SECOND DIVISION In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks Article 41 of the Family Code expressly
pondent judge seeks Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor
of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted
evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he
contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the
wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony
between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside
his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at
the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which
does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of
Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away
from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator,
respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal
Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the
mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as
judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack
of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No.
OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy,"
which is still pending.
exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between
Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn
F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by
the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that
Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost
seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that
in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he
did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which
states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that
article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since
the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution
of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part
of complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be
dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer
thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to
prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is
"separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint
affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer,
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued
by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that
they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving
rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint
affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death,
and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony.
We do not agree.
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this
provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has
been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively
dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death.
Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error
on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article
35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from
the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under
Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony
outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the
Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers
the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the
office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on
the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29
of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer
in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house
or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the
justification for his having solemnized the marriage between
Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's
jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be
held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that
either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed
to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this
provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3,
one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized
by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision,
refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not
alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided
in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not
invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to
marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or
a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while understanding of the law.
it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability. 5 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with acts will be dealt with more severely.
authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent
judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross
ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases
brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is
due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts,
are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than
the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in
instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply
the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a
shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by
those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make
mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is
considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its
Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO
NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit
dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a
car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of
the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have
no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could
file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City,
Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family
Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following
issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at
the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal
is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased
father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity
of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's
death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the
action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent
before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an
action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review
with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's
averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"."
It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal
effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon
motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to
the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically,
the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case
law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."
13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least
five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and
contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their
names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt
them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we
now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be
resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated
under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five
year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year
continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being
lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or
intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of
a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor
is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is
counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved
at anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated
to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would
be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those
who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must
be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should
not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be
no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar
thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the
local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the
local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down
the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application
for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the
same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The
Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital
affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming
that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year
period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.
It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the
law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact
from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where
there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality
to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void after his
death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code
20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage
relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file
an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons
who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be
the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed
by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except
in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage
can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as
well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary,
the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void
hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void
marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or
both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which
cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes
either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense,
then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is

necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For
other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family
Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only
for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the

Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil
Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
July 27, 2016
G.R. No. 204494
JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO,
Petitioners
vs.
LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated August 6,
2012 and the Resolution3 dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA affirmed the
Decision4 dated July 23, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No. 69611.
The Facts
On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5
docketed as Civil Case No. 69611 against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-
Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along with
Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses
Maya), seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale6
dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002.7
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surv1vmg spouse of the
late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They were married in a civil
ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their
marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on
December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a
previous relationship.8
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real
properties located in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by the
following Transfer Certificate of Title/s (TCT/s):
1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),
2. TCTNo. 60069/T-301(nowTCTNo. 11106-R),
3. TCTNo. 5109/T-26 (nowTCTNo. 11107),
4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),
5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and
6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R).9
According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement
between him and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to
their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent,
Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on
January 23, 2002 transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos.
20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new
certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died
on September 21, 2002,11 Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on
October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She
secured new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R,
44637 and 8003.12
Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of
his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a
compulsory heir of Severina.13
In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,14 which the trial
court considered as the Answer of her husband, Gerard,15 Jo-Ann
countered that she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her
mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a
common-law relationship which they both acknowledged and
formally terminated through a Partition Agreement16 executed in
November 1980. This was implemented through another Partition
Agreement17 executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already
received the properties apportioned to him by virtue of the said
agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of
Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs covering
Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and she was
described therein as single without reference to any husband.18
Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's
stance in their Answer,19 stating that Maria Luisa is also not aware
that Luis and Severina were married. She is cognizant of the fact
that Luis and Severina lived together as common-law husband and
wife - a relationship which was terminated upon execution of a
Partition Agreement. In the Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina
were described as single and they acknowledged that they were
living together as common-law spouses. They also mutually agreed
to the partition of the properties they owned in common. Hence,
Luis already received his share in the properties20 and is estopped
from denying the same.21 After the termination of their
cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA),
married one Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while Maria
Luisa was left under the guardianship and custody of Severina.22 It
was after the death of Severina that Maria Luisa executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Severina de
Asis on October 25, 2002. The Spouses Maya were also able to
obtain a Certificate of No Record of Marriage23 (between Luis and
Severina) from the Office the Civil Registrar General of the National
Statistics Office.24
Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented
documentary evidence which included a certified true copy of his
marriage contract with Severina,25 the Spouses Salgado and
Spouses Maya filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.26 The
Spouses Salgado disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's
marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license as borne out by
the marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis himself
disclosed on cross-examination that he did not procure a marriage
license prior to the alleged marriage.27 Luis had also admitted the
existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition
Agreement.28 The logical conclusion therefore is that the properties
disposed in favor of Jo-Ann were owned by Severina as her own,
separate and exclusive properties, which she had all the right to
dispose of, without the conformity of Luis.29
On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers,
explaining that the sufficiency of evidence presented by Luis is
evidentiary in nature and may only be controverted by evidence to
the contrary.30 The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their
separate motions for reconsideration,31 which the trial court
denied.32 Consequently, both the Spouses Salgado and Spouses
·Maya filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the CA.33
Meanwhile, the Spouses Salgado were deemed to have waived their
presentation of evidence when they failed to attend the scheduled
hearings before the trial court.34

Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence
filed by the Spouses Salgado, the CA Second Division directed the
trial court "to properly resolve with deliberate dispatch the
demurrer to evidence in accordance with Section 3, Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by stating clearly and distinctly the
reason therefor on the basis of [the Spouses Salgado's] proffered
evidence[,]"35 whereas the CA Ninth Division dismissed the petition
of the Spouses Maya and ordered the trial court to decide the case
with deliberate dispatch.36
In an Order37 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the
order of the CA to resolve the demurrer to evidence in more specific
terms, denied the twin demurrers to evidence for lack of merit and
held that the totality of evidence presented by Luis has sufficiently
established his right to obtain the reliefs prayed for in his complaint.
Ruling of the RTC
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision38 in favor of Luis,
holding that the marriage between Luis and Severina was valid. It
noted that the marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys
the presumption of regularity in its execution and is conclusive as to
the fact of marriage.39 The trial court also based its ruling in
Geronimo v. CA40where the validity of marriage was upheld despite
the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage
contract.41 The trial court thus declared that the properties covered
by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which
cannot be disposed of by Severina without the consent of her
husband, Luis.42
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of [Luis] and against [the Spouses Salgado] ordering as follows:
1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO
FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) Unilateral Deeds of Sale, all
dated January 23, 2002 executed by [Severina] in favor of [Jo-Ann];
2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO
FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) [TCT] Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R
and 11106-R covering the subject properties, all issued in the name
of [Jo-Ann] by the Registry of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila;
3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R,
11105-R and 11106-R (formerly TCT Nos. 5109, 20618 and 60069,
respectively) to the conjugal community of properties between
[Luis] and [Severina].
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.43
On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another Decision44 which
ordered the "ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and
DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis executed by
[Maria Luisa] dated October 25, 2002 x x x."45 The RTC also ordered
the cancellation of new TCTs issued by virtue of the said Deeds.46
The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective
motions for reconsideration on September 11, 200747 and August
28, 2007,48 respectively, which the RTC denied in the Omnibus
Order49 dated October 30, 2007 for lack of merit. This prompted
the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya to file their separate notices
of appeal before the CA on December 13, 200750 and April 24,
2009,51 respectively.
Ruling of the CA
The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise
Agreement52 which was approved by the CA in its Decision53 dated
October 26, 2011. This resulted in the termination of the Spouses
Maya's appeal.54
On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision,55 dismissing the
appeal of the Spouses Salgado. The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado] is
DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 23, 2007 of the [RTC] of Pasig is
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.56
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that
the Spouses Salgado did not present and formally offer any
testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the evidence
presented by Luis.57 The CA further explained that "the best
evidence to establish the absence of a marriage license is a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the parties to the
Marriage Contract did not secure a marriage license or at the very
least a certification from the said office that despite diligent search,
no record of application for or a marriage license was issued on or
before December 28, 1966 in favor of Luis and Severina. Again,
Spouses Salgado failed to prove the same by their failure to secure
the said certification and present evidence during the trial."58
The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for
reconsideration59 which the CA denied through its Resolution60
dated November 26, 2012.
The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising
the core issue of whether the CA committed reversible error in
affirming the RTC decision which declared the marriage between
Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.
Ruling of the Court
The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and
Severina is null and void for want of marriage license based on the
Marriage Contract61 presented by Luis which has adequately
established its absence.62
Luis, in his Comment,63 opposes the filing of the present petition on
the ground that it raises a question of fact, which cannot be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari. He also countered that the
Spouses Salgado did not present any evidence to support their
theory.64 If the existence of the marriage license is in issue, it is
incumbent upon the Spouses Salgado to show the lack of marriage
license by clear and convincing evidence.65
Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition,
the Court shall first tackle the procedural issue raised by Luis which
pertains to the propriety of the filing of this petition for review on
certiorari.
Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question
of law, mainly, whether the absence of a marriage license may be
proven on the basis of a marriage contract which states that no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on account
of the marriage being of an exceptional character.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought
before it from the appellate court is, as a general rule, limited to
reviewing errors of law, there are exceptions66 recognized by the
Court, such as when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.67
Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to
determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time
of its celebration68 on December 28, 1966.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 5369
of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for marriages of
exceptional character,70 renders the marriage void ab initio
pursuant to Article 80(3 ). It sets forth:
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character;
x x x x. (Emphasis ours)
"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit,
these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point
of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (3)
consular marriages, (4) ratification of marital cohabitation, (5)
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages, and (7) mixed marriages."71 To reiterate, in any of the
aforementioned marriages of exceptional character, the
requirement of a valid marriage license is dispensed with.
The marriage is not of an
exceptional character
A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina
reveals that no marriage license number was indicated therein. It
also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil
Code) being cited as the reason therefor. The pertinent portion of
the marriage contract is quoted as follows:
[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x
on x x x, 19 x x x in favor of, said parties, was exhibited to me or no
marriage license was exhibited to me, this marriage being of an
exceptional character performed under Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; x x
x.72
The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract
is not dismissible. Being a public document, the marriage contract is
not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. This is pursuant to Section 44,
Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made
in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines,
or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage
contract are prima facie proof that at the time of their marriage, no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the
reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under
Article 77 of the Civil Code.
Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire
to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations, rites, or
practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be
necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title
and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely
religious ceremony.
The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed
with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was solemnized
civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the
subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious
practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the
required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent
religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be
applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious
ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with
law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious
in nature.
Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and
Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil ceremony
officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage
appearing on the records. This was also consistently affirmed by Luis
in open court:
Atty. Francisco:
Q- You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as
Exhibit A certifying that you were married to the late [Severina].
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Do you recall when this marriage took place?
A- As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my
daughter get (sic) one (1) year old. That was 1966 December
something like 28, because she was born December 30, the death of
Jose Rizal. I can remember 1965. So, before she turned one (1) year
old two (2) days before we got married here in San Juan.
Q- So, when was she born if you can recall?
A- Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.
Q- If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- If you can recall who solemnized the marriage?
A- It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan.73
xxxx
[Atty. Valenton:] x x x You alleged during your direct examination
that you were married to [Severina]?
A: Yes sir.
Q: When do you say you marr[ied] her?
A: Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is
December 28, 1966.74 (Emphasis ours)
Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only
marriage ceremony between the parties and this was not
solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or
regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does
not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident
that the twin requirements of the provision, which are: prior civil
marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony,
were not complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus,
this marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage
license is required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.
Absence of marriage license
The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the
existence or non-existence of the marriage license?
Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage
contract itself that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the
Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not obtain in their
case, it is the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required
marriage license.
However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed
issued to them at the time of their marriage, Luis relied mainly on
the presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption does not
hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract),
which on its face has established that no marriage license was
presented to the solemnizing officer. If there was a marriage license
issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the marriage contract
was not explained at all. Neither the original nor a copy of the
marriage license was presented. No other witness also testified to
prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify
regarding its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one,
and is uncertain about the documents they purportedly submitted
in the Municipal Hall. As he revealed in his testimony:
ATTY. VALENTON:
Q- How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place COURT:
between you and [Severina]?
But in this particular case before you went to the house of the
A TTY. FRANCISCO: May I know the materiality, Your Honor? Mayor for the solemnization of your marriage, did you apply for a
marriage license?
ATTY. VALENTON: We are exploring as to whether there was really a
wedding that took place, Your Honor. A- No. 76
COURT: Answer. x x xx
What preparations were done? RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
A- There was no preparation because we were just visitors of the [LUIS]:
Mayor during that time and the Mayor is a close friend of
ours.1âwphi1 So, when he knew that we are traveling, we are going Q- Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you were
to Thailand with the invitation of a friend to work with him in asked by counsel as well as a question was raised by the Honorable
Thailand, he told us you better get married first before you travel Court whether or not you applied for a marriage license when you
because your daughter will be illegitimate.75 got married on December 28, 1966 allegedly with [Severina]. Can
you tell the Court what you meant by that?
xxxx
COURT:
ATTY. VALENTON:
By what?
Q- Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?
ATTY. FRANCISCO:
A- We did not.
When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court.
Q- So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?
COURT:
A- No.
Whether he applied?
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS
ATTY. FRANCISCO:
[Q-] There was no marriage license?
Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the
A- Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license. solemnization of the marriage, you answered No.
COURT: WITNESS:
Not necessarily. I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something affidavit
or application before we went to the house of the Mayor to get
A- But, I don't know whether there was an application for the marry (sic) but that was about - - I cannot recall if that past (sic) a
license because it was at the house of the Mayor. week or 2 days or 3 days ago.
ATTY. FRANCISCO:
Q- You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you
used we, whom are you referring to?
A- [Severina].
Q- And, yourself?
A- Yes.
Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with
[Severina] before the solemnization of the marriage?
A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the
Registrar, Office of the [M]ayor or Office of the Chief of
Police.1awp++i1 I cannot recall. It is inside the Munisipyo of San
Juan.
Q- Who made you sign that Affidavit?
A- The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our
marriage. They let us signed (sic) an application or affidavit. I cannot
recall what it is.77 (Emphasis ours)
In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the
CA failed to consider the glaring statements in the marriage contract
that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer
and that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77
of the Civil Code, the latter statement being fallacious. Both the RTC
and CA upheld the fact of marriage based on the marriage contract
but simply glossed over the part stating that the marriage is of an
exceptional character. It is inevitable to deduce that this is not a
case of mere non-recording of the marriage license number on the
marriage contract, as was in Geronimo.78
The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the
case under review, hence, inapplicable. In Geronimo, despite the
absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract
presented by therein petitioner (brother of the deceased), there
was no statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional
character. Various witnesses also testified that the deceased and
her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the husband
of the deceased was able to produce a copy of the marriage
contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section
where the marriage license number appears.
"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license
must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties."79 Considering that the
absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage
contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of
an exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was
presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that the
marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid
marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot,80the Court similarly declared
that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license based on a
fabricated claim of exceptional character, is void. In lieu of a
marriage license, therein parties to the marriage executed a false
affidavit of marital cohabitation. In declaring the marriage void, the
Court rejected the notion that all the formal and essential requisites
of marriage were complied with. The Court held that to permit a
false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an
abject circumvention of the law. It was further explained:
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of
the statements in the parties' affidavit will not affect the validity of
marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied
with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be
denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated
without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose
and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.
xxxx
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that
the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have
cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no
marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in
the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a
mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie,
then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence,
it is as if there was no affidavit at all.81
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the
marriage contract because these refer to the absence of a formal
requisite of marriage. "The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing
a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception."82 "The requirement and issuance of
marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
'autonomous social institution."'83
Partition Agreement is Valid
Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their
cohabitation, Luis and Severina executed a notarized Partition
Agreement84 in November 1980, which divided their properties
between them without court intervention. Luis sought to annul such
agreement on the ground that "the separation of property is not
effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the
parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It,
therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial approval, without
which it is void."85
The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture.
In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City,86the Court held that "[i]n
a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may
be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
Civil Code x x x."87 It provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their .ioint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.88 (Emphasis ours)
As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to
marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering
that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid
marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,89 in relation to
Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law
governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code
"applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a
marriage license."90 "Under this property regime, property acquired
by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed
by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during presented himself to be the husband of Severina. Not even their
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. During trial, he never
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition presented any other witness to the marriage. He contends that his
of the property shall still be considered as having contributed marriage to Severina was valid and subsisting, yet he knowingly
thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and contracted a subsequent marriage abroad. Verily, Luis failed to
maintenance of the family household."'91 prove the validity of their marriage based on the evidence he
himself had presented.
Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code
shall apply in the partition of the properties co-owned by Luis and "The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for
"partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties,
thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making
thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may be a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of
validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a
may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval for well."95
the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the
partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6,
execution of the Partition Agreement. 2012 and the Resolution dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are hereby REVERSED and SET
Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.
authenticity of the Partition Agreement.92 It also remains
uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated in
the Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason to have
the said agreement declared null and void or annulled, in the
absence of any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or
at least, voidable.
All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of
no record of marriage license or certification of "due search and
inability to find" a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of the license,93 such
certification is not the only proof that could validate the absence of
a marriage license.
In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's
marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer, coupled with a contrived averment therein that
the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the
Civil Code, are circumstances which cannot be disregarded.
Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis' failure to assert his
marriage to Severina during the latter's lifetime is suspect. Luis left
for the USA in 1981, and until Severina' s death in 2002, he never
saw, much less reconciled with her.94 All those years, he never
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R.
No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-
Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose
Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa
were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized
by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and
Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and
that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated
between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit
stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least
five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured
through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his
filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in
1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in
Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later,
Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother
from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal
from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached
them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that
the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so.
However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get
both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave
them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987
when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He
alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the
sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he discovered
that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he
confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and
defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had
maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of
marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred
contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.5
In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to
Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa
filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found
Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and
meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one
year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the
Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence
presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the
[C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED
with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented,
the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November
1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any
attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could
have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they
were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he
who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said
package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on
guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that
her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it
took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces
of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract.
[Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court,
to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by
the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he
wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and
liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered
the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false.
[Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the
person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not
believe that the only reason why her name was written in his
company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just
but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully
wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she
testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the
marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29,
1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the
name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he
voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken
on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable
Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by
her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the
more belied his claim that his consent was procured through
fraud.10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action
had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which
requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the
discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was
obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he
could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered
the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take
any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to
the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court
of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive
portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage
between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the
marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the
prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck
down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was
employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action
for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and
(5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of
marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by
fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party
within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four
(4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch
as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then
he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that
Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that
his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the
effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife
for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the
marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals
gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer
over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted
that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V.
Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court
of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was
a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged.
According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did
not require that either one of the contracting parties to the
marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or
religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718 of
the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion
for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was
that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from
a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision,
dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and
SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between
Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar
of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of
this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit
that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried,
they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they
desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing
a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united
in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character,
shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between
Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement
of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the
absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no
avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May
2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this
Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set
aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing
the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this
Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of
uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments
for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE
VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS
AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by
reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior
marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation
with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the
annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an
administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid
liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their
marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and
Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly
tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances
give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between
Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing
this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress
its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose
and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used
in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the
falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity
of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were
complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to
investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated
a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic
posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage
was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the
signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered
a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the
Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he
wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993
issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay
City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband
and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2
May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue
of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A
survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as
a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites
are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
(Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code,
but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code
makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of
the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage
Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the
marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority
granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit,
these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point
of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2)
consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4)
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation
under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is
that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such
persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing
their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed
an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity;
that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to
marry each other."37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar
is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-
year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to
the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with
exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter
by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine
qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained
the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no
other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The
exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since
the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five
years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of
the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law
not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also
prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite
facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
months before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of
Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to
her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or
March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also
cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they
satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A
question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings
are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-
settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is
when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the
exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals
and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if
such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial
evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986,
executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement
of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of
the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of
marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied
with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be
denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated
without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose
and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this
Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar.
Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an
apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be
applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered
into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence,
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every
intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will
not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was
entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance
with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional
circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license
is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by
making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the
defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If
this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we
must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures
set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that
the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have
cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no
marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in
the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a
mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie,
then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence,
it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,
estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it
is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage
does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that
the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76
means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot
void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal
liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the

argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be
stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a
law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose
is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for
lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived
together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent
marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according
to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the
March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J.
Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at
Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted
Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued
by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as
shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the
Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent
were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While
the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on
May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy –
respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had
revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and
while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending –
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court
in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed
on the ground that it stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the
Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that
the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of
any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is,
respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree
obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his
first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract
a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian,
to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes
absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to
the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the
Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11,
13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable
provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely
erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment
granting the divorce decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we
shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20
petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign
judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon
proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law
of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist).
In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to
show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-
off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil
Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and
proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees
that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in
evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements
under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read
as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the
contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such
license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous
marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish,
instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or
her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the
marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce
decree is a public document – a written official act of an Australian
family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is
given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a
foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May
18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected,
not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial
court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce
law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the
validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant
of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in
that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce
law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take
judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution
or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden
of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are
denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent,
the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the
divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was
validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal
capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense,
divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some
other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may
allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence,
we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on
this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree
raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his
civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for
the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal
effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by
Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the
application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the
records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit
"A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino)
on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit
"C" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino)
and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon,
Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment
between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its
records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship
of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended
Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit
"3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d)
Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family
Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and
Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent,
who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity
to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very
least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to

respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may
turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we
believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the
trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo
may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial

justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of
receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the
parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to
make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented
as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1
dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4,
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had
declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated
to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as
follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-
an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A.
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26
OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid
mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to
file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore,
the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation.
The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife
obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry
filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must
be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is
ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired
alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of
marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration
of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we
must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place,
and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to
cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family
Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)
registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose
spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who
are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce
even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly
divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced
here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made
into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed
that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v.
Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the
same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper
remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a
long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage
tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain
married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce
decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule
that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove
his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen.
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14
Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show
that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we
are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that
his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence
in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is

GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July
2001,1 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy
and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a
Complaint3 for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent
Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford
Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their
union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert,
and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of
their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-
tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the
Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of
their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the
care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the
U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said
request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the
letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an
American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came
back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu
Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to
Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow
and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines
several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child,
Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child,
Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live
with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and
in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada
Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years
since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no
more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus
finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to
Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June
1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen
since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she
admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having
five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by
respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no
more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was
because of the latter’s drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere
effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of
their household. She could not have been extravagant since the
family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left
for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job
and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the
Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left
all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide
financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus.
Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A.,
except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons.
While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied
having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to
sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from
respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and
acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American
citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present
nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself
was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She
also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of
₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain
operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely
also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus
null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely
the ₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial
Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present
their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in
support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September
1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health
Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract
between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3)
the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein
Fely openly used her American husband’s surname, Micklus.9
Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take
the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus,
Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular
officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where
the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13
issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and
California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon
written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted
to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since
respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed
to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order,
dated 05 October 1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her right
to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for
decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its
Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings –
The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a
reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiff’s testimony is
decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply
with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing
fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence
presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the
United States of America and married another man and has
establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous
situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to
another man in another country.
Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or
manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows
the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually
manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this
instance.
Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly
reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution
of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout
the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of
the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such
incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question
is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to
plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case
establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy,
firmly.
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the
Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things
over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was
already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for
these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of
plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and
void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the
RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated
30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no
reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for
declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void, to wit –
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States.
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for
seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage…
… per se constitute psychological incapacity.
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A
FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING
HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE
HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted
provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino
citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she
has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant
has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s citizenship and
thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the
benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino
citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and
thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances,
plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her
total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To
condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and
in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is
incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be
given relief by affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of
the marriage of the parties.16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,17
denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the
instant Petition before this Court, based on the following
arguments/grounds –
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in
accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of
Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained
that Fely’s psychological incapacity was clearly established after a
full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become
an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of
petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to
intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable
laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be
meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to
support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of
the Family Code of the Philippines, reads –

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological
incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for
determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity
was defined, thus –
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated…21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down
by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be
reproduced below –
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition
sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however,
must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during
the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned
jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence
presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is
no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus
before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into
question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of
evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of
Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2)
the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which
Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even considering the
admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent
Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to
convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that
prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article
36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt
and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her
hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her
flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may
indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with
her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not
identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified,
then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to
be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it
is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist
or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29
respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement
laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the
root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness
and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.32
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines –
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and
the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its
plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied
to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the
time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted
in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in
1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the
same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen
since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino
citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and
legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine
laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained
a divorce from respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent
Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office
of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition
on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides –
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General
does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal
defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office
of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the
services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land,
then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and
contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this
Court or the Court of Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when
the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it
shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate
courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and
practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the
RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the
interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of
the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as
follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)],
this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)]
reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals
[Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State…37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should
dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of
the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the
State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to
intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to
higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below –
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –
… or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of
the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of
the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of
its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the
same period.
… 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of
Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the
public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It
may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No
other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. –
… remains valid and subsisting. SO ORDERED.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or
by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication
failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of
the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
…
Sec. 20. Appeal. –
…
(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General
may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within
fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration
on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to
those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity
and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely.
At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this
Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously
shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is
one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answer to every individual problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,
affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the
RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March
2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper
venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file
the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2
on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started
to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14
January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4)
and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately
issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case
from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
– because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the
case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in
"gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides
that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements
may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8
Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the
wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to
declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration
of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a
special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10
In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the
status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and
wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as
void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code
on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd
words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the
party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity
would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a
bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the
"procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for
divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree
of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the
dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule
108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or
correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to
annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the
trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition
based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a
case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the
defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed"
the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he
substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he
"is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x
x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of
impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited
Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should
be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x
which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition
based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that
this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover,
the verification and certification against forum shopping of the
petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General
and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their
comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the
Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the
RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x
x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor
General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an
injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited
Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he
or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal
remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of
the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage
which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz
concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the
Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and
status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears
on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be
proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional
infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De
Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to
comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition.42
Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she
was previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he
inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand,
Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say
might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife
can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as
a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact
under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such
as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and
the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54
the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd
because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation
on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is
tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign
court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced
back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the
civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the
effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the
rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void
does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as
if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under
which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute
their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as
well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64
Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of
a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the
Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce
decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a
fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment
is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4)
of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of
fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108
creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No.
3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted
by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in
a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has
the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on
the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted
and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt
that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record
of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of
the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68)
his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right
to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of
the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the
union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of
a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section
2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it
refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither
the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of
the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages
void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any
citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more
reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the
public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is
entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For
this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as
a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the
entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus,
the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition
of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in
the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among
these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of
the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is
also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino
citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a
foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine
law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article
26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his
or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to
address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a
Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen,
whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino
spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made
by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce
decree, which is already effective in the country where it was
rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which
declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The
Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse,
after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to
remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the
Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the
Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse
is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A
critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and
a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as
a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse
has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the
only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the
foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its
effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed
in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether
the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy
in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove
an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the
comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states
that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a
right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as
the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy]
shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees
the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and
form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January
2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to
REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with
this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a
petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November
29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after
the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005
to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took
effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found
another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file
any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition.
The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able
to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code
reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative
intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly
asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he
contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the
alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the
doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only
to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to
the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient
legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he
might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in
the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would
be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor
General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support
Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is
in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative
history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages –
void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending
Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO
227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases,
the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of
marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the
alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses.
The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to
be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a
wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law
"to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating
him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree
of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot
be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree),
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in
this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens –
with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence
of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."28 This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section
24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand,
at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with
our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment,
once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as
discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not
for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be
legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate
or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded.
In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil
registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the
civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do
not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be
read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the
foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series
of 198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage,
can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed
the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition
that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not,
by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry.
A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the
civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to
the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case,
we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one
filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be

construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration
of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition
of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can
serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in
terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and

REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the
Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case
No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July
1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an
Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her
putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been
married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked petitioner to
marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married
Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and
parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose
someone who was "without responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be
included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had
been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got
married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for
bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the
prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was
void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife,
Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that
she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.
Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang
only in August and September 1997, or after she had already
married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married
Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on
the more credible account of Galang that she had already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April
1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner
that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by
a person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage,
"her marriage was celebrated without a need for a marriage license
in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an
admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the
celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted
petitioner as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused
Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six
( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to
six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her
marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated
without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if
the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her
case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together
as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence,
she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from
bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused
that is null and void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to
pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos,
something this court cannot do. The best support to her argument
would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment
of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their
marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was
not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the
credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of
the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution
witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos.
Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply
stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her
marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her
conviction for bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-
accused in the instant case, because she was not aware of Santos's
previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to
Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage license. She
elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those
marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not
previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least
five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she
married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in
1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that
their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
respondent advances the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition
should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's
subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any
knowledge of Santos' s first marriage, respondent reiterates that
credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts
a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of
bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been
legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x;
(c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all
the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime,
People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she should have had
knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17
likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of
her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her
responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first
marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of
two persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of
one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be
the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the
second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the
previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included
in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's
knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently
found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of
the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and
visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed
their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person
like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang,
who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who
had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that
she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former
was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or
modify the factual findings of the R TC, less so in the present case in
which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect,
since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the
expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs
with the ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy. However,
we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal
penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out
to her the penalty within the range of prision correctional as
minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21
holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is
liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.
Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person,
whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be
married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an
accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction
should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which
has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the
sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23
prision correctional, which has a duration of six months and one day
to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period
consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and
two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to
Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted
of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the
nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense
during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the
criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27
questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the
ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of
a marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The
RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the validity of the
marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to
attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked
certain issues and facts, 29 and given that an appeal in a criminal
case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now
resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between
petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage license. The
absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was
celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads
as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal
impediment to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in
more or less in February 1996 32 and that after six months of
courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any
objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had
frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their
marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was
residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her
previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross examination,
respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime
in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos
had only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it
follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least
five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this
demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show that they
submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of
the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually
cohabited for at least five years before they married each other.
Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the
Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer stated
under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the
marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in
the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago,
contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they
were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face
an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of
bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a
marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the
cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making
claims in no less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a
bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal
prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct
character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the
State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by
allowing individuals "to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal
acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her
innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery
of the sanctity of marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend
its aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily become a
party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41
If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which
involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left
unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be denied
relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair
and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in
issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative
defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with
Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license.
But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false
Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted
from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that
they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal
marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full well that
they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation
requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it
will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to
use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an
acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked
the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that
when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on
18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their
marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was
celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the
Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public
documents in order to contract a second marriage. In contrast,
petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage,
and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking
her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in
De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of
the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the
whims and caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping
therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the
conviction of petitioner for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum
to four years of prision correctional as maximum plus accessory
penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated February
1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information
which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being previously
united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without
said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging
that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the
second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y.
Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and
void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC
of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision
declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime
of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and
Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for
bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage
between him and private respondent had already been declared
void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted
petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be
dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004 had already been
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in
Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already
final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it
was stated, among others, that the issues raised in the civil case are
not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned
case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not
determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and
arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion that
there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it
appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili
and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness,
non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As
such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set
aside the RTC’s decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No.
128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said
decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24,
2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on
certiorari alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO
DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED
JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG
CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370
GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST
PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS
BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND
DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT,
AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE
TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS
DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS
BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH
FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS
CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT
IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY
TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME
"CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-
6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES
WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL
AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON
DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF
ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration
of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the
crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the
offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of
bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28,
2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for
the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may
still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so
long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction
for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the
celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare
his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action
as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage
to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage
is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the
first marriage was annulled.11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the
aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person criminally
liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further
held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the
offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant,
liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.13 It is
clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner
from the time he contracted the second marriage with private
respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal
charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of
the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an
individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are
concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were
wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was
going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage,
this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas
learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether
the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten
letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was
indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4
The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-
L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful
marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which
second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with
Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to
each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage
contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he
requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila
whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes,
but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City,
Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment
of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS
ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE
AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in
which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes,
and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second
marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of
the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his
acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both
documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage
between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract
between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which,
as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall
before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to
by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a
handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994,
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally
married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented
(1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated
October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these
documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record
of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot
adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public
documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract,
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract,
issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the
best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates
that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes
on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification
issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would
plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that
there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and
Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents
merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of
such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a
record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to
the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as
positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence
than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-
serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this
testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner
informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and
petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the
first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the
non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his
brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to
note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office
and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and
February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are
dated after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private
respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the
subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts
to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such,
he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently
declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to
realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment
insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22
Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain
reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on
April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the
crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind,
there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or
subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the
sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and
punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent
character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner
has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by
the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing
officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24
Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of
marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over
eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second
marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr.
of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least
two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is
not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity
and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of
bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record,
petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to
Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is
irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes of
this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate
disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look
kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the
State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy
step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a
duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There
being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same
shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for
review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the
crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.
SEPARATE OPINION>
VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting,
while still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his
second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab
initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity, he
should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a
subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of the prior
union, which would have been binding were it not for its being
bigamous.
Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage,
prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid
defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the
psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained),
the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent
from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to
establish their nullity.2 As early as the case of People vs. Aragon3
this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code
itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the
judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can
be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the
law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision
to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but
that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict
interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage
which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a
defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted
prior to the decree of annulment)4 the complete nullity, however,
of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally
inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a
person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is
ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second
marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of
nullity of the prior marriage.5 I maintain strong reservations to this
ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads:
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed
that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked
"on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime
of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge
Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the
spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage)
void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of
the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been
abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of
Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the
Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say
that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There
is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has amended
or intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the
settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.8
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by
itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to reconcile
the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those of
church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the
essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct
from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or
formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or
disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence
of a marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a
party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a
voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is
judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code
considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before
its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule
on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the
assume, that the spouses’ rights and obligations, property regime essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting
and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a first union. Hence, where it is established that the second marriage
voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially has been contracted without the necessary license and thus void,13
declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological or that the accused is merely forced to enter into the second
incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy
the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal can attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapses refers to
requisites of a valid marriages;10 and second, unlike the other the elements required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all
grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the the requisites for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and
parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal
are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological liability for bigamy can unassailably arise.
incapacity, however, being a mental state, may not so readily be as
evident.11 It would have been logical for the Family Code to Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate
consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in
were not for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to
Canon Law rules and nomenclature. the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be
inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of
merely differ from a voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage
not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might be but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous
recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the
Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite
falling under Article 36, celebrated before the effectivity of the conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the
Code, could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered
Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of into it.
prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers
that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact
that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for
all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially
declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been
declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage
could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of
the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same
way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being
valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the
prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than
the existence of the first marriage, this Court has declared in a line
of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed.12 The Court has
explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,
vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks
to annul the Order1 dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case
No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed
against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the
RTC Resolution2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in
Lezo, Aklan.3 On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the
said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in
San Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on
the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256,
rendered an Amended Decision5 declaring the marriage of
respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final
and executory on October 13, 2003.6
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s
daughter from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court
of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the
complaint was an Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated
August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,9 which
alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio
that she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an
Information10 for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC
of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent
marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first
marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by
proper judicial authorities.11
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the
Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had
already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no
more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on
January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e.,
two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that
since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy
had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13
arguing that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated
when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that
the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which
appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has
not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.
In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It
found respondent's argument that with the declaration of nullity of
her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and
thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to
have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan15 where we
held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage
although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-
complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second
marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already
been consummated by then. x x x16
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the
RTC found that while the second marriage indeed took place in
1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on
November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence,
prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the
Mercado ruling was not applicable, since respondent contracted her
first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition
for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal
complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family
Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair
her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity
of a completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set
aside. Let a new one be entered quashing the information.
Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had
contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the
effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the
Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC
found that both marriages of respondent took place before the
effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state
of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the
principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the
accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of
nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was
declared once and for all valid with the annulment of her first
marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the
prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated
January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that
the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is
tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said
marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in
contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us
raising the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the
enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs.
Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid
defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage
prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement
in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence
prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement
in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a
declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second
marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a
subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without
incurring criminal liability.19
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's
dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed by private
complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which should represent the government in all judicial proceedings
filed before us.20
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had
done in the past. In Antone v. Beronilla,21 the offended party
(private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA)
the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her
husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among
others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the
People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in
all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that
we had given due course to a number of actions even when the
respective interests of the government were not properly
represented by the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the
following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is
aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the
OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order
or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the
State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to
dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required
the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in
some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has
ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of
the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the
petition, which it did, praying that the petition be granted in effect,
such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or
not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed
against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy
as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been
legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage.23 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy
that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage.24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second
marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates
celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been
annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the
elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion
to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage
with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April
2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City.
The said decision was never appealed, and became final and
executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case,
her marriage with Mr. Flores had already been declared void from
the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to
speak of. In other words, there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid
marriages, is therefore wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question
now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first
marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed
against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial,
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage
while the first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting
at the time the second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the accused
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without
legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born
before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract
be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.31
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we
affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling that the
moment the accused contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime
of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage
which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the
first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally
dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would
not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during
the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly
charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the
offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing
of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was
rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not
marriage. enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the declaration nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.34 adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
prosecuted for bigamy.35 subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage
marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would
effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of render nugatory the provision on bigamy.38
securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void
marriage. WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED.
The Order dated September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated
We are not persuaded. January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET
In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial
reconsideration, argued that since her marriages were entered into court for further proceedings.
before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is
Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613),37 instead of Article 40 of SO ORDERED.
the Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent
marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already
made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure,
should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family
Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights."
The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1âwphi1
SECOND DIVISION
February 10, 2016
G.R. No. 199194
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the proper remedy to challenge a trial court's declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 ofThe Family Code of the
Philippines1 (Family Code).2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3assails the October 24, 2011
Decision4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 04158-MIN
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of
the Philippines (Republic).
Factual Antecedents
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed
a Petition5 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz6 City-
Branch 15 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
Netchie S.7 Sareñogon (Netchie).8
In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the
Petition for initial hearing on April 16, 2009. It likewise directed the
publication of said Order in a newspaper of general circulation in the
cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of
Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition.9 Trial then
followed.10
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental
in 1991.11 They later became sweethearts and on August 10, 1996,
they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall.12 However,
they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because
he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a
domestic helper.13 For three months, he did not receive any
communication from Netchie.14 He likewise had no idea about her
whereabouts.15 While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s
parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis
Occidental.16 He returned home after his contract expired.17 He
then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about her
whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was.18 Because
of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already
dead.19 He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract
another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.20
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel
Sareñogon, and by Netchie’s aunt, Consuelo Sande.21 These two
witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband
and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for
separate destinations abroad.22 These two added that they had no
information regarding Netchie’s location.23
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision24 dated January 31, 2011 in Spec. Proc. No. 045-08,
the RTC held that Jose had established by preponderance of
evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under Article 41
of the Family Code.25 The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared
for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that
his wife was indeed already dead.26 The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring respondent presumptively dead for purposes of
remarriage of petitioner.
SO ORDERED.27
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On April 19, 2011, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari28 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In its Decision29 of October 24, 2011, the CA held that the Republic
used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA perceived no error at
all in the RTC’s judgment granting Jose’s Petition for the declaration
of the presumptive death of his wife, Netchie. The CA thus held in
effect that the Republic’s appeal sought to correct or review the
RTC’s alleged misappreciation of evidence which could not translate
into excess or lack of jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of
discretion.30 The CA noted that the RTC properly caused the
publication of the Order setting the case for initial hearing.31 The
CA essentially ruled that, "[a] writ of certiorari may not be used to
correct a lower court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of
judgment, which are correctible by an appeal."32 The CA then
disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.33
Issues
The Republic filed the instant Petition34 raising the following issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION BECAUSE:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC’S PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, ON THE GROUND THAT
THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL THE RTC
DECISION, BECAUSE IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY
JUDGMENTS OR DECISIONS ARE NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE
EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW.
II
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING
WIFE DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELLFOUNDED BELIEF"
THAT RESPONDENT’S ABSENT WIFE X X X IS PROBABLY DEAD.35
Petitioner’s Arguments
The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge an
RTC’s immediately final and executory Decision on a presumptive
death.36

The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose’s alleged
efforts in locating Netchie did not engender or generate a well-
founded belief that the latter is probably dead.37 It maintains that
even as Jose avowedly averred that he exerted efforts to locate
Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the assistance of the
relevant government agencies like the Philippine National Police,
the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration.38 It likewise points out that Jose did not present
any disinterested person to corroborate his allegations that the
latter was indeed missing and could not be found.39 It also
contends that Jose did not advert to circumstances, events,
occasions, or situations that would prove that he did in fact make a
comprehensive search for Netchie.40 The Republic makes the plea
that courts should ever be vigilant and wary about the propensity of
some erring spouses in resorting to Article 41 of the Family Code for
the purpose of terminating their marriage.41
Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert
that he wanted to have Netchie declared presumptively dead
because he intends to get married again, an essential premise of
Article 41 of the Family Code.42
Respondent’s Arguments
Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic’s Petition
because the latter’s petition is erected upon the ground that the CA
did not correctly weigh or calibrate the evidence on record, or
assigned to the evidence its due worth, import or significance; and
that such a ground does not avail in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.43 Jose also contends that the
Republic should have instead filed a motion for reconsideration44 of
the RTC’s Decision of January 31, 2011, reasoning out that a motion
for reconsideration is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law.
Jose furthermore submits that the RTC did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously in granting his petition because it even dutifully
complied with the publication requirement.45 He moreover argues
that to sustain the present petition would allow the executive
branch to unduly make inroads into judicial territory.46 Finally, he
insists that the trial court’s factual findings are entitled to great
weight and respect as these were arrived after due deliberation.47
This Court’s Ruling
This Court finds the Republic’s petition meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to question the RTC’s Decision
in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death
In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,48 we held that the
RTC’s Decision on a Petition for declaration of presumptive death
pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final and
executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of
appeal pertaining to such judgment.49 Concurring in the result,
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban further therein
pointed out that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC Decision
was to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and not a
petition for review under Rule 45.50
We expounded on this appellate procedure in Republic v. Tango:51
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal
of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family
Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules
in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring
summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by
the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall
likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69,
73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs
and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does
not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. x x
x52 (Citation omitted; Underscoring supplied)
"In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may
file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision of
the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court."53
In fact, in Republic v. Narceda,54 we held that the OSG availed of
the wrong remedy when it filed a notice of appeal under Rule 42
with the CA to question the RTC’s Decision declaring the
presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda.55
Above all, this Court’s ruling in Republic v. Cantor56 made it crystal
clear that the OSG properly availed of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 to challenge the RTC’s Order therein declaring Jerry Cantor
as presumptively dead.1âwphi1
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly availed
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in assailing
before the CA the aforesaid RTC’s Decision.
The "well-founded belief" requisite
under Article 41 of the Family Code is
complied with only upon a showing that
sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had
indeed been made to ascertain whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead
We now proceed to determine whether the RTC properly granted
Jose’s Petition.
Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
In Republic v. Cantor,57 we further held that:
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained,
it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the
Family Code, there are four essential requisites for the declaration
of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.58
(Underscoring supplied)
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element
that in this case invites extended discussion), the holding is that the
– month and that after this, there had been no information as to
mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the
law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general
presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice.
This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the
Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving
the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded
belief" which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper
and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only
the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the
absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead.
xxxx
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It
depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be
able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).59 (Emphasis
omitted; underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose has "well-founded belief"
that Netchie was already dead upon the following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie’s parents while he was
still out of the country, but did not reach them as they had allegedly
left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because
when he returned home, he was not able to obtain any information
that Netchie was still alive from Netchie’s relatives and friends;
(3) Jose’s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive,
hence must be presumed dead, was corroborated by Jose’s older
brother, and by Netchie’s aunt, both of whom testified that he
(Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one
Netchie’s whereabouts.
In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor,60 this Court held that
the present spouse (Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor) merely conducted a
"passive search" because she simply made unsubstantiated inquiries
from her in-laws, from neighbors and friends. For that reason, this
Court stressed that the degree of diligence and reasonable search
required by law is not met (1) when there is failure to present the
persons from whom the present spouse allegedly made inquiries
especially the absent spouse’s relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2)
when there is failure to report the missing spouse’s purported
disappearance or death to the police or mass media, and (3) when
the present spouse’s evidence might or would only show that the
absent spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that
the latter was indeed dead.61 The rationale for this palpably
stringent or rigorous requirement has been marked out thus:
x x x [T]he Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in
nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the "strict
standard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not
used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should
never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter
standard required by the Family Code is met. x x x
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more
imperative if we consider the State’s policy to protect and
strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the
family’s foundation and since it is the state’s policy to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic social institution, marriage should
not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. x x x
x x x [I]t has not escaped this Court’s attention that the strict
standard required in petitions for declaration of presumptive death
has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to
cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled
on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less than
the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this
situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict
standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family
Code." (Citations omitted)62

Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a

declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC’s
finding that Jose’s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41
of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief"
standard. If anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the
missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent
diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare
claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to
Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand
specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the
course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie.
Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he
undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for
Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and
naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or
municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific
persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October

24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04158-MIN is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent’s Petition in said Spec.
Proc. No. 045-08 is accordingly DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by
her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling
finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property"
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others
that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth
Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No.
1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona,
Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one
Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in
1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January
23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and
she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of
the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign
employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed
and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence;
out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal
properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which
are under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime
in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that
he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that
he had been disposing of some of her properties without her
knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and
thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-
in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn
over the possession and administration of said properties to her
brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and
possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The
petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising
any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their
marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and
Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all
properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
properties be placed under the proper management and
administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition
stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the
petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous
and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property
which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order
denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first
marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the
case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage
(citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no
dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with
herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal
and void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage
should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case.
In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in
explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed
that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37
SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the
previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of
Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no
property in his possession is an issue that may be determined only
after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous
application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of
justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On
September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt
within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil
action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition.
It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that
of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because
these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife
while the instant case prays for separation of property corollary
with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the
separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired
during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the
status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or
not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner.
Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits,
the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this
proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the
properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code,
it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents
of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it
noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in
refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for
which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer,
proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate
the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit.5

Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are
the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should
be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of
private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties
allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v.
Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent
must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous.
Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the
Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since
the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private
respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore,
be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes
of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with
one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is
from the beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the
absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon
by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was
void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses
to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is
reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in
subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v.
Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and
Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the
husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the
second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment
of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there
is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course
contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that "although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and
applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the
prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful
surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her
deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and
effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the
Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no
need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such
a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of
a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the
Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the
fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne
out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40,
then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis
of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided
in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include
not only void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that
the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine
for himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court
action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the
provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question.
Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of
annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared
invalid, does it include the annulment of a marriage and the
declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the
affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if the
marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that
this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to
require first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not
annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred.
Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid until
a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase
"absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they
change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the
provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with
collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa
explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a
final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not
declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the
other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are,
therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof.
Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the
assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they
depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability
because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that
they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or
invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same
proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void
marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and
suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then
proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may
be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent
marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad
and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that
they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that
if one enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final
judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said
subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back
to the original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article
41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that
his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there
is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of
Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the
latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio
is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained
only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this
purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of
the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in
the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows
that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in
conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for
purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly
qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have
been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus
rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party
might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody
and support of their common children and the delivery of the
latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must
be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which
remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is
legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous
one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words,
for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable
basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for
purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as
an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as
such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms,
the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial
are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation
that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of
the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so
defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of
marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect —
and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution
would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would
be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state
pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment
to a second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be
gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be
included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously
married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved
and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40
of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his
position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition
that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the
dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art.
40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was
in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to
refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only"
refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on
the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they
use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee
approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute
nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private
respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the
recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during
their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be
acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction
to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he
pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as
the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with
private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that
"the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be
raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the
final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated,
but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except
that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the
other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in
bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by
testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad
faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in
favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate
prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their
properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of
property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the
lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the
respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the
lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated
March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida
Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest
observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe,
no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except in the
following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of
Article 40 of the Family Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code in case a party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36,
Family Code), where an action or defense for the declaration of
nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect
(Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed
unaffected by the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity,
albeit the preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the
majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or
the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific instances
where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void
marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void marriages
under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in
relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of
presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following
the annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived
or born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void
marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family
Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered
extant per se. Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under the
old regime nor the absolute community of property under the new
Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their
property relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules
under either Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must
hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the exceptional
effects on children of a void marriage because of the psychological
incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended to cover
even the personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike the
other cases of void marriages where the grounds therefor may be
established by hard facts and with little uncertainty, the term
"psychological incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a
judicial declaration of nullity is made its interim effects can long and
literally hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses
themselves are concerned but also as regards third persons with
whom the spouses deal.
FIRST DIVISION April 18, 2016
G.R. No. 189607
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N; SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1
in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed the same.
The CA reversed the Decision3 dated 23 March 2007 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between the parties on the ground that respondent had a
previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA
believes on the other hand, that respondent was not prevented
from contracting a second marriage if the first one was an
absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to await a
final decree of nullity of the first marriage.
The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA
was correct in holding thus and consequentially reversing the RTC's
declaration of nullity of the second marriage.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married
Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent
married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,4 praying that his marriage to Lea
be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA
states in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of
psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for this finding by
the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others
that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not
secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of
the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.5
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first
marriage to Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision6
declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and
void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of
Finality saying that the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become
final and executory. 7
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8
claiming that the proof adduced by petitioner was insufficient to
warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that
it was bigamous. In his Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that
whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and
regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the
time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was
valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's
demurrer in its Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.
In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio
on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of
the Family Code. 12 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby declares the marriage between RENATO A. CASTILLO and
LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the
Mary the Queen Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage,
under Article 41 of the Family Code. 13
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was
subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her
marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The
lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a
judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial
declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it
also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage
judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled,
since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first
marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with
Renato. 14
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of
their properties were concerned. 15 His motion, however, was
denied by the RTC in its Order16 dated 6 September 2007.
Thereafter, both petitioner17 and Respondent18 filed their
respective Notices of Appeal.
In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside
the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties'
marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's
marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the
applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages
were celebrated, and not the Family Code.20 Furthermore, the CA
ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was
likewise denied in the questioned CA Resolution22 dated 16
September 2009.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision
finding her marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in toto, and that
all properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage be
declared conjugal. In his Reply to the Comment,24 petitioner
reiterated the allegations in his Petition.
OUR RULING
We deny the Petition.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration.25 In
this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages
was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while
the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the
Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil
Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80,26 81,27 82,28 and
83 (first paragraph);29 and those on voidable marriages are Articles
83 (second paragraph),30 8531 and 86.32
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable
marriage in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent -
i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable
marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court;
(2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can
be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage
can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal
partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction,
while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered
legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish
the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must
be a judicial decree.33
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of
People v. Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante,
36 that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity
of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. 37
In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936,
1941, and 1949. The second marriage was contracted in the belief
that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was
contracted after the death of the second wife. The Court ruled that
the first marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the
second marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the third
marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its
performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial
decree declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved
substantially the same factual antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing
Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial
decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages
under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code
rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable
to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the
nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage. 38 A second marriage contracted prior to the
issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous
and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy
behind the institution of this requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as
an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as
such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the
Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life." So crucial are
marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that
their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore, the
nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another
cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of
both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to
the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void
ipso jure and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so,
this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and
would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for
nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human
ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant
institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only
would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively
confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would
be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.40
(Emphases supplied)1âwphi1
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v.
Court of Appeals, 42 the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity
does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the
effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the
parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court
clarified that those cases continue to be governed by Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:
x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal
trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The
judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely
forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the
issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza
and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and
all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of
Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private
respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time,
the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The
first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license
and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity
before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore,
we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to
petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held
in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect
unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case,
that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent x x x. (Citations omitted)
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is
applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes that the
subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the
invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of
a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the
first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was
contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil
Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of
Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only
serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage
to Renato is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in
upholding the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and Resolution dated
16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,
vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks
to annul the Order1 dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case
No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed
against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the
RTC Resolution2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in
Lezo, Aklan.3 On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the
said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in
San Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on
the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256,
rendered an Amended Decision5 declaring the marriage of
respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final
and executory on October 13, 2003.6
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s
daughter from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court
of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the
complaint was an Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated
August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,9 which
alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio
that she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an
Information10 for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC
of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent
marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first
marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by
proper judicial authorities.11
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the
Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had
already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no
more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on
January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e.,
two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that
since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy
had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13
arguing that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated
when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that
the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which
appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has
not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.
In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It
found respondent's argument that with the declaration of nullity of
her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and
thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to
have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan15 where we
held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage
although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-
complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second
marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already
been consummated by then. x x x16
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the
RTC found that while the second marriage indeed took place in
1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on
November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence,
prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the
Mercado ruling was not applicable, since respondent contracted her
first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition
for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal
complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family
Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair
her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity
of a completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set
aside. Let a new one be entered quashing the information.
Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had
contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the
effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the
Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC
found that both marriages of respondent took place before the
effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state
of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the
principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the
accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of
nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was
declared once and for all valid with the annulment of her first
marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the
prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated
January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that
the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is
tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said
marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in
contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us
raising the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the
enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs.
Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid
defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage
prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement
in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence
prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement
in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a
declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second
marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a
subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without
incurring criminal liability.19
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's
dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed by private
complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which should represent the government in all judicial proceedings
filed before us.20
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had
done in the past. In Antone v. Beronilla,21 the offended party
(private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA)
the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her
husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among
others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the
People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in
all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that
we had given due course to a number of actions even when the
respective interests of the government were not properly
represented by the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the
following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is
aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the
OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order
or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the
State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to
dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required
the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in
some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has
ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of
the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the
petition, which it did, praying that the petition be granted in effect,
such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or
not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed
against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy
as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been
legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage.23 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy
that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage.24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second
marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates
celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been
annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the
elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion
to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage
with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April
2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City.
The said decision was never appealed, and became final and
executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case,
her marriage with Mr. Flores had already been declared void from
the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to
speak of. In other words, there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid
marriages, is therefore wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question
now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first
marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed
against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial,
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage
while the first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting
at the time the second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the accused
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without
legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born
before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract
be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.31
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we
affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling that the
moment the accused contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime
of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage
which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the
first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally
dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would
not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during
the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly
charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the
offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing
of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was
rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not
marriage. enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the declaration nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.34 adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
prosecuted for bigamy.35 subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage
marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would
effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of render nugatory the provision on bigamy.38
securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void
marriage. WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED.
The Order dated September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated
We are not persuaded. January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET
In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial
reconsideration, argued that since her marriages were entered into court for further proceedings.
before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is
Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613),37 instead of Article 40 of SO ORDERED.
the Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent
marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already
made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure,
should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family
Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights."
The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1âwphi1
SECOND DIVISION
January 13, 2016
G.R. No. 207406
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed
with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are
guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first
marriage.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court
of Appeals Decision2 dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution3 dated
June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
Decision4 of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
convicting petitioner Norberto Abella Vitangcol (Norberto) of
bigamy punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.5
Norberto was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.6
In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto with bigamy.7 The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, being then legally married to GINA M.
GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally dissolved,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second or subsequent marriage with ALICE G. EDUARDO-
VITANGCOL which second marriage has all the legal requisites for its
validity with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL
knowing fully well prior to and at the time of the celebration of the
second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M.
GAERLAN.
Contrary to law.8
Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then
ensued.9
According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto
married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at the Manila Cathedral in
Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children.10
After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband]
was previously married to another woman[.]"11 She eventually
discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina
M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage
contract registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice
subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against
Norberto.12
On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became
romantically involved sometime in 1987.13 "After much prodding by
their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in
1994."14
Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed
to Alice that he had a "fake marriage"15 with his college girlfriend, a
certain Gina Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless, despite Norberto’s revelation,
Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus,
Norberto and Alice were married on December 4, 1994 and,
thereafter, had three children.17
Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household
workers that Alice was having an affair with a married man. He was
able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone conversation
with her paramour.18
Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on
convinced Alice to end the affair. The lawyer also warned Alice of
the possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing
her paramour.19
Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her,
Alice filed the criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.20
Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice
despite his subsisting valid marriage with Gina, Branch 25 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The
dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds
accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum
imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.21
On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against
Norberto but modified the penalty imposed in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1,
2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the penalty to
which appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now
meted to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four
(4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.22
Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,23 which the Court of
Appeals denied in the Resolution dated June 3, 2013.24
Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court.
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed a Comment25 to which Norberto filed a Reply.26
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this
case.27 He presents as evidence a Certification28 from the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has
no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and
his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an
essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the
prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage.29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first
marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy. According to
Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that
punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.30 Stating that "[a]ny
reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused[,]"31
Norberto prays for his acquittal.32
The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of
Norberto’s prior valid marriage with Gina as evidenced by the
marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise
proved that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally
dissolved; that while his first marriage was subsisting, Norberto
contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the second
marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of
the first. Norberto, therefore, should be convicted of bigamy.33
The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the
Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage
license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife
Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates
him from the bigamy charge.
The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no
record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it
does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license.
Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere
certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years
before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his
alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this
case was pending, he did not present any decision from any trial
court nullifying his first marriage.
I
Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must
prove all of the following elements:
[first,] that the offender has been legally married;
[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.34
The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first
marriage with Gina because the civil registrar of the municipality
where they were married had no record of the marriage license
allegedly issued in their favor.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are
present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when
he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the
crime charged.
Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s
first marriage was solemnized on July 17, 1987. This was before the
Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August
3,1988.35 Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines36 govern the validity of his first marriage.
Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage,
the absence of any of which renders the marriage void from the
beginning:37
Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local
civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides.38 The marriage license represents the state’s
"involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested."39
To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, "the law requires that the absence of such marriage license
must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties."40
Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:
[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application
for Marriage License and License Issuance available in this office, no
record could be found on the alleged issuance of this office of
Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A.
VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.41
This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was
solemnized without a marriage license. It does not categorically
state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.42
Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature
appearing on the marriage contract between him and his first wife,
Gina.43 The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a
positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first
marriage.44This "should be given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the
marriage[.]"45
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro46 was originally an action
for the declaration of nullity of a marriage.47 As part of its evidence,
the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the marriage
license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear from
[the local civil registrar’s] records."48
This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value,
[the local civil registrar] being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license."49

This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance
of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, a certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’ sufficiently
proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage
license . . . to the contracting parties."50
The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro
involved a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage that does
not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro
was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being
no prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present
case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is
a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to
Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.
The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot
be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of
action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the
certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case.
We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that
a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite
statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of
the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be
found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.
A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order
insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses may be
conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The
motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade
prosecution.
This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.51 In
Cariño, the marriage contract between Santiago Cariño and his first
wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number.52 In addition,
the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage
license issued to Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.53 This court
declared Santiago Cariño’s first marriage void for having been
solemnized without a marriage license.54
In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a
marriage license number freely and voluntarily signed and attested
to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing
officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The
second marriage was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a
span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days,
petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his
first marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision
declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In other
words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is
rendered untrue by his own actuations.
This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification
from the Office of the Civil Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to
prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage, petitioner
nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The
admission of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and
due execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of
evidence will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a
certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license cannot
be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no
such marriage license was issued.
The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the
marriage contract.55 There is no evidence to show that the number
series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been issued
from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued
before or after the document in question still exists in the custody of
the civil registrar. There is no evidence that relates to the
procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would
have shown whether there was unfettered access to the originals of
the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the proper
judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar
implies.
This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity
in the performance of official functions to the civil registrar for the
purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely
detached to the conclusion that there is no marriage license.
At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil
registrar’s function without the context just discussed can lead to
the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage
license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the
marriage license did not exist. Nor does it mean that the marriage
license was issued.
However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept.
There was a marriage contract duly executed by petitioner and his
first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage
contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions by a public officer
should likewise be applicable to infer a conclusion that the marriage
license mentioned in that contract exists.
Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate
imposition of a penalty amounting to a deprivation of liberty. It is
not a far-fetched conclusion—although this is not always the case—
that a well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to
achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases can turn on documentary
evidence the issuance of which is within the discretion of a
government employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a
document, which may be accurate but which he knows the accused
will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by
an accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on
how the trial court judge evaluates the demeanor of the witnesses.
We can defer to that discretion as much as to make our own
judgment based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by
the trial court. Using both, we have no reason to disturb the
conclusions of the trial court.
II
Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was
solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner remains liable for
bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void.
Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead
under the Civil Code.56 The second element of the crime of bigamy
is, therefore, present in this case.
As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that
parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority.
Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage
is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.58
The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the
Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of the Family Code:59
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.1avvphi1
Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed
as an element of the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal
Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has to do
is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first."60 Further, "[a] party may even
enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—usually
the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the
first on the assumption that the first marriage is void."61
For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not
be revisited by this court En Banc as petitioner insists.62
The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case.
Petitioner admitted that he subsequently married Alice G. Eduardo
on December 4, 1994.63 As for the last element of bigamy, that the
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is
presumed. The crime of bigamy was consummated when petitioner
subsequently married Alice without his first marriage to Gina having
been judicially declared void.64
With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was
correctly convicted of the crime charged.1âwphi1
III
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
penalty that may be imposed on petitioner is that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the
penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court
then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the
range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the
maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered.65
The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty
next lower to that is prision correccional. Prision correccional ranges
from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years;67 hence, the
minimum penalty can be any period within this range.
As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision
mayor in its medium period, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period
ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.
Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The
ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the
ranges as previously computed. The indeterminate penalty imposed
was proper.
Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift and redeem valuable human
material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness[,]’"68 we lower the
minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated
June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of
the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S.
Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the subject of the
controversy between the two Susans whom he married.
1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set
aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he
contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and
Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee),
with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation
starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to
diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away
on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for
his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining
to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner
Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS
Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case
for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao
praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at
least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos
(P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death benefits” which
she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner
failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in
default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased
took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner
and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no
knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of
it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who
introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action
for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the
same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In
support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate
of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license
number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of
the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are
married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot
issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License
number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee
Cariño for whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent,
Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in
the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago
S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs
of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed
in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition,
contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING
EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND
UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN
MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT
OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority
to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the
same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to
the subject “death benefits” of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage
of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the
marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages
exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore,
was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and,
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent
any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value,
he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then
became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is
valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although
she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could
have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a
marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and
this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose
to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in
jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot
stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without
the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void
ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that
since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void
ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be
awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of
the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence,
the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the
separation of the property of the spouses according to the
applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages
are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather,
be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property
regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the
same married man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-
ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him
or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the
home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during
the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article
148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI,
are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer.
Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it
could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry
in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not
owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to
the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to
claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of
the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not
being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article
applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a
marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
xxx

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and
salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be
owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the
other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the
disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof.
As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus,
one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to
the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other
half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession,
to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the
retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other
half, to the second wife, holding that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage
has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status
as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husband’s share in the property here in dispute....” And with respect
to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the
conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved
before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court
equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of
second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay
and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the
conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” 21 amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said SO ORDERED.
case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance
with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing
Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate
declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition
precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is
previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she
has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void,
before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the
second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the
first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to
determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case
for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to
be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is
necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence,
testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage
from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the
court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will
rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to
determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable
laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court
explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family
Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only
for purpose of remarriage.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground
(in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the
validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the
Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although
this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity
in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges
and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific
cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled
— exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in
the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present
case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2
in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared
the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at
the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom
he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of
the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense
quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in
March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to
live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them;
that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable
of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's
best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order
to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage
from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he
and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were
due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3)
Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14,
1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three
years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of
the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony
and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora
Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr.
Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital
and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as
Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts
of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish
in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is
anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the
Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on
personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the
part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well
as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the
Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a
defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable
of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to
us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and
her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been
no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist
based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic)
the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another
woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part
of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary
blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely
ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the
Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the
Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to
thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting
discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and
solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is
to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards
the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family
as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already
ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent
with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to
whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in
any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v.
Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4
January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain,
that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to
discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the
present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar
conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all
fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much
as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner
Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the
latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the
husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of
mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental
faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the
Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code
Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand
the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological
incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question
underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the session
was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has
dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to
"mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer
to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the
idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There
being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological
or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier
February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a
person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with
another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the
inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B.
Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it
would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be
cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow
the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
"special cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in
Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground
for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time
of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is
capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of
the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon
Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of
causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36
of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only
two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void.
Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable
or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can
never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified
by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal
procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law
as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter
lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law,
the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples
have found themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds in
the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid
civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some
persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft
the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family
Code — and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code,
while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in
effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three
old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according
to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that
persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in
marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required
that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent
to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but
related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and
'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the
person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of
the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out
the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding
ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s
and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the
capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably
not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what
came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of
serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at
the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to
give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the
wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment,
but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a
marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage
from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this
was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a
person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both
grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all
kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of
the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the
right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity
for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the
spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship
because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a
true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength
of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship
and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in
isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary
to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability;
(4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other
terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was
on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their
responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into
civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure
out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage
was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the
spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court
held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to
communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof
of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.5
Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and
subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6
this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the
part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months'
sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not
deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his
wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference
and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital
obligation described as "to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the
action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage
remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under
Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the
spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the
guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper
appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family
Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was
neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P.
Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting
marriage; (those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and
accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an
aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory
enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the
several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as
distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like
Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct
reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed
so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court
of Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54
of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able
to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in
nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not
mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity
and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage
may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has
envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as
another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it,
to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that
the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such
intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it
were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the
constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less,
has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how
the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be
significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for
the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional
provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary
implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them
enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them.
It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage
and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that
demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to
whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in
any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v.
Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4
January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain,
that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to
discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the
present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar
conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all
fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much
as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner
Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the
latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the
husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of
mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental
faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the
Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code
Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand
the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological
incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question
underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the session
was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has
dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to
"mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer
to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the
idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There
being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological
or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier
February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a
person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with
another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the
inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B.
Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it
would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be
cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow
the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
"special cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in
Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground
for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time
of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is
capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of
the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon
Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of
causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36
of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only
two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void.
Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable
or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can
never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified
by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal
procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law
as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter
lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law,
the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples
have found themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds in
the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid
civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some
persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft
the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family
Code — and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code,
while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in
effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three
old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according
to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that
persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in
marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required
that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent
to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but
related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and
'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the
person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of
the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out
the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding
ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s
and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the
capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably
not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what
came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of
serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at
the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to
give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the
wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment,
but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a
marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage
from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this
was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a
person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both
grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all
kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of
the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the
right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity
for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the
spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship
because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a
true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength
of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship
and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in
isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary
to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability;
(4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other
terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was
on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their
responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into
civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure
out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage
was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the
spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court
held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to
communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof
of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.5
Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and
subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6
this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the
part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months'
sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not
deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his
wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference
and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital
obligation described as "to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the
action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage
remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under
Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the
spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the
guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper
appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family
Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was
neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P.
Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting
marriage; (those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and
accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an
aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory
enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the
several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as
distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like
Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct
reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed
so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court
of Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54
of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able
to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in
nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not
mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity
and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage
may occur only thereafter; and
enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them.
It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage
and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that
demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has

envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as
another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it,
to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that
the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such
intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it
were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the
constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less,
has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how
the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation

of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development. (The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be
significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for
the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional
provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary
implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non
for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage
between the parties is hereby declared valid."2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution
denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos
and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6,
1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art.
36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved
[sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in
relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the
legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of
the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to
the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the
National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent
with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married
twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge
Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2)
on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar,
Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in
Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5)
children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential
Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime.
Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's
Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the
Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military
service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned
at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he
as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through
telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually
became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No.
1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which
she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was
still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service
in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not
however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work
so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of
the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to
have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict
physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during
their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were
already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic
uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would
first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military service,
she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a
trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and
Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16,
1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living
separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On
that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that
she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm
on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following
day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and
sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries
were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and
driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their
missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing
the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a
samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were
renting a house in Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was
residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the
children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to
them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan,
Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216),
while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of
his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards appellee and their children, x x x."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not
been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It
ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root
cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be
medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be
grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume
the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71
and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied
marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition,
established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings
about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based
only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only
to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or
she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to
assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that
he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his
supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or
clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by
an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that
the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could
not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the
incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable."4
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's
consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside
the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity
of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
simply because the respondent did not subject himself to
psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the
demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence
she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various
tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological
incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have
been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that
the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had
no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to
determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had
refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the
application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity
referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were laid down by this
Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees
marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxx xxx xxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095."10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:11
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines
do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical abandonment and the like.12 At best, the evidence presented by
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law,
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation
presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social
worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for
psychologically incapacitated. failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in
that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and Molina.
may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality
of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision
on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incurable. incapacity. No costs.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that SO ORDERED.
he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of
more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and
even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period
and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is
no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now
that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.1âwphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those
provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code.
SECOND DIVISION
February 6, 2017
G.R. No. 214064
MIRASOL CASTILLO, Petitioner
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE IMPAS, Respondents
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner
Mirasol Castillo (Mirasol) challenging the Decision1 and Resolution,2
dated March 10, 2014 and August 28, 2014, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled against the dissolution and nullity
of her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The facts of the case follow:
As their parents were good friends and business partners, Mirasol
and Felipe started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts.
During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his
affair with his former girlfriend. The couple's relationship turned
tumultuous after the revelation. With the intervention of their
parents, they reconciled. They got married in Bani, Pangasinan on
April 22, 1984 and were blessed with two (2) children born in 1992
and in 2001.3
On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint4 for declaration of nullity
of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas,
Cavite, Branch 90.
Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious
prompting her to believe that the same was made in heaven.
However, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe resumed
philandering. Their relatives and friends saw him with different
women. One time, she has just arrived from a trip and returned
home to surprise her family. But to her consternation, she caught
him in a compromising act with another woman. He did not bother
to explain or apologize. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the
conjugal dwelling and stopped any communication with him.5
Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not
communicating with her, and not supporting their children for a
period of not less than ten (10) years without any reason, constitute
a severe psychological disorder.6
In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila
Marie Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who, in her Psychological
Evaluation Report,7 concluded that Felipe is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations. A portion of
the report reads:
x x xx
The personality disorder speaks of antecedence as it has an early
onset, with an enduring pattern and behavior that deviates
markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. His poor
parental and family molding (particularly lack of parental parenting)
caused him to have a defective superego and he proved to be
selfish, immature and negligent person and followed a pattern of
gross irresponsibility and gross disregard of the feelings of his
partner/wife disregarding the marriage contract and the
commitment he agreed on during the wedding. In other words, the
root cause of respondent's flawed personality pattern can be in
childhood milieu. Respondent's familial constellation, unreliable
parenting style from significant figures around him, and unfavorable
childhood experiences have greatly affected his perceptions of
himself and his environment in general. The respondent did not
grow up mature enough to cope with his obligations and
responsibilities as married man and father.
It also speaks of gravity as he was not able to carry out the
normative and ordinary duties of marriage and family, shouldered
by any married man, existing in ordinary circumstances. He just
cannot perform his duties and obligations as a husband, as he
entered into marriage for his own self-satisfaction and gratification,
manipulate and denigrate the petitioner for his own pleasures and
satisfaction. In the process, respondent was unable to assume his
marital duties and responsibilities to his wife. He failed to render
mutual help and support (Article 68, FC).
Additionally, it also speaks of incurability, as respondent has no
psychological insight that he has a character problem. He would not
acknowledge the pain he caused to people around him. People
suffering from this personality disorder are unmotivated to
treatment and impervious to recovery. There are no medications
and laboratory examinations to be taken for maladaptive behavior
such as the NPD (Narcissistic Personality Disorder).
Otherwise stated, his personality disorder is chronic and pervasive
affecting many aspects of his life, such as social functioning and
close relationships.1âwphi1 Apparently, he has failed to develop
appropriate adjustment methods. He lacks the intrapersonal and
interpersonal integration that caused him the failure to understand
the very nature of that sharing of life that is directed toward the
solidarity and formation of family.
x x x x8
In a Decision9 dated January 20, 2012, the RTC in Civil Case No.
4853-11 declared the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe null and
void. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Court hereby declares the
marriage contract by the petitioner MIRASOL CASTILLO to the
respondent FELIPE IMPAS on April 22, 1984 in Bani, Pangasinan to
be NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
the Clerk of Court is directed to enter this judgment upon its finality
in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue the corresponding
Entry of Judgment. Thereupon, the Office of the Civil Registrars in
Bani, Pangasinan and Imus, Cavite, are also mandated to cause the
registration of the said ENTRY OF JUDGMENT in their respective
Book of Marriages.
Likewise, furnish the petitioner and the counsel of the petitioner,
the respondent, the Solicitor General, 3rd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Oscar R. Jarlos and the Civil Registrar General with
copies hereof.
Upon compliance, the Court shall forthwith issue the DECREE OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
SO ORDERED.10
On February 22, 2012, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an Order11 dated April 3,
2012.
On appeal, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 99686 reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering from
psychological incapacity, thus, incapable of performing marital
obligations due to some psychological illness existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage.12 A pertinent portion of the
decision reads:
x x xx
Based on the records, it appears more likely that Felipe became
unfaithful as a result of unknown factors that happened during the
marriage and not because of his family background. His tendency to
womanize was not shown to be due to causes of a psychological
nature that are grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, it was only
after thirteen (13) years of marriage that he started to engage in
extra-marital affairs. In the complaint filed by Mirasol, she said that
after they got married, their relationship as husband and wife went
smoothly and that she was of the belief that she had a marriage
made in heaven.
In short, Felipe's marital infidelity does not appear to be
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him
incapable of performing his spousal obligations. Sexual infidelity, by
itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which
make him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of marriage. Since that situation does not obtain in the case,
Mirasol's claim of psychological incapacity must fail. Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it
is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the
psychological incapacity of Felipe, We cannot but rule in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated January
20, 2012 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.13
Upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration, Mirasol elevated
the case before this Court raising the issue, thus:
[Petitioner] was able to establish that respondent is suffering from
grave psychological condition that rendered him incognitive of his
marital covenants under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Basically, the issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the
totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC determined, the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the
ground of the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
This Court rules in the negative.
Mirasol alleges that she has sufficiently established that Felipe is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. The conclusions of the trial court regarding
the credibility of the witnesses are entitled to great respect because
of its opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Since
the court a quo accepted the veracity of the petitioner's premises,
there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of Felipe's psychological
incapacity drawn from the expert witness. She claims that
Montefalcon was correct in interviewing her for it was submitted
that it was only her who knew best whether her husband was
complying with his marital obligations. Moreover, the OSG admits
that personal examination of the respondent by the clinical
psychologist is not an indispensable requisite for a finding of
psychological incapacity.
On the other hand, the OSG argues that Mirasol failed to establish
from the totality of evidence the gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability of Felipe's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The
conclusions of the clinical psychologist that he was psychologically
incapacitated and that such incapacity was present at the inception
of the marriage were not supported by evidence. At most, the
psychologist merely proved his refusal to perform his marital
obligations.14 Moreover, she has no personal knowledge of the
facts from which she based her findings and was working on pure
assumptions and secondhand information related to her by one
side.15
Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been
intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.16
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it
must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.17
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,18 this Court
laid down the more definitive guidelines in the disposition of
psychological incapacity cases, viz.:
x x xx
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. x x x
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x
xxx19
The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be
based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations.20
As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it
is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause,
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of
a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented
before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert
opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of the proceedings.22
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence
to show the psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that
the same would have automatically ensured the granting of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It bears repeating that
the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base
their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the
parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.23
Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful perusal of the
records, this Court rules that the totality of the evidence presented
failed to establish Felipe's psychological incapacity.
Clinical psychologist Montefalcon opined that respondent is
encumbered with a personality disorder classified as Narcissistic
Personality Disorder deeply ingrained in his personality structure
that rendered him incapacitated to perform his marital duties and
obligations. In her direct testimony, she stated:
ATTY. BAYAUA:
Question: Were you able to interview and conduct examination on
the respondent?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: [W]here did you base your conclusion that supported
your findings that the husband of Mirasol is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage?
Answer: From the interviews I had with the petitioner and also from
my interview of the couple's common friend who validated all
information given to me by the petitioner.
Question: You mean to say you were not able to interview the
respondent?
Answer: No sir. But I sent him an invitation to undergo the same
psychological evaluation I administered with the petitioner but he
did not respond to my invitation.
Question: [W]hat relevant information were you able to gather from
your interview of the friend of the couple?
Answer: She validated every piece of information relayed to me by
the petitioner during the interview.
x x xx
Question: Madam witness, were you able to determine at what
point in time in the life of the respondent did he acquire this
disorder that you mentioned?
Answer: The disorder of the respondent already existed even at the
time of celebration of their marriage, although the incapacity
became manifest only after their marriage. His disorder seemed to
have started during the early years of his life.
Question: In your expert opinion, what would be the likely source of
the disorder of the respondent?
Answer: The disorder of the respondent seemed to have developed
during the early years of his life due to his poor parental and family
[molding] particularly lack of parental guidance. [His] parents
separated when he was still young and when [his] mother had
another affair and lived with her common-law husband.
Respondent's familial constellation and [unfavorable] childhood
experiences have greatly affected his perceptions of himself and his
environment. Respondent did not grow up mature enough to cope
with his obligations and responsibilities as a married man and
father.
x x x24
The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the psychological
evaluation by Montefalcon. A perusal of the RTC's decision would
reveal that there was no assessment of the veracity of such
allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the
pieces of evidence presented. Also, there were no factual findings
which can serve as bases for its conclusion of Felipe's psychological
incapacity.
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough
and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.25 The probative force of the
testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render
to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her
criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.26
Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of Felipe's personality
disorder, it was, however, admitted that she evaluated respondent's
psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered
from Mirasol and her witness. Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait
which brought about his personality disorder as painted in the
evaluation was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of
petitioner. There was no independent witness knowledgeable of
respondent's upbringing interviewed by the psychologist or
presented before the trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the couple's
common friend, agreed with petitioner's claims in the interview
with the psychologist, confirmed the information given by
petitioner, and alleged that she knew Felipe as "chick boy" or
''playboy."27 She did not testify before the court a quo.
As such, there are no other convincing evidence asserted to
establish Felipe's psychological condition and its associations in his
early life. Montefalcon's testimony and psychological evaluation
report do not provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful
veracity of Mirasol's one-sided assertion. The said report falls short
of the required proof for the Court to rely on the same as basis to
declare petitioner's marriage to respondent as void.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare
him psychologically incapacitated is not required, the root cause
thereof must still be "medically or clinically identified," and
adequately established by evidence.28 We cannot take the
conclusion that Felipe harbors a personality disorder existing prior
to his marriage which purportedly incapacitated him with the
essential marital obligations as credible proof of juridical
antecedence. The manner by which such conclusion was reached
leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of
evidence required in determining psychological incapacity. The lack
of corroborative witness and evidence regarding Felipe's upbringing
and family history renders Montefalcon's opinion on the root cause
of his psychological incapacity conjectural or speculative.
Even if the testimonies of Mirasol and Montefalcon at issue are
considered since the judge had found them to be credible enough,
this Court cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to
information on Felipe's pre-marital history which is crucial to the
issue of antecedence in this case because we only have petitioner's
words to rely on. To make conclusions and generalizations on a
spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed by
only one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not
different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.29
Anent Felipe's sexual infidelity, Mirasol alleged in her judicial
affidavit, to wit:
x x xx
Question: You said Madam Witness that after several months you
and respondent became sweethearts, what happened next Madam
Witness?
Answer: Sir, while we were already sweethearts, I got dismayed
when respondent was also maintaining another woman who was his
former girlfriend.
Question: What was the reaction of the respondent when you told
him about his relation with his former girlfriend?
Answer: Respondent was shocked and became moody Sir. This
turned our relationship sour and it led to being stormy.
Question: You said Madam Witness that you and respondent's
relationship became sour and stormy, what happened next, if any?
Answer: Sir, my relationship with respondent should have been
ended had it not been with the timely intervention of our parents.
Respondent and I reconciled.
x x xx
Question: Madam Witness as you said you finally got married with
the respondent as evidenced in fact by a Marriage Certificate. What
happened next after the marriage?
Answer: After our wedding, our relationship as husband and wife
went on smoothly. I was of the belief that my marriage was made in
heaven and that respondent had already reformed his ways and had
completely deviated from his relationship with his ex-girlfriend;
x x x30
Question: After giving birth to your first child did respondent change
or become responsible considering that he is already a father?
Answer: No, Sir. I thought that having our first child would already
change the ways of respondent. The birth of our first child did not
actually help improve respondent's ways because respondent is
really a man who is not contented with one woman even before we
got married;
xxx31
Question: After you gave birth to you[r] second child what
happened next Madam Witness?
Answer: Sir, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, respondent is back
to his old habit where he has been seen having relationship with a
different woman. This was also seen by our relatives and friends of
respondent.
x xx32
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.33 In order for sexual
infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's
unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a
disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state; there must
be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful
to his spouse.34 It is indispensable that the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.35
As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did not
emanate from a personal interview with the subject himself. Apart
from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's allegations, no
other reliable evidence was cited to prove that Felipe's sexual
infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged personality disorder,
which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable. We are not persuaded
that the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his obligation to be faithful
to his wife was medically or clinically established.

Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence,

are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not
evidence.36 Based on the records, this Court finds that there exists
insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Felipe's sexual
infidelity and irresponsibility can be equated with psychological
incapacity as contemplated by law. We reiterate that there was no
other evidence adduced. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did
not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on
Felipe's infidelity notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that
their relatives saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore,
is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.

In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the
CA against the dissolution and nullity of the parties' marriage due to
insufficiency of the evidence presented. The policy of the State is to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.37

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari filed by

herein petitioner Mirasol Castillo. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
assailed Decision and Resolution, dated March 10, 2014 and August
28, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a
marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly
inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works
of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her
uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch
89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the
trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758)
which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court
and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at
the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their
Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the
South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for
the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations,
that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or
having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went
to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to
sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the
first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and
fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they
can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they
went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an
uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the
defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4)
days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long
walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located
at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the
same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
[S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts
nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese
General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy,
normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination
was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was
prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given
to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but
he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had
observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the
fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2)
that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very
young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it
can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not
be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988,
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the
defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse
with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims,
that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not
continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the
plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate
their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because
they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their
differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His
penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of
finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there,
that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find
out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from
the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis
of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter.
Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is
why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further
erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of
having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no
collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the
marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May
22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio
de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no
sexual intercourse between the parties without making any findings
of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch
as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties
decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there
was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-
3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations
in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no
other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that
the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and
confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the
trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and
that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged
in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings.
What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage
without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified
under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party,
she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such
evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as
stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the
Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule
19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want
their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he
and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact
with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with
magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is
not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the
appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic
marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the
documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019,
January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding
that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial
court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological
incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal
which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders"
because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May
22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage
void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the
other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to
show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal
may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have
discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her,
and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing
in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what
the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence
is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's
claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent
upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at
bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
incapacity. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
As aptly stated by the respondent court, ensures the continuation of family relations.
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and
plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between
inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
for not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice
incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by as a sublime social institution.
the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were
frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
and put to rest her marital status.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in
proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be
achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of SO ORDERED.
cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or
unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes
to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable
resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
within the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68,
Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not
have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA,
respondents.
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA,
Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July
12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After
respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court,
amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended
answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically
incapacitated.1
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between
plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh
Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the
amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million
pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorney’s
fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation
of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership
property[,] particularly the plaintiff’s separation/retirement benefits
received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding,
giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of
P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per
annum from the date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his
outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and
Provident Group of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy
Singh Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject
to modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh
Buenaventura to his mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her
maiden family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry
and registries of properties.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals.
While the case was pending in the appellate court, respondent filed
a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of
their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition
thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for
oral argument.3
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
increasing the support pendente lite to P20,000.4 Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.5
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision
dismissing petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto
the trial court’s decision.6 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned
Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly
support for the son.7 Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to
question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari8 and the
Petition for Certiorari9 were ordered consolidated by this Court.10
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the
Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord with law and
jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN
THE AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1
MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION,
WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEY’S FEES AND
P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS
RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK AND
TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS
DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS
ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO
TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF
STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT
GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE
ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT ISABEL
AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE
PARTIES’ MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING
THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS
CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD
LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.11
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following
contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO SET RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT
FOR THE PARTIES’ SON FOR HEARING.12
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE
JAVY’S MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY
PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.13
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF
JAVY’S SUPPORT, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED
THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT
OF PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY
ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN
SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL."14
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN
PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO
SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVY’S SUPPORT.15
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals
articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact
ascertained from the testimonies not only of the parties particularly
the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists,
awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the
defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true love
instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental
pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-
appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his
career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable
to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his
son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the
marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest
way out, that of leaving defendant–appellee and their son; that he
had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved
by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their
separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to
suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless
nights not only in those years the parties were together but also
after and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial court’s decision on the ground
that unlike those arising from a breach in ordinary contracts,
damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded.
While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the
Supreme Court where damages by reason of the performance or
non-performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not
follow that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for
moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of 7 million
pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full
justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed
for. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.16
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles
2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s
wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 221917 of the
Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be
recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must
be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully
cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful
and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages,
therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but
have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were
based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral
damages would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the
parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to
psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura.
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .18
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the
petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological
incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said
courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for
granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control
of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the
petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The
award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act
of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was
done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of
his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such
evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one
is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must
assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the
basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the
private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was
not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the
award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the
grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.19
With respect to the grant of attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorney’s fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an
award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiff’s act or omission has
compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of
litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems
it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered. (par. 11)20
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary
damages is fully justified, the award of attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified.21
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to
deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the
complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered
as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both
are grounded on petitioner’s psychological incapacity, which as
explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to
comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a
ground for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore,
since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer
justified, the award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is
left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and
Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park and
the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with
the assets of the conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of
annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held
that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 –
573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it
was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the
final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore,
all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary
is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117
of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership
properties. Among others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of
either or both of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the
marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits from
the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to
requiring an inventory of what are the parties’ conjugal properties
and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was
disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who
worked first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far
East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement package from
the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain
deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount of
P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts or obligations other than
those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay, under Art.
129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement
or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such
share as provided in this Code." In this particular case, however,
there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor
had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the
defendant wife’s share in the conjugal partnership properties. The
previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2)
share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-
35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro Manila, in favor
of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement
dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial
Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full
settlement of any and all demands for past support. In reality, the
defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff
husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of
liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot
on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the
parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only child has
chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-
half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she
will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half
was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by
way of her share in the conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful
and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same
being part of their conjugal partnership properties having been
obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of
said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the
Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of
the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the
Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies.22
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the
trial court for him to give one-half of his separation/retirement
benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his
outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latter’s share in the
conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision
approving the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties.
In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that
henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no
steps were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the
separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant received
from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-
President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued
from plaintiff–appellant’s service for the bank for a number of years,
most of which while he was married to defendant-appellee, the trial
court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding
shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident
Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-
appellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee, the
latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal
partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial
court.23
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a
bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to
Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of
gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule
applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio,
the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,24 this
Court expounded on the consequences of a void marriage on the
property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable
provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as
interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage
or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of
the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains,
the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the
co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above
extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law
now expressly provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of]
his or her share in co-ownership property, without the consent of
the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit
his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common
children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common
children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation
or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
…
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement
of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither
imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to
declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with
authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it
commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property
in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions
on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in
relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly
prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the
latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by
its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void
marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of
nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter
is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old
doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now
requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by
final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the
present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the
status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the
Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage
to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be
assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property
relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable
marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-
law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the
latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the
provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must
be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious,
that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e.,
the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code,
remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the
spouses.25
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo
were found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to
have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would
be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of
one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said
distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by
the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of
co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains.
son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the
age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8,
1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are
contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby
MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The
order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of
petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of
petitioner’s shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the
Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not
of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said
Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting
the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and
November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente lite in
favor of the parties’ son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT
and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy
Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to turn
twenty-five years of age on May 27, 200526 and has, therefore,
attained the age of majority.

With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for

Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to the fact that the
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City,
dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel
Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and
respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and
before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering
that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to
adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married
life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner
Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife
exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him
which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose
nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything
and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in
his office and anything not of her liking like the physical
arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with
other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for
the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal
Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects
around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she
cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not
even give him moral support and encouragement; that her
psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-
seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack
of love and appreciation from her own parents since childhood and
that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if
treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense
beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that
he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless
marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is
still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that
he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to
marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was
respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family
obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his
endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real
happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was
stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took
the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition.
He testified that his parents never approved of his marriage as they
still harbored hope that he would return to the seminary.4 The early
years of their marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time
being accepted as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this
period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and
temperamental5 to him and his parents.6 She was also obsessive
about cleanliness which became the common source of their
quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union as happy during
that period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they
were engrossed in furnishing their new house.8 In 1981, when he
became busy with law school and with various community
organizations, it was then that he felt that he and his wife started to
drift apart.9 He then narrated incidents during their marriage that
were greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his
wife quarreled with an elderly neighbor;10 when she would visit him
in his office and remark that the curtains were already dirty or when
she kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a ballpen
from his table;11 when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly
opened while he was away;12 when she confronted a female tenant
of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair with him;13 and
other incidents reported to him which would show her jealous
nature. Money matters continued to be a source of bitter
quarrels.14 Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not
able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did
not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very
generous when it came to celebrations of their parish priest.15
Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer16 or that
he had a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their
conjugal properties and obligations.18
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel’s Clerk of Court, testified
that petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuel’s
office.19 But when she was there, she would call witness to
complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office.20 One
time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through
respondent Manuel’s drawer looking for his address book while the
latter was in Subic attending a conference.21 When petitioner
Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called witness, telling
the latter that she was looking for the telephone number of
respondent’s hotel room in Subic. A process server was requested
by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper.
When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open
the locked drawer. On another occasion, particularly in August of
1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to
respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka
anak mo yan sa labas?"22
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA
GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were
admitted by petitioner Juanita.23 From her psychiatric
evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-
Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner
relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the
marital bond with love, support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM
IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel
and Juanita had engaged themselves in a defective communication
pattern which is characteristically negative and deformed. This
affected their competence to maintain the love and respect that
they should give to each other.

Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both
partners who are expected to use healthy strategies to solve their
disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory,
critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive,
Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression. In his effort to
satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for his felt
or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental
effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage.
Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire
(along with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately
empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each other’s needs
and feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and
a progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their
psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the
fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of
maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of personality
disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per
DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and
psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in existence
before the marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to
recovery.25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel’s
allegations. She insisted that they were a normal couple who had
their own share of fights; that they were happily married until
respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs26 which he
had admitted to her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she would
wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her
husband.28 She stated further that she has continuously supported
respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in law school
to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the
present case, she would still attend to his needs.29 She
remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway,
respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a
new family.30
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was
admitted by respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a
psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of which
were embodied in his report. Said report stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological
tests, respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to
be a mature, conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman
who possess [sic] more than enough psychological potentials for a
mutually satisfying long term heterosexual relationship. Superego is
strong and she is respectful of traditional institutions of society like
the institution of marriage. She was also found to be a loving,
nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of enduring
severe environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is
reality-oriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound
decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be
psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential
obligations of marriage.32
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992
described the Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other.33
The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the
community.34 Both were likewise leaders in their community.35
Witness then stated that she would often go to the house of the
couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel
there.36
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuel’s
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner
Juanita holding in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not
preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily
married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son.
Their life together continued years thereafter in peace and
prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed
and obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties’ relationship
sometime in the early 90’s when the defendant-wife started
receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.
xxx xxx xxx
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk
responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital
relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due
to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures
to her husband. But, as our laws now stand, the dissolution of the
marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In contrast to some
countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a mere
refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may sound
like a firetruck.37
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order
dated 04 May 2001.38
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision,
relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding
both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the
case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.39 Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita.
It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and defendant.
That is – a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love "amore gignit
amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise
conscious of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi
vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and
set aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled
to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also of
himself.40
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred –
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL
LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE
FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT

III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The Court’s Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we
held that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given
case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage
depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely
scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be no
case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court of Appeals
did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming
Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at
bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing
the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988
until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The
perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of
her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her
husband. We sustained the wife for the reason that an essential
marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that
"the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue
herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband who is constantly
embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways, who
finds his wife’s obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his
wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and
respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book,
however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led
respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should
refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In
Republic v. Court of Appeals44 we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a)
medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c)
sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.45
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve
the issue of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against
petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and
its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.46 With this cardinal state policy in
mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals47 that the burden of
proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff
(respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.
The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent
Manuel’s own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner
Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge whether or not her
husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider,
cool, intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of
what he has done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He
is having extra marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I
believe that our biggest problem is not having a child. It is his
obsession to have a child with his girl now. He started his
relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the
car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the
petition." She feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic]
"paulit-ulit," but, that she still is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not
really psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You
and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new family." She
answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right.
Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin."48
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as
from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the
only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not
able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity,
per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within
the contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be shown that
respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality which makes him completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state51 and not
merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and
blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had
[extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
particular point."52 incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his bond one is about to assume.
salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave
psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent
essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a
these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations
marriage or that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific
expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, answers to every individual problem.61
reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply
with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.54 WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of
Garcia, on the other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and
there supports the doctor’s conclusion that petitioner Juanita is given full force and effect. No costs.
psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly
shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is SO ORDERED.
traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as required by
law – but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-
laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood,55 her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by
him,56 and her inability to conceive.57 Dr. Garcia’s report paints a
story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the
marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming
busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness
as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself
during his direct examination.58
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we
have been allowed a window into the Siayngcos’s life and have
perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting
apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband
consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological
incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a clichéd
subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case,
however, with much ado, it having realized that current
jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by
which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated—free in form
and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The
petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying
the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent
Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the
Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then
initially attracted to Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter already
had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was
in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and
respondent, a freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one
another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each
other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first
meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused,
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however,
made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that
month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the
boat ticket.4
However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their
pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted
it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go
back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward
to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide,
Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get
married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.6 The two then
continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated
like a prisoner—he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her
uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk
to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents’
home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who,
however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they
could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but
the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited,
and insisted that Edward must go home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle,
and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena
and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his
persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it
was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of
the latter’s psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-00-39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000,
ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to
investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.12 In
the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on
its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between
the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both
parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the following
findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult
born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two
years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently
unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA
GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a
psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of
Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological
incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and
one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business world
by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This
said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He
generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly
remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he
tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being
quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His
interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or
a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during
his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its
message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy
father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her
collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her
boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner
and this became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After
a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is
having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted
that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get
out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to
petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and
inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage
because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996,
respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already
bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly
agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are
supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they
were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an
apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any
so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and
seek help from petitioner’s parents. When the parties arrived at the
house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country
so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime
while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of
separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she
wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when
he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to
why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went
home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then
and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do.
Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against
petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner
asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this point
in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out
of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April
23, 1996, respondent’s uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,]
and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the
Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never
applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until
after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of
petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle
showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he
should persist in going home, they will commission their military
friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a
declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for
him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses. Sometime in June of
1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his
parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported
him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not
inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent.
When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling.
Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent.
Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioner’s
parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea
and claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a
separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also
intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of
whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new
life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner
already settled his differences with his own family. When
respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them
to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of
his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since
he also does not have a job, he would not be able to support her.
After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner
that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be
undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was
caused by both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment and their
young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting
boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally
immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital
vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be
still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is
still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a
lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other
individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it
boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship
especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously
aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of
person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn
time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the
aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat
exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is
seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage
with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a
rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and
threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon
the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly
finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and
marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should
not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution
solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner
and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have
impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of
their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition.
She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so
as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides
toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave,
severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only
manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological
incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring
the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both
parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the
OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003
Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial
court’s ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did
not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell
short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.22 The CA faulted the lower
court for rendering the decision without the required certification of
the OSG briefly stating therein the OSG’s reasons for its agreement
with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.23 The CA
later denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the likewise
assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for
review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits
that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both
parties’ psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that
there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions
of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it
had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders
and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the
annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of
the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply
with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not
alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically
identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the
OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina29 were not
satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is
null and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting
the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision
Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision
Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations.
The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy
written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in
the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought
of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new
Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the
IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the
Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses
after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for
dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two
grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the
spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and
(b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one
for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of
Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee
and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as —
‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
law.’
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional
concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent,
inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the
great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their
joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and,
instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the
civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again
prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and
those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two
Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of
a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on
void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was
the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the
enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’
‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.’
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country
today may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds
proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy
of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of
due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear
grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage
to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance,
cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse
by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who
refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have
children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have
found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands
are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like
inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence
or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the session
was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has
dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to
"mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer
to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the
idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There
being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . .
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological
or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier
February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a
person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with
another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the
inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B.
Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it
would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be
cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow
the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
"special cases and special situations," hence, its special treatment in
Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground
for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time
of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is
capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of
the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon
Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of
causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36
of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only
two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void.
Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable
or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can
never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified
by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal
procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law
as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter
lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law,
the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples
have found themselves in limbo—freed from the marriage bonds in
the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid
civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some
persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft
the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family
Code—and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code,
while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in
effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three
old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be ‘capable
according to law’ in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant’ of the major
elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear
category) required that internal and external freedom be present in
order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced
two distinct but related grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due
discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of due discretion
means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent
at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack
of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying
out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the
wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and
1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the
capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably
not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what
came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of
serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at
the time of the ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was
taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so designed as to
allow some resiliency in its application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as expressed by Article 6840 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has
been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.41 This
interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual
distinction must be made between the second and third paragraphs
of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment
and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario
Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if
somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela,
and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive
law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract,
viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior
to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire
unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by
the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal
with the psychological process of giving consent because it has been
established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent,
and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and
its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid
because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act
is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is
directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete
summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the
positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The
person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is
not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of
the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in
1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising
from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity
to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the
incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a
sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this
rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual
anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of
intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies
that are purely so – that is to say, they arise from certain
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect
the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so
that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence
from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain
anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards
sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its
frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity
itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these
anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher
faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to
have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the
gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely.
The question though is whether such a person can assume those
responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to
understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume
the essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to
posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit
consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually
confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts
were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna,
for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such
an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and
its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the
intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this
irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a
decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the
necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision
made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a
free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact,
true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an
irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and
certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in
which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly
and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies;
his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that
he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to
be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would
seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but
is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object
that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by
fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to
have seen his way more clearly through this tangled mess,
proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill
the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and
they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have
no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However,
such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free
consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the
object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of
positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person
afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction
usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and
evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the
delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From
the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a
certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the
formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person with the
ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a
mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram
Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse
can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent
but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto
esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is
incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although
she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of
marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same
obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was
not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic
impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity
rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These
anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is
qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the
impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084.
Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding
himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly
renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations.
According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral
theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or
both of the contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining
this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one
of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that
he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let
alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second
incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of
beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to
the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise
when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the
other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the
bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or
contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than
qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage.
Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of
procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other,
but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other.
These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and
individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete
circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be
suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the
essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming
them because of his "constitutional immorality."

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as
regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at
the moment of decision but also and especially during the moment
of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of
the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the
essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that
must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a
position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place.
When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill
the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also
and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19
Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent
to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic
constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his
irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the
rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are
invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A
lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others
feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation,
especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common
is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken
advantage of in order to achieve one’s ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential
matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio
vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the children.
Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily
incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several,
or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic
features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage
include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under
what rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of
marriage – that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of
the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because
of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to
consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of
nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal
decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer
not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae.
The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate
juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that
homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent
because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is
usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it
a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily
suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual
anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and
intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to
assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to
fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the
invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect
of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed
is the source of incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a
psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause
is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words,
there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is
only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic
constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can
then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis
contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this
juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something
rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of
these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in one’s
consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this
invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be
some freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit,
while one accepts as given one’s psychic constitution. It would seem
then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be
one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.42
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-
case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is
psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower
court’s judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43
ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the
appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v.
Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined
by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of
Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of
procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as
so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,46
thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is
to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed
as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s
membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred
"in the result" and another three—including, as aforesaid, Justice
Romero—took pains to compose their individual separate opinions.
Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In
the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another
case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court
has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for
the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently,
as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose
a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital
bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as
the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."50 The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little
by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has
become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina,
has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.51
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through
the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence.52 The Court should rather be
alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child
abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It
may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the
very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity
under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should
not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost,
because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial
declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a
lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have
become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality
disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorder
recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment
of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by
Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At
the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle
that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6)
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s,
that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to
give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment,
but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a
marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage
from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this
was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a
person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both
grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all
kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of
the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right
to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have
refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality;
as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses
must be ‘other oriented’ since the obligations of marriage are
rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more
than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends,
according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the
ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity
of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the
fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary
to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability;
(4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other
terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was
on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at
the time the marriage was entered into."581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a
party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there
is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis,
that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and
in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for
a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point,
finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a
court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties.
This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of
psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of
the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties’
prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment,
which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that both
parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat,
dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The
Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as
follows—
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are
characteristic of a person’s recent and long-term functioning.
Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to
isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive
and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties
or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by
adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become
less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more than
one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality
disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which
the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are
perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even
criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities
may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as
difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame
others for their problems. Other individuals with personality
disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be
lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal
difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints
propose a variety of causes of personality disorders. These include
Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave
activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of
development led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders
as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic
character types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent
and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the
oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional
aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage;
fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and
an inability to engage in intimate relationships.lawphil.net However,
later researchers have found little evidence that early childhood
events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific
personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic
factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline
personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other
personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies
suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic
factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline
personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-
hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with
measures of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts.
Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet
monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit
eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG)
have been reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow
wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline
patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG
abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are
categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders.
Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or
eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic
personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-
aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not
otherwise specified," that can be used for other specific personality
disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the
specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-
term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following
manner—
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are
easily hurt by others’ comments. At times they actually bring about
dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.
Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday
decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow
others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to
live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are
wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own,
volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and
are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.65 and
antisocial personality disorder described, as follows—
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is
intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a
society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard
for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal
behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or
spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others.
There is often a façade of charm and even sophistication that masks
disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need
to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also
may befit some individuals who are prominent in business or politics
whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of
others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was
referred to as moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless
behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
reasoning.lawphil.net psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on
personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001,
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders REINSTATED.
considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, SO ORDERED.
rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of
both parties’ psychological incapacity. We further consider that the
trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses’
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help
and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when
alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.67 As
clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to
him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible,
has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the
respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder
makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This
finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her
abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her
tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as shown in
this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and
of committing suicide.

SECOND DIVISION
November 14, 2016
G.R. No. 203284
NICOLAS S. MATUDAN, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARILYN** B. MATUDAN,
Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1seeks to set aside the January
31, 2012 Decision2 and August 23, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the Petition in CA·G.R. CV No. 95392 and the
Motion for Reconsideration,4 thus affirming the December 18, 2009
Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn
B. Matudan (Marilyn) were married in Laoang, Northern Samar on
October 26, 1976. They had four children.
In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and
the children lost contact with her; she had not been seen nor heard
from again.
Twenty-three years later, or on June 20, 2008, petitioner filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,6 docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-08-62827 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94.
Petitioner alleged that before, during, and after his marriage to
Marilyn, the latter was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her
obligations as a wife and mother; that she consistently neglected
and failed to provide petitioner and her children with the necessary
emotional and financial care, support, and sustenance, and even so
after leaving for work abroad; that based on expert evaluation
conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag),
Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and
incurable; that petitioner's consent to the marriage was obtained by
Marilyn through misrepresentation as she concealed her condition
from him; and that Marilyn is "not ready for a lasting and pennanent
commitment like marriage"7 as she "never (gave) him and their
children financial and emotional support x x x and for being selfish
through their six (6) years of cohabitation;"8 that Marilyn became
"so despicably irresponsible as she has not shown love and care
upon her husband, x x x and that she cannot properly and morally
take on the responsibility of a loving and caring wife x x x."9
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General, opposed the Petition.
The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor having determined
that there is no collusion between the parties, proceedings were
conducted in due course. However, trial proceeded in Marilyn's
absence.
Apart from the testimonies of the petitioner, his daughter Maricel B.
Matudan (Maricel), and Dr. Tayag, the following documents were
submitted in evidence:
1. Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit10 (Exhibit "A") which was adopted
as his testimony on direct examination;
2. The Judicial Aftidavit11 of Maricel (Exhibit "D"), which was
adopted as part of her testimony on direct examination;
3. The Sworn Affidavit12 of Dr. Tayag (Exhibit "B"), which was
considered part of her testimony on direct examination;
4. Dr. Tayag's evaluation report entitled "A Report on the
Psychological Condition of NICOLAS T. MATUDAN, the petitioner for
Nullity of Marriage against respondent MARILYN BORJA-
MATUDAN''13 (Exhibit "C"); and
5. Other relevant evidence, such as petitioner's marriage
contract/certificate and respective birth certificates of his children,
and a Letter/Notice, with Registry Return Receipt, sent by Dr. Tayag
to Marilyn requesting evaluation/interview relative to petitioner's
desire to file a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage
(Exhibits "E" to "G").
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On December 18, 2009, the RTC issued its Decision14 dismissing the
Petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on the ground that petitioner's
evidence failed to sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed psychological
incapacity. It held, thus:
Petitioner, his daughter Maricel Matudan and psychologist Nedy L.
Tayag testified. Petitioner offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to ''G"
which were admitted by the Court.
The State and the respondent did not present any evidence.
From the testimonial and documentary evidence of the petitioner,
the Court gathered the following:
Petitioner and respondent were roamed on October 26, 1976 x x x.
They begot four (4) children x x x. Petitioner and respondent lived
together with their children. On June 25, 1985, petitioner asked
respondent [sic] for permission to work and left the conjugal
dwelling. Since then she was never heard of [sic]. Respondent never
communicated with the petitioner and her children. Petitioner
inquired from the relatives of the respondent but they did not tell
him her whereabouts.
In his Affidavit which was considered as his direct testimony,
petitioner claimed that respondent failed to perform her duties as a
wife to him. Respondent never gave petitioner and their children
financial and emotional support, love and care during their
cohabitation. She was irresponsible, immature and exhibited
irrational behavior towards petitioner and their children. She was
self-centered, had no remorse and involved herself in activities
defying social and moral ethics.
On cross-examination, petitioner testified that he and the
respondent had a happy married life and they never had a fight. The
only reason why he filed this case was because respondent
abandoned him and their children.
Maricel Matudan was only two (2) years old when respondent left
them. She corroborated the testimony of the petitioner that since
respondent left the conjugal dwelling she never provided financial
support to the family and never communicated with them.
Nedy L. Tayag, Psychologist, testified on the 'Report on the
Psychological Condition of Nicolas Matudan' which she prepared
(Exhibit "C''). She subjected petitioner to psychological test and
interview. She likewise interviewed Maricel Matudan. She came up
with the findings that petitioner is suffering from Passive-Aggressive
Personality Disorder and respondent has Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with Antisocial Traits. The features of petitioner's disorder
are the following: negativistic attitude, passive resistance, lacks the
ability to assert his opinions and has great difficulty expressing his
feelings.
The root cause of his personality condition can be attributed to his
being an abandoned child. At a young age, his parents separated
and he was left in the custody of his paternal grandmother. He
lacked a support system and felt rejected. He developed a strong
need for nurturance, love and attention and that he would do
anything to attain such.
As for respondent, the manifestation of her disorder are as follows:
Preoccupation with pursuing matters that would make her happy;
has a high sense of self-importance; wants to have her way and
disregards her husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants to have a
good life.
Her personality condition is rooted on her unhealthy familial
environment. She came from an impoverished family. Her parents
were more pre-occupied with finding ways to make ends meet to
such extent that they failed to give adequate attention and
emotional support to their children.
Ms. Tayag further testified that the psychological condition of the
parties are grave and characterized by juridical antecedence as the
same already existed before they got married, their disorders having
been in existence since their childhood years are permanent and
severe.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether x x x respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code as amended, states:
'A marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapicity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.'
Article 68 of the same Code provides:
'The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.'
In the case of Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, January 4, 1995,
G.R. No. 112019, the Honorable Supreme Court held:
'Justice Alicia Sempio Dy, in her commentaries on the Family Code
cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso a former
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila x x x, who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.
For psychological incapacity however to be appreciated, the same
must be serious, grave and 'so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.' x x x.
In the case of Santos, it was also held that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.'
It must be emphasized that the cause of action of petitioner is the
alleged psychological incapacity of the respondent. During the pre-
trial, the sole issue raised is whether or not respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The alleged personality disorder
of the petitioner is clearly not an issue in this case.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds that the totality of
the evidence adduced by petitioner has not established the
requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Again, it
must be emphasized that this petition was filed on the ground of
the psychological incapacity of respondent and not the petitioner.
Respondent is said to be suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with antisocial traits. The salient features of her disorder
were enumerated by Nedy Tayag in her report as follows: pre-
occupation with pursuing matters that would make her happy; has a
high sense of self-importance; wants to have her way and disregards
her husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants to have a good life.
Her personality disorder is considered permanent, grave and
incurable. It has its root cause in her unhealthy familial environment
during her early developmental years.
In petitions for declaration of marriage (sic), the testimony of the
petitioner as to the physical manifestation of the psychological
incapacity is of utmost importance. Unfortunately, petitioner's
testimony particularly his affidavit which was considered as his
direct examination contained only general statements on the
supposed manifestations of respondent's incapacity. Respondent
was described therein as irresponsible, immature, self -centered,
lacks remorse, got involved with activities defying social and moral
ethics. Petitioner however miserably failed to expound on these
allegations. In fact during his cross-examination, he even
contradicted the allegations in his petition and affidavit. He clearly
stated that he had a happy marital relationship with the respondent
and never had a fight with her (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 8).
Petitioner harped on the abandonment of respondent. He even
admitted that this the [sic] only reason why he wants their marriage
dissolved (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 9). Abandonment of spouse
however is not psychological incapacity. It is only a ground for legal
separation.
Petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage are sui generis, the
allegations therein must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence that would warrant the dissolution of the marriage bond.
Absent such proof, the Court will uphold the validity of the marriage
for 'the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bond.' (Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006).
In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage is on the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioner moved to reconsider, 16 but in a May 12, 2010 Order,17
the RTC held its ground reiterating its pronouncement that
petitioner failed to demonstrate Marilyn's psychological incapacity,
and that the petition is anchored merely on Marilyn's abandonment
of the marriage and family, which by itself is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R CV No.
95392. However, in its assailed January 31, 2012 Decision, the CA
instead affirmed the RTC judgment, declaring thus:
Petitioner-appellant asserts that the ETC should not have denied the
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Marilyn x x x. He
maintains that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the trial court,
he was able to establish by the quantum of evidence required, the
claimed psychological incapacity of his wife.
The argument of Nicolas R. Matudan fails to persuade Us.
Verily, instead or substantiating the alleged psychological incapacity
his wife, petitioner-appellant revealed during his cross examination
that it was actually his wife's act of abandoning the family that led
him to seek the nullification of their marriage. In fact, during his
cross-examination, he readily admitted that they were happily
married and that they never engaged in bickering with each other.
xxxx
Q: But how would you describe your marital relations [sic]? Were
there moments that you were happy with your wife?
A: Yes, ma' am, that is why we begot four children.
COURT
And so, you so you [sic] had a happy married life then?
FISCAL
I would presume that you had a happy married life, how come your
wife just left you like that? Do you have any idea why your wife just
left you like that?
A: She did not communicate with us to tell her whereabouts.
Q: Did you ever have a fight with your wife?
A: None, ma'am.
xxxx
COURT
All right, you stated in this Affidavit that you are filing this case for
the declaration of nullity of marriage because of the psychological
incapacity of your wife, what do you mean by that?
WITNESS
'Pinabayaan lang kmning pamilya niya, hindi naman niya sinasabi
kung saan siya hahanapin.' She did not inform us of her
whereabouts.
COURT
Is that the only reason why you want your marriage with her
dissolved?
WITNESS
Yes, your honor.
As correctly observed by the RTC, abandonment by a spouse, by
itself, however, does not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be
shown that such abandonment is a manifestation of a disordered
personality which makes the spouse concerned completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Indeed, the term 'psychological incapacity' to be a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. Psychological incapacity must refer to
no less than a mental not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Rorodel Glaviano Molina, the
following definitive guidelines were laid down in resolving petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the
Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff: Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
(3) Tue incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
celebration' of the marriage,
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition.
These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements established in
Santos v. Court of Appeals that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the
grant of a petition for nu1lity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Using the above standards, We find the totality of the petitioner-
appellant's evidence insufficient to prove that the respondent-
appellee is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of
her as a wife.
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and
finding of the clinical psychologist cannot be relied upon to
substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the psychological
incapacity of his wife.
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings
below. The clinical psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-
appellee's condition was based mainly on the information supplied
by her husband, the petitioner, and to some extent from their
daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only
around two (2) years of age at the time the respondent left and
therefore cannot be expected to know her mother well. Also,
Maricel would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article
36 case because she could not have been there when the spouses
were married and could not have been expected to know what was
happening between her parents until long after her birth. On the
other hand; as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas' description of
Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased, and a psychological
evaluation based on this one-sided description can hardly be
considered as credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v.Angelita Suazo,
et al., is illuminating on this score:
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert
opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the
psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on
her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's
psychological condition only in an indirect manner - she derived all
her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias
for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the
court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due
care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of
standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and
in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for
a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave,
severe and incurable.
xxxx
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using
meager information coming from a directly interested party, could
not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelita's
psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is
not true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot
satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report
that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that
psychological incapacity exists.
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua,
it was similarly declared that '[t]o make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based
on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence.'
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist
on the psychological condition of the respondent-appellee to be
insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
existed that prevented Marilyn from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded
that Marilyn suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives as manifestations
of the same. The report neither explained the incapacitating nature
of the alleged disorder, nor showed that the respondent-appellee
was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of
a psychological, not physical, nature.
xxxx
Dr. Tayag's testimony during her cross-examination as well as her
statements in the Sworn Affidavit are no different.
When asked to explain the personality disorder of Marilyn, Dr.
Tayag simply replied:
Q: On her case you assessed her as, likewise, suffering from a
personality disorder characterized by Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with Anti-Social Trait. Will you please tell to the Court what
do you mean by that personality disorder?
A: In layman's term, once you are being labeled as a narcissistic [sic],
this is a person whose preoccupation are all toward his own self
satisfaction both materially or emotionally at the expense of
somebody. They have what you called [sic] strong sense of
entitlement thinking that she can get away whatever [sic] she wants
to in pursuit of her own satisfaction at the expense of somebody.
And this is what happened to the respondent. She gave more
consideration to her own satisfaction material wise at the expense
of social embarrassment of the children because of what happened
to her.
On the other hand, in her Sworn Affidavit, Dr. Tayag stated:
7. Without a doubt, Marilyn is suffering from a form of personality
disorder that rooted [sic] the downfall of their marriage. As based
on the DSM-IV, respondent's behavioral disposition fits with
individuals with NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER with Anti-
social traits, as characterized by her disregard for and violation of
the rights of others as well as her failure to conform to social norms
with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly
performing acts that are clearly immoral and socially despised. Such
is also depicted through his [sic] deceitfulness, as indicated by
repeated lying and conning methods she used upon others in order
to achieve personal profit or pleasure. In addition, her consistent
irresponsibility, as indicated by her repeated failure to sustain
consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations and her lack
of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing
having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another. x x x. And such
condition is considered to [sic] grave, severe, long lasting and
incurable by any treatment available.
Accordingly, even if We assume that Marilyn is really afflicted with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits, in the
absence of any showing that the same actually incapacitated her
from fulfilling her essential marital obligations, such disorder cannot
be a valid basis for declaring Nicolas' marriage to Marilyn as null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code. To be sure, jurisprudence
has declared that not every psychological illness/disorder/condition
is a ground for declaring the marriage a nullity under Article 36.
'[T]he meaning of 'psychological incapacity' [is confined] to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.'
All told, We find that no reversible error was committed by the trial
court in rendering its assailed Decision:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No.
Q-08-62827, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.18 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 23,
2012 Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant
Petition.
In a November 19, 2014 Resolution,19 this Court resolved to give
due course to the Petition.
Issue
Petitioner mainly questions the CA's appreciation of the case,
insisting that he was able to prove Marilyn's psychological
incapacity.1âwphi1
Petitioner's Arguments
In his Petition and Reply,20 petitioner argues that contrary to the
CA's findings, he was able to prove Marilyn's psychological
incapacity which is rooted in Dr. Tayag's diagnosis that she was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which existed even
before their marriage, and continued to subsist thereafter; that her
illness is grave, serious, incurable, and permanent as to render her
incapable of assuming her marriage obligations; that the
nullification of his marriage to Marilyn is not an affront to the
institutions of marriage and family, but will actually protect the
sanctity thereof because in effect, it will discourage individuals with
psychological disorders that prevent them from assuming marital
obligations from remaining in the sacred bond;21 that the issue of
whether psychological incapacity exists as a ground to nullify one's
marriage is a legal question; and that the totality of his evidence and
Marilyn's failure to refute the same despite due notice demonstrate
that he is entitled to a declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Respondent's Arguments
In its Comment22 praying for denial, the Republic argues that the
Petition calls for an evaluation of facts, thus violating the rule that a
petition for review on certiorari should be confined to legal
questions. Citing Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,23which decrees as
follows-
Tue issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given
case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than
in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual issue,
however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the
function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
or premises supportive of such factual determination. It is a well-
established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for
the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of
the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to
the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are
unavailing in the instant case. (Citations omitted)
the State argues that the instant case should be dismissed instead.
The public respondent adds that allegations and proof of
irresponsibility, immaturity, selfishness, indifference, and
abandonment of the family do not automatically justify a conclusion
of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that
the intent of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders -
existing at the time of the marriage - clearly demonstrating an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage, and depriving the spouse of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the marital bond he/she is about to assume; that
petitioner failed to show how each of Marilyn's claimed negative
traits affected her ability to perform her essential marital
obligations; that the supposed psychological evaluation of Marilyn
was in fact based on the one-sided, self-serving, and biased
information supplied by petitioner and Maricel - which renders the
same unreliable and without credibility; that petitioner's real reason
for seeking nullification is Marilyn's abandonment of the family; and
that all in all, petitioner failed to prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability of Marilyn's claimed psychological
incapacity.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals24taught us that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. Thus, the incapacity "must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved."25 In this connection, the burden of proving psychological
incapacity is on the petitioner, pursuant to Republic v. Court of
Appeals,26or the Molina case.
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained
as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the
psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the
existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly
on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be
established by the totality of evidence presented during trial,
making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the
existence of the psychological incapacity. 27
Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil
Case No. Q-08-62827 on the ground that the totality of petitioner's
evidence failed to sufficiently prove that Marilyn was psychologically
unfit to enter marriage - in short, while petitioner professed
psychological incapacity, he could not establish its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability.
The Court agrees.
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and
testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of his daughter
Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation
report on the psychological condition both petitioner and Marilyn.
The supposed evaluation of Marilyn's psychological condition was
based solely on petitioner's account, since Marilyn did not
participate in the proceedings.
Indeed, "[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition."28 "[T]he
complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as
are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage."29 Petitioner's judicial affidavit and
testimony during trial, however, fail to show gravity and juridical
antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of
guilt and was involved in "activities defying social and moral
ethics,"30 and that she was, among others, irrational, irresponsible,
immature, and self-centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently
and particularly elaborate on these allegations, particularly the
degree of Marilyn's claimed irresponsibility, immaturity, or
selfishness. This is compounded by the fact that petitioner
contradicted his own claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were
happily married and never had a fight, which is why they begot four
children; and the only reason for his filing Civil Case No. Q-08-62827
was Marilyn's complete abandonment of the marriage and family
when she left to work abroad.
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental--
not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 31
If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the
very least. At most, they fail to sufficiently establish the degree of
Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.
On the other hand, Maricel cannot be of help either. She was only
two years old when Marilyn left the family. Growing up, she may
have seen the effects of Marilyn's abandonment - such as the lack of
emotional and financial support; but she could not have any idea of
her mother's claimed psychological incapacity, as well as the nature,
history, and gravity thereof.
Just as well, Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding
Marilyn's psychological condition were not based on actual tests or
interviews conducted upon Marilyn herself; they are based on the
personal accounts of petitioner. This fact gave more significance and
importance to petitioner's other pieces of evidence, which could
have compensated for the deficiency in the expert opinion which
resulted from its being based solely on petitioner's one-sided
account. But since these other pieces of evidence could not be
relied upon, Dr. Tayag's testimony and report must fail as well. In
one decided case with a similar factual backdrop and involving the
very same expert witness, this Court held:
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other
for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing
established fact shows that living together as spouses under one
roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace's departure from their home
in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute
inability to comply with her obligation to live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined
by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more
convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability of the former's condition. Glenn, however, failed in this
respect. Glenn's testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito,
on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn's statements
are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to
MaryGrace's traits and acts, which she exhibited during the
marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the antecedence of Mary
Grace's alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months
before they got married, they saw each other almost everyday.
Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and well[-] educated person" in Mary
Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayag's assessment of Mary Grace's condition, the Court
finds the same as unfounded. Rumbaua provides some guidelines
on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists
or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage,
viz.:
We' cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the
respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias
in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance
alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her
report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more
rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed
above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent
from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear,
see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted
and responded to the doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's
narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a
self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who 'believes
that the world revolves around him'; and who 'used love as a . . .
deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended
towards him.' x x x
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth
and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying
with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the
root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and
to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did
it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show
that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due
to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we
cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report
--i.e., that the respondent suffered 'Narcissistic Personality Disorder
with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave
and incurable' -is an unfounded statement, not a necessary
inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner
could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with
respect to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based
on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence.32

Finally, the identical rulings of the trial and appellate courts should
be given due respect and finality. This Court is not a trier of facts.

The issue of whether or not psychological inq1pacity exists in a

given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to
review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings
of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons x x x.33

With the foregoing disquisition, there is no need to resolve the

other issues raised. They have become irrelevant.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2012 Decision

and August 23, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 95392 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.