The Limitations of Miss Anscombe's Grocer

Author(s): D. Z. Phillips
Source: Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Jan., 1969), pp. 97-99
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3327640
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 THE LIMITATIONS OF MISS ANSCOMBE S GROCER 97
politely, refuse the gratitude of the poor. I can explain this insight
without needing Kant's supporting theory that the whole distribution-
system is independentlyunjust. (See Kant's Lectureson Ethics,p. 194,
p. 236, Translatedby L. Infield, Harper and Row, 1963.) But many
differencesbetween our rescue-situationand the process of economic
redistributionneed further consideration. Here I wish only to prepare
for these large projects by disposing of the spontaneousobjection that
a general right to beneficence would undermine the very notion of
gratitude. Admitting this general right would only move the line
determiningwhen real thanks are due, in a way that fits well with our
reflective standardof gratitude.
Colorado State University

THE LIMITATIONS OF MISS ANSCOMBE'S GROCER

By D. Z. PHILLIPS

I [WHAT exactly are the limitations of Miss Anscombe's grocer?

One limitation I ascribedto him slandersthe good name of that
worthy businessman. Mr. Williamsonwas correctin pointing this out.1
The limitationin question, however, was incidentalto the main purpose
of my paper, which was to show that Miss Anscombe's analysiscannot
account for the possibility of variedmoral reactionsto the samesituation.
But let us give incidentalstheir due first.
The passagein my paperwhich provoked Mr. Williamson'sreaction
was the following one:
. . . the fact that paymentis madefor goods deliveredis not a merely
contingentfeatureof the institutionof buyingandselling. Nevertheless,
in certainsituations,'You mustpay',viewed morally,may be regarded
as a harshdemandratherthanas a normalexpectation. But wouldMiss
Anscombe'sgroceragreewith this? I doubtit. The goods have been
ordered,deliveryhasbeenmade,for himthe restis obvious(p. 178).
I had said that Miss Anscombe's grocer's view of what he ought to do
is a limited one, but I was wrong in thinking that his view need be
limited to the reaction, 'You must pay'. As Williamson says, 'there is
nothing in Miss Anscombe's own account which commits her grocer to
being hard-hearted'(p. 180). He points out, quite correctly, that the
existence of a debt in no way entailsthat the debt must be met. Indeed,
1D. Z. Phillips: 'Miss Anscombe's grocer,' and Colwyn Williamson: 'The grocers of
Miss Anscombe and Mr. Phillips', ANALYSIS,
Vol. 28, No. 6,1968.
98 ANALYSIS

one can tell someone to forget a debt only where there is a debt to be
forgotten. What I should have said was that the grocer's view of what
he ought to do is limited, becausehe thinks that whatever his reactionis,
it is the only moral possibility. Nothing Williamson says shows this
conclusion to be mistaken.
Mr. Williamson does not dwell on the details of Miss Anscombe's
paper. He is content to refer to 'Miss Anscombe's position'. But we
ought to remindourselvesof the mainpartof her paper. Miss Anscombe
seems to be saying that if we want to understanda moral conclusion we
can do so by seeing how certainfacts are brute relativeto it. Thus, once
I understandthat a man has orderedpotatoes and had them delivered,
I can see that his owing for the potatoes consists in these facts. It might
also be said that the grocer's saying, 'You must pay' consists in these
facts, given that these are the only facts. Miss Anscombe recognisesthat
a specialcontext will put the business transactionin a new light, but she
does not give examples. I introduced a special consideration,namely,
the fact that a debtor is unemployed. As we have seen, there is nothing
preventingMiss Anscombe'sgrocer from saying, 'Forget what you owe
me' in the light of this fact. But, now, applying her notion of "brute
facts" to the newsituationand the newmoral conclusion,Miss Anscombe
would have to say that this moralconclusionconsistsin these facts which
are brute relative to it. But this is precisely what the possibility of
varied moral reactions shows to be mistaken. Given the new fact, the
debtor's unemployment,some will conclude, 'You must pay up', and
some will say, 'Forget what you owe me'. Furthermore,people may
reach these conclusions for very differentreasons. But how can the
variety of moral reactions to the samesituation be analysedin the way
Miss Anscombe suggests; how can the same facts be brute relative to
differentmoral conclusions; how can the varied judgements simply
consist in these facts? Miss Anscombe may say that she has no wish to
applyher notion of 'bruterelative'in these contexts. If so, the usefulness
of the notion is extremelylimited in moral philosophy, a fact which her
originalpapertends to obscure. What needs to be emphasisedis what I
did emphasise, namely, that 'facts which weigh a great deal for some
people do not weigh at all for others' (p. 179).
Mr. Williamsondoes not appreciatethe nature of these difficulties.
He suggests that if we want to say that there is a logical connection
between an obligation and the facts, despite exceptionalcircumstances,
we can do so by saying that the facts have changed,hence the change in
the nature of the obligation. He says that, 'If a man concedes that he
orderedand received the goods we expect him to be able to tell us why
he considered that he owes the shopkeeper nothing. That these
 THE LIMITATIONS OF MISS ANSCOMBE S GROCER 99
additional facts are relevant, and modify the nature of the inference,
merely confirms Miss Anscombe's position' (p. 181). The superficial
plausibilityof this point depends on Williamson'simplied limitation of
the modificationto the moral viewpoint of a singleindividual. But there
are situationswhere, given the additionalfacts, some people will think
that such a modificationis called for, others that other modificationsare
called for, and others that no modificationis called for at all. I gave
some examples of possible reactions to the debtor's unemploymentin
my paper: 'Business is business'-'It's our duty to help'-'Charity
encourages laziness'-'Charity destroys self-respect'-'It depends on
how he spends his money'-'Did he become unemployed through his
own fault?'-'I don't know about any of that, but forget what you owe
me'-etc., etc. I do not deny, as Williamsonseems to think, that all these
reactionsneed a certainbackgroundto makethem intelligible. I stressed
the necessity of such a backgroundin the early part of my paper. But
given the background, people will differ over what they think is the
most importantaspect of it, or over what moral considerationsshould
be brought to bear on it. To say that such moral considerationsand
views of what is importantsimply consist in these factsis hardlyhelpful.
Mr. Williamsonmay be right, in certaincircumstances,in predicting
that when a situation has changed, earlier moral conclusions will be
modified. He is wrong, however, if he thinks that, given such changes,
there must be moral modificationsof a specifiablekind, modifications
which are analysablein terms of facts which can be seen to be brute
relative to them in the sense elucidatedby Miss Anscombe. What I am
insisting on is that agreement on how a situation has been modified
factually does not imply agreement on how moral conclusions will be
modified,if at all, in the light of such changes.
Mr. Williamson is right in saying that the judgements of Miss
Anscombe's grocer could change with changing situations. What he
fails to see, and what Miss Anscombe's paper, I suggest, implies, is
that whateverthe situation,whatever changes it undergoes, there could
only be one appropriatemoraljudgement-and that would be the judge-
ment of her infalliblegrocer.

University
Collegeof Swansea