Republic of the Philippines Navotas Fish Port Complex (NFPC) is hereby re-assigned and designated as Acting Port Manager of

SUPREME COURT the Iloilo Fish Port Complex.

THIRD DIVISION
Mr. Illera and Engr. Cosejo should immediately clear themselves of their administrative accountabilities
before proceeding to their new place of assignment.

G.R. No. 147530 June 29, 2005 This Order shall remain effective until revoked in writing by the undersigned.

PABLO B. CASIMINA, then General Manager of the Philippine Fisheries Development (SGD.) PABLO B. CASIMINA
Authority, petitioner, General Manager
vs.
HON. EMILIO B. LEGASPI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC of Iloilo, Branch 22 and
EMMANUEL T. ILLERA, respondents. On March 22, 2000, private respondent sent a memorandum2 to petitioner praying for a reconsideration
of the above order. He wrote –
DECISION
22 March 2000
CORONA, J.:
MEMORANDUM
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the nullification of the
decision dated August 18, 2000 of Hon. Emilio B. Legaspi, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of F O R: The General Manager, PFDA
Iloilo City, Branch 22 in Civil Case No. 00-26187, directing petitioner to desist from giving effect to the
re-assignment of private respondent from his permanent station in Iloilo City to the Quezon City office. T H R U: The Asst. General Manager, PFDA

The facts follow. F R O M: The Port Manager, PFDA-IFPC

Private respondent Emmanuel T. Illera was the Port Manager of the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex (IFPC)
while petitioner Pablo B. Casimina was the then General Manager of the Philippine Fisheries
Development Authority (PFDA) with offices in Quezon City.
On March 17, 2000, petitioner Casimina issued Special Order No. 821 re-assigning private respondent
from Iloilo to the central office in Quezon City:
17 March 2000
SUBJECT: REASSIGNMENT
In the late afternoon of 21 March 2000, S.O. no. 82 s. 2000 was faxed to my office. I was surprised
when my staff gave this communication to me the next day because considering my transfer or any
employees transfers for that matter – would have far reaching official and personal consequences as
well, I expected that this matter should have at least first been discussed with me. As it is I do not know
for what reasons if any I am being reassigned or even what I am supposed to be doing in your office
when I get there. The S.O. itself is silent on these matters.

SPECIAL ORDER My situation becomes quite ironic when we look at S.O. no. 81 s. 2000 which is dated 14 March 2000.
Before this Order referring to Ms. Irma Catain’s detail to Central Office was even prepared, Ms. Catain
first talked to you, me and Atty. Paz to whose office she will be assigned. When we accepted her
No. 82 personal reasons for reassignment our offices worked out the details of her transfer and so the Special
Series of 2000 Order was issued. If you will recall, last 18 January 2000 an undated S.O. No. 024 was issued
transferring Engr. P. Zapanta, the IFPC Acting EMD chief to General Santos and no prior consultation
Subject: REASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL was also done. I thought with the procedure observed in Ms. Catain’s case all that was behind us.

In the exigency of the service, Mr. EMMANUEL T. ILLERA, Port Manager of the Iloilo Fish Port In view therefore of the above I am requesting that S.O. No. 82 s.2000 be reconsidered.
Complex (IFPC) is hereby reassigned to the Central Office of the General Manager effective 03 April
2000. To assume responsibility of over-all port administration, Engr. TITO C. COSEJO, Port Manager,
(SGD.) EMMANUEL T. ILLERA
On March 29, 2000, petitioner issued a memorandum 3 to private respondent stating therein the reason
for the re-assignment. He explained –
29 March 2000
MEMORANDUM
T O: The Port Manager, IFPC
F R O M: The General Manager
SUBJECT: Reassignment to Central Office
Your response dated 22 March 2000 to Special Order No. 82 Series of 2000 regarding your
reassignment to the Central Office is noted.
While in the Central Office, you are expected to help review and formulate credit and collection policies
that would negate the accumulation of uncollected accounts receivables, in addition to the other duties
that may be assigned to you in the interest of the service.
In this connection, you are hereby ordered to cease and desist from the further performance of your
duties as Port Manager of the Iloilo Fish Port Complex effective 03 April 2000 and to assume duties and
responsibilities as stated.
For strict compliance.
(SGD.) PABLO B. CASIMINA
After receiving the memorandum, private respondent immediately filed a case for injunction with prayer
for temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner in the RTC of Iloilo,
Branch 22 docketed as Civil Case No. 00-26187, to restrain petitioner from transferring him to the
central office in Quezon City.
On April 14, 2000, petitioner, through counsel, filed an omnibus motion for the dismissal of the
complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over his person and the subject matter, and lack of
cause of action. He averred that he never received any summons or copy of the complaint against him,
hence, the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. He further contended that the case
involved personnel movement of a government employee in the public service and should have been
appealed to the Civil Service Commission instead of the regular courts.
The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint against him and granted the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by private respondent ordering petitioner to "desist from giving effect to
the re-assignment of plaintiff (herein private respondent) from his permanent station in Iloilo City to the
Quezon City office."4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but it was denied, hence, this appeal. He
raises the following as the issues for our consideration:
A. Whether or not public respondent, Hon. Emilio B. Legaspi, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 22, exercised grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in deciding the case when the said
trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and the subject matter
of the case;
B. Whether or not the instant case should be dismissed for lack of cause of action on the
ground of private respondent’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 5
Petitioner contends that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because the
summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was not personally served on him. He argues that the
summons was served by the sheriff in the PFDA office in the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex while his office
was in Quezon City. He further contends that when Assistant Government Corporate Counsel Reynaldo
R. Tansioco, Government Corporate Attorney Ruben S. de la Paz and Government Corporate Attorney
Mariano C. Alojado appeared in court during the hearing of the motion for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction on April 18, 2000, they did so only to inform the court that they had filed an omnibus motion to
dismiss the complaint against petitioner on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person and over
the subject matter of the case.
We find the petition meritorious.
A court acquires jurisdiction over a person either through a valid service of summons or the person’s
voluntary appearance in court. A court must necessarily have jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be
bound by a court decision.6
Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. 7
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such
writ is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. 8 As a rule, summons
should be personally served on the defendant.9 It is only when summons cannot be served personally
within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to.10 The Rules specify two
modes for effecting substituted service of summons, to wit:
a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
 b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.11
Here, petitioner never received the summons against him, whether personally or in his office. The
records show that petitioner’s official address as the General Manager of the Philippine Fisheries
Development Authority (PFDA) was in Quezon City. Yet, the summons, together with a copy of the
complaint, was served not in his Manila office but in PFDA’s Iloilo branch office and received by the
records receiving officer there. We have held that the failure to faithfully, strictly and fully comply with
the requirements of substituted service renders the service ineffective. 12
In ruling that there was a valid service of summons, respondent judge "presumed that the said Records
Receiving Officer (was) authorized to receive the communication or court processes addressed to the
defendant."13 He further surmised and held that:
One thing sure is, he forwarded it to their Manila, Quezon City Central Office. In fact, Engr. Tito Cosejo
who briefly acted as the Department Manager of the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex, appeared in Court
during the summary hearing on the plaintiff’s prayer for the issuance of the TRO on April 4, 2000 and
informed the Court that the summons was received by their Central Office when defendant was on his
way to the province. There was therefore substantial compliance of the rule on service of summons.
We disagree.
The doctrine of substantial compliance requires that for there to be a valid service of summons, actual
receipt of the summons by the defendant through the person served must be shown. 14 We further
require that where there is substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who
received the summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom petitioner had a relation of
confidence ensuring that the latter would receive or would be notified of the summons issued in his
name.15 None of these was observed in the case at bar.
We cannot infer actual receipt of summons by petitioner from the fact that the government corporate
counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case against him and Mr. Cosejo appeared on his behalf during
the summary hearing for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to ask for the postponement of
the case. It is well-settled that a party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the
jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalidity of summons, among others, cannot be
considered to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.16 Even the assertion of affirmative
defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, cannot be considered a
waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.17
Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, he could not have been
bound by the decision of respondent judge ordering him to desist from transferring private respondent
from his station in Iloilo City to the central office in Quezon City. Any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal, before this Court.
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, we agree with petitioner that this case falls
within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because it involves the movement of
government personnel to promote order and efficiency in public service. The 1987 Constitution
specifically mandates that:
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merits
and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President
and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.18 (emphasis ours)
Personnel actions, i.e., appointments, promotions, transfers, re-assignments, etc., are specifically
provided for in Section 26 (3), Chapter 5, Book V, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292, or the
Administrative Code of 1987. Thus,
Section 26. Personnel Actions. – xxx any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the
civil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through
certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, re-employment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and
separation. All personnel actions shall be in accordance with such rules, standards, and regulations as
may be promulgated by the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Transfer. A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level, or
salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment.
It shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which case,
the employee concerned shall be informed of the reason therefore. If the employee believes that
there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the Commission. (emphasis
ours)
xxx xxx xxx
While we are aware that the power to transfer and re-assign government employees from one office to
another can be abused by some unscrupulous government officials, not all transfers, however, amount
to removal from office.19
… (N)either does illegality attach to the transfer of an employee from his assigned station to the main
office, effected in good faith and in the interest of the service pursuant to Sec. 32 of the Civil Service
Act.20
Here, petitioner ordered the transfer of private respondent from the Iloilo branch to the main office in
Manila in the exigency of the service and in order to
… help review and formulate credit and collection policies that would negate the accumulation of
uncollected accounts receivables, in addition to the other duties that may be assigned to (him) in the
interest of the service.21

There is nothing to show from the facts presented to us that the order transferring private respondent to
Manila was done in bad faith or motivated by ill will. We thus find his refusal to transfer to the main
office to be without basis.

In any event, if private respondent believed that his transfer was unjustified, his remedy was to appeal
to the Civil Service Commission.22 It was therefore wrong for the trial court to take cognizance of the
case without private respondent first exhausting the administrative remedies available to him.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision in Civil
Case No. 00-26187, and the order denying the motion for its reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 70661 April 9, 1987
FILMERCO COMMERCIAL CO., INC., SPOUSES JAIME and ANA MARIA MIGUEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; HON. TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., in his official capacity
as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 147, Makati
Metro Manila; PIOQUINTO VILLAPANA, in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of the Office of
the Provincial Sheriff, National Capital Judicial Region, Makati, Metro Manila; and BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents.
Tomacruz, Manguiat & Associates for petitioners.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The main issue in this petition is whether or not the petitioners were served valid summons so as to
bring their within the jurisdiction of the court.
Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc., (Filmerco) obtained two separate loans from the Bank of Philippine
Islands (BPI) on November 26, 1982 and December 26, 1982 respectively. As security for the payment
of the obligation stated in the promissory notes, spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel executed a deed
of continuing suretyship wherein the Miguels bound themselves jointly and solidarily with Filmerco for
the payment of the latter's obligation under the loan-accounts.
The loans remained outstanding even after they became due and demandable. Hence, on May 5,1983,
BPI filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 2807 for recovery of a sum of money against Filmerco
and spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Rizal.
Upon motion of the plaintiff, the defendants were d in default for failure to file an answer within the
reglementary period. The plaintiff was then allowed to present its evidence ex-parte after which the
lower court on June 11, 1984 rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay, jointly and severally,
the former:
a) the sum of P308,525.17 plus 10% interest per annum and 12% penalty fee per
annum from May 21, 1984 until the amount is fully paid;
b) the sum equivalent to 20% of the total amount due as and for attorney's fees;
c) to pay the costs of suit. (p.52, Rollo)
On the ground that the period to appeal expired without any decision having been appealed, the plaintiff
filed a motion for execution of judgment before the lower court. This motion was granted and a writ of
execution was issued against Filmerco and the Miguels.
Pursuant to the writ of execution, respondent Sheriff Villapana levied on and attached alleged properties
of Filmerco and the Miguels. These properties were scheduled for sale on September 20, 1984.
On September 25, 1984, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the decision, writ of execution,
notice of levy/attachment and to restrain the holding of the auction sale. The motion was premised on
the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants because no valid summons was
served on them.
On November 26, 1984, after opposition to motion, reply, rejoinder and sub-rejoinder had been duly
submitted, the lower court issued an order denying the aforesaid motion.
On December 3, 1984, while the public auction of the attached properties was in progress, the
defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 26, 1984 order.
Without waiting for the resolution of the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, the defendants filed with
the Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, injunction and preliminary
restraining order against the lower court's decision and orders.
The appellate court dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners submit that no valid summons was served upon them. Therefore, they contend that the
lower court had not acquired jurisdiction over their persons thus resulting in the nullity of its decision.
According to the sheriff's return dated September 7, 1983, summons and copy of the complaint were
not served on the petitioners at 31 Sta. Escolastica Street, Pasay City, their given principal place of
business and had to be returned to the court unserved for the reason that the "defendants have already
vacated the premises and/or addresses more than a year ago and no definite information could be had
regarding their present whereabouts." Three separate summons for each of the defendants were
addressed to 31 Sta. Scholastics Street, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
Upon motion of the private respondent (plaintiff in the case) the lower court issued alias summons.
According to the sheriff's return dated March 31, 1984, summons were duly served upon "defendant-
spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel at No. 18, Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, thru Mrs. Angle Morger, a person residing therein of suitable age and
discretion to receive service of that nature and who received the said court processes for and in behalf
of the defendants but refused to sign." It was noted therein that the defendant spouses are "duly
served" but that the other defendant Filmerco was "not and could not be served"and the summons
pertaining to it was " returned unserved."
Petitioner spouses, Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel contend that the substituted service of summons upon
their persons thru Mrs. Angle Morger at No. 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila was in- valid for the following reasons: (1) at the time of the service they were
not residents of the said address, and (2) Mrs. Angle Morger was not authorized to receive papers or
documents for them. They submitted affidavits of Angle Morger to prove their point.
There can be no dispute that service of summons upon the defendant is necessary in order that a court
may acquire jurisdiction over his person. Any judgment without such service in the absence of a valid
waiver is null and void. (Keister v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209).
Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of court, summons must be served on the
defendant. However, when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after
efforts to locate him have failed, substituted service may be made.
In the case at bar, there is no question that personal service of summons upon the defendants could not
be made because they moved out from their given address and their whereabouts were unknown as
indicated in the sheriff's return. Hence, the court resorted to substituted service of summons provided
for under Section 8, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 8. Substituted service. — If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person
in charge thereof.
In the case of Keister v. Navarro (supra), we construed this rule as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
... [U]nder the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service
must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than
that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective. (Ibid., pp. 1053-1054).
Indeed, the constitutional requirement of due process requires that the service be
such as may be reasonably expected to give the desired notice to the party of the
claim against him. (Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186; Dy Reyes v. Ortega, 16 SCRA 903)
xxx xxx xxx
... The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of
service, hence it is not sufficient "to leave the copy at defendant's former dwelling
house, residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after his removal
therefrom." (72 C.J.S. 1059) They refer to the place where the person named in the
summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be
temporarily out of the country at the time. Similary, the terms "office" or "regular place
of business" refer to the office or place of business of defendant at the time of service.
... (at p. 215)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we find that no valid service of summons upon the
defendant spouses could be effected thru Mrs. Angle Morger. In her affidavits, Mrs. Morger manifested
that she and her husband are the bona fide residents of 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila; that they leased the said premises from the owner thereof as evidenced by a
contract of lease dated August 8, 1983; that they have been occupying the premises since September
1, 1983; that on March 31, 1984, Sheriff Villapana attempted to serve the official summons and a copy
of a complaint against spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel and Filmerco Commercial Inc.; that she
informed the sheriff that the Miguels do not reside in the place and that neither was said residence the
dwelling place of the Miguel spouses; that she does not know Filmerco, Inc.; that despite the fact that
she informed the sheriff that she is not authorized by the spouses and Filmerco to receive any papers
for them, the sheriff left, leaving some documents with her maid, Daday Lopez; that she did not affix her
signature on the documents being then served by the sheriff nor did the maid affix hers; that the
documents left by the sheriff with the maid were not even ascertained nor read by the affiant. Mrs.
Morger's manifestation is not refuted or rebutted.
Obviously, the address No. 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila was neither the "residence" nor the "dwelling house" of the petitioners at the time summons was
served upon them as contemplated by the Rules.
Moreover, Angle Morger is not a proper person with whom the copies of the summons could be left. The
sheriff 's return indicates that she refused to sign the summons and the same was returned to the court
unsigned. This fact adds credence to Angle Morger's manifestation about her informing the sheriff that
she was not authorized to receive papers in behalf of the defendant-spouses and that she refused to
receive them. We ruled in the case earlier cited:
xxx xxx xxx
... [T]he rule designates the persons to whom copies of the process may be left. The
rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with
whom the copy is left and the defendant and therefore, assumes that such person win
deliver the process to defendant or in some way give notice thereof. (Keister v.
Navarro, supra)
Mrs. Morger's manifestation negates any close relationship between herself and the defendant-spouses
to qualify her as representative of the former to receive summons in their behalf.
The private respondent merely relies on the sheriff's return that summons was duly served on the
spouses and states that to disregard the return would be disastrous as "self-serving affidavits" would be
preferred over the presumption of regularity in the discharge of official functions. It urges that the
sheriff's return should be given credence over the affidavit.
A sheriff's certification that he duly served summons on a defendant does not necessarily mean that he
validly served the summons. In this particular case, there is a strong showing that Mr. and Mrs. Jaime
Miguel are notresidents of 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa. The
respondent, itself, states that the spouses are hiding to escape their obligations. Sworn statements of
Mrs. Angle Morger assert that she and her husband are lessees of the premises and are the actual
residents therein. The respondents claim these statements are self-serving. Whether self-serving or not,
the fact remains that Mrs. Morger was seen by the sheriff as the then person in that house. The
respondents have absolutely no grounds, other than suspicions, for their contention that the Miguels
and not the Morgers are the actual residents at that address.
In the light of these facts, the appellate court's reliance on the sheriff's return that summons upon
defendant-spouses thru Angle Morger was "duly served" in consonance with the principle of
presumption in favor of regularity of performance of official functions of a public officer (Section 5, Rule
13, Rules of Court) has no basis.
With regards to the petitioner corporation, the sheriff's return categorically states that the alias summons
was not served upon the corporation. Moreover, the private respondent filed a motion to declare
defendant-spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel alone, in default without including the petitioner
corporation (Annex E, p. 64, Rollo)
These facts not withstanding the trial court declared all the defendants in default and rendered a
decision also against the petitioner corporation. This decision was affirmed by the appellate court which
applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction. The appellate court stated:
The records disclose that petitioner-spouses are both directors of respondent-
Corporation being the majority stockholder of FILMERCO (Annex "A," Comment). The
records, also, reveal that both petitioner-spouses and petitioner-corporation were
impleaded as party defendants in the civil case filed before the lower court. Hence,
petitioner-corporation cannot now claim to have been improperly served with
summons. This Court, therefore, finds justifiable reason for the lower court's order
piercing the veil of corporate fiction. ... (p. 56, rollo)
We have already found that there was no valid summons effected upon petitioner-spouses. Since, the
appellate court considered service of summons upon the petitioner-spouses as constituting service of
summons upon the petitioner-corporation, the inevitable conclusion is that no valid summons could
have been effected upon the petitioner-corporation.
Moreover, even if we assume that there was valid service of summons upon the petitioner-spouses, it
does not necessarily follow that there was also valid service of summons upon the petitioner-
corporation.
We have explained the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction in the following manner:
The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the
members and stockholders who compose it is recognized and respected in all cases
which are within reason and the law. (Borja v. Vasquez, 74 Phil. 56), When the fiction
is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the
evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or
perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, (Koppel
Phil. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496; Lidell & Co. v. Collector, G.R. No. L-9687, June 30, 1961;
Commissioner v. Norton & Harrison Company, G.R. No. L- 17618, Aug. 31, 1964; and
Guevarra, Phil. Corp. Law, 1961 ed., p. 7) the veil with which the law covers and
isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who compose it will be
drifted to allow for its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. (Villa Rey
Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845-857).
In effect, this doctrine refers to determination of liability and not to determination of jurisdiction.
This is so because the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only during the trial
of the case after the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the corporation. Hence, before this
doctrine can be applied, based on the evidence to be presented, it is imperative that the court must first
have jurisdiction over the corporation. For the court to acquire jurisdiction over a domestic corporation
such as the petitionercorporation, summons must be served upon it through the officers of the
corporation enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. There is not even a
semblance of any effort to serve summons upon an officer as such Since, the summons intended for
the petitioner-corporation was "not and could not be served" as certified in the sheriff's return, the lower
court never acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner-corporation. It follows that the judgment against the
petitioner-corporation is null and void
The allegations that the petitioners deliberately concealed their whereabouts to escape the payment of
just and valid obligations appear to have some basis. However, allegations such as these do not justify
the appellate court's upholding a judgment wherein the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants.
The private respondent has chosen to employ a procedure which is strictly in personam. As indicated in
the cases of Citizens Surety and Insurance, Inc. v. Melencio-Herrera (38 SCRA 369) and Magdalena
Estate, Inc. v. Nieto (125 SCRA 758) it is also possible to use proceedings in rem or quasi in rem to
achieve the same desired ends. There may be other ways which, if utilized, would insure that the courts
acquire jurisdiction over defendants in recovery of money cases but the shortcut method approved by
the respondent court is not one of them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The lower court's decision in Civil Case No.
2807 is SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for proper service of summons and trial.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164041. July 29, 2005
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and natural guardian, Armi A. Alba, and
ARMI A. ALBA, in her personal capacity, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROSENDO C. HERRERA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the February 27, 2004 decision2 and the May 14, 2004
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883, which dismissed petitioner’s original
action for annulment of judgment4of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, and denied the
motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The antecedent facts show that on October 21, 1996, private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a
petition5 for cancellation of the following entries in the birth certificate of "Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.", to
wit: (1) the surname "Herrera" as appended to the name of said child; (2) the reference to private
respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private
respondent to the child’s mother, Armi A. Alba (Armi) on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He
claimed that the challenged entries are false and that it was only sometime in September 1996 that he
learned of the existence of said birth certificate.
Private respondent alleged that he married only once, i.e., on June 28, 1965 with Ezperanza C. Santos
and never contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr. In support thereof, he
presented certifications from the Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City 6 and the National Statistics
Office,7 both stating that they have no record of marriage between private respondent and Armi.
On November 12, 1996, private respondent filed an amended petition, 8 impleading Armi and "all the
persons who have or claim any interest in th[e] petition." 9
On November 27, 1996, the trial court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing on January 24,
1997, and directed the publication and service of said order to Armi at her address appearing in the
birth certificate which is No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, and to the Civil Registrar of the City of
Manila and the Solicitor General. The full text of the order, reads:
In a verified Amended Petition for Correction of Entry, the Petitioner prays, inter alia, that the following
entries appearing in the subject Certificate of Live Birth be deleted:
1. All informations having reference to him as the father of the child mentioned therein;
2. The surname "Herrera" appended to the child’s name;
3. His alleged marriage with the natural mother of the child.
Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the Petition be set for hearing on January
24, 1997 at nine o’clock in the morning before this Branch at Rooms 447-449, Fourth Floor, Manila City
Hall. All interested parties are hereby notified of the said hearing and are ordered to show cause why
the Petition should not be granted.
Let a copy of this Order be published at the expense of the Petitioner, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila, and raffled pursuant to
P.D. 1079.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the City of Manila
with copies of the Petition and of this Order.
Let the same be likewise furnished the Private Respondent Armi Alba Herrera at the address indicated
in the subject Certificate of Live Birth.
SO ORDERED.10
On January 13, 1997, before the scheduled January 24, 1997 hearing, the trial court issued an
Amended Order11with substantially the same contents, except that the hearing was re-scheduled to
February 26, 1997. A copy of said Amended Order was published in "Today", a newspaper of general
circulation in Manila in its January 20, 27, and February 3, 1997 issues. Copies thereof were also sent
to Armi at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, on January 17, 1997, the Local Civil Registrar of Manila
and the Solicitor General.
At the scheduled hearing on February 26, 1997, the counsel from the Office of the Solicitor General
appeared but filed no opposition to the petition. Armi, on the other hand was not present. The return of
the notice sent to her had the following notation:
This is to certify that on January 17, 1997, the undersigned [process server] personally served a copy of
the Amended Order in Sp. Proc. No. 96-80512 dated January 13, 1997 to the private respondent, Armi
Alba Herrera at … 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, but failed and unavailing for reason that (sic),
private respondent is no longer residing at said given address.12
On April 1, 1997, the court a quo rendered a decision which became final and executory on June 2,
1997.13 The dispositive portion thereof, states:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such
a way that the entry under the name of the child, the surname Herrera, Jr.[,] is ordered deleted, and the
child shall be known as ROSENDO ALBA; and that the entry under the date and place of marriage, the
date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered deleted or cancelled.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila for proper correction and
entry.
SO ORDERED.14
Private respondent filed a motion15 for amendment of the decretal portion of the decision to include the
cancellation of all entries having reference to him as the father of petitioner minor. This was granted in
the August 11, 1997 order of the trial court as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such
a way that the entries under the name of the child, the surname Herrera, Jr., and the name of the father
Rosendo Caparas Herrera are ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as ROSENDO ALBA; and
the entry under the date and place of marriage, the date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong, MM is likewise
ordered deleted or cancelled.
SO ORDERED.16
On November 24, 2000, Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over their person. She
allegedly came to know of the decision of the trial court only on February 26, 1998, when San Beda
College, where her son was enrolled as a high school student, was furnished by private respondent with
a copy of a court order directing the change of petitioner minor’s surname from Herrera to Alba.
Armi averred that private respondent was aware that her address is at Unit 302 Plaza Towers
Condominium, 1175 Lorenzo Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, because such was her residence when she
and private respondent cohabited as husband and wife from 1982 to 1988; and her abode when
petitioner minor was born on March 8, 1985. Even after their separation, private respondent continued
to give support to their son until 1998; and that Unit 302 was conveyed to her by private respondent on
June 14, 1991 as part of his support to petitioner minor. According to Armi, her address i.e., No. 418
Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, as appearing in the birth certificate of their son, was entered in said
certificate through the erroneous information given by her sister, Corazon Espiritu. She stressed that
private respondent knew all along that No. 418 Arquiza St., is the residence of her sister and that he
deliberately caused the service of notice therein to prevent her from opposing the petition.
In his answer, private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his purported cohabitation
with Armi. He branded the allegations of the latter as "false statements coming from a polluted
source."17
On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding, among others, that
petitioner failed to prove that private respondent employed fraud and purposely deprived them of their
day in court. It further held that as an illegitimate child, petitioner minor should bear the surname of his
mother.18 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments may be annulled on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud. 19
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and her minor child
depends on the nature of private respondent’s action, that is, in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. An
action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed
against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant,
but its object is to subject that person’s interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. 20
Hence, petitions directed against the "thing" itself or the res,21 which concerns the status of a
person,22 like a petition for adoption,23 annulment of marriage,24 or correction of entries in the birth
certificate,25 as in the instant case, are actions in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. 26 The
service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction
but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.27
In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested the latter jurisdiction
over the res. Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry records affecting the
status or legitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court.28 Being a proceeding in rem,
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is therefore not required in the present case. It is
enough that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the publication thereof in a
newspaper of general circulation in Manila, sufficiently complied with the requirement of due process,
the essence of which is an opportunity to be heard. Said address appeared in the birth certificate of
petitioner minor as the residence of Armi. Considering that the Certificate of Birth bears her signature,
the entries appearing therein are presumed to have been entered with her approval. Moreover, the
publication of the order is a notice to all indispensable parties, including Armi and petitioner minor,
which binds the whole world to the judgment that may be rendered in the petition. An in rem proceeding
is validated essentially through publication.29 The absence of personal service of the order to Armi was
therefore cured by the trial court’s compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by
publication, thus:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, the trial court granted a petition for correction/change of entries in a
minor’s birth certificate to reflect the name of the minor’s real father as well as to effect the
corresponding change of her surname. In seeking to annul said decision, the other children of the
alleged father claimed that they are indispensable parties to the petition for correction, hence, the failure
to implead them is a ground to annul the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals denied the
petition which was sustained by this Court on the ground, inter alia, that while petitioner is indeed an
indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured by the publication of the order of hearing. Thus
– husband and wife in the condominium unit from 1982 to 1988 and because private respondent
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected
by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando
would affect her ward’s share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew
of Mary Joy’s existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be
cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be
affected by the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all
the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. The fact that Nadina amended
her petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates earnest effort on her part to comply with Section
3 as quoted above.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out
that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication,
thus:
Section 4. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fix the time and place for the hearing
of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent
judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have
been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. The Court of Appeals
correctly noted:
The publication being ordered was in compliance with, and borne out by the Order of January 7, 1985.
The actual publication of the September 22, 1983 Order, conferred jurisdiction upon the respondent
court to try and decide the case. While "nobody appeared to oppose the instant petition" during the
December 6, 1984 hearing, that did not divest the court from its jurisdiction over the case and of its
authority to continue trying the case. For, the rule is well-settled, that jurisdiction, once acquired
continues until termination of the case.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a
person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that
the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any
sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 30
Furthermore, extrinsic fraud, which was private respondent’s alleged concealment of Armi’s present
address, was not proven. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the
prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from
presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Here,
Armi contended that private respondent is aware of her present address because they lived together as
continued to give support to their son until 1998. To prove her claim, she presented (1) private
respondent’s title over the condominium unit; (2) receipts allegedly issued to private respondent for
payment of homeowner’s or association dues; (2) a photocopy of a January 14, 1991 deed of sale of
the subject unit in favor of Armi; and (3) the subsequent title issued to the latter. However, these
documents only tend to prove private respondent’s previous ownership of the unit and the subsequent
transfer thereof to Armi, but not the claimed live-in relationship of the parties. Neither does the sale
prove that the conveyance of the unit was part of private respondent’s support to petitioner minor.
Indeed, intimate relationships and family relations cannot be inferred from what appears to be an
ordinary business transaction.
Although the January 14, 1991 deed of sale 31 stated that Armi resides at 1175 L. Guerrero St., Ermita,
Manila, the same is not sufficient to prove that private respondent has knowledge of Armi’s address
because the former objected to the offer of the deed for being a mere photocopy. 32 The counsel for
petitioners even admitted that they do not have the original of the deed and that per certification of the
Clerk of Court, the Notary Public who notarized the deed of sale did not submit a copy of the notarized
document as required by the rules.33 The deed cannot thus be the basis of ascribing knowledge of
Armi’s address to private respondent inasmuch as the authenticity thereof was neither admitted by
private respondent nor proven by petitioners.
While Armi presented the alleged love letters/notes from private respondent, they were only attached as
annexes to the petition and not formally offered as evidence before the Court of Appeals. More
importantly, said letters/notes do not have probative value because they were mere photocopies and
never proven to be an authentic writing of private respondent. In the same vein, the affidavits 34 of Armi
and her sister, Corazon Espiritu, are of no evidentiary weight. The basic rule of evidence is that unless
the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must
be rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to
disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination.35 Inasmuch as Armi and her sister
were not presented before the Court of Appeals to affirm the veracity of their affidavits, the same are
considered hearsay and without probative value.
Ei incumbit probotio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. 36 Armi’s
claim that private respondent is aware of her present address is anchored on the assertion of a live-in
relationship and support to her son. Since the evidence presented by Armi is not sufficient to prove the
purported cohabitation and support, it follows that private respondent’s knowledge of Armi’s address
was likewise not proven. Thus, private respondent could not have deliberately concealed from the court
that which was not shown to be known to him. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed the
petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of failure to establish extrinsic fraud.

The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals in an action to annul a
judgment of a Regional Trial Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, where only questions of law may be raised. The resort of petitioner to the
instant civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is therefore erroneous. The special civil action
of certiorari will not be allowed as a substitute for failure to timely file a petition for review under Rule 45,
which should be instituted within 15 days37 from receipt of the assailed decision or resolution. The
wrong choice of remedy thus provides another reason to dismiss this petition.38

Finally, petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the trial court’s decision. In an
action for annulment of judgment, the petitioner must convince the court that something may indeed be
achieved should the assailed decision be annulled. 39 Under Article 17640 of the Family Code as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9255, which took effect on March 19, 2004, illegitimate children
shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they
may bear the father’s surname. In Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar,41 it was held that an illegitimate child
whose filiation is not recognized by the father, bears only a given name and his mother’s surname. The
name of the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is only when said child is
recognized that he may use his father’s surname, reflecting his status as an acknowledged illegitimate
child.

In the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is an illegitimate child
because she was never married to private respondent. Considering that the latter strongly asserts that
he is not the father of petitioner minor, the latter is therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such,
he must bear the surname of his mother.

In sum, the substantive and procedural aspects of the instant controversy do not warrant the annulment
of the trial court’s decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The February 27, 2004 decision and the May 14, 2004
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.