Case # 1. Estipona v.

lobrigo

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter
a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of
the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender
and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all
violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon

the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.

HELD:

YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive
and Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-
equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court
asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to
the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate,
the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is
exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.
Case # 6. Villagracia v sharia

FACTS: Roldan E. Mala, who purchased a 300 sqm parcel of land, filed an action to
recover the possession of the parcel of land with respondent Shari’a Court. Roldan
alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim and that he is the registered owner of the lot. He
prayed that respondent Court order Vivencio to vacate his property. Respondent
court caused service of summons on Vivencio but the latter failed to answer.
Vivencio argues that he is not a Muslim and that under Art 143, par 2 (b) of the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, Shari’s District Courts may only take
cognizance of real actions where the parties involved are muslims and therefore the
respondent court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

ISSUE: W/N a Shari’s Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where
one of the parties is a non-Muslim if the District Court decides the action applying the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

HELD: No. The case involves an action for recovery of possession of real property.
Shari’a District Courts may only take cognizance of a real action “wherein the parties
involved are Muslims”. Considering, that one of the parties involved is not a Muslim.
Respondent Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the case. The
proceedings before it are void.

Case # 11. Malayan v alibudbud

FACTS: Alibudbud was employed by Malayan as SVp for Sale Department, she was
issued a 2004 Honda Civic Sedan under Malayan’s Car Financing Plan on the
condition that: 1. She must continuously stay and serve Malayan’s for at least 3 full
years from date of availment of Car Financing Plan, and 2. In case, of resignation,
retirement or termination before 3-year period, she shall pay in full 100% share of
Malayan and outstanding balance of cost of vehicle. Alibudbud was dismissed and
demanded to surrender the possession of car but was refused. Malayan filed a
complaint for replevin before RTC of Manila and prayed for seizure of car.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC properly took cognizance of the Replevin case;

HELD: YES, the RTC properly took cognizance of the Replevin case. The
relationship of the parties is that of debtor and creditor. Malayan's demand for
Alibudbud to pay the 50% company equity over the car or, to surrender its
possession, is civil in nature. The trial court's ruling also aptly noted the Promissory
Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage voluntarily signed by Alibudbud to secure her
financial obligation to avail of the car being offered under Malayan's Car Financing
Plan. The issue in the replevin action is separate and distinct from the illegal
dismissal case.
Case # 16. RIVIERA V CCA

FACTS: Riviera Golf, a domestic corporation entered into a Management Agreement

with CCA Holdings, B.V. (CCA Holdings). The Management Agreement was for a
period of five (5) yearsRiviera Golf initially paid the agreed fees, but defaulted in its
payment of the licensing fees and the reimbursement claims. Riviera Golf sent CCA
Holdings a letter informing the latter that it was pre-terminating the Management
Agreement

CCA Holdings protested the termination of the agreement and demanded that
Riviera Golf settle its unpaid management and royalty fees. Riviera Golf however
refused on the ground that CCA Holdings violated the terms of the agreement.

CCA Holdings filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 146, Makati City,
a complaint for sum of money with damages docketed as Civil Case No. 01-611 (first
complaint) against Riviera Golf. Subsequently, CCA Holdings again sent a letter to
Riviera Golf, this time, demanding the sum of US$390,768.00. As its demands went
unheeded, CCA Holdings filed another complaint for sum of money and damages
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-399 (second complaint) before Branch 57 of the RTC
of Makati City.

ISSUE: Whether the CCA Holdings violated the prohibitions against res judicata and
splitting a single cause of action when it filed the claim for damages for unrealized
profits

HELD: Yes. The Second Complaint is Barred by Res Judicata. Res judicata requires
the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2)
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between
the first and second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and
(c) identity of causes of action.

Case # 21. Paglaum Management and Development corp vs Union Bank (GR
179018)

Facts:

Union Bank filed this motion for reconsideration saying that restructuring agreement
is null and void because the borrower has not complied with the condition precedent
of the bank. It is also unenforceable because it was only between Health and Union
bank. Paglaum was a party only to the real estate mortgages and not in the
restructuring agreement. The venue is exclusively in Cebu City, and the assumption
of the RTC's jurisdiction was without basis.

ISSUE: whether Makati City is the proper venue to assail the foreclosure of the
subject real estate mortgage. This Court rules in the affirmative.
According to the Rules, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the court that
has jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated. In this case, all the
mortgaged properties are located in the Province of Cebu. Thus, following the
general rule, PAGLAUM and HealthTech should have filed their case in Cebu, and
not in Makati.
However, the Rules provide an exception, in that real actions can be commenced
and tried in a court other than where the property is situated in instances where the
parties have previously and validly agreed in writing on the exclusive venue
thereof. In the case at bar, the parties claim that such an agreement exists. The only
dispute is whether the venue that should be followed is that contained in the Real
Estate Mortgages, as contended by Union Bank, or that in the Restructuring
Agreement, as posited by PAGLAUM and HealthTech. This Court rules that the
venue stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement should be controlling.

Case # 26. VILLALON V LIRIO

Lirio and Semicon Integrated Electronics Corporation (Semicon) entered into a

contract of lease covering Lirio’s properties in Pasig City. Villalon, who was then
Semicon’s president and chairman of the board, represented the lessee corporation
in the lease contract. Prior to the expiration of the lease, Semicon terminated the
contract and allegedly left unpaid rentals, damages, and interest. Lirio demanded
payment but Semicon and Villalon failed to pay.Lirio filed a complaint for sum of
money with prayer for preliminary attachment against Semicon and Villalon. Lirio
alleged that Semicon and Villalon unjustly pre terminated the lease and failed to pay
the unpaid rentals despite demand. Lirio claimed that Villalon fraudulently and
surreptitiously removed Semicon’s equipment, merchandise, and other effects from
the leased premises, preventing him to exercise his right, among others, to take
inventories of these effects, merchandise, and equipment. Villalon filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against
him. He argued that he is not a real party-in-interest in the action as he is merely an
officer of Semicon. Villalon further contended that there was no competent allegation
in the complaint about any supposed wrongdoing on his part to warrant his inclusion
as a party defendant.

ISSUE: whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action against Villalon.

HELD: The complaint failed to state a cause of action court.

Even if we are to relax the rules of procedure and allow certiorari to substitute for the
lost appeal, the court still grant Villalon's appeal and reverse the CA's decision.

To recall, Lirio claims that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed
the complaint against Villalon by "whimsically and arbitrarily ignoring the basic
doctrines in piercing the veil of corporate fiction." A review of the allegations of the
complaint, however, would show that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it dismissed the complaint.

Case # 31. DO-ALL ,ETAL V SECURITY BANK

FACTS: Spouses Lim took a loan from Security Bank. Unable to pay on time, the
Lims assigned to the Bank their real property. The Bank offered to lease said
property to the Lims through the Do-All Metal Industries Inc (DMI). Months before the
lease was up, the Bank notified DMI that it was pre-terminating it. While negotiations
were ongoing, the Bank posted security guards at the said place and padlocked the
entrances. Because of this, DMI and Lims incurred damages then filed a complaint
with RTC Pasig for damages with prayer for the issuance of TRO or preliminary
injunction..

ISSUE: W/N RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint.

HELD: YES. The RTC acquired Jurisdiction over the action from the moment they
filed the original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the
same. Their non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims
did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.

Case # 36. GENTLE SUPREME PHILIPPINES (GSP) V CONSULTA

FACTS: GSP filed a collection case with application of preliminary attachment

against Consar Trading Corporation (CTC), its president Consulta and its VP
Sarayba before RTC of Pasig City from buying some merchandise but refused to
pay. Sheriff failed to serve the summons and copies of the complaint on any of
CTC’s authorized officers. He left copies of such documents with Canave who,
accordingly, was Sarayba’s secretary and an authorized representative of both
Sarayba and Consulta.

ISSUE: W/N there was a valid service of summons at defendant’s place of business.

HELD: Yes. There is valid substituted service of summons at defendant’s on

Consulta at his place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
According to the Sheriff’s return, which is prima facie evidence of the facts it states,
he served a copy of the complaint on Canave, an authorized representative of both
Consulta and Sarayba.

Case # 41. PADILLA V GLOBE

Facts: From the years 2005 to 2008, Philippine National Bank (PNB) entered into
several Contracts to Sell (CTS) Facility Agreements[2] with respondents Globe
Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation (Globe Asiatique) and Filmal Realty
Corporation (Filmal) represented by Delfin S. Lee and Dexter L. Lee, President and
Vice-President, respectively, of the two corporations. PNB thereby agreed to make
available to Globe Asiatique and Filmal CTS Facility in the amount not exceeding
Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to finance the purchase of certain
Accounts Receivables or the in-house installment receivables of respondents arising
from the sale of subdivision houses in their real estate/housing projects as evidenced
by contracts to sell. These availments were later increased to a total amount of One
Billion Two Hundred Million Pesos (P1,200,000,000.00).

Respondents defaulted in the payment of their outstanding balance and delivery to

PNB of transfer certificates of title corresponding to the assigned accounts
receivables, for which PNB declared them in default under the CTS Facility
Agreements. Subsequently, respondents made partial payments and made
proposals for paying in full its obligation to PNB as shown in the exchange of
correspondence between respondents and PNB. PNB made a formal and final
demand upon respondents to pay/settle the total amount of P974,377,159.10
representing their outstanding obligation. In the course of credit monitoring and
verification, PNB claimed it discovered 231 out of 240 Contracts to Sell to have
either inexistent addresses of buyers or the names of the buyers are non-existent or
both. Thereafter, PNB instituted Civil Case No. R-PSY-10-04228-CV (Philippine
National Bank v. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation, Filmal Realty
Corporation, Delfin S. Lee and Dexter L. Lee) for recovery of sum of money and
damages with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC of Pasay
City.

Issue:
whether or not a court can take cognizance of a compulsory counterclaim despite the
fact that the corresponding complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling:
Respondents are incorrect in arguing that petitioner adopted the wrong mode of
appeal,... petitioner raises the lone issue of whether the Pasig City RTC was correct
in refusing to hear her counterclaims after the dismissal of respondents' complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.
petitioner's counterclaim for damages raised in her answer before the Pasig City
RTC is compulsory, alleging suffering and injury caused to her as a consequence of
the unwarranted filing of the baseless complaint... the RTC of Pasig City should have
allowed petitioner's counterclaim to proceed notwithstanding the dismissal of
respondents' complaint, the same being compulsory in nature and with its cause not
eliminated by such dismissal.
petitioner was hailed to a separate court (Pasig City RTC) even while the dispute
between PNB and respondents was still being litigated, and she already incurred
expenses defending herself

Case # 46. Navarro v ermita

FACTS: Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part
of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality for not being in
compliance with the population or the land area requirements of the Local
Government Code under Sec. 461. Previous decisions relating to this case declared
the creation of the province as unconstitutional.

Issue:

Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional?

Held: YES

. SC now looked at the central policy considerations in the creation of provinces.

They compared the LGC provisions on the creation of municipalities and cities and
how they allow an exception to the land area requirement in cases of non-contiguity
as provided for under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC.SC concluded that it must
have been the intent of the legislators to extend such exception to provinces
especially considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago. In
fact, while such exemption was absent under Section 461 of the LGC (provision
relating to creation of provinces), such was incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus
correcting the congressional oversight in said provision and reflecting the true
legislative intent. Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction
which could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose
of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the
land area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity

Case # 51. RE: letter complaint of fabiana

FACTS: The case is about the claim for death benefits by the heirs of the late Marlon
Fabiana against his former manning agent Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (MMC)
and its principal Air Sea Holiday. Basically, Merita, the widow, filed an administrative
case against CA Presiding Justice Reyes, et al, for having defied the resolution
promulgated by the SC in the case Heirs of Fabiana v MMC. In his case, Heirs
appeal to CA to question NLRC’s Jurisdiction to take the appeal (First Petition).
MMC also appeals to CA (Second Appeal).

Heirs moved to dismiss the second petition as the decision of the first petition
rendered it moot. CA denied the motion to dismissed alleging that it is not true that
the petition here has been rendered moot.

ISSUE: W/N the CA willfully disobeyed the decision in the first petition.

HELD: No. In administrative proceedings, the burden of substantiating the charges

falls on the complainant who must prove her allegations in the complaint by
substantial evidence. Here, the allegation of willful disobedience against respondent
CA justices was unsubstantiated and baseless. The CA said that the issues raised in
the first petition were limited to the NLRC’s jurisdiction over the appeal by MMC and
its principal, and to the reduction of the amounts awarded as moral and exemplary
damages

Case # 56. SHIMIZU V MAGSALIN

Facts: The petition filed a complaint against both Magsalin and FGU Insurance.
The complaint sought Two Million Three Hundred Twenty-Nine Thousand One
Hundred Twenty Four Pesos and Sixty Centavos (php 2, 329,124.60) actual
damages for the breach of contract.

FGU Insurance was duly served with summons. RTC denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration, prompting the latter to elevate its case to the CA via a Rule 41
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the Appellate Court has Jurisdiction to determine the merit of the
appeal which involves both questions of law and Facts.

Held:

The dismissal order is void. The appeal was property filed under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court. The instant petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the CA are
reversed and set aside.Petitioner’s complaint is ordered Reinstated for further
proceedings. NO COSTS.

Case # 61. San Lorenzo ruiz v baying

FACTS: Petitioner, as seller, and respondent as buyer, entered into a “contract to

Sell” of a lot. Upon full payment of the monthly amortization on the purchased lot,
respondent demanded from petitioner the execution of the deed of absolute sale and
the lot’s title but the latter failed to deliver. Respondent filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against the petitioners before the HLURB and it ruled in
favor of respondent. Petitioners appealed to the OP but was dismissed for having
filed out of time. Petitioners moved to reconsider and argued that the”fresh period
rule” should be applied to their case.

ISSUE: W/N the fresh period rule in Neypes applies

HELD: The fresh period rule in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals. In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision
of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in
nature; thus, the “fresh period rule” in Neypes does not apply.

Case # 66. CRUZ V MANILA INTL AIRPORT

FACTS: Cruz filed before the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Pasig City a complaint for
breach of contract against respondent Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
for the establishment of a commercial arcade for sublease to other businesses. She
averred that MIAA failed to inform her that part of the leased premises is subject to
an easement of public use. As a result, she was not able to obtain a building permit
as well as a certificate of electrical inspection from the Manila Electric Company,
leading to her consequent failure to secure an electrical connection for the entire
leased premises.

Due to the lack of electricity, Cruz’s tenants did not pay rent; hence, she was unable
to pay her own rental obligations to MIAA from December 2004 onwards causing her
to suffer actual damages in the amount of ₱633,408.64.10. MIAA filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the following grounds: (a) violation of the certification requirement against
forum shopping under Section 5,Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, given that the lease
contract subject of the Pasig case is the same actionable document subject of Civil
Case No. 1129918 which is a complaint for partial annulment of contract also filed by
Cruz before the RTC of Manila, Branch 1; and (b) improper venue, since in the
complaint for annulment of contract, as well as the verification/certification and the
annexes attached there to, it is indicated that Cruz is a resident of 506, 2nd Street,
San Beda Subdivision, San Miguel, Manila.

ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Cruz’s appeal on the basis of
improper venue

HELD: The Court finds that the CA committed a reversible error in sustaining the
dismissal of the Pasig case on the ground of improper venue because the same was
not an error raised by Cruz who was the appellant before it. Pursuant to the above-
mentioned principles, the CA cannot take cognizance of MIAA’s position that the
venue was improperly laid since, being the appellee, MIAA’s participation was
confined to the refutation of the appellant’s assignment of errors. As MIAA’s interest
was limited to sustaining the RTC-Pasig City’s judgment, it cannot, without pursuing
its own appeal, deviate from the pronouncements made therein. In particular,
records bear out that the RTC-Pasig City, while granting MIAA’s motion to dismiss,
found the latter’s argument on improper venue to be erroneous. Hence, given that
the said conclusion was not properly contested by MIAA on appeal, the RTC-Pasig
City’s ruling on the matter should now be deemed as conclusive. Corollary, the CA
should not have taken this ground into consideration when it appreciated the case
before it. By acting otherwise, it therefore committed a reversible error, which
thereby warrants the reversal of its Decision

Case # 71. Dare Adventure Farm Corporation vs CA

G.R. No. 161122 September 24, 2012

Facts: The petitioner acquired a parcel of land with an area of 65,100 square meters
situated in San Roque, Lilo-an, Metro Cebu known as lot 7531-part (the property)
through a deed of absolute sale executed on July 28, 1994 between the petitioner,
as vendee, and Agripina R. Goc-ong (a respondent herein), Porferio Goc-ong,
Diosdado Goc-ong, Crisostomo Goc-ong, Tranquilino Goc-ong, Naciancena Goc-
ong and Avelino Goc-ong (collectively, the Goc-ongs), as vendors. The petitioner
later on discovered the joint affidavit executed on June 19, 1990 by the Goc-ongs,
whereby the Goc-ongs declared that they were the owners of the property, and that
they were mortgaging the property to Felix Ng, married to Nenita N. Ng, and Martin
T. Ng, married to Azucena S. Ng (collectively, the Ngs) to secure their obligation
amounting to P 648,000.00, subject to the condition that should they not pay the
stipulated 36-monthly installments, the Ngs would automatically become the owners
of the property. With the Goc-ongs apparently failing to pay their obligation to the
Ngs as stipulated, the latter brought on January 16, 1997 a complaint for the
recovery of a sum of money, or, in the alternative, for the foreclosure of mortgage in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, in Mandaue City (RTC) only against respondent
Agripina R. Goc-ong.4 The action was docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2838.

Issue: Whether or not annulment of judgement if the proper remedy for the
petitioner.

Held: No. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional

in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if
the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a
court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being
exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties
aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted
safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that
the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards
cannot prosper.

It is elementary that a judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the
parties and those who are their successors in interest by title after the
commencement of the action in court.

Case # 76. LIM V LAZARO

FACTS: Lim filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment before the RTC, seeking to recover from respondents
Lazaro the sum of Php 2, 160, 000.00. RTC granted the writ. Parties agreed into
compromise agreement. Sps Lazaro agreed to pay the amount plus interest. Lazaros
filed Omnibus Motion seeking to lift the writ and granted by the RTC.

ISSUE: W/N the writ was properly lifted.

HELD: Yes. Preliminary attachment is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own
sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to
be granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the
main action. Attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the
action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where
personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.

Case # 81. Bank of commerce v planters

FACTS:

First set of CB Bills: RCBC was the registered owner of 7 Central Bank (CB) bills
with a total face value of 70M. These CB bills was sold and transferred to different
banks which all in all, the BOC acquired the first set of seven CB bills.

Second set of CB bills: the RCBC, as registered owner, (i) sold two CB bills with a
total value of 20M to the PDB and (ii) delivered to the PDB the corresponding
Detached Assignment. On even date, the PDB delivered to Bancap the two CB bills.
In turn, Bancap sold the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the
Philippines, which in turn sold it to the BOC.

PDB informed the OIC of the BSP’s Govt Securities Department (Nuqui) of the
PDB’s claim over these CB bills based on the Detached ASssignment in its
possession. The PDB requested the BSP to record its claim on account on imperfect
negotiations but Nuqui denied the request. BSP asked that an interpleader which the
Court grants. PDB filed an omnibus motion questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over
BOC’s counterclaims. RTC dismissed the PDB’s petition, the BOC’s counterclaim
and the BSP’s counter claim.
ISSUE: W/N the Ruling of RTC is correct

HELD: No. The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a person

against double vexation in respect of a single liability. It requires, as an
indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or
may be made against the stakeholder who claims no interest whatever in the subject
matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.
Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single
proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the
possibility of having to pay more than once on a single liability.

Case # 86. City govt of baguio v masweng

FACTS: In pursuance of the final decision in GR No180206, petitioner issued the

subject demolition advices for the enforcement of Demolition Order No. 33 against
Ampaguey Sr, et al and Demolition Order No. 83 against Daluyen Sr, et al, all in
Busol Watershed, Baguio City. The aforesaid individuals filed petition for
injunctionfor recognition of ancestral land claims with prayer for TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondent in his capacity issued TRO and preliminary
injunction on both cases.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the
subject TRO and Writs.

HELD: Yes. Said orders clearly contravene the court’s ruling in GR no. 180206 that
owners of houses and structures covered by the demolition orders issued by
petitioner are not entitled to the injunctive relief previously granted by respondent.
The court finds that petitioners and private respondents present the very same
arguments and counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the
fencing of the Busol Watershed Reservation.

Case # 91. NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY

FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric
Power Plant Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction
of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus
River to the hydroelectric plants.

On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a
prayer for just compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the
agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their
land had also become an unsafe place for habitation, forcing them and their workers
to relocate to safer grounds.

ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation
RULING: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property
taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the
power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.

The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for
an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are
clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is
liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It
is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need
not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. This is so because in this case, the
nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use.
Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of
the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the
property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value

Case # 96. Jose v Alfuerto

FACTS: The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo
Chua Sing located in Parañaque City. Sing then leased the property to petitioner
Jose. The contract of lease was neither notarized nor registered with the Parañaque
City Registry of Deeds. There are occupants already occupying the property even
before the lease contract was executed. Sing and Jose signed the lease contract
and demanded in writing that said property be vacated and pay monthly rental but
respondents refused to do so. Jose then filed an ejectment case before MeTC of
Parañaque.

ISSUE: W/N the Court can treat an ejectment case as an accion publiciana or accion
reinvindicatoria.

HELD: No. The Court cannot treat an ejectment case as an accion publiciana or
accion reinvindicatoria. The court cannot simply take the evidence presented before
the MeTC in an ejectment case and decide it as an accion publiciana or accion
reinvindicatoria for these cases are different and not interchangeable. Forcible entry
must be filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the real property. Former is
concerned with the issue of the right to the physical possession of the property while
the latter’s subject of litigation is the better right to possession over the real property.
The former is filed in the MTC and summary action, while the latter’s plenary action
in the RTC.