War Paper Final

John Slosser
PSCI 471: War (Fall 2008)

Research Paper
27 October 2008
Word Count:2949
MIXING THE MILITARY WITH HUMANITARIAN AID

FOREIGN POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS AND CRITICISMS
Pledged:________________________________________________________________
1
MIXING THE MILITARY WITH HUMANITARIAN AID
INTRODUCTON
"Ultimately, one of the best weapons, one of the truest weapons that we have against
terrorism is to show the world the true strength of character and kindness of the
American people.” President George W. Bush, 10/11/01
A key development in international relations since the end of World War II, and
especially since the end of the Cold War, has been the extent to which leaders have
recognized humanitarian issues as a legitimate focus in U.S. foreign policy. This
recognition presents opportunities and challenges for traditional humanitarian aid efforts
and military involvement with humanitarian assistance, especially during armed conflict.1
In John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address, he argued that by fighting for the people "in the
huts and villages" of the world, the United States would help itself, because "if a free
society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich." 2 He
understood that effectively countering the current communist threat meant Washington
would need more than just a military answer. Strategic foreign policy also needed to
focus on development, democracy, and human rights. Kennedy created the Peace Corps
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to promote American
ideals. 3 These groups helped with an overall cold-war strategy that strengthened the
1
Natsios, Andrew. U.S. foreign policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse : Humanitarian Relief in
Complex Emergencies (Praeger: Westport, CT, 1997) p. 21
2
Nossel,Suzanne. Smart Power. Foreign Affairs March 2004 - April 2004
3
2
United States' influence both overseas and at home. Using the military in a humanitarian
capacity is one form of peacetime use of defense assets. During a military conflict
however, the foreign policy implications of military/humanitarian interaction are often
more partisan and therefore more risky. 4 A harsh reality of modern warfare is that
soldiers, civilians, and aid workers are increasingly intermingled during armed conflicts.
U.S. military forces must consider a range of civilian factors throughout the course of
their military operations while civilian aid groups struggle to save lives and remain
neutral.5 If they are to be successful in their respective missions, policy makers, aid
groups, and military commanders must collaborate in ways that take into account the
complexities of warfare, the inherent mission of aid groups, and the strategic use of the
military as an essential part of U.S. foreign policy.
Can traditional civilian humanitarian action with its emphasis on neutrality and
impartiality ever effectively mix with the military, especially when the humanitarian
assistance is performed by military forces in the context of armed conflict? This is a
foreign policy question that is not only important for deciding the proper use of the
military, but also effectively helping civilian aid agencies, and civilians who may depend
on them.
THESIS STATEMENT
4
5
3
Policymakers must seek out opportunities where idealism and realism intersect and
push for policies that reinforce U.S. interests.6 A nation’s use of military forces outside
of its borders is an execution and interpretation of that countries foreign policy. This
holds true whether those forces are engaged in war or peacetime operations. The purpose
of this paper is to highlight the foreign policy advantages and disadvantages of mixing
military forces with humanitarian assistance, and show that such mixing is indeed a
worthwhile (but risky) tool.
BACKGROUND
“The key lesson I have learned in nearly forty years of humanitarian work… is that in
between theory and practice is a very important field called politics. Like any other field,
aid work is intertwined with politics. We must always be conscious of this.” -Dr. Bernard
Kouchner, co-founder,Médecins Sans Frontiers.7
Military humanitarian assistance is an effort to create strategic and tactical benefits
through humanitarian aid by military personnel.8 Generally speaking, humanitarian
assistance is meant to save lives that are at imminent risk as a result of a natural disaster
or armed conflict, which is why such aid has a character of immediacy to it.9 This should
not be confused with aid in the form of other forms of civilian developmental assistance,
6
7
-Dr. Bernard Kouchner, co-founder,Médecins Sans Frontiers,March 2, 2004 Introduction In October
2003, the Feinstein International Famine Center (FIFC)
8
Brigety, Reuben E. II Ph.D. Assistant Professor. Department of Public and International Affairs, George
Mason University “The Ethics of Military Humanitarian Operations”Presentation for International Studies
Association Convention Honolulu, HI 1-6 March 2005
9
4
which is designed to address the structural causes of poverty in society over a much
longer period of time than humanitarian assistance. Generally speaking, major
developmental projects do not take place in the context of armed conflict. While the U.S.
military has coined the term “civil-military operations,” the use of humanitarian
assistance by military forces to achieve operational and strategic ends has been dubbed
“instrumentalization” by some international civilian aid officials. They define
instrumentalization as the “integration by some state actors of humanitarian action into
the range of tools available to them in the conduct of their campaign against terrorist
activities.”10
The idea that the military should engage in humanitarian aid is not new. What is new,
however, is that they are; increasingly publicizing their efforts, serving as combatants in
the same theater in which they are providing assistance, supporting their own tactical and
strategic objectives, and working in relatively close proximity to civilian aid agencies
who try to remain and appear neutral. 11 These factors are the basis for what many aid
groups refer to as the “crisis of humanitarianism.” Humanitarian workers argue that
military humanitarian aid activities in war zones, where the military is also fighting,
degrades and endangers the overall humanitarian effort. They argue that pinning strategic
or tactical military objectives to humanitarian assistance (which they say should be
impartial) identifies such activity with one party to a conflict and makes it a possible
target for attack. They say that humanitarian assistance by both civilian aid workers and
combatants on a battlefield distorts the identity of the two groups and increases the
10
11
5
chances that neutral aid workers will be attacked by hostile groups who either confuse
them for soldiers or presume they support a certain side. This is why they say military
forces acting in a humanitarian capacity can decrease the effectiveness of an aid
operation and undermine the humanitarian aid mission. Civilian aid groups argue that the
involvement of military forces in aid work should be strictly limited to carefully
implemented security and logistical support of humanitarian missions.
Most civilian humanitarian aid agencies try to operate under four main principles:
neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence.12 Neutrality means that aid agencies
should have no interest in the outcome of the war in which they are operating and do not
favor any side of the conflict. Impartiality suggests that they will serve all people in need
of assistance regardless of their partisan affiliation, and should only be restricted by their
ability to respond. Humanity implies that aid agencies are motivated to respond to crises
solely by human suffering and not by any other political or ideological purpose. Finally,
independence means that aid groups are free to plan and conduct their operations without
any direction, reliance on or interference by any other entity, such as a sovereign
government or insurgency group. 13 These four principles seldom describe the reasons
cited for using the military.
Since most aid groups are unarmed and depend on a certain level of security in order to
provide their services, neutrality and independence are among their greater concerns.
They must strive to convince all sides of their neutrality in order to minimize the
likelihood of becoming a perceived military target. The idea is that neutrality is

12
13
6
compromised when aid groups are simply perceived to be working with one side of the
other in a conflict.
The United Nations Guidelines on the use of Military and Civilian Defense Assets in
Complex Emergencies states:14
“The need for humanitarians to maintain an actual and perceived distance from the
military is especially important with regard to belligerent forces or representatives of an
occupying power. Any coordination with a party to an armed conflict must proceed with
extreme caution, care, and sensitivity, given that the actual or perceived affiliation with a
belligerent might lead to the loss of neutrality… of the humanitarian organization, which
might in turn affect the security of beneficiaries as well as humanitarian staff, and
jeopardize the whole humanitarian operation in a conflict zone. Thus, cooperation…
with belligerent forces should in principle not take place, unless in extreme and
exceptional circumstances and as a last resort….”15
THE DEFENSE
The U.S. military uses civil-military operations (CMO), for the same reasons that they
conduct most other operations, to serve national interests. The U.S. Military’s Joint
Doctrine for Civil Affairs states:
“The purpose of CMO is to facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and
achieve operational US objectives. CMO are the activities of a commander that
14
Pierre Krahenbuhl, “Humanitarian Security: A Matter of Acceptance, Perception, Behavior…”
International Committee of the Red Cross, 31 March
2004,http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5XSGWE.
15
Pierre Krahenbuhl, “Humanitarian Security: A Matter of Acceptance, Perception, Behavior…”
International Committee of the Red Cross, 31 March
7
establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental
and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in
a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area. CMO may include performance by
military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local,
regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or
subsequent to other military actions.”16
Professor Reuben E. Brigety, an International Affairs scholar who studied this issue,
points out that simply asserting military forces should not use humanitarian assistance,
may neglect understanding the various ways humanitarian assistance is useful to the
United States as an instrument of influence.17 U.S. military forces are inherently non-
neutral, especially when performing humanitarian missions in the same areas that they
are also fighting. Military commanders do not necessarily conduct humanitarian
operations out of a sense of morality, but rather to support the policies of their
government. 18 While some people view the alleviation of human suffering as an
obligation to be met, others view it as an opportunity to be seized. A major irony
however, is that the military’s man power, material resources, and mobility often make
the Department of Defense an obvious choice to provide immediate assistance to
countries in need. This was seen in peacetime situations when U.S. Navy vessels
provided support to nations affected by a massive tsunami. It was also evident during
wartime when U.S. Army helicopters provided search and rescue support to Afghanistan
16
17
The Alan Shawn Feinstein International Famine Center, “The Future of Humanitarian Action:
Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises.” January 2004, p. 4.
18
Nye, 116
8
and Pakistan following a 2005 earthquake that killed more than 40 thousand people.
Military contacts and relations often provide channels of influence and contact not
available through ordinary diplomatic means.19 “Indeed some humanitarian observers
worry that America’s five military regional commanders have more resources and better
access in their regions than the American Ambassadors in those countries.”20
Several reports from the United Nations and various non-governmental organizations
say that military mixing with humanitarian work should only be allowed if the military
falls directly under civilian humanitarian leadership. They say that this will ensure that
military assets will be used in the “best possible way.”21
Most military leaders counter that as long as UN and NGO relief officials remain
convinced that they understand military resources and capabilities better than military
commanders, they will be inclined to think they can employ the military more effectively
(on this point the author points out that this is not addressing combat forces but those
units engaged in engineering, medical, air and ground transportation, and communication
tasks.22) Some military leaders have agreed that if the scale of the operations is limited to
one or two sorties of aircraft, a few trucks, or some trained medical personnel with
supplies, civilian control can be feasible. If, however, large military formations are
employed, such control is not an option because civilian relief agencies lack the capacity,
leadership and organization to manage them effectively.23 A fundamental requirement
for military formations is effective command and control. Policy makers have said there
is plenty of evidence to show that coalition leaders in various humanitarian missions may
19
Nye, 116
20
Nye, 116
21
Humanitarian Intervention Reflections on the Crisis, 239
22
23
9
have initially lacked expertise in humanitarian assistance, but the nature of their job and
their professional track records allowed them to adapt quickly. 24 The military has
repeatedly shown a capacity to improvise, adapt, and overcome new and different
challenges.
FOREIGN POLICY???
Scholars and government officials cite two main justifications or reasons for military
involvement with humanitarian aid as an interpretation of U.S. foreign policy. The first
point is that the instability that is common to places in dire need of humanitarian aid can
be a strategic liability to other countries. Stuart Eizenstat argued in Foreign Affairs that
terrorism, conflict, and regional instability are on the rise throughout the developing
world. Weak and failed states and the chaos they nurture inevitably harm U.S. security
and the global economy that provides the basis for American prosperity.25 Humanitarian
aid can inhibit the influence of non-state actors that try to take advantage of under-
developed countries in chaos. It also factors in the fact that violence, epidemics, and
refugee crises that plague decayed nations often spill into neighboring countries,
destabilizing entire regions. Eizenstat’s argument addresses one of the sources of
instability in failed and fragile states and advocates humanitarian aid as a way to support
U.S. interests.
The second school of foreign policy thought on the military/humanitarian aid mix is
that states can derive strategic benefit by publicly responding to human suffering,
particularly in the context of armed conflict and natural disasters. The emergence of
24
25
Stuart Eizenstat, John Edward Porter and Jeremy Weinstein “Rebuilding Weak States,” Foreign Affairs,
January/February 2005.
10
global, up to the second, media reports allows nations to demonstrate their strength and
humanity by publicizing the humanitarian efforts of their soldiers. The United States has
a strategic interest in the inherent alleviation of human suffering and in being “seen” as
the agent by which such suffering is relieved.26 There are two basic justifications for
strategic influence through humanitarian aid. First, the threat to United States interests
can come from the mere existence of destabilizing forces. The U.S. may benefit the most
when human suffering is actually mitigated and complex emergencies are stabilized
because this helps to alleviate the overall threat. The second argument is that the threat to
national interests can come simply from the perception that the U.S. is not responding to
human suffering and thus does not care to provide aid.27 The first angle suggests that
strategic benefits come from humanitarian assistance. The second says that humanitarian
aid as a form of public (premptive?) diplomacy. A logical foreign policy conclusion is
that states have an interest in ensuring that human needs are met abroad, regardless of
who actually provides the aid.
As Andrew Natsios, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development
has argued: “Doing good may sometimes bring geo-strategic advantage, a concept that
may offend the Puritan instinct in [the American] national character because it seems to
mix motives so deliberately. In fact, the integration of the humanitarian imperative into
U.S. foreign policy strategies will both bring geo-strategic advantage and increase the
effectiveness and force of those strategies.” 28
26
27
28
Complex Emergencies (Praeger: Westport, CT, 1997)
11
Author Robert Kaplan recently witnessed one form of military humanitarian action in
Afghanistan. He writes about one experience he had while visiting a remote part of the
country. He visited a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT- a remote army civil affairs
unit with limited base security.) A PRT uses humanitarian aid money provided by the
DOD to give “influence without the stigma of occupation.” 29 Kaplan writes that the
Army’s long term goal is to civilianize the PRTs by embedding representatives from the
State Department and USAID. Kaplan wrote “I worried that the American’s were being
too altruistic; nobody aside from the people actually helped would know about such
programs…”30 When he left that particular example of a wholly owned military
humanitarian mission, he wrote that the overall feeling among the civil affairs leaders
was that; “Everything was possible in Afghanistan – with years and patience.31”
FUTURE POLICY?
U.S. forces were not designed or trained to undertake complex political and legal
challenges such as mediating local disputes or organizing elections. It is unclear exactly
how the United States should go about restoring order and building democracy in chaotic
places. Condoleezza Rice, argued in Foreign Affairs in 2000, that the military "is most
certainly not designed to build a civilian society." One major problem however, is there is
not always a good or easy alternative.32 Some have advocated that the United States
create a new branch of the military dedicated exclusively to postwar stabilization,
29
Kaplan, 220
30
Kaplan, 220
31
Kaplan, 221
32
12
reconstruction, and humanitarian work. They say it should draw on the skills of military
officers who have distinguished themselves as peacekeepers and develop capabilities as
diverse and specialized as today's war fighters.33
One interesting anecdote on this point involves a former Secretary of State. Before
entering Harvard, a 22-year-old U.S. Army Sergeant named Henry Kissinger served
briefly as de facto mayor of a German town during the U.S. occupation. It is interesting
to note that such experience could help influence military leaders and policy makers in
their understanding of such complex civil-military situations. Policymakers could
consider service-members in similar circumstances for future roles in humanitarian aid.
This could also have the effect of drawing talented young people interested in national
service, some of whom would otherwise never consider joining the military, to enlist. A
standing “Humanitarian corps” (similar to USAID but with security force capability)
could be available for large-scale deployments such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan and
smaller missions conducted independently or through multilateral organizations.34 It is
important to note that U.S. interests can also be extended by enlisting others on behalf of
U.S. goals, through alliances, international institutions, careful diplomacy, and the power
of ideals.35
CONCLUSION
Many aid workers are concerned about what they call the “crisis of humanitarianism.”
The problem involves humanitarian missions by U.S. military forces in the same conflict
zones where they also use conventional military force. Civilian aid workers say that this
33
34
35
13
politicizes the aid effort, undermines the neutral independence of aid organizations, and
threatens the overall humanitarian effort.36
Many policy makers, on the other hand, recognize that military power and humanitarian
endeavors can and often do reinforce one another. Strategies that focus on counter
proliferation and economic development can help eliminate threats before more
traditional military action becomes an issue.37 It also involves a certain degree of
restraint which means knowing that the United States' military involvement is not always
the best application of foreign policy.
One of the most important contributions foreign policy makers can make to this field is
to study humanitarian/military mix objectively. In so doing, they can help both soldiers
and civilians adjust to the new battlefield and the vast possibilities for new humanitarian
aid missions. In the long run, this should benefit the United States, aid agencies, and most
importantly, the civilians who need humanitarian help.38
36
The Ethics of Military Humanitarian Operations Reuben E. Brigety, II Ph.D. Assistant Professor,
Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University Presentation for International
Studies Association Convention Honolulu, HI 1-6 March 2005
37
38
Complex Emergencies (Praeger: Westport, CT, 1997), p. 21
14
Word Count: 2949 words
Works Cited Bibliography

The Alan Shawn Feinstein International Famine Center, “The Future of Humanitarian
Action: Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises.” January 2004
Brigety, Reuben E. II Ph.D. Assistant Professor, “The Ethics of Military Humanitarian

Operations”, Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University
Presentation for International Studies Association Convention Honolulu, HI 1-6 March
2005
Byman, David and Waxman, Matthew. “The Dynamics of Coercion

American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might”
RAND Studies in Policy Analysis. February 2002
Eizensta, Stuart t, John Edward Porter and Jeremy Weinstein “Rebuilding Weak States,”
Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005.
Goodman, Mel. The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy In Focus
www.fpif.org February 1, 2004
15
Graves, Ernest and Steven Hildreth. “U.S. Security Assistance and the Political Process.”
Lexington Box. Washington D.C. 1985
Kaplan, Robert. Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground.

Random House. September 2005 Imperial Grunts
Kouchner, Bernard. co-founder,Médecins Sans Frontiers,March 2, 2004 Introduction In

October 2003, the Feinstein International Famine Center (FIFC)
Krahenbuhl, Pierre. “Humanitarian Security: A Matter of Acceptance, Perception,

Behavior…” International Committee of the Red Cross, 31 March
Natsios, Andrew. “U.S. foreign policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse :
Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies” (Praeger: Westport, CT, 1997), p. 21
Nossel, Suzanne. “Smart Power” Foreign Affairs March 2004 - April 2004 BYLINE:
SECTION: FROM FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MARCH/APRIL 2004
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. The Decline of America's Soft Power

From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004.
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040501facomment83303/joseph-s-nye-jr/the-decline-of-
america-s-soft-power.html
16

War Paper Final

Cargado por

Información del documento

Descripción original:

Derechos de autor

Formatos disponibles

Compartir este documento

Compartir o incrustar documentos

Opciones para compartir

¿Le pareció útil este documento?

¿Este contenido es inapropiado?

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

War Paper Final

Cargado por

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

John Slosser

PSCI 471: War (Fall 2008)

MIXING THE MILITARY WITH HUMANITARIAN AID

American people.” President George W. Bush, 10/11/01

recognized humanitarian issues as a legitimate focus in U.S. foreign policy. This

however, the foreign policy implications of military/humanitarian interaction are often

military as an essential part of U.S. foreign policy.

assistance is performed by military forces in the context of armed conflict? This is a

worthwhile (but risky) tool.

Kouchner, co-founder,Médecins Sans Frontiers.7

Military humanitarian assistance is an effort to create strategic and tactical benefits

through humanitarian aid by military personnel.8 Generally speaking, humanitarian

longer period of time than humanitarian assistance. Generally speaking, major

“instrumentalization” by some international civilian aid officials. They define

instrumentalization as the “integration by some state actors of humanitarian action into

groups refer to as the “crisis of humanitarianism.” Humanitarian workers argue that

or tactical military objectives to humanitarian assistance (which they say should be

forces acting in a humanitarian capacity can decrease the effectiveness of an aid

involvement of military forces in aid work should be strictly limited to carefully

implemented security and logistical support of humanitarian missions.

any direction, reliance on or interference by any other entity, such as a sovereign

cited for using the military.

likelihood of becoming a perceived military target. The idea is that neutrality is

Complex Emergencies states:14

military is especially important with regard to belligerent forces or representatives of an

jeopardize the whole humanitarian operation in a conflict zone. Thus, cooperation…

exceptional circumstances and as a last resort….”15

Doctrine for Civil Affairs states:

“The purpose of CMO is to facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and

achieve operational US objectives. CMO are the activities of a commander that

a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area. CMO may include performance by

subsequent to other military actions.”16

are also fighting. Military commanders do not necessarily conduct humanitarian

government. 18 While some people view the alleviation of human suffering as an

obligation to be met, others view it as an opportunity to be seized. A major irony

the Department of Defense an obvious choice to provide immediate assistance to

available through ordinary diplomatic means.19 “Indeed some humanitarian observers

access in their regions than the American Ambassadors in those countries.”20

military assets will be used in the “best possible way.”21

leadership and organization to manage them effectively.23 A fundamental requirement

destabilizing entire regions. Eizenstat’s argument addresses one of the sources of

aid as a form of public (premptive?) diplomacy. A logical foreign policy conclusion is

who actually provides the aid.

As Andrew Natsios, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development

effectiveness and force of those strategies.” 28

programs…”30 When he left that particular example of a wholly owned military

challenges such as mediating local disputes or organizing elections. It is unclear exactly

create a new branch of the military dedicated exclusively to postwar stabilization,

officers who have distinguished themselves as peacekeepers and develop capabilities as

diverse and specialized as today's war fighters.33

their understanding of such complex civil-military situations. Policymakers could

consider service-members in similar circumstances for future roles in humanitarian aid.

smaller missions conducted independently or through multilateral organizations.34 It is

threatens the overall humanitarian effort.36

traditional military action becomes an issue.37 It also involves a certain degree of

the best application of foreign policy.

importantly, the civilians who need humanitarian help.38

Works Cited Bibliography

Brigety, Reuben E. II Ph.D. Assistant Professor, “The Ethics of Military Humanitarian

Byman, David and Waxman, Matthew. “The Dynamics of Coercion

Kaplan, Robert. Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground.

Kouchner, Bernard. co-founder,Médecins Sans Frontiers,March 2, 2004 Introduction In

Krahenbuhl, Pierre. “Humanitarian Security: A Matter of Acceptance, Perception,