Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press and Philosophy of Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy of Science.
http://www.jstor.org
An invisiblehand seems to play an importantrole in science.In this paper I set out the
generalstructureof invisible-handexplanations,countersome objectionsthat havebeen
raised to them, and detail the role that they play in science. The most importantissue
is the characterof the mechanisms that are supposed to bring about invisible-hand
effects.
S117
that restructurethat area of science from the bottom up. The history
of science does not look much like a movement toward equilibrium.
In addition, Mirowski(1994, 566) complainsthat invisiblehandsare
introduced primarily to compensate for treating scientists as if they
were marooned Robinson Crusoes, when in actuality scientists form
researchgroups of varyingdegreesof integration.If economic theories
lack any significantidea of "the social," then economics is in real trou-
ble. But invisible-handexplanationsneed not treatscientistsas hermits.
All that is necessaryis that sometimes these individualsact in relative
autonomy from each other with respect to the general good at issue
and that, within the groups that they form, an important concern is
looking out for themselves.
Severalauthors have also noted that invisible-handexplanationsof-
ten result from differencesbetweenappearanceand reality.A phenom-
enon that appearsto have been brought about by someone'sintention
actually was not. It was an unintendedconsequence of human inten-
tions. Conversely, sometimes what appears not to have been brought
about by anyone's intention actuallywas. How could all the electricity
on the east coast of America go out as it did a few years back?Either
some evil cabal was responsibleor else a whole seriesof flukesproduced
the shutdown.People who have a much higheropinion of the foresight,
understandingand competence of their fellow human beings than I
have are prone to such conspiracytheories. I myself tend to preferthe
second alternative. In any case, Nozick (1974, 19) terms conspiracy-
theory explanations"hidden-hand"in contrast to "invisible-hand"ex-
planations. In this paper, I limit myself to invisible-handexplanations.
The real problem with invisible-handexplanations is the specifica-
tion of the mechanismthat is supposed to bringabout the result(Pettit
1996,Ylikoski 1995).As Ullmann-Margalit(1978, 267-268) concludes,
the onus of invisible-handexplanations "lies on the process, or mech-
anism, that aggregates the dispersed individual actions into the pat-
terned outcome: it is the degree to which this mechanism is explicit,
complex, sophisticated-and, indeed, in a sense unexpected-that de-
termines the success and interest of the invisible-handexplanation."
Can the mechanismsresponsiblefor this behaviorin sciencebe set out
explicitly?Are these mechanismsadequate to bring about the effects I
claim for science, or do they merely appeal to mysteriouscoincidences
that serve only to paper over these anomalous states of affairs(Geertz
1973, 206)?
In sum, invisible-hand explanations are offered in human affairs
when individualsbehave the way that they do in order to bring about
their own self-centeredgoals and in the processbringabout some other
unintendedmore general consequence for a largergroup of people of
which they are part. In the remainderof this paper I set out what I
take to be the mechanismsthat are responsiblefor the peculiarepiste-
mic characterof science and argue that these conditions are frequently
realizedin science as it has been practicedfor the past couple hundred
years in the West. I begin with some uncontroversial observations
about science and scientists-not about all scientists all the time but
about scientists when they are being the most successfulin coming to
understandthe world in which we live.
amass lots of data, some of it fairly isolated, but they also devise the-
ories that organize data and entail all sorts of conclusions about what
should be the case. Any error fed into the system is likely sooner or
later to produceerroneousresultssomewhere.If scientistshad to check
each and every result before incorporatingit into their own work, sci-
ence would slow to a crawl. However, as Mirowski has pointed out to
me, the social structureof science not only serves to reduce errorbut
also helps scientists to function successfully even in the presence of
error.
Scientists are not peculiar in that they are constantly enjoined to
adhereto the strictestcanons of their discipline.Such invocationsmay
have some positive effect on how scientists behave, but in other areas
of human endeavor, comparable calls to do one's duty do not come
close to being sufficientto bring about the stated goals of the discipline.
Although appeals to duty certainlyhave some effect, it always helps if
individualsdo not have to sacrificetheir individualgoals for the good
of the group. Social systems work much better when virtue and indi-
vidual benefit go hand in hand. Once again, scientists are in a bind.
They would like to conduct their researchas quickly as possible, to get
their resultsout sooner than anyone else so that they can get the credit.
But the chief credit in science, the currencythat really matters, is use.
Scientistsdo not use the results of other scientistsidly. In adoptingthe
views of other scientists or using their data, scientists are voting with
their careers(Quillian 1994, 437). One of the most importantfeatures
of use as a criterion of worth is that only practicing scientists can assign
it. Nonscientists play many significant roles in science, but only sci-
entists functioning as scientistscan use the work of other scientistsby
incorporatingit into their own work.
As mentioned previously, scientists almost never test the results of
other scientistsbefore using them. However,if things startgoing wrong
with their own research,scientistsbegin searchingto see what the prob-
lem is. If the errors can be traced back to your work, you are in real
trouble. Citations may well give credit where credit is due, but they
also leave paper trails for assigningblame as well. With the possibility
of credit comes the possibility of discredit. One effect of uncovering
mistakes in the work of other scientists is increasedcare in using the
work of these scientists in the future. In fact, often one egregious in-
stance is enough for a group of aggrievedscientists to cease using the
work of those scientistsfound guilty.
Because scientists are invested in their own work, they are not all
that good at discoveringerrorsin their own pet hypotheses, but other
scientists are more than happy to fill the gap. Scientists get very little
creditfor replicatingother scientists'experiments,but they do get credit
hold back the progress of science. In the past decade, two of the most
innovative and powerful scientists in the world devoted a significant
amount of theirtime and the time of theirco-workersarguingoverwho
really discoveredthe virus that causes AIDS (Rawling 1994). Millions
of people are dying, and these scientistsare arguingoverpriority!Moral
indignationto one side, prioritydisputesare the pricethat must be paid
for the mechanismthat emergedto force scientiststo make theirdiscov-
eries public so that other scientistscan use them.
The preceding discussion hints at a second differencebetween the
causal mechanisms operative in science and pure invisible-hands-
scientists do not come close to working in total isolation from each
other. A high percentage of scientists work in tightly-knit research
teams (Sen 1983),and those scientistsworkingin such groupsaremuch
more productive than those working in relative isolation (Blau 1978).
From the perspectiveof rewardand punishment,these groups are the
relevant "individuals." Even in the absence of such well-integrated
groups, scientistsinfluenceand are influencedby other scientists,both
as individualsand as sources of information.Invisiblehandsjoin with
invisible colleges. In addition, scientists are much more responsiveto
local than to global comparisons (Frank 1985). Most scientistsdo not
expect their work to be noticed, let alone used, by all other scientists
but primarilyby those working in their own restrictedarea of science.
The most importantissue is whetherthe "individual"goals of scientists
and the good of science are sufficientlyindependentso that they can
work at cross-purposes. Once again, priority disputes provide some
evidence that they can.
As early as 1788 the authors of the FederalistPapers can be found
observing that the "desire of rewardis one of the strongestincentives
of human conduct." As a result, the "best security for the fidelity of
mankind,is to make interestcoincide with duty." (Hamilton,Madison,
and Jay 1818, 452). Scientists might well be as motivated to produce
knowledge for its own sake as they say they are, and perhaps these
admirablemotivations are sufficientto bring about the production of
reliable knowledge, but the really neat thing about the rewardsystem
in science is that it is so organizedthat, by and large, more self-serving
motivations tend to have the same effect as more altruisticmotivations.
Virtue and benefit go hand in hand. Scientists need not be saints to
contributeto science. To the extent that scientistsare motivatedby the
high opinion of others as evidenced by the use of each other's work,
they will be pressuredto behave themselves.
A third peculiarity of invisible-handmechanismsin science is that
scientists can become aware of them (Ylikoski 1995). Uncritical sci-
entists go about their work convinced that they are motivated almost
entirely by the quest for knowledge for its own sake, but some have
become aware that they may also be influenced by less altruistic
motives. What effect might scientists' understandingof how science
works have on science?As in so many other cases, might not this self-
knowledge endangerthe fabric of science?Perhaps a less visible hand
might producestill better science,as Fuller(1994, 601) suggests?I think
not. As scientistscome to understandthe varioustensions and conflicts
that confront them in science, my best guess is that they will be better
able to handle them (Hirshleifer1977).
The precedingmay sound plausible, but is it true?Testing claims of
any sort is difficult enough. Testing claims about social phenomenais
even more difficult. In my Science as a Process (1988), I made a first
stab at testing my invisible-handexplanation. I broke down the pos-
tulated mechanisminto as many localized parts as possible and tested
each as separately as possible. For example, might not science work
better if it were organized differently?Might it not work better if sci-
entists submergedtheir individualegos to the generalgood as Francis
Bacon (1620) suggested?Such contrary-to-factconditionals are very
difficultto evaluate-unless they actuallyoccur-and in the case of the
preceding questions they have. The French Academy was formed in
1666 along Baconian lines so that all the credit for the contributions
of individual members of the Academy went to the Academy as a
whole, rather than to individual members, but by 1699 this noble ex-
periment was abandoned as a failure and replaced by credit for con-
tributions. The Royal Society of London adopted this structureright
from the start (Hull 1988, 322-323).
The one example that I have been able to find in which group effort
performedby seeminglyanonymous individualsled to majoradvances
in knowledge was the strange case of Nicholas Bourbaki in which a
group of young French mathematiciansset themselves the task of re-
working the foundations of mathematics. Rather than listing all the
individualswho contributedto this project through the years, they in-
vented an imaginarymathematicianwhom they named Bourbaki. By
the time that this projectwas completed, thirty-fourvolumes had been
publishedunder this pseudonym (Hull 1988, 223).
Even though this example concerns mathematicsand not empirical
science, it still counts against the mechanismthat I am postulatingfor
science because these mathematicians made major contributions to
mathematicswithout (apparently)getting any individualcredit.On my
view, not all scientists need insist all the time on receivingindividual
credit for their contributions, but any case of sustained success over
long periods by numerous scientists without individual credit does
bring my views into question. To be sure, the identitiesof the changing
membership of Bourbaki were well known, and being asked to join this
prestigious group was an honor in itself, but I am committed to the
view that, upon closer examination, we will discover that these authors
did receive individual credit for their contributions (see Weintraub and
Mirowski 1994). A graduate student, Michelle Little, is currently work-
ing on a case in which one group of radio astronomers held up pub-
lishing a major discovery until other groups could catch up to them! If
too many cases of this sort can be uncovered, then my hypothesis about
the role of invisible hands in science is in serious jeopardy.
REFERENCES
Bacon, F. ([1620] 1960), The New Organon and Related Writings, F. H. Anderson (ed.).
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.
Blau, J. R. (1978), "Sociometric Structure of a Scientific Discipline", Research in Sociology
of Knowledge, Sciences and Art 1: 191-206.
Collins, H. M. (1985), Changing Order:Replication and Inductionin Scientific Practice. Lon-
don: Sage.
Frank, R. H. (1985), Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Questfor Status.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Frank, R. H. and P. Cook. (1995), The Winner-Take-AllSociety. New York: Free Press.