Arturo Pelayo vs.

Marcelo Lauron
G.R. No. L-4089, January 12, 1909
12 Phil. 453

FACTS:

On or about October 13, 1906, the plaintiff Arturo Pelayo was called to
the house of the defendants, Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella situated in
San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render
medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a
child. After consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escaño, the
plaintiff found it necessary to remove the fetus by means of an operation, in
which service he was occupied until the following morning, and had visited
the patient several times. The equitable value of the services rendered by
the plaintiff was P500.00, which the defendants refused to pay. On
November 23, 1906, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants
and prayed that the judgment be rendered in his favor as against the
defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with
any other relief that may be deemed proper. In answer, the defendants
denied all allegations and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-
in-law died as a consequence of the said childbirth, and when she was still
alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house and
without any relation whatsoever with them, and on the day she gave birth
she was in the house of the defendants and her stay there was accidental
and due to fortuitous circumstances. Thus, the defendants prayed that they
be absolved from the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff demurred the answer and that the lower court sustained
the demurrer directing the defendants to amend their answer. In
compliance, the defendants amended their answer denying each and every
allegation contained in the complaint. The lower court rendered judgment in
favor of the defendants absolving them from the complaint.

ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not the parents-in-law are under any obligation to
pay the fees claimed by the plaintiff.

OPINION:
The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by
virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of
any contract entered into between them and the plaintiff from which such
obligation might have arisen.
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised
among the mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual
support. When either of them by reason of illness should be in need of
medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish
the necessary services of a physician in order that the health may be
restored; the party bound to furnish such support is therefore, liable for all
the expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional
services. The liability arises from the obligation, which the law has expressly
established, between married couples. It is therefore the husband of the
patient who is bound to pay for the services of the plaintiff.
REACTION

The plaintiff made a mistake when he decided to direct his actions to

the parents-in-law of the patient to ask for the payment when first and
foremost it is not the obligation of the defendants to pay for the medical fees
of their daughter-in-law. It is because the defendants are not obliged
principally to the medical fees because obligations arising from law are not
presumed and therefore they are strangers to the obligation,
notwithstanding they are the one who asked for medical assistance in such
emergency. Only when it is evident that the defendants and the plaintiff has
entered into a contract to make the plaintiff entitled to the medical fees
against the defendants. Thus, the plaintiff must have directed his action to
the husband of the patient because he is held responsible for such
emergency of his lawful wife.
 MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION VS. BAKING
GR No. 57435 May 25, 2007

FACTS:

Sebastian Baking, respondent, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up.
Dr. Sy gave respondent two medical prescriptions – Diomicron for his blood sugar and Benalize
tablets for his triglyceride.

Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Alabang Branch) to

buy the prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription Diamicron as a
prescription for Dormicum. Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine,
respondent took one pill of dormicum on three consecutive days. On the third day he took the
medicine, and he figured in a vehicular accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of
one Jose Peralta. Respondent fell asleep while driving he could not remember anything about the
collision nor felt its impact.

Suspecting that the tablet he took may have bearing on his physical and mental state at
the time of the collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sy. Upon being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy
was shocked to find that what was sold to him was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed
Diamicron

The RTC and CA rendered their decision in favor of respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate
cause of respondent’s accident.

OPINION:

Article 2176 states that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties, is called a quasi-delict…”

Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling respondent domicrum,

instead of the prescribed diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and
death for a buying patient, the employee should have been very cautious in dispensing
medicines. Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s
negligence in driving. The court disagrees. The accident could have not occurred had petitioner’s
employee been careful in reading the prescription.

Article 2180 in complementing the preceding article states that “the obligation imposed
by articles 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.” It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee
is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the
part of the employer either in the selection of the employee or the supervision over him, after
such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the
employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employee.

In this case, petitioner failed to prove such exercised of due diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of employee, thus making the petitioner solidarily liable
for the damages.
REACTION

It is thus necessary for the petitioner to be liable for the damages

suffered by the respondent due to the negligent act of the petitioner’s
employee and without any evidence to prove the contrary that the petitioner
exercised the necessary diligence required in selection and supervision of
employees. But the courts may mitigate the damages if it is proven that
there is contributory negligence on the part of the respondent that caused
the accident. But since the court had already favored the respondent that no
such accident happened if such employee has been diligence enough in
reading and giving the prescriptions. Therefore, the decision is right and just
in favor of the respondent to be entitled for the damages.