1
I. The Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act 141) 1. The Republic of the Philippines should have exhausted all
Preliminaries
G.R. No. L-50464 January 29, 1990
SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC., CORAL BEACH
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
BATAAN, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, Convenience Foods
Corporation (hereafter simply SUNBEAM) and Coral Beach
Development Corporation (hereafter simply CORAL BEACH)
bring to our attention the decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals in "Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Pedro T.
Santiago, et al.," disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted. The order of the
respondent judge dated October 7, 1977, dismissing Civil
Case No. 4062 is set aside, and respondent judge is ordered
to require private respondents to file their answer to the
complaint in said Civil Case No. 4062 and thereafter to
proceed with the trial of the case on the merits and to render
judgment thereon.'
The following facts stated by the respondent Court in its
decision and restated by the petitioners in their petition are
accurate:
(a) On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the
issuance of a Sales Patent in favor of defendant Sunbeam
Convenience Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both
situated in Mariveles, Bataan and more particularly described
and bounded as follows:
Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m )
Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m
(b) On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered
with the defendant Register of Deeds of Bataan who in turn
issued Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of
defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two
parcels of land above-described;
(c) Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
12421 was issued over Lot 1, Sgs-2409, while Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12422 was issued over Lot 2, Sgs-2409,
both in favor of defendant Coral Beach Development
Corporation I
(d) On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines instituted before the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, an action for reversion docketed as Civil
Case No. 4062. 2
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the following grounds:
fully measuring the Court's discretion, enumerates the
administrative remedies before filing the case in court;
2. The title issued to SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH had
become indefeasible and imprescriptible;
3. The action for reversion was defective, having been initiated
by the Solicitor General and not by the Director of Lands. 3
The then Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissed the
complaint in the Order of October 7, 1977,4 adopting mainly
the theory that since the titles sought to be cancelled
emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands
Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the
disposition of the land.
The Solicitor General received the copy of the Order on
October 11, 1977 and filed a Notice of Appeal dated October
25, 1977 .5 The Solicitor General then moved for an extension
of thirty days within which to file the Record on Appeal and to
pay the docket fee in order to perfect the appeal. This was to
be followed by another motion for extension filed by the
Solicitor General, resulting in the Court of Appeals granting the
petitioner another extension of fifteen days from December 10,
1977. Finally before this period of extension lapsed, instead of
an appeal, a petition for certiorari with the respondent Court of
Appeals was filed.
According to the Solicitor General, the Court of First Instance
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint and in
a. Not finding that since the lower court acted in a Motion to
Dismiss, the correctness of its decision must be decided in the
assumed truth and accuracy of the allegations of the
complaint. The complaint alleges that the lands in question are
forest lands; hence, inalienable.
b. Finding that Lots I and 2 are alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under the jurisdiction of the Director of
Lands despite clear and positive evidence to the contrary.
c. Concluding that the complaint for reversion is defective as it
was not initiated by the Director of Lands.
d. Finding that the complaint for reversion states no cause of
action for alleged failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative
remedies. 6
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for
certiorari, set aside the Order of Dismissal rendered by the
Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 4062, and ordered the
presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago to receive the answers
of the private respondents SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH in
the action for reversion.
Hence Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed this petition for review.
A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion,
and is granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefore. The following, while neither controlling nor
premises for granting a review:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court
or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or
the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; and
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far
sanctioned such departure by a lower court as to call for
supervision .7
We agree with the Court of Appeals' granting of the petition
filed by the Republic of the Philippines charging the then Court
of First Instance with grave abuse of discretion. The filing of
the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for reversion by
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH on the ground of lack of
cause of action, necessarily carried with it the admission, for
purposes of the motion, of the truth of all material facts
pleaded in the complaint instituted by the Republic.
An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the
classification of the lands as forest lands. This material
allegation stated in the Republic's complaint' was never denied
specifically 9 by the defendants (petitioners herein) SUNBEAM
and CORAL BEACH.
If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these
proceedings become moot and academic. Land remains
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered
open to disposition.10
Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the
State.11 Thus, before any land may be declassified from the
forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act
from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified
as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain. 12
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands
does not confer any validity on such title if the property
covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest. 13
The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the
classification of the land is by remanding the case to the lower
court for a full- dress trial on the issues involved.
Generally, the rules of procedure must be observed so that the
efficient administration of justice is ensured. However, the
rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice.14 They must lead to the
proper and just determination of litigation, without tying the
hands of the law or making it indifferent to realities.1âwphi1
Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is
made available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.

15 The long line of decisions denying the petition for certiorari,
either before appeal was availed of or specially in instances
where the appeal period has lapsed, far outnumbers the
instances when certiorari was given due course. The few
significant exceptions were: when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictate; or when the broader
interests of justice so require, or when the writs issued are null,
16 or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority. 17
We find nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of
Appeals to give due course to the petition considering that the
issue affected a matter of public concern which is the
disposition of the lands of our matrimony No less than the
Constitution protects its policy.
We therefore find no compelling reason to disturb the findings
of the appellate court, in the absence of a clear showing that
the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance in a
manner inconsistent with jurisprudence, or that the respondent
Court has departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings. In sum, no reversible error has been
committed by the respondent court. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva
Vizcaya, HEIRS OF CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF
LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES, and PHILIPPINE
CACAO AND FARM PRODUCTS, INC., respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Sought to be annulled and set aside in this special civil action
of certiorari is the decision of respondent Judge Sofronio G.
Sayo rendered on March 5, 1981 in Land Registration Case
No. N-109, LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by virtue of a
compromise agreement, the title of the private respondents
over a tract of land.
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an
original application for registration of a tract of land identified
as Lot No. 7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago, BL Cad.
211 (July 17, 1961) and having an area of 33,950 hectares.
The land was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago,
Province of Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva
Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No. 236.
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the
Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some
others, including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua.1 In due course,
an order of general default was thereafter entered on
December 11, 1961 against the whole world except the
oppositors.
The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3,
1981 when a compromise agreement was entered into by and
among all the parties, assisted by their respective counsel,
namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died),
the Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the
Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm
Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of
Casiano Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and
ceded —
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109
hectares;
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development,
12,341 hectares;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000
hectares; and
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc.,
8,000 hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the
compromise agreement, adjudicated to and acknowledged as
owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area,
1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their
counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In
consideration of the areas respectively allocated to them, all
the parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior
claims to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre.
In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent
Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the
title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have
that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void
and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. The Solicitor General contends that —
1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in
support of their petitions for registration;
2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of
Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the
compromise agreement;
3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but
was not given notice of the compromise agreement or
otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein;
4) that he was not even served with notice of the
decision approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the
"patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take
immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor
General's arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot
7454 is public land, but it is not. According to them, as pointed
out in the application for registration, the private character of
the land is demonstrated by the following circumstances, to
wit:
2
1) the possessory information title of the applicants and
their predecessors-in-interest;
2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public
land by the Director of Lands in the proper cadastral
proceedings;
3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated
August 16, 1932 to the effect that the (Estadistica de
Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the
Bureau of Archives, the property in question was registered
under the 'Spanish system of land registration as private
property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants'
predecessors-in-interest;
4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act
496 (the Torrens Act) presupposes that there is already a title
to be confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings
under the Public Land Act where the presumption is always
that the land involved belongs to the State.
Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land
registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms
part of the public domain. 3 Unless the applicant succeeds in
showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property
involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for the proper
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part
of the public domain . 4 The applicant must present competent
and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely
on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than
factual evidence of possession and title. 5
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document
relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to
prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of
their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the
National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above
mentioned) to the effect that according to the Government's
(Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896, the
property in question was registered under the Spanish system
of land registration as private property of Don Liberato Bayaua.
But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that
Spanish document, the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot
be considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants
made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not
constituting primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is an
inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the
private character of the land in question.
And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for
registration of land under the Torrens Act is proof that the land
is of private ownership, not pertaining to the public domain, is
to beg the question. It is precisely the character of the land as
private which the applicant has the obligation of establishing.
For there can be no doubt of the intendment of the Land
Registration Act, Act 496, that every applicant show a proper
title for registration; indeed, even in the absence of any

adverse claim, the applicant is not assured of a favorable
decree by the Land Registration Court, if he fails to establish a
proper title for official recognition.
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a
quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the
parties. But that compromise agreement included private
persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their
ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding.
Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons
or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their
ownership of any part of the land. What was done was to
consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the
parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition.
The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little
extension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation
at all of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but
the agreement among themselves that they had rights and
interests over the land.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development
to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private
respondents.
As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private
respondents, it should be pointed out that under the Spanish
Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to
public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription
thereof in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public,
adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty
(20) years (later reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here,
proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent, the
informacion posesoria cannot be considered as anything more
than prima facie evidence of possession. 7
Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the
execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to
the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who
is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason
for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the
fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land
registration cases, are not binding until they are actually
received by the Solicitor General." 8
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the
judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared
null and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness
however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration
Court so that the private parties may be afforded an
opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective
claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge
complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land
Registration Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is
REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further
appropriate proceedings therein, receiving the evidence of the
parties and thereafter rendering judgment as such evidence
and the law may warrant. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129401. February 2, 2001]
FELIPE SEVILLE in his capacity as judicial administrator
of the estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and/or FELIPE
SEVILLE, EMILIA ESTRADA, MARIA S. TELLDER, MA.
ISABEL SEVILLE, MA. TERESITA LICARDO, FRANCISCO
SEVILLE, RAMON O. SEVILLE, JOSE MARIE SEVILLE,
GEMMA ALVAREZ-ASAYAS, ANNABELLE ALVAREZ-
GONZALES, SYLVIA ALVAREZ-LIOK, ADOLFO O.
ALVAREZ JR., DIANA ALVAREZ-DABON, MARIA
SALVADOR O. POLANCOS and JOAQUIN ORTEGA II as
successors-in-interest of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and his
estate, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, LEYTE SAB-A BASIN DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED SMELTING AND
REFINING CORPORATION, LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED
MINING CO., PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER
CORPORATION, CALIXTRA YAP and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF LEYTE, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person,
that piece of land remains part of the public domain. Hence,
occupation thereof, however long, cannot ripen into ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
November 29, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA),
as well as the May 19, 1997 CA Resolution[2] denying the
Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive part of the CA
Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaint. The counterclaims of appellants are denied. Costs
against plaintiffs-appellees.[3]
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the undisputed facts in this
manner:
1. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 625, Leyte Sab-A Basin
Development Authority (LSBDA) was created to integrate
government and private sector efforts for a planned
development and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in the
[P]rovince of Leyte, empowered to acquire real property in the
successful prosecution of its business. Letter of Instruction No.
962 authorized LSBDA to acquire privately-owned lands
circumscribed in the Leyte Industrial Development Estate
(LIDE) by way of negotiated sales with the landowners.
2. On June 14, 1980, [Respondent] Calixtra Yap sold to
LSBDA Lot No. 057 SWO 08-000047 consisting of 464,920
square meters, located at Barangay Sto. Rosario, Isabel,
Leyte, covered under Tax Declarations Nos. 3181, 3579, 3425,
1292 and 4251 under the name of said vendor.
3. On June 1, 1982, appellant LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous
Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands covering said lot
3
together with other lots acquired by LSBDA with an aggregate
area of 442, 7508 square meters.
4. After due notice and investigation conducted by the Bureau
of Lands, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 was issued in
the name of [Respondent] LSBDA on the basis of which
Original Certificate of Title No. P-28131 was transcribed in the
Registration Book for the [P]rovince of Leyte on August 12,
1983 in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA. On December 14,
1989, LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject property
to its [Co-respondent] National Development Company (NDC)
as a result of which a new Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued on March 2, 1990 by the Registry of Deeds for the
province of Northern Leyte in the name of NDC. The subject
property was leased to [Respondents] Philippine Associated
Smelting & Refining Corporation (PASAR), Philippine
Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS) and Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. (LEPANTO).
5. On November 29, 1988, the Estate of Joaquin Ortega
represented by judicial administrator Felipe Seville filed with
the Regional Trial Court (Branch 12) of Ormoc City, a
complaint for recovery of real property, rentals and damages
against the above-named [respondents] which complaint was
later on amended on May 11, 1990. [Respondents] filed their
respective Answers. After trial, the trial court rendered
judgment the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, [a] decision is hereby rendered for [petitioners]
and against [respondents].
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Calixtra Yap on June 14,
1980 in favor of LSBDA, (Exhibit PP and 25) conveying the
subject property to said LSBDA is declared NULL and VOID ab
initio;
2. The intestate estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA is declared the
owner in fee simple of the 735,333 square meters real property
subject of the present action and defendant NDC is ordered to
segregate the same area from OCT P-28131 and CONVEY
the same to the Estate of Joaquin Ortega;
3. Upon the segregation of the 735,333 square meters from
OCT No. P-28131 the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Leyte is ordered to issue a new title to the said portion in the
name of the Intestate Estate of Joaquin Ortega;
4. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, PASAR, are ordered to pay
jointly and severally to [petitioners] the sum of FOUR MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SIX PESOS (P4,784,846.00) as rentals
due from 1979 to the present, plus accrued interest pursuant to
par. 2 of the Lease Contract between NDC and PASAR.
(Exhibit 54)
5. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, and PHILPHOS are also
ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners] the sum of
TWO MILLION EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
NINETY EIGHT PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS
(P2,086,398.60) as accrued rentals of PHILPHOS from 1979
to present, plus the accrued interest for non-payment pursuant
to paragraph 2 of the same Lease Contract cited above;

6. [Respondents] are ordered to pay jointly and severally
[petitioners] P200,000.00 as indemnity for the value of the
ancestral home;
7. [Respondents] are also ordered to pay jointly and severally
[petitioners] the sum of P250,000.00 as reimbursement for
attorneys fees and the further sum of P50,000.00 as expenses
for litigation;
8. Finally, [petitioners] and [respondents] are ordered to sit
down together and discuss the possibility of a compromise
agreement on how the improvements introduced on the
landholding subject of the present suit should be disposed of
and for the parties to submit to this Court a joint manifestation
relative thereto. In the absence of any such compromise
agreement, such improvements shall be disposed of pursuant
to Article 449 of the New Civil Code.
Costs against [respondents].
SO ORDERED.[4]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing the Regalian doctrine that lands not appearing to be
privately owned are presumed to be part of the public domain,
the CA held that, first, there was no competent evidence to
prove that the property in question was private in character.
Second, possession thereof, no matter how long, would not
ripen into ownership, absent any showing that the land had
been classified as alienable. Third, the property had been
untitled before the issuance of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent
in favor of the LSBDA. Fourth, petitioners were guilty of laches,
because they had failed to apply for the judicial confirmation of
their title, if they had any. Fifth, there was no evidence of bad
faith on the part of LSBDA in dealing with Yap regarding the
property.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues
for the consideration of the Court:[6]
A. Whether or not the sale by Calixtra Yap of the Estate of the
Late Joaquin Ortega in favor of LSBDA was null and void.
B. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Sales
Patent and an Original Certificate of Title in favor of LSBDA
was valid.
C. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches.
D. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy of
reconveyance and the damages awarded by the trial court.
In the main, the Court is called upon to determine the validity
of LSBDAs title. In resolving this issue, it will also ascertain
whether, before the issuance of the title, the land was private
or public.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Validity of LSBDAs Title
Petitioners argue that LSBDAs title to 73 hectares of the 402-
hectare Leyte Industrial Development Estate was void, having
allegedly been obtained from Calixtra Yap who had no right to
it. They maintain that they acquired title to the disputed
property by acquisitive prescription, because they and their
predecessors in interest had been in possession of it for more
than thirty years.[7] Although it was the subject of settlement
proceedings, petitioners further claim that Yap sold the same
to LSBDA without the permission of the trial court.
Disputing these contentions, respondents and the appellate
court maintain that petitioners have not shown that the land
had previously been classified as alienable and disposable.
Absent such classification, they argue that possession of it, no
matter how long, could not ripen into ownership.
We agree with respondents and the appellate court. First.
There was no showing that the land had been classified as
alienable before the title was issued to LSBDA; hence,
petitioners could not have become owners thereof through
acquisitive prescription. Second, petitioners challenge to
LSBDAs title cannot be granted, because it is based on a
wrong premise and amounts to a collateral attack, which is not
allowed by law.
Public Character of the Land
Under the Regalian doctrine, all the lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.[8] In Menguito v. Republic,[9] the court held that [u]nless
public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title. To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.
Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered
remains inalienable.
A person in open, continuous, exclusive an notorious
possession of a public land for more than thirty years acquires
an imperfect title thereto. That title may be the subject of
judicial confirmation, pursuant to Section 48 of the Public Land
Act, which provides:
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefore, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
4
xxx xxx xxx
(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall he entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter.
Under Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073,[10]
paragraph b of the aforecited provision applies only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The
provision reads:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c),
Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act, are hereby amended in
the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-
interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.
It should be stressed that petitioners had no certificate of title
over the disputed property. Although they claim that their title
was based on acquisitive prescription, they fail to present
incontrovertible proof that the land had previously been
classified as alienable. They simply brush aside the conclusion
of the CA on this crucial point by saying that it was without
factual basis.[11] Instead, they maintain that the private
character of the land was evidenced by various tax
declarations, Deeds of Sale, and Decisions of the trial court
and even the Supreme Court.[12]
Petitioners arguments are not convincing. Tax declarations are
not conclusive proofs of ownership, let alone of the private
character of the land. At best, they are merely indicia of a claim
of ownership.[13] In Spouses Palomo v. CA,[14] the Court also
rejected tax declarations as proof of private ownership, absent
any showing that the forest land in question had been
reclassified as alienable.
Moreover, the Deeds of Sale of portions of the disputed
property, which Joaquin Ortega and several vendors executed,
do not prove that the land was private in character. The
question remains: What was the character of the land when
Ortega purchased it? Indeed, a vendee acquires only those
rights belonging to the vendor. But petitioners failed to show
that, at the time, the vendors were already its owners, or that
the land was already classified as alienable.
Also misplaced is petitioners reliance on Ortega v. CA,[15] in
which the Supreme Court allegedly recognized the private
character of the disputed property. In that case, the sole issue
was whether the respondent judge xxx acted in excess of
jurisdiction when he converted Civil Case No. 1184-O, an
action for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of sale, and

annulment of tax declaration of a parcel of land, into an action
for the declaration of who is the legal wife, who are the
legitimate children, if any, and who are the compulsory heirs of
the deceased Joaquin Ortega.[16] The Court did not all make
any ruling that the property had been classified as alienable.
In any event, Ortega arose from a suit for quieting of title, an
action quasi in rem that was binding only between the
parties.[17] The present respondents as well as the Bureau of
Lands, which subsequently declared that the land was public,
are not bound by that ruling, because they were not impleaded
therein.
While petitioners refer to the trial court proceedings
supposedly recognizing the private character of the disputed
property, they make no claim that these cases directly involve
the classification of the land, or that the Bureau of Lands is a
party thereto.
Clearly, the burden of proof that the land has been classified
as alienable is on the claimant.[18] In the present case,
petitioners failed to discharge this burden. Hence, their
possession of the disputed property, however long, cannot
ripen into ownership.
LSBDAs Title
Equally unmeritous is the argument of petitioners that the title
of LSBDA is void. As earlier stated, they claim that such title
was derived from Calixtra Yap, who was allegedly not the
owner of the property. Petitioners assume that LSBDA, having
acquired the rights of Yap, resorted to a confirmation of her
imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. This
argument is devoid of factual or legal basis.
Petitioners fail to consider that the title of LSBDA was based,
not on the conveyance made by Yap, but on Miscellaneous
Sales Patent No. 9353 issued by the director of the Bureau of
Lands. In fact, after LSBDA had filed an application for patent,
the Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation and found that
the land was part of the public domain. After compliance with
the notice and publication requirements, LSBDA acquired the
property in a public auction conducted by the Bureau of
Lands.[19]
Petitioners insist, however, that LSBDA was estopped from
claiming that the land was public, because the Deed of Sale
executed by Yap in its favor stipulated that the seller is the
absolute owner in fee simple of the xxx described property.[20]
It is scarcely necessary to address this point. To begin with,
the power to classify a land as alienable belongs to the State,
not to private entities. Hence, the pronouncements of Yap or
LSBDA cannot effect the reclassification of the property.
Moreover, the assailed misrepresentation was made by Yap as
seller. Hence, objections thereto should be raised not by
petitioners but by LSBDA, the contracting party obviously
aggrieved.
In any case, the actions of LSBDA after Yaps conveyance
demonstrated its position that the disputed land was part of the
public domain. That this was so can be inferred from LSBDAs
subsequent application for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and,
in a public auction, its purchase of the property from the
Bureau of Lands. Indeed, Yap merely conveyed a claim, not a
title which she did not have.
Collateral Attack
There is another reason for denying the present Petition.
Petitioners insist that they are not seeking the re-opening of a
decree under the Torrens system. Supposedly, they are only
praying for the segregation of 735,333 square meters of land,
or 73 hectares more or less from the OCT No. P-28131 issued
to LSBDA.[21] This disputation is mere quibbling over the
words, plain and simple.
Semantics aside, petitioners are effectively seeking the
modification of LSBDAs OCT, which allegedly encompassed
even a parcel of land allegedly belonging to them. Hence, the
present suit, purportedly filed for the recovery of real property
and damages, is tantamount to a collateral attack not
sanctioned by law. Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property
Registration Decree, expressly provides:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. -- A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted
by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles would be
lost.[22]
Moreover, the title became indefeasible and incontrovertible
after the lapse of one year from the time of its registration and
issuance.[23] Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that [u]pon the
expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration
and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. Any
person aggrieved buy such decree of registration in any case
may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the
applicant or other persons responsible for the fraud. Although
LSBDAs title was registered in 1983, petitioners filed the
amended Complaint only in 1990.
Reconveyance
Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be
reconveyed to them. This cannot be allowed. Considering that
the land was public before the Miscellaneous Sales Patent was
issued to LSBDA, petitioners have no standing to ask for the
reconveyance of the property to them. The proper remedy is
an action for reversion, which may be instituted only by the
Office of the Solicitor General, pursuant to section 101 of the
Public Land Act, which reads as follows:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the [Republic] of the
Philippines.
Verily, the prayer for reconveyance and, for that matter, the
entire case of petitioners rest on the theory that they have
5
acquired the property by acquisitive prescription; and that Yap,
without any right or authority, sold the same to LSBDA.
Conclusion
In the light of our earlier disquisition, the theory has no leg to
stand on. Absent any showing that the land has been classified
as alienable, their possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,
cannot ripen into ownership. In other words, they have not
become owners of the disputed property. Moreover, LSBDAs
title was derived from a Miscellaneous Sales Patent, not from
Yap. Finally, petitioners cannot, by a collateral attack,
challenge a certificate of title that has already become
indefeasible and incontrovertible.
If petitioners believe that they have been defrauded by Yap,
they should seek redress, not in these proceedings, but in a
proper action in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73246 March 2, 1993
DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT AND J. ANTONIO ARANETA,
respondents.
NOCON, J.:
For review before Us is the decision of the Court of Appeals in
the land registration case entitled J. Antonio Araneta v. The
Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development, AC-
G.R. CV. No. 00636,1 affirming the lower court's approval of
the application for registration of a parcel of land in favor of
applicant therein, J. Antonio Araneta.
Evidence show that the land involved is actually an island
known as Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf. Situated in the
Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan, the area consists of 187,288
square meters, more or less. The initial application for
registration was filed for Pacific Farms, Inc. under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act, Act No. 496, as
amended.
The Republic of the Philippines, thru the Director of Lands
opposed the application alleging that the applicant, Pacific
Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor
did its predecessors possess the land for at least thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of application. The
opposition likewise specifically alleged that the applicant is a
private corporation disqualified under the (1973) new
Philippine Constitution from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain citing Section 11, Article 14.2
The Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition
alleging that the land is within the unclassified public land and,
hence, inalienable. Other private parties also filed their
oppositions, but were subsequently withdrawn.

In an amended application, Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a
manifestation-motion to change the applicant from Pacific
Farms, Inc. to J. Antonio Araneta. Despite the supposed
amendment, there was no republication.
Evidence presented by the applicant include the testimony of
Placido Orlando, fishery guard of Pacific Farms, Inc., who said
he has known the disputed land since he attained the age of
reason for some forty (40) years now; that when he first came
to know the property it was then owned by and in the
possession of Paulino Castelo, Juan Ambrosio and Julio
Castelo, and later on the whole island was bought by Atty.
Vicente Castelo who in turn sold it to J. Antonio Araneta.
Deposition by oral examination of Araneta was also presented,
together with documents of sale, tax declarations and receipts,
and survey of property. Applicant, however, failed to present
the tracing cloth plan and instead submitted to the court
certified copies thereof.
While this case is pending here in Court, respondent filed an
Omnibus Motion for Substitution of private respondent.3
Apparently, Antonio Araneta had assigned his rights to and
interest in Tambac Island to Amancio R. Garcia4 who in turn
assigned his rights and interest in the same property to Johnny
A. Khonghun whose nationality was not alleged in the
pleadings.
On October 4, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision
adjudicating the subject property to J. Antonio Araneta. On
appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, the decision
of the lower court was affirmed on December 12, 1985.
Petitioners raised the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in adjudicating the lands
subject of registration to applicant-appellee despite his failure
to present the original tracing cloth plan the submission of
which is a statutory requirement of mandatory character.
II. The lower court erred in not denying registration in
favor of J. Antonio Araneta since the amendment of the
application was simply an attempt to avoid the application of
the constitutional provision disqualifying a private corporation
— the Pacific Farms, Inc. in this case — from acquiring lands
of public domain.
III. The lower court erred in not declaring the land
known as the "Tambac Island" not subject of registration it
being an island formed on the seas.
IV. The lower court erred in adjudicating the land to the
applicant under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
despite absence of any specific invocation of this law in the
original and amended application.
V. The lower court erred in not granting the
government's motion for reconsideration at least to enable it to
present proof of the status of the land as within the unclassified
public forest, and hence beyond the court's jurisdiction to
adjudicate as private property.
VI. The lower court erred in not declaring that the
applicant has failed to overthrow the presumption that the land
is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines.
From the foregoing it appears that the more important issues
are: 1) whether the presentation of the tracing cloth plan is
necessary; and 2) whether the land known as "Tambac Island"
can be subject to registration.
By mere consideration of the first assignment of error, We can
right away glean the merit of the petition.
Respondent claims that the tracing cloth plan is with the files of
the Land Registration Commission, and the only evidence that
can be presented to that fact is the request for the issuance of
a certified copy thereof and the certified copy issued pursuant
to the request.5 Respondent further argues that failure of the
petitioners to object to the presentation of the certified copy of
the tracing cloth plan was the basis of the trial court's denial of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In a very recent decision of this Court, entitled The Director of
Lands v. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court and Lino
Anit,6 We have ruled that the submission of the tracing cloth
plan is a mandatory requirement for registration. Reiterating
Our ruling in Director of Lands v. Reyes,7 We asserted that
failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is
fatal it being a statutory requirement of mandatory character.
It is of no import that petitioner failed to object to the
presentation of the certified copy of the said plan. What is
required is the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for
and objection to such requirement cannot be waived either
expressly or impliedly.8 This case is no different from the case
of Director of Lands v. Reyes, supra wherein We said that if
the original tracing cloth plan was indeed with the Land
Registration Commission, there is no reason why the applicant
cannot easily retrieve the same and submit it in evidence, it
being an essential requirement for registration.
As to the second assignment of error, We are inclined to agree
with petitioners that the amendment of the application from the
name of Pacific Farms Inc., as applicant, to the name of J.
Antonio Araneta Inc., was a mere attempt to evade
disqualification. Our Constitution, whether the 19739 or
1987, 10 prohibits private corporations or associations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease.
Apparently realizing such prohibition, respondent amended its
application to conform with the mandates of the law.
However, We cannot go along with petitioners' position that the
absence of republication of an amended application for
registration is a jurisdictional flaw. We should distinguish.
Amendments to the application may be due to change in
parties or substantial change in the boundaries or increase in
the area of the land applied for.
In the former case, neither the Land Registration Act, as
amended, nor Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, requires republication
6
and registration may be allowed by the court at any stage of
the proceeding upon just and reasonable terms. 11 On the
other hand, republication is required if the amendment is due
to substantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area
of the land applied for.
As to the fourth assignment of error. We do not see any
relevant dispute in the lower court's application of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, instead of Act No. 496, in adjudicating the
land to the then applicant, assuming that the land involved is
registrable. Both laws are existing and can stand together.
P.D. 1529 was enacted to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property, in order to facilitate effective
implementation of said laws.12
The third, fifth and sixth assignment of errors are likewise
meritorious and shall be discussed forthwith together.
Respondent asserts that contrary to the allegation of
petitioners, the reports of the District Land Officer of Dagupan
City, Land Inspector Perfecto Daroy and Supervising Land
Examiner Teodoro P. Nieva show that the subject property is
an unclassified public land, not forest land. This claim is rather
misleading. The report of Supervising Land Examiner Nieva
specifically states that the "land is within the unclassified forest
land" under the administrative jurisdiction of the then Bureau of
Forest Development.13 This was based on the reports of Land
Inspector Daroy and District Land Officer Feliciano Liggayu.
Lands of the public domain are classified under three main
categories, namely: Mineral, Forest and Disposable or
Alienable Lands.14 Under the Commonwealth Constitution,
only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. Their
disposition was provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 141
(Secs. 6-7), which states that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head, who has the
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Mineral and
Timber or forest lands are not subject to private ownership
unless they are first reclassified as agricultural lands and so
released for alienation. 15 In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified land until
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Courts
have no authority to do so. 16
This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands
of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Under the
Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to
declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. 17
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable.18
Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by convincing
evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish

Government or by possessory information title, or any other
means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property
must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant
must present evidence and persuasive proof to substantiate
his claim. 19
In this particular case, respondent presented proof that as
early as 1921, the subject property has been declared for tax
purposes with receipts attached, in the names of respondent's
predecessors-in-interest. Nevertheless, in that span of time
there had been no attempt to register the same either under
Act 496 or under the Spanish Mortgage Law. It is also rather
intriguing that Vicente Castelo who acquired almost 90% of the
property from Alejo Ambrosia, et al. on June 18, 1958 and from
Julio Castelo on June 19, 1958 immediately sold the same to
applicant J. Antonio Araneta on 3 July 1958.
According to the report of Land Investigator Daroy, the land
was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Vicente
Castelo only in 1958 and the purported old tax declarations are
not on file with the Provincial Assessor's Office.
In any case tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not
supported by evidence.20 The fact that the disputed property
may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of
the applicants or of their predecessors-in-interest way back in
1921 does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely
indicia of a claim of ownership.21
Respondent's contention that the BFD, LC Map No. 681,
certified on August 8, 1927 which was the basis of the report
and recommendation of the Land Examiner, is too antiquated;
that it cannot be conclusively relied upon and was not even
presented in evidence, is not well taken. As We have said in
the case of Director of Lands v. CA:22
And the fact that BF Map LC No. 673 dated March 1, 1927
showing subject property to be within unclassified region was
not presented in evidence will not operate against the State
considering the stipulation between the parties and under the
well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the
omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, if omission
there was, in fact.
Respondent even admitted that Tambac Island is still an
unclassified public land as of 1927 and remains to be
unclassified.
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever
possession
the applicant may have had and however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership. 23 The conversion of subject property
does not automatically render the property as alienable and
disposable.
In effect what the courts a quo have done is to release the
subject property from the unclassified category, which is
beyond their competence and jurisdiction. We reiterate that the
classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department of the Government and not of the
Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains
unclassified until released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. 24
In fairness to respondent, the petitioners should seriously
consider the matter of the reclassification of the land in
question. The attempt of people to have disposable lands they
have been tilling for generations titled in their name should not
only be viewed with understanding attitude, but as a matter of
policy encouraged. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
decisions of the courts a quo are REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 63786-87. April 7, 1993.
UNITED PARACALE MINING COMPANY, INC., AND COCO
GROVE, INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, in his capacity as the former
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte,
Branch 2, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 70423. April 7, 1993.
ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING COMPANY, INC.,
petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, as Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, and PHILZEA MINING &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 73931. April 7, 1993.
JOSEPH V. LOPEZ and MIGUEL C. ANDRADE, petitioners,
vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT MARSMAN
& COMPANY, INC. and UNITED PARACALE MINING
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION;
INTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE; PROPER ONLY WHEN
THERE IS DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE;
CASE AT BAR. — The view of the petitioner that by virtue of
the registration of the mining claims under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 624, the mining claims became private
property and thereby brought outside the control and
supervision of the Director of Mines is without legal basis. The
abovecited law does not distinguish between private property
and lands of the public domain. The provision of law involved
is clear and is not susceptible to interpretation. A condition sine
qua non before the court may construe or interpret a statute is
that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. Section 7 of
P.D. 1281 quoted above defining the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Director of Mines is clear. Time and again, it
has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application. [Cebu
Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 35
SCRA 708 (1968)] Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it
must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has
no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed.
[Chartered Bank Employees Association vs. Ople, 138 SCRA
273 (1985)].
7
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDICIAL
RELIEF; NOT A VESTED RIGHT; A MERE STATUTORY
PRIVILEGE, NOT A PROPERTY RIGHT. — There can be no
vested right in a judicial relief for this is a mere statutory
privilege and not a property right. The distinction between
statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for
persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The state
may change or take away rights which were created by the law
of the state, although it may not take away property which was
vested by virtue of such rights.(16A Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 652-653)
Besides, the right to judicial relief is not a right which may
constitute vested right because to be vested, a right must have
become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future
enjoyment of property, or to the present or future enforcement
of a demand or legal exemption from a demand made by
another. (National Carloading Corporation v. Phoenix-E1 Paso
Express, Inc., cited in 16A Am, Jur. 2d, p. 651) Definitely, the
judicial relief herein referred to by the petitioner does not fall
under any of these.
3. CIVIL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1214; A
VALID EXERCISE OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE
STATE AS OWNER OF LAND OF PUBLIC DOMAIN;
SUSTAINED IN CASE AT BAR. — The heart of these twin
petitions is the question of constitutionality of P.D. 1214.
Unless P.D. 1214 is successfully assailed, the petitioners will
be but mere applicants for the lease of the mining claims
involved and would thus have no causes of action against
private respondents. This question has been resolved by this
Court in Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. vs. Leido, Jr. [156
SCRA 1 (1987), which ruling was reiterated in Zambales
Chromite Mining Company, Inc. vs. Leido, Jr., 176 SCRA 602
(1989)] thus: "(W)e hold that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is
not unconstitutional.' It is a valid exercise of the sovereign
power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain,
of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over
the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a
valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that
the Decree does not cover all mining claims located under the
Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their
locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such
locators may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25)
lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the Mineral
Development Resources Decree of 1974. Mere location does
not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the
mining claim. It merely segregates the located land or area
from the public domain by barring other would-be locators from
locating the same and appropriating for themselves the
minerals found therein. To rule otherwise would imply that
location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over
a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction
because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the
locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the
requirements for annual work and improvements in the located
mining claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction because it
is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator
should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements
for annual work and improvements in the located mining claim.
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV
of the 1973 Constitution. The same Constitutional mandate is
found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution.

CAMPOS, JR., J p:
The cases herein were consolidated upon the representations
of petitioners that they involve the same issues or questions of
law or at the very least, revolve around the same set of facts. A
perusal of the records, however, reveals the contrary. Only two
petitions are properly consolidated. Thus, it behooves Us to
discuss the cases separately.
In blatant violation of Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which in part, provides:
"Sec. 2. Contents of the petition — The petition shall contain
a concise statement of the matters involved, the assignment of
errors made in the court below, and the reasons relied on for
the allowance of the petition, . . . (Emphasis Ours.).
"Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must
be distinctly set forth . . ."
this petition devotes nine (9) pages under the subtitle
"Summary statement of the matters involved" to a discussion
of matters off tangent from the real issues in the case.
Definitely, the question of whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order suspending
hearing pending the resolution of their motion to dismiss, does
not involve the Philippine Bill of 1902, Executive Order No.
141, much less P.D. 1214. The counsel for petitioners even
discussed pending cases in this Court (G.R. No. 63786 - 87
and 69203) which have completely nothing to do with the
instant petition except for the fact that the parties therein are
being represented by the same counsel as in this petition. In
several pleadings subsequent to their petition, petitioners
insisted that the proceedings in the court below must be
restrained until this Court resolves the pending cases
abovecited. For this reason this case was consolidated thereto.
A summary of the real matters involved in this petition is found
in the respondent Court's decision, to wit:
"This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XL, in Camarines Norte from
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 5148
and to disqualify the respondent judge from acting in that case.
The case was brought by the respondents Marsman and Co.,
Inc. and United Paracale Mining, Inc., to enjoin the petitioners,
Joseph V. Lopez and Miguel Andrade, from entering and
conducting mining operations within the "McDonald" and "San
Antonio" Tunnels in Paracale, Camarines Norte, in which the
private respondents have mining claims ("Tulisan," "Santa
Marta," "California," and "Rocky Mountain Fraction"). On
December 11, 1984 the RTC issued a restraining order against
the petitioners.
On December 12 the petitioners filed their answer alleging
that, in accordance with PD 1214, the private respondents had
forfeited their right to the mining claims. They likewise argued
that in view of PD 605, the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain
the case. On the same day the petitioners moved for the
disqualification of the respondent judge of the RTC, claiming
(sic) that in issuing the restraining order of December 11,
1984, he showed his "bias, prejudice and personal hatred of
and hostility to the [petitioners'] counsel [Atty. Pedro A.
Venida]."
On December 24, 1984 the petitioners filed a motion for a
preliminary hearing on their defense that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction under PD 605 to issue a temporary restraining
order or injunction in cases involving or growing out of the
action of administrative officials on the applications for permits
for the disposition, exploitation, utilization, or exploration or
development of the natural resources. Accordingly the RTC, in
its order of September 5, 1985, suspended the hearing of the
case until the resolution of the petitioners' motion to dismiss. It
is at this point that the present petition was filed." 1
The respondent Court denied this petition on grounds that: (1)
the questions being raised are not proper in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 but rather defenses which should be
raised in the action itself; (2) the question of jurisdiction which
has yet to be resolved by the trial court pending resolution of
the motion to dismiss is prematurely raised; and (3) there was
no basis for determining whether or not the judge must be
disqualified. 2
The review of this decision is what is on appeal before.
We refuse to be persuaded by the petitioners that the RTC
must be enjoined from exercising its jurisdiction in settling the
case presented before it for the reason that the constitutionality
of the law involved in the said case is being questioned before
this Court. This case should have been disposed of
independently of the other petitions herein.
The respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error. Neither did it commit grave abuse of discretion as what
petitioners want this Court to believe. The petitioners fail to
point out any assigned error which the respondent Court had
supposedly committed but simply narrate the action taken by it.
Much less have they stated the reasons relied upon for the
allowance of the instant petition. For being insufficient in
substance and in form, the instant petition lacks merit and
must be dismissed.
G.R. No. 70423
This is a petition involving the question of jurisdiction of regular
courts in cases which had been placed under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines under P.D. 1281.
This petition seeks to reverse the order of then Judge, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Hon. Alfredo L.
Benipayo, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner herein on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, citing Section 7 of P.D. 1281
and the doctrine enunciated in Twin Peaks Mining Association,
et al. vs. Navarro, 3 that an action for the enforcement of
mining contracts, in this case cancellation of a mining contract,
is outside the competence of regular courts in view of the law
cited. 4
The complaint filed with the then CFI of Manila, Branch XVI,
was one for the rescission of its mining contract with herein
private respondent on grounds of violations of the terms and
8
conditions thereof, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The trial court,
however, upon motion of the defendant therein, dismissed the
case.
Petitioner wants Us to construe Section 7 of P.D. 1281 as
applicable only to mineral lands forming part of the public
domain and not to mining claims located and registered under
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624 as is its case.
Section 7 of P.D. 1281 reads as follows:
Sec. 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative
functions over companies, partnerships or persons engaged in
mining exploration, development and exploitation, the Bureau
of Mines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases involving:
(a) a mining property subject of different agreements
entered into by the claim holder thereof with several mining
operators;
(b) complaints from claimowners that the mining
property subject of an operating agreement has not been
placed into actual operations within the period stipulated
therein; and
(c) cancellation and/or reinforcement of mining
contracts due to the refusal of the claimowner/operator to
aside by the terms and conditions thereof.
All actions and decisions of the Director of Mines on the above
cases are subject to review, motu proprio or upon appeal by
any person aggrieved thereby, by the Secretary of Natural
Resources whose decision shall be final and executory after
the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party
of said decision, unless appealed to the President in
accordance with the applicable provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 309 and Letter of Instructions Nos. 119 and 135.
The view of the petitioner that by virtue of the registration of
the mining claims under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
624, the mining claims became private property and thereby
brought outside the control and supervision of the Director of
Mines is without legal basis. The abovecited law does not
distinguish between private property and lands of the public
domain. The provision of law involved is clear and is not
susceptible to interpretation. A condition sine qua non before
the court may construe or interpret a statute is that there be
doubt or ambiguity in its language. 5 Section 7 of P.D. 1281
quoted above defining the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Director of Mines is clear. Time and again, it has been
repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application. 6 Where the
law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it
that its mandate is obeyed. 7
This Court in Benguet Corporation vs. Leviste, 8 made these
pronouncements:

"We grant the petition. Presidential Decree No. 1281 which
took effect on January 16, 1978 vests the Bureau of Mines with
jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining
claims or applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses,
permits, leases and/or operators thereof, including mining
service contracts and service contractors insofar as their
mining activities are concerned. To effectively discharge its
task as the Government's arm in the administration and
disposition of mineral resources, Section 7 of P.D. 1281
confers upon the Bureau quasi-judicial powers as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Analyzing the objective of P.D. 1281, particularly said Section
7 thereof, the Court in Twin Peaks Mining Association, the
case relied upon by petitioner, noted that the trend is to make
the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter.
This observation was reiterated in the more recent case of
Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals."
The petitioner further argues that to hold that P.D. 1281
retroactively applies to its mining claims which according to it is
private property would constitute impairment of vested rights
since by shifting the forum of the petitioner's case from the
courts to the Bureau of Mines, as urged by private respondent,
the substantive rights to full protection of its property rights
shall be greatly impaired and prejudiced. The judicial relief
available for the redress of private property rights violated, now
being enjoyed by petitioner shall be lost altogether.
This argument does not merit Our approval. There can be no
vested right in a judicial relief for this is a mere statutory
privilege and not a property right. The distinction between
statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for
persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The state
may change or take away rights which were created by the law
of the state, although it may not take away property which was
vested by virtue of such rights. 9 Besides, the right to judicial
relief is not a right which may constitute vested right because
to be vested, a right must have become a title, legal or
equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, or to
the present or future enforcement of a demand or legal
exemption from a demand made by another. 10 Definitely, the
judicial relief herein referred to by the petitioner does not fall
under any of these.
The case at bar falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines, hence, the trial court did
not err in dismissing the petitioner's complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. Nos. 63786-87
In these petitions filed by petitioners United Paracale Mining
Company, Inc. and Coco Grove, Inc., petitioners seek to set
aside the Order of dismissal of the case they filed with the trial
court for the ejectment of their respective defendants from the
mining claims which were allegedly privately owned by them
having been located and perfected under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624.
The heart of these twin petitions is the question of
constitutionality of P.D. 1214. Unless P.D. 1214 is successfully
assailed, the petitioners will be but mere applicants for the
lease of the mining claims involved and would thus have no
causes of action against private respondents.
This question has been resolved by this Court in Santa Rosa
Mining Company, Inc. vs. Leido, Jr. 11 thus:
"(W)e hold that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not
unconstitutional. ** It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power
of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of
which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the
patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a
valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that
the Decree does not cover all mining claims located under the
Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their
locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such
locators may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25)
lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the Mineral
Development Resources Decree of 1974.
Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the
affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates the
located land or area from the public domain by barring other
would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for
themselves the minerals found therein. To rule otherwise
would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and
maintain rights over a located mining claim. This, we cannot
approve or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of
the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and consistently
comply with the requirements for annual work and
improvements in the located mining claim.
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV
of the 1973 Constitution which states:
'All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and
resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploration, development, and exploitation, or utilization of
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than development of
water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.'
The same Constitutional mandate is found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution, which declares:
'All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
9
natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State . . .'"
Notwithstanding Our ruling , in favor of the constitutionality of
P.D. 1214, petitioners contend that having filed mining lease
applications on the mining claims they have previously located
and registered under then existing laws, pursuant to the
requirements of this Presidential Decree, and despite the
waiver of their rights to the issuance of mining patents therefor
(emphasis theirs), they cannot be placed in equal footing with
those who forfeit all rights by virtue of non-filing of an
application within the prescribed period such that they
(petitioners) have no causes of action against private
respondents.
We are not persuaded by this contention.
Although We may agree that those who filed their mining lease
applications have better rights than those who forfeited all their
right by not filing at all, this, however, does not amount to any
vested right which could be the basis for their cause of action
against herein private respondents. What is precisely waived is
their right to the issuance of a mining patent upon application.
This in effect grants the government the power, in the exercise
of its sound discretion, to award the patent to the applicant
most qualified to explore, develop and exploit the mineral
resources of the country in line with the objectives of P.D. 463,
and not necessarily to the original locator of the mining claim.
To sustain their contention that they can question the award of
mining patents to applicants other than them would put to
naught the objectives of P.D. 1214 as enunciated in its
WHEREAS clauses.
We agree with the trial court that with the waiver of their right
to the issuance of a mining patent upon their application for a
mining lease, their status is reduced to a mere applicant, their
only advantage over the others is the fact that they have
already conducted explorations at the site and this exploration
may he ongoing. But still, this credential, so to speak, is not
intended to tie the hands of the government so as to prevent it
from awarding the mining patent to some other applicants,
which in its belief may he more qualified than them.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 73931 is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit; the Order of dismissal assailed in
G.R. No. 70423 is AFFIRMED and this petition is hereby
likewise DISMISSED; the Order of dismissal assailed in G.R.
Nos. 63786-87 is AFFIRMED and these petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73974 May 31, 1995
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Represented by the
Director of Lands), petitioner,
vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON, MANUEL G.
ATIENZA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Lucena Branch) and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify and set
aside the decision 1 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
reversing the decision of the former Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Branch II at Lucena City 2 which annulled Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13840 and Free Patent (FP)
No. 324198 issued to Manuel Atienza for a 17-hectare piece of
land which turned out to be within the forest zone in Pagbilao,
Quezon.
On April 18, 1967, Atienza was awarded FP No. 324198 over a
parcel of land located in Ila, Malicboy, Pagbilao, Quezon, with
an area of 172,028 square meters. By virtue of such award, he
was issued on May 5, 1967, OCT No. P-13840.
Sometime in 1968, an investigation was conducted by the
Bureau of Lands in connection with alleged land grabbing
activities in Pagbilao. It appeared that some of the free
patents, including that of Atienza's, were fraudulently acquired.
Thus, on March 19, 1970, a criminal complaint for falsification
of public documents was filed in the then Court of First
Instance of Quezon, Branch II, against Atienza and four other
persons for allegedly falsifying their applications for free
patent, the survey plans, and other documents pertinent to
said applications.
In its decision dated October 4, 1972, the court acquitted the
accused of the crime charged but, finding that the land covered
by the application for free patent of private respondent was
within the forest zone, declared as null and void OCT No. P-
13840 in Atienza's name and ordered the Register of Deeds of
Quezon to cancel the same.
Meanwhile, before the promulgation of said decision, or on
May 10, 1972, then Acting Solicitor General Conrado T.
Limcaoco filed for the petitioner a complaint against Atienza,
the Register of Deeds of Quezon, and the Rural Bank of
Sariaya, which was later dropped as defendant and, in an
amended complaint, substituted by the Development Bank of
the Philippines as actual mortgagee of the subject parcel of
land. Docketed as Civil Case No. 7555, the complaint prayed
for the declaration of nullity of FP No. 324198 and OCT No. P-
13840.
In his answer, Atienza claimed that the land in question was no
longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the
approval of his application for free patent by the Bureau of
Lands, the land "was already alienable and disposable public
agricultural land." Since the subject land was a very small
portion of Lot 5139 of the Pagbilao Cadastre, an area which
had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral
court on March 9, 1932 in Cadastral Case No. 76 entitled "El
Govierno Filipino de las Islas Filipinas contra Jose Abastillas,
et al., G.L.R.O. cadastral Record No. 1124," he also averred
that the Director of Lands had given due course to free and
homestead patent applications of claimants to Lot 5139. He
further alleged that through a certain Sergio Castillo, he had
been in possession of the land since the Japanese occupation,
cultivating it and introducing improvements thereon. The DBP,
after due and proper investigation and inspection of his title,
even granted him a loan with the subject property as collateral.
Finally, he stated that his acquittal in the criminal case proved
that he committed no fraud in his application for free patent.
On July 27, 1981, the lower court rendered a decision with the
categorical finding based on "solid evidence" that "the land in
question was found definitely within the forest zone
denominated as Project 21-A."
The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, (J)udgment is hereby
rendered:
(a) Declaring as null and void Original Certificate of Title
No. P-13840 in the name of defendant Manuel G. Atienza, as
well as Free Patent No. V-324198;
(b) Ordering defendant Manuel G. Atienza to pay the
Development Bank of the Philippines, Lucena City Branch, the
sum of P15,053.97, and all interests due thereon; and
(c) Ordering defendant Manuel G. Atienza to pay the
costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, Atienza maintained that the land in question was
not within the unclassified public forest land and therefore
alienable land of the public domain. The then Intermediate
Appellate Court relied only on the arguments he raised since
petitioner had not filed any brief, and arrived at the conclusion
that "(t)he litigated land is part of public land alienable and
disposable for homestead and [F]ree Patent." On December
27, 1985, the appellate court set aside the lower court's
decision, declared as valid and subsisting Atienza's OCT, and
dismissed the cross-claim of the DBP.
After receiving a copy of said decision, Assistant Solicitor
General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili informed the Director of Lands of
the adverse decision of the appellate court, which noted that
no appellee's brief had been filed in said court. Agcaoili also
stated that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had not
been furnished with the appellant's brief; that the Bureau of
Lands received notice of hearing of the record on appeal filed
by the appellant but the OSG had not been informed of the
"action taken thereon;" that since the Bureau of Lands had
been furnished directly with relevant pleadings and orders, the
same office should "take immediate appropriate action on the
decision;" and that it may file a motion for reconsideration
within fifteen (15) days from January 6, 1986, the date of
receipt by the OSG of the copy of the decision sought to be
appealed.
On January 28, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for extension of
time to file motion for reconsideration which was denied in a
resolution dated February 12, 1986. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of said resolution was likewise denied.
The instant petition for review on certiorari raises the following
arguments: (a) petitioner was denied due process and fair play
when Atienza did not furnish it with a copy of his appellant's
brief before the then Intermediate Appellate Court thereby
depriving it of the opportunity to rebut his assertions which
later became the sole basis of the assailed decision of
December 27, 1985; (b) the appellate court erred in holding
10
that the land in question is part of the alienable and disposable
public land in complete disregard of the trial court's finding that
it forms part of the unclassified public forest zone; and (c) the
appellate court erred in declaring that the land in question
could be alienated and disposed of in favor of Atienza.
We find for the petitioner.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such,
courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party
of the right to appeal, particularly if the appeal is meritorious. 3
Respect for the appellant's right, however, carries with it the
corresponding respect for the appellee's similar rights to fair
play and justice. Thus, appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
down in the Rules of Court. 4
Of paramount importance is the duty of an appellant to serve a
copy of his brief upon the appellee with proof of service
thereof. 5 This procedural requirement is consonant with
Section 2 of Rule 13, which mandates that all pleadings and
papers "shall be filed with the court, and served upon the
parties affected thereby." The importance of serving copies of
the brief upon the adverse party is underscored in Mozar v.
Court of Appeals, 6 where the Court held that the appellees
"should have been given an opportunity to file their appellee's
brief in the Court of Appeals if only to emphasize the necessity
of due process."
In this case, however, the Court of Appeals, oblivious of the
fact that this case involves public lands requiring as it does the
exercise of extraordinary caution lest said lands be dissipated
and erroneously alienated to undeserving or unqualified private
individuals, decided the appeal without hearing the
government's side.
Atienza avers that he furnished Atty. Francisco Torres, a
lawyer in the Bureau of Lands and designated special attorney
for the Office of the Solicitor General, with two copies of the
appellant's brief, thereby implying that it was not his fault that
petitioner failed to file its appellee's brief.
Such an assertion betrays a lack of comprehension of the role
of the Solicitor General as government counsel or of the OSG
as the government's "law office." 7 Only the Solicitor General,
as the lawyer of the government, can bring or defend actions
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and, therefore,
actions filed in the name of the Republic, if not initiated by the
Solicitor General, will be summarily dismissed. 8 Specifically,
he is empowered to represent the Government in all land
registration and related proceedings, 9 such as, an action for
cancellation of title and for reversion of a homestead to the
government. 10 Hence, he is entitled to be furnished with
copies of all court orders, notices and decisions.
Consequently, service of decisions on the Solicitor General is
the proper basis for computing the reglementary period for
filing appeals and for finality of decisions. His representative,
who may be a lawyer from the Bureau of Lands, has no legal
authority to decide whether or not an appeal should be made.
11

Service of the appellant's brief on Atty. Torres was no service
at all upon the Solicitor General. It may be argued that Atty.
Torres could have transmitted one of the two copies of
appellant's brief upon the Solicitor General, but such omission
does not excuse Atienza's failure to serve a copy of his brief
directly on the Solicitor General.
On the part of the appellate court, its decision based solely on,
and even quoting verbatim from, the appellant's brief was
certainly arrived at in grave abuse of discretion. It denied
appellee (petitioner herein) of the opportunity to be heard and
to rebut Atienza's allegations, in rank disregard of its right to
due process. Such violation of due process could have been
rectified with the granting of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration by the appellate court, 12 but even the door to
this recourse was slammed by the appellate court with the
denial of petitioner's motion for extension of time to file motion
for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 12, 1986,
which ruling erroneously applied the Habaluyas doctrine. 13
Such denial notwithstanding, petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration. Considering the clear allegations thereunder,
the appellate court would have done well, in the interest of
justice, not to blindly adhere to technical rules of procedure by
dismissing outright said motion. As we declared in Villareal v.
Court of Appeals: 14
. . . The requirements of due process are satisfied when the
parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain and air their side. The essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling taken. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the foregoing and the long-standing procedural rule
that this Court may review the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals in the event that they may be contrary to those of the
trial court, 15 in order to attain substantial justice, the Court
now reviews the facts of the case.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly
appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to belong to the
State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are
public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they
under the Constitution, become private properties. In the
absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified
public land until released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. 16
In our jurisdiction, the task of administering and disposing
lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands,
and ultimately, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources 17 (now the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources). 18 Classification of public lands is, thus, an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department through the
Office of the President. 19 Courts have no authority to do so.
20
Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public
agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption
of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the
private claimant 21 who, in this case, is Atienza. The records
show, however, that he failed to present clear, positive and
absolute evidence 22 to overcome said presumption and to
support his claim.
Atienza's claim is rooted in the March 9, 1932 decision of the
then Court of First Instance of Tayabas in Cadastral Case No.
76, which was not given much weight by the court a quo, and
for good reasons.
Apart from his assertions before this Court, Atienza failed to
present proof that he or his predecessor-in-interest was one of
the claimants who answered the petition filed by the then
Attorney-General in the said cadastral proceedings. The
document reflecting said cadastral decision, a xerox copy,
indicated the claimants simply as "Jose Abastillas et al." In
support of that decision, Atienza presented a certification
purportedly issued by someone from the Technical Reference
Section of the Surveys Division, apparently of the Bureau of
Lands, stating that "Lot 5886 is a portion of Lot 5139 Pagbilao
Cadastre," which evidence is, however, directly controverted
by the sketch plan showing that the land in controversy is
actually outside the alienable and disposable public lands,
although part of Lot 5139.
The fact that Atienza acquired a title to the land is of no
moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of titles issued
under the Torrens system. In Bornales v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 23 we ruled that the indefeasibility of a
certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the
same by means of fraud. The "fraud" contemplated by the law
(Sec. 32, P.D. 1529) is actual and extrinsic, that is, "an
intentional omission of fact required by law," 24 which in the
case at bench consisted in the failure of Atienza to state that
the land sought to be registered still formed part of the
unclassified forest lands.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the court a
quo dated July 27, 1981, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 128017. January 20, 1999]
RAMON ITURALDE, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO
FALCASANTOS, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the
Court of Appeals reversing that of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Basilan province, and dismissing petitioner's
complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of a
parcel of land with the improvements existing thereon, situated
at Barangay Upper Baas, municipality of Lantawan, province of
Basilan, with an area of 7.1248 hectares.
The facts may be related as follows:
On October 17, 1986, petitioner acquired by purchase from the
heirs of Pedro Mana-ay a parcel of land located at Baas,
Lantawan, Basilan Province, with an area of 6.0000 hectares,
more or less, more particularly described as follows:
11
"A parcel of land, situated at Baas, Lantawan Basilan.
Bounded on the North by property of Alejandro Marso; on the
East by property of Ramon Bacor; on the South by property of
Atty. Ricardo G. Mon and on the West by property of Librada
Guerrero. Containing an area of 6.0000 hectares, more or
less."
However, on November 3, 1986, respondent applied with the
Bureau of Lands in Isabela, Basilan province, for the award to
him of the same parcel of land under free patent. On
November 17, 1986, petitioner filed a protest to such
application.
On February 7, 1989, the Regional Director of Lands rendered
a decision giving respondent a period of one hundred twenty
(120) days to exercise the right to repurchase the land by
reimbursing petitioner of all expenses he incurred in the
purchase of the property in question, and held in abeyance
respondent's application for free patent.
On October 11, 1989, the Regional Director issued an order
declaring that respondent had waived his right of repurchase,
and rejected his application for free patent for lack of interest,
and allowed petitioner to file a public land application for the
subject land.
On May 8, 1990, the Regional Director ordered respondent to
vacate the land in question, but respondent refused.
On July 24, 1990, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Basilan province, a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession with preliminary injunction of the subject parcel of
land.
In answer to the complaint, respondent alleged that the land
occupied by him belonged to the Republic of the Philippines,
and that he had introduced improvements thereon such as
coconut and other fruit trees.
After trial on the merits, on March 20, 1993, the trial court
rendered decision declaring petitioner the owner and
possessor of the subject parcel of land with all the
improvements existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper
Baas, municipality of Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an
area of 3.1248 hectares, and ordering respondent to vacate
the land in question, to pay petitioner the amount of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fee, the amount of
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as litigation expenses, and
three hundred pesos (P300.00) as judicial cost.
In due time, petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the
Court of Appeals.
On December 20, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered
decision reversing the appealed decision, and entering a new
judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint without prejudice to
any action that petitioner may take if the subject land was
declassified from forest land to alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.
Hence, the present recourse.

Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in setting
aside the trial court's decision in his favor and dismissing the
complaint because when the Director of Lands allowed
petitioner to file a public land application for said property, it
was equivalent to a declaration that said land was no longer
part of the public domain.
We deny the petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that
"the evidence is unrebutted that the subject land is within the
Forest Reserve Area as per L.C. Map No. 1557 certified on
August 13, 1951."[1] and, hence, not capable of private
appropriation and occupation.[2]
In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon, we held that
"Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public
lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under
the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of
such classification, the land remains unclassified public land
until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.[3]
In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we
said: Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest
group and converted into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act
from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified
as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain."[4]
Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to
declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.[5]
And the rule is Possession of forest lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership.[6]
What is more, there is yet no award or grant to petitioner of the
land in question by free patent or other ways of acquisition of
public land. Consequently, he can not lawfully claim to be the
owner of the land in question.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 42306,
dismissing the complaint of petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court, Basilan province, in Civil Case No. 441-63.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and
JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA,
VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE
LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA,
VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE
LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth
that may be found in the bowels of the earth even if the land
where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar,
which have been consolidated because they pose a common
issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a
parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa
on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria,
Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon,
Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan
Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold
to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya
Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation,
as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry
Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified
that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription
Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father
shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the
land, which was possessed by her parents under claim of
ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from
his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was
planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas,
avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a
barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67
years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of
the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax
declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to
1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax
receipts from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral
claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934,
by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the
claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909.
From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of
owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of
annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on
the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of
Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims
located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and
12
recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining
recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these
locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said
lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the
claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of
annual taxes thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance
with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided
that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the
philippine Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby
declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and
purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation
and purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said
islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its
objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was
covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by
reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the
applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and
ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The
applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed
the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but
subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their
mining claims. 12 In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and
Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking
their superior right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own
petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the
private respondents nor the two mining companies have any
valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and
registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land
and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this
did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at
that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the
June Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and
Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of
plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E.
Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of
the location of the June Bug mineral and the same was
recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909.
All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had
made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting
of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the required
affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet
introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also

conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and
trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug"
for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of
Harrison registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives
acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are
within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge
Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and
Emma mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to
the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they
were removed from the public domain and had become private
properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when
the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and
according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and
applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42
Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the
area from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The
moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on
the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance
with law, the power of the United States Government to
deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and
enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had
become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that
could be granted to any other person. The reservations of
public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral
perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is
made upon public lands afterwards included in a reservation,
such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the
former location. By such location and perfection, the land
located is segregated from the public domain even as against
the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van
Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only
to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to
the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right
to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and
conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of
a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public
domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining &
Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law
ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected
it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of
present and exclusive possession, with the right to the
exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all
the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by
the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the
locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the
patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by
virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws,
the fee remains in the government until patent issues."(18
R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-
266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured
a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for
all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to
secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of
the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes
of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied
with all the requirements of the mining laws, the claims were
removed from the public domain, and not even the government
of the Philippines can take away this right from them. The
reason is obvious. Having become the private properties of the
oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due
process of law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the
Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands
of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this
was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII,
Section 1, it was categorically provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural
resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources with the
exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated,
and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, in which case
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on
November 8, 1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to
the contrary notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim
made prior to February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest
reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative Code
which would be valid and subsisting location except to the
existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be valid and
subsisting locations as of the date of their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from
the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as the purchase of the
land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had
become the private property of the locators, they had the right
to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private
property was subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even
to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
13
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the
method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case
at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open,
continuous, adverse and exclusive possession submitted by
the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of
ownership. They themselves had acquired the land only in
1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the
earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16
The trial judge, who had the opportunity to consider the
evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the
witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We
defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was
reached with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient
basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-
interest of the de la Rosas had really been in possession of the
subject property, their possession was not in the concept of
owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural
land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they
were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing
the lights of the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust
them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In
fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being
undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less
protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the
said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no
conflict of interest" between the owners of the surface rights
and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece
of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as
mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to
separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand,
especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner
will be planting on the land while the mining locator will be
boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well
because he may interfere with the operations below and the
miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above.
How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go
without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the
dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and
that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral.
The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant
case, as already observed, the land which was originally
classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral
— and completely mineral — once the mining claims were
perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being
undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so
and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were
unlawfully occupying the surface.

What must have misled the respondent court is
Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals
belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of government established under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for
agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, or for any
purpose other than mining does not include the ownership of,
nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be
found on or under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize,
the minerals included within all areas for which public
agricultural land patents are granted are excluded and
excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize,
the minerals included within all areas for which Torrens titles
are granted are excluded and excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its
name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of
private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all
minerals that may be found in public and even private land
devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the
owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his
ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or
utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to
which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in
supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both
mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct
interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land,
whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such
use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the
minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be
used by any private party, including the registered owner
thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by
such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation
under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings. 21
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to
the property in question by virtue of their respective mining
claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of
1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain
except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at
the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have
been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of
acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining companies for
agricultural and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated
April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated
March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195990, August 05, 2015
HEIRS OF RAFAEL GOZO REPRESENTED BY CASTILLO
GOZO AND RAFAEL GOZO, JR., Petitioners, v.
PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF THE
SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH (PUMCO), SOUTH
PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF SDA (SPUMCO) AND
SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH AT SIMPAK, LALA,
LANAO DEL NORTE REPRESENTED BY BETTY PEREZ ,
Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioners
Heirs of Rafael Gozo seeking to reverse and set aside the 10
November 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals and its 14
February 2011 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00188. The
assailed decision and resolution reversed the 30 June 2004
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte and held that the action for nullification and
recovery of possession filed by the petitioners is already,
barred by laches. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated 30 June 2004 of the court
a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The South Philippine
Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventist Church remains
the absolute owner of the donated
property.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Facts
Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of the Spouses Rafael
and Concepcion Gozo (Spouses Gozo) who, before their
death, were the original owners of a parcel of land with an area
236,638 square meters located in Sitio Simpak, Brgy. Lala,
Municipality of Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte. The
respondents claim that they own a 5,000 square-meter portion
of the property. The assertion is based on the 28 February
1937 Deed of Donation5 in favor of respondent Philippine
Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist
(PUMCO-SDA). Respondents took possession of the subject
property by introducing improvements thereon through the
construction of a church building, and later on, an elementary
school. On the date the Deed of Donation is executed in 1937,
the Spouses Gozo were not the registered owners of the
property yet although they were the lawful possessors thereof.
It was only on 5 October 1953 that the Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-642 covering the entire property was issued
in the name of Rafael Gozo (Rafael) married to Concepcion
Gozo (Concepcion) pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted
by the President of the Philippines on 22 August 1953.6
In view of Rafael's prior death, however, his heirs, Concepcion,
and their six children, namely, Abnera, Benia, Castillo, Dilbert,
Filipinas and Grace caused the extrajudicial partition of the
property. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Lanao del
14
Norte issued a new certificate of title under Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. (T-347)-2927 under the names of the heirs
on 13 January 1954.
On 30 July 1992, Concepcion caused the survey and the
subdivision of the entire property including the portion
occupied by PUMCO-SDA.8 It was at this point that
respondents brought to the attention of Concepcion that the
5,000 square-meter portion of the property is already owned by
respondent PUMCO-SDA in view of the Deed of Donation she
executed together with her husband in their favor in 1937.
When Concepcion, however, verified the matter with the
Register Deeds, it appeared that the donation was not
annotated in the title. The absence of annotation of the so-
called encumbrance in the title prompted petitioners not to
recognize the donation claimed by the respondents. The
matter was left unresolved until Concepcion died and the rest
of the owners continued to pursue their claims to recover the
subject property from the respondents.
A compromise was initially reached by the parties wherein the
petitioners were allowed by respondents to harvest from the
coconut trees planted on the subject property but a
misunderstanding ensued causing respondents to file a case
for qualified theft against the petitioners.
On 19 June 2000 or around six decades after the Deed of
Donation was executed, petitioners filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Document, Recovery of Possession
and Ownership with Damages against PUMCO-SDA before
the RTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.9 In their-Complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. 21-201, petitioners claimed that the
possession of PUMCO-SDA on the subject property was
merely tolerated by petitioners and therefore could not ripen
into ownership.10 In addition, petitioners argued that the
signatures of the Spouses Gozo were forged underscoring the
stark contrast between the genuine signatures of their parents
from the ones appearing in the deed.11 Finally, petitioners
averred that granting for the sake of argument that the said
signatures were genuine, the deed of donation will remain
invalid for lack of acceptance which is an essential requisite for
a valid contract of donation.12
For their part, respondents insisted on the validity of the
donation and on the genuineness of the signatures of the
donors who had voluntarily parted with their property as faithful
devotees of the church for the pursuit of social and religious
ends.13 They further contended that from the moment the
Spouses Gozo delivered the subject property to respondents in
1937, they were already in open, public, continuous and
adverse possession thereof in the concept of an owner.14 A
considerable improvement was claimed to have been
introduced into the property in the form of church and school
buildings.15 The argument of the petitioners, therefore, that
the donation was invalid for lack of acceptance, a question
which came 63 years after it was executed, is already barred
by laches.
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. Both
parties adduced documentary and testimonial evidence to
support their respective positions.

On 30 June 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision16 in favor of
the petitioners thereby declaring that they are the rightful
owners of the subject property since the contract of donation
which purportedly transferred the. ownership of the subject
property to PUMCO-SDA is void for lack of acceptance. In
upholding the right of the petitioners to the land, the court a
quo held that an action or defense for the declaration of nullity
of a contract does not prescribe. Anent the claim that
petitioners slept on their rights, the RTC adjudged that the
equitable doctrine of laches is inapplicable in the case at bar
because the action of the registered owners to recover
possession is based on Torrens title which cannot be barred
by laches. The RTC disposed in this
wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioners], to wit:
(1)
Declaring the 5,000 square meter portion of the land covered
by TCT [No.] (T-347)-292 part of the common property of the
[petitioners]; and
(2)
Declaring the Deed of Donation as void.
The [petitioners], however, are not entitled to damages,
attorney's fees and cost of litigation prayed
for.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision18
and ordered the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the
ground of laches. The appellate court opined that petitioners
failed to assert their rights over the land for more than 60
years, thus, laches had set in. Even if petitioners were the
registered owners of the land in dispute, laches would still bar
them from recovering possession of the same.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was
likewise denied by the appellate court in a Resolution19 dated
14 February 2011.
Petitioners are now before this Court via this instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution on the sole ground
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE
COURT A QUO ON THE GROUND OF
LACHES.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
While the opposing parties center their arguments and counter
arguments on the timeliness of raising the question of the
validity of' donation, a careful scrutiny of the records, however,
reveals a significant fact that at the time the Deed of Donation
was executed by the Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937, the
subject property was part of the inalienable public domain. It
was only almost after two decades later or on 5 October 1953
that the State ceded its right over the land in favor of the
Spouses Gozo by granting their patent application and issuing
an original certificate of title in their favor. Prior to such
conferment of title, the Spouses Gozo possessed no right to
dispose of the land which, by all intents and purposes, belongs
to the State.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII,
Section 2 of our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified
or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a
private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain.21
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of
the executive department of the government and not the
Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains
as an unclassified land until it is released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition. This is in consonance with the
Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State and that the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.22
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, all public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by
the State remain part of the alienable public domain. As
already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the
person claiming title to public land should show that his title
was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the Government that the
land applied for is alienable and disposable.23
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land
Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, remains to
this day the existing general law governing the classification
and disposition of lands of the public domain, other than timber
and mineral lands. The following provisions under Title I,
Chapter II of the Public Land Act, as amended, is very specific
on how lands of the public domain become alienable or
disposable:24
SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands
from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
15
SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition
of alienable or disposable public lands, the Batasang
Pambansa or the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Natural Resources, may from time to time declare
what public lands are open to disposition or concession under
this Act.
xxxx
SEC. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition
or concession which have been officially delimited and
classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not
been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated
by the Government, nor in any manner become private
property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed,
or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased
to be so. However, the President may, for reasons of public
interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition
before the same have had their boundaries established or
been surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend their
concession or disposition until they are again declared open to
concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by
Act of the Congress.
SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition,
the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition
shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which
such lands are destined, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Agricultural;cralawlawlibrary
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;cralawlawlibrary
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public
uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
make the classifications provided for in this section, and may,
at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one
class to another.25cralawredChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as
the Revised Forestry Code, the President delegated to the
DENR Secretary the power to determine which of the
unclassified lands of the public domain are (1) needed for
forest purposes and declare them as permanent forest to form
part of the forest reserves; and (2) not needed for forest
purposes and declare them as alienable and disposable
lands.26
Per the Public Land Act, alienable and disposable public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. For homestead settlement;cralawlawlibrary
2. By sale;cralawlawlibrary
3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization;cralawlawlibrary
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).27
Homestead over alienable and disposable public agricultural
land is granted after compliance by an applicant with the

conditions and requirements laid down under Title II, Chapter
IV of the Public Land Act, the most basic of which are quoted
below:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 12. Any citizen of the Philippines over the age of
eighteen years, or the head of a family, who does not own
more than twenty-four hectares of land in the Philippines or
has not had the benefit of any gratuitous allotment of more
than twenty-four hectares of land since the occupation of the
Philippines by the United States, may enter a homestead of
not exceeding twenty-four hectares of agricultural land of the
public domain.
SEC. 13. Upon the filing of an application for a homestead, the
Director of Lands, if he finds that the application should be
approved, shall do so and authorize the applicant to take
possession of the land upon the payment of five pesos,
Philippine currency, as entry fee. Within six months from and
after the date of the approval of the application, the applicant
shall begin to work the homestead, otherwise he shall lose his
prior right to the land.
SEC. 14. No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the
land applied for until at least one-fifth of the land has been
improved and cultivated. The period within which the land shall
be cultivated shall not be less than one nor more than five
years, from and after the date of the approval of the
application. The applicant shall, within the said period, notify
the Director of Lands as soon as he is ready to acquire the
title. If at the date of such notice, the applicant shall prove to
the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that he has resided
continuously for at least one year in the municipality in which
the land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the same
and has cultivated at least one-fifth of the land continuously
since the approval of the application, and shall make affidavit
that no part of said land has been alienated or encumbered,
and that he has complied with all the requirements of this Act,
then, upon the payment of five pesos, as final fee, he shall be
entitled to a patent.28ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is clear under the law that before compliance with the
foregoing conditions and requirements the applicant has no
right over the land subject of the patent and therefore cannot
dispose the same even if such disposal was made gratuitously.
It is an established principle that no one can give what one
does not have, nemo dat quod non habet.29 It is true that
gratuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing or a right
but the term right must be understood in a "proprietary" sense
over which the possessor has jus disponendi.30 This is
because in true donations there results a consequent
impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his assets.31 In
Republic v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court declared the
contract of donation, executed by the donor who has no
proprietary right over the object of the contract, null and void,
viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the
military "camp site" was executed between Eugenio de Jesus
and Serafin Marabut, such donation would anyway be void
because Eugenio de Jesus held no dominical rights over the
site when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that year,
Proclamation No. 85. of President Quezon already withdrew
the area from sale or settlement and reserved it for military
purposes, x x x Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be
possessed of that "proprietary" right over the whole 33
hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081 hectares for at
the time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed
from the mass disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85
and excluded from the Sales Award. Impoverishment of
Eugenio's asset as a result of such donation is therefore
farfetched. (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is beyond question that at the time the gratuitous transfer
was effected by the Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937, the
subject property was part of the public domain and is outside
the commerce of man. It was only on 5 October 1953 that the
ownership of the property was vested by the State to the
Spouses Gozo by virtue of its issuance of the OCT pursuant to
the Homestead Patent granted by the President of the
Philippines on 22 August 1953. Hence, the donation of the
subject property which took place before 5 October 1953 is null
and void from the very start.33
As a void contract, the Deed of Donation produces no legal
effect whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit
effectum34 That which is a nullity produces no effect.35
Logically, it could not have transferred title to the subject
property from the Spouses Gozo to PUMCO-SDA and there
can be no basis for the church's demand for the issuance of
title under its name. Neither does the church have the right to
subsequently dispose the property nor invoke acquisitive
prescription to justify its occupation. A void contract is not
susceptible to ratification, and the action for the declaration of
absolute nullity of such contract is imprescriptible.36
The lack of respondents' right over the property was confirmed
when the Spouses Gozo had the entire property, including the
portion occupied by the church, surveyed and patented, and
covered by their homestead patent. Further, after a certificate
of title was issued under their names, the Spouses Gozo did
not effect the annotation thereon of the supposed donation.
Registration is the operative act that gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land.37 Indeed it has been
ruled that where there was nothing in the certificate of title to
indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or
any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to
explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face
indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that
may subsequently defeat his right thereto.38 If the rule were
otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of
title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely
be futile and nugatory.39 The public shall then be denied of its
foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Land
Registration Act.40
Just as significantly, the homestead application of the Spouses
Gozo over the entire area of the property including that
occupied by respondents and the issuance in their favor of the
corresponding title without any complaint or objection from the
respondents, remove the case of the petitioners from the
operation of the doctrine of laches.
And, further than the issuance of an original title, the entire
property was made subject of an extrajudicial partition of the
property by the Gozo heirs resulting in the issuance of TCTs in
their names in 1954. Again, in no instance during the partition
did the respondents make known their claim over the property.
16
Clearly from the facts, the petitioners asserted their rights
repeatedly; it was the respondents who kept silent all
throughout about the supposed donee's rights.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 10 November
2010 and Resolution dated 14 February 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00188 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186603
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR, REGION VI,
ILOILO CITY, Petitioners,
vs. VALENTINA REGISTER OF PROVINCE OCCIDENTAL,
CALISTON, DIOSCORO ESCARDA, ESPINOSA, DEEDS OF
THE OF NEG ROS LEONILA and & SPOUSES ESTRELLA,
Respondents
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to nullify the
Court of Appeals' (CA) July 25, 2008 Decision2 and February
4, 2009 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00421. The CA
modified the May 12, 2004 Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros
Occidental, and dismissed the reversion case filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (State) against respondents
Valentina Espinosa and her successor-in-interest, Leonila B.
Caliston, to wit: WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated May 12, 2004 and Order dated July 16, 2004
are hereby modified upholding the validity of Original
Certificate of Title No. 191-N and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 91117, respectively, issued in the names of Valentina
Espinosa and Leonila Caliston. The award of damages,
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in favor of Leonila
Caliston is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.5
On October 26, 1955, Cadastral Decree No. N-31626 was
issued to Valentina Espinosa (Espinosa) in Cadastral Case
No. 39, L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. 980. It covered a 28,880-
square meter lot located at Lot No. 3599 of Cadastral Record
No. 980, Poblacion, Sipalay City, Negros Occidental
(property). By virtue of the decree, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 191-N was issued on October 15, 1962 in the name
ofEspinosa.6 On June 17, 1976, Espinosa sold the property to
Leonila B. Caliston (Caliston), who was later issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T- 911177 on June 29, 1976.8
On January 13, 2003, the State, represented by the Regional
Executive Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Region VI, Iloilo City, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint9 for
annulment of title and/or reversion of land with the RTC,
Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental. The State
claimed that the property is inalienable public land because it
fell within a timberland area indicated under Project No. 27-C,
Block C per Land Classification (LC) Map No. 2978, as
certified by the Director of Forestry on January 17, 1986.10

The spouses Dioscoro and Estrella Escarda (spouses
Escarda) intervened, 11 alleging that they have been
occupying the property since 1976 on the belief that it belongs
to the State. 12 They prayed that Caliston be ordered to cease
and desist from ejecting them. 13
In answer, Caliston countered that the property is not
timberland. Invoking laches and prescription, she argued that
her title was issued earlier in 1962, while the map shows that
the property was classified only in 1986.14 Caliston also
claimed that the spouses Escarda lacked the capacity or
personality to intervene because only the State may initiate an
action for reversion. She also alleged that the spouses
Escarda cannot claim a better right as against her because
she merely tolerated their occupancy of the property until their
refusal to vacate it. 15 As counterclaim, Caliston claimed for
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses against the spouses Escarda for the baseless and
malicious complaint. 16
The RTC rendered a Decision17 dated May 12, 2004. Relying
on LC Map No. 2978, the trial court ruled in favor of the State
and ordered the reversion of the property to the mass of the
public domain, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment 1s hereby
rendered as follows:
1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No.191-N in the name
of Valentina Espinosa and all its derivative titles, such as: TCT
No. T-91117 in the name of Leonila Caliston, null and void ab
initio;
2. Ordering defendants to surrender the owner's duplicate
copy of OCT No. 191-N and TCT N[o]. T-91117 to defendant
Register of Deeds for the Province of Negros Occidental and
the latter to cancel said titles and all their derivative titles, if
any;
3. Ordering the reversion of the land covered by the aforesaid
patent and title to the mass of the public domain under the
administration and disposition of the Director of Forestry (now
Regional Executive Director, Region VI, Iloilo City);
4. Declaring that defendant Leonila Caliston has better right
over the subject lot as against intervenors Spouses Dioscoro
and Estrella Escarda; and
5. Ordering the intervenors to pay defendant Leonila Caliston
the following sums:
a) Not less than P20,000.00 for moral damages;
b) Not less than Pl0,000.00 for exemplary damages;
c) Not less than Pl0,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus so much
appearance fees of ₱2,000.00 incurred and/or paid by
answering defendant in connection with this case; and
d) Not less than ₱5,000.00 for expenses of litigation.
SO ORDERED. 18
Caliston' s motion for reconsideration 19 was denied in an
Order20 dated July 16, 2004. On August 5, 2004, Caliston filed
a Notice of Appeal21 with the RTC. On the other hand, the
spouses Escarda did not file a notice of appeal. Records were
then forwarded to the CA, where proceedings ensued.
There, Caliston argued that the trial court improperly relied
upon LC Map No. 2978, which was prepared long after the
property was alienated and awarded to Espinosa, her
predecessor-in-interest. The map, the admissibility and
genuineness of which have yet to be proved, cannot be used
to defeat the cadastral proceedings presumed to have been
regularly conducted. Even assuming the map can be
considered, Caliston claims that her property is situated in an
area indicated as alienable and disposable. She also reiterated
her defenses of laches and prescription. 22
For its part, the State argued that the lower court did not err in
relying upon LC Map No. 2978 though it was prepared only in
1986. According to the State, forest lands are incapable of
private appropriation and possession, however long;
prescription does not run against the government. 23
The CA rendered a Decision24 dated July 25, 2008 modifying
the RTC Decision. It upheld the validity of OCT No. 191-N and
TCT No. 91117 issued in the names of Espinosa and Caliston,
respectively, and affirmed the award of damages, attorney's
fees, and expenses of litigation in favor of Caliston.
The CA found that the State failed to prove fraud or
misrepresentation on the part of Espinosa when she was
issued OCT No. 191-N. It further ruled that the State failed to
prove that the property is forest land. The lone piece of
evidence consisting of LC Map No. 2978, certified by the
Director of Forestry on January 17, 1986, was not
authenticated pursuant to Section 24, 25 Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court. It noted that the parties stipulated only as to the
existence of the map, but not as to its genuineness or the
truthfulness of its content. Assuming that the map is admitted
in evidence, Espinosa's rights over the property, which
accrued in 1962; should not be prejudiced by a subsequent
classification by the State done in 1986, or after 24 years. 26
The CA cited27 the case of SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. v.
Republic of the Philippines. 28
In a Resolution29 dated February 4, 2009, the CA denied the
State's Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The lone issue presented is whether the State has sufficiently
proved that the property is part of inalienable forest land at the
time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a
title.
We deny the petition.
I prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of
The State failed to prove that the property was classified as
forest land at the time of the grant of the cadastral decree and
issuance of title to Espinosa.
17
In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden
of overcoming the presumption of State ownership. It must
establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land
sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a
positive act of the government. 30 Since cadastral proceedings
are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and
evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of title are
issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite
jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled to the claimed lot, that
all parties are heard, and that evidence is considered.31 As
such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates
ownership after proving these jurisdictional facts.32
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral
decree and was subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N, the
predecessor title of Caliston's TCT No. 91117. Having been
granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be
presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 33
This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove
by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and
disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.
This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to
recover the property if indeed it is part of the inalienable lands
of the public domain. The State may still do so through an
action for reversion, as in the present case.
Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the
Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of the
public domain. 34 It is proper when public land is fraudulently
awarded and disposed of to private individuals or
corporations.35 There are also instances when we granted
reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a
"person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which
includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under
the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not
have jurisdiction over the same because it is of the public
domain."36
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges
neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the cadastral
proceedings and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa's favor.
The argument for the State is merely that the property was
unlawfully included in the certificate of title because it is of the
public domain.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land
registration, the burden is on the State to prove that the
property was classified as timberland or forest land at the time
it was decreed to Espinosa.37 To reiterate, there is no burden
on Caliston to prove that the property in question is alienable
and disposable land. 38 At this stage, it is reasonable to
presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston derived her title,
had already established that the property is alienable and
disposable land considering that she succeeded in obtaining
the OCT over it.39 In this reversion proceeding, the State must
the property in Espinosa' s title because it was of public
dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of
proof rests on the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.40

Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of
evidence, the land classification map prepared in 1986.
The records show, however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not
formally offered in evidence. The rules require that
documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence
after the presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be
done orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing.41 Due
process requires a formal offer of evidence for the benefit of
the adverse party, the trial court, and the appellate courts.42
This gives the adverse party the opportunity to examine and
oppose the admissibility of the evidence.43 When evidence
has not been formally offered, it should not be considered by
the court in arriving at its decision.44 Not having been offered
formally, it was error for the trial court to have considered the
survey map. Consequently, it also erred in ordering the
reversion of the property to the mass of the public domain on
the basis of the same.
Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted in
evidence, this will not help to further the State's cause.1âwphi1
This is because the only fact proved by the map is one already
admitted by the State, that is, that the land was reclassified in
1986.45 This fact does not address the
presumption/conclusion that Espinosa has, at the time of the
cadastral proceedings conducted in 1955, proved that the land
is alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the decree
issued in his favor in 1962.
II
The reclassification of the area where the property is located in
1986 should not prejudice Espinosa and her successor-in-
interest.46 Apropos is the case of Sta. Monica Industrial and
Dev't Corp. v. Court of Appeals. 47 In that case, the State
offered in evidence a land classification map to prove that at
the time the land was decreed to the original owner, it had not
yet been released and still fell within the forest zone. However,
the map did not conclusively state the actual classification of
the land at the time it was adjudicated to the original owner.
We thus ruled that the State failed to prove that the titles
should be annulled- Finally, we find the need to emphasize
that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the
judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner. The petitioner must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the judgment
is fatally defective. When the proceedings were originally filed
by the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner
contended that when the decree in favor of De Perio was
issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still
part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's
case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several
years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps fail
to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in
1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner
reiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a
1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval
reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are
parts thereof. These, for reasons discussed earlier, are
insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the
decree's regularity, more so when we consider that notice of
the application for registration and the date of hearing thereof,
addressed to the Attorney General, the Director of Lands, the
Director of Public Works and the Director of Forestry, among
others, was published in the Official Gazette and that Governor
General Smith's Proclamation of 1908 itself recognizes private
rights.48
We stress that our ruling is not inconsistent with the doctrine
that forest lands are outside the commerce of man and
unsusceptible of private appropriation.1âwphi1 Neither are we
changing the rule on imprescriptibility of actions for reversion.
We are merely deciding on the facts as proved by the record.
To allow a reversion based on a classification made at the time
when the property was already declared private property by
virtue of a decree would be akin to expropriation of land
without due process of law.49
At this juncture, we agree with the CA' s application of SAAD
AgroIndustries, Inc., 50 which involved a complaint for
annulment of title and reversion of a lot covered by a free
patent and original title. To support its claim that the lot was
part of the timberland and forest reserve, the State submitted
as evidence a photocopy of a land classification map. This
map also became the basis of the testimonies of City
Environment and Natural Resources Office officers declaring
that the lot falls within the timberland or forest reserve. The
State, however, failed to submit either a certified true copy or
an official publication of the map, prompting the trial court to
deny its admission in evidence. After proceedings, the trial
court dismissed the complaint due to the State's failure to
show that the subject lot therein is part of the timberland or
forest reserve or has been classified as such before the
issuance of the free patent and the original title. The CA,
relying on the map, reversed the trial court.
When the case was brought before this court, we reinstated
the trial court's decision. We held that the photocopy of the
land classification map cannot be considered in evidence
because it is excluded under the best evidence rule. We
emphasized that all parties, including the Government, are
bound by the rules of admissibility and must comply with it-
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same
rule holds true when the Government is one of the parties. The
Government, when it comes to court to litigate with one of its
citizens, must submit to the rules of procedure and its rights
and privileges at every stage of the proceedings are
substantially in every respect the same as those of its citizens;
it cannot have a superior advantage. This is so because when
a [sovereign] submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court and
participates therein, its claims and rights are justiciable by
every other principle and rule applicable to the claims and
rights of the private parties under similar circumstances.
Failure to abide by the rules on admissibility renders the L.C.
Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to show
that the subject lot is part of the forest reserve. 51
We went on to explain that even if the map was admitted in
evidence to prove that the lot was classified as part of the
timberland or forest reserve, the classification was made long
after private interests had intervened. Not only was the lot
already occupied and cultivated, a free patent and a certificate
of title were also awarded and issued years ahead of the
classification- Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by
respondent is admissible in evidence, still the land in question
18
can hardly be considered part of the timberland or forest
reserve. L.C. Map No. 2961, which purports to be the "correct
map of the areas demarcated as permanent forest pursuant of
the provisions of P.D. No. 705 as amended" was made only in
1980. Thus, the delineation of the areas was made nine (9)
years after Orcullo was awarded the free patent over the
subject lot.
xxx
Obviously, private interests have intervened before
classification was made pursuant to P.D. No. 705. Not only has
Orcullo by herself and through her predecessors-ininterest
cultivated and possessed the subject lot since 1930, a free
patent was also awarded to her and a title issued in her name
as early as 1971. In fact, it appears that the issuance of the
free patent and certificate of title was regular and in order.
Orcullo complied with the requisites for the acquisition of free
patent provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public
Land Act), as certified by the Director of Lands and approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
xxx
The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in the present
Constitution, but also in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The
Court has always recognized and upheld the Regalian doctrine
as the basic foundation of the State's property regime.
Nevertheless, in applying this doctrine, we must not lose sight
of the fact that in every claim or right by the Government
against one of its citizens, the paramount considerations of
fairness and due process must be observed. Respondent in
this case failed to show that the subject lot is part of timberland
or forest reserve it adverted to. In the face of the
uncontroverted status of Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No.
0-6667 as valid and regular issuances, respondent's insistence
on the classification of the lot as part of the forest reserve must
be rejected. 52
These principles laid down in SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc.
undoubtedly apply here. As part of fair play and due process,
the State is as bound by the rules on formal offer of evidence
as much as every private party is. More, the State's
subsequent reclassification of the area where the property is
situated cannot be used to defeat the rights of a private citizen
who acquired the land in a valid and regular proceeding
conducted 24 years earlier.
The result would have been different had the State proved that
the property was already classified as part of forest land at the
time of the cadastral proceedings and when title was decreed
to Espinosa in 1962. However, it failed to discharge this
burden; the grant of title which carries with it the presumption
that Espinosa had already proved the alienable character of
the property in the cadastral proceedings stands. To grant the
reversion based on a subsequent reclassification, more so on
lack of evidence, would amount to taking of private property
without just compensation and due process of law.53 This,
however, is not what our Constitution envisions; fairness and
due process are paramount considerations that must still be
observed.54

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals' July 25, 2008 Decision and February 4,
2009 Resolution are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
A. Imperium and Dominium
G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK,
ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK,
petitioners,
vs. ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:p
Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse
a decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower
court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens
Title 2 of respondent Aniano David declared null and void.
What makes the task for petitioners quite difficult is that their
factual support for their pretension to ownership of such
disputed lot through accretion was rejected by respondent
Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning, they must
perforce rely on a legal theory, which, to put it mildly, is
distinguished by unorthodoxy and is therefore far from
persuasive. A grant by the government through the appropriate
public officials 3 exercising the competence duly vested in
them by law is not to be set at naught on the premise,
unexpressed but implied, that land not otherwise passing into
private ownership may not be disposed of by the state. Such
an assumption is at war with settled principles of constitutional
law. It cannot receive our assent. We affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of
the lower court makes clear that there is no legal justification
for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the
disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by
respondent officials. As noted in the decision under review, he
"acquired lawful title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous
sales application in accordance with which an order of award
and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of
Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area
of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the
Naga Cadastre. On the basis of the order of award of the
Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous
Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-
appellee Aniano David on October 21, 1959. According to the
Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of
Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with
said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent
in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any
opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them
because after the registration and issuance of the certificate
and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent,
the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards
provided therein.... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question
concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud
should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance
of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon
becomes indefeasible.... In this case the land in question is not
a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained
the public character thereof for having been formed by
reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available to the
appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of
fraud. In this case we do not see any fraud committed by
defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase
of the land involved through his Miscellaneous Sales
Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in the records of the
Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033,
because everything was done in the open. The notices
regarding the auction sale of the land were published, the
actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David were not
clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer of the
Government. The application was merely a renewal of his
deceased wife's application, and the said deceased occupied
the land since 1938." 4
On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a
different conclusion is likely to be attended with frustration. The
first error assigned predicated an accretion having taken place,
notwithstanding its rejection by respondent Court of Appeals,
would seek to disregard what was accepted by respondent
Court as to how the disputed lot came into being, namely by
reclamation. It does not therefore call for any further
consideration. Neither of the other two errors imputed to
respondent Court, as to its holding that authoritative doctrines
preclude a party other than the government to dispute the
validity of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible
character of a public land patent after one year, is possessed
of merit. Consequently, as set forth at the outset, there is no
justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose
by petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set forth in the
exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the
Court of Appeals, now a member of this Court: "There is,
furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to this action. Only the
Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an
action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a
void patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of
Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31,
1959). This was not done by said officers but by private parties
like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title
issued for the land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as
owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after
claiming it as their private property. The cases cited by
appellants are not in point as they refer to private registered
lands or public lands over which vested rights have been
acquired but notwithstanding such fact the Land Department
subsequently granted patents to public land applicants."5
Petitioner ought to have known better. The above excerpt is
invulnerable to attack. It is a restatement of a principle that
dates back to Maninang v. Consolacion, 6 a 1908 decision. As
was there categorically stated: "The fact that the grant was
made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was
19
in conformity with the law or not is a question which the
government may raise, but until it is raised by the government
and set aside, the defendant can not question it. The legality of
the grant is a question between the grantee and the
government."7 The above citation was repeated ipsissimis
verbis in Salazar v. Court of Appeals.8 Bereft as petitioners
were of the right of ownership in accordance with the findings
of the Court of Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes
v. Rodriguez, 9 "question the [title] legally issued." 10 The
second assignment of error is thus disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not
of outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law
between the government authority possessed by the state
which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty,
and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is not
inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes
under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The
use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by
the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may
provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural
resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that
existed during the medieval era between such two concepts,
but did note the existence of res publicae as a corollary to
dominium." 11 As far as the Philippines was concerned, there
was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cariño v. Insular
Government, 12 a case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its
earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all
lands were held from the Crown...." 13 That was a
manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, 14 which was
adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being
vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. What
was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more
extensive discussion of the matter in the leading case of
Valenton v. Murciano, 15 decided in 1904. One of the royal
decrees cited was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes
de las Indias 16 in these words: "We having acquired full
sovereignty over the Indies and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal
predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the
royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are
held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us
according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving
before all what to us or to our viceroys audiences, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways,
pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled,
taking into consideration not only their present condition, but
also their future and their probable increase, and after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage
and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and
giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may
remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may
wish." 17
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular
Government" 18 that "as to the unappropriated public lands
constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is
vested in Congress, ..." 19 They continue to possess that
character until severed therefrom by state grant. 20 Where, as
in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the
disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly

categorized as public land is undeniable. 21 What was held in
Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands 22 finds
application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the
property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or
their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title or by any other
means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be
held to be public domain." 23 For it is well-settled "that no
public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, from the government." 24 It is
indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the
state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 25
The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an
opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: 26 "The applicant,
having failed to establish his right or title over the northern
portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and
there being no showing that the same has been acquired by
any private person from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, the property is and remains part of the public
domain." 27 To repeat, the second assignment of error is
devoid of merit.
3. The last error assigned would take issue with this
portion of the opinion of Justice Esguerra: "According to the
Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of
Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with
said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent
in his favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse
claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the
registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate
certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land
covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of
Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein
... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the
validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised
within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent.
Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes
indefeasible ..." 28 Petitioners cannot reconcile themselves to
the view that respondent David's title is impressed with the
quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an attitude,
they railed to accord deference to controlling precedents. As
far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of
Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated:
"The proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under
the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the
same in that both are against the whole world, both take the
nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of
registration issued is conclusive and final." 30 Such a view has
been followed since then. 31 The latest case in point is
Cabacug v. Lao. 32 There is this revealing excerpt appearing
in that decision: "It is said, and with reason, that a holder of a
land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated
than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a
free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in
addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his
favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years." 33 It
is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally
indefensible.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of
January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are
affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.
B. IPRA Law
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN,
BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO
WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M.
COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU
BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU
MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU
EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON
BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D.
SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU
SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO
CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY
DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA
HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L.
SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY
MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG,
TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L.
GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH
JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY
ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,
MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI,
PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL
T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY
MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB,
MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO,
ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN,
PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S.
SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY
UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG,
MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M.
ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY
DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON,
SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P.
GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG,
SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS
MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO
MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father
MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by
her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD
M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO
20
B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-
PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-
WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON
FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required
respondents to comment.1 In compliance, respondents
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on
October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they
defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the
petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated
Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is
partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership
over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that
the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of
Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr.
Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave
to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the
petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the
principle of parens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who
are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this
reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan
Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the
Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed
a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention.
They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and
organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the
parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in
which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of
ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that
ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of
water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous
peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines
the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of
the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of
the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the
indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development
or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within
the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right
to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral
lands" which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA
defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes
involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground
that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which
vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the
NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon
notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and
Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of
the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions
and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with
respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt
or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in
favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices
shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples;
and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II,
Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of
the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a
lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes
upon the President’s power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59,
63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and
desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371
and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to
cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of
1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary
of Budget and Management to cease and desist from
disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply
with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate
21
to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the
Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed
an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with
the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be
read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a
justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the
petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He
reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated
by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary
majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the
separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-2746. December 6, 1906. ]
MATEO CARIÑO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE INSULAR
GOVERNMENT, Respondent-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PUBLIC LANDS; PRESCRIPTION; STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS. — The statute of limitations did not run against
the Crown of Spain as to its public agricultural lands in these
Islands. (Following Valenton Et. Al. v. Murciano, and other
cases.)
2. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF GRANT. — There is in these
Islands no conclusive presumption of a grant from the
Government founded merely upon long possession.

3. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT. — Act No. 926, section 54,
paragraph 6, is not applicable to this case.
WILLARD, J. :
The appellant, on the 23d of June, 1903, by his attorney in
fact, Metcalf A. Clarke, filed a petition in the Court of Land
Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a tract
of land in the municipality of Baguio, in the province of
Benguet, containing 146 hectares. The Government of the
Philippine Islands, appeared in the Court of Land Registration
and opposed the petition. The Government of the United
States that the land was part of the military reservation of
Baguio. Judgment was entered in the Court of Land
Registration in favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the
respondents appealed in accordance with the law then in force
to the Court of First Instance of the province of Benguet. The
case was therein tried de novo, and judgment was entered
dismissing the petition. The petitioner has brought the case
here by bill of exceptions.
The petitioner presented no documentary evidence of title,
except a possessory information obtained in 1901. By the
provisions of the Mortgage Law, under which this possessory
information was obtained (art. 394), it produced only those
effects which the laws give to mere possession.
The petitioner not having shown any title from the Government,
and the land being agricultural, the case is governed by the
decisions of this court in the cases of Valenton Et. Al. v.
Murciano 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 434); Cansino Et. Al. v. Valdez Et. Al.
2 (4 Off. Gaz., 488); and Tiglao v. The Insular Government 1 (4
Off. Gaz., 747). In these cases it was held that the mere
possession of land such as that in controversy in this case
would give the possessor and title thereto as against the
Government; in other words, that the statute of limitations did
not run against the State in reference to its agricultural lands.
The petitioner, however, insists that although the statute of
limitations as such did not run against the Government of
Spain in the Philippine Islands, yet a grant is to be conclusively
presumed from immemorial use and occupation. To say that
the presumption of a grant is presumption of law is, in our
opinion, simply to say that it amounts to a statute of limitations;
and for a court to hold that the statute of limitations does not
run against the Government as to its public agricultural lands,
and at the same time to hold that if a person has been in
possession of such lands for thirty years it is conclusively
presumed that the Government has given him a deed therefor,
would be to make two rulings directly inconsistent with each
other.
Considered as a presumption of fact, the contention could not
be sustained in this particular case. Here the surrounding
circumstances are incompatible with the existence of a grant, It
is known that for nearly three hundred years all attempts to
convert the Igorots of the Province of Benguet to the Christian
religion completely failed, and that during that time they
remained practically in the same condition as they were when
the Islands were first occupied by the Spaniards. To presume
as a matter of fact that during that time, and down to at least
1880, the provisions of the laws relating to the grant,
adjustment, and sale of public were taken advantage of by
these deeds from the Government for these lands would be to
presume something which did not exist. The appellant says in
his brief (p.10):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Igorot, no less than the American Indian, is an aborigine,
and is equally ignorant of the forms of law and procedure
necessary to protect his interests."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is, moreover, in the case evidence that in 1894 the
petitioner sought to obtain title from the Government in
accordance with the laws then in force. In 1901 he made a
contract with Metalcalf A. Clarke, by the terms of which he
agreed to sell the land to Clarke for 6,000 pesos when he
obtained title thereto from the Government, and this contract
he does not say that he is the owner, but simply that he is in
possession thereof. The court below found that the land is now
worth upwards of P50,000.
The possession of the land has not been of such a character
as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived
upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but
pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and
since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been
used by the petitioner for any purpose.
The petitioner relies upon the case of the United States v.
Chaves (159 U.S., 452) and the case of The United States v.
Chaves (175 U.S., 509). In the case of Hays v. The United
States (175 U.S. 248) the court said at page 261;
"But this presumption is subject to the limitation that where title
is claimed from a deed which is shown to be void, it will not be
presumed that there was an independent grant (Smith v.
Highbee, 12 Vermont,. 113), or where surrounding
circumstances are inconsistent with the theory of a grant.
(Townsend v. Downer, 32 Vermont, 183).
"The substance of this doctrine is that lapse of time any be
treated as helping out the presumption of a grant, but where a
void grant is shown, it affords no presumption that another
valid grant was made. Nor does such presumption arise if the
surrounding circumstances are incompatible with the existence
of a grant. In this case under consideration we can not find any
evidence which justifies us in believing that a legal grant can
have been made, and under those circumstances we can not
consider possession since the date of the treaty as dispensing
with the requirement that the title, if not perfect at that time,
was one which the claimant would have a lawful right to make
perfect had the territory not been acquired by the United
States."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Chaves v. The United States (175 U.S., 552) the
court made the following statement at page
562:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Finally, it distinctly appears that the possession of the parties
is insufficient in length of time to prove a valid title. In United
States v. Chaves (159 U.S., 452) the possession was under
the claim of a grant made by the governor of New Mexico to
the alleged grantees. The grant had been lost, but it had been
22
seen and read by witnesses, and its existence had been
proved by evidence sufficient, as we stated in the opinion (p.
460), to warrant ’the finding of the court below that the
complainant’s title was derived from the Republic of Mexico,
and was complete and perfect at the date when the United
States acquired sovereignty in the territory of New Mexico,
within which the land was situated. We do not question the
correctness to the remarks made by Mr. Justice Shiras in
regard to evidence of possession and the presumptions which
may under certain circumstances drawn as to the existence of
a grant.
"We do not deny the right of the duty of a court to presume its
existence in a proper case, in order to quiet a title and to give
to long continued possession the quality of a rightful
possession under a legal right. We recognized and enforced
such a rule in the case of United States v. Chaves decided at
this term. in which the question is involved. We simply say in
this case that the possession was not a duration long enough
to justify any such inference.
"There is no proof of any valid grant, but on the contrary the
evidence offered by the plaintiff himself and upon which the
bases the title that he asks the court to confirm, shows the
existence of a grant from a body which had no legal power to
make it, and which, therefore, conveyed no title whatever to its
grantee, and the evidence is, as given by the plaintiff himself,
that it was under this grant alone that possession of the lands
was taken. We can not presume (within the time involved in
this case) that any other and valid grant was ever made. The
possession of the plaintiff and of his grantors up to the time of
the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, had not been long
enough to presume a grant. (Crispin v. United States, 168
U.S., 208; Hayes v. United States, 170 U.S., 637, 649, 653;
Hays v. The United States, ante 248.) The possession
subsequently existing, we can not notice. Same
authorities."cralaw virtua1aw library
As we understand it, it is well settled in the United States that
prescription does not run against the Government as to its
public lands — in other words, that if a person desires to obtain
title to the public lands of the United States situated within the
boundaries of the States, he must do so in the way pointed out
by the law. We do not understand that a person in possession
of unsurveyed public lands in the State of Minnesota, for
example, whose ancestors had occupied that the land for forty
years, could maintain in court a claim that he was the legal
owner of the lands by reason of the presumption that the
United States had granted the land to his ancestors, a
presumption founded not upon any proceedings taken in the
General Land Office to acquire a patent thereto, but upon the
mere possession for that length of time.
The same is true of the public lands of Spain in the Philippine
Islands. In the case of Valenton Et. Al. v. Marciano it was
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"While the State has always recognized the right of the
occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient
length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make
that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain

from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the
absolute owner."cralaw virtua1aw library
But in any event, and whatever the law may be elsewhere, it
seems clear that this doctrine of presumptive grant can not
apply to the Philippines in view of the Spanish legislation for
the Indies. From time to time there were promulgated laws
which required the person in possession of public lands to
exhibit their titles or grants thereto. If these titles or grants were
found to be good, they were confirmed, but if they were not, or
if the persons had no grants or titles at all, they were evicted
from the land. For example, in Law 14, title 12, 4,
Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, it is
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We therefore order and command that all viceroys and
presidents of pretrial courts designate, at such times as shall to
them most expedient, a suitable period within which all
possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall
exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for
this purpose their title deeds thereto. And those who are in
possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts or by virtue
of just prescriptive rights shall be protected, and all the rest
shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will.
In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, it was provided —
"that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to
the date of promulgation and publication of said order, shall
have occupied royal lands, whether or not the same shall be
cultivated or tenanted, may, either in person or through their
attorneys or representatives, appear and exhibit to said
subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said
lands are occupied. Said subdelegates will designate as the
period within which documents must be presented a term
sufficient in length and proportionate to the distance the
interested party may have to travel for the purpose of making
the presentation. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn
the parties interested that in case of the failure to present their
title deeds within the term designated, without a just and valid
reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their
lands, and they will be granted to others."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In the regulations of June 25, 1880, it was provided as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of
the lands whose possession they are unlawfully enjoining
within the time of one year, or, the adjustment having been
granted by the authorities, they shall fail to fulfill their obligation
in connection with the compromise, by paying the proper sum
into the treasury, the latter will, by virtue of the authority vested
in it, reassert the ownership of the Stated over the lands, and
will, after fixing the whole thereof, proceed to sell at public
auction that part of the same which, either because it may
have been reduced to cultivation or is not located within the
forest zone, is not deemed advisable to preserve as State
forest reservations." 1
In the royal decree of the 13th of February, 1894, published in
the Official Gazzette of Manila of the 17th of April, 01894, it is
provided in article 4 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 4. The title to all agricultural lands which were capable
of adjustment (composicion) under the royal decree of the 25th
of June, 1880, but the adjustments of which decree in the
Gaceta de Manila, will revert to the State. Any claim to such
lands by those who might have applied for the adjustment of
the same, but who have not done so as the above mentioned
date, will not avail them in any way or at any time."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In view of these provisions of the law, it seems to us
impossible to say that as to the public agricultural lands in the
Philippines there existed a conclusive presumption after a
lapse of thirty or any other number of years that the
Government of Spain had granted to the possessor thereof a
legal title thereto.
The plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 6 of
section 54 of Act No. 926, the Public Land Act, for the reason
that act is not applicable to the Province of Benguet. The
judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the Appellant.
After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered
accordingly and ten days thereafter the case be returned to the
court below for execution. So ordered.
Cariño v. Insular Government,
212 U.S. 449 (1909)
Annotate this Case
Syllabus | Case
U.S. Supreme Court
Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)
Cariño v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands
212 U.S. 449
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
Syllabus
Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional,
method of bringing Cases to this Court. The latter method is in
the main confined to equity cases, and the former is proper to
bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands affirming a judgment of the Court of Land Registration
dismissing an application for registration of land.
Although a province may be excepted from the operation of
Act No. 926 of 1903 of the Philippine Commission which
provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one
who actually owns property in such province is entitled to
registration under Act No. 496 of 1902, which applies to the
whole archipelago.
While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations,
sovereignty is absolute, practically it is a question of strength
and of varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide
23
how far it will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to
the former sovereign and how far it will recognize actual facts.
Page 212 U. S. 450
The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of
acquiring the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under the
Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing
that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the
inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years
cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain
ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine
Commission or by Spanish law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights
embodying safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the
Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually
occupying land for many years, and against the government
which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with
provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.
Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish
law in force in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by
the United States, and one occupying land in the Province of
Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is
entitled to the continued possession thereof.
7 Phil. 132 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 212 U. S. 455
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land
Registration for the registration of certain land. The application
was granted by the court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was
taken to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet
on behalf of the government of the Philippines, and also on
behalf of the United States, those governments having taken
possession of the property for public and military purposes.
The Court of First Instance found the facts and dismissed the
application upon grounds of law. This judgment was affirmed
by the supreme court, 7 Phil. 132, and the case then was
brought here by writ of error.
The material facts found are very few. The applicant and
plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where
the land lies. For more than fifty years before the Treaty of
Page 212 U. S. 456
Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the
plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His
grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences
sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of
the country, some of the fences, it seems, having been of
much earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and had used
parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his

turn. They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots,
and he had inherited or received the land from his father in
accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title, however,
had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-
1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one
under the royal decrees then in force, nothing seems to have
come of it, unless, perhaps, information that lands in Benguet
could not be conceded until those to be occupied for a
sanatorium, etc., had been designated -- a purpose that has
been carried out by the Philippine government and the United
States. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership,
under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him,
that process, however, establishing only a possessory title, it is
said.
Before we deal with the merits, we must dispose of a technical
point. The government has spent some energy in maintaining
that this case should have been brought up by appeal, and not
by writ of error. We are of opinion, however, that the mode
adopted was right. The proceeding for registration is likened to
bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in principle. It is a
proceeding in rem under a statute of the type of the Torrens
Act, such as was discussed in Tyler v. Court of Registration,
175 Mass. 71. It is nearer to law than to equity, and is an
assertion of legal title; but we think it unnecessary to put it into
either pigeon hole. A writ of error is the general method of
bringing cases to this Court, an appeal the exception, confined
to equity in the main. There is no reason for not applying the
general rule to this case. Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S. 47, 134
U. S. 65; Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478; Metropolitan R.
Co. v. District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322.
Page 212 U. S. 457
Another preliminary matter may as well be disposed of here. It
is suggested that, even if the applicant have title, he cannot
have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act
No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among
others from its operation. But that act deals with the acquisition
of new titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the
perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. The
applicant's claim is that he now owns the land, and is entitled
to registration under the Philippine Commission's Act No. 496,
of 1902, which established a court for that purpose with
jurisdiction "throughout the Philippine Archipelago," § 2, and
authorized in general terms applications to be made by
persons claiming to own the legal estate in fee simple, as the
applicant does. He is entitled to registration if his claim of
ownership can be maintained.
We come, then, to the question on which the case was
decided below -- namely, whether the plaintiff owns the land.
The position of the government, shortly stated, is that Spain
assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in the
Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to
be acquired; that there was no prescription against the Crown,
and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required
registration within a limited time to make the title good; that the
plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it
was not always, public land; that the United States succeeded
to the title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights that
the Philippine government is bound to respect.
If we suppose for the moment that the government's
contention is so far correct that the Crown of Spain in form
asserted a title to this land at the date of the Treaty of Paris, to
which the United States succeeded, it is not to be assumed
without argument that the plaintiff's case is at an end. It is true
that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal
theory that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps
the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not
recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those
Page 212 U. S. 458
in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true also
that, in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as
against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain
asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as
against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States
asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one
side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in
degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and
how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to
decide.
The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the
Solicitor General, in his argument, characterized as a savage
tribe that never was brought under the civil or military
government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not
certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to
anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the
plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would
have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have
been the technical position of Spain, it does not follow that, in
the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a
mere trespasser when the present government seized his land.
The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of
native titles throughout an important part of the island of
Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the
Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to
enforce.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of
the white race in the United States. Whatever consideration
may have been shown to the North American Indians, the
dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy the
land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our
taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose,
would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount
necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the
islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their
country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c.
1369, § 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the property and rights acquired
there by the
Page 212 U. S. 459
United States are to be administered "for the benefit of the
inhabitants thereof." It is reasonable to suppose that the
attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what
was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what
it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights,
24
embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the
Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that
"no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the
laws."
§ 5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from §
12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to
declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace
the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only
that which had become such by ceremonies of which
presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard,
and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native
custom and by long association -- one of the profoundest
factors in human thought -- regarded as their own.
It is true that, by § 14, the government of the Philippines is
empowered to enact rules and prescribe terms for perfecting
titles to public lands where some, but not all, Spanish
conditions had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for
not more than sixteen hectares of public lands actually
occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13,
1898. But this section perhaps might be satisfied if confined to
cases where the occupation was of land admitted to be public
land, and had not continued for such a length of time and
under such circumstances as to give rise to the understanding
that the occupants were owners at that date. We hesitate to
suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had
not a paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all the
wilder tribes afloat. It is true again that there is excepted from
the provision that we have quoted as to the administration of
the property and rights acquired by the United States such
land and property as shall be designated by the President for
military or other reservations,
Page 212 U. S. 460
as this land since has been. But there still remains the
question what property and rights the United States asserted
itself to have acquired.
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to
go no further than the necessities of decision demand, every
presumption is and ought to be against the government in a
case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and
sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory
goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to
have been public land. Certainly, in a case like this, if there is
doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the
applicant the benefit of the doubt. Whether justice to the
natives and the import of the organic act ought not to carry us
beyond a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even
beyond the attitude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is
unnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way, it was assumed that
the wild tribes of the Philippines were to be dealt with as the
power and inclination of the conqueror might dictate, Congress
has not yet sanctioned the same course as the proper one "for
the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."

If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do
not discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to
satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the
older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in
error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were
recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal
grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the
native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers, or even
into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, Title 12, Law 14 of
the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary
conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, while it
commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call
for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who
hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it
Page 212 U. S. 461
begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship
and the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That
was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were
admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain
beyond this recognition in their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October
15, 1754, cited in 3 Phil. 546:
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title
deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession, as a valid title by prescription."
It may be that this means possession from before 1700; but, at
all events, the principle is admitted. As prescription, even
against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain, we
see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it was
recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over which
Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25,
1880, for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by
private individuals in the Philippine Islands. This begins with
the usual theoretic assertion that, for private ownership, there
must have been a grant by competent authority; but instantly
descends to fact by providing that, for all legal effects, those
who have been in possession for certain times shall be
deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years,
uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So
that, when this decree went into effect, the applicant's father
was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. But, it is
said, the object of this law was to require the adjustment or
registration proceedings that it described, and in that way to
require everyone to get a document of title or lose his land.
That purpose may have been entertained, but it does not
appear clearly to have been applicable to all. The regulations
purport to have been made "for the adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals." (We follow the
translation in the government's brief.) It does not appear that
this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied. In Article
6, it is provided that
"interested parties not included within the two preceding
Page 212 U. S. 462
articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and
thirty years] may legalize their possession, and thereby acquire
the full ownership of the said lands, by means of adjustment
proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner."
This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those declared
already to be owners by lapse of time. Article 8 provides for the
case of parties not asking an adjustment of the lands of which
they are unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one year,
and threatens that the treasury "will reassert the ownership of
the state over the lands," and will sell at auction such part as it
does not reserve. The applicant's possession was not
unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him
or his father ever was made. Finally, it should be noted that the
natural construction of the decree is confirmed by the report of
the council of state. That report puts forward as a reason for
the regulations that, in view of the condition of almost all
property in the Philippines, it is important to fix its status by
general rules on the principle that the lapse of a fixed period
legalizes completely all possession, recommends in two
articles twenty and thirty years, as adopted in the decree, and
then suggests that interested parties not included in those
articles may legalize their possession and acquire ownership
by adjustment at a certain price.
It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to
those "who may prove" possession for the necessary time, and
we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under
the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient
family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word
of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in
view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when
called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show
that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
Page 212 U. S. 463
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if
not by earlier law. The royal decree of February 13, 1894,
declaring forfeited titles that were capable of adjustment under
the decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not been sought,
should not be construed as a confiscation, but as the
withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant
never was disturbed. This same decree is quoted by the Court
of Land Registration for another recognition of the common law
prescription of thirty years as still running against alienable
Crown land.
It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the
Spanish law present a problem not without difficulties for
courts of a different legal tradition. We have deemed it proper
on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of
sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the
fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a
consideration of the whole case, we are of opinion that law and
justice require that the applicant should be granted what he
seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and
25
belief of those among whom he lived, was his property,
through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of
Spain.
Judgment reversed.
C. Reservations of lands of public domain are valid
assertions of Regalian Right
G.R. No. 81564 April 26, 1990
ACTING REGISTRARS OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS OF
PASAY CITY, PASIG AND MAKATI, METRO MANILA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 57, IN MAKATI,
METRO MANILA PRESIDED OVER BY THE HONORABLE
JUDGE FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, AND THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE DELFIN CASAL, represented by
DOMINGO C. PALOMARES, ADMINISTRATOR, respondents.
G.R. No. 90176 April 26, 1990
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DELFIN CASAL,
represented by DOMINGO C. PALOMARES,
ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE CONRADO VASQUEZ, JR., Presiding Judge,
BRANCH 118, RTC, RICARDO P. SANTIAGO, ET AL.,
respondents.
Tañada, Vivo & Tan for the Intestate Estate of the Late Delfin
Casal.
Antonio J. Dalangpan for himself and the heirs of Delfin Casal.
Pedro S. Ravelo for Gerardo Casal.
Filomeno Peralta, Jr. for Domingo C. Palomares.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioners ** charge His Honor, Judge Francisco Velez, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati, Metro Manila, with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order authorizing the
private respondent, through Domingo Palomares, to perform
acts of ownership over a 2,574-hectare parcel of land known
as Hacienda de Maricaban spread out in various parts of
Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay City, and Parañaque. There is no
controversy as to the facts.
On November 5, 1985, the private respondent, Domingo
Palomares, as administrator of the heirs of Delfin Casal,
commenced suit with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 132,
Makati, Metro Manila for declaratory relief, quieting of title,
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192, and
cancellation of entries upon Original Certificate of Title No.
291.
Palomares had earlier come to this Court (February 27, 1985)
on a similar petition, and in addition, to direct the Register of
Deeds to issue a duplicate owner's copy of Original Certificate
of Title No. 291, embracing allegedly Hacienda de Maricaban,

in lieu of the (alleged) lost one. On September 9, 1985, the
Court denied the petition for lack of merit. (G.R. No. 69834).
On December 19, 1985, the petitioners filed their answer.
On June 2, 1986, the private respondent filed a motion to
admit amended complaint impleading the Republic of the
Philippines and the Registers of Deeds of Pasig, Makati, and
Pasay City as parties-respondents, and alleging, among other
things, that: (1) on October 1, 1906, the Court of Land
Registration (James Ostrand, Presiding Judge) confirmed the
title of Dolores Pascual Casal y Ochoa, a native of Madrid,
Spain, over the 2,574-hectare parcel above-mentioned; (2) on
October 17, 1906, the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued OCT
No. 291 in her name; (3) upon her death, and successive
deaths of her heirs, the property devolved on Gerardo,
Reynaldo, Lolita, and Erlinda, all surnamed Casal, great
grandchildren of Dolores; (4) no conveyances or dispositions
of any kind have been allegedly made upon the parcel; (5)
TCT No. 192, which covers the same landholding, is allegedly
spurious and inexistent; (6) the State itself, by placing
27,213,255 square meters thereof under a military reservation
(Fort McKinley now Fort Bonifacio), by Proclamation No. 423,
and fifty hectares thereof pursuant to Proclamation No. 192,
had been guilty of landgrabbing; (7) any and all holders of any
and all TCTs emanating therefrom or from TCT No. 192, are
null, void, and of no force and effect; and (8) as a
consequence thereof, the heirs of Dolores Casal suffered
various damages and attorney's fees.
On June 26, 1986, the petitioners filed an answer, stating,
among other things, that: (1) the estate of Dolores Casal (or
Delfin Casal, her grandchild) is not a juridical person
authorized by law to bring suit; (2) the Registers of Deeds of
Makati, Pasig, and Pasay City are not the real parties in
interest, but rather, the registered owners over which the court
had not acquired jurisdiction; (3) the non-joinder of the real
parties in interest is fatal; (4) OCT No. 291 has long been
cancelled; (5) Judge Gregorio Pineda of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, had earlier denied
prayers for the issuance of duplicate owner's copy of OCT No.
291 because the land embraced therein had been validly
delivered to the Government; (6) the Supreme Court itself had
denied the Casals' appeal; *** (7) as a consequence, res
judicata is a bar; (8) prescription has also set in; and (9) the
Casal's claims can not validly override the titles of innocent
purchasers for value.
On August 29, 1986, the respondent judge issued a temporary
restraining order, directing the petitioners to cease and desist
from performing the acts complained of.
In a subsequent memorandum, the petitioners alleged that
Dolores Casal had conveyed the property to the Government
of the United States in 1906 and the Manila Railroad Company
on which Judge Ostrand, the Presiding Judge of the Court of
Land Registration, later Justice of this Court, had stamped his
imprimatur.
On October 12, 1987, the respondent court issued an order in
the tenor, as follows:
No other opposition having been registered, this Court hereby
resolves to grant the plaintiffs' prayer in the OMNIBUS
MOTION in order to safeguard the integrity of the land
embraced in OCT 291, hereby authorizing for this purpose the
plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares:
1. To order such subdivision and/or individual survey or
surveys within Parcel II, Parcel III and Parcel IV under Survey
Plan Psu-2031 by a licensed geodetic engineer or engineers at
plaintiffs' expense in order to facilitate and simplify the efficient
administration of the property described in OCT 291; and
2. To sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose (of) any area
or areas or portion or portions thereof, subject to the approval
of the Intestate Estate Court, to cover expenses for the
payment of taxes to which the property is subject, as well as
expenses of administration and for the protection of the
integrity of the said lands.
SO ORDERED. 1
Eleven days later, or on October 23, 1987 to be precise, it
issued another order, as follows:
Acting on the plaintiffs MOTION dated October 15, 1987
praying for the issuance of a Writ of Execution implementing
the Order of this Court dated October 12, 1987 before the
expiration of the time to appeal, and after inquiring from the
plaintiff's counsel for their reason in seeking the same, the
Court hereby issues this clarificatory order affirming the power
of the plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares to execute and perform
the acts authorized in the said Order of October 12, 1987
without the need of a Writ of Execution, where no relief has
been sought therefrom by any party, said Order being
implementable at the instance of the said plaintiff Domingo C.
Palomares, anytime when the said Order becomes final 15
days after the said plaintiff received copy of the same (see
Section 39, Chapter IV, B.P. Blg. 129). Plaintiff Domingo C.
Palomares may therefore take whatever steps he considers
appropriate for the implementation of the said Order without
need of further Orders or additional authority from this Court.
SO ORDERED. 2
The petitioners filed a notice of appeal; the respondent court,
however, denied it" 3 "it being directed against . . . an
interlocutory order. . . 4
Hence, this recourse.
The petitioners interpose the following questions:
A. Whether or not respondent Court can validly decide before
trial in favor of private respondent the ownership and
possession of the 25,743,514 square meters (of) land known
as "Hacienda de Maricaban", which is the main issue in this
case;
B. Whether or not respondent Court can validly allow private
respondent to exercise and perform all acts of ownership and
possession over the said land before trial
26
C. Whether or not respondent Court has acquired jurisdiction
to hear and decide this action;
D. Whether of not respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not dismissing
this action or allowing petitioners to appeal from the orders in
question. 5
In their comment, the private respondent averred, among other
things, that: (1) the respondent court, contrary to the
petitioners' claim, did not decide the case "before trial"; (2)
OCT No. 291 had not been validly cancelled and that the
rubber stamp impression thereon, "CANCELLED" is a forgery;
(3) the act of Judge Pineda, in denying issuance of OCT No.
291, duplicate owner's copy, can not be considered res
judicata because that case involved purportedly a mere
petition for issuance of duplicate owner's copy; (4) non-joinder
of proper parties is not a jurisdictional defect; (5) the TCTs
issued thereafter are a nullity because OCT No. 291 had not
been shown to have been duly cancelled; (6) OCT No. 291 has
become imprescriptible; and (7) the private respondent has a
valid right of dominion over the property.
In the meantime, the private respondent came to this Court on
certiorari (G.R. No. 90176) alleging that on December 15,
1987, in connection with Sp. Proc. No. P-2993 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 118, Pasay City, entitled "In the matter of
the Intestate Estate of the Late Fortunato Santiago and
Mariano Pantanilla Crisanta P. Santiago, et al., Petitioners,"
Judge Conrado Vasquez, Jr. issued an order disposing of
certain parcels which the private respondent claims as forming
part and parcel of Hacienda de Maricaban.
On June 20, 1988, the respondent judge in G.R. No. 81564
filed his own comment, asserting, among other things, that: (1)
what he had sought to bar, by virtue of injunction, was
incursions and forcible entries of trespassers and squatters; (2)
the petitioners can not rightly claim that he had prematurely
adjudicated the case, because there was allegedly no decision
to begin with; (3) that he issued the writ of preliminary
injunction in order only to maintain the status quo ante bellum
that is, to re-place the private respondent, which had been
allegedly in prior possession, in possession; (4) he did not
allegedly authorize unbridled "acts of ownership" to be
exercised on the property; (5) all rights of dominion given
thereon were subject to the approval of the intestate estate
court; (6) he denied the notice of appeal because the order
dated October 12, 1987, was interlocutory in nature from which
no appeal lies; (7) as to jurisdiction, the various motions filed
by petitioners, allegedly accepting the court's jurisdiction, have
clothed the court with jurisdiction, and that besides, the
jurisdictional question was never raised except now.
On July 7, 1988, the petitioners filed a reply traversing the
respondent judge's allegations.
On August 26, 1988, the respondent judge filed a
supplemental comment. He reiterated that the writ of injunction
was directed only on such spaces not occupied by the
Government (Fort Bonifacio, Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy
Aquino International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, Population

Commission, National Science and Development Board, and
National Housing Authority).
Meanwhile, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan for and on behalf
purportedly of the "Heirs of Delfin Casal" and the private
respondent, Domingo Palomares, file a Comment/Opposition
in Intervention", dated December 23, 1988 asking for the
outright dismissal of the petition.
On December 14, 1989, the private respondent filed a
manifestation, stating, among other things, that assuming OCT
No. 291 had been cancelled, there was still basis for the
respondent judge to prevent landgrabbers from entering into
vacant portions of the state embraced thereby.
The Court finds the issues, quintessentially, to be:
(1) Is OCT No. 291 still valid and subsisting?
(2) Did the respondent judge, in issuing the orders, dated
October 12 and October 23, 1987, commit a grave abuse of
discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction?
I.
Is OCT No. 291 still valid and subsisting?
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the hectarage
embraced by TCT No. 192 (OCT No. 291) consists of
Government property. Three things persuade the Court: (1) the
decrees of Proclamations Nos. 192 and 435; (2) the
incontrovertible fact that OCT No. 291 has been duly
cancelled; and (3) the division of the Court of Appeals in AC-
G.R. CV No. 00293, affirming the decision of Hon. Gregorio
Pineda, Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXI, in LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 2484, Case No. R-1467
thereof, entitled "In Re: Issuance of Owner's Duplicate of
Certificate of Title No. 291," as well as our own Resolution, in
G.R. No. 69834, entitled "Domingo Palomares, et al., v.
Intermediate Appellate Court".
(a)
Proclamation No. 192 ("RESERVING FOR THE VETERANS
CENTER SITE PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON") and Proclamation No. 423
("RESERVING FOR MILITARY PURPOSES CERTAIN
PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE
MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG, TAGUIG, AND PARAÑAQUE
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND PASAY CITY") have the
character of official assertions of ownership, and the
presumption is that they have been issued by right of
sovereignty and in the exercise of the State's dominical
authority. We take not only judicial notice thereof 6 but accept
the same as a valid asseveration of regalian light over
property.
With respect to the premises occupied by the Libingan ng mga
Bayani, Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Nayong Pilipino,
the Population Commission, National Science and
Development Board, and the National Housing Authority, we
do not have the slightest doubt that they stand on Government
property by sheer presumption that, unless otherwise shown,
what the Government occupies is what the Government owns.
While there is no presumption that property is Government
property until otherwise shown, because the law recognizes
private ownership, thus:
Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial
property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities,
consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively. 7
we find hard evidence on record that: (1) the property covered
by OCT No. 291 had been conveyed to the United States of
America; (2) it had been later ceded to the Republic of the
Philippines, and (3) as a consequence, OCT No. 291 was
cancelled upon final order of Judge Ostrand.
Be that as it may, the private respondent in G.R. No. 81564 is
pressed hard to establish the fact that portions of the property,
especially the open spaces referred to in the lower court's writ
of injunction and the private respondent's manifestation of
December 14, 1989, and which open spaces it claims to be
outside Maricaban, are indeed outside Maricaban (or OCT
291). With respect, however, to parts thereof on which Fort
Bonifacio, Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy Aquino International
Airport, Nayong Pilipino, Population Commission National
Science and Development Board, and National Housing
Authority sit, the hands of the private respondent are tied.
Claims that Judge Ostrand's decree was a counterfeit is not
only self-serving, it finds no support from the records. The
presumptions is "that official duty has been regularly
performed," 8 and the burden is on the private respondent to
prove irregular performance. The barren insistence that Judge
Ostrands order was a forgery is not sufficient to overthrow the
presumption. To begin with, the act of forgery has been
seasonably disputed by the petitioners. Secondly, the Acting
Registrar of Deeds of Pasig, who supposedly certified to the
fake character of Judge Ostrand's order, has himself joined the
other petitioners in opposing the reconveyance sought.
(b)
The decision in AC-G.R. No. 00293, dismissing the private
respondent's petition for the issuance of a new owner's copy of
OCT No. 291, a dismissal affirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
69834, also militates against the return of the property to the
heirs of Delfin Casal. The Appellate Court's judgment, a
judgment sustained by this Court, operates as, at the very
least, the law of the case between the parties, that OCT No.
291 has been cancelled and the land covered has been
conveyed and ceded to the National Government. The fact that
AC-G.R. CV No. 00293 dealt with a petition for issuance of lost
owner's duplicate copy is no argument because be that as it
may, the private respondent can not rightfully say that the heirs
of Delfin Casal still have title to the land. If it can not secure a
new owner's copy, it can mean that they have lost title thereto.
(c)
27
The principle of res judicata is also a bar to the instant
proceedings. It should be noted that in G.R. No. 69834, Mr.
Domingo Palomares prayed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered it is most respectfully
prayed to the most Honorable Supreme Court, that in the
name of law, justice and fair play, to prevent and frustrate
"land-grabbing" by the government, decision be rendered:
FIRST, That a thorough review of the aforementioned
resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court be made;
SECOND, That after due consideration, the resolution subject
of review be set aside based on the aforestated assignment of
error;
THIRD, That the Order of the Lower Court dated Jan. 19, 1977
be affirmed as the lawful and valid order;
FOURTH, To erase all doubts by declaring OCT No. 291 as
continuously and existing validly against the whole world;
FIFTH, Clearing OCT No. 291 of all adverse claims, since the
herein petitioners are the true and legally declared heirs; and
SIXTH, Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal to issue
the Owner's Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 291.
Petitioner-Appellant further prays for other just and equitable
reliefs.****
When we therefore denied that petition, we, in effect, held that
reconstitution (of lost duplicate owner's copy) was not possible
because the mother title (OCT No. 291) had been duly
cancelled. And when we therefore declared OCT No. 291 to
have been cancelled, we perished all doubts as to the invalidity
of Mr. Palomares' pretenses of title to Maricaban. Our
judgment was conclusive not only as to Mr. Palomares, but
also as to the existing status of the property. As we have held:
The lower Court correctly ruled that the present action is
barred by the final judgment rendered in the previous case of
Tuason & Co. vs. Aguila, Civil Case No. Q-4275, of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal. The reason is plain: if the herein
appellants really had a preferential right to a conveyance of the
land from J.M. Tuason & Co., or if the certificate of (Torrens)
title held by Tuason & Co. were truly void and ineffective, then
these facts should have been pleaded by these appellants in
the previous case (Q-4275), since such facts, if true,
constituted a defense to the claim of Tuason & Co. for
recovery of possession. If appellants failed to plead such
defenses in that previous case, they are barred from litigating
the same in any subsequent proceeding, for it is a well
established rule that as between the same parties and on the
same subject and cause of action, a final judgment is
conclusive not only on matters directly adjudicated, but also as
to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto. 9
II

Did the respondent judge, in issuing the order, dated October
12, 1987, commit a grave abuse of discretion equivalent to
lack of excess of jurisdiction?
(a)
The Court has no doubt that Judge Velez is here guilty of
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction to warrant certiorari. As above-stated, what he gave
away, by virtue of reconveyance, was property that inalienably
belongs to the Government or its successors. Worse, he gave
away property without notice to the actual possessors, that is,
the present registered owner. It is beyond debate, as we have
indicated, that the land had been, since the cancellation of
OCT No. 291, parcelled out to a succession of buyers and
owners. In the absence of notice, it acquired no jurisdiction to
decree redelivery or reconveyance. It is well-established that
owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted are
indispensable parties, without whom no relief is available and
without whom the court can render no valid judgment. 10
Furthermore, the present holders of the land in question are
innocent purchasers for value, or presumed to be so in the
absence of contrary evidence, against whom reconveyance
does not lie. 11
(b)
The respondent judge can not conceal his faults behind
arguments that he did not intend to convey the premises, but
rather, to secure, allegedly, vacant portions thereof from
interlopers. First, this is not stated in his order. Second, that
order is clear and unequivocal that Domingo Palomares has
the right "[t]o sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose of any
area or areas or portion or portions thereof . . . " 12 Third and
last, the security of the property is the lookout of the claimants,
and not the court's. In case the premises the respondent
judge's injunctive writ have been directed belong to others, let
them air their plaints.
(c)
The Court is also agreed that the challenged order was issued
with no benefit of trial or hearing. The private respondent can
not validly rely on AC-G.R. No. 00293 as the "trial or hearing"
to justify the issuance of its said order, in the first place,
because it is a different proceeding. But above all, the private
respondent itself says that AC-G.R. CV No. 00293 can not be
made a basis for denying reconveyance because "the . . .
petition was merely for the issuance of a new owner's
duplicate copy . . . 13 Accordingly, it can not invoke that case
and yet, repudiate its effects. It is the height of contradiction.
(d)
It was also grave error for the lower court to deny the Solicitor
General's notice of appeal. The Government had all the right to
appeal because: (1) the order of October 12, 1987 was in the
nature of a final judgment, as "final judgment" is known in law
(however it is captioned), that is to say, one that "finally
disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be
done with it in the trial court; 14 (2) it did not merely maintain
the status quo, but allowed Mr. Domingo Palomares to transact
on the property by near right of dominion over it.
Judge Velez had therefore no reason, indeed, excuse, to deny
the Government's notice of appeal. What is plain is the fact
that Judge Velez was hell-bent, so to speak, in blocking the
Government's efforts to defend what rightfully belongs to it.
What has obviously been lost on the parties, Judge Velez in
particular, is the established principle that injunction does not
lie "to take property out of the possession or control of one
party and place it into that of another." 15 In this wise it has
also been held:
xxx xxx xxx
It is a well established doctrine in this jurisdiction that an
injunction is not the proper remedy for the recovery of
possession of real estate and the improvements thereon, as
well as for the ejectments therefrom of the actual occupants
who claim to have title to or material interest therein. The use
of said remedy in such cases has invariably been considered
unjustified, in open violation of the legal presumption that the
bona fide possessor of a certain piece of land and
improvements thereon, holds the same under claim of
ownership and with a just title, and as an advanced concession
of the remedy to which the claimant might be entitled.
(Citations omitted) 16
xxx xxx xxx
Injunction, moreover, is an extraordinary remedy. It lies only in
certain cases, to wit:
Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A
preliminary injunction may be granted at any time after the
commencement of the action and before judgment when it is
established:
(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission or continuance of some act
complained of during the litigation or the non-performance
thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or
is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in
violation of the plaintiffs rights respecting the subject of the
action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 17
xxx xxx xxx
The conspicuous and unusual zeal with which Judge Francisco
Velez now defends his acts 18 has not escaped us. His Honor
should have borne in mind that in proceedings under Rule 65
of the Rules, such as the present cases, the judge is included
only as a nominal party. Unless otherwise ordained by this
Court, he is not called upon to answer or comment on the
28
petition, but rather, the private respondent. It is indeed
distressing to note that it is the very judge who has taken the
cudgels for the latter, in defending its interests, when he, the
judge, should have remained a neutral magistrate. Res ipsa
loquitor. 19 He must get his just deserts.
III
The Court thus closes the long-drawn tale of Hacienda de
Maricaban. In this connection, let trial judges be cautioned on
the indiscriminate disposition of our dwindling natural
resources to private persons. Accordingly, we grant G.R. No.
81564 and dismiss G.R. No. 90176, and so also, end what has
come down as nearly a century of uncertainty, doubt, and
conflict Maricaban has left in its trail. The Court has finally
spoken. Let the matter rest.
WHEREFORE:
1. The petition in G.R. No. 81564 is GRANTED:
(a) The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by our Resolution,
dated April 13, 1988, enjoining the respondent judge from
enforcing his: (i) order of October 12, 1987 and (ii) the follow-
up order of October 23, 1987, is made permanent and
(b) Original Certificate of Title No. 291 is declared duly
CANCELLED;
2. The petition in G.R. No. 90176 is DISMISSED; and
3. Judge Francisco Velez is ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he
should not be administratively dealt with for giving away, by
virtue of reconveyance, property that inalienably belongs to the
Government, without notice to the registered owner, and
without benefit of trial or hearing; for blocking Government
efforts to defend what rightfully belongs to it; and for filing his
comment of June 17, 1988 and supplemental comment of
August 26, 1988 without express leave of court.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.