SOLID MANILA CORP. vs. BIO HONG TRADING CO.

- Easement and Servitudes

Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenement of which they form part, and even if they are possessed
of a separate juridical existence, they cannot be alienated from the tenement or mortgaged separately.

Note: In a personal servitude, there is no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement
pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. (Merger, which presupposes
ownership, is not possible.)

FACTS:

Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita. The same lies in the vicinity of another
parcel registered under Bio Hong Trading whose title came from a prior owner. In the deed of sale between
Bio Hong and the vendor, 900 sqm of the lot was reserved as an easement of way.

The construction of the private alley was annotated on Bio Hong’s title stating among other things "(6) That
the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; and (7)
that the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use the same,
and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for
the use thereof”

The petitioner claims that ever since, it (along with other residents of neighboring estates) made use of the
above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over
its protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.

On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent, to have
the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement.

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The trial court ordered Bi Hong to open the gates but the latter argued that the easement has been
extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the
property from its former owner.

CA reversed holding that an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the
private respondent's title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the property, "merger"
brought about an extinguishment of the easement.

Thus, Solid went to the SC alleging that the very deed of sale executed between the Bio Hong and the
previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the
parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding the sale.

[While the case was pending, Bio Hong asked the RTC to cancel the annotation in question, which it
granted subject to the final outcome of the prior case.]

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not easements may be alienated (sold) from the tenement or mortgaged separately

2) Whether or not the easement had been extinguished by merger.

HELD: NO to both

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1) The sale included the alley. The court rejected Solid’s contention that the alley was not included in the
sale. It was included but there was a limitation on its use-the easement. As a mere right of way, it cannot be
separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence. (Art. 617)

Even though Bio Hong acquired ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley –– as a result
of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon
and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the
public.

2) No genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent
corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient
estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger requires full ownership of both estates.

Note that The servitude in question is a personal servitude (established for the benefit of a community, or of
one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong). In a personal servitude, there is
therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a
dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Thus, merger could not have been possible.

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation, is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila,
The private respondent’s (de Guzman) title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of
sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way: a portion thereof measuring NINE
HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private
alley for the benefit of neighboring estates, this being duly annotated at the back of the
covering transfer Certificate of title per regulations of the Office of the City Engineer of
Manila and that the three meterwide portion of said parcel along the Pasig River, with an
area of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (179) SQUARE METERS, more or less, had actually
been expropriated by the City Government, and developed pursuant to the beautification
drive of the Metro Manila Governor. (p. 3, Record).
The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring
estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep,
until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent constructed
steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
ISSUE/ HELD: Whether or not an easement exists on the property even after the property
was sold. AFFIRMATIVE. Easement cannot be separated from the tenement and maintain an
independent existence.
RATIO DICIDENDI:
It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioner’s
contention that the deed of sale “excluded” it, because as a mere right-of-way, it cannot be
separated from the tenement and maintains an independent existence. Thus:
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or
passively belong.
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main
lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner’s claims, because as an easement precisely, it
operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right
to use (jus utendi).
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the
property –– including the disputed alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire
the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the
public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.

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The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no
genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent
corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant
and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen,
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requires full ownership of both estates.

In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense, indeed, a sham
one, because as we said, merger is not possible, and secondly, the sale unequivocally
preserved the existing easement. In other words, the answer does not, in reality, tender
any genuine issue on a material fact and cannot militate against the petitioner’s clear cause
of action.

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