MORETO MIRALLOSA vs.CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC.

G.R. No. 194538

November 27, 2013

Facts:

Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner

of a Caloocan property known as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio
Makatipo, Caloocan City. The lot that petitioner presently occupies is
Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by the titles above-mentioned. On 14
September 1973, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 293 which
invalidated the titles of respondent and declared them open for
disposition to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners
Association, Inc. (MHAI). On the basis of P.D. 293, petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHAI,
occupied Lot No. 32 and subsequently built houses there. On the other
hand, respondent was constrained to allow the members of MHAI to
also occupy the rest of Pangarap Village.

The Supreme Court promulgated Roman Tuason and Remedio V.

Tuason, Attorney-in-fact, Trinidad S. Viado v. The Register of Deeds,
Caloocan City, Ministry of Justice and the National Treasurer which
declared P.D. 293 as unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts
om January 29, 1988. As a consequence, Presidential Decree No. 293
is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts. The
public respondents are commanded to cancel the inscription on the
titles of the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the
memorandum declaring their titles null and void and declaring the
property therein respectively described open for disposition and sale to
the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do
whatever else is needful to restore the titles to full effect and efficacy;
and henceforth to refrain, cease and desist from implementing any
provision or part of said Presidential Decree No. 293.

Sometime in 1995, petitioner took over Lot No. 32 by virtue of

an Affidavit executed by Pelagio M. Juan in his favor. As a
consequence of Tuason, respondent made several oral demands on
petitioner to vacate the premises, but to no avail. A written demand
letter which was sent sometime in April 2002 also went unheeded until

1
Carmen filed a complaint for unlawful detainment. Mirallosa claimed
that Carmel has no cause of action against him under the doctrine of
operative fact and he should not be prejudiced by Tuason case case
because he was not a party to the case.

Issue:

Whether or not Mirallosa can avail the Operative Fact Doctrine.

Held:

No. Mirallosa merly anchored his right over the property to an

Affidavit issued by Juan in 1995 after the Tuason was promulgated. At
the time he built the structures on the premises, he ought to have
been aware of the binding effects of the Tuason case and the
subsequent unconstitutionality of PD 293. These circumstances
necessarily remove him from the ambit of the operation fact doctrine.

The Operative Fact Doctrine is a rule in equity. As such, it must

be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional
law produces no effect. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration
of unconstutionality will impose an undue burden on those who relied
on the invalid law, but it can never invoke to validate as constitutional
an unconstitutional act.

2
 CAPALLA vs. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 201112
June 13, 2012

Facts:

On July 10, 2009, the COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM entered

into a Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election System for
the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections (AES
Contract). The contract between the COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM
was one of “lease of the AES with option to purchase the goods listed
in in the contract.” In said contract, the COMELEC was given until
December 31, 2010 to exercise the option. In September 2010, the
COMELEC partially exercised its OTP 920 units of of PCOS machines
with corresponding canvassing/consolidation system for the special
elections in certain areas in the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur
and Bulacan. In a letter dated December 18, 2010, Smartmatic-TIM,
through its Chairman Flores, proposed a temporary extension of the
option period on the remaining PCOS machines until March 31, 2011,
waving the storage costs and covering the maintenance costs. The
COMELEC did not exercise the option within the extended period.
Several extensions were given to COMELEC to exercise the OTP until
its final extension on March 31, 2012.

On March 29, 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution resolving

to accept Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the period to exercise the
OTP until March 31, 2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign
for and on behalf of the COMELEC the Agreement on the Extension of
the OTP under the AES Contract. COMELEC again issued a Resolution
resolving to approve the Deed of Sale between the COMELEC and
Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter’s PCOS machines to be used in
the upcoming may 2013 elections and to authorize Chairman Brillantes
to sign the Deed of Sales for on behalf of the COMELEC. The Deed of
Sale was forthwith executed.

Petitioner assail the constitutionality of the COMELEC Resolutions

on the grounds that the option period provided for n the AES contract
had already lapsed; that the extension of the option period and the

3
exercise of the option without competitive public bidding contravene
the provisions of RA 9184; and that the COMELEC purchased the
machines in contravention of the standards laid down in RA 9369. On
the other hand, respondent argue on the validity of the subject
transaction based on the grounds that there is no prohibition either in
the contract or provision of law for it to extend the option period; that
the OTP is not an independent contract itself, but is a provision
contained in the valid and existing AES contract that had already
satisfied the public bidding requirements of RA 9184; and that
exercising the option was most advantageous of the COMELEC.

Issue:

Wheteher or not there was a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC
in issuing the assailed Resolution and in executing the assailed
Extension Agreement and Deed.

Held:

No. A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would

show that the parties are given the right to amend the contract which
may include the period within which to exercise the option. There is
also no prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that the
contract is still effective. The COMELEC still retains the amount due as
performance security , which indicated that the AES contract is still
effective and not yet terminated. Consequently, pursuant to Article 19
of the contract, the provisions thereof may still be amended by mutual
agreement of the parties provided said amendment is in writing and
signed by the parties. Considering, however that the AES contract is
not an ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a government
agency, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed by the
Civil Code but also by RA 9184. A winning bidder is not precluded from
modifying or amending certain provisions of the contract bidded upon.
However, such changes must not constitute substantial or material
amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and
would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid
on the same terms.

4
 It is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that an
instrument must be construed as to give effect to all the provision of
the contract. In essence, the contract must read as a whole. While the
contract specifically required the Comelec to notify the Smartmatic-
TIM of its OTP the subjects goods unitl December 31, 2010, a reading
of the other provision of the AES contract would should that the
parties are given the right to amend the contract which may include
the period within which to exercise the option. Also, there is no
prohibition on the extension of the period, privided that the contract is
still effective.

5
 DE JESUS vs. AQUINO
G.R. NO. 164662
February 18, 2013

Facts:

On February 20, 2002, petitioner Maria Lourdes de Jesus

filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal against
private respondents Supersonic Services Inc., Pakistan Airlines, Gil
Puyat Jr., and Divina Abad Santos praying for the payment of
separation pay, full backwages, moral and exemplary damages as
Sales Promotion Officer. De Jesus was fully authorized to solicit clients
and receive payments for and in its behalf, and as such, she occupied
a highly confidential and financially sensitive position in the company.
De Jesus was able to solicit several ticket purchases for Pakistan
International Airlines (PIA) routed from Manila to various destinations
abroad and received all payments for PIA tickets in its behalf. Two
memorandum were then issued to De Jesus reminding her of her
collectibles and her obligation to remit it to Supersonic. Despite the
demands, De Jesus still failed to comply causing Supersonic to file a
criminal case of Estafa which was countered by the petitioner by filing
an illegal dismissal case.

The CA observed that De Jesus had not disputed her failure to

remit and account for some of her collections, for, in fact, she herself
had expressly admitted her failure to do so through her letters dated
April 5, 2001 and May 15, 2001 sent to Supersonic’s general manager.
Thereby, the CA concluded, she defrauded her employer or willfully
violated the trust reposed in her by Supersonic. In that regard, the CA
rightly observed that proof beyond reasonable doubt of her violation of
the trust was not required, for it was sufficient that the employer had
“reasonable grounds to believe that the employee concerned is
responsible for the misconduct as to be unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by her position.”

Issues:

6
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Held:

No. The CA precisely ruled that the violation by Supersonic of

the two-written notice requirement rendered ineffectual and dismissal
of De Jesus for just cause under Article 282 of the the Labor Code, and
entitled her to be paid in full backwages from the time of her dismissal
until the finality of its decision. The Court cannot ignore that the
applicable case law when the CA promulgated its decision on July 23,
2004, and when it denied Supersonic’s motion for reconsideration on
October 21, 2004 was still Serrano. Considering that the Court
determines in this appeal by petition for review on certiorari only
whether or not CA committed an error of law in promulgating its
decision of July 23, 2004, the CA cannot be declared to have erred on
the basis of Serrano being meanwhile abandoned through Agabon if all
that the CA did was to fully apply the law and jurisprudence applicable
at the time of the rendition of the judgment.

As a rule, a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as

of the date that the law was originally passed , subject only to the
qualifications that when a doctrine of the Court is overruled and the
Court adopts a different view, and more so when there is a reversal of
the doctrine, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and
should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in
good faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality
of fairness and justice, for, then, there is no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication.

7
 REPUBLIC vs. RAMBUYONG
G.R. NO. 167810
October 04, 2010

Facts:

Alfredo Y. Chu filed a case for collection of a sum of money

and/or damages against the National Power Corporation (NPC) which
was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay, Branch 24. Appearing as counsel for Chu is Atty. Richard B.
Rambuyong who was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Thereafter, NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition of
Atty. Rambuyong arguing that under Section 90 (b), (1) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, sanggunian members are prohibited "to appear as counsel
before any court wherein x x x any office, agency or instrumentality of
the government is the adverse party." NPC contended that being a
government-owned or controlled corporation, it is embraced within the
term "instrumentality."

The RTC ruled that government-owned or controlled corporations

are expressly excluded from Section 90 (b), (1) of the Local
Government Code. It further held that "to insistently maintain that
'government-owned or controlled corporations' are included in the
signification of 'agency and instrumentality of the government' x x x
would be leaving behind what is apparent in favor of opening the door
to the realm of presumption, baseless conjecture and even absurdity."
Hence, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave

abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in ruling that the
statutory prohibition pertaining to the private practice of law
by sanggunian members does not apply to cases where the adverse
party is a government-owned or controlled corporation.

On May 20, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
It ruled that if ever there has been an erroneous interpretation of the
law, the same may be attributed to a mere error of judgment which is
definitely not the same as "grave abuse of discretion."

8
The motion for reconsideration of NPC was denied. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition is meritorious.

Held:

Yes. The CA erred in scrutinizing that the petition involves a

great abuse of discretion. Given the categorical words of both the law
and jurisprudence, to still go to extra-ordinary lengths to interpret the
intention of the lawmakers and come out with the construction that a
government-owned or controlled corporation like the National Power
Corporation is not included within the term.

The strained and contrary interpretation of clearly worded

provisions of law, which therefore should be merely applied and not
interpreted, is an earmark of despotism and grave abuse of discretion.

9
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
G.R. No. 164987
April 24, 2012

Facts:

For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari

assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in
Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004
(GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and
Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a
mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social
monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is
silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of
lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of
projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to
propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of
PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of

separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending
funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect
intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose
and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-
legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore,
impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.

The perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must

not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media
preaching the evils of pork barrel.

Issue:

Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of

judicial review are met in this case

10
Held:

A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged

has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this
case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged
unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition
complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation
and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges

“such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’
suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been
illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

The Court does not lose sight of the presumption of the validity
accorded to statutory acts of Congress. The presumption is that the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, just law, and onw which
operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific
purpose of law.

11
 VICENCIO vs. VILLAR
G.R. No. 182069
July 3, 2012

Facts:

The City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon

(SPM), presided by Hon. Benjamin Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor,
adopted and approved City Ordinance No. 15-2003, entitled “An
Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice-Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay
Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter into Contract for Consultancy Services
for Consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in
their Respective Areas of Concern.”

Arnold Vicencio was elected City Vice-Mayor of Malabon. By

virtue of this office, he also became the Presiding Officer of the SPM
and, at the same time, the head of the Sanggunian Secretariat.
Vicencio, representing the City Government of Malabon City, entered
into Contracts for Consultancy Services. After the signing of their
respective contracts, the three consultants rendered consultancy
services to the SPM. Thereafter, the three consultants were
correspondingly paid for their services pursuant to the contracts
therefor. However, an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) was
issued disallowing the amount for being an improper disbursement.

Aggrieved by the disallowance, Vicencio appealed it to the

Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the Commission on Audit
(COA) which subsequently denied it.

Issue:

Whether or not the Commission on Audit committed serious

errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction when it affirmed ASB’s decision.

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Held:

Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code,

there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to
enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that
provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to
enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by
the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically
authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy
services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the
Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed
as a “continuing authority” for any person who enters the Office of the
Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.

The COA’s assailed Decision was made in faithful compliance

with its mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as
conferred on it by the Constitution. The COA was merely fulfilling its
mandate in observing the policy that government funds and property
should be fully protected and conserved; and that irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such
funds and property should be prevented. Thus, no grave abuse of
discretion may be imputed to the COA.

As a rule in statutory construction, where the words of statute

are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted intepretation. Thus, the
ordinance should be applied according to its express terms and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. In
the case at bar, there is no reason to depart from this rule.

13
 GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 182069
September 04, 2012

Facts:

A formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before PNP-NCR

against Manila Police District. Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw,
before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While
said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the
National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of
petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation
to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct
was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police
officers in the Office of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed
before the Office of the City Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding
that the material allegations made by the complainant had not been
substantiated by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of
respondents of the offenses charged.

Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a

Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the
administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the
complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due
notice. However, upon the recommendation of herein petitioner
Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his
fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the
Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final
approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and
action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists
on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have
himself reinstated in the police service.

In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the

tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven
others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry
against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation
14
of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was
tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the
conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable
negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by
allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more
than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the
Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in
administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission.
The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The
prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.
Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.

Issue:

Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise

administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of
the Ombudsman.

Held:

Yes. The Ombudsman's administrative
disciplinary power over a

Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the
Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and
covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with
the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such
authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials,
Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A
harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions
in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had
intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of
Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in
the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through
15
the person of the President, that would exercise the power of
administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and
plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees

By granting express statutory
power to the President to remove


a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor, Congress
merely
filled an obvious gap in
the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman
himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by
impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however,
no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from
office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that
matter.

The Power of the President to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman


and a Special Prosecutor is
Implied from his Power to
Appoint.
Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is
already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint
the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity
and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a
military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the
general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of
primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Granting the President the Power
to Remove a Deputy

Ombudsman
does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the

Ombudsman. Petitioner Gonzales may not be
removed from office
where the questioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do
not
constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the
PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Hence, the President, while he may be
vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as
Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the
grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.

Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered reinstated with

payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension

16
effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is
directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above
case against petitioner. Hence, decision of the Office of the President is
hereby reversed.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a

statute, care should be taken that every part of the statute be fiven
given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated
measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A
construction that would render a provision imperative should be
avioded, instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole. Thus, the challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is denied

17
 GAMBOA vs TEVES
G.R. No. 176579
June 28, 2011

Facts:

This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of

Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the
government of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the
Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets
Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited
(First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment management and
holding company and a shareholder of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT).

The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also

involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or about 6.3 percent of
the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First
Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT
increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the
total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about
81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates Section 11, Article
XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership
of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%.

Issue:

Whether or not the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers to the total common shares of PLDT.

Held:

No. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote
in the election of directors, then the term “capital” shall include such
preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote
in the election of directors. In short, the term “capital” in Section 11,
Article XII of the constitution refers only to shares of stock that can
vote in the election of directors.

To construe broadly the term “capital” as the total outstanding

capital stock, including both common and non-voting preferred shares,
grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the

18
“State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.” A broad definition
unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which
necessarily equates to control of the public utility.

Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn
less than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly
contravenes the express command in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution.

As a matter of fact, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common

shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to vote
in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT; (2)
Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDT’s common shares, constituting a
minority of the voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over
PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no
voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that
common shares earn; (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of
common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the
authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%.
Thus, this kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery
of the Constitution

19
 MACALINTAL vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 191618
November 23, 2010

Facts:

Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal questioned the constitution of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized
progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: The Supreme
Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized

to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the creation of a
purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation,
a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the
constitutional mandate. Petitioner’s averment is supposedly supported
by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (2005 PET Rules), specifically:

(1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein

the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices are designated as
"Chairman and Members," respectively;

(2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to

appoint employees and confidential employees of every member
thereof;

(3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of

the Tribunal" with the appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk
of the Tribunal who, at the discretion of the PET, may designate
the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and

(4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct

from the Supreme Court seal.

Issue:

20
 Whether or not the constitution of the PET, composed of the
Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4,
Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET),

specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution
to act respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications" of the President and Vice-
President.

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily

reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. It
states that, “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose." The word "contest" in the provision means that the
jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked after the election and
proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no
"contest" before a winner is proclaimed.

To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the

establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory
before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in
our country cannot be denied.

A rule in statutory construction is verba legis which provides that

wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.

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 STO. TOMAS vs. SALAC
G.R. No. 152642
June 07, 2014

Facts:

On January 8, 2002 respondents Rey Salac, Willie D. Espiritu,

Mario Montenegro, Dodgie Belonio, Lolit Salinel, and Buddy Bonnevie
(Salac, et al.) filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction against petitioners, the DOLE Secretary, the POEA
Administrator, and the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) Secretary-General before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City from regulating the activities of private
recruiters.

Thereafter, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.

intervened in the case before the Court, claiming that the RTC March
20, 2002 Decision gravely affected them since it paralyzed the
deployment abroad of OFWs and performing artists. The Confederated
Association of Licensed Entertainment Agencies, Incorporated (CALEA)
intervened for the same purpose.

Salac Respondents invoked Sections 29 and 30 of the Republic

Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which provides that recruitment
agency in the Philippines shall be deregulated one year from the
passage of the said law. It also provided that, 5 years thereafter,
recruitment should be fully deregulated.

RA 8042 was passed in 1995, hence, Salac insisted that as early

as 2000, the aforementioned government agencies should have
stopped issuing memorandums and circulars regulating the
recruitment of workers abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
Issue
Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.
Held:
No. The issue became moot and academic. It appears that
during the pendency of this case in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to

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Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was passed which
repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.

Therefore, the Supreme Court has decided that the liability of

the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any
and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This
provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages
that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages.

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