Atty Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections and Joseph Estrada 1. No.
1. No. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by a legislative action. Section 19 of
GR Number 206666
Petition: Petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 (Revised Rules of Court) and Petition-in-
intervention in view of the disqualification of private respondent
Petitioner: Atty Alicia Risos-Vidal
Petitioner-Intervenor: Alfredo S. Lim
Respondents: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Date: January 21, 2015
Facts:
On September 12, 2007 the Sandiganbayan convicted the private respondent, Joseph Estrada, for the crime of
plunder. On October 25, 2007, Gloria Arroyo extended executive clemency by way of pardon. Private
respondent received and accepted the pardon by affixing his signature beside his written notation the next
day.
On November 30, 2009 private respondent filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. There
were 3 oppositions to the candidacy. However, all petitions were effectively dismissed on the grounds that:
the Constitutional proscription on re-election applies to a sitting president and the pardon granted to him
restored his right to vote and be voted for public office. After the May 2010 elections, Estrada only managed
to garner the 2nd highest number of votes.
On October 2, 2012 he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of the Mayor of City of Manila. On
January 24, 2013, the petitioner filed a disqualification petition against the respondent on the theory that he is
disqualified to run for public office because of his previous conviction for plunder (relying on Section 40 of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC). COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification. The subsequent
motion for consideration was also denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in:
1. Holding that Estrada’s pardon was not conditional
2. Not finding that Estrada is disqualified to run as Mayor of Manila
3. Dismissing the petition for disqualification
4. Not ruling that Estrada’s pardon neither restored his right of suffrage nor remitted his perpetual
absolute disqualification from seeking public office
5. Not having exercised its power to motu proprio disqualify Estrada in the face of his patent
disqualification to run for public office because of his perpetual and absolute disqualification to seek
public office and to vote resulting from his criminal conviction for plunder
Ruling:
Article 7 and Section 5 of Article 9-C provides that the President possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency. Any act of Congress by way of statute cannot
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
2. No. Article 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way that will give full effect
to the executive clemency granted by the President. The pardon granted admits no other
interpretation other than that he regained FULL civil and political rights—including the right to seek
elective office.
3. No. Section 12 of the OEC allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude to run for and hold any public
office, whether local or national.
4. No. Pardon granted to Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal, and concrete
factual basis upon which to anchor or support presidential intent to grant a limited pardon.
5. No. The arguments forwarded by the petitioner failed to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal
bases to prove that the COMELEC resolution were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious
exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or
were so patent and gross as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Dispositive:
Petition for certiorari and petition-in-intervention are dismissed. Resolution of COMELEC 2nd Division and En
Banc are affirmed.
Barrioquinto v. Fernandez
GR No. L-1278 January 21, 1949
Feria, J.
FACTS:
 Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged of the crime of murder. Barrioquinto has not yet been
arrested while the case proceeded against Jimenez.
 After trial Court of First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment.
 Before the period for appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants
amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy and
committed from December 8, 1941, to the date when each particular area where the offense was
committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation.
 On January 9, 1947, the Amnesty Commission issued an order returning the cases of the petitioners
to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding on the case saying that since the
Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny having committed the crime, they cannot invoke the benefits of
amnesty.
ISSUE:
 W/N Barrioquinto and Loreto should be given Amnesty.
HELD:
  The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong
conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
Pardon Amnesty
Granted by the Chief Executive, private act which Proclamation of the Chief Executive with
the Court takes no notice. concurrence of the Congress, public act which
the Court should take judicial notice
Granted after conviction Granted to classes of persons or communitie
who may be guilty of political offenses generally
before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
looks forward and relieves the offender from the looks backward and abolishes and puts into
consequences of an offense of which he has been oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
convicted obliterates the offense with which he is charged
*doesn’t restore right to hold public office or *as though no crime committed.
right of suffrage, unless stipulated in the pardon
 Admittance of having committed the crime is not a condition precedent in order to be granted
Amnesty. It is enough that the offense committed comes within the terms of the Amnesty
Proclamation.
 The Commissions should conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and
the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy,
or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the
benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services
to the nation."
 The court ordered the 14th Guerilla Amnesty Commission to hear and decide the application for
amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez.
Separate Opinions:
PERFECTO, J., concurring
To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided by a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission only the following
elements are essential:
1. That he is charged or may be charged with an offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code,
except those against chastity or for purely personal motives;
2. That he committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy;
3. That it was committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when the area where
the offense was committed was actually liberated from enemy control and occupation.
If these three elements are present in a case brought before a Guerrillas Amnesty Commission, the latter
cannot refuse to hear and decide it under the proclamation. There is nothing in the proclamation to even hint
that the applicant for amnesty must first admit having executed the acts constituting the offense with which
he is charged or be charged.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
Mandamus is ordinarily a remedy for official inaction. (Guanio vs. Fernandez, 55 Phil., 814.) The Court can
order the Commission to act but it can not tell the Commission how to act. How or for whom a case should be
decided is a matter of judgment which courts have no jurisdiction to control or review. And so ifs the
sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence. The writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise
of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon a public officer the right and the duty to exercise
judgment. In reference to any matter in which he is required to act, it is his judgment that is to be exercised
and not that of the court. (Blanco vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 46 Phil., 190.)
Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says that he has not committed a crime he
cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also self-evening that where the Amnesty Proclamation imposes certain
conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of those conditions. A
petition for amnesty is in the nature of plea of confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess the
allegations against him before he is allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action. It is a
rank inconsistency for one to justify an act, seek forgiveness for an act of which, according to him, he is not
responsible.
Barrioquinto v. Fernandez (1949)
Petitioners: Loreto Barrioquinto and Norberto Jimenez
Respondents: Enrique Fernandez, et al. (Chair and members of the Guerilla Amnesty Commission)
Ponente: Feria
Topic: Powers and functions of the President – Executive clemency
SUMMARY: Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon. Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is
a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public
act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
FACTS:
 Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder committed during World War II before
the CFI of Zamboanga.
 The case proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was not arrested.
 Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment.
 Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of
Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act
penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy during World War II.
 Both Jimenez and Barrioquinto (who had been apprehended) decided to submit their case to the
Guerilla Amnesty Corporation (GAC) to avail of the amnesty.
 However, the GAC returned petitioners’ cases to the CFI, without deciding WoN they are entitled to
the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, since they refused to admit to the crime as charged.
Barrioquinto alleged that a certain Hipolito Tolentino committed the crime imputed to them.
ISSUE/S:
 WoN a person should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal
act or offense which he is charged, to entitle him to the benefits of amnesty
o NO. The theory of the GAC, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong
conception of the nature or character of the amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from
pardon.
o Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty
by Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice.
o Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution
of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
o Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of
which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does “nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,” and it “in no
case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence” (Art. 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed
no offense.
o To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided by a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission
only the following elements are essential: First, that he is charged or may be charged with ab
offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code, except those against chastity or for purely
personal motives; second, that he committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to
the enemy; and third, that it was committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to
the date when the area where the offense was committed was actually liberated from
enemy control and occupation.
o If these three elements are present in a case brought before a GAC, the latter cannot refuse
to hear and decide it under the proclamation. There is nothing in the proclamation to even
hint that the applicant for amnesty must first admit having executed the acts constituting
the offense with which he is charged or be charged.
NOTES:
 Tuason, dissenting
o The decision proceeds on the assumption that the GAC refused to hear and decide the
application for amnesty of the present petitioners. I think this is a mistake. There are
examinations of records, hearing and decisions.
o In the view I take of the case, it is unnecessary to discuss the court's premise that "there is
nothing in the proclamation to even hint that the applicant for amnesty must first admit
having executed the acts constituting the offense with which he is charged or may be
charged." Nevertheless, I don't think the Commission was wrong in its theory. Amnesty
presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says that he has not committed a
crime he cannot have any use for amnesty.
 This decision was overruled in Vera v. People (next case), adopting the theory in the dissent of this
case.
I. Short Title: Vera vs. People
II. Full Title: Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido, Paulino Bayran And Jayme
Garcia vs. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 152, January 31, 1963, J. Barrera (ponente)
II. Topic: Powers of the President- Amnesty
IV. Statement of Facts: In the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Vera and others were charged with the
complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes, alias Azarcon. Upon their motion, invoking the
benefits of Amnesty Proclamation of the President, series of 1946, the case was referred to the Eighth
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, which actually tried it. During the hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants
admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact Gaudencio Vera, the only defendant who took the
witness stand instead of admitting the killing of the deceased Lozañes categorically denied it. Hence, the
Amnesty Commission held that it could not take cognizance of the case on the ground that the benefits of the
Amnesty Proclamation could be invoked only by defendants in a criminal case who admitting the commission
of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated
against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commission
ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial.
V. Statement of the Case The petitioners then appealed to the Court of the appeals in view of the legal issue
involved namely, whether or not the persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should admit having committed
the crime of which they are accused. The court of appeals then rendered a decision affirming the Order of the
commission. The CA stated that in order that the Amnesty Commission may take cognizance of the case, the
accused or respondent must allege or claim verbally or in writing that he committed the acts charged against
him in furtherance of the resistance movement or against persons who aided in the war efforts of the enemy
for amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime
VI. Issue Whether or not Vera and others can avail the benefit of Amnesty without admission of guilt
VII. Ruling Petitioners contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8, it is not
necessary for them to admit the commission of the crime charged, citing in support of their submission the
cases of (Barrioquinto, et al. vs. Fernandez, et al), (Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte v. De los Santos, et al.) and
(Viray v. Amnesty Commission, et al.) to the effect that "in order to entitle a person to the benefits of Amnesty
Proclamation (No. 8), it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit
having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it
is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed
comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
But said cases have been superseded and deemed overruled by the subsequent cases of (People v. Llanita, et
al) and (People v. Guillermo, et al) wherein the court held that — It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify
an act, or seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes
the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot
have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the
nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him
but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would being the crime charged
within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.
At any rate, the facts established before the Commission do not bring this case within the terms of Amnesty
Proclamation No. 8. Note that said proclamation extends its provisions to "all persons who committed any act
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons
aiding in the war effort of the enemy." As found by the Commission, the killing of the deceased (Lozañes) was
not in furtherance of the resistance movement, but was due to the rivalry between the Hunter's Guerrilla, to
which he belonged, and the Vera's Guerrilla of petitioners. VIII. Dispositive Portion WHEREFORE, finding no
error in the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioners.
Cristobal v Labrador
Petitioner: Miguel Cristobal G.R. No. L-47941
Respondents: Alejo Labrador et. al. Ponente: Laurel, J.
FACTS
 Teofilo Santos was found guilty of the crime of estafa by the Court of First Instance (CFI) Rizal and
was sentenced six months of arresto mayor and to pay Toribio Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo the
amounts P375 and P125.
 He was imprisoned at the provincial jail of Pasig Rizal from March 14-Aug 18, 1932
 He also paid the amount of money that he owed
 Commonwealth Act No. 357, otherwise known as the Election Code, was approved by the national
Assembly, section 94, paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been
"declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against the property
 Despite his conviction, he continued to be a registered voter of Malabon, Rizal
 Labrador applied for an absolute pardon and was likewise granted by President Manuel Quezon.
o The pardon restored his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to
hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which
are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility."
 On November 16, 1940, Miguel Cristobal, filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Teofilo C.
Santos from the list of voters in precinct No. 11 of Malabon, Rizal, on the ground that Santos is
disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357
ISSUE
 WoN the absolute pardon granted his to Alejo restored his right to vote (WoN the Executive’s
pardoning power applies to legislative prohobitions)
RULING
 Yes! It restored his right to vote!
RATIO DECIDENDI
 Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides:
o (6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
to remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of
impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as may be
deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
the National Assembly.
o 2 limitations upon the exercise of pardon: (a) that the power be exercised after convictions;
and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment
 The pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action
 In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that
"he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or
 Manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores
the respondent to full civil and political rights."
 The disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not
fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the
Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the
political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.
 A pardon implies guilt; it does not obliterate the fact of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof; it does not wash out the moral stain; as has been tersely said, it involves
forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
 Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they
cannot erase the stain of blood, which has been definitely fixed. (State vs. Serfling, 131 Wash. 605,
230 Pac. 847.)
 Republic of the Philippines ago; that he had already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he
SUPREME COURT had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to
Manila 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally
elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940. Under these
EN BANC circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the
position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned
G.R. No. L-48100 June 20, 1941 hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason
for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the
Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical
FLORENCIO PELOBELLO, petitioner-appellant, vs. GREGORIO PALATINO, respondent-appellee.
objection.
LAUREL, J.:
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant, So ordered.
The petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First
Avanceña, C.J., Diaz and Moran, JJ., concur.
Instance of Tayabas against the respondent-appellee, Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of the municipality of
Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. The proceedings were had pursuant to the provisions of section 167, in
relation with section 94 (a), of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357). It was alleged that the
respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atendado contra la autoridad y sus In re Lontok (1922)
agentes and sentenced to imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, was
disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not Petition: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Moral turpitude (Marcelino Lontok)
having been removed by plenary pardon. Petitioners:
Respondent:
Ponente: J. Malcolm
The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the election and consequent proclamation of the
Date: 7 April 1922
respondent-appellee for the office of municipal mayor. It is also admitted that the respondent-appellee was
granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915; and it has been proven (Vide Exhibit 1,
Case statement:
admitted by the lower court, rec. of ap., p. 20) that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the
Attorney-General asks that an order be issued for the removal of Lontok from his office of lawyer in the
Philippines, granted the respondent-appellee absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil
Philippine Islands, because of having been convicted for the crime of bigamy. Lontok, on the other hand, prays
and political rights.
that the charges be dismissed: principally on a pardon issued to him by former Gov.-Gen. Harrison.
The question presented is whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification
Facts:
incident to criminal conviction under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been
 Lontok Convicted of bigamy Zambales CFI
granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office (sec. 4, Election Code). Without
o 27 Feb 1918 – Sentenced to imprisonment, 8 years
the necessity of inquiring into the historical background of the benign prerogative of mercy, we adopt the
 9 Feb 1921 – pardon issued by Gov-Gen
broad view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940, that subject
o Citing Philippine Organic Act
to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
o Pardon conditional on Lontok not again being guilty of any misconduct
legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction, and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute
Pertinent laws/provisions/concepts:
pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction, While there may be force in the argument
which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not be extended to
Sec. 19, Art VII
cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this
jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment
completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more than 25 years
Issues: ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be
1. Did the executive pardon remove the cause of action for disbarment? [Yes]
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to
Ruling/Ratio Decidendi: serve the balance of his original sentence.
1. YES.
 While pardon relieves one of the penal consequences of the act, it does not operate as a bar HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
to the disbarment proceeding.
 Ex parte Garland 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
o Petitioner applied for license to practice law in US Courts [did not take oath about executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
never voluntarily giving aid to any gov’t hostile to US – required by statute]
 Petitioner had been member of the Confederate Congress during the 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences
secession of the South of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
o Pardoned by the US President
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
o Court ruled: to exclude the petitioner from the practice of law would be to enforce a
punishment for the offense conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
o Justice Field: A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, release the punishment and
blot out of existence the guilt necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
 In the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
committed the offense.
 Art. 130, RPC: one of the ways to extinguish criminal liability – by pardon 3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned
convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he
Decision: Proceedings dismissed
was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
Dissenting Opinion: None. constitutional vice.

Principles: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section
The Executive Department  The President  Executive Clemency
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which
imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who “having been granted
TORRES v. GONZALES
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of
Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the
Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of
his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on
appeal.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M.
LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
Facts:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding
the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the “Marines”) to join the Philippine National Police (the “PNP”) in
visibility patrols around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility
patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the “AFP”), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the
presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter
of Instruction 02/2000 (the “LOI”) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task
Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief
of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a
Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. In the
Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila
through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The President further
stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his
powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President
declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta
Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and
Domestic Airport.
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the “IBP”) filed the instant petition to annul
LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional,
arguing that:
I arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION,
IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY,
THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN
DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION
OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE
CONSTITUTION;
C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE
CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY
MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
Issue: WON the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has legal standing to petition for the annulment of the LOI
and to assail the constitutionality of the declaration of deployment of the Philippine Marines
Ruling: NO
Rationale:
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its
locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which
is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards, the IBP has failed to present a
specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the
administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also
be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a
formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in
the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue.
Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not
shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act.
Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a
result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been
projects as injurious is the supposed “militarization” of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine
democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed
“injury” not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a
consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment
of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to
raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this
Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
(Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance
of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not
a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people Thus, when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a
reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order
are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the
Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It
will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve
the issue now, rather than later.)
SANLAKAS VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY by Martin
TINGA; FEBRUARY 3, 2004
FACTS:
 Three hundred junior officers and enlisted men from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) staged a
mutiny by storming the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City on July 27, 2003
 The mutineers cried of corruption in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; demanded for the resignation of
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
 In lieu of the said mutiny, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both
declaring a state of rebellion and called on the AFP to suppress the rebellion
 The mutiny ended on the evening of July 27, 2003
 After negotiations with the soldiers to return to their barracks, the President lifted the state of rebellion
five days later on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435
 Petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa (PM), and Social Justice Society (SJS), in relation to Section 18,
Art. VII of the Constitution, contend that:
o The declaration of a state of rebellion is not required to call out the armed forces
o Due to the cessation of the rebellion, there exists no factual basis for the imposition of a state of
rebellion in an indefinite period (the mutiny ended on the evening of July 27, 2003; the state of
rebellion ensued for five days until August 1, 2003)
o The report circumvents the report requirement, which requires the President to make a report 48
hours after the proclamation of martial law
 Petitioner Suplico, et al., contends that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is an
indirect exercise of emergency powers
o Said petitioner contends that under Section 23 (2), Art. VII of the Constitution, such exercise of
emergency powers is exclusive to Congress, and that the declaration made by the President thus
results to the latter’s usurpation of their said exclusive power
 Petitioner Senator Pimentel contends that the presidential issuances constitute an unwarranted exercise
of martial law power, which is baseless under the Constitution
o Said petitioner fears that the said declaration of the President may pave way for the
unconstitutional imposition of warrantless arrests
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not petitions are moot and academic
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
3. Whether or not a declaration of a state of rebellion is required to call out the armed forces
4. Whether or not there is factual basis for the imposition of a state of rebellion
5. Whether or not said declaration constitutes exercise of emergency powers
6. Whether or not the issuances are tantamount to exercising martial law powers
HELD/RULING:
1. Petitions are moot and academic, although the Supreme Court recognizes jurisdiction over cases that are
capable of repetition yet evading review
 The petitions are deemed moot and academic, because the state of rebellion has been lifted already
on August 1, 2003
 The Lacson vs. Perez precedent proved that this case is capable of repetition; in the said case, an
angry mob that stormed Malacanang on May 1, 2001 has compelled the President to call upon the
AFP and PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1
 In this case, the Supreme Court went on to assess the validity of the President’s declaration
2. Petitioners Sanlakas, PM, and SJS, have no legal standing to sue; Petitioners Suplico et al. and Pimentel
(Members of Congress) have standing to sue
 Whereas petitioners Sanlakas et al. are considered “people’s organizations” that represents the
interest of the people, the Supreme Court is still observant of the rule that only real parties in interest
or those who would suffer a direct injury from the controversy, are the ones who may invoke the
judicial power
 Petitioners Members of Congress have made clear the validity of their legal standing, since their
contention involving the alleged usurpation of the President of their constitutional power speaks of
their incurrence of direct damage
3. For purposes of exercising the calling out power, the President is not required to declare a state of
rebellion
 Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution: …whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
 Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution grants the President, in her capacity as Commander-in-Chief,
the following powers:
o Calling out power
o Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
o Power to declare martial law
 In order for the President to exercise the latter two powers, these two conditions must exist:
o Actual invasion or rebellion
o Exercise of said power required for ensuring public safety
 The aforementioned conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power
 The Constitution of the United States of America (USA) serves as the foundation of the overall
concept of the President’s power as Chief Executive and Commander-In-Chief
 Residual executive powers of the President, as suggested by Justice Cortes, rests upon the President
o Such is due to the highly unitary and centralized nature of the Philippines government
o Exemplified in Marcos vs. Manglapus, wherein residual executive power is practiced by the
President by barring the return of former President Marcos due to perceived threats of
destabilization against the government and other forms of socio-political disturbances
4. There is factual basis for the implementation of a state of rebellion
 Section 18 (3), Art. VII of the Constitution: The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, ad must promulgate its
decision thereon within three days from its filing.
 No proof was shown by the petitioners that the President has acted without factual basis
5. Power exercised by the President in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces is in
consonance with her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
 There was no instance wherein the President has acted beyond her powers as both Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief
6. No. Said declarations are not tantamount to the declaration of martial law
 No indication that military tribunals have taken over jurisdiction over civil courts
 No indication of curtailment of civil and political rights
 No indication of President’s encroachment of other branches of government
 No indication of attempt, at all, that President attempted to exercise martial law
Petitions DISMISSED.
Aquino, Ninoy v Enrile
59 SCRA 183
Ponente: Makalintal, CJ.
Topic: Commander-in-Chief
Introduction of Justice Makalintal (short summary)
These cases are 9 Petitions for habeas corpus. All petitioners having been arrested and detained by the
military because of Marcos’ Presidential Proclamation No. 1081 (Martial Law) dated September 21, 1972.
Before this case was decided, Jose Diokno filed to withdraw his petition. Marcos released him before his
petition was granted and thus, renders the decision of the Court moot and academic. In other cases EXCEPT
NINOY AQUINO, they have been released and were subject to certain restrictions.
Ninoy Aquino had to face formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of firearms with a
Military Commission.
Facts
 Petitioners1 were arrested pursuant to General Order No. 2 “for being participants in the conspiracy
to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force…”
 Because Marcos had declared Martial Law, he now had the power to order the arrest of people at his
pleasure. He had suspended the writ of habeas corpus.
 Looking at the proclamation, the 1935 Constitution states that the “President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of the all armed forces and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion. He
may also suspend the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines under Martial Law.”
Issues/ Held/ Rationale
 Is the Proclamation No. 1081 valid and maybe subject to judicial inquiry? Is the question political or
justiciable in character?
o The Justices of the Supreme Court have varied answers to this question.
 Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino hold that the question
is political and therefore its determination is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
1
Ninoy Aquino, Ramon Mitra, Francisco Rodrigo, Napoleon Rama, Joaquin Roces, Teodoro Locsin, Sr, Jose
Diokno, Carmen Diokno, etc.
  Justice Barredo believes that political questions are not per se beyond the Court's
jurisdiction, the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being plenary and all-
embracing, but that as a matter of policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court
should abstain from interfering with the Executive's Proclamation, dealing as it does
with national security, for which the responsibility is vested by the charter in him
alone.
 Justice Esguerra maintains that the findings of the President on the existence of the
grounds for the declaration of martial law are final and conclusive upon the Courts.
 Justice Antonio, with whom Justices Makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino concur, finds
that there is no dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, and
on that premise emphasizes the factor of necessity for the exercise by the President
of his power under the Constitution to declare martial law, holding that the decision
as to whether or not there is such necessity is wholly confided to him and therefore
is not subject to judicial inquiry, his responsibility being directly to the people.
 Justice Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Palma hold that the doctrine laid down in
Landang v Garcia should be applied. “The recognition of justiciability accorded to
the question in Lansang, it should be emphasized, is there expressly distinguished
from the power of judicial review in ordinary civil or criminal cases, and is limited to
ascertaining "merely whether he (the President) has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act." The test is not whether the President's decision is correct
but whether, in suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily. Applying this
test, the finding by the Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in
the President's proclamation of martial law pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; and I
concur with them in that finding.”
 Justice Makalintal states that he is convinced that the proclamation of Marcos of
Martial Law was valid because “a state of rebellion existed in the country when
Proclamation 1081 was issued.” He also thinks that the state of rebellion still
continues up to the present (1974).
 Moreover, Justice Makalintal states that the “question of validity of Proclamation
No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution
[Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of
the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after ... the
ratification of this Constitution ..."
 On the issue of political and justiciable question, Makalintal said that “the political-
or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by this Court in the present
cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of
martial law — has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general
referendum of July 27-28, 1973.”
 Must the Court dismiss the petitions of those who have been released but have not withdrawn their
petitions because they are still subject to restrictions?
o Yes, the Court should dismiss.
 The power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to the situation
which justifies the proclamation of martial law, such as the existence of a state of
rebellion, necessarily implies the power (subject, in the opinion of the Justices who
consider Lansang applicable, to the same test of arbitrariness laid down therein), to
impose upon the released detainees conditions or restrictions which are germane
to and necessary to carry out the purposes of the proclamation.
 Justice Fernando, however, "is for easing the restrictions on the right to travel of
petitioner Rodrigo" and others similarly situated and so to this extent dissents from
the ruling of the majority; while Justice Teehankee believes that those restrictions
do not constitute deprivation of physical liberty within the meaning of the
constitutional provision on the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
 Justice Makalintal states that it is only RIGHT that those who were detained were
arrested because it was pursuant to the objective in declaring Martial Law which is
to suppress invasion, insurrection, rebellion and safeguard the public from
imminent danger. The preservation of society and national survival take
precedence. The Court UNANIMOUSLY AGREED on this point that those who were
detained should have their privilege of habeas corpus suspended!!!!!!!!!!
SUPREME COURT DISMISSED THE PETITIONS FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
Summary of the Whole Case (if you’re in a hurry)
Decided during Martial Law, it involved the petition of habeas corpus of Marcos’ critics, notably
Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Jose W. Diokno. The Supreme Court decided unanimously to dismiss the
petitions, but as Chief Justice Querube Makalintal put it, “there was no agreement as to the manner
the issues would be treated and developed. The same destination would be reached, so to speak, but
through different routes and by means of different vehicles of approach.” He said that the reason
why the Court did not produce a single, collegial opinion, among others, was that the members of the
Supreme Court are conscious of "the future verdict of history" upon their stand.
Even before the cases were decided, Jose W. Diokno, to the chagrin of the Supreme Court, opted to
withdraw his petition on the ground that no fair decision can be made of the court to render him
justice. What made it worse was the fact that before the Supreme Court could respond to Diokmo’s
challenge, Marcos issued an order releasing him and the other petitioners, leaving Aquino behind.
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro opined that the declaration of Martial Law automatically suspends the
application of the said writ, thus Aquino cannot be released. He said that Martial Law “is founded
upon the principle that the state has a right to protect itself against those who would destroy it, and
has therefore been likened to the right of an individual to self-defense.”
Navales vs Gen. Abaya (GR No. 162318, October 25, 2004)
Facts:

 Consolidated petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition
 Oakwood Incident: On July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted men,
mostly from the elite units of the AFP – the Philippine Army’s Scout Rangers and the Philippine Navy’s
Special Warfare Group (SWAG) – quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City.
They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They
planted explosives around the building and in its vicinity. Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers
were able to issue a public statement through the ABS-CBN News (ANC) network and claimed that
they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the administration of President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo. (i.e.: the graft and corruption in the military, the sale of arms and ammunition to
the “enemies” of the State, etc.) They declared their withdrawal of support from the chain of
command and demanded the resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo
administration. PGMA gave them until 5p.m. to give up their positions and return to the barracks. At
about 1:00 p.m., she declared the existence of a “state of rebellion” and issued an order to use
reasonable force in putting down the rebellion. An agreement was forged between the two groups at
9:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Pres. Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood was over. The
soldiers agreed to return to barracks and were out of the Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m.
 August 1, 2003 - DOJ charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in the “Oakwood Incident” with
violation of Article 134-A (coup d’etat) of the Revised Penal Code (filed w/ RTC)
 September 12, 2003 – 243 of accused filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the RTC assume
jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military tribunal in accord w/ RA 7055 and, order the
prosecution to present evidence to establish probable cause against 316 of 321 accused in which
failure to do so should cause dismissal of case.
 October 20, 2003 - While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the Resolution
finding probable cause for coup d’etat against only 31 of the original 321 accused and dismissing the
charges against the other 290 for insufficiency of evidence.
 November 14, 2003 – RTC admitted Amended Information, charging only 31 of original accused with
coup d’etat. It expressly stated that the case against the other 290 accused, including petitioners 1Lt.
Navales, et al. and those who are subject of the petition for habeas corpus, Capt. Reaso, et al., was
dismissed
 Meanwhile, Capt. Reaso, et al. and 1Lt. Navales, et al. were charged before the General Court-Martial
with violations of the Articles of War 63, 64, 67, 96, 97. The 31 charged in the Amended Information
were not included in the charge sheets.
 February 11, 2004 – acting on the earlier Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the original accused
under the Information dated August 1, 2003, the RTC (Branch 148) issued an Order rendering
contents of OM moot and academic and all charges before court martial against the accused and
former accused declared not service-connected but rather absorbed and in furtherance to alleged
crime of coup d’etat.
 March 1, 2004 - General Court-Martial set on March 16, 2004 the arraignment/trial of petitioners for
violations of the Articles of War
Issue: whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.
Held: NOOOOO.
 The sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148), that all charges before the court-martial
against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of
coup d’etat, was made without or in excess of jurisdiction and thus cannot be given effect. (null and
void)
o The Order dated February 11, 2004 was issued purportedly to resolve the Omnibus Motion,
which prayed for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the
military courts in accordance with Rep. Act No. 7055.
o The said Omnibus Motion was filed on September 12, 2003 by 243 of the original accused
under the Information dated August 1,2003. However, this information was subsequently
superseded by the Amended Information dated October 20, 2003 under which only 31 were
charged with the crime of coup d'etat.
o In the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61), the Amended Information was
admitted and the case against the 290 accused, including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt.
Reaso, et al., was dismissed. The said Order became final and executory since no motion for
reconsideration thereof had been filed by any of the parties.
o Therefore, when the RTC (Branch 148) eventually resolved the Omnibus Motion on February
11, 2004, the said motion had already been rendered moot by the November 14, 2003 Order
of the RTC (Branch 61) admitting the Amended Information under which only31 of the
accused were charged and dismissing the case as against the other 290.
 It had become moot with respect to those whose charge against them was
dismissed because they were no longer parties to the case.
 In view of this the case against aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can no
longer assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military courts and this
Court cannot undo nor reverse the Order of November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza,
there being no motion filed by the prosecution to reconsider the order or by any of
the accused.
 Such declaration was made by the RTC (Branch 148) in violation of Section 1, RA 7055
o RA 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are
considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be
tried by the court-martial.
o In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148) cannot divest the
General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Articles 63
(Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64 (Disrespect TowardSuperior Officer), 67 (Mutiny
or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Article)
ofthe Articles of War, as these are specifically included as "service-connected offenses or
crimes" under Section 1 thereof. Military courts have jurisdiction.
 Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law. Once vested by law on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action cannot be dislodged by any body other than by the legislature through the
enactment of a law.
 Writ of Habeas Corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court (includes General Court-Martial) which has
jurisdiction to do so. It should not be allowed after the party sought to be released has been charged
 before any court or quasi-judicial body. This rule applies to Capt. Raso, et al., as they are under
detention pursuant to Commitment Order issued by Chief of Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 70 of
Articles of War.
 Writ of Prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from
usurping/exercising a jurisdiction/power with which they have not been vested by law. The General
Court-Martial has jurisdiction has jurisdiction over the charges filed against 1Lt. Navales, et al. under
RA 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction.
LANSANG VS. GARCIA [42 SCRA 448; L-33964; 11 Dec 1971]
Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding
a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and
other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the
President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and
insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons
(13) who have been arrested without a warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in
flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word “actually staging”.
Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities.
Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D
further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities
whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the
existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became moot
and academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the
issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the
suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no
untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971;
(d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that
the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to
require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in
order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after
conclusive decision reached by majority.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon
the courts and upon all other persons.
(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed
in Proclamation No. 889-A.
Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for the
valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege.
President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already,
called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege
is the least harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains
and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area
in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations; has exploited
the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA
G.R. 158802
November 17, 2004
J. Ynares-Santiago
Lacking the requisites set by Feria, petition for writ of habeas corpus unavailing as a collateral attack
to a final judgment.
Aileen Mendoza, 12, was raped by her uncle, Reynaldo de Villa in her home in Pasig. Her pregnancy
prompted the filing of charges by her parents against de Villa.
De Villa:
1. sickness, old age of 67 rendered me incapable of erection
2. Mendozas bear a grudge against me
3. Alibi: in hometown of San Luis, Laguna at time of crime
RTC: de Villa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, sentenced to death.
Case automatically elevated to SC for automatic review due to penalty imposed.
SC: affirmed RTC decision, modified by awarding moral damages. SC found date of birth of Aileen’s
child, Leahlyn medically consistent with time of rape.
 June de Villa, son of accused, alleged that defense counsel only learned of DNA testing to resolve
paternity issue at time of pendency of SC automatic review. His 2 MRs of the case praying for DNA tests to be
conducted were denied. DNA tests obtained from Billy de Villa, grandson of Reynaldo, and Leahlyn showed
that de Villa could not have sired the latter.
June thus filed petition for writ of habeas corpus for his father.
Issue: WON writ of habeas corpus a proper remedy in the instant case.
Held: No.
Ratio of the Court.
1. On the issue of writ of habeas corpus as proper remedy:
a. individual is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form
of illegal restraint
b. however, cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or
tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this
jurisdiction
c. It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of conviction due to said lack of jurisdiction
which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through HC
d. Feria v. CA doctrine allowed HC as post-conviction remedy only when there exists:
i. deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint
ii. court had no jurisdiction
iii. penalty being excessive, is voided
e. June did not allege any of the three conditions in Feria to avail of HC
2. Proper remedy should have been certiorari or appeal
3. *On the issue of denial of de Villa’s effective aid of counsel who left for the US in the middle of
appeal
a. SC did not find negligence amounting to denial of constitutional right
4. *On the issue of the relevance of the DNA test as to de Villa’s guilt
a. Pregnancy not an essential element of crime of rape
b. Results of DNA test could not conclusively determine de Villa’s guilt for the crime of rape
5. *On the issue of remedy of motion for new trial
a. Rule 121 of Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.—The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused have been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
b. Requisites for motion for new trial:
(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
(d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably
change the judgment
c. Lack of knowledge of DNA testing attributable to negligence of counsel, and the same is
binding upon de Villa
d. Other means to determine paternity were previously available to de Villa anyway.
Dispositive. Petition for habeas corpus and motion for new trial dismissed.
*only a nice to know factoid, includes all subheadings
Randolf David et al vs Gloria Arroyo (2006)
February 2006: due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits
issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which
Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and
write ups.
Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in
1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of
PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to
exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis
and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such
declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners
claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights.
The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue
of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power,
take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is
still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence,
the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same
time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of
the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was
also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent
any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms
and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes
in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain
reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to
state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s
‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent
an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it
was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared
PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed
forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of
the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They
assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted
former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction;
the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not
come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress
must be based on the following:
1. There must be a war or other emergency.
2. The delegation must be for a limited period only.
3. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of
the calling out power of the president by the president.

#13 Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
These cases concern the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of habeas corpus in 2009 in a province in Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight
days.
FACTS: On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down
and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this
carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of
emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless
violence in Central Mindanao.
On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front.
Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance with
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in
person or in writing of her action.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution to review the validity of the President's action. But, two days later or on December 12 before
Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294, 190301, 190302, 190307,
190356, and 190380 brought the present actions to challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo's
Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao. But, given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress
could review it and before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of Maguindanao's inhabitants
could arise, the Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse.
ISSUE: Whether the court may rule on the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959.
HELD: No, but it is not unavoidable for two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate
or invalidate the same. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18.The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the
power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power,
not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the
ground, a power that the President does not have.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact
convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the
Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpusin Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
Two. Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30 days from the filing
of an appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus —
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
Justice Carpio of course points out that should the Court regard the powers of the President and Congress
respecting the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as
sequential or joint, it would be impossible for the Court to exercise its power of review within the 30 days
given it.
But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution, should be enough for the Court to fulfill its duty without pre-
empting congressional action. Section 18, Article VII, requires the President to report his actions to Congress,
in person or in writing, within 48 hours of such proclamation or suspension. In turn, the Congress is required
to convene without need of a call within 24 hours following the President's proclamation or suspension.
Clearly, the Constitution calls for quick action on the part of the Congress. Whatever form that action takes,
therefore, should give the Court sufficient time to fulfill its own mandate to review the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its issuance.
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or suspension
within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's
action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it can annul the proclamation or the
suspension. But what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves inadequate? Justice Carpio himself
offers the answer in his dissent: that 30-day period does not operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction over
the case. The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has been terminated.
The problem in this case is that the President aborted the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation
and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having
become moot and academic.
Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily would have been regarded as
moot. But the present cases do not present sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that the same have become
moot and academic.

Lagman, et. al. vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. 231658, 231771 & 231774; July 4, 2017; Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No.
216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the WHOLE of
Mindanao. This was done in response to the Marawi crisis, where the group of Isnilon Hapilon sieged the city
as a pledge of support to the ISIS and to establish a "Daesh". The consolidated petitions basically question the
factual sufficiency of the declaration of martial law.
DOCTRINES:
Petition for certiorari is not the appropriate proceeding. It is also not correct to say that the power to review
the factual basis of the declaration of Martial Law falls under Section 1 and Section 5, Article VIII.
Rule 65 is not the appropriate proceeding because this refers to whether or not an official gravely abused
his/her authority amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The review of the sufficiency of the FACTUAL
basis of Martial Law cannot be done using the same standard of review. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law is suis generis -- it is a special
ad specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court aside from those enumerated in Section 1 (expanded jurisdiction
of the Court) and Section 5 (exclusive and original jurisdiction of the SC) of Article VIII. If the Court applies the
standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under
Section 18, Article VII. The framers of the Constitution added an additional safeguard under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of the Court.
Lansang doctrine reiterated
According to the case of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, decided after the declaration of martial law during the
presidency of Ferdnand Marcos, the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is a political question and not subject to judicial review. The Garcia case overturned the
Lansang doctrine, an earlier case that declared that the factual basis of declaring martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are subject to judicial inquiry. In the case at bar, the
Supreme Court made it clear that the 1987 Constitution (Section 18, Article VII) reverted to and
constitutionalized the Lansang doctrine.
The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.
By this conclusion, the Court reversed the doctrine in Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo insofar as it refers to the
role of Congress and the Supreme Court in the review of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law. In
Fortun, the Court declared that it was only on "standby" in case Congress defaults, but the Court made it clear
in the case at bar that the it can exercise its power of review simultaneously with the power of Congress to do
the same.
Graduation of powers: It refers to hierarchy based on scope and effect, and not to a sequence/order that the
President must adhere to. Also, the Court cannot calibrate the President's decision on which among the powers
he will avail of in a given situation.
The President as Commander-in-Chief has three extraordinary powers: (a) Calling out the armed forces, (b)
Suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (c) Declaring martial law.
Calling out the armed forces is the most benign and involves ordinary police action. It is done only when it is
necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. The only limitations are that the
president must act within constitutional boundaries and not in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion.
For both the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law, the
president is allowed to resort to these only when there is actual invasion or rebellion AND public safety
requires it. It is limited to 60 days, subject to review and possible revocation by Congress, and also to review
and possible nullification by the Supreme Court. Insurrection and IMMINENT danger are NOT grounds for the
suspension of the writ or declaration of Martial Law. As a constitutionally granted power of the President, the
recommendation of the Defense Secretary to declare martial law is not a prerequisite.
During the period of martial law, the president exercises police power, which is normally a function of the
legislature. The president as commander-in-chief can also order arrests and seizures without judicial warrants,
ban public assemblies, takeover news media and agencies and censor the press, and issue presidential
decrees. Nonetheless, the president still does not have unbridled discretion to infringe the rights of civilians
because martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the operation of civil
courts or legislative assemblies.
Proclamation No. 216 is not vague and is, therefore, constitutional.
As held in this case, the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies only to free speech cases. Proclamation No. 216
does not regulate speech or any other fundamental right that may be facially challenged. It only seeks to
penalize conduct, not speech.
The inclusion of "other rebel groups" does not make the proclamation vague, as it should be interpreted in
relation to the other words that accompany it. They refer to the other rebel groups as found in Proclamation
No. 55 (calling out armed forces), which was cited in Proclamation No. 216 by way of reference in the Whereas
clauses.
The lack of operational parameters does not make the proclamation void. Operational guidelines are mere
tools for the implementation of the proclamation. Judicial review covers only the sufficiency of the
information or data at the time, or prior to the declaration or suspension. The review by this Court will be
confined to the proclamation itself and the report submitted to Congress. Any act committed under the said
orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be
resolved in a separate proceeding.
Sufficiency of factual basis test
The president as Commander-in-Chief has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual
basis for the exercise of such must ONLY be based on facts or information known by the President at the time
he made the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are already found in the proclamation as
well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress.
The Court cannot look at the absolute correctness of the facts, as this will unduly burden the president and
impede the process of decision-making. The Court should look into the full complement or totality of the
factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's
decision is correct, rather it only has to satisfy itself that the decision had sufficient factual bases. (Sufficiency >
accuracy)
Standard of proof is only probable cause.
The Supreme Court declared that the president only needs to satisfy probable cause to make a declaration of
martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is, according to the majority
decision, the most practical and most expedient standard by which the President can ascertain the existence
or non-existence of rebellion. Based on the facts cited in the 2 proclamations and the report to Congress, the
Court found that the factual circumstances in Marawi warranted the declaration of Martial Law. As to other
parts of Mindanao, the Court took notice of the fact that the Maute group has established extensive networks
and linkages with foreign and local armed groups.
The counter-evidence provided by the petitioners were not given credence. As found by the Court, the
counter-evidence came from unverified news reports. The ruling in Bedol vs. Commission on Elections on the
admissiblity of independent relevant statements does not apply. Independent relevant statements are reliable
only when the statements are relevant and when the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. In the case at bar,
the truth or falsity of the contents of the news reports is material.
Maute groups are terrorists. Although terrorism is not cited as a ground to declare martial law, terrorism and
rebellion are not mutually exclusive.
Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Objective of a terrorist is to sow and create a condition of
widespread fear among the populace in order for the government to give in to an unlawful demand. Rebellion
is political. Nonetheless, nothing in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code nor RA 9372 makes them mutually
exclusive. In fact, rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which is broader in scope and
covers a wide range of predicate crimes. Rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be
committed.
ALEXANDER A. PADILLA v. CONGRESS OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 231671, 2017-07-25
Facts:
P.S. Resolution No. 388 was approved, after receiving seventeen (17) affirmative votes as against five (5)
negative votes, and was adopted as Senate Resolution No. 49[5] entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense of
the Senate Not to Revoke, at this Time, Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, Entitled 'Declaring a State of
Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao.'"[6]P.S.
Resolution No. 390, on the other hand, garnered only nine (9) votes from the senators who were in favor of it
as opposed to twelve (12) votes from the senators who were against its approval and adoption.[7]On May 31,
2017, the House of Representatives, having previously constituted itself as a Committee of the Whole
House,[8] was briefed by Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea (Executive Secretary Medialdea),
Secretary Lorenzana, and other security officials for about six (6) hours. After the closed-door briefing, the
House of Representatives resumed its regular meeting and deliberated on House Resolution No. 1050 entitled
"Resolution Expressing the Full Support of the House of Representatives to President Rodrigo Duterte as it
Finds No Reason to Revoke Proclamation No. 216, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending
the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao.'"[9] The House of Representatives
proceeded to divide its members on the matter of approving said resolution through viva voce voting. The
result shows that the members who were in favor of passing the subject resolution secured the majority
vote.[10]The House of Representatives also purportedly discussed the proposal calling for a joint session of
the Congress to deliberate and vote on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. After the debates, however,
the proposal was rejected.[11]These series of events led to the filing of the present consolidated petitions.
he Padilla PetitionPetitioners in G.R. No. 231671 raise the question of "[w]hether Congress is required to
convene in joint session, deliberate, and vote jointly under Article VII, [Section] 18 of the Constitution"
HE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION, SUPPORTED BY THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE FRAMERS, AND
CONFIRMED BY THE SUPREME COURT, REQUIRES THAT CONGRESS CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION TO
DELIBERATE AND VOTE AS A SINGLE DELIBERATIVE BODY.
Petitioners claim that in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[18] this Court described the "duty" of the Congress to
convene in joint session as "automatic." The convening of the Congress in joint session when former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) declared martial law and suspended the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was also a legislative precedent where the Congress clearly
recognized its duty to convene in joint session.[19]
The Tañada Petition... he petitioners in G.R. No. 231694 chiefly opine that:A PLAIN READING OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION LEADS TO THE INDUBITABLE CONCLUSION THAT A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS TO REVIEW A
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW BY THE PRESIDENT IS MANDATORY.FAILURE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION
DEPRIVES LAWMAKERS OF A DELIBERATIVE AND INTERROGATORY PROCESS TO REVIEW MARTIAL
LAW.FAILURE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION DEPRIVES THE PUBLIC OF TRANSPARENT PROCEEDINGS WITHIN
WHICH TO BE INFORMED OF THE FACTUAL BASES OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE INTENDED PARAMETERS OF ITS
IMPLEMENTATION.THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED THAT A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS BE
CONVENED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW.
Consolidation of Respondents' CommentsRespondents assert firmly that there is no mandatory duty on their
part to "vote jointly," except in cases of revocation or extension of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.[29] In the absence of such duty, the non-convening of
the Congress in joint session does not pose any actual case or controversy that may be the subject of judicial
review.[30] Additionally, respondents argue that the petitions raise a political question over which the Court
has no jurisdiction.
Respondents further contend that the constitutional right to information, as enshrined under Article III,
Section 7 of the Constitution, is not absolute. Matters affecting national security are considered as a valid
exception to the right to information of the public. For this reason, the petitioners' and the public's right to
participate in the deliberations of the Congress regarding the factual basis of a martial law declaration may be
restricted in the interest of national security and public safety... espondents allege that petitioners failed to
present an appropriate case for mandamus to lie. Mandamus will only issue when the act to be compelled is a
clear legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent to perform the act
required that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station.
According to respondents, it is erroneous to assert that it is their ministerial duty to convene in joint session
whenever martial law is proclaimed or the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in the absence
of a clear and specific constitutional or legal provision. In fact, Article VII, Section 18 does not use the words
"joint session" at all, much less impose the convening of such joint session upon the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. What the Constitution requires is joint
voting when the action of the Congress is to revoke or extend the proclamation or suspension.
Subsequent EventsOn July 14, 2017, petitioners in G.R. No. 231671, the Padilla Petition, filed a Manifestation,
calling the attention of the Court to the imminent expiration of the sixty (60)-day period of validity of
Proclamation No. 216 on July 22, 2017. Despite the lapse of said sixty (60)-day period, petitioners exhort the
Court to still resolve the instant cases for the guidance of the Congress, State actors, and all Filipinos.On July
22, 2017, the Congress convened in joint session and, with two hundred sixty-one (261) votes in favor versus
eighteen (18) votes against, overwhelmingly approved the extension of the proclamation of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao until December 31, 2017.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these consolidated petitions;Whether or
not the petitions satisfy the requisites for the Court's exercise of its power of judicial review;Whether or not
the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the President's proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution; andWhether or not a writ of mandamus or certiorari may be issued in the present cases.
Ruling:
The Court's jurisdiction over these consolidated petitions
The principle of separation of powers
Contrary to respondents' protestations, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over these petitions cannot be
deemed as an unwarranted intrusion into the exclusive domain of the Legislature. Bearing in mind that the
principal substantive issue presented in the cases at bar is the proper interpretation of Article VII, Section 18
of the 1987 Constitution, particularly regarding the duty of the Congress to vote jointly when the President
declares martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, there can be no doubt that
the Court may take jurisdiction over the petitions. It is the prerogative of the Judiciary to declare "what the
law is."
Political question doctrine
Corollary to respondents' invocation of the principle of separation of powers, they argue that these petitions
involve a political question in which the Court may not interfere. It is true that the Court continues to
recognize questions of policy as a bar to its exercise of the power of judicial review.
Existence of the requisites for judicial review
Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 allege that they are suing in the following capacities: (1) Padilla as a member of
the legal profession representing victims of human rights violations, and a taxpayer; (2) Saguisag as a human
rights lawyer, former member of the Philippine Senate, and a taxpayer; (3) Monsod as a framer of the
Philippine Constitution and member of the 1986 ConCom, and a taxpayer; (4) Rosales as a victim of human
rights violations committed under martial law declared by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and a
taxpayer; (5) Gorospe as a lawyer and a taxpayer; and (6) Senator De Lima as an incumbent Member of the
Philippine Senate, a human rights advocate, a former Secretary of Justice, Chairperson of the Commission on
Human Rights, and a taxpayer.
Petitioners satisfy these standards.
Actual case or controversy
There are two conflicting claims presented before the Court: on the one hand, the petitioners' assertion that
the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene in joint session to deliberate on Proclamation No. 216; and,
on the other, the respondents' view that so convening in joint session is discretionary on the part of the
Congress.
As the present petitions allege an omission on the part of the Congress that constitutes neglect of their
constitutional duties, the petitions make a prima facie case for mandamus, and an actual case or controversy
ripe for adjudication exists. When an act or omission of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but, in fact, the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute.
Liberality in cases of transcendental importanceIn any case, it is an accepted doctrine that the Court may
brush aside procedural technicalities and, nonetheless, exercise its power of judicial review in cases of
transcendental importance.
MootnessThe Court acknowledges that the main relief prayed for in the present petitions (i.e., that the
Congress be directed to convene in joint session and therein deliberate whether to affirm or revoke
Proclamation No. 216) may arguably have been rendered moot by: (a) the lapse of the original sixty (60) days
that the President's martial law declaration and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus were
effective under Proclamation No. 216; (b) the subsequent extension by the Congress of the proclamation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus over the whole of Mindanao after
convening in joint session on July 22, 2017; and (c) the Court's own decision in Lagman v. Medialdea,[64]
wherein we ruled on the sufficiency of the factual bases for Proclamation No. 216 under the original period
stated therein.
It cannot be gainsaid that there are compelling and weighty reasons for the Court to proceed with the
resolution of these consolidated petitions on the merits. As explained in the preceding discussion, these cases
involve a constitutional issue of transcendental significance and novelty. A definitive ruling from this Court is
imperative not only to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public but, more importantly, to clarify the
parameters of congressional conduct required by the 1987 Constitution, in the event of a repetition of the
factual precedents that gave rise to these cases.
The duty of the Congress to vote jointly under Article VII, Section 18
The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote jointly to revoke the
President's declaration or suspension.By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, the
Congress. is only required to vote jointly to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.The
Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In its literal and ordinary meaning, the provision
grants the Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may exercise such power, i.e., by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session. The use of the word
"may" in the provision - such that "[t]he Congress x x x may revoke such proclamation or suspension x x x" - is
to be construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to
revoke,[71] but in order to revoke, the same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of the
Members of the Congress, voting jointly, favor revocation.
I and their already evident lack of intent to revoke the same, the provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer to a "joint session." While it may be conceded,
subject to the discussions below, that the phrase "voting jointly" shall already be understood to mean that the
joint voting will be done "in joint session," notwithstanding the absence of clear language in the
Constitution,[72] still, the requirement that "[t]he Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly applies only to the situation when the Congress
revokes the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Simply put, the provision only requires Congress to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's
proclamation and/or suspension.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not support the petitioners' argument
that it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session following the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under all circumstances
The deliberations of the 1986 ConCom reveal the framers' specific intentions to (a) remove the requirement of
prior concurrence of the Congress for the effectivity of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the Congress the discretionary power
to revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a majority of its Members,
voting jointly.
As the Court established in its preceding discussion, the clear meaning of the relevant provision in Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution is that the Congress is only required to vote jointly on the revocation of
the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Based on the Civil Liberties Union case, there is already no need to look beyond the plain language of the
provision and decipher the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
That the Congress will vote on the revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension in a joint
session can only be inferred from the arguments of the Commissioners who pushed for the "voting jointly"
amendment that the Members of the House of Representatives will benefit from the advice, opinion, and/or
wisdom of the Senators, which will be presumably shared during a joint session of both Houses. Such
inference is far from a clear mandate for the Congress to automatically convene in joint session, under all
circumstances, when the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, even when Congress does not intend to revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
There was no obligation on the part of the Congress herein to convene in joint session as the provision on
revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution did not even come into operation in light of
the resolutions, separately adopted by the two Houses of the Congress in accordance with their respective
rules of procedure, expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.
The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a joint
session is specifically for the purpose of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the petitions at bar, the Senate and House of
Representatives already separately adopted resolutions expressing support for President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216. Given the express support of both Houses of the Congress for Proclamation No. 216,
Constitution on revocation did not even come into operation and, therefore, there is no obligation on the part
of the Congress to convene in joint session.
It cannot be disputed then that the Senate and House of Representatives placed President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216 under serious review and consideration, pursuant to their power to revoke such a
proclamation vested by the Constitution on the Congress.
The Court highlights the particular circumstance herein that both Houses of Congress already separately
expressed support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, so revocation was not even a possibility and
the provision on revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to
vote jointly in a joint session never came into operation. It will be a completely different scenario if either of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, or if both Houses of the Congress, resolve/s to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in
which case, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution shall apply and the Congress must convene in joint
session to vote jointly on the revocation of the proclamation and/or suspension.
Petitioners invoke the following provision also in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution: "The
Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension convene
in accordance with its rules without call." Petitioners reason that if the Congress is not in session, it is
constitutionally mandated to convene within twenty-four (24) hours from the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with all the more reason
required to convene immediately if in session.
The Court is not persuaded.
First, the provision specially addresses the situation when the President proclaims martial law and/or
suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus while the Congress is in recess. To ensure that the
Congress will be able to act swiftly on the proclamation and/or suspension, the 1987 Constitution provides
that it should convene within twenty-four (24) hours without need for call. It is a whole different situation
when the Congress is still in session as it can readily take up the proclamation and/or suspension in the course
of its regular sessions, as what happened in these cases.
Second, the provision only requires that the Congress convene without call, but it does not explicitly state that
the Congress shall already convene in joint session. In fact, the provision actually states that the Congress
"convene in accordance with its rules," which can only mean the respective rules of each House as there are
no standing rules for joint sessions. And third, it cannot be said herein that the Congress failed to convene
immediately to act on Proclamation No. 216. Both Houses of the Congress promptly took action on
Proclamation No. 216, with the Senate already issuing invitations to executive officials even prior to receiving
President Duterte's Report, except that the two Houses of the Congress acted separately.
There is likewise no basis for petitioners' assertion that without a joint session, the public cannot hold the
Senators and Representatives accountable for their respective positions on President Duterte's Proclamation
No. 216. Senate records completely chronicled the deliberations and the voting by the Senators on Senate
Resolution No. 49 (formerly P.S. Resolution No. 388) and P.S. Resolution No. 390. While it is true that the
House of Representatives voted on House Resolution No. 1050 viva voce, this is only in accordance with its
rules. Per the Rules of the House of Representatives... ince no one moved for nominal voting on House
Resolution No. 1050, then the votes of the individual Representatives cannot be determined. It does not
render though the proceedings unconstitutional or invalid.
The Congress did not violate the right of the public to information when it did not convene in joint session.
e REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, EDGAR R. ERICE, TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT,
Petitioners contend that the Constitution requires a public deliberation process on the proclamation of martial
law: one that is conducted via a joint session and by a single body. They insist that the Congress must be
transparent, such that there is an "open and robust debate," where the evaluation of the proclamation's
factual bases and subsequent implementation shall be openly discussed and where each member's position on
the issue is heard and made known to the public.
However, based on their internal rules, each House has the discretion over the manner by which
Congressional proceedings are to be conducted. Verily, sessions are generally open to the public,[84] but each
House may decide to hold an executive session due to the confidential nature of the subject matter to be
discussed and deliberated upon.
t is clear that matters affecting the security of the state are considered confidential and must be discussed and
deliberated upon in an executive session, excluding the public therefrom.
That these matters are considered confidential is in accordance with settled jurisprudence that, in the exercise
of their right to information, the government may withhold certain types of information from the public such
as state secrets regarding military, diplomatic, and other national security matters.
Thus, to demand Congress to hold a public session during which the legislators shall openly discuss these
matters, all the while under public scrutiny, is to effectively compel them to make sensitive information
available to everyone, without exception, and to breach the recognized policy of preserving these matters'
confidentiality, at the risk of being sanctioned, penalized, or expelled from Congress altogether.
Propriety of the issuance of a writ of mandamus or certiorari... t
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. Mandamus
never issues in doubtful cases.
Although there are jurisprudential examples of the Court issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the fulfillment
of legislative duty,[94] we must distinguish the present controversy with those previous cases. In this
particular instance, the Court has no authority to compel the Senate and the House of Representatives to
convene in joint session absent a clear ministerial duty on its part to do so under the Constitution and in
complete disregard of the separate actions already undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No. 216,
including their respective decisions to no longer hold a joint session, considering their respective resolutions
not to revoke said Proclamation.
In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to grant a writ of certiorari.
To reiterate, the two Houses of the Congress decided to no longer hold a joint session only after deliberations
among their Members and putting the same to vote, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure.
Premises considered, the Congress did not gravely abuse its discretion when it did not jointly convene upon
the President's issuance of Proclamation No. 216 prior to expressing its concurrence thereto.
JR., GARY C. ALEJANO, AND EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, Petitioners, vs. SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO
PIMENTEL III, SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,
DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, BUDGET SECRETARY BENJAMIN E. DIOKNO
 AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFFGENERAL REY LEONARDO GUERRERO,
Respondents.
GR Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145, 236155
February 6, 2018
TOPIC: martial law extension
PONENTE: Tijam
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the proclamation of martial
law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to
December 31, 2018.
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding
sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG).
On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons
that impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388 while
the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full support to the
Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same.
On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216. In a
Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending
Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.
In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of StaffGeneral Guerrero,
recommended the further extension of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018 “for compelling reasons based on
current security assessment.”
On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar recommendation to the
President “primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq
(DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the
communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and financiers, and to ensure speedy rehabilitation,
recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic
development and prosperity in Mindanao.”
Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate
and the House of Representatives to further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December
31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine.
On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session, adopted Resolution of
Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.
ISSUE:
PROCEDURAL:
1. Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 fatal to their petitions.
2. Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent.
3. Whether or not the Congress was an indispensable party to the consolidated petitions.
4. Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment from examining the
persistence of rebellion in Mindanao.
5. Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216.
6. Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for extension of martial
law is subject to judicial review.
7. Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
8. Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216.
9. Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of the President’s exercise of
military powers.
10. Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive
writ.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 fatal to their
petitions. NO.
The Court held that since Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is an official act of Congress, the they can take
judicial notice thereof. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that a court can take judicial notice of
the official acts of the legislative department without the introduction of evidence.
Moreover, the Court noted that respondents annexed a copy of the Resolution to their Consolidated
Comment.
SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent. YES.
The Court held that the President should be dropped as party respondent considering that he enjoys the
presidential immunity from suit.
The Court reiterated their ruling in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, to wit:
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs
his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.
THIRD ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress was an indispensable party to the consolidated petitions. YES.
The Court held that in cases impugning the extension of martial law for lack of sufficient factual basis, the
entire body of the Congress, composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, must be impleaded,
being an indispensable party thereto.
The Court further ruled that in these consolidated petitions, petitioners are questioning the constitutionality
of a congressional act, specifically the approval of the President’s request to extend martial law in Mindanao.
Clearly, therefore, it is the Congress as a body, and not just its leadership, which has interest in the subject
matter of these cases.
FOURTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment from
examining the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao. NO.
The Court held that as to the second requirement, there was np identity of issues between the Lagman and
Padilla cases, on one hand, and the case at bar.
Conclusiveness of judgment, a species of the principle of res judicata, bars the re-litigation of any right, fact or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits. In order to successfully apply in a succeeding
litigation the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, mere identities of parties and issues is required.
The issue put forth by petitioners in the earlier Lagman case, which this Court already settled, refers to the
existence of a state of rebellion which would trigger the President’s initial declaration of martial law, whereas
the factual issue in the case at bar refers to the persistence of the same rebellion in Mindanao which would
justify the extension of martial law.
The fact that petitioners are not barred from questioning the alleged persistence of the rebellion in these
consolidated petitions is also supported by the transitory nature of the Court’s judgment on the sufficiency of
the factual basis for a declaration of martial law.
Verily, the Court’s review in martial law cases is largely dependent on the existing factual scenario used as
basis for its imposition or extension. The gravity and scope of rebellion or invasion, as the case may be, should
necessarily be re-examined, in order to make a justiciable determination on whether rebellion persists in
Mindanao as to justify an extension of a state of martial law.
FIFTH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No.
216. NO.
The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they emphasized that the Court’s jurisdiction
under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is special and specific, different from those enumerated in
Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. It was further stressed therein that the standard of review in a petition for
certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions, whereas under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is
tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency powers.
Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is not
the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will emasculate the Court’s
constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII, which was precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard
against possible martial law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
Finally, the Court held that a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s expanded jurisdiction is not the proper
remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the Congress’ extension of the proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.
 PRELIMINARIES ON MARTIAL LAW
Congressional check on martial law
Congressional check on the President’s martial law and suspension powers thus consists of:
1. The power to review the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and to revoke such proclamation or suspension. The review is “automatic in the sense that it
may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension is made.” The Congress’
decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the President.
2. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension, upon the President’s initiative, for
such period as it may determine, if the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
Joint executive and legislative act
When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or suspension, as described during the
deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, becomes a “joint executive and legislative act” or a “collective
judgment” between the President and the Congress.
SIXTH ISSUE: Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for
extension of martial law is subject to judicial review. NO.
The Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the absence of any
constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that the above-quoted rules of the Joint Session violated
any provision or right under the Constitution.
Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its rules, the Court, in the
case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, et al. explained that the limitation
of this unrestricted power deals only with the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It should be
added that there must be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by
the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.
In the instant case, the rules in question did not pertain to quorum, voting or publication. Furthermore,
deliberations on extending martial law certainly cannot be equated to the consideration of regular or ordinary
legislation. The Congress may consider such matter as urgent as to necessitate swift action, or it may take its
time investigating the factual situation. This Court cannot engage in undue speculation that members of
Congress did not review and study the President’s request based on a bare allegation that the time allotted for
deliberation was too short.
SEVENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. YES.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon
the initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus.
What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend such
proclamation or suspension are (1) that the extension should be upon the President’s initiative; (2) that it
should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and
(3) that it is subject to the Court’s review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any
citizen.
Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation and suspension.
However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that
that the extension shall be “for a period to be determined by the Congress.”
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez’s proposal to limit the extension to 60 days was not adopted by the majority of
the Commission’s members. The framers evidently gave enough flexibility on the part of the Congress to
determine the duration of the extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article VII and the records of the
deliberation of the Constitutional Commission buttress the view that as regards the frequency and duration
of the extension, the determinative factor is as long as “the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety
requires” such extension.
EIGHTH ISSUE: Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend
Proclamation No. 216. YES.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the extension of the
proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion
or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension.
Rebellion persists as to satisfy the first condition for the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate that the rebellion, which
caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its “remnants” have been resolute in
establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and training of new
members, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and continued attacks.
AFP General Guerrero also cited, among others, the continued armed resistance of the DAESH-inspired DIWM
and their allies. Moreover, The AFP’s data also showed that Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting as
instructors to the new members of the Dawlah Islamiyah.
Also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi, the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebellion no
longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana, during the Congress’ Joint Session on December 13, 2017, explained that
while the situation in Marawi has substantially changed, the rebellion has not ceased but simply moved to
other places in Mindanao.
Acts upon which extension was based posed danger to general public
The Court also ruled that the acts, circumstances and events upon which the extension was based posed a
significant danger, injury or harm to the general public.
The Court added that the information upon which the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be based principally emanate from and are in the possession of the
Executive Department. Thus, “the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the Executive
Department; in tum, the Executive Department will have to open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court.”
The Executive Department did open its findings to the Court when the· AFP gave its “briefing” or
“presentation” during the oral arguments, presenting data, which had been vetted by the NICA, “based on
intelligence reports gathered on the ground,” from personalities they were able to capture and residents in
affected areas, declassified official documents, and intelligence obtained by the PNP. According to the AFP, the
same presentation, save for updates, was given to the Congress. As it stands, the information thus presented
has not been challenged or questioned as regards its reliability.
The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply establish that rebellion persists in
Mindanao and public safety is significantly endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient
factual basis for the further extension sought by the President and approved by the Congress in its Resolution
of Both Houses No. 4.
NINTH ISSUE: Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of the President’s
exercise of military powers. NO.
The Court reiterated their ruling in the earlier Lagman case that the determination of which among the
Constitutionally given military powers should be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a
prerogative of the President. The Court’s power of review, as provided under Section 18, Article VII do not
empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon the President, as to which and how these
military powers should be exercised.
TENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites for the issuance of an
injunctive writ. NO.
By jurisprudence, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioners have the burden to establish the following
requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3)
that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage; and
(4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
Petitioners anchored their prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ on respondents’ gross transgressions of
the Constitution when they extended the martial law in Mindanao for one year. The Lagman petition likewise
alleges that petitioner Villarin, a Davao City resident, is personally prejudiced by the extension or martial law
in Mindanao “which would spawn violations of civil liberties of Mindanaoans like petitioner Villarin who is a
steadfast critic of the Duterte administration and of the brutalities committed by police and military forces”.
The alleged violations of the petitioners’ civil liberties do not justify the grant of injunctive relief. The
petitioners failed to prove that the alleged violations are directly attributable to the imposition of martial
law. They likewise failed to establish the nexus between the President’s exercise of his martial law powers and
their unfounded apprehension that the imposition “will target civilians who have no participation at all in any
armed uprising or struggle”. Incidentally, petitioners failed to state what the “civil liberties” specifically refer
to, and how the extension of martial law in Mindanao would threaten these “civil liberties” in derogation of
the rule of law. Evidently, petitioners’ right is doubtful or disputed, and can hardly be considered a clear legal
right, sufficient for the grant of an injunctive writ.
This Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend upon competent proof
and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances. We emphasize that the grant or
denial of an injunctive writ cannot be properly resolved by suppositions, deductions, or even presumptions,
with no basis in evidence, for the truth must have to be determined by the procedural rules of admissibility
and proof.
Incidentally, there is nothing in the Constitution, nor in any law which supports petitioners’ theory. Such
purported human right violations cannot be utilized as ground either to enjoin the President from exercising
the power to declare martial law, or the Congress in extending the same. To sanction petitioners’ plea
would result into judicial activism, thereby going against the principle of separation of powers.
As discussed above, petitioners are not left without any recourse. Such transgressions can be addressed in a
separate and independent court action. Hence, petitioners can lodge a complaint-affidavit before the
prosecutor’s office or file a direct complaint before the appropriate courts against erring parties.
 Spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino vs Jose Cuisia
November 7, 2010
472 SCRA 505 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Executive Department – Qualified Political Agency –
when not applied – Borrowing Powers of the President
During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with a scheme to reduce the country’s
external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought
to initiate the program for foreign debts – they are basically buyback programs and bond-conversion
programs. The spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their
minor children who are Filipino citizens, together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred that the
buyback and bond-conversion schemes were onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or
“guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such
power, unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts
is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President, hence, the respondents herein,
Central Bank Governor Josse Cuisia et al, cannot incur debts for the Philippines or such power can be
delegated to them. Constantino argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the
Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of
pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the
propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken
toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the
concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more
often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional
interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the
holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the
government. The act of the Cuisia et al are not unconstitutional.
Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification
by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation
which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise
of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would

prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive

submission that not respondents but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the

they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the said scheme. suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by
ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt power to the
the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a
respondents.
showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
HELD: Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the President may contract
or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country with prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no
distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the
President can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of
Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the
fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep
within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of
funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the
President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to
 Spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino vs Jose Cuisia
November 7, 2010
472 SCRA 505 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Executive Department – Qualified Political Agency –
when not applied – Borrowing Powers of the President
During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with a scheme to reduce the country’s
external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought
to initiate the program for foreign debts – they are basically buyback programs and bond-conversion
programs. The spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their
minor children who are Filipino citizens, together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred that the
buyback and bond-conversion schemes were onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or
“guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such
power, unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts
is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President, hence, the respondents herein,
Central Bank Governor Josse Cuisia et al, cannot incur debts for the Philippines or such power can be
delegated to them. Constantino argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the
Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of
pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the
propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken
toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the
concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more
often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional
interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the
holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the
government. The act of the Cuisia et al are not unconstitutional.
Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification
by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation
which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise
of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would

prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive

submission that not respondents but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the

they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the said scheme. suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by
ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt power to the
the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a
respondents.
showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
HELD: Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the President may contract
or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country with prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no
distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the
President can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of
Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the
fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep
within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of
funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the
President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to