality, Berlin takes foxes, figuratively, as referring to

thinkers with a plural, and contradictory, view of phenomena.7 In Berlin’s eyes, the

fox presents unsystematic and disparaging versions of reality; and therefore, we may

conclude, holds no single moral or aesthetic principle.8 We could argue that the fox

views the world ‘in a realistic way’, or rather, conceptualises the world through a

realistic lens.

We can conclude from the above discussion of the different qualities, that the

hedgehog and the fox represent, that the essential difference between them is, that the

hedgehog looks at the world with a preconceived principle, and reconstructs the world

accordingly, whereas the fox grounds himself in reality, thus exposing the existing

contradictions.

Similarly, in Berlin’s famous essay, ’Two Concepts of Liberty’, his point of view

with regard to monism is, arguably, embodied in the theme of positive freedom and its

consequence in reality. In this essay, Berlin presents his account of monism; he states:

This is the belief [monism] that somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine
revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history
or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final
solution. This ancient faith rests on the conviction that all the positive values in
which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible and perhaps even entail
one and another.9

This comment can be construed as entailing an outline of Berlin’s version of

monism. It may be abstracted as containing three main ideas, that is, first, ultimate

answers to problems in reality can be found, and second, answers can be discovered. In

the above passage Berlin points to approaches to discover these answers. A solution to

7
Ibid.
8
Ibid., pp. 436-437.
9
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp. 237-238.

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an answer may reflect one’s values; and thus the expression of ‘a final solution’ in the

above passage reveals that the value one holds is ultimate. This realisation may refer to

the third point of monism, – that is, values which may be the expressions of ultimate

solution, are harmoniously coexisting and may be reconciled with one another,

eventually.

I have pointed out earlier on that Berlin’s view of monism can be found in his many

essays; and I have analysed the characteristics of monism in ‘The Hedgehog and the

Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History’ and ’Two Concepts of Liberty’. To

pursue the analysis further, here I choose the essay ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’ to present

Berlin view of monism. Although I am aware of the fact that Berlin’s individual essays

early as well as late ones may provide some aspects of his thought on monism, – but

not necessarily deliver a final evaluation –, one reason for choosing ‘The Pursuit of the

Ideal’ is that it provides a focus for my analysis; and the other reason is, that, finished

in 1988, this essay is one of Berlin’s last, and thus appears as a summary of his

intellectual life, and as a sign towards his view of monism.

I have already pointed to the three assumptions of monism. Now I am turning to

discuss them in more detail. The first assumption appears in two forms of expression.

The first form, Berlin’s usual account, is phrased as ‘all genuine questions must have

one true answer and only one, all the rest being necessarily errors.’10 Sometimes, the

first form is substituted by another form, in which the phrasing of what the essence of

human nature is, has only one true answer.11

The two expressions do not contradict one another, for they share a point of view.

Each genuine question must have only one true answer, except that the second form

appears as a specific question, to demonstrate the intellectual concern of the

Enlightenment. In my view, the two statements try to capture a principal intellectual

feature within the context of a historical era; – and beyond that, a major political and

10
Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 5.
11
Berlin, ‘The Counter-Enlightenment’, p. 243.

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ethical thought over 2500 years of history. Although this way of capturing does not

focus on details and differences among individual thinkers, yet it offers a point of view

from which to look at the whole picture.

I am now turning to the second assumption with regard to monism. Berlin

generalises in that true answers to genuine questions can, in principle, be approached,

if not delivered.12 This assumption presents itself as a technical matter, because the

first assumption, as detailed above, serves as its underlying belief. That is to say, given

that fundamental questions such as what is a good life can in principle be approached,

if not delivered, what is left may be considered as a technical problem about the choice

of method to search for answers.

Enlarging the first and the second assumption of monism, the third assumption, as

projected by my reading of Berlin, can be viewed as demonstrating an existing state

among the true answers to genuine questions:

[…] in the third place that the true answers, when found, must necessarily be
compatible with one another and form a single whole, for one truth cannot be
incompatible with another – that we knew a priori.13

I have addressed the point, that solutions may reflect one’s value; following this

point, ‘true answers’ reveal ultimate values. With this in mind, the above passage

demonstrates that values may be viewed as fitting together into a coherent and

harmonious whole, which seems to speak against the second claim of pluralism, that

values are in a conflicting state.

I have identified Berlin’s theory of pluralism as the third ‘hermeneutic circle’, and

proposed that this circle sets up a theoretical context for our understanding of Berlin’s

reading of Rousseau’s moral thought. I have also taken pluralism as my starting point

for analysing monism, since the dichotomy of pluralism and monism is the analytical

tool Berlin uses to define the nature of Rousseau’s moral thought. I shall now turn to

12
Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, pp. 5-6.
13
Ibid., p. 6.

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the specific question how I read Berlin in defining the nature of Rousseau’s moral

thought, taking here the dichotomy of value presuppositions as my starting point.

If we look at his major essays on Rousseau, it can be observed that Berlin

characterises the nature of Rousseau’s moral thought through his identification of the

three assumptions of monism, rather than unpacking the character of Rousseau’s moral

thought based on the dichotomy. I am proposing here that he uses monism as an aid to

a definition of the nature of Rousseau’s moral thought. I shall offer evidence for this

claim in the following examination. The characteristic of Berlin’s reading of

Rousseau’s moral thought is, that he does not offer a coherent and detailed analysis,

rather his comments are constituted as scattered remarks, and thus need to be

reconstructed in several stages. To some extent, these remarks reveal different facets of

monism’. In ‘The Roots of Romanticism’, Berlin comments:

If we consider what it is that Rousseau actually said, as opposed to the manner in

which he said it – and the manner and the life are what are important – we find that
it is the purest milk of the rationalist world. All that Rousseau said is this: We live in
a corrupted society; we live in a bad, hypocritical society, where men lie to each
other and murder each other and are false to each other. It is possible to discover the
truth. This truth is to be discovered not by means of sophistication or Cartesian logic
but by looking within the heart of the simple uncorrupt human being, the noble
savage, or the child, or whoever it may be. Once this truth is discovered, it is an
external truth, true for all men, everywhere in all climates and seasons, and when we
have discovered this truth, then it is important that we should live in accordance
with it.14

In my reading, this passage demonstrates, that Berlin projects Rousseau as a

monistic thinker, which can be illustrated by looking at his approach to the analysis of

Rousseau. To recapitulate, the first assumption of monism comprises that all questions

have single true answers. Now Berlin uses this presupposition to expose the character

of Rousseau’s moral thought. In the first place, Berlin states, that Rousseau believes

that ethical and political problems, – such as moral corruption and social disorder –,

can be solved by presenting true answers; and in the second place, Berlin comments,

14
I. Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, H. Hardy (ed.), London, Pimlico, 2000, pp. 52-53.

124
that the final solution in Rousseau’s view is universal. This way of capturing the nature

of Rousseau’s moral thought makes up Berlin’s identification of monism.

To further explore this problematic, I turn to another essay by Berlin. In ‘Rousseau’,

Berlin uses a similar theoretical frame to expose Rousseau’s moral thought:

We must ask questions in such terms as make them answerable; and that can be
done only by means of reason. Just as in the sciences a true answer given by one
scientist will be accepted by all other scientists who are equally reasonable, so in
ethics and politics the rational answer is the correct answer: the truth is one and error
alone is multiple.15

Here, the portrait of the character of Rousseau’s moral thought presents a consistent

picture of monistic moral thought, in that it shows the second presupposition of

monism, that is, Berlin proposes that Rousseau should identify ‘reason’ as a means to

attain true answers.

In another part of ‘The Roots of Romanticism’, he states:

[…] the Rousseau who wrote the Social Contract, which is typically a classical
treatise that speaks of the return of the man to those original, primary principles
which all men have in common; the reign of universal reason, which unites men, as
opposed to emotions, which divide them; the reign of universal justice and universal
peace against the conflicts and the turbulence and the disturbances which tear
human hearts from their minds and divide men against themselves.16

With monism as analytical tool, and some stylistic irony, – such as ‘the return of the

man to those original, primary principles’; ‘the reign of universal reason’; ‘the reign of

universal justice and universal peace’; which is not to say that this distracts from the

strength of Berlin’s statement, to the contrary –; Berlin appears to acknowledge the

utopian idealism in Rousseau. Berlin presents Rousseau’s famous political treatise as

comprising three monistic presuppositions: (1) absolute principles are shared by all

human beings; (2) reason is the faculty that obliges human beings to live under these

principles; (3) once (1) and (2) are established, any problem or conflict in life will be

solved, and harmony reigns with peace and justice. To sum up the insights we can gain

15
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 28.
16
Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, p. 7.

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from these comments, I propose that although no direct criticism is uttered, the

descriptive condensation exposes Berlin’s scepticism with regard to Rousseau’s

utopian reach.

Berlin’s remarks above, – which I have selected for defining the nature of

Rousseau’s moral thought –, reveal that Berlin seems to fit his characterisation into the

three assumptions of monism. I shall argue that the reason for this derives from

Berlin’s presupposition that the nature of Rousseau’s moral thought has features that

resemble characteristics of monism. Although Berlin may not develop the vocabulary

of monism at the time when he tries to capture the characteristics of Rousseau’s moral

thought, – that is to say, Berlin presupposes that Rousseau is a monistic thinker, as is

demonstrated by my earlier discussions.

These observations need to be pursued in more detail. Regarding the assumption

stated above, we can expect that Berlin elaborates some reasons as to why he assumes

that Rousseau is a monistic thinker; yet he points out that Rousseau is a child of

rationalism, which causes his doctrine of morality to share features of rationalist

thinking. Berlin comments:

Rousseau believed in a timeless set of truths which all men could read, for they were
engraved on their hearts in letters more durable than bronze, thereby conceding the
authority of natural law, a vast, cold, empty abstraction.17

The above comments are made in the context of Berlin’s exploration of the denial of

the central doctrine of the Enlightenment by nationalism.18 Berlin continues his

statements about Rousseau’s intellectual position:

[…] according to which [the central theses of the Enlightenment] what is true, or
right, or good, or beautiful can be shown to be valid for all men by the correct
application of objective methods of discovery and interpretation, open to anyone to
use and verify. In its full romantic guise this attitude [to identify oneself with a
group] is an open declaration of war upon the very heart of the rational and
experimental method which Descartes and Galileo had inaugurated, and which for

17
Berlin, ‘The Counter-Enlightenment’, p. 252.
18
Nationalism is the belief in the uniqueness and superiority of the national mission. See I. Berlin, ‘European Unity
and its Vicissitudes’, in H. Hardy (ed.), The Crooked Timber of Humanity, London, John Murray, 1990, pp.
176-177.

126
 all their doubts and qualifications even such sharp deviationists as Montesquieu, or
Hume and Rousseau and Kant fully and firmly accepted.19

Further conclusions then can be drawn. Berlin’s classification displays the

intellectual tradition that Rousseau’s moral thought, assumedly, is rooted in, while it

has the merit of understanding Rousseau’s meaning, and the scope of his thought in its

intellectual context. In this sense, Berlin’s argument of the feature of Rousseau’s moral

thought should be regarded as acceptable by situating Rousseau’s idea of morality

within the context of Rousseau’s intellectual engagement.

4.1.2 The Normative and the Empirical in Rousseau

I will show, how another plausible, but opposing interpretation of Rousseau reveals,

that Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral thought as monism is not the only one

possible. In my view, the nature of Rousseau’s moral thought appears to be more

complex than the one detected by Berlin. I shall argue that Rousseau’s moral thought

contains at least two principal layers, namely, a normative layer and an empirical layer.

The normative aspect often presents itself in unqualified statements. In chapter six of

the Social Contract, Rousseau states:

Whatever is good and in conformity with order is such by nature of things and
independently of human conventions. All justice comes from God; he alone is the
source. But if we knew how to receive it from so exalted source, we would have no
need for government or laws. Undoubtedly there is a universal justice emanating
from reason alone; but this justice to be admitted among us, ought to be reciprocal.20

As I read it, this passage could arguably be read as revealing the two aspects of

Rousseau’s moral thought stated above. Taking this assumption as a starting point, the

normative aspect manifests the monistic nature of Rousseau’s moral thought for two

reasons. First, this aspect can be viewed as assuming that values such as justice and

goodness exist harmoniously, which manifests in the order of things; and second, that

reason is the means to deduce a just order.

19
Berlin, ‘The Counter-Enlightenment’, p. 252.
20
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p. 60.

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 In the ‘Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar’ in Emile, Rousseau expresses

similar ideas, in deploying the literary device of the Vicar’s voice:

God is just, I am convinced of it; it is a consequence of His goodness. The injustice

of man is their work not His. Moral disorder, which gives witness against
providence in the eyes of the philosophers, only serves to demonstrate in mine. But
man’s justice is to give each what belongs to him, and God’s justice is to ask from
each an accounting of what He gives to him.21

I shall argue that the point of view taken in this passage can be read as

demonstrating the nature of Rousseau’s moral thought. In the normative sense, the

value of goodness and the value of justice can be viewed as being compatible; and to

perform goodness is to fulfil justice.

These passages from a variety of Rousseau’s texts could be read as showing both the

normative and the empirical aspect of Rousseau’s moral thought. The normative aspect

is here understood as not totally based on what human beings can sense and experience

empirically, but on what they derive from an unquestioned authority, and what they

should hold to be the truth about right and wrong.

As I have argued in the above discussion, Rousseau’s moral thought may

demonstrate its monistic nature, in claiming that values are harmonious and compatible.

Viewed from this angle, it is in line with Berlin’s characterisation of Rousseau’s moral

thought. However, by contrast to my reading, Berlin does not unfold the complexity of

the assumption on which the normative level of Rousseau’s moral thought seems to

rest. In the following discussion I shall examine this point, and also uncover the plural

nature of the empirical aspect of Rousseau’s moral thought, which is not elaborated by

Berlin due to his own processes of meaning-making.

Apart from the penetrating and persuasive power of the above moral statements in

some of Rousseau’s texts, the problem is that they lack historical and empirical

evidence. However, the critic Williams claims that to understand the normative facet

of morality, one has to hold a certain assumption, namely:

21
Rousseau, Emile or On Education, p. 285.

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 If one does not believe in suprasensible objects, one can still identify certain patterns
of human behaviour. If one does not believe in suprasensible objects of some kind,
however, it is difficult to establish transcendent moral principles.22

This passage points to the fundamental assumption of morality in its normative

dimension, that is to say, morality as grounded upon some unquestioned sources, such

as God or a divine authority.

Williams offers some reasons for Rousseau’s turning away from the empirical to

ground his moral thought, namely, that the decision is taken due to the changeable and

the contingent in the world of the observable.23 The standard of right and wrong in one

particular historical era, perhaps, differs from another.

One could assume that Berlin might, or might not, be familiar with the above reason,

yet his theory of pluralism is rooted in history and experience, and theorises reality.

The empirical tendency leads him to have a sympathetic understanding towards reality,

and a concern for the knowledge deriving from the observable. Perhaps this may

explain why Berlin shows less engagement with the monistic nature of Rousseau’s

moral thought.

One further aspect has to be considered. I shall propose that there is also a plural

dimension to Rousseau’s moral thought, which lies in its empirical dimension. In book

three of the Social Contract, we can observe a shift in that Rousseau addresses a few

issues on government, and its appropriate form under concrete conditions, which also

may throw some light on the character of his moral thought. This is captured by the

critic Vaughan in the following manner:

In the earlier chapters of the Contrat social, it is clear that the more abstract vein
was that which lay uppermost in his [Rousseau’s] mind […] Here, at any rate, is no
paltering with soil and climate, no balancing of circumstances, no quailing before
the traditions of the past, no misgiving that one nation may be less born for freedom
than another […]24

22
D.L. Williams, Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment, University Park, Pennsylvania State U.P., 2007, p. 6.
23
Ibid., p. 9.
24
C.E. Vaughan, ‘Introduction’, in C.E. Vaughan (ed.), The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1915, p. 77.

129
 Vaughan continues in order to contract the abstract and the empirical facets of

Rousseau’s thought:

In the latter part of the Contrat social, still more in the Lettres de la Montagne and
the Gouvernement de Pologne, the abstract plea has fallen into the background; a
cautious, almost a timid, regard for national prejudice and historical tradition has
taken its place.25

Central among the issues Rousseau deals with in book three of the Social

Contract, – where Vaughan situates the shift in Rousseau’s attitude towards the

empirical –, the question of the best form of government can be viewed as

demonstrating the various, and contradicting, layers of Rousseau’s subtle thought on

morality. Regarding this question, Rousseau does not offer an answer; he states:

When the question arises as which one is absolutely the best government, an
insoluble question is being raised because it is indeterminate. Or if you wish, it has
many good answers as there are possible combinations in the absolute and relative
positions of peoples.26

There is no ultimate answer to the question of a best form of government.

Alternatively, to express this idea from another perspective, many reasonable answers

can be offered to the question of what is the best form of government. This view is in

line with Berlin’s theory of pluralism, which claims that no single answer can be

offered to a political question.27

In the light of the above passage, when choosing a best form of government, it is not

a matter of applying a rigorous moral principle to concrete situations, but rather,

conversely, it is a matter of considering and weighing factors formed by chance and

natural conditions. Rousseau states:

Thus in each climate there are natural causes on the basis of which one can assign
the form of government that the force of the climate requires, and can even say what
kind of inhabitants it should have.28

25
Ibid., p. 78.
26
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p. 190.
27
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, p. 191. One has to admit, that the two questions are of a different scope; while
the first question, as to which is the best government, is more restricted, the second question, as to how many
reasonable answers can be provided, is more open to discussion. However, the first question mirrors the
fundamental idea of pluralism.
28
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p. 188.

130
 The empirical aspect of Rousseau’s moral thought then is concerned with the

concreteness of circumstances, and thus reveals the multiplicity, complexity, and

contradictions of moral values. To conclude the above discussion, the empirical facet

of Rousseau’s moral thought is plural rather than monistic, which Berlin does not fully

appreciate in its significance.

4.2 An Assumed Harmony of Values

While section one examined the manner in which Berlin characterises the nature of

Rousseau’s moral thought, namely, as monistic, section two and three shall address the

particulars of Berlin’s critical interpretation of Rousseau, namely, respectively as a

value harmonist, and as a thinker who ranks freedom as the highest value. Here in

section two, I first turn to the notion of an assumed harmony of values.

4.2.1 Portraying Rousseau as a Value Harmonist

I shall propose that Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau as a value harmonist can be

considered along two lines. One line is strategic, in that he selectively emphasises

some aspects of Rousseau’s moral thought, which serve his interpretative purpose. The

second line is methodological, in that he chooses his specific perspective and thus his

reading approach.

In terms of the first strategic line, – as demonstrated in the first section –, Berlin

characterises Rousseau’s moral thought as monistic and based on the general

evaluation; the interpretation of the details of Rousseau’s moral thought is therefore

continuously in accordance with this evaluation. The underlying principle of such an

interpretative strategy is what Iser defines as a ‘consistency-building’ of meaning, as I

have demonstrated earlier. According to Iser, ‘consistency-building’ of meaning is the

idea that a reader tries to establish a coherent meaning of a text by making his

131
purposive selection of textual clues, and excluding others.29 To transfer this insight to

the phenomena of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral thought, I propose that

Berlin’s evaluation of Rousseau’s moral thought as monistic shapes his reading

expectation; even if in Rousseau’s texts statements occur that are at odds with Berlin’s

evaluation, Berlin will endeavour to make things consistent by a series of revisions to

meet his reading expectation.

Now I am turning to the second line of Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau as a value

harmonist, that is, the methodological line. As discussed in chapter three, Berlin

believes, that pluralism reflects, conceptually and philosophically, the existing state of

normative values. The thesis that values conflict demonstrates the inharmonious state

of normative values. This is the first moral presupposition that Berlin brings into his

reading of Rousseau’s moral thought.

This presupposition represents Berlin’s standpoint, which sets the parameters for his

vision; thus his encounter with Rousseau’s moral thought gains a distinct focus. I shall

argue that, since Berlin approaches Rousseau’s moral thought by considering the

relationship between values, his presupposition also shapes the question of whether

Rousseau views ultimate values as conflicting or not. To follow this line of argument, I

shall propose that Berlin’s position with regard to the conflict of values shapes his

reading of Rousseau’s notion of the relationship between values. Finally, in my view,

Berlin posits that the conflict of values reflects the state of values theoretically;30 thus

his reading carries a value judgement towards Rousseau’s doctrine of morality, which

should be taken into account, when we read Rousseau’s moral thought through

Berlin’s lens.

So far I have examined, in some detail, Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau as a value

harmonist considered along two lines, a strategic and a methodological one. Anchored

in these two lines, I argue that Berlin identifies Rousseau’s moral thought as holding

29
Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 123.
30
Berlin, ‘Vico and the Ideal of the Enlightenment’, p. 124.

132
the notion, that values are harmonious in three aspects. With regard to the first one,

Berlin connects Rousseau’s view of the relationship between values with his idea of

natural harmony. Berlin states:

Rousseau knows that, since nature is a harmony (and this is the great premise, the
great and dubious premise of almost all of eighteenth-century thought), it follows
that what I truly want cannot collide with what somebody else truly wants. For the
good is what will truly satisfy anyone’s rational demands; and if it were the case that
what I truly want does not tally with somebody else truly, in other words rationally,
wants, then two true answers to two genuine questions will be incompatible with
each other; and that is logically impossible.31

The above passage demonstrates two points with regard to Berlin’s view of

Rousseau as a value harmonist. First, Berlin defines ‘the good’, namely a value, as

one’s need identified by rationality. Second, a rational need cannot collide with

another rational want, for it is grounded in the belief that nature is harmonious, that is

to say, Berlin holds the point that Rousseau logically derives his view of

value-harmony from the idea of natural harmony. It has to be admitted that the

harmonious state of nature is a conjectural scenario and does not have any relevance in

reality. To form an ethical view through the angle of natural harmony is an unempirical

view of reality which contravenes Berlin’s.

Berlin grounds the second aspect with regard to values being harmonious in an

assessment of Rousseau’s text, in that it describes a kind of value-harmony, which

only a perfect state of life can have. Berlin comments:

At first the simple life in Rousseau is merely a description of the kind of conditions
in which the true answer may be vouchsafed. To those who crave for it, gradually it
becomes the truth itself: it becomes difficult to distinguish, both in Emile and La
Nouvelle Héloïse, between the condition for knowing the answers to questions and
the answers themselves.32

In my reading, the passage demonstrates two aspects of Berlin’s reading of

Rousseau’s text as depicting the notion of value-harmonist. First, in Berlin view,

Rousseau’s description derives from a confusion between perfection and fact in reality.

31
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 38.
32
Ibid., p. 42.

133
Second, rather than being an empirical observation, the idea of value harmony is a

starting point for Rousseau to conceptualise reality, and to pursue the moral purpose

that his works aim to achieve.

However, what Rousseau describes, and justifies, in his works contradicts the

theoretical perspective of value conflict that Berlin holds. The contradiction between

their perspectives does not incite Berlin to reflect on, nor to modify, his notion of value

conflict. Quite to the contrary, the juxtaposition reinforces his value position, and

Berlin’s moral thought has a distinct empiricist resistance to any theory lacking in a

sense of reality. This will be demonstrated in the following discussion of Berlin’s

critique of Rousseau.

Finally, turning to the third aspect with regard to values being harmonious, Berlin

focuses on the historical context that forms Rousseau’s idea of value harmony.

According to Berlin, the eighteenth-century Geneva was a religious and political

society governed by Calvinist tradition, with rigorous principles about right and wrong.

The rules about right and wrong stand in polar opposition to each other, and there is no

area which entails ambiguous moral principles:

It [the right way of living] will take the form of rules of life which, in effect, say ‘Do
thus: do not do thus’ or statement of the form: this is wrong and this is right. This is
just and this is unjust. This is good, this is bad. This is handsome: this is ugly.33

There are clear principles to distinguish good and bad. These principles are the

foundations of morality. If these principles do not exist, moral judgement would be

groundless.

Berlin portrays Rousseau as a thinker whose idea of value harmony is influenced,

and shaped, by his historical context:

The moral laws which man obeys are absolute, something from which man knows
that he must not depart. In this respect Rousseau’s view is a secular version of
Calvinism, for the one thing which he perpetually insists upon is that laws are not
conventions, are not utilitarian devices, but simply the drawing up in terms suitable

33
Ibid., p. 35.

134
 to the particular time and place and people of regulations embodying sacred truths,
sacred rules which are not man-made, but eternal, universal and absolute.34

The rigorous principles about right and wrong in Calvinist tradition form

Rousseau’s moral thought. Rousseau regards moral values as universally applicable to

human beings; this attitude directs itself against the influence of social conventions

shaped by conditions, and differing from one nation to another. Thus, the universality

of moral values is harmonious, which is untouched by any contradictions rooted in

reality. In earlier discussion, I have proposed that Berlin’s reading of Rousseau as a

value-harmonist reinforces his own value position. In the following analysis I will

demonstrate this point of view through Berlin’s critique of Rousseau.

There are two facets of Berlin’s criticism of monism, a conceptual and an empirical

one. With regard to the conceptual facet, Berlin states:

[…] it must always be the case that some values are not compatible, historically
compatible (incompatible) with others, so that the notion of an order in which all
true values are simultaneously present and harmonious with each other is ruled out,
not on the ground of unreality due to human weakness or ignorance or other
shortcomings [...] but owing to the nature of reality itself. This means that the idea
of perfection is ruled out not so much for empirical reasons but because it is
conceptually incoherent, not compatible with what we see history necessarily to
be.35

Berlin makes his argument of conflicting values an indisputable reason to

demonstrate the fallacy of the notion of value-harmony. The notion of value conflict is

Berlin’s value position, and accordingly his criticism of value-harmony can only

reinforce this position. Berlin also points to the fact, that human history testifies to the

incoherence of value-harmony.

Having dealt with the conceptual facet, I now turn to the empirical facet, for which

Berlin points out two attributes of the world of life experience. The first attribute of

reality is that moral dilemmas generate human life.36 This insight does not imply that

we experience such dilemmas in everyday life, but that it is an undeniable factual truth

34
Ibid.
35
Berlin, ‘Vico and the Ideal of the Enlightenment’, p. 124.
36
Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 11.

135
in life that sometimes choice-making seems to be equally good or bad, and

paradoxically excludes one another.

The second attribute of Berlin’s account of life experience is that it is impossible to

offer ultimate solutions to reality, because experience demonstrates that solutions to

old problems bring about new problems, and further contradictions.37 These two

points of view towards reality, – as the two attributes of the world of experience

explained above –, lead Berlin to argue that the idea of value-harmony is empirically

unreasonable.

I have pointed out, that Berlin does not develop a systematic critique of Rousseau,

but Berlin’s criticism of value-harmony has, in my view, its points. Berlin has a

negative opinion of Rousseau’s political and moral doctrines, which is in line with his

criticism of monism and could be detected through his judgement of the consequence

in applying Rousseau’s thought in reality:

What about Rousseau? Rousseau is of course quite correctly assigned to the

romantic movement as, in a sense, one of its fathers. But the Rousseau who was
responsible for the ideas of Robespierre, the Rousseau who was responsible for the
ideas of the French Jacobins, is not the Rousseau, it seems to me, who has an
obvious connection with romanticism.38

Berlin recognises Rousseau’s influence on romanticism. However, in Berlin’s eyes,

Rousseau’s moral and political doctrine is considered as responsible for the French

Revolution and its political aftermath. This carries a different evaluation from the

‘romantic’ Rousseau and reveals that Rousseau’s moral and political thought is read as

detaching itself from reality and leading to the destruction of life. In an earlier

discussion, I have unfolded Berlin’s criticism of monism under two aspects, namely,

the conceptual and the empirical aspects. Here, the judgement of a totalitarian

Rousseau reveals Berlin’s criticism of monism under the empirical aspect.39

37
Ibid., p. 12.
38
Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, p. 7.
39
For Berlin, The totalitarian Rousseau is a more accurate characterisation of Rousseau’s thought, which I shall
demonstrate in chapter five. Cherniss makes the point that Berlin’s discussion of freedom is one of his first explicit
rejections of monism. See J.L. Cherniss, A Mind and its Time: The Development of Isaiah Berlin’s Political
Thought, Oxford, Oxford U.P., 2013, p. 230. Following Cherniss. I view that the totalitarian Rousseau mirrored in

136
 Nevertheless, we are left with an important question, namely, what Rousseau’s

intention is with regard to the function of the idea that values are harmonious. In the

third section of chapter two, ‘Deducing Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom in the

Individual Sense’, I have shown that Rousseau’s theory of human nature is normative,

and functions as evaluative towards reality. In the same vein, I shall propose that

Rousseau’s notion of harmonious values is normative, in the sense that it demonstrates

what ought to be, rather than what is, in the world of life experience. Its feature is not

realistic, because its purpose is not to describe but to evaluate, and to see how much

interpretative power it might have in reality. This is pointed out by Shklar, when she

states:

The utopian form was ideally situated to convey his [Rousseau’s] concern for the
contrast between what is and what ought to be. With it came the characteristic
indifference to history. Moreover, Rousseau shared the typical utopian sense of the
distance between the probable and the possible. He also knew that suffering was not
necessary since he ‘had discovered that the source of all men’s miseries and
wickedness was in their false opinions’. The task, therefore, was to show men
models of what they could be, if only they were to abandon their chains – an
eventuality he did not in the least expect.40

The function of Rousseau’s utopian thought is to contrast the normative and the

empirical, it does not expect to alter reality completely, – although one has to admit

that the effect of utopian thought on reality may alter some people’s behaviour. Second,

Rousseau’s moral thought aims to set standards to demonstrate what we ought to be.

But we have to admit that Berlin has pointed out the effect of Rousseau’s utopian

thought on reality, and that Berlin has his reasons for offering an unsympathetic

critique of the notion of harmonious values. Berlin has vivid experiences of the Soviet

political dictatorship in the 1940s. For instance, through his talks with Josephine

Pasternak and Anna Akhmatova, Berlin notices how the Soviet writers and artists are

suppressed by the communist ideology in their country.41 These experiences shape

Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its political sense reveals Berlin’s criticism of monism under a
conceptual aspect.
40
Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory, p. 3.
41
Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life, pp. 142-147; pp. 151-169.

137
Berlin’s attitude towards idealised ideas of morality and politics.42 In theory, the

harmoniously utopian form of moral values may function as evaluative, but Berlin

guards himself against the tendency that utopian thought may be taken for reality itself,

and attempts to reconstruct the world of life experience based on such utopian thought.

To prove Rousseau as a thinker who holds the notion of value-harmony is a crucial

step in Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of freedom, because then he can,

strategically, push his argument further to prove that Rousseau ranks values according

to a standard. While we realise Berlin’s intentions, we have to admit that Berlin’s

critical account of Rousseau’s notion of value-harmony is thin. As my analysis above

intended to show, Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau is an outline, which derives from his

general assessment of features of Rousseau’s works, and a characterisation of the

social and political context in which Rousseau lives, thus it lacks in the exploration of

details of Rousseau’s texts. Berlin’s critique of his Rousseau dissatisfies, as it emerges

from a general depiction and criticism of the concept of value-harmony.

Now turning back to my comments on Gadamer’s theory: even though the approach

to reading advocated by Gadamer is formed by the reader’s fore-meaning, nevertheless

his method takes into account the process of the production of meaning as a fusion of

the fore-meaning, and the ‘horizon of understanding’ of the text. While the meaning is

anchored in the first place in the text, it is then taken beyond the text by way of the

effort of the reader. In this sense, meaning is bound, yet also free. In the case of

Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of value-harmony, the way Berlin portrays

Rousseau’s moral thought does not readily persuade, since he skips the complex and

the subtle elements of Rousseau’s moral thought, even though he has his specific

intentions and arguable reasons as explained above.

42
S. Talbot, ‘Foreword’, in H. Hardy (ed.), The Soviet Mind: Russian Culture under Communism, Washington, D.C.,
Brookings Institution Press, 2004, pp. xii-xv.

138
4.2.2 The Monistic and the Plural in Rousseau

If we turn to Berlin’s critics, two principal points of view with regard to the idea of

the state of values in Rousseau’s moral thought can be discerned. Some critics propose,

that Rousseau’s views of values are conflicting, rather than Berlin’s portrait of

Rousseau. Other critics argue that Berlin’s approach to Rousseau’s moral thought – by

deploying the dichotomy of values as either harmonious or conflicting – leads to

unproductive thinking, because Rousseau’s moral thought contains both, namely, a

view of harmonious and of conflicting values.

I am now turning to a critic representing the first point of view. Garrard argues that

Berlin presents a false interpretation of Rousseau’s moral thought in maintaining that

his portrait of Rousseau as a moral monist is misleading.43 To support this argument,

Garrard offers two reasons. First, Rousseau regards a genuine Christian life as virtuous.

Second, he also understands the republican life as moral.44 It needs to be pointed out

that the two sets of values, the Christian and the republican, oppose one another; thus

Garrard concludes that Rousseau’s moral thought is plural rather than monistic as

claimed by Berlin.45

Rousseau’s most sustained discussion of moral values is in chapter eight of book

four of the Social Contract, where he addresses the issue of the relationship between

the Christian and the republican value systems. Rousseau’s central point is that these

two value systems present a conflicting state.46 The republican value system requires

its citizens to cultivate the values of courage and patriotism, because these two types of

values are the core ones to keep the nation functioning, whereas the Christian value

system advocates another set of values, directed at the happiness in an otherworldly

kingdom, rather than the felicity in a secular world.47 The two sets of values, the

Christian and the republican, stand in opposition to each other.

43
Garrard, ‘Strange Reversals: Berlin on the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment’, p. 149.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p. 222.
47
Ibid., p. 224.

139
 However, in my view, Garrard misses an important point, namely, that Rousseau

makes a choice between the Christian and the republican value systems; he states:

But since this religion [Christianity] has no particular relation to the body politic, it
leaves laws with only the force the laws derive from themselves, without adding any
other force to them. And thus one of the great bonds of a particular society remains
ineffectual. Moreover, far from attaching the hearts of the citizens to the state, it
detaches them from it as from all the other earthly things. I know of nothing more
contrary to the social spirit.48

The above passage implies that Rousseau chooses the set of civic moral values over

the Christian, which in my view means, that he ranks values, and cancels out certain

values according to a moral standard. The standard is in line with the general purpose

of the Social Contract. Viewed from this angle, Berlin’s assessment of Rousseau’s

moral thought is reasonable, since Rousseau seems to promote a kind of

value-harmonious state in his political treatise.

I am now turning to a critic representing the second point of view. Unlike Garrard’s

criticism, – that Berlin misinterprets Rousseau as holding the view of value-harmony –,

Williams points out that Rousseau’s moral thought contains two dimensions, that is, he

views values as both harmonious and conflicting. He argues that Berlin’s dichotomy of

moral values is an unproductive argument, when applied to assess Rousseau’s moral

thought, since it takes the notion of value-conflict and the idea of value-harmony as

mutually exclusive. This theoretical approach leads Berlin to ignore the complexity

and subtlety of Rousseau’s moral thought.49

In Williams’ view, the relationship between value-conflict and value-harmony in

Rousseau’s moral thought is not exclusive but supplementary,50 for which he offers

two reasons. One, Rousseau’s moral thought has its contradictory characteristics, – that

is to say, Rousseau is sensitive to concrete contexts, variable circumstances and the

temperaments of people, and these factors determine the forms of societies and

governments. Each form of society and its government results from a particular set of

48
Ibid.
49
Williams, ‘Political Ontology and Institutional Design in Montesquieu and Rousseau’, p.526.
50
Ibid.

140
values.51 In following Williams’ reasonable account of the empirical dimension of

Rousseau’s moral thought, it can be inferred that sets of values on which different

societies rest, may contradict one another.

The other reason Williams offers for the supplementary model of values is that

Rousseau’s moral thought is also harmoniously formed. This is expressed on the

normative level.52 First, it is not subject to social conventions, but independent of

them. Williams captures Rousseau’s way of thinking, as contemplating the immaterial

form/substance of morality through the activity of the intellect.53 Second, through

revealing the normative nature of the value of justice in Rousseau’s moral thought,

Williams demonstrates Rousseau’s view of the harmonious state of values. For

Williams, Rousseau’s idea of justice is based on the immaterial substance of morality,

and he states:

The idea of justice, according to Rousseau, is both universal and completely beyond
the ability of man to change. A people cannot make something just by willing it to
be so. Rousseau can only hope that their will can somehow be brought around to see
the idea of justice.54

If we were to take Williams’ first and second reasons, as explored above, we could

maintain that Rousseau draws a line between concrete moral norms and absolute moral

principles, and that he does not mix both. The concrete moral norms reflect the

conflicting nature of morality, whereas the absolute moral principles demonstrate the

harmonious nature of Rousseau’s moral thought.

Yet I argue that Williams’ critique of Berlin is driven by a misplaced understanding

of Berlin’s theory of pluralism, for he identifies pluralism as a theory of ‘postmodern

relativism’.55 That is to say, pluralism equates to relativism. As I have analysed in

chapter three, Berlin’s account of pluralism has its own contradictions, but this cannot

sufficiently prove that pluralism is relativism. In chapter three, I also demonstrate that

51
Ibid., p. 525.
52
Ibid., p. 532.
53
Ibid., pp. 532-533.
54
D.L. Williams, ‘Justice and the General Will: Affirming Rousseau’s Ancient Orientation’, Journal of the History
of Ideas, vol. 66, no. 3, 2005, p. 401.
55
Williams, ‘Political Ontology and Institutional Design in Montesquieu and Rousseau’, p. 526.

141
Berlin holds two points of view with regard to pluralism. One, the difference between

pluralism and monism is a difference in a normative sense, rather than one in an

empirical sense. Second, pluralism reflects the real state of normative values, and

monism is conceptually incoherent. Thus, Berlin’s theoretical lens of interpreting

Rousseau’s moral thought rests on a normative level. Viewed from this perspective,

Williams fails to capture the normative nature of Berlin’s theory of pluralism, and thus

misidentifies the approach that Berlin uses in his analysis of Rousseau’s moral

thought.

Nevertheless, I argue that Williams’ exposition of the two dimensions of Rousseau’s

moral thought deserves to be addressed, in particular, his analysis of the monistic

strand of Rousseau’s moral thought, because he unfolds its complexity, which Berlin

sets aside. Berlin claims that the notion that values conflict, concerns the existing state

of values in a normative sense.56 This is the lens that Berlin uses to read Rousseau’s

moral thought. Thus the starting point of Berlin’s reading focuses on the normative

level of Rousseau’s moral thought, which then can be set in contrast to Williams’

analysis of the normative dimension of Rousseau.

I now turn to another critic, Shklar, who pushes the point of the plurality of values in

Rousseau’s moral thought even further, in that she argues that Rousseau not only

believes in the harmony of normative values, but also holds the view that these values

are conflicting.57 In Shklar’s view, Rousseau offers his reader two equally valid, but

conflicting versions of the moral life, – namely, the version of the Spartan city

reflected on in the Social Contract, and the version of the tranquil household reflected

on in Julie.58 Each version contains a certain set of principles of humanity, while the

two sets are opposed to one another. The plurality of values contains the possibility of

conflict among the values.

56
Berlin, ‘Vico and the Ideal of the Enlightenment’, p. 124.
57
Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory, pp. 3-4.
58
Ibid.

142
 Shklar’s presentation of Rousseau’s moral thought stands in opposition to Berlin’s

view, that Rousseau regards values as harmonious. Despite the many arguments

against it, I shall argue that Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau still keeps its force. This is

based on two reasons. First, in order to serve his interpretative purpose, Berlin is more

concerned with Rousseau’s political works. In the third section of chapter two,

‘Deducing Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom in the Individual Sense’, I have shown, that

Berlin qualifies Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense as positive

freedom through his interpretation of the meaning of Rousseau’s idea of human nature.

In Berlin’s view, the notion of positive freedom, – as to be one’s master by way of

reason, may lead to a notion of positive freedom in its political sense; monism being

the inner logic which connects the two types of freedom. The purpose of Berlin’s

interpretation of Rousseau is to unfold the logic, thus Berlin is more concerned with

Rousseau’s political works to see how the logic can be unpacked. The version of the

Spartan city reflected in the Social Contract presents a harmonious state of moral

values.

Second, in an earlier discussion, I have demonstrated that Iser’s idea of

‘consistency-building’ of meaning is one of the underlying principles of Berlin’s

process of reading. With this point in mind and given that Berlin is focused on

Rousseau’s political works, he strategically avoids inconsistency of meaning with

regard to his expectation. Even if he confronts other aspects of Rousseau’s idea about

the relationship among values, he would ignore these layers of Rousseau’s moral

thought, so as to consistently meet his interpretative purpose.

To sum up then, Rousseau’s moral thought, particularly his notion of the

relationship between normative values, is more subtle and complex than Berlin’s

presentation assumes, but, as I have attempted to demonstrate, Berlin has his reasons to

read Rousseau in his way. However, it is still important to be aware of Berlin’s

Rousseau. This awareness could keep Berlin’s reader at a certain distance, to critically

see his portrait of Rousseau as a value harmonist.

143
4.3 Individual Freedom: A Supreme Value

This section analyses how Berlin ranks Rousseau’s notion of freedom as the highest

value, and addresses the reason for Berlin’s evaluation. Turning to Rousseau’s texts

and the argument of his critic Cohen, the section aims to supplement Berlin’s reading.

4.3.1 Reading Rousseau as Taking Freedom as the Highest Value

There are certain reasons for making this move. If we take the idea, that values are

incommensurable, as the conceptual framework that forms Berlin’s perspective, and

transfer it to his reading of this second facet of Rousseau’s moral thought, then we can

propose, that he tests Rousseau’s moral thought with his question, whether it takes

account of the fact that values are incommensurable or not. In the first section of this

chapter, ‘Rousseau as an Utopian Moralist’, – where I have shown the general

character of Rousseau’s moral thought –, Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau

consistently encounters this evaluation. In fact, the meaning Berlin produces is, in my

view, a detailed demonstration of the third statement of monism, that is, the idea that

values are commensurable.

This argument can be taken further in that it is also the second dimension of Berlin’s

interpretation of Rousseau’s moral thought, as established earlier on. The first

dimension concerns the fact that Berlin reads Rousseau as a value harmonist, and the

second dimension, that Rousseau views individual freedom as the highest value.

Similar to the analysis of the first dimension, the second dimension presents two

attributes. First, its analysis is a detailed exposition of Berlin’s general characterisation

of the nature of Rousseau’s moral thought. Second, the notion that values are

incommensurable is the horizon of Berlin’s reading, and also functions as a theoretical

tool. Grounded in these two definitions, the present section intends to unpack the logic

of Berlin’s interpretation.

144
 In the third section of the third chapter, ‘The Conflict and Incommensurability of

Values’, I have demonstrated that the idea of incommensurable values implies that

values cannot be compared, – or to paraphrase it in another way, there exists no

common standard to measure plural values. By contrast, the idea of commensurable

values means, that they can be weighed against one another by a common standard.

Here I wish to bring forward an important point. The idea that values are

commensurable demonstrates a state where two, or more than two, values exist, while

the idea that values are incommensurable also shows a state where a plurality of values

exist. The difference between the two states lies in the logical consequence. The notion

that values are commensurable implies that one value may be left to assert itself as

universal and ultimate, and that values can be ranked eventually. In this light, the

realisation of the ultimate value entails realisations of other values. The idea, that

values are incommensurable comprises a state where no values can be weighed against

one another, that is, they are equally valuable.

For Berlin, Rousseau holds the notion of individual freedom as an absolute

value,60 – that is to say, freedom stands as the highest value in Rousseau’s moral

thought. Before I examine Berlin’s arguments to prove his point, I need to clarify what

Berlin means by the notion of individual freedom. To recapitulate, what I have shown

earlier on, Berlin defines the idea of individual freedom as accomplish a rational self.61

According to this qualification, the notion of individual freedom is to fulfil a rational

purpose, – that is to say, freedom is to shape one’s life in a rational form. This is

positive freedom in its individual sense, because positive freedom in its individual

sense is defined by Berlin as to master oneself, and thus achieve a rational self.62 In

the third section of the second chapter, ‘Deducing Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom in

the Individual Sense’, I have demonstrated that this type of freedom has certain

requirements. On the individual level, it demands one’s effort to control and direct

60
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 31.
61
Ibid., p. 38.
62
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp. 214-215.

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one’s desires and passions, – in other words, freedom consists in not doing what one

does not want to do.

In a contrary definition, Berlin also qualifies Rousseau’s notion of individual

freedom as emerging in the context of the state of nature, as ‘permission for men to do

what they like, a situation in which anybody does anything’.63 This is a definition that

differs from the concept of positive freedom in its individual sense. According to this

definition, the notion of individual freedom is to do whatever one likes without the

purpose of realising a rational self through self-control. Thus, we can conclude, that

there are differences in Berlin’s definition of Rousseau’s notion of individual freedom.

The difficulty of Berlin’s different readings leads to the problematic of knowing

which type of individual freedom he has in mind with regard to what Rousseau ranks

as the highest value. Following the logical line of Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau

in order to demonstrate the transformation of Rousseau’s idea of positive freedom in

its individual sense into the idea of positive freedom in its collective sense by way of

the theory of monism, it is reasonable to hold, that Berlin defines the notion of

individual freedom as realising a rational self, rather than as doing whatever one wants

to do as the highest value.

I shall review this problem in more detail below. Berlin offers three arguments to

prove his reading, that positive freedom in its individual sense is the highest value in

Rousseau’s moral thought. His first argument is broad, and appears in the form of an

assessment: ‘Liberty for him [Rousseau] is an absolute value. He looks on liberty as if

it were a kind of religious concept.’64 A religious belief does not necessarily need to

be justified by reason, it is a priori. In this regard, Berlin’s assessment demonstrates

Rousseau’s attitude towards freedom that bears religious belief. However, apart from

this statement, Berlin does not elaborate and clarify why he thinks that Rousseau takes

the notion of freedom as a religious belief.

63
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 33.
64
Ibid., p. 31.

146
 Now I am turning to Berlin’s second argument, which possesses a stronger force,

yet is condensed and not without a problem. According to Berlin, Rousseau qualifies

the notion of freedom as the essence of human nature, because first, it renders moral

responsibility possible, and second, the concept of moral responsibility distinguishes

men from animals: ‘For him [Rousseau], liberty is identical with the human individual

himself. To say that a man is a man, and to say that he is free, are almost the same.’65

Freedom is intricately connected with the notion of being human. If one loses one’s

freedom, one may cease to be a human being.

Based on this qualification, Berlin continues:

If a man is not free, if a man is not responsible for what he does, if a man does not
do what he does because he wants to do it, because this is his personal, human goal,
because in this way he achieves something which he, and not somebody else, at this
moment desires – if he does not do that, he is not a human being at all: for he has no
accountability. The whole notion of moral responsibility, which for Rousseau is the
essence of man almost more than his reason, depends upon the fact that a man can
choose, choose between alternatives, choose between them freely, be uncoerced.66

Berlin maintains that moral responsibility gives man the essential quality for being

human, and freedom renders the responsibility possible. Following this line of

reasoning, freedom encapsulates a supreme status among values.

Berlin turns to Rousseau’s objection to slavery as a proof, to give a detailed

justification of the second argument. Berlin offers three reasons for Rousseau’s

objection to slavery; and the first reason is phrased as a commentary. Berlin points out

that slavery for Rousseau is against nature,67 but he does not elaborate this point of

view, which makes his presentation of the first reason general.

However, the second reason is more detailed than the first one. Berlin offers a

paraphrase of Rousseau: ‘To renounce liberty’, declares Rousseau, ‘is to renounce

being a man, to surrender the rights of humanity, and even its duties […] Such a

65
Ibid.
66
Ibid., pp. 31-32.
67
Ibid., pp. 32-33.

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renunciation is not compatible with man’s nature.’68 Slavery is against the nature of

human beings, and reinforces Berlin’s point of view that Rousseau takes liberty as the

essence of human nature.

The third reason underlines Berlin’s second argument that freedom renders moral

responsibility possible: ‘To do this [to become a slave] is to commit moral suicide, and

suicide is not human action – ‘death is not an event in life’.69

By demonstrating Rousseau’s argument of objecting to slavery, Berlin is able to

unpack the layers of his second argument, and justifies his statement that Rousseau

takes freedom as the ultimate value.

Yet, there is a problem in Berlin’s second argument, as it presents an inconsistency

in his interpretation of Rousseau’s theory of human nature. At the surface of meaning,

Berlin identifies individual freedom as the essence of human nature in Rousseau’s

account, however, elsewhere he defines reason as the essential part of Rousseau’s

account of human nature, as I have demonstrated in the first section of chapter two, ‘A

Reconstruction of Rousseau’s Idea of Human Nature’.

Individual freedom and reason are two different concepts, and therefore identifying

human nature with individual freedom is not consistent with identifying human nature

with reason. The contradiction between the two accounts leaves the reader to wonder

whether, as I have suggested before, Berlin is motivated by his themes, and whether he

therefore presents different accounts of Rousseau in his essays. However, as I have

stated above, the inconsistency does not mean that Berlin contradicts himself. In fact,

in Berlin’s mind, Rousseau’s idea of reason shares the meaning with his notion of

individual freedom,70 – that is to say, to accomplish reason is to complete freedom in

theory, and the two concepts bear the same meaning.

68
Ibid., p. 33.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid., pp. 38-39.

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 Taking Berlin’s position, his identification of the status of Rousseau’s idea of

individual freedom as realising reason can be understood as building a consisting

meaning of his characterisation of the nature of Rousseau’s moral thought. The above

identification presents Rousseau’s theory of monism, that is, Rousseau grades values,

and ranks the values of individual freedom as the highest.

However, it has to be admitted that Berlin’s comments on Rousseau’s grading of

freedom as ultimate are underwritten with a negative attitude, as expressed in the

following statement: ‘But there are many other values too. It is impossible simply to

declare that freedom, individual freedom, permission for men to do what they like, a

situation in which anybody does anything, is the ideal condition of man.’71 This is

consistent with Berlin’s moral supposition, that values are incommensurable.

In the third section of chapter two, ‘Deducing Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom in the

Individual Sense’, I have examined that Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual

sense is to choose and to lead a rational form of life in employing one’s ability to

control and resist one’s desires and passions. Berlin states that freedom is the supreme

value in Rousseau’s moral thought;72 however, his presentation of the arguments for

Rousseau’s reasons to rank the value of freedom puts aside certain subtle and complex

facers if we search Rousseau’s texts.

Rousseau comments:

The only one who does his own will is he who, in order to do it, has no need to put
another’s arms at the end of his own; from which it follows that the first of all goods
is not authority but freedom. The truly free man wants only what he can do and does
what he pleases.73

The way Rousseau proves the value of freedom is connected with the freedom of

will. Freedom is a precious value, because it allows man to behave in accordance with

his will. For Rousseau, the freedom of will is the source of morality,74 that is to say,

71
Ibid., p. 33.
72
Ibid., p. 31.
73
Rousseau, Emile or On Education, p. 84.
74
Ibid., p. 286.

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the value of freedom in Rousseau is connected with morality, which I shall explore in

unpacking Cohen’s reading in the following section.

4.3.2 Linking Freedom with the Sentimental Dimension of Morality

I am turning to the critic Cohen to elaborate the problematic of freedom as the

highest value in order to point out what has been left aside by Berlin’s reading. In

Cohen’s eyes, Rousseau offers at least three arguments, to support the point of view

that freedom is a supreme value, whereby he identifies the three arguments,

respectively, as instrumental, rational and moral.75 The instrumental argument refers

to a fact, that is, freedom is one of the principal instruments by which to preserve

oneself.76 In Cohen’s view, this argument has a limited force, since the purpose of

Rousseau’s notion of freedom is to retain one’s own will and judgement as a guide to

conduct, but the problem of the argument is that, as a tool, freedom could be used to

one’s preservation,77 and also for other purposes, as it is not an end but a means.

Cohen is more concerned with the rational and the moral arguments. Regarding the

second argument, namely the ‘rationality argument’, he believes that Rousseau ranks

the value of freedom as the highest, because it is an objective given and described by

Rousseau as ‘most precious of all […] gifts’.78 Thus, the argument presents itself as

rational based on the fact that to trade freedom for any other values is irrational,

because this action buys a lesser value at the cost of a greater value.

Cohen unpacks a supportive claim of the rational argument which Rousseau does

not explicitly establish in his second argument, in stating that we all have a sense of

our worth; and that this sense is connected with our individual freedom, and thus the

power to act, based on the principle that we sense what is best for us.79 The supreme

status of freedom lies in the fact that it is relevant to, and connected with, morality, as
75
J. Cohen, Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals, Oxford, Oxford U.P., 2010, p. 29.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid., p. 28.

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well as a necessary condition for conducting what we sense is the best for us.80 What

is important in Cohen’s unpacking of the supportive idea of the rational argument is

that it explores Rousseau’s emphasis on the movement of the soul as the source of our

moral sentiments.

Cohen’s exploration of Rousseau’s second argument unearths the depth of

Rousseau’s notion of our pre-empirical sense of what is good, which in turn presents

the sentimental dimension of Rousseau’s moral thought. In Emile, Rousseau speaks

through the voice of the Savoyard Vicar:

I do not draw these rules [the rules about how I ought to act] from the principles of a
high philosophy, but find them written by nature with ineffaceable characters in the
depth of my heart. I have only to consult myself about what I want to do. Everything
I sense to be good is good; everything I sense to be bad is bad.81

Here, Rousseau points to one of the primary foundations of morality, namely, an

innate awareness about what is right and good, which is independent of reflection.

The importance of the awareness is, that Rousseau takes it as the ultimate principle,

that conducts our actions; he states:

Sublime science of simple souls, are there so many difficulties and so much
preparation necessary in order to know you? Are your principles not engraved in all
hearts, and is it not enough, in order to learn your laws, to commune with oneself
and, in the silence of the passions, to listen to the voice of one’s conscience?82

The importance of retaining one’s inborn moral sense over one’s conduct is prior to

any other principles acquired through experience and reason.

According to Cohen, Rousseau’s third argument is a detailed analysis, and an

elaboration, of the supporting idea in the rationality argument; more specifically, it is a

demonstration of the connection between our sense of what is best and freedom.83 The

‘moral nature’ argument considers the concept that even if one alienates one’s freedom,

becomes an instrument of the will of an authority, and commits a crime involuntarily,

80
Ibid.
81
Rousseau, Emile or On Education, p. 286.
82
J.-J. Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts’, in D.A. Cress (ed. and trans.), Basic Political Writings of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 21.
83
Cohen, Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals, p. 30.

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one cannot cancel out one’s sense of what is best, as the feelings of guilt and remorse

after the crime arise as a proof of this sense, which also proves that the sense of what is

best is prior to the will of the authority. Thus to alienate the free man is impossible.84

The idea of our sense of what is best justifies the point of view that an alienation of

freedom is impossible as perceived in the moral dimension.

Cohen’s exploration enters the depth of the supportive relationship between the

sentimental facet of Rousseau’s moral thought and his notion of freedom. The inborn

awareness of our sense of what is best is bound with freedom, and this renders freedom

supreme.

Apart from the impossible alienation of freedom in the situation, where one is

coerced by the will of the authority, supreme freedom is also expressed on the

individual level, which is a supplement for Cohen’s proof. Rousseau states:

When I abandon myself to temptations, I act according to the impulsion of external

objects. When I reproach myself for this weakness, I listen only to my will. I am
enslaved because of vices and free because of remorse. The sentiment of my
freedom is effaced in me only when I become depraved and finally prevent the voice
of the soul from being raised against the law of the body.85

This passage demonstrates two points of view. First, Rousseau views freedom as

exercising a control over one’s desires, and raising oneself above the physical law.

Second, it shows the tie between freedom and the immaterial substance of the soul;

real freedom is in line with the sentiments deriving from the soul, that is, freedom is

directed by ‘the voice of the soul’.

By contrast to Cohen’s deep-searching comments, the way Berlin justifies the status

of Rousseau’s notion of freedom casts aside the sentimental dimension of morality that

Rousseau addresses. Yet this dimension has crucial importance, both in understanding

the content of Rousseau’s idea of individual freedom, – which was presented in the

third section of chapter two, ‘Deducing Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom in the

84
Ibid.
85
Rousseau, Emile or On Education, p. 280.

152
Individual Sense’ –, and in defining the status of freedom, which I have shown in this

section.

In this chapter, I have examined the distinctive and the valuable elements in Berlin’s

reading of Rousseau’s moral thought; and I have highlighted the point that this reading

is not the only one possible by drawing on other interpreters of Rousseau’s moral

thought. The establishment of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral thought paves the

way for chapter five; it enables Berlin to unpack the inner connection between his

reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense and in its political

sense. It also helps us to perceive, how the way Berlin links his reading of Rousseau’s

moral thought with his interpretation of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its political

sense puts aside some important aspects of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its

political sense.

153
 Chapter Five:
Reading Positive Freedom in a Political Sense
Following on from Berlin’s characterization of the nature of Rousseau’s moral
thought in the last chapter, I shall propose that understanding Rousseau’s notion of
positive freedom in its individual sense aids in our understanding of its political sense.
In this chapter I shall analyse the question, how Berlin reads Rousseau’s idea of
freedom in its political sense, and I shall assess Berlin’s reading. Specifically, I am
attending to three issues, namely, first, the problematic of the state of nature; second,
Rousseau’s proposed solution in the form of the general will; and third and concluding,
the issue of positive freedom in its political sense.

5.1 The Problematic of the State of Nature

Assuming that Rousseau’s moral thought is monistic, Berlin accordingly concludes

that Rousseau’s political doctrine faces a problem. I shall suggest that Berlin’s
exposition of this problematic contains two layers, that is, the conflict between
individual freedoms among people, and the contradiction between individual freedom
and political power.

5.1.1 The Conflict between Individual Freedoms

Regarding the first layer of conflict between individual freedoms, Berlin does not
elaborate the problematic, he simply points out that to allow one to do whatever he
likes in the state of nature will lead to chaos and anarchy.1 I shall propose that this
succinct statement needs to be situated in Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s moral
thought to gain its meaning. Berlin defines two features of Rousseau’s moral thought,
that is, it is monistic, and it ranks individual freedom as the highest value. This has
been exposed in chapter four.

1
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 31.

154
 But the problematic of the idea is that because freedom is a value that has a supreme
status, everyone may claim to have a right to it. However, the reality is that it is
impossible for everyone to have the claim to the supreme value fulfilled without
conflict with others; one’s desires for freedom, and one’s means to realize the claim,
conflict with those of others.

Though succinct, the first layer of Berlin’s description of the problematic of the
conflict between individual freedoms captures the essential issue, as presented by
Rousseau in the ‘Second Discourse’.2 But I shall argue that to understand this problem,
one has to consider its context, – for it demonstrates the depth, the complexity and the
subtlety of Rousseau’s account of the state of nature. Berlin’s presentation of the
problem is brief; thus he cannot enter the details and analyse the specific background
addressed by Rousseau.

In order to get a different perspective, I shall turn to Rousseau’s works, in particular

the ‘Second Discourse’, to focus on the specific context underlying the above
problematic. The background is opened in the conflicting state of nature in the ‘Second
Discourse’. In my first chapter, ‘A Critic of Rousseau’s Idea of Human Nature’, I have
demonstrated, that the state of nature is a thought experiment which Rousseau
conducts in order to reveal the nature of human beings and its development over time
and circumstance. In my second chapter, ‘Positive Freedom in the Individual Sense’, I
have illustrated, that for Rousseau the state of nature is considered under two aspects,
namely, the pure state of nature and the conflicting state of nature. In focusing on the
pure state of nature, I have examined Rousseau’s idea of the nature of natural man.
Based on these foregoing discussions, I shall now turn my attention to the second part
of Rousseau’s account of the state of nature, that is, the conflicting and competitive
state. I shall examine this question with regard to the situations in which this
conflicting state of nature arises.

The conflicting and competitive state of nature, as presented in part two of the
‘Second Discourse’, contains many stages of revolutionary change compared to the

2
Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, pp. 68-69.

155
pure state of nature.3 I do not intend to expose each stage in detail, but for the purpose
of illustrating situations where the conflicting state of nature arises, I shall focus on
unfolding one crucial aspect of the conjectural historical change, that is, the invention
of agriculture and metallurgy.

In his ‘Second Discourse’, Rousseau argues that the discoveries of metallurgy and
agriculture lead humanity to enter a new historical stage, which irreversibly causes
men’s dependence on one another. With regard to metallurgy, this brings about the
division of labour on the grounds that those who are skilled at the art of ‘working
metals and multiplying their uses’ necessarily need those who can produce food to feed
them, and those who are good at farming need iron-makers to supply iron to multiply
their food products.4 With respect to agriculture, it results in the division of land,
which leads to the establishment of property.5 Compared to the pure state of nature,
where human beings have no thought of turning natural sources to their advantage, or
drawing boundaries for the land, the stage where metallurgy and agriculture are
developed by human beings is a new historical era, – the division of labor and land
make human beings depend on one another.

The new stage, where self-sufficiency is lost, deals a fatal blow to the tranquillity of
the pure state of nature. According to Rousseau, in the pure state of nature, natural
inequalities such as physical strength and the qualities of mind do not carry full weight.
However, in the new stage, when metallurgy and agriculture dominate life, natural
inequalities become decisive qualifiers; the strongest can do the most work, and the
smartest can find solutions to shorten their labor.6 As a result, natural inequalities in
brain power and physical strength then, in turn, establish further inequalities, namely,
between the rich and the poor, masters and slaves.

In Rousseau’s eyes, the inequalities of rank and fate grounded in natural inequalities
can be considered as unfair; in the situation, where legitimate authority is lacking, the
rich and the powerful selfishly advance themselves at the expense of the poor and the

3
Ibid., pp. 63-65.
4
Ibid., p. 66.
5
Ibid., pp. 65-66.
6
Ibid., p. 67.

156
miserable, whereas the latter being unable to feed themselves sufficiently degenerate
into thieves.7 Soon perpetual conflict arises in the state of nature; with no one in a
position of holding legitimate power, the situation ends up in the horrible state of war.8
The idea of individual freedom, as pursuing whatever one likes, arises on the
background of the conflicting state of nature, thus is a conflict between individual
freedoms. Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau aims at being a general portrait in diagnosing
the main features.

5.1.2 The Conflict between Individual Freedom and Political Power

This section turns to the second layer of Berlin’s exposition, the contradiction
between individual freedom and political power. With respect to this layer, Berlin
views it as a dilemma between the absolute value of freedom and the absolute value of
the right rules; he asserts:

Men do live in society and consequently have to create rules whereby human beings
must so conduct themselves as not to get in each other’s way too much, not frustrate
each other excessively, not employ their power in such a way as to thwart too many
of each other’s purposes and ends.9

The problem cannot be denied; social order must enter into conflict with individual
freedom, for one’s desire of doing whatever one likes will be confined by social order.

Similar to Berlin’s exposition of the first layer of the problematic Rousseau’s

political philosophy faces, his analysis sets aside the contextual setting of Rousseau’s
thought. The problem of the conflict between social order and individual freedom
arises in the context of Rousseau’s critique of the rise of government in the conflicting
state of nature. I shall propose that considering this context helps to understand two
related strategic moves, – namely, the method and the principle Rousseau takes to
solve the problem.

To begin with, I shall set out the situation. In the state of conflict, laws and political
institutions become necessary. However, for Rousseau to legitimize the existing

7
Ibid.
8
Ibid., p. 68.
9
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 34.

157
inequalities by establishing a government in the state of conflict is unjust, for which he
offers two reasons, whereby the first reason contains two points of view. First, the state
of conflict is unfavourable to the rich, because they ‘alone paid all the costs and in
which the risk of losing one’s life was common to all and the risk of losing one’s goods
was personal’.10 Second, a contract is invented by the rich for the poor to turn their
adverse situation into a favourable one.11 The establishment of government in the
above situation has the effect of sanctioning the existing inequalities, and therefore,
apparently, bringing peace; however, there is a lack of legitimation, since one could
argue that the intentions of the rich for proposing a contract are meant to cleverly use
the poor and the dispossessed to their advantage, and therefore to legitimate their past
taking, and use, of power.

The second reason for being considered as unfair, as Rousseau argues, lies in the
fact that in the pure state of nature men who are used to being free and independent can
– naively – be persuaded, and led by the stronger to consent to the existing material
and moral inequalities:

They [men who live in the state of war] all run to chain themselves, in the belief that
they secure their liberty, for although they had enough sense to realize the
advantages of a political establishment, they did not have enough experience to
foresee its dangers. The most capable of anticipating the abuses were precisely those
who counted on profiting from them; and even the wise saw the need to be resolved
to sacrifice one part of their liberty to preserve the other, just as a wounded man has
his arm amputated to save the rest of his body.12

In the state of conflict and war, mutual consent is extracted from an assumed belief
in making a sacrifice for one’s betterment. In this situation, political power can be
considered unfair on the grounds that the poor – as one part of the associates – are
ignorant of the situation of forming a political power, whereas the rich – as the other
part of the associates – use the situation to their benefit.

To conclude my discussion, I shall argue that the problematic between freedom and
authority in Rousseau’s political philosophy should be viewed in the light of
Rousseau’s critique of the rise of government in the conflicting state of nature. This

10
Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, p. 69.
11
Ibid., pp. 68-69.
12
Ibid., p. 70.

158
provides a context for understanding Rousseau’s idea of the general will, which I shall
analyse in section two.

5.1.3 The Problematic of Psychological Injuries

As pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, for the first problematic of the state
of nature I shall focus my analysis around Rousseau’s texts to gain a different
perspective. After drawing out the contextual background of Rousseau’s approach to
the issue of conflict, I wish to focus on another aspect of the problematic, that is, the
psychological injuries caused by the process of socialization. This aspect has a
profound influence on our understanding of Rousseau’s formulation of the general will;
as Shklar points out, the general will can be considered as a political recovery for the
moral and psychological injuries we have incurred through the process of
civilization.13 On the other hand, to analyse this aspect provides another angle for
understanding Rousseau’s thought of the general will apart from Berlin’s reading,
which I will deal with in the next section.

In order to explore this aspect of the problematic, – that is, the psychological and
moral injuries caused by the process of socialization –, I shall follow Rousseau’s idea
of amour-propre, which in my view is a central concept that Rousseau uses to capture
the originating cause of the injuries.

So as to illustrate the notion of amour-propre, Rousseau imagines the following

scenario:

People grew accustomed to gather in front of their huts or around a large tree; song
and dance, true children of love and leisure, became the amusement or rather the
occupation of idle men and women who had flocked together. Each one began to
look at others and to want to be looked at himself, and public esteem had a value.
The one who sang or danced the best, the handsomest, the strongest, the most adroit
or the most eloquent became the most highly regarded. 14

To draw out some points of Rousseau’s reflection: the imagined condition

demonstrates a turning point, – that is, the occasional gathering of people become

13
Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory, p. 184.
14
Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, p. 64.

159
social rituals. Such a turning point gives rise to the idea of amour-propre; the pure
intention of love and leisure turns into a desire of looking at others, comparing, and
finally wishing to be regarded as superior by one’s peers.

Since the notion is so central in Rousseau’s work, it might be helpful to aim at a

precise definition. In a lengthy footnote of the ‘Second Discourse’, Rousseau
elaborates amour-propre through a comparison with amour de soi:

Amour-propre [vanity] and Amour de soi [self-love], two very different passions in
their nature and their effects, should not be confused. Self-love is a natural sentiment
which inclines every animal to attend to its self-preservation and which, guided in
man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. Amour-propre is
only a relative sentiment, factitious, and born in society, which inclines every
individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone else, inspires men with all
the evils they do one and another [sic], and is the genuine source of honor.15

In the first section of chapter two, ‘The Natural Goodness of Man and its
Problematic’, I have demonstrated that amour de soi concerns only one’s own
preservation without involving any thought or passion of suppressing others. As the
above passage demonstrates, amour-propre differs from amour de soi; it is a desire of
being regarded highly by other people, and feeling superior to them.

Rousseau’s notion of amour-propre requires some complexity in finding a proper

translation to capture its rich meaning. However, Gourevitch and Wokler have
proposed possible approaches to understand this notion, and I shall draw on their
points of view. In ‘A note on the translations’, Gourevitch points out:

The obvious candidates for Rousseau’s amour-propre are ‘vanity’, ‘vainglory’ and
‘pride’, especially since he introduces amour-propre as a technical term in the
context of his criticism of Hobbes’s understanding of ‘vanity’ or ‘vainglory’.16

Amour-propre relates to a range of psychological characteristics; Gourevitch does

not offer a definite answer, but he provides a few possible translations of this notion in
the sense of ‘vanity’, ‘vainglory’ and ‘pride’. Compared to Gourevitch, Wokler gives a
more definite answer to the meaning of amour-propre in translating it as vanity and

15
J.-J. Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men or Second Discourse’, in V.
Gourevitch (ed.), Rousseau: The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, p. 218.
16
V. Gourevitch, ‘A note on the translations’, in V. Gourevitch (ed.), Rousseau: The Discourses and Other Early
Political Writings, p. xlviii.

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pride.17 Although this translation is at risk of simplifying the richness of the idea of
amour-propre, I view Wokler’s characterization as more succinct, since amour-propre
contains two aspects; the first aspect focuses on other people’s opinion of oneself as
superior, whereas the second aspect concerns one’s performed status in society as
privileged; the notions of vanity and pride define the two aspects well.

After an examination of the meaning of amour-propre and its possible translation, I

shall now turn to Rousseau’s diagnosis of its influence on our moral psychology. In the
second section of chapter two, ‘A Reconstruction of Rousseau’s Idea of Human
Nature’, I have demonstrated that the natural goodness of man lies in his natural
inclination; spontaneity sprung from amour de soi and pitié, which is a mirror
Rousseau holds up to us to reflect the distortions of human nature in society. By
contrast to amour de soi, amour-propre, in Rousseau’s view, deflects man’s natural
goodness:

It was necessary for his advantage to show himself to be something other than what
he in fact was. Being something and appearing to be something became two
completely different things; and from this distinction there arose grand ostentation,
deceptive cunning, and all the vices that follow in their wake.18

The expressions ‘show’ and ‘appearing’ reveal, that living is no longer a purely
sentimental feeling mirrored in the image of natural man, but a performance conducted
by social man. The effect of ‘ostentation’ demonstrates that the aim of man’s
performance is to have other people think highly of him, whereas the phrase ‘deceptive
cunning’ reveals man’s intention of using others as instruments to reach his purpose.
The natural inclination and spontaneity towards oneself and others, sprung from amour
de soi and pitié, are replaced by deceptive passions.

Amélie Rorty in her essay, ‘Rousseau’s Therapeutic Experiments’ identifies five

19
aspects for the moral and psychological injuries brought about by amour-propre.
Firstly, the self is divided, – that is, man becomes an object being observed by himself
and other people. The result of such a division is that social man is uncertain of his
self-esteem, and relies on other people’s opinion of him, and that this opinion is not of

17
Wokler, Rousseau: A Very Short Introduction, pp. 125-126.
18
Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, p. 67.
19
A.O. Rorty, ‘Rousseau’s Therapeutic Experiments’, Philosophy, vol. 66, no. 258, 1991, pp. 418-419.

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a stable form.

Secondly, man lives in his fantasy. In order to illustrate the idea of fantasy, Rorty
makes a comparison between this idea and the notion of imagination; imagination
reflects man’s natural needs and desires, whereas fantasy emerges as desires formed in
the mind by society. Because fulfilling his fantasy is beyond man’s power, it results in
man’s dissatisfaction, which, – in Rorty’s words –, leads to man becoming ‘reactively
busy without being genuinely – that is, independently – active.’20 Man pursues his
fantasy, that is beyond his natural needs; this puts him into a situation where he tries to
find means to satisfy his fantasy with the help of others. In this sense, man lives an
incomplete existence, being busy with pursuing something beyond his power without
touching his true needs.

Thirdly, society’s man is endowed with calculative reasoning rather than reason. The
calculating form of reasoning fulfils fantasy by the strategy of flattery. Once flattery
fails to satisfy fantasy, the frustration inflames rather than suppresses fantasy, which
leads to the contradiction of reason and emotion.21

Fourthly, the opposition between reason and emotion generates a further problem,
namely, the selfish passions of the self are intensified. The reason for this problematic
is, that rationality is directed to serve subjective interests rather than being principled
by self-examination and universality.22

Finally, Rorty proposes that property invented by calculative rationality and fantasy
leads to man’s slavery, in the sense that he is attached to his unsatisfied desires. The
original function of property is to survive and protect man’s well-being, but this
function is deflected by man’s desire of assuring the opinion and cooperation of other
people, in other words, property becomes a symbol for social status and wealth; thus
man is no longer free in the sense that his actions are guided by harmful passions such
as greed, envy, resentment, and jealousy.23

The above five aspects which Rorty demonstrates as the harmful influence of

20
Ibid., p. 419.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid., p. 420.
23
Ibid.

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amour-propre on man’s psychological and moral attitudes is, in my view, a detailed
examination; however, Rorty’s argument of analysing the third aspect does not clearly
address the issue of how the mind gets enlightened to develop calculative reasoning. In
my view, this leads to another problematic, which Rousseau diagnoses but Rorty does
not attend to.

In Rousseau’s speculation on social circumstances, one crucial point he maintains is

that as soon as amour-propre awakens, inequality – which takes the form of relative
terms such as weak and strong – forms the mind, and man starts to measure himself
against others.24 Amour-propre is the power that generates comparative notions, and
therefore brings about the development of calculative rationality.

The above insight, I shall argue, leads to a further problematic, namely, that
calculative rationality distorts pitié, which renders human beings deceptive. In the first
section of chapter two, ‘The Natural Goodness of Man’, I have shown that pitié is the
spontaneous repugnance to seeing the suffering of others, and serves as an innate
principle in expressing humanity. However, Rousseau states that, – as amour-propre
awakens –, calculative reasoning becomes dominant in man’s actions, and pitié is
eventually substituted by it.25 The purpose of calculative rationality is to satisfy one’s
vanity beyond one’s power, and others become the tool for reaching one’s aim; thus,
the moral and psychological injury of distorting pitié results in human beings
becoming deceptive.

To conclude the above examination, the problematic that the ‘Second Discourse’
diagnoses, and the Social Contract sets out to answer, is more complex than Berlin’s
portrait of the issue allows for. Apart from the contradictions between individual
freedoms, and between individual freedom and authority, the other aspect of the
problematic deals with the psychological and moral injuries that the ‘Second
Discourse’ exposes, which is left aside by Berlin. The deliberated, slanted reading
partially shapes Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s idea of the general will, which I
shall analyse in the following section.

24
Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, p. 64.
25
Rousseau, ‘Moral Letters’, p. 198.

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5.2 The Notion of the General Will

This section turns to the second issue dealing with the principle of solution in the
form of the general will, before I finally turn in the third and concluding section to the
issue of positive freedom in its political sense.

Berlin defines the question that Rousseau’s political treatise, the Social Contract,
aims to answer, as being the problem of the conflict between individual freedoms, and
the problem of the contradiction between individual freedom and political authority.
This definition leads Berlin to regard the idea of the general will as the solution offered
by Rousseau. This section analyses two problematic issues, namely, how Berlin
interprets Rousseau’s idea of the general will, and what Berlin sets aside in his reading
of the general will because of his own interpretative purposes.

5.2.1 The Principle of Rousseau’s Political Solution

I start with analysing how Berlin interprets Rousseau’s idea of the general will. The
problematic of the conflict between individual freedoms, and the conflict between
individual freedom and a legitimate authority, is a fundamental question in the social
contract tradition. The principle of a solution to both conflicts varies among individual
thinkers. In Berlin’s eyes, Hobbes and Locke solve the problem in a way of moderation
and compromise, – that is, by giving up a certain part of individual liberty in order to
guarantee peace and security –,26 whereas Rousseau’s solution presents a different
picture. Berlin states:

Somehow the ideal of liberty and the ideal of order must not merely be united in
some awkward and precarious compromise, but must be made to cohere in some
single, authoritative, global solution of the problem.27

Here the principle of Rousseau’s solution is to retain one’s freedom in a

uncompromising manner while keeping authority absolute, – in other words, Berlin
proposes, that Rousseau does not intend to compromise individual freedom for
26
Berlin, ‘The Idea of Freedom’, pp. 108-110.
27
Ibid., p. 111.

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political power.

Berlin questions the above prescribed principle:

How can we at one and the same time unite ourselves with other people, and
therefore found a form of association which must exercise some degree of authority,
of coercion – very different from being entirely free or solitary in a state of nature –
and yet remain free, that is, not obey these same people?28

Berlin’s moral presupposition of pluralism underwrites this view. In the third section
of chapter three, ‘The Conflict and Incommensurability of Values’, one point has been
established, that is, Berlin holds the view that ultimate values can be conflicting and
therefore irreconcilable. According to this doctrine, to retain the value of freedom
unconditionally is an unreasonable expectation, because the value of a legitimate rule
formed in a society limits the freedom of doing whatever one wants. On the other hand,
pluralism shapes a reading horizon, specifically, it allows Berlin to organize certain
chosen elements from Rousseau’s texts and to concretize a meaning, which reflects
Berlin’s value system and forms his view towards Rousseau’s prescribed principle.

However, the important question remains as to why Rousseau wants to offer the
above paradoxical principle, to which Berlin’s answer contains two aspects as
expressed in the following statement:

Rousseau, in the Discourses, in the Social Contract, in Émile and La Nouvelle

Héloïse, is a curious combination of violent emotional imagination, together with a
passionately romantic humanistic morality which casts away all but perfection – all
that falls short of absolute spontaneity, sincerity, generosity, freedom – and in terms
of this ideal constructs vivid versions of the glories and the miseries of this or that
condition of man; and at the same time a pedantic, narrowly logical capacity for
abstract reasoning, something perhaps inherited from his Calvinistic upbringing, a
power of rigorous casuistry of an unhistorical sort. Both gifts come into play in what
he conceived as his final solution, and have made it a compound of logic and
imaginative art which, however confused, inconsistent and at times absurd, have
given it a power over men’s minds greater than the more coherent or more concrete
constructions of less inwardly divided thinkers.29

This interpretation contains two aspects; one is that Berlin exposes the reasons for
Rousseau’s paradoxical principle through applying an ‘inside view’, and the other is
that Berlin’s examination is based on his qualification of Rousseau’s moral thought.

28
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 36.
29
Berlin, ‘The Idea of Freedom’, p. 111.

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Regarding the first aspect, in the second section of chapter one, ‘Critiquing Fixed
Human Nature in Rousseau’, I have discussed that the ‘inside view’ presents a method
of penetrating into an author’s inner world, and his historical and social conditions, to
examine the instigating motives and the prevailing conditions, from which the meaning
of the texts might emerge. Here, through addressing the characteristics of Rousseau’s
personality, Berlin argues for psychological reasons of Rousseau’s proposed
combination of freedom and authority. In Berlin’s view, Rousseau is fantastic and
emotional, which shapes his notion of morality. Specifically, Rousseau’s view of the
moral world is an imaginative version of his inner version of a perfect world.

In terms of the second aspect of Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s reasons in

combining freedom and authority in a compatible way, the descriptions ‘romantic’ and
‘perfection’ used to evaluate Rousseau’s works in the above passage, point to Berlin’s
interpretative strategy, – that is, Berlin’s interpretation is built upon his reading of
Rousseau’s moral thought. In the first section of chapter four, ‘Rousseau as a Utopian
Moralist’, I have analysed Berlin’s characterization of Rousseau’s moral thought as
monistic; one of its beliefs is that it views values as harmonious, which implies that
any conflict among values causes friction, which is the reason, why Rousseau
combines two incompatible values paradoxically. In the third section of chapter four,
‘Individual Freedom: A Supreme Value’, I have shown, that Berlin maintains that
Rousseau ranks individual freedom as the highest value. Based on these two points of
view, Rousseau’s uncompromising solution to the conflict of freedom and authority is
an application and demonstration of his monistic thought.

The approach Berlin takes to explain the reasons for Rousseau’s reconciliation of
freedom and authority is a consistent application of his method of an ‘inside view’ in
studying Rousseau, and the meaning Berlin produces through this approach fits the
consistent pattern of his interpretation of Rousseau’s notion of morality. In the
foregoing discussion I have established one crucial point regarding the production of
meaning of a text, that is, in Gadamer’s view, our understanding and interpretation of a
text is situated in our preconceived ideas, – that is to say, the production of meaning in
a text is a blend between the reader’s preconceptions and the ideas embodied in the

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text. However, in Berlin’s case of reading Rousseau, I shall argue that Berlin’s
preconceived ideas play a dominant role in that he does not compromise his theoretical
position when confronted with Rousseau’s ideas. In this manner, the meaning Berlin
produces through reading Rousseau’s texts is filtered through Berlin’s theoretical lens.

In chapter three, I have addressed the question that pluralism is the preconception
that Berlin brings into his reading of Rousseau’s moral thought, and that it functions as
a horizon of understanding, and shapes Berlin’s interpretative frame of Rousseau’s
moral thought. Founded upon the horizon of Berlin’s understanding of morality,
chapter four has established Berlin’s production of the meaning of Rousseau’s moral
thought; the importance of this produced meaning lies in the fact that it is the
theoretical basis of Berlin’s assessment of how Rousseau’s notion of positive freedom
in its individual sense leads to its political sense. The theoretical basis is used by Berlin
to demonstrate the reasons why Rousseau does not compromise individual freedom
over authority. The meaning Berlin produces, by explaining why Rousseau combines
two incomparable values, can be understood by what Iser labels as
‘consistency-building’ of meaning.

I have explained Iser’s concept of ‘consistency-building’ of meaning in chapter two,

– that is, the reader strategically selects certain textual clues and excludes others to
complete his purposive production of meaning; even if the reader is confronted with
contradicting views in the text, the principle of ‘consistency-building’ of meaning will
make the reader endeavour to make meaning coherent. Berlin explains Rousseau’s
principle of resolving the contradiction between individual freedom and authority from
the perspective of Rousseau’s moral thought; this theoretical perspective shapes
Berlin’s reading expectation, – that is to say, even though Rousseau offers reasons to
underpin his principle of solution, and even though Berlin is aware of these reasons,
Berlin would not modify his interpretative framework to contradict the consistency of
his production of meaning.

It is plausible that as readers we cannot escape following the principle of

‘consistency-building’ of meaning, because we cannot avoid bringing ourselves into a
text, – as if what Gadamer calls a state of virgin purity untouched by the knowledge
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with which, or the context in which, the text is read;30 we may unconsciously bring
our preconceived ideas to the encounter with the text. As a thinker, Berlin’s
preconceptions are well-established, and develop into a systematic theory, namely,
pluralism; thus as a reader, Berlin’s encounter with Rousseau’s texts is active and
constructive, and this in turn deeply marks his reading perspective on monism, and his
theoretical position of pluralism.

After demonstrating how Berlin’s interpretation enables us to critically read the

inner logic of Rousseau’s prescribed principles in the social contract through Berlin’s
theoretical lens, and how Berlin’s theoretical standpoint limits our understanding of
Rousseau, I shall now turn to the ‘Second Discourse’ and the Social Contract with the
purpose of throwing a different light on Berlin’s interpretation. In these two works,
Rousseau offers sufficient reasons to explain why the political solution proposed by
him intends to keep one’s freedom complete, while submitting oneself to an authority.

In the Social Contract, Rousseau does not describe the actual mechanism of consent
in forming a social contract,31 but he is aware of the philosophical problem of forming
a social contract through agreement. In order to approach Rousseau’s reasoning, I turn
to exploring the notion of consent, which is the foundation of a social contract. The
idea of consent is a slippery concept. This problem has been addressed in the first
section of this chapter, ‘The Problem of the State of Nature’, where I have shown that
the consent between the rich and the poor could be based on deceptions. In this case,
the social pact cannot guarantee the fairness of its terms, and thus is dismissed by
Rousseau as a fraud.32 In other words, a consent established upon deception is not a
legitimate foundation for a political power.

Another example of the problematic of the concept of consent is pointed out by

Rousseau in a situation where someone holds an absolute physical power. Consent in
this context is based on power, the forced party might agree to something, but this
agreement derives from an act of necessity. Once power is taken away, the bond of

30
Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 245.
31
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p. 148.
32
Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’, p. 70.

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obedience dissolves.33 That is to say, physical power is not the moral foundation of
authority.

In addressing the problem of the idea of consent, – namely, agreement reached either
by deception or by force –, now it can be inferred that to form a social pact by mere
consent does not guarantee the fairness of its terms. Rousseau’s main concern in
forming a social contract, in my view, is what would make the terms of the social
contract fair.

In the first section of chapter two, ‘A Reconstruction of Rousseau’s Idea of Human

Nature’, I have argued that for Rousseau the freedom of will enables human beings to
follow their choices, rather than the commands of their senses as animals do, and thus
it is the essential quality that distinguishes human beings from animals. In the third
section of chapter four, ‘Individual Freedom: A Supreme Value’, I have demonstrated
that the freedom of will renders moral responsibility possible, and makes moral
obligation legitimate. Based on these two points, it can be inferred that in Rousseau’s
moral and political thought only someone who has agreed to something through his
will of freedom is morally bound to the cause. Viewed in this light, Rousseau’s
statement of keeping one as free as before after forming a social contract needs to be
understood as retaining one’s freedom of will, for it creates and retains a just condition.

To conclude, the purpose of Rousseau’s notion of the social contract is clearly

expressed by Berlin as to preserve a radical independence by establishing a political
authority. However, I have demonstrated that the approach of the dichotomy of
monism and pluralism Berlin takes in analysing the inner logic of this purpose, sets the
reasons Rousseau addresses in forming the principle of his notion of the social contract
into a different light. In Rousseau’s thought, as I read it, to preserve one’s freedom of
will guarantees the fairness of the terms of the social contract.

5.2.2 Berlin’s View of the General Will

In earlier discussions, I have considered Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau’s formulation

33
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p. 143.

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of the problematic in the state of nature, and addressed the psychological aspect of this
problematic, that Berlin does not attend to for his own reasons. I also have examined
Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau’s proposed principles in giving attention to the
above exclusion in his reading. Based on these discussions, this section analyses how
Berlin critically interprets the notion of the general will, and attempts to throw light on
his reading.

The idea of the general will is a solution proposed by Rousseau to accommodate his
principle of reconciling individual freedom with authority. The idea derives from the
notion of the social contract, which sets up a constitutional framework in which the
notion of the general will becomes the decisive element of reconciliation between
freedom and authority. In book one, chapter six, of the Social Contract, Rousseau
states the clauses of the social contract:

These clauses [of the social contract], properly understood, are all reducible to a
single one, namely, the total alienation of each associate, together with all of his
rights, to the entire community.34

This is the condition Rousseau presupposes and means to achieve, that is, each
associate must surrender entirely to his community. The conception of alienation is
defined by Rousseau as to sell or to give.35 Here, in the context of forming a social
contract, the phrase ‘the total alienation of each associate’ demonstrates that this
alienation is a total surrender of one’s freedom, rights and possessions to one’s
community.

In Berlin’s eyes, the above condition demanded by Rousseau is an incursion into the
personal sphere of people, to which he is opposed; this opposition can be read in terms
of a defense of the individual against an immersive collective.36 Berlin also argues that
it is the annihilation of one’s power, – for one’s goods, natural rights and will are all
alienated to the state –; the sovereignty of the state is absolute in the sense that no
constitutional limitation is set up to constrain its power.37 Thus, Rousseau’s social
contract, in Berlin’s view, is an extreme form of collectivism, which destroys the rights

34
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p. 148.
35
Ibid., p. 144.
36
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 45.
37
Ibid., pp. 44-45.

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of the individual.38

Contrary to Berlin’s charge that Rousseau’s social contract is the destruction of the
rights of the individual, Simpson argues that the terms of the total surrender to a
community preserves the rights of the individual.39 Along this line of argumentation,
to give oneself totally to a community creates an equal condition for each associate;
and under this condition every member has to fulfil his duty of helping others, whereas
he reciprocally gains others’ assistance. The enjoyment of right is thus considered as
being intertwined with the duty of fulfilling its respective responsibility.

In contrast to Berlin’s reading, Simpson’s interpretation of the terms of Rousseau’s

social contract may be closer to Rousseau’s intention. In the Social Contract, Rousseau
holds the view that the arrangement of his social pact guarantees that no associate is in
a superior or inferior status than someone else. In this light, he argues that no one
would have the privilege of having a right without fulfilling his duty.40

Cassirer’s interpretation of Rousseau’s social contract can be offered as a reasonable

response to answer Berlin’s other charge, – namely, that the social contract created by
Rousseau is a mutilation of one’s personality. Cassirer argues that the terms of the
social contract, that each associate’s total alienation protects the independence of one’s
freedom of will, will be met only, if the will of the individual is not controlled by other
people’s arbitrary actions; if this is the case, then it can be kept in its independent state.
Following this line of argumentation, it has been proposed that the community,
Cassirer states, ‘does not act as a coercive institution but only puts the individual under
an obligation which he himself recognizes as valid and necessary, and to which he
therefore asserts for its sake as well for its own.’41 If we were to take this reading on
board, then, I would argue that the free will of the individual can be considered as
being retained in the union of the state.

Cassirer’s argument contains an assumption that Rousseau may hold in forming the
social contract, which Cassirer himself does not unfold explicitly, – namely, that each

38
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp. 233-234.
39
Simpson, Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, pp. 34-35.
40
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p. 149.
41
Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pp. 55-56.

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associate is a rational human being. In the third section of chapter two, ‘Deducing
Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom in the Individual Sense,’ I have examined Rousseau’s
idea of rationality, which bears two aspects. On the one hand, rationality depends on
one’s ability to know what is good for oneself, in conformity with the nature of things.
On the other hand, it demands that one behave in accordance with one’s conscience. In
this third section, I have also addressed the point that the two dimensions of rationality
in Rousseau are normative. With these in mind, Rousseau’s idea of the social contract
should be evaluated as being normative. As Cohen argues, Rousseau’s notion of the
social contract is ‘not simply a way to think about political justification in particular
settings by asking what all can consent to in those settings, but a way to fix the basic
principle of political right in all such contexts.’42

With the above assumption in mind, two points of view can be considered: first,
given the conflicting state of nature, as rational beings, one could recognize the
necessity of the existence of political society; second, as rational beings, one could
agree on the plausibility of giving oneself totally to one’s community, for this puts
every associate under equal condition. Contemplating the different possible points of
view, I shall argue that Rousseau’s social contract should be read as being normative,
in the sense, that it may be prescribing principles, rather than describing reality.

After discussing Berlin’s critical reading of the terms of Rousseau’s social contract, I
shall now turn to the question of how this interpretation influences Berlin’s reading of
Rousseau’s notion of the general will. Berlin proposes two aspects of reading the idea
of the general will. The first aspect follows, in my view, from Berlin’s comprehension
of the inner logic of Rousseau’s moral thought, thus needs to be situated within this
context. According to my analysis in the first section of chapter four, ‘Rousseau as a
Utopian Moralist’, Berlin defines Rousseau’s moral thought as monistic, – that is to say,
values can be conjointly realised in a solution which Berlin, hesitantly, considers in
expressing doubts. In his view, Rousseau’s notion of the general will is an application
of Rousseau’s monistic thought. Berlin elaborates this point in the following manner:

The problem [the moral dilemma of reconciling freedom and authority] must be

42
Cohen, Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals, p. 33.

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 viewed in such a way that one suddenly perceived that, so far from being
incompatible, the two opposed values are not opposed at all, not two at all, but one.
Liberty and authority cannot conflict for they are one; they coincide.43

As I read it, the general will is imagined to combine two conflicting values, that is,
the value of freedom and the value of authority should entail one another; the notion of
the general will encompasses both, while also preserving both.

Differing from the logic of Berlin’s reading, Shklar argues that the general will, as
combining freedom and authority, re-orients amour-propre towards communal ends,
and endows citizen with a complete moral existence.44 In the first section of this
chapter, ‘The Problem of the State of Nature’, I have addressed the issue that
amour-propre is the cause of man’s psychological injuries, such as self-division and
selfishness. Here, in Shklar’s argument, the general will offers a political remedy for
man’s psychological injuries. In my view, this argument rests on one point, – namely,
that in Rousseau the completeness of a citizen’s life lies in his identity with his state,
and, eventually, becomes part of it.

In order to explore this aspect of Rousseau’s version of an ideal citizen’s life, I turn
to book one of Emile, where Rousseau expresses the form of complete life that the
ancient republics cultivate in their people:

A Spartan woman had five sons in the army and was waiting news for the battle. A
Helot arrives; trembling, she asks him for news “Your five sons were killed.” “Base
slave, did I ask that?” “We won the victory.” The mother runs to the temple and
gives thanks to the gods.45

This is the example of how a true citizen should live in Rousseau’s imagination, – in
other words, he wants to dignify amour-propre by channelling it in the service of
public goodness, and to endow man with a complete existence. However, this view of
imaginary completion contradicts human nature in reality. In the beginning, man’s
living condition generates amour-propre. It seems impossible to totally purify this
condition, and to fully redirect amour-propre towards public goodness. In this sense,
the view of a complete existence is a utopian construction, which aims to lay down
principles for reality. Thus, Shklar’s interpretation that Rousseau’s formulation of his
43
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 37.
44
Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory, pp. 15-16.
45
Rousseau, Emile or On Education, p. 40.

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notion of the general will, as combining individual freedom with authority, intends to
offer a political remedy for man’s psychological injuries, ought to be understood in a
normative sense. However, Berlin’s reading of the general will is situated in his
interpretation of Rousseau’s moral thought, and thus puts aside Rousseau’s concern of
offering the idea of the general will as a cure for man’s deficiencies.

As stated earlier, Berlin proposes two aspects of reading the idea of the general will.
The first aspect follows from Berlin’s comprehension of the inner logic of Rousseau’s
moral thought, – namely, that Rousseau’s view of the general will is an application of
Rousseau’s monistic thought. Now I turn to the second aspect of Berlin’s reading of
Rousseau’s general will. Berlin’s analysis of Rousseau’s general will is scattered
through three essays. In ‘The Idea of Freedom’, Berlin proposes that the general will is
a compound of each individual’s rational will, and therefore can be considered as a
general entity represented by a state.46 In ‘Rousseau’, Berlin’s portrait of his reading
of the general will is consistent with the above analysis, but he adds one point, that the
general will represents the common good of a society.47 The above two qualifications
demonstrate that for Berlin the concept of rational will is essential in shaping the
notion of the general will. Finally, in ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin offers a
detailed explanation of the idea of rational will, as defined in the context of the
rationalist view of human nature. According to Berlin, the rationalist perspective views
human nature as divided into two parts, namely, the empirical self and the rational self;
the empirical self is characterized as representing desires and passions, whereas the
rational self is identified with a higher form represented by rationality.48 Thus to
conclude, Berlin explains the general will as a collective form of rational will, which is
represented by the state.

In my view, the second aspect of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s general will needs
to be situated in the context of his interpretation of Rousseau’s theory of human nature,
through which it gains its concrete meaning. In the second section of chapter one,
‘Critiquing Fixed Human Nature in Rousseau’, I have demonstrated that Berlin

46
Berlin, ‘The Idea of Freedom’, p. 116.
47
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, p. 44.
48
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp. 204-205.

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characterizes Rousseau’s doctrine of human nature as unhistorical and fixed. Based on
this characterization, the first section of chapter two, ‘A Reconstruction of Rousseau’s
Idea of Human Nature’, unfolds Berlin’s interpretation of the content of Rousseau’s
theory of human nature, – that is, Rousseau divides human nature into a rational self
and an empirical self, and holds the view that to realise the rational self is to manifest a
fixed human nature. Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s general will evolves from his
reading of Rousseau’s human nature; the general will manifests Rousseau’s doctrine of
human nature in its political sense, as constituted by rational selves.49

The second aspect of Berlin’s reading captures the decisive parts of Rousseau’s
thought of the general will, – namely, that it is a will constituted by rational wills.
However, this reading does not consider relevant aspects of Rousseau’s thought,
specifically Rousseau’s consideration of the concept of will.

To offer a different perspective on this problematic, I shall turn to Riley’s analysis.

He proposes to understand the general will in two strands, namely, as a concept of will
and as a concept of generality.50 In terms of the first strand as a concept of will, Riley
defines it under three aspects. In the first place, it is the foundation of morality, in the
sense that it renders moral responsibility possible; in the second place, the will is also a
voluntary act conducted by human beings, which the physical law cannot explain. In
this sense Riley regards Rousseau’s idea of the will as metaphysical. Finally, Riley
reads the will in Rousseau as directed by rationality, and characterizes it as
philosophical, in the sense that it presents what ought to be in a normative sense.51

With regard to the second strand of Riley’s understanding of the general will, as a
concept of generality, he reads it as the idea in terms of the public good, expressed
through the rule of law.52 Resting on the definitions of the concepts of will and of
generality, Riley concludes that the general will in Rousseau may be considered as a
compound of rational wills towards the public good.53

49
Berlin, ‘The Idea of Freedom’, p. 116.
50
P. Riley, ‘Rousseau’s General Will,’ in P. Riley (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau, Cambridge,
Cambridge U.P., 2001, p. 127.
51
Ibid., p. 131.
52
Ibid., p. 127.
53
Ibid., pp. 130-131.

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 In sum then, Berlin defines the concept of the will as a rational will, which plays a
dominant role in controlling desire and passion. Riley analyses the concept through its
relation with morality. I would like to argue that these opposing readings of Rousseau’s
intent lead to very different perspectives, which warrant further exploration.

5.3 Positive Freedom in its Political Sense

This section turns to the third, and concluding, issue of positive freedom in its
political sense. To begin with an insight from the previous section, I shall propose, that
Berlin’s examination of the inner logic of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its political
sense is built upon his reading of Rousseau’s concept of the general will.

5.3.1 Reading Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom with a Formed Horizon

According to my argument in the second section of this chapter, ‘The Principle of

Solution: The General Will’, Berlin reads the general will as a combination of rational
wills. Following this reading, Rousseau’s political freedom leads, in Berlin’s eyes, to
its opposite, namely, the suppression of individual freedom.54 I shall explore Berlin’s
reasoning in more detail, so as to uncover its procedure by following his essay
‘Rousseau’.

Berlin’s line of argumentation takes the following trajectory. In the first place, true
freedom for Rousseau is to fulfill rational ends. In the second place, rational human
beings would not have disputes with regard to rational solutions.55 According to this
doctrine, – since the general will is, in Berlin’s eyes, a rational solution to the
problematic of the conflicts between individual freedoms, and between individual
freedom and authority –, rational human beings would not have disagreements with the
idea of the general will.56 However, the actual truth is, in Berlin’s view, that the ends
pursued by human beings may clash. Berlin explains the reasons for such a clash:

54
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, pp. 45-47.
55
Ibid., p. 38.
56
Ibid., p. 40.

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 If I know that what I seek is the true good, then people who oppose me must be in
error about what it is that they themselves seek. No doubt they too think that they are
seeking the good, they assert their own liberty to secure it, but they are seeking it in
the wrong place.57

‘The true good’ and ‘error’ sets a contrast between those who know the truth and
those who do not. The word ‘error’ also reveals a reason for conflict between human
beings, – that is, the conflict is due to people’s error in looking for the truth –; the
present thought also provides a reason for justifying the coercion of individual freedom.
Berlin continues: ‘To force a man to be free is to force him to behave in a rational
manner […] I force him to do certain things which will make him happy. He will be
grateful for it if he ever discovers what his true self is.’58

The general will is a combination of individual freedom and authority, which I have
argued in the second section of this chapter, ‘The Principle of Solution: The General
Will’; thus to realise the general will is to fulfil both values, that of individual freedom
and authority, and in this sense, individual freedom transforms into another type of
freedom – namely, collective freedom, as I have proposed earlier –, to realize freedom
in a collective sense. In the second section of chapter two, ‘Negative and Positive
Freedom and the Validity of their Distinction’, I have argued that Berlin defines
positive freedom in the political form as to fulfil a common goodness that is
recognized as an ultimate purpose. If we were to take this line of argumentation, we
could make the proposition that the freedom to force people to realise a rational self in
its collective sense, – as Berlin speculates Rousseau does –, is mirrored in the notion of
the general will, while, at the same time, being considered as positive freedom in its
political sense.

For Berlin, to fulfil the general will is the destruction of human rights and freedom
of will:

This is the sinister paradox according to which a man, in losing his political liberty,
and in losing his economic liberty, is liberated in some higher, deeper, more rational,
more natural sense, which only the dictator or only the State, only the assembly, only
the supreme authority knows, so that the most untrammelled [sic] freedom coincides

57
Ibid., p. 45.
58
Ibid., p. 47.

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 with the most rigorous and enslaving authority.59

Freedom is identified with an authority into which it eventually dissolves in the

sense that man loses his economic and civil rights. The authority could take any form,
such as the form of a person, a state, or a group of people, but what Berlin intends to
uncover is Rousseau’s understanding of freedom in the collective sense, where the
individual becomes an indispensable part, that is made to fit an authority to fulfil its
function. The word ‘paradox’ reveals Berlin’s sceptical attitude towards such an idea.

Viewed from Berlin’s theoretical standpoint, – freedom according to Rousseau’s

notion of the general will – does not guarantee more individual freedom, rather it leads
to its opposite, – namely, the state having the power to coerce its people in the name of
the general will, while the individual does not have any immunity from the forced
participation of public services.

In my view, Berlin’s critical and perceptive analysis draws on the logical nexus
between Rousseau’s monistic thought of morality, his concept of general will, and his
idea of freedom in its individual and political senses. In particular, Berlin unfolds the
implicit connection between his reading of Rousseau’s notion of positive freedom in its
individual dimension, and the one in a collective dimension, through his interpretation
of Rousseau’s moral thought, and its expression of the idea of the general will.

Taking Berlin’s position, as a reader of Rousseau, his portrait of Rousseau is a

purposive construction of meaning. Berlin’s theories of human nature, freedom and
pluralism serve as the horizon of his reading of Rousseau, which shape the approach
and the scope of this interpretation. In the second section of chapter two, ‘Negative and
Positive Freedom and the Validity of their Distinction’, I have argued that Berlin
defines positive freedom in the individual sense as to realise a rational purpose, and
positive freedom in the political form as to fulfill a common goodness, both of which
establish the horizon of Berlin’s understanding of reading Rousseau’s idea of freedom.
In the third section of chapter two, ‘Deducing Rousseau’s Notion of Freedom in the
Individual Sense’, I have shown, how Berlin characterizes Rousseau’s notion of
freedom in its individual sense as positive, based on his horizon of understanding of

59
Ibid., p. 49.

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freedom. Through reading Rousseau’s moral thought as monistic, which I have
examined in chapter four, Berlin purposively unfolds how its expression of the general
will, leads Rousseau’s notion of positive freedom in its individual form to its collective
one.

That is to say, Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s freedom in its political sense can be
considered as a logical consequence of his interpretation of Rousseau’s freedom in its
individual sense, his reading of Rousseau’s moral thought and its expression of the
general will.

The meaning Berlin produces in Rousseau, through his horizon of understanding,

focuses on the question, how to realise the general will. The question could be
approached in a different manner; for instance, contrary to Berlin’s view, Riley argues
that Rousseau expresses a hope towards the realization of the general will:

At the end of its political education – no more “denaturing” or transformative than

any true education – political society would finally be in a position to say what
Emile says at the end of his “domestic” education: “I have decided to be what you
have made me.” 60

This line of argumentation could be read as dealing with an intellectual hope, – that
is to say, some day through political education men would realise what is good, and
will the common good without needing to be persuaded.

Not fully agreeing with Riley’s point of view, I shall argue that Rousseau holds the
view that the sovereignty of the general will is improbable to be realised in reality.61
Unlike Rousseau’s expression of the general will in the first two books of the Social
Contract, which maintains an absolute attitude towards the general will, when
considering the conditions of realizing it, Rousseau seems to be pessimistic, for which
he presents three reasons.

Firstly, the size of the state must be small, much like the size of the ancient republic
of Rome, which enables citizens to meet and gather continuously in order to approach

60
Riley, ‘Rousseau’s General Will’, p. 133.
61
Rousseau believes that the sovereignty of the general will is virtually impossible in modern Europe, but states in
The Social Contract that Corsica is the place that the idea of the general will might succeed. Rousseau, ‘On the
Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p.170.

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the idea of the general will.62 Secondly, the small-scale state should be an agrarian one,
where no noteworthy inequality of wealth and status exists among citizens, in order to
make the general will operative; and where the passion of citizens’ amour-propre can
be kept relatively dormant, so as to direct the general will in its proper direction.63
Finally, the agrarian democratic state has some requirements for its people; they must
be endowed with a certain insight and reason, in order to be able to love the public
good, and, – at crucial times –, to sacrifice self-interest for the common welfare.

Yet, regarding the capacity of the people in shaping the general will, Rousseau
seems to be very sceptical: ‘We (the people) always want what is good for us, but we
do not always see what it is. The populace is never corrupted, but it is often tricked,
and only then does it appear to want what is bad.’64 Rousseau continues: ‘Were there a
people of gods, it would govern itself democratically. So perfect a government is not
suited to men.65 These passages may suggest Rousseau’s hesitant attitude towards the
capacity of the people in making the right decision consistent with the public good.

The above considerations may also demonstrate that Rousseau is pessimistic

towards a realization of the general will; and in this sense Berlin’s critique of
Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its political sense requires further scrutiny.

However, in my view, taking Berlin’s position, he points to the possible distortion

and the abuse of the logic of Rousseau’s doctrine of political freedom, when applied in
reality. There are historical and theoretical reasons underpinning Berlin’s reading. In
critically applying Gadamer and Iser’s reader response theory in earlier chapters, I
have argued for the crucial point that a reader approaches a text with his ‘prejudices’
and ‘preconceptions’ which form his horizon of understanding.

As a reader, Berlin’s reading ‘prejudice’ is shaped by his experience. He witnessed

the revolution in St. Petersburg in 1917, when he was a child, and observed the
profoundly negative influence of the Soviet dictatorship on its intellectuals between

62
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, pp. 169-170.
63
Ibid., pp. 165-166.
64
Ibid., p. 155.
65
Ibid., p. 180.

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1945 and 1956, when his intellectual position was taking shape.66 These formative
encounters put Berlin empirically on guard against any ambitious social purpose
sacrificing the fulfilment of individuals’ lives.

Theoretically, as a thinker, Berlin has his own reading ‘preconception’ regarding the
idea of freedom. For him, freedom should be exempt from interference by others, –
such as the intervention of government or interest group –, and this freedom is defined
as negative freedom.67 In the second section of chapter two, ‘Negative and Positive
Freedom and the Validity of Their Distinction’, I have examined positive freedom as
having certain purposes to fulfill, and analysed negative freedom as being concerned
with a preservation of ample room for an individual to do whatever he likes, rather
than fulfilling a rational purpose. Thus, Berlin’s preconception of the notion of
freedom cares about a private sphere, where the individual is left to be free from the
influence of political authority.

Berlin’s preconception of negative freedom coheres with his theories of human

nature and pluralism. His theory of human nature demonstrates that its diversity
captures his intellectual concern, which I have addressed in the first section of chapter
one, ‘Examining Berlin’s Idea of Human Nature’. In chapter four, I have demonstrated
that Berlin’s theory of pluralism views moral values as dynamic, conflicting and
incommensurable. Negative freedom, as leaving a sphere for one to do whatever
inspires one’s desires, allows for this human diversity to unfold and develop. It also
allows people to pursue the diversity of values, and tolerates the possible conflicts
between these pursuits, unless they violate the law. Berlin’s preconception of negative
freedom is firmly connected with his theories of human nature and pluralism.

Taking into consideration Berlin’s personal experience, and viewed from his
theoretical standpoint, it is reasonable that he regards Rousseau’s notion of political
freedom as an unpersuasive understanding of freedom. Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau’s
notion of freedom in its political sense presents it as an idea, that one takes up a certain
form of life in consistency with the general will.68 In my view, freedom in this sense,

66
Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life, p.27, pp. 135-169.
67
Berlin, Four Essays On Liberty, p. xlii.
68
Berlin, ‘Rousseau’, pp. 45-47.

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in the first place, is an obligation; one may propose that the participation in public
services could give the right to enjoy individual freedom. This type of freedom can be
considered a collective property, as it exists in a collective form. The state has the
power to coerce its people in the name of the general will, while the individual does
not have any immunity from forced participation in public services.

5.3.2 Civil Freedom in Rousseau

In an earlier discussion I have argued that Berlin’s critical analysis of the inner logic
of Rousseau’ s freedom in its political sense focuses on the question, how to form the
notion of the general will, which, in my view, does not engage with the meaning of
Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its political sense. For Rousseau, the social contract
and the general will offer a constitutional framework, in which the idea of freedom in
its political sense takes its form:

What man loses through the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited
right to everything that tempts him and he can acquire. What he gains is civil liberty
and the proprietary ownership of all he possesses. So as not be in error in these
compensations, it is necessary to draw a careful distinction between natural liberty
(which is limited solely by the force the individual involved) and civil liberty (which
is limited by the general will), and between possession (which is merely the effect of
the force or the right of the first occupant) and proprietary ownership (which is
based solely on a positive title).69

Under the social contract, Rousseau defines the notion of freedom in its political
sense as civil freedom, which is confined by the general will. In an earlier discussion, I
have argued, that the general will is normative in that it is identified with the
conception of the common good. Deriving from the general will, I shall propose that
civil freedom also is normative.

Regarding the content of the idea of civil freedom, Simpson reads it as the idea that
one pursues the kind of life one likes, when the law is unregulated,70 Simpson offers
three reasons to support his interpretation. First, under the social contract, the
sovereignty creates each associate’s possession, and person with security, since they

69
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p. 151.
70
Simpson, Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, pp. 52-53.

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are secured by the whole community. Simpson states that security is of crucial
importance for civil liberty, for it protects each associate from dangers outside, and
also each associate from the other; the possible conflicts between men in the state of
nature, and the lack of arbitrary circumstances, are mediated by the sovereignty as a
legitimate power.71

Secondly, to follow this line of argumentation, Simpson argues that in order to

protect civil freedom, Rousseau puts checks on the government. The state can make
demands on individuals only for the reason that this is done in the name of the
common good. Simpson notices the problematic of this argument, that the government
decides what the common good is, which may limit civil rights in the name of a sham
common good in reality; but he argues that Rousseau’s theory of government
constructs the ideal rather than describing a reality. Viewed in this light, the common
good cannot contain any private interests, and the state’s decision on what constitutes
the common good, cannot be erroneous.72

Thirdly, Simpson argues that Rousseau puts two checks on the sovereignty’s ability
to infringe on the civil freedom of its citizens. On the one hand, the laws must be
general; so when the state imposes its power on individuals, it does so only through
laws that are equally applied to all. On the other hand, the legislative power is shaped
in a democratic form; this means that the state, as an executive power, can pass laws
only with the consent of the people. Thus, through general laws and democratic
legislation to constrain the power of the sovereign, Simpson concludes that these two
73
checks guarantee individual citizens’ civil liberty.

Such argument has been qualified as Rousseau’s theory of sovereignty; Simpson

demonstrates that in this manner, Rousseau’s notion of civil freedom underscores his
concern for the negative nature of freedom and preserves an area of human conduct
unregulated by sovereignty. In other words, it is a sphere where one can form the kind
of life one desires on the condition that one does not destroy the law.74

71
Ibid., p. 53.
72
Ibid., p. 54.
73
Ibid., pp. 54-55.
74
Ibid., p. 59.

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 Simpson offers a reasonable perspective to understand Rousseau’s notion of civil
freedom, – namely, attaching the meaning and nature to this idea by defining
Rousseau’s notion of sovereignty; however, it does not cover the point that Rousseau’s
idea of shaping sovereignty through citizens’ lawmaking defines his notion of civil
freedom as positive freedom.

In order to explore Rousseau’s concept of sovereignty, especially in its function with

regard to the notion of civil freedom, I shall draw on the Social Contract, where
Rousseau characterizes the concept of sovereignty in the following manner:

Sovereignty is indivisible for the same reason that it is inalienable. For either the will
is general, or it is not. It is the will of either the people as a whole or of only a part.
In the first case, this declared will is an act of sovereignty and constitutes law. In the
second case, it is merely a private will, or an act of magistracy. At most it is a
decree.75

Sovereignty, in Rousseau’s understanding, is the will of the people, – that is to say,

the people, as a whole, are ruled by themselves. In particular, this idea is demonstrated
by Rousseau’s insistence that the people make laws.

The above notion is of crucial importance. In Wokler’s eyes, Rousseau endows the
concept of sovereignty with a new meaning. Before Rousseau, the notion of
sovereignty meant force and power represented by kings or governors, but Rousseau
identifies this idea with morality, that is, sovereignty derives from the ruled and ruling
elements.76 In other words, the people, as the ruling, are also the ruled. Thus, apart
from Simpson’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of civil freedom, – as being consistent with
the legal protection by the government of one’s right of living, as long as the individual
freedom does not infringe on the rights of others or the common good –,77 Rousseau’s
notion that sovereignty is expressed by the people in making laws defines the other
aspect of his idea of civil freedom, – that is, civil freedom is positive freedom, as it
demands citizens’ participation in lawmaking to sustain the indivisibility of
sovereignty.

To conclude, in my view, positive freedom and negative freedom are not as

75
Rousseau, ‘On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, p. 154.
76
Wokler, ‘Rousseau and his critics on the fanciful liberties we have lost’, pp. 193-194.
77
Simpson, Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, pp. 52-53.

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incompatible as we might be inclined to assume in some of Berlin’s statements.78 In
Rousseau, the notion of civil freedom is negative freedom and is also positive freedom;
more specifically, the positive aspect of civil freedom in Rousseau’s political
philosophy is a sufficient condition for negative freedom. This is the hermeneutic
difference between Berlin’s purposive reading of what constitutes real freedom, and
Rousseau’s textual expression. For Berlin, freedom starts when the law is silent;79 for
Rousseau this is not sufficient. From the above interpretation of Rousseau’s idea of
civil freedom, one could draw the suggestion that he is inclined to prioritize duty over
right; freedom is in the first place a collective property, – that is to say, freedom is a
collective self–rule. Real freedom should start at the beginning of making the law; and
this may assure us that the individual is not under the whim of an alien rule, but under
the control of his own will, which renders negative freedom, as to pursue the kind of
life one likes, in a meaningful and sustainable manner.

Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of political freedom provides us with an often

puzzling and idiosyncratic meaning. Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its political sense is
formed under his idealized idea of the general will; yet, Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s
political freedom rests on the question, how the general will is realized; this, by
necessity, leads Berlin to put aside the aspects of Rousseau’s notion of political
freedom under the idea of the general will. I have argued in the last section that
Rousseau’s idea of civil freedom has a positive and a negative aspect, which, in
degrees, differs from Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau as a thinker holding up positive
freedom, though not the absolute exclusion of negative freedom. Such a thought points
to a further question, as to whether negative freedom is sufficient in guaranteeing
citizens’ political rights, which is beyond the current study, however, of importance in
thinking freedom in its individual and political sense.

78
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp. 202-203.
79
Ibid., p. 194.

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Conclusion
I have pursued two main inquiries in this thesis; firstly, I have successfully exposed
the inner logic of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom, and laid open
Berlin’s reasons for doing so; secondly, I have provided a thorough assessment of
Berlin’s account.

I have selected, as the frame of reference for this thesis, Gadamer’s and Jauss’
theories of the process of reading, that a text is always read with the reader’s
preconceptions in play, drawing attention to the fact that the conditions under which
the text is produced, are no longer those under which the reader later comes across the
text.

I have presented an introductory analysis of the theoretical foundations, and the

characteristics, of Berlin’s theory of human nature. This has allowed for the
observation that, influenced by Vico’s notion of the ‘philosophy of man’ and Herder’s
notion of a diversity of cultures, Berlin views human nature as dynamic and
changeable; and that Berlin’s doctrine of human nature exists in a field between a
priori and a posteriori, which is blended with sociological and historical statements,
and with psychological insight.

By applying Gadamer’s insight that the meaning of a text evolves out of the
interaction between reader and text, I have demonstrated that Berlin comes in his
reading of Rousseau to the conclusion that he holds a fixed view of human nature; and
that, consequently, Berlin charges Rousseau’s theory of human nature with ignoring
the fact that history undergoes coherent changes, and that cultures are diverse. I have
shown that this reading can be considered as consistent with Berlin’s preconception of
human nature.

Turning to Rousseau’s ‘Second Discourse’, and a range of contemporary critics, I

have come to the conclusion that, – unlike Berlin’s charge of Rousseau –, Rousseau’s
theory of human nature should not be considered as a description of human nature in
reality, rather, it should be viewed as derived from a hypothesis – which enables us to

186
be aware of the distance between the actual human nature in reality and the principles
of human nature that Rousseau sets up in theory.

In analysing and critiquing Berlin’s historical and philosophical reconstruction of

the content of Rousseau’s theory of human nature, I have maintained that Berlin’s
reading of the natural goodness of man as primitive and rough purposively focuses on
his selected meaning, which does away with the two principles of human behaviour of
amour de soi and pitié, which constitute Rousseau’s theory of the natural goodness of
man in the ‘Second Discourse’.

After establishing Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s doctrine of human nature, and

assessing this reading, I have successfully engaged with Berlin’s analysis of negative
freedom and positive freedom, – particularly with his examination of positive freedom
–, which serves to establish the analytical and philosophical grounds for deducing
Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense.

Drawing on Berlin’s essay, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, and his introduction to Four
Essays on Liberty, I have drawn up two decisive critical positions; firstly, that Berlin’s
conceptual distinction between negative freedom and positive freedom should be
considered as valid, – as opposed to the critical position that the idea of freedom ought
to be regarded as one formula, that is, one is free from any constraint or obstacle either
to do or not to do –; secondly, that Berlin’s definition of positive freedom in its three
senses, – as being a state of mastering oneself, to master oneself and to coerce
individuals to lead certain determinate forms of life –, effectively captures this idea, as
opposed to the critical position, that Berlin’s three characterisations of positive
freedom cannot effectively separate the concept of positive freedom from the idea of
negative freedom.

By establishing Berlin’s reading of the natural goodness of man in Rousseau’s

account of human nature, and Berlin’s analysis of positive and negative freedom, –
particularly his examination of positive freedom –, I was able to move on to analysing
and critiquing Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual sense.
For this specific move, I have turned to Iser’s theory of ‘aesthetic response’, and have

187
thus drawn the critical consequences, to insightfully explain the phenomena of Berlin’s
reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense. This has allowed for
the conclusion that Berlin does not anchor his reading totally within the structures of
Rousseau’s texts, but, selectively, makes his purposive choice of certain structures,
while at the same time situating his reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom within his
understanding of positive freedom.

I have critically engaged with Rousseau’s Social Contract, the Confessions, the
‘Moral Letters’, and Emile, and identified the term of moral freedom used by Rousseau
in the Social Contract as having a close association with Berlin’s reading of
Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its individual sense. Taking up, – and further developing
–, several contemporary critical positions, I have drawn the conclusion that Berlin’s
reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense purposively puts aside
Rousseau’s emphasis on the dimension of moral sentiment in shaping the content of
freedom, and is not concerned with the condition, from which Rousseau’s notion of
freedom in its individual sense derives.

Since I have examined Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its

individual sense, based on Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s doctrine of human nature, I
have contended that Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom ought to be read
as much as telling his story about positive freedom, as telling Rousseau’s. Following
on from my evolving insights, I have explored and assessed how Berlin links his
reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its individual sense with the one in its
collective sense, by interpreting Rousseau’s theory of moral values.

In consistently applying reader-response theory, and turning to Gadamer’s and Jauss’

point that a text is always read with the reader’s preconceptions, I have identified the
first preconception of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom, namely,
Berlin’s doctrine of human nature. By interpreting the meaning of Berlin’s theory of
pluralism, I have established the second preconception of Berlin understanding of
moral values, which determines the way he characterises and reads the nature, and the
content, of Rousseau’s moral thought.

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 I have analysed the theoretical foundations of the first claim of pluralism, namely,
maintaining a plurality of values. By examining Vico’s division of knowledge, and by
applying the hermeneutic method of ‘imaginative insight’ appropriate to the
humanities and social sciences, I have pointed out that Berlin views history and culture
as creations of human beings, and that these creations are expressions of man’s
intention, emotion, and intellect. I have concluded that Berlin’s thesis of the plurality of
values does not derive from an observation of the empirical world, but from an
imaginative reconstruction of the psychological worlds of historical and cultural creators,
– that is, Berlin focuses on the inner reasons for the manifested plurality of values.

By analysing Herder’s theory of the distinctiveness of cultures, I have proposed that

Berlin’s first claim of the plurality of values should not be read as generalising an
empirical fact, but as having an inner connection with the nature of human beings, as
well as manifesting the nature of the psychological worlds of human beings. Drawing
on the critical argument that Berlin’s claim of the plurality of values is generic, –
which neither specifies the number of values nor their substance –, and in turning to
Berlin’s essay, ‘My Intellectual Path’, I have suggested that such a critical argument is
not unreasonable; however, I have pointed out that the critical argument leaves aside
the fact that Berlin intentionally develops an account to prove the objectivity of values.

By demonstrating Berlin’s way of justifying the objectivity of values through the

concept of ‘human horizon’, and drawing on the contemporary critique that the way
Berlin proves the objectivity of values fails – on the ground that, if all people accept a
value, this does not necessarily imply that the value is objective –, I have suggested
that the contemporary critique may not be considered reasonable, for Berlin’s account
of the objectivity of values should be considered as neither a purely empirical idea nor
a metaphysical one, but standing between the two. By unfolding the reasons for
proving the objectivity of a value, I have pointed out that the second line of Berlin’s
reasoning, – the objectivity of values through the notion of a ‘central core’ of values –,
should be reconsidered on the grounds that universality differs from commonality.

By examining Berlin’s reading of Vico, as to how the mind generates historical

change, and Berlin’s reading of Herder’s view of culture, I have drawn two
189
conclusions: firstly, that history is shown as an unfolding mental process of
contradiction, representation and development, and that this embodies two claims of
Berlin’s theory of pluralism, – namely, the conflict of values and the
incommensurability of values –; secondly, that the uniqueness and difference rooted in
cultures define the idea of the incommensurability of values, and that cultures can
coexist with one another, while their embodied values may conflict. Drawing on the
contemporary critique that Berlin’s account of pluralism, as grounded on the
knowledge of the observable, amounts to relativism, and by assessing the point that in
Vico and Herder absolute principles exist regardless of time and space, I have asserted
that Berlin’s wish to find a middle ground between the ‘knowledge of the Ought’ and
the ‘knowledge of the observable’ determines the unsettling nature of his theory of
pluralism.

I have established Berlin’s horizon of understanding of moral values, which forms

the theoretical perspective of his reading of Rousseau’s moral thought. By analysing
the approach of Berlin’s characterisation of the nature of Rousseau’s moral thought, –
that Berlin uses monism as an aid to a serious definition of the nature of Rousseau’s
moral thought –, and by turning to Rousseau’s Social Contract, and Emile, I have
contended that Berlin’s characterisation should, in a normative sense, be considered, in
line with Rousseau’s moral thought; however, that Berlin’s depiction, purposively,
does not unfold the complexity of the assumption of Rousseau’s moral thought, and
leaves its plural nature in an empirical sense aside. By examining book three of
Rousseau’s Social Contract, – and turning to a contemporary critical reading regarding
Rousseau’s intellectual shift from the normative to the empirical in the latter part of the
Social Contract –, I have concluded that the empirical facet of Rousseau’s moral
thought should be considered as plural rather than as monistic.

Following on from Berlin’s characterization of Rousseau’s moral thought, I have

addressed the particulars of Berlin’s critical reading. By unfolding the logic of Berlin’s
portrait of Rousseau as a value harmonist, I have pointed to the purposive limitations
of Berlin’s reading, but I have defended its plausibility. In the first place, by turning to
Rousseau’s Social Contract for answering a contemporary critique, – that Rousseau’s

190
moral thought is plural rather than monistic as claimed by Berlin –, I have defended
Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral thought. In the second place, by examining the
critical position that Berlin’s dichotomy of moral values should be evaluated as an
unproductive argument, when applied to assess Rousseau’s moral thought, – since the
relationship between value-conflict and value-harmony in Rousseau is supplementary
–, I have concluded that the critical argument fails to capture the normative nature of
Berlin’s theory of pluralism and thus misidentifies the approach that Berlin uses in his
analysis of Rousseau’s moral thought. Finally, by exploring yet another critical reading
of Rousseau’s moral thought, – that the plurality of values in Rousseau contains the
possibility of conflict among the values –, and addressing the reasons for Berlin’s
depiction of Rousseau, I have demonstrated the plausibility of Berlin’s selected portrait
of Rousseau.

By examining Berlin’s three arguments to provide a persuasive account of the notion of

individual freedom as an absolute value in Rousseau, and in turning to the critical
elaboration of the problematic of freedom pas the highest value in Rousseau, I have
contended that Berlin proves the status of Rousseau’s notion of freedom by reading
Rousseau’s texts selectively, casting aside the sentimental dimension of morality that
Rousseau addresses, while this dimension has a crucial importance in defining the
status of freedom. Overall, I have defended Berlin’s line of reading Rousseau’s moral
thought, but pointed out its purposive restriction.

I have concluded that Berlin’s intentional reading of Rousseau’s moral thought leads
him to assert that Rousseau’s political doctrine faces a problem. By demonstrating
Berlin’s reading of the first aspect of the problematic, the conflict between individual
freedoms, – and in exposing its specific background of the conflicting state of nature,
addressed by Rousseau in the ‘Second Discourse’ –, I have proposed that Berlin
captures the essential issue of the problematic, however, that his portrait of Rousseau
does away with the textual context.

By turning to the second aspect of the problematic explored by Berlin, the

contradiction between individual freedom and political power –, and addressing the
context of Rousseau’s critique of the rise of government in the conflicting state of
191
nature –, I have maintained that the problematic between freedom and authority in
Rousseau’s political philosophy should be understood in the context of his rejection of
legitimating the existing material and moral inequalities in the state of conflict, which
provides access to Rousseau’s idea of the general will as a solution to the problematic
of the conflict. Finally, by analysing Rousseau’s idea of amour-propre, and its
influence on our understanding of moral psychology, I have proposed that Berlin
leaves aside the instance of psychological and moral injuries, and that this deliberately
slanted reading partially determines Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of general
will.

I have analysed Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s idea of the general will as a solution
to the problematic of the conflict between freedom and authority, and attended to its
shortfalls. Firstly, by exposing Berlin’s critical analysis of the prescribed principle of
Rousseau’s solution against the background of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral
thought, – and in turning to Rousseau’s ‘Second Discourse’, and the Social Contract,
to explain Rousseau’s proposed principle –, I have asserted that the approach of the
dichotomy of monism and pluralism, which Berlin takes in analysing the inner logic of
Rousseau prescribed principle purposively disregards the reasons Rousseau addresses
–, that to preserve one’s freedom of will guarantees the fairness of the terms of the
social contract.

Secondly, by examining the first aspect of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of

the general will, and in using Gadamer’s insight, – that the production of meaning in a
text is a blend between the reader’s preconceptions and the ideas embodied in the text
–, to assess Berlin’s reading, I have asserted that Berlin’s evaluation of the general will
is situated within his reading of Rousseau’s moral thought. In turning to Rousseau’s
Emile, and a critical reading of the general will, I have pointed out that Berlin’s reading
puts aside Rousseau’s concern of offering the idea of general will as a cure for man’s
deficiencies.

Finally, by analysing the second aspect of Berlin’s reading, – that the general will is
constituted by rational wills –, and turning to a critical reading of the general will, I
have drawn attention to the omitted metaphysical aspect in Berlin’s reading of
192
Rousseau’s notion of the general will.

I have linked Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s concept of the general will with his
examination of the inner logic of Rousseau’s idea of freedom in its political sense. By
unfolding the implicit connection between Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of
positive freedom in its individual dimension, and the one in a collective dimension,
through Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s moral thought, and its expression of the idea of
the general will, I have come to the conclusion that Berlin’s examination of Rousseau’s
notion of freedom in its political sense in fact examines the question, how to realise the
general will.

By turning to Rousseau’s Social Contract, in responding to Berlin’s reading, I have

argued that Rousseau does not even think that the general will can be realised in reality;
that Berlin’s reading, indeed, points to the possible distortion and abuse of the logic of
Rousseau’s doctrine of political freedom, when applied in reality. By turning once
more to the Social Contract, and a critical reading of civil freedom as negative
freedom, I have proposed that Rousseau’s idea of civil freedom has its positive and its
negative aspect, which differs from Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau as a thinker
upholding positive freedom only.

The thesis has projected three main expected outcomes, that is, to demonstrate the
inner logic of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of freedom, to explain the
plausibility of his reading, and to test and qualify his reading through turning to
Rousseau’s texts.

With regard to the first projected outcome, in applying the methodology of

reader-response theory to the examination of Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s notion of
freedom in its two aspects, – namely, the individual and the political one –, I have
situated Berlin’s reading in the context of his theory of human nature, and his doctrine
of pluralism, which renders a selected meaning to Berlin’s reading. I have elaborated
the inner logic of Berlin’s reading, and have analysed the notions of negative freedom
and positive freedom that Berlin uses to qualify Rousseau’s idea of freedom, and
drawn the conclusion that the way Berlin reads Rousseau deliberately leaves aside the

193
complex and the subtle aspect of Rousseau’s notion of freedom, for the sake of his own
theoretical consistency.

With regard to the second projected outcome, in taking Berlin’s position, – and in
considering the historical context of his intellectual growth and his personal experience
–, I have examined the reasons for Berlin’s reading, and justified the plausibility of his
reading through the perspective of reader-response theory. I have reached the
conclusion that Berlin has his theoretical and historical reasons for reading Rousseau
in the way he does, while the way Berlin reads Rousseau, – at the same time –, unfolds
the inner tension of Rousseau’s doctrine of freedom, and the possible abuse and
distortion when this doctrine is applied in real situations.

With regard to the third projected outcome, by examining Rousseau’s texts, – in

particular the ‘Second Discourse’, Emile and the Social Contract –, I have attempted to
supplement what Berlin left aside, – when following his own logic of reading
Rousseau –, and have reached two conclusions. Firstly, that Rousseau’s notion of
freedom in its individual and its political sense, and in its moral foundation, ought to
be understood in a normative sense; secondly, that Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its
individual sense should be understood as taking the moral sentiment of conscience into
consideration; and thus revealing the complexity of the idea of freedom in its
individual sense. By examining Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its political sense, I
have proposed that this notion ought to be understood not only as positive freedom, as
Berlin portrays it, but also as negative freedom.

In the process of my study, and my research, into Berlin’s reading of Rousseau’s

notion of freedom, two questions have emerged, which need further inquiry. For the
reason of the scope of the current project, I cannot examine these questions, but it is
worthwhile raising them, given that they are of great importance in thinking freedom
in its individual and its political sense.

Firstly, I have examined Berlin’s notions of negative freedom and positive freedom,
which function as analytical tools that Berlin uses to qualify, and critique, Rousseau’s
idea of freedom in its individual sense. I have addressed this issue, that by qualifying

194
the concept of reason, in order to control one’s desire and passion, it is meant to guide
the other faculties of human nature to develop into a state of harmony and order, and to
make them act in line with one’s conscience. I have proposed, that Rousseau views
freedom as to act in line with one’s reason, – that is to say, not every pursuit is viewed
as meaningful in Rousseau’s understanding of freedom in its individual sense; for
instance, to pursue harmful desires like addiction to drugs is not regarded as having
freedom.

Compared to Rousseau’s version of freedom in its individual sense, I have addressed

in the frame of the three dimensions of positive freedom, the issue that Berlin defines
negative freedom, as to leave one to pursue the life one likes, unless one breaks the law.
In the frame of positive freedom in its political sense, I have demonstrated that Berlin
defends the notion of negative freedom from the perspective of his theories of human
nature and pluralism, that is, negative freedom allows for human diversity to unfold
and develop. It also allows people to pursue a diversity of values, and tolerates the
possible conflict between these pursuits, unless they violate the law.

The above exposition demonstrates that Rousseau’s version of freedom shares with
Berlin’s defense of negative freedom the aspect that one’s pursuit must not break the
law, but stands in a sharp contrast to Berlin’s defense of negative freedom, as to leave
one to pursue the life one likes. From the contrast arises a question, namely, whether
the notion of negative freedom needs a rational qualification of one’s pursuit as
meaningful and significant, to support its validity.

Secondly, I have analysed Rousseau’s notion of freedom in its political sense,

namely, civil freedom, and pointed out that it has a positive and a negative aspect. In
Rousseau’s understanding, citizens’ negative freedom of enjoying civil rights can be
guaranteed through the positive freedom of citizens’ participation in lawmaking, to
sustain the indivisibility of sovereignty. Contrasted with Berlin’s portrait of Rousseau
as a thinker holding up positive freedom, the realization of Rousseau’s concept of civil
freedom points to a further question, as to whether negative freedom is sufficient in
guaranteeing citizens’ political rights; this question concerning freedom in its political
sense is worth further inquiry.
195
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