G.R. No.

L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO
ROSALES, respondents.

Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.

Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised is whether the
widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.

It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died
intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes
and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox
Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross
value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the
trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.

In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following
in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate —

Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales,
1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.

This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving
spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law
together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.

Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court denied her plea.
Hence this petition.

In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First — is a widow (surviving spouse) an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second — are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting
a share of the estate in question final as against the said widow?

Our answer to the first question is in the negative.

Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who
inherit by the right of representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the
1

order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, or by the right of representation provided for in Article
2

981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:

Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.
 Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of representation, and if
any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be
divided among the latter in equal portions.

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower
shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-
in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her
own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate
succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the
State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate
heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse
an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.

Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code
which provides that:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither
do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them
in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

The aforesaid provision of law refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse
3

(widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had
occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, to Wit:
4

We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the
intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-
law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with
respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A
careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased
spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased
Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox
Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.

The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz —

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is
raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the
latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the
person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood
relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same
right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or
contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband
was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales
by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the second
question posed by the petitioner.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her
parent-in-law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA
DIZON, oppositors-appellants.

Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.

Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's project of partition
instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition. 1

On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by
seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon,
Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named
Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said
decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-
appellants.

The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named
beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren,
namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and
Laureano Tiambon.

In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two
small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of
P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named
heirs.

Testate proceedings were in due course commenced and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament
2

of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed
executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued
to her.

After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed
commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same
was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.

The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised value of
P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. (¹/7 of the half of the 3

estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants).4 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in
accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire
bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by
the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:

1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80

2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01

The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as follows:

(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas
(appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their respective
legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia
received less than their respective legitime;
 (2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus
cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other
hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash
and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;

(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched. <äre||anº•1àw>

On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated February 14,
1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis:

(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half (½) of the
entire estate, the value of the said one-half (½) amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the
Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally
reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties
devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and
(d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively
devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the
devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.

Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically her
whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the
names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:

1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56

2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80

T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78

while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-
appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their
respective legitimes.

The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906
and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be
completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of
partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or
portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will
substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding
that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is
legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some
P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the
oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in
cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have
been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."

From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise anew the following
issues: .

1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to the
free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and

3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime, instead of some
of the real properties left by the Testatrix;

which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.

The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the life and soul of a
will." In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that
5

"(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the
disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will
give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico for violation of 6

these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment,
must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his
intention was otherwise." 8

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase
an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law
whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither
these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental
premises, the Court finds for the appellee.

1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of
her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as
well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the
administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I
command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby
she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs
and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as 10

contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person
make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right
of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory
heirs:

ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs
shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.

This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five
oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the
differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash
and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who
admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.

2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which
has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that
Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter
vivos." This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an
11 12

act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the
efficacy of the amendment but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly
13

admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906
and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the
lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce
the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would
consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half
of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount
substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil
Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."

3. In Habana vs. Imbo, the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of
14

two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory
heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a
stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the
other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of
said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations
of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657,
659, and 661, Civil Code). Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the
15

proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized
by herself and her co-heirs ..."

4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises
of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her
real properties to the respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous
conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can only
dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ...
and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken
from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16

Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to
specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the
disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the
beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use
of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same
into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix'
intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere
devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is
expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the
third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this
testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall
inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17

Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in
favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the
second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may
dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said
heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers
precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her
estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value
does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of
apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18
Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article
1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and
testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.

Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if
the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the
construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not
imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some plausibility in an appropriate case, has no
19
application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the
testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to
determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application
of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and
undisputed.

5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues are likewise
necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil
Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further
share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the
executrix-appellee.

Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate instead of
being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the
testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible
to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest
wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The
appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was
approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question — and none is
presented — as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been
understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the
testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the
testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent
(Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would
never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and
properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors,
Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties'
manifestation, "does not in any way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as
20

the same is a mere advance of the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by
way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as
well as to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. That her co-
21

oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined further,
whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of partition and
when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-46903 July 23, 1987

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda de
Roma,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate
on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the
private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory
of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to
Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included. 1

The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50. There is no dispute
2

regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The
private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing
Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation
was not officious.

The two articles provide as follows:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of
the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination
of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so
expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be
reduced as inofficious.

The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,* which held that the decedent, when she
made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair
the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the
free portion of Candelaria's estate.3

On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court** holding that the deed of donation
contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation
and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the fruits of the donated property, between
Buhay and Rosalinda. 4

The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:

IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si

BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at
naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay
kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang
mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga
lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring
tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa
kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga
mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;

IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa
pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang
mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na
kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. 5

We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of
the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express
prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof
6

from the collation required under Article 1061.

We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared
by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is
reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express
prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062. The suggestion
1awphil

that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the
decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed
donation is officious The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general
rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the
rule, which is categorical enough.

There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed
case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973
Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz, the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time
7

would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987
Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy
disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now
being taken by the Court to meet that need.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO,
SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES JAUCIAN
ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE
JAUCIAN, respondents.

Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners.

Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 — affirming with modification the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et
al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages — is sought. in these
proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however reinstated upon a second
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents were required to comment thereon. The
petition was thereafter given due course and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These, together
with the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the case.

First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:

The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He owned
extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate
was divided among his three (3) children as follows:

(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena
Locsin;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose,
Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;

(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the
residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his
marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she
had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other properties
acquired by the spouses in the course of their union, which however was not blessed with children.
1

Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System. Those that Mariano
inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin,
married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2

Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all
his properties. The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes.
3

Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them
shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin
relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." 4

Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was probated
in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his
will, Doña Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney
Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate which she submitted to the probate court for approval, Catalina
5 6

declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form part of his
capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7

Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doña Catalina was closest to her nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes,
her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two:
Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the titles of her
properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty.
Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria
Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.

Don Mariano relied on Doña Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as
if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doña Catalina
began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective
nephews and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties which she had received from her
husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES

23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481

favor of Mariano Locsin

1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000

Jose R. Locsin

1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian

1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509

favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin

2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045

favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin

3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)

favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin

4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio

favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco

5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian

6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto -

favor of Aurea B. Locsin

7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto -

favor of Aurea B. Locsin

15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto -

Aurea Locsin

16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado

17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin

19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto -

favor of Mariano Locsin

1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Rosario whose maternal
grandfather was Getulio
Locsin

2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Rosario but the rentals
from bigger portion of
Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were assigned to
Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Cornelio

Of her own properties, Doña Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and nieces and others:

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE

2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000

Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
(6,825 sqm. when
resurveyed)
24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000
in favor of Francisco M.
Maquiniana

26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300

favor of Francisco
Maquiniana

27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000

favor of Ireneo Mamia

28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750

favor of Zenaida Buiza

29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500

favor of Felisa Morjella

30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000

favor of Inocentes Motocinos

31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500

favor of Casimiro Mondevil

32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200

favor of Juan Saballa

25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500

of Rogelio Marticio

Doña Catalina died on July 6, 1977.

Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the transfers she had
made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives
agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them under the
will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the
executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.

In 1989, or six (6) years after Doña Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already
received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City
(Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her
lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the
laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doña Catalina did not join the action.

After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin
defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the defendants:

(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo Jaucian, who
withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian
Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and Gregorio,
both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina;

(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange and all other instruments
conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in
the inventory of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;
 (3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all certificates of title and
other transfers of the real properties, subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and
derivatives therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;

(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership and possession of all such
properties to the plaintiffs, together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered, and
all the fruits and incomes received by the defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal interest
from the filing of this action; and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons
that might have intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for the value of such
properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal interest from the filing, of this case

(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and

(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in the
amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.

Costs against the defendants. 9

The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its now appealed judgment
on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.

The petition has merit and should be granted.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews and nieces of Doña
Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10)
years before her death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession." The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment
10

of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or conveyed
11

to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may
lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to
her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain
circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the
respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12

There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doña Catalina, in transferring the properties she had
received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private
respondents' rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that
she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property
during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose
of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached,
the respondents may not invoke:

Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof,
provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself,
and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be
supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any
person affected. (634a)

The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doña Catalina was already 90 years old when she died on July 6, 1977. It
insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally
pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had
inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.

For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doña Catalina had already begun transferring to
her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on
January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed
13
away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. The next year, or on March 22,
14

1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15

On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 was partitioned by and among Doña Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and
16

Agapito Lorete. At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the
17

genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and
the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.

Among Doña, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of property which she made in favor
of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18

There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doña Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made
those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she was
transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor of
the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) one-half (or
5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to
Julian Locsin.19

From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and other persons, namely:
Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan
Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. None of those transactions was impugned by the private respondents.
20

In 1975, or two years before her death, Doña Catalina sold some lots not only to Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin,
and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. If she was competent to make that conveyance to Mercedes,
21 22

how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other pieces of property to Aurea and
Mariano II?

The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a "consciousness of its
real origin" which carries the implication that said estate consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her
parents, flies in the teeth of Doña Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the
private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of the marriage with
the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She would have
known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal property so it is safe to assume
that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by the probate court
in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own
nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false inventory that would have
been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.

This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano died, he and his wife
(Doña Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective properties should eventually revert to their
respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doña Catalina, he
would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.

Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doña Catalina's nephews and nieces, those
closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her
nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and
Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the
Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that
Doña Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact,
considering their closeness to Doña Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ
"fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or donate her properties to them. Doña
Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-
in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and donations which she signed
in favor of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1)
deed of donation dated November 19,
1974 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975 in favor of Matilde Cordero,
23 24

and (3) still another deed dated September 9, 1975 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio
25

Cornelio (who is married to Doña Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to another
niece, Maria Olbes. The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974 were witnessed by
26 27

Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but
free and voluntary acts on her part.

Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for
annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had been
consummated, and six (6) years after Doña Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions
were recorded in the Registry of Property, whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to redress an injury
28

to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions because the
registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world. 29

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts
and reconveyance of properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is
DISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003]

MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO MANONGSONG, Petitioners, v. FELOMENA JUMAQUIO
ESTIMO, EMILIANA JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ, CELESTINO ORTIZ, RODOLFO ORTIZ, ERLINDA O. OCAMPO, PASTOR
ORTIZ, JR., ROMEO ORTIZ BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, SR., BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR., AURORA NICOLAS, GLORIA RACADIO,
ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO DELA CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of 26 June 1998 and the Resolution of 21 December 1998
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision dated 10 April 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-1685, partitioning the property in controversy and
awarding to petitioners a portion of the property.

Antecedent Facts

Spouses Agatona Guevarra (Guevarra) and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children, namely: (1) Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta
Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of respondents Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena Jumaquio Estimo (Jumaquio
sisters); (3) Victor Lopez, married to respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother of respondents
Narciso, Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario Lopez-dela Cruz, married to
respondent Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. and the mother of respondents Benjamin Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all surnamed dela
Cruz, and of Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros
Lopez Manongsong (Manongsong).

The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila with an area of
approximately 152 square meters (Property). The records do not show that the Property is registered under the Torrens
system. The Property is particularly described in Tax Declaration No. B-001-003903 as bounded in the north by Juan
Gallardo, south by Calle Velay, east by Domingo Lavana and west by San Jose Street. Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390
was registered with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Las Pias on 30 September 1984 in the name of Benigna Lopez,
et al.4 However, the improvements on the portion of the Property denominated as No. 831 San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las
Pias were separately declared in the name of Filomena J. Estimo under Tax Declaration No. 90-001-02145 dated 14
October 1991.5 cräläwvirt ualib rä ry
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint6 on 19 June 1992, alleging that Manongsong and
respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking Article 494 of the Civil Code,7 petitioners prayed for the
partition and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing market value, and for
damages.

Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon Guevarras death, her children inherited the
Property. Since Dominador Lopez died without offspring, there were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the
five children, including Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the Property. As Vicente Lopez
sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her fathers 1/5 share in the Property by right of representation.

There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of Guevarras children and their offspring, have been
in possession of the Property for as long as they can remember. The area actually occupied by each respondent family
differs, ranging in size from approximately 25 to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only descendants not occupying any
portion of the Property.

Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and Celestino Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo (Ortiz family), as
well as Benjamin Sr., Benjamin Jr., and Roberto dela Cruz, Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas and Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio (Dela
Cruz family), entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. Under the Stipulation of Facts and Compromise
Agreement8 dated 12 September 1992 (Agreement), petitioners and the Ortiz and Dela Cruz families agreed that each
group of heirs would receive an equal share in the Property. The signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue
an order of partition to this effect and prayed further that those who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced
so that those who have less and those who have none shall get the correct and proper portion.9 cräläwvirtual ibrä ry

Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez who each occupy 50 square meter portions of the
Property and Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the Agreement.10 However, only the Jumaquio sisters actively opposed
petitioners claim. The Jumaquio sisters contended that Justina Navarro (Navarro), supposedly the mother of Guevarra,
sold the Property to Guevarras daughter Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.

The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 91111 for the year 1949 in the sole name of Navarro. Tax
Declaration No. 911 described a residential parcel of land with an area of 172.51 square meters, located on San Jose St.,
Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal with the following boundaries: Juan Gallardo to the north, I. Guevarra Street to the south, Rizal
Street to the east and San Jose Street to the west. In addition, Tax Declaration No. 911 stated that the houses of "Agatona
Lopez" and "Enriquita Lopez" stood on the Property as improvements.

The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA12 (Kasulatan) dated 11 October 1957,
the relevant portion of which states:

AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa LAS PIAS, ay siyang nagma-may-ari
at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa na matatagpuan sa Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal, lihis sa anomang pagkakautang lalong
napagkikilala sa pamamagitan ng mga sumusunod na palatandaan:

BOUNDARIES:

NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST. EAST: RIZAL ST., WEST: SAN JOSE ST.,

na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX DECLARATION BILANG 911.

NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN LIMANGPUNG PISO (P250.00), SALAPING PILIPINO, na sa akin
ay kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, may sapat na gulang, Pilipino, may asawa at naninirahan sa Las
Pias, Rizal, at sa karapatang ito ay aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap ng nasabing halaga na buong kasiyahan ng
aking kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI, ISINALIN AT INILIPAT sa nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa kanyang mga
tagapagmana at kahalili, ang kabuuang sukat ng lupang nabanggit sa itaas nito sa pamamagitan ng bilihang walang
anomang pasubali. Ang lupang ito ay walang kasama at hindi taniman ng palay o mais.

Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at pagtatangkilik ng nasabing lupa kay ENRIQUETA LOPEZ sa
kanilang/kanyang tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.

The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1 June 1994 that the KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG
LUPA, between Justina Navarro (Nagbili) and Enriqueta Lopez (Bumili), was notarized by Atty. Ruperto Q. Andrada on 11
October 1957 and entered in his Notarial Register xxx.13 The certification further stated that Atty. Andrada was a duly
appointed notary public for the City of Manila in 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the Property for more than thirty years, they
also invoked the defense of acquisitive prescription against petitioners, and charged that petitioners were guilty of laches.
The Jumaquio sisters argued that the present action should have been filed years earlier, either by Vicente Lopez when he
was alive or by Manongsong when the latter reached legal age. Instead, petitioners filed this action for partition only in
1992 when Manongsong was already 33 years old.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision14 of 10 April 1995 ruled in favor of petitioners. The trial court held
that the Kasulatan was void, even absent evidence attacking its validity. The trial court declared:

It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is controverted. According to defendants Jumaquios, it pertains to
them through conveyance by means of a Deed of Sale executed by their common ancestor Justina Navarro to their mother
Enriqueta, which deed was presented in evidence as Exhs. 4 to 4-A. Plaintiff Milagros Manongsong debunks the evidence as
fake. The document of sale, in the observance of the Court, is however duly authenticated by means of a certificate issued
by the RTC of the Manila Clerk of Court as duly notarized public document (Exh. 5). No countervailing proof was
adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the documents legality or its validity.

xxx The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugal character.
No positive evidence had been introduced that it was solely a paraphernal property. The name of Justina Navarros
spouse/husband was not mentioned and/or whether the husband was still alive at the time the conveyance was made to
Justina Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the distribution of
the estate under question to the exclusion of others. She is entitled to her legitime. The Deed of Sale [Exhs 4 & 4-1(sic)]
did not at all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against Agatona
Guevarra and her six (6) legitimate children including the grandchildren, by right of representation, as described in the
order of intestate succession. The same Deed of Sale should be declared a nullity ab initio. The law on the matter is clear.
The compulsory heirs cannot be deprived of their legitime, except on (sic) cases expressly specified by law like for instance
disinheritance for cause. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, the dispositive portion of the trial
courts decision was directed against the Jumaquio sisters only, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the remaining active
defendants, Emiliana Jumaquio and Felomena J. Estimo, jointly and severally, ordering:

1. That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to above be immediately partitioned giving plaintiff Milagros
Lopez-Manongsong her lawful share of 1/5 of the area in square meters, or the prevailing market value on the date of the
decision;

2. Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as compensatory damages for having deprived the latter the use and
enjoyment of the fruits of her 1/5 share;

3. Defendants to pay plaintiffs litigation expenses and attorneys fee in the sum of P10,000.00; and

4. Defendants to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis supplied)

When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the Jumaquio sisters appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners, in their appellees brief before the Court of Appeals, presented for the first time a supposed photocopy of the
death certificate16 of Guevarra, which stated that Guevarras mother was a certain Juliana Gallardo. Petitioner also attached
an affidavit17 from Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina Navarro only by name and had never met her
personally, although he had lived for some years with Agatona Guevarra after his marriage with Rosario Lopez. On the
basis of these documents, petitioners assailed the genuineness and authenticity of the Kasulatan.

The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and affidavit presented by petitioners on the
ground that petitioners never formally offered these documents in evidence.
The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their admission that Navarro was the original owner of
the Property, as follows:

Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court that Justina Navarro and not Juliana Gallardo was
the original owner of the subject property and was the mother of Agatona Navarro (sic). Plaintiffs-appellees in their Reply-
Memorandum averred:

As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly admit as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by JUSTINA NAVARRO who has a daughter by the name
of AGATONA GUEVARRA who on the other hand has six children namely: xxx xxx xxx.

which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the parties. Since this is the admitted history, facts of
the case, it follows that there should have been proper document to extinguish this status of co-ownership between the
common owners either by (1) Court action or proper deed of tradition, xxx xxx xxx.

The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The trial court held:

xxx xxx xxx

With the parties admissions and their conformity to a factual common line of relationship of the heirs with one another, it
has been elicited ascendant Justina Navarro is the common ancestor of the heirs herein mentioned, however, it must be
noted that the parties failed to amplify who was the husband and the number of compulsory heirs of Justina Navarro. xxx
xxx xxx

Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact that Justina Navarro was their common ancestor
and was the original owner of the subject property.

The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming that the Property was conjugal in nature when
Navarro sold it. The appellate court reasoned as follows:

However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that all property of marriage belongs to the
conjugal partnership, must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coveture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.

In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject property was acquired by Justina
Navarro during her marriage. xxx

The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in nature is not supported by any evidence.

To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared, for taxation purposes under the name of
Justina Navarro alone. This indicates that the land is the paraphernal property of Justina Navarro.

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby
rendered DISMISSING plaintiffs-appellees complaint in so far as defendants-appellants are concerned.

Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.

SO ORDERED.18 cräläwvirtua lib räry

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of 21 December
1998.19cräläwvirtual ibrä ry

On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate courts decision and resolution to this Court. The Court initially
denied the petition for review due to certain procedural defects. The Court, however, gave due course to the petition in its
Resolution of 31 January 2000.20
 The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:

1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE ON THE ALLEGED SALE BY ONE JUSTINA NAVARRO;

2. WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES RAISED ARE REVIEWABLE;

3. WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;

4. WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS ON THE LAND SHOULD PREVAIL;

5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS THE OTHER CO-HEIRS;

6. WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE SHARE OF PETITIONERS.21 cräläwvirt ualib räry

The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were able to prove, by the requisite quantum of evidence,
that Manongsong is a co-owner of the Property and therefore entitled to demand for its partition.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general, only questions of law are appealable to this Court
under Rule 45. However, where the factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals conflict, this Court has the
authority to review and, if necessary, reverse the findings of fact of the lower courts.22 This is precisely the situation in this
case.

We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of evidence and the burden of proof in civil
cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals :23 cräläwvirt ualib rä ry

xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case,
the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case
in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima faciecase, otherwise, a
verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the

Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa

Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that Manongsong is a co-owner or co-heir of the Property by
inheritance, more specifically, as the heir of her father, Vicente Lopez. Petitioners likewise allege that the Property
originally belonged to Guevarra, and that Vicente Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5 interest in the Property. As the
parties claiming the affirmative of these issues, petitioners had the burden of proof to establish their case by
preponderance of evidence.

To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax declarations and the testimonies of
witnesses. However, the Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted
petitioners claim of co-ownership.

The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and prima facieevidence of its
authenticity and due execution. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the evidence must
be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.24 Otherwise the authenticity and due execution of the document
should be upheld.25 The trial court itself held that (n)o countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or
impugn the documents legality or its validity.26 cräläwvirt ualib räry
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document and thus still presumed to be authentic.
The Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or
by any circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine.27 cräläwvirtua lib räry

Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because the Property was conjugal at the time Navarro sold
it to Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio. We do not agree. The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal was not based
on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there
is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential
condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.28 cräläwvirt uali brä ry

There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage. There is no basis for
applying the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911
showed that, as far back as in 1949, the Property was declared solely in Navarros name.29 This tends to support the
argument that the Property was not conjugal.

We likewise find no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory
heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for
valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there
is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values,30 that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent
monetary consideration.

Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2)
determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.31 The presence of these elements is apparent
on the face of the Kasulatan itself. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.32

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents presented by petitioners for the first time on appeal

We find no error in the Court of Appeals refusal to give any probative value to the alleged birth certificate of Guevarra and
the affidavit of Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. Petitioners belatedly attached these documents to their appellees brief. Petitioners
could easily have offered these documents during the proceedings before the trial court. Instead, petitioners presented
these documents for the first time on appeal without any explanation. For reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally
offer in evidence these documents before the trial court as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.33 To
admit these documents now is contrary to due process, as it deprives respondents of the opportunity to examine and
controvert them.

Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not controvert Navarros ownership of the Property.
Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.s affidavit stated merely that, although he knew Navarro by name, he was not personally
acquainted with her.34 Guevarras alleged birth certificate casts doubt only as to whether Navarro was indeed the mother of
Guevarra. These documents do not prove that Guevarra owned the Property or that Navarro did not own the Property.

Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. However, petitioners denied before
the Court of Appeals that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate court that this constitutes an
impermissible change of theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he cannot change his theory on
appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice
and due process.35 cräläwvirtua lib räry

If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine petitioners case. Absent any hereditary
relationship between Guevarra and Navarro, the Property would not have passed from Navarro to Guevarra, and then to
the latters children, including petitioners, by succession. There would then be no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership
by virtue of inheritance from Guevarra. On the other hand, this would not undermine respondents position since they
anchor their claim on the sale under the Kasulatan and not on inheritance from Guevarra.

Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed to refute by clear and convincing
evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that the Property belonged
to Guevarras estate. There is therefore no legal basis for petitioners complaint for partition of the Property.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643, dismissing the complaint of
petitioners against Felomena Jumaquio Estimo and Emiliana Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 177616, August 27, 2014

HEIRS OF SPOUSES JOAQUIN MANGUARDIA and SUSANA MANALO, namely: DANILO MANGUARDIA, ALMA
MANGUARDIA, GEMMA MANGUARDIA, RODERICK MANGUARDIA, MADELINE MANGUARDIA, joined by her husband,
RODRIGO VILLARANTE, ALAN MANGUARDIA, ROSE MANGUARDIA, joined by her husband, LEOPOLDO ADRID, JR.,
RONALD MANGUARDIA, JOEBERT MANGUARDIA, and RANDY MANGUARDIA; HEIRS OF SPOUSES LEONARDO ARAZA
and REBECCA ARROYO, namely: MARY MAGDALENA ARAZA,* joined by her husband CARLITO VILLANUEVA, NENITA
ARAZA, joined by her husband, LEONARDO BADE, ANTONIO ARAZA, and the children of ENECITA ARAZA- VARGAS,
namely: GADFRY VARGAS, GINA VARGAS, JOEL VARGAS, MARY GRACE VARGAS, ANA MAE VARGAS, and the minor
JUNAR VARGAS, represented by his guardian ad litem MAGDALENA ARAZA-VILLANUEVA, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF CAPIZ, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF SIMPLICIO VALLES and MARTA VALLES, represented by GRACIANO VALLES,
SULPICIO VALLES, TERESITA VALLES, joined by her husband, LEOPOLDO ALAIR, and PRESENTACION CAPAPAS-
VALLES, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

“[T]he burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that standing.” 1 cralaw red

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 3dated June 22, 2006 rendered
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78302 which affirmed in toto the Decision4 dated December 19, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 15, in Civil Case No. V-7421. Also assailed is the CA Resolution5 dated March 27,
2007 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.6 c ralawred

Factual Antecedents

The facts, as culled from the records, show that Marta, Simplicio, Melquiades, Rustico, Visitacion and Catalina, all surnamed Valles,
were siblings. Simplicio and Marta were the registered owners of a 42,215-square meter property in Barrio Cudian, Ivisan, Capiz
known as Lot 835 and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-4017.7 cralaw red

Marta died in 1943 and was survived by her illegitimate daughter, Encarnacion Ordas (Encarnacion). On the other hand, Simplicio
died on April 20, 1957. He was survived by his wife Villarica8 Ordas, who passed away sometime in 1969, and his children,
Felicisimo, Adelaida, Rosario, Juan, and Dominica, all surnamed Valles. With the exception of Felicisimo, all of Simplicio’s children
died single and childless. Felicisimo was survived by his wife, Presentacion 9 Capapas, and his children Graciano, Sulpicio, Teresita
and Antonio (now deceased).

It appears, however, that on October 28, 1968, a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale 10 over Lot 835 was executed by Simplicio and
Marta in favor of their brothers, Melquiades and Rustico; Simplicio’s daughter, Adelaida Valles (Adelaida); and Marta’s daughter,
Encarnacion. The Deed of Absolute Sale ostensibly bore the signature of Marta and the thumb marks of Simplicio and his wife. On
even date, said deed was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Capiz, resulting in the cancellation of OCT No. RO-4017 and the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.T-9409.11 The following day, or on October 29, 1968, the alleged buyers and new
registered owners executed a Subdivision Agreement, 12 subdividing Lot 835 into four lots. Said Subdivision Agreement was also
registered on the same day in the Registry of Deeds of Capiz. Hence, TCT No. T-9409 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, individual
titles to the subdivided lots were issued to the putative buyers as follows:
c hanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Name of Buyer Lot No. Area TCT No.

Adelaida Lot No. 835-A 10,555sqm. TCT No. T-941113
Melquiades Lot No. 835-B 10,553sqm. TCT No. T-941214
Encarnacion Lot No. 835-C 10,554sqm. TCT No. T-941315
Rustico Lot No. 835-D 10,553sqm. TCT No. T-941416

Lot 835-A

Lot 835-A remains registered in Adelaida’s name as it was never transferred or conveyed to anyone. But Graciano, Adelaida’s
nephew17 and grandson of Simplicio, possesses it since 1970.

Lot 835-B

On February 16, 1970, Melquiades sold Lot 835-B to his niece and co-vendee in the original Deed of Absolute Sale, Encarnacion,
and his nephew, Roberto Araza18 (married to Dolores De Domingo), by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Realty. 19 Thereafter, TCT
No. T-1025520 was issued in their names.

On February 15, 1972, Encarnacion and Roberto Araza, who are cousins in the first degree, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 21 in
favor of the latter’s aunt, Soledad Manalo Araza (Soledad; married to Pedro Araza), and TCT No. T-1123722 was issued in her name.

On November 27, 1980, Soledad sold the lot to her niece, Susana Manalo Manguardia, and her husband, Joaquin Manguardia,
(spouses Manguardia) by way of a Deed of Sale of Lots 835-B and 835-C, Ivisan Cadastre.23 Consequently, TCT No. T-
1895324 covering Lot 835-B was issued in the names of spouses Manguardia.

Lot 835-C

On January 27, 1969, Encarnacion sold Lot 835-C, which she described as property she inherited from her mother, to her uncle and
co-vendee in the original Deed of Absolute Sale, Rustico (married to Petrona Bacarra).25 TCT No. T-953126 was issued in the name
of Rustico two days after the execution of the sale document.

On March 19, 1970, Rustico sold the lot to spouses Pedro Araza (Pedro) and Soledad 27 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.28
Thereafter, TCT No. T-1017029 was issued in their names.

In the aforesaid Deed of Sale of Lots 835-B and 835-C, Ivisan Cadastre30 dated November 27, 1980, Pedro and his wife Soledad
also sold Lot 835-C to the spouses Manguardia. Subsequently, TCT No. T-1895231 covering Lot 835-C was issued in the names of
the latter.

Lot 835-D

Rustico likewise sold Lot 835-D to Pedro and Soledad under the Deed of Absolute Sale 32 dated March 19, 1970 and the
corresponding Torrens33 title was issued. Then on May 8, 1972, Pedro and Soledad executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 34 in favor of
their nephew Leonardo Araza (Leonardo; married to Rebecca Arroyo), 35 who was one of the attesting witnesses to the original Deed
of Absolute Sale. Subsequently, TCT No. T-1131536 was issued by virtue of such sale.

As a result of the conveyances, the registered owners of Lot 835 are:

a) Adelaida (Lot 835-A);
b) Spouses Manguardia (Lots 835-B and 835-C); and
c) Leonardo and Rebecca (Lot 835-D).

As previously mentioned, Lot 835-A is presently occupied by Graciano. The other lots are presently occupied by the surviving heirs
of the registered owners.

On December 13, 1999, the heirs of Simplicio and Marta, namely, Graciano, Sulpicio and Teresita Valles, along with their mother
Presentacion and Teresita’s husband, Leopoldo Alair (respondents), commenced an action for the Declaration of Nullity of
Certificates of Title and Deeds of Sale, Cancellation of Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages 37 against the heirs
of spouses Manguardia and the heirs of spouses Leonardo and Rebecca (petitioners) in the RTC of Roxas City. Respondents alleged
that in September 1998 they discovered the various documents of sale and titles covering Lot 835 when Teresita and her siblin gs
agreed to subdivide the lot among the heirs of Simplicio and Marta and searched for the title of the property in the Registry of
Deeds of Capiz. They averred that the purported Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 28, 1968 is a forgery because Marta and
Simplicio were long dead when the said document was executed. Consequently, all titles emanating therefrom including the titles
covering the subdivided lots of Lot 835 registered in the names of spouses Manguardia, Leonardo and Rebecca, and Adelaida, are
all null and void. Respondents, therefore, prayed that petitioners be ordered to remove the improvements introduced on the
disputed lot and vacate the same, and that a new title be issued over Lot 835 in the names of Marta and Simplicio as owners.

In their Answer,38 the heirs of spouses Manguardia39 averred that their predecessors-in-interest were innocent purchasers in good
faith and for value, having acquired Lots 835-B and 835-C in 1980 from their registered owners and occupants, Pedro and Soledad.
They further averred that their parents had been in possession of the lots since they purchased them in 1980, and had since then
constructed four buildings thereon for their poultry business, without opposition from anyone, including Graciano who occupies the
adjacent Lot 835-A. They maintained that the titles in the names of the spouses Manguardia are valid and legal. In addition, since
the documents of sale and Torrens titles were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds, and that actual possession by the different
transferees spanning a period of over 30 years were known to the respondents and their predecessors without any complaint or
opposition, the claim of respondents is barred by prescription, estoppel and laches. The heirs of the spouses Manguardia moreover
asserted that the Complaint against them fails to allege a cause of action and that the same was not brought by the real parties-in-
interest.

On the other hand, the heirs of Leonardo and Rebecca 40 (except Antonio Araza) in their Answer,41averred that their Torrens title
covering Lot 835-D is valid and lawful having been issued as a result of their parents’ acquisition of said lot from the registered
owners, spouses Pedro and Soledad. They averred that their parents were purchasers in good faith and for value and that the
document of sale is genuine and authentic. The heirs of Leonardo and Rebecca further alleged that the matter of the subdivision
and ownership of the lots was known to respondents as they had been, from Mindanao, coming back and forth to the subject
property; and, that despite such knowledge, they never claimed or complained about the ownership of Leonardo and his heirs over
the subject lot. By way of affirmative and special defenses, the heirs of Leonardo and Rebecca contended that the action is already
barred by prescription, estoppel and laches. This is considering that immediately after the sale in 1972, their parents possessed
and exercised all acts of dominion over Lot 835-D without opposition from anyone, including Graciano. Also, there is no cause of
action against them and the Complaint was not brought by the real parties-in-interest.
In their Answer42 to the Amended Complaint, the heirs of Enecita Araza Vargas raised the same averments, affirmative and special
defenses, and counterclaims as those raised by the other heirs of Leonardo and Rebecca. Likewise, Antonio Araza adopted the
Answer of the other heirs in a Manifestation 43 submitted to the court.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The trial resulted in the RTC rendering a Decision44 in favor of herein

respondents. It declared the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 28, 1968 void ab initio because there was no proof that the
vendors, Marta and Simplicio, were still alive in 1968 and had signed/thumb marked the sale document. The RTC likewise opined
that the vendees in the questioned sale document could not feign ignorance of the death of the purported vendors because two of
them are their brothers, while each of the other two are children of each of the said vendors. Consequently, the RTC also declared
the series of documents of sale, including the Subdivision Agreements and the corresponding Torrens titles issued subsequent to
OCT No. RO-4017, as null and void. It did not consider the subsequent buyers of the different portions of the lot as innocent
purchasers in good faith and for value because some transfers were made by and among co-vendees, a witness in the void Deed of
Absolute Sale, and close relatives. The transfers did not go far, but were limited to close relatives by affinity and consanguinity,
living in close proximity to each other. Because of these, the trial court found it hard, if not impossible, to presume good faith
among the parties to the series of conveyances.

With regard to the issue of laches and prescription, the trial court held that it would be impractical, unjust and patently iniquitous to
apply laches against the respondents by virtue of an absolutely simulated deed which never conveyed any right over the subject
properties to the alleged original buyers. It ratiocinated that laches is an equitable doctrine and its application is controlled by
equitable considerations; it cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.

The trial court did not also give credence to petitioners’ assertion that they acquired the subject properties thru prescription or
adverse possession, ratiocinating that the right to recover possession of land registered under the Torrens system does not
prescribe. Besides, assuming that extraordinary prescription of 30 years is applicable in the case at bar, the trial court opined that
the said 30-year period from October 28, 1968 has not yet elapsed when demands to return the property were assumed to be
made in September 1998, the time when the alleged sale transactions were discovered by the respondents. Petitioners mistakenly
concluded that the respondents were estopped from challenging their possession and ownership based on a mere presumption of
knowledge on the part of the latter. The accidental discovery of the documents of sale and corresponding titles in 1998 confirmed
respondents’ lack of knowledge of the transactions.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents] and against [petitioners]: c ralawlawli bra ry

1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exh. “B”, dated October 28, 1968 purportedly executed by Marta Valles and Simplicio
Valles in favor of Rustico Valles, Melquiades Valles, Encarnacion Ordas and Adelaida Valles void ab initio and therefore non-
existent; cha nro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

2. Declaring the Subdivision Agreement dated October 29, 1968 Exh. “E” executed by and among Melquiades Valles, Rustico
Valles, Adelaida Valles and Encarnacion Ordas, null and void and inexistent; c han roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

3. Deed of Absolute Sale of Realty, dated February 16, 1970, Exh. “J”, executed by Melquiades Valles in favor of Roberto Araza
married to Dolores Domingo and Encarnacion Ordas married to Jose Romero, covering Lot 835-B, null and void; chan rob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

4. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 15, 1972 Exh. “L” executed by [Encarnacion Ordas and] Roberto Araza
[married to Dolores De Domingo in favor of Soledad Manalo-Araza] married to Pedro Araza, covering Lot 835-B, as null and
void;cha nrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

5. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exh. “N”, executed by Pedro Araza and Soledad Manalo-Araza in favor of Joaquin
Manguardia and Susana Manalo, dated November 27, 1980, covering Lots 835-B and 835-C, as null and void; chan rob lesvi rtual lawlib rary

6. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exh. “P”, dated January 27, 1969, executed by Encarnacion Ordas in favor of Rustico
Valles, covering Lot 835-C, void ab initio and inexistent; chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

7. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exh. “R”, dated March 19, 1970 executed by Rustico Valles and Petrona Bacarra in favor of
Spouses Pedro Araza and Soledad Manalo-Araza covering Lots Nos. 835-C and 835-[D] as void ab initio and inexistent; c han roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

8. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exh. “V”, dated May 8, 1972, executed by Spouses Pedro Araza and Soledad Manalo-Araza
in favor of Leonardo Araza and Soledad Arroyo null and void; chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary

9. Declaring TCT Nos. 9409 issued in the names of Melquiades Valles married to Flora Zabal; Rustico Valles married to Pedrona
Bacarra; Adelaida Valles and Encarnacion Ordas married to Jose Romero null and void; chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

10. Declaring TCT No. 9411 issued in the name of Adelaida Valles; TCT No. T-9412 issued in the name of Melquiades Valles; TCT
No. T-9413 issued in the name of Encarnacion Ordas; TCT No. T-9414 issued in the name of Rustico Valles married to Pedrona
Bacarra; TCT No. T-10255 issued in the names of Roberto Araza and Encarnacion Ordas; TCT No. T-11237 issued in the name of
Soledad M. Araza married to Pedro Araza; TCT No. T-18953 issued in the name of Spouses Joaquin Manguardia and Susana
Manalo; TCT No. T-9531 issued in the name of Rustico Valles married to Pedrona Bacarra; TCT No. T-10170 issued in the name of
Pedro Araza and Soledad Araza; TCT No. T-18952 issued in the names of Spouses Joaquin Manguardia and Susana Manalo; TCT No.
T-10169 issued in the names of Pedro Araza and Soledad Manalo and TCT No. T-11315 in the name of Leonardo Araza married to
Rebecca Arroyo, null and void; chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary
[11.] Ordering the [petitioners] Heirs of Joaquin Manguardia and Susana Manalo to remove the buildings they constructed on the
property, [to] vacate the premises and [to] surrender possession thereof to [respondents] Heirs of Simplicio Valles, represented by
Graciano Valles, Sulpicio Valles and Teresita Valles[;]

[12.] Ordering the Register of Deeds of Capiz to cancel TCT No. T-9411, TCT No. T-18953, TCT No. T-18952 and TCT No. T-
11315[;]

[13.] Ordering the [petitioners] Heirs of Joaquin Manguardia and Susana Manalo and Heirs of Leonardo Araza and Rebecca Arroyo
to jointly and solidarily pay the [respondents]:
a) P30,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.
b) P10,000.00 as litigation expenses.
[14.] Dismissing all the counterclaims[;]

[15.] Dismissing the complaint as against the Register of Deeds of Capiz.

Costs against the [petitioners].

SO ORDERED.45 c hanro bles law

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA. They attributed error on the trial court for not considering their
predecessors-in-interest as innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, and for not upholding their ownership and possession
over the subject properties. They also questioned the trial court’s ruling on the inapplicability of laches, prescription and estoppel
as to bar the action filed by the respondents.

On June 22, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision 46 affirming in toto the trial court’s Decision. Just like the RTC, the CA found that
petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest are not buyers in good faith and for value. The appellate court further held that petitioners
cannot be considered to have acquired the subject properties through prescription since the whole lot is covered by a Torrens title
under the name of Marta and Simplicio. They could not justify their ownership and possession of the lots acquired by their
predecessors-in-interest, to wit: chanRoble svi rtual Lawlib rary

Besides, [petitioners] cannot justify their ownership and possession of the subject parcels of land acquired by their predece ssors-in-
interest since the requisites provided in Article 1117 of the Civil Code regarding the requirement of good faith enunciated in the first
paragraph of Article 526 of the Civil Code which states, thus:
“He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.”
[have] not been met.

In the light of the above provision, [petitioners] could not claim that their predecessors have been possessors in good faith of the
subject parcel of land in view of the finding that at the very inception the certificates of title obtained by their predecessors, which
[petitioners] now assert to be the basis of their just title, originated from a forged Deed of Absolute Sale dated x x x October 28,
1968. Clearly, the forged deed containing the simulated signatures of Simplicio and Marta who were known to be both dead at the
time of the execution of the said document is a nullity, and cannot serve as a just title. 47

The CA did not likewise give merit to the defense put forth by petitioners that respondents’ action is already barred by laches and
prescription. Citing St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cleofas48 and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Aguirre,49 it held that a party who
immediately filed a case upon discovery that his/her property was covered by a title in another’s name is not guilty of laches.
Moreover, an action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribes. The CA further found that respondents immediately
took steps to assert their rights to the subject properties upon discovery of the various titles by demanding from petitioners that
possession of the same be returned to them, and by subsequently filing an action for the nullification of the certificates of titles in
question and recovery of possession of the property covered by the original title, OCT No. RO-4017.

The fallo of the CA Decision reads: c hanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

[WHEREFORE], the appeal of [petitioners] is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Roxas City, Branch 15, dated 19 December 2002 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.50 c hanro bles law

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,51 but the same was denied in a Resolution52 dated March 27, 2007.

Issue

Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of: cha nRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TWENTIETH (20TH) DIVISION ERRED IN DENYING THE APPEAL OF
[PETITIONERS] AND [IN] AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO PETITIONERS HEREIN BEING BUYERS IN
GOOD FAITH.53

Arguments of the Petitioners

Petitioners argue that the CA failed to appreciate material facts which, if properly considered, would warrant the reversal of the
Decision of the court a quo. They posit that the failure of the lower courts to appreciate relevant facts resulted in the erroneous
finding that they are not buyers in good faith and for value and this rendered their Torrens titles of no value and effect. Petitioners
insist that they acquired the subject lots in good faith, for value, and by prescription or adverse possession; that their titles are
valid and legal considering that they stemmed from a series of registered sales and titles from as early as 1968 when Lot 835 was
first sold and subdivided into four lots; that respondents are guilty of laches for neglecting to assert their alleged rights within a
reasonable period of time despite the fact that the documents of sale, subdivision agreement and various land titles are duly
registered, and despite respondents’ knowledge of petitioners’ actual possession of the properties spanning a period of 30 years;
and, that after the sale, they immediately took possession of the lots and exercised acts of dominion over the same without any
opposition from any of the respondents.

In further defending their claim of good faith, petitioners assert that they are not required to go beyond what appears on the face
of the Torrens title of the previous owner; otherwise, it would defeat the primary objective of the Torrens System. 54 Furthermore,
their ownership which is rooted in good faith is independent of that of the previous owners’ title. 55 c ralawre d

Arguments of the Respondents

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that only questions of law may be raised in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. They contend that the lone issue raised by the petitioners dealt with the determination of whether petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest were buyers in good faith, which is a factual issue generally outside the scope of the Supreme Court’s
power in a petition for review on certiorari. In any case, petitioners failed to prove that their predecessors-in-interest were buyers
in good faith. Hence, there exists no apparent reason for this Court to review the lower courts’ decisions.

Our Ruling

The Petition lacks merit.

The Court finds no reason to depart from

the factual findings of the lower courts.

Time and again, this Court has reiterated that it is not a trier of facts. Well entrenched is the principle that factual findings of the
trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court. 56
The Court’s “role in a petition under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing or reversing errors of law allegedly committed by the a ppellate
court.”57 This rule, however, is not without well defined exceptions. “Findings of fact of the trial court and the CA may be set aside
when such findings are not supported by the evidence or where the lower courts' conclusions are based on a misapprehension of
facts.”58 Considering the contention of petitioners that misinterpretation of facts was committed, this Court embarked on the task of
reviewing the facts of this case.

After a painstaking review of the records, however, the Court finds no reason to reverse and set aside the factual findings of the
trial court, as affirmed by the CA, since these factual findings are supported by and are based on preponderant evidence. 59 c ralaw red

Petitioners failed to discharge the burden

of proving that their predecessors-in-interest
were buyers in good faith.

Petitioners do not dispute that the original Deed of Absolute Sale is a forgery because the alleged vendors were already long dead
when the questioned deed was executed. While their ownership rights are ultimately based upon this forged deed, petitioners
assert that the good faith of their predecessors-in-interest validates their title over the lots.

The Court, however, disagrees. It must be noted that the relationships by consanguinity or affinity, between and among the
vendors and vendees in the series of sales of the subject properties, were established by testimonial evidence. Again, these were
not contradicted by petitioners. And as aptly concluded by the trial court, it can reasonably be assumed from these relations that
the spouses Manguardia and Leonardo were not buyers in good faith, viz: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Are the Manguardias and Leonardo Araza third persons x x x who are innocent purchasers for value?

The general rule x x x that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens Certificate of Title without need
of inquiring further cannot apply when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient
facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to [inquire] into the status of the title of the property in litigation (Voluntad vs. Dizon,
313 SCRA 209). If circumstances exist that [require] a prudent man to investigate and he does not, he is deemed to have acted
in mala fide, and his mere refusal to believe that a defect exists or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of
a defect in his vendor’s title will not make him an innocent purchaser for value (Voluntad vs. Dizon, supra).

Spouses Soledad Manalo and Pedro Araza purchased the properties in question from Roberto Araza, x x x [Visitacion] Valles Araza’s
son. The father of Roberto Araza, Panfilo Araza, was Pedro Araza’s brother, making Pedro Araza the uncle of Roberto Araza.
Encarnacion Ordas, one of the two [v]endors of the land in question to Pedro Araza and Soledad Manalo Araza, is Roberto Araza’s
cousin as the mother of Encarnacion Ordas and Roberto’s mother, x x x [Visitacion] are sisters. Joaquin Manguardia, on the other
hand, is the husband of Susana Manalo, niece of Soledad Manalo Araza, being the daughter of Jose Manalo, Soledad’s brother.

Leonardo Araza, on the other hand is x x x [Visitacion] Valles-Araza’s son, whose father, Panfilo Araza is brother of Pedro Araza,
Soledad Araza’s husband. x x x [Visitacion] is a sister of Simplicio Valles and Marta Valles, both of whom were dead when the Deed
of Sale, exh. “B” was purportedly executed in 1968, selling the property, Lot 835, to x x x [Visitacion’s] brothers, Rustico and
Melquiades, and [Visitacion’s] nieces, namely: Encarnacion Ordas and Adelaida Valles.

The transfers of the properties in question did not go far, but [were] limited to close family relatives by affinity and consanguinity.
Circuitous and convoluted [as they may be], and involving more than two families but belonging to a clan which, although living in
different barangays, such barangays belong to the same city and [are] adjacent to each other. Good faith among the parties to the
series of conveyances is therefore hard if not impossible to presume. 60

Unfortunately for the petitioners, they did not provide any sufficient evidence that would convince the courts that the proximity of
relationships between/among the vendors and vendees in the questioned sales was not used to perpetrate fraud. Thus there is
nothing to dispel the notion that apparent anomalies attended the transactions among close relations. Glaringly emphasized were
the established facts that the parties to the alleged original sale in 1968, and the witnesses thereto were close relatives (siblings,
children and nephew of Marta and Simplicio). Similarly, the vendors and vendees in subsequent sale transactions were either the
co-vendees themselves in the original sale, first cousins, and close relatives by consanguinity and affinity. In addition, these
transactions between close relatives happened at a time when everybody knew everyone, in a place where vendees lived in close
proximity to the vendors, and to the disputed properties.

This is not to say however, that a sale between close relatives is automatically anomalous. It is just that in this particular case, the
circumstances strongly show that fraud was committed by relatives against relatives and the evidence adduced by petitioners was
insufficient to remove the cloud of doubt pertaining to the good faith of their predecessors-in-interest in acquiring the properties in
question.

It must be emphasized that “the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts
that standing. In discharging the burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith that everyone is
presumed to act in good faith. The good faith that is here essential is integral with the very status that must be proved. x x x
Petitioners have failed to discharge that burden.” 61 cra lawred

Acquisitive prescription is not applicable

in the case at bar.

Petitioners’ contention of acquisitive prescription cannot prevail over the rights of respondents. To begin with, the disputed
property is a duly registered land under the Torrens system. “It is well-settled that no title to registered land in derogation of that
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Neither can prescription be allowed against the
hereditary successors of the registered owner, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent and are merely the
continuation of the personality of their predecessor[-]in[-]interest. Consequently, since a certificate of registration covers it, the
disputed land cannot be acquired by prescription regardless of petitioner's good faith.” 62 c ralawred

Laches cannot be used to perpetrate injustice.

On the claim of laches, this Court reiterates that “[l]aches is based upon equity and the public policy of discouraging stale claims.
Since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or
to [perpetrate] fraud and injustice. Thus, the assertion of laches to thwart the claim of respondents is foreclosed because the
[d]eed upon which [petitioners base their] claim is[, first and foremost,] a forgery.”63 cra lawred

All told, the Court finds the trial court’s disquisition, as affirmed by the CA, in order.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The June 22, 2006 Decision and March 27, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 78302 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Bersamin,** Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 189776 : December 15, 2010]

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, REPRESENTED BY HER DULY APPOINTED GUARDIANS, AGNES P. ARELLANO AND NONA P.
ARELLANO, PETITIONER, VS. FRANCISCO PASCUAL AND MIGUEL PASCUAL, RESPONDENTS.BR

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is
represented by her daughters[1] Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N.
Pascual.[2]

In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration," docketed as Special Proceeding
Case No. M-5034, filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter
alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by
the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of
petitioner.
Respondent's nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.[3]

Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register
of Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it "may be considered as an advance
legitime" to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the
donation.

Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the purpose of determining whether it
formed part of the decedent's estate,[4] the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of
notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which
reads:[5]

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate. Thus it disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that:

1. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;

2. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation;

3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine and the 3 rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City
form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;

4. The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual:

a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal Village Makati TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the
rental income thereon;

b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square meters located at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City,
TCT No. 119063;

c. Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at Puerta Galera Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;

d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the following Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144,
A082906, A006087, A065796, A11979, A049521, C86950, C63096, C55316, C54824, C120328, A011026,
C12865, A10439, A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309;

e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the following Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128,
S58308, S69309, A006708, 07680, A020786, S18539, S14649;

f. ¼ share in Eduardo Pascual's shares in Baguio Gold Mining Co.;

g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in the name of Nona Arellano;

h. Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered by TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of Makati
City;

i. Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by Branch 64 of the Court on November 17, 1995.

5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:

a. To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No. 181889;

b. To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and
119063 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City and the property covered by OCT No. 2159, to be divided
equally between them up to the extent that each of their share have been equalized with the actual value of
the property in 5(a) at the time of donation, the value of which shall be determined by an independent
appraiser to be designated by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the real
properties are not sufficient to equalize the shares, then Francisco's and Miguel's shares may be satisfied from
 either in cash property or shares of stocks, at the rate of quotation. The remaining properties shall be divided
equally among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that

. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.

II

. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.

III

. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY
HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.

xxxx
and
V

. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS. [6]
(underscoring supplied)

By Decision[7] of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioner's appeal "partly meritorious." It sustained the probate court's
ruling that the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:

Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of division, We hold that the property subject of
donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent and we
believe that under the circumstances, the value of such immovable though not strictly in the concept of advance legitime, should be
deducted from her share in the net hereditary estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible error when it included the
said property as forming part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.[8] (citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate court, herein petitioner "was able to submit prima
facie evidence of shares of stocks owned by the [decedent] which have not been included in the inventory submitted by the
administrator."

Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar
as the order of inclusion of properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition and distribution of the
same to the co-heirs are concerned.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in accordance with the disquisitions herein.[9]
(underscoring supplied)

Petitioner's Partial Motion for Reconsideration [10] having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution [11] of October 7, 2009, the
present petition for review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its ruling

. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS
ESTATE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.

II

. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.

III

. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO
LEGITIMES.

IV

. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS
LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.[12] (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation; and whether the property of
the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties.

On the first issue:

The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations
made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property
disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime. [13]

The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free
portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. [14]

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If
there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. [15]

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by
his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime - that part of the testator's property
which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.[16]

The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are
those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory
heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and
ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or
the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs. [17]

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even
if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid,[18] is deemed
as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. [19] There being no compulsory heir, however,
the donated property is not subject to collation.

On the second issue:

The decedent's remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner
and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (underscoring supplied)

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering the collation of the property donated to
petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to
conduct further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to
divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta,* Bersamin, Mendoza,** and Sereno, JJ., concur.

G.R. NO. 154942 : August 16, 2005]

ROLANDO SANTOS, Petitioners, v. CONSTANCIA SANTOS ALANA, Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing
the Decision1 dated March 7, 2002 and Resolution dated July 24, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 40728.

A brief narration of the factual antecedents follows:

Rolando Santos, petitioner, and Constancia Santos Alana, respondent, are half-blood siblings both asserting their claim
over a 39-square meter lot located at 1339-B Andalucia St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. It was registered in the name of their
father, Gregorio Santos, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14278 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. He died
intestate on March 10, 1986.

During his lifetime, or on January 16, 1978, Gregorio donated the lot to petitioner which the latter accepted on June 30,
1981. The deed of donation ("Pagsasalin ng Karapatan at Pag-aari") was annotated on Gregorio's title.

On April 8, 1981, Gregorio sold the lot to petitioner as per a Deed of Absolute Sale.

On June 26, 1981, by virtue of the annotated deed of donation, TCT No. 14278 in Gregorio's name was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. 144706 was issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila in petitioner's name.

On January 11, 1991, respondent Constancia Santos filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, a complaint
for partition and reconveyance against petitioner. She alleged that during his lifetime, her father Gregorio denied having
sold the lot to petitioner; that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that the donation is inofficious as she was deprived
of her legitime.

In his answer, petitioner countered that respondent's suit is barred by prescription considering that she is aware that he
has been in possession of the lot as owner for more than ten (10) years; and that the lot was sold to him by his father,
hence, respondent can no longer claim her legitime.

The trial court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was not signed by the parties nor was it registered in the Registry of
Deeds. Thus, it is not a valid contract. What is valid is the deed of donation as it was duly executed by the parties and
registered.

The trial court then held that since Gregorio did not own any other property, the donation to petitioner is inofficious
because it impaired respondent's legitime.

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the Deed of Donation inofficious insofar as it
impair the legitime of the plaintiff which is - the of the subject property.

The Registry of Deeds of Manila is hereby ordered to cancel the entry in TCT No. 14278 of the Deed of Donation dated
January 16, 1978 and to cancel TCT No. 144706 issued based on said entry.

The parties are enjoined to institute the proper action for the settlement of the Estate of Gregorio Santos and for the
eventual partition of the estate."2

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Decision, holding that:

"There are in the instant case two documents by which the subject property was purportedly transferred to the defendant -
a deed of donation and a deed of sale.

xxx

There can, therefore, be no way by which the appellant may successfully convince us that Gregorio Santos
sold the property in dispute to him and such sale can bind the appellee so as to remove the case from the
realm of the law on donations.

Moreover, as aptly put by the trial court:

'In general one who has disposed his property would not and could not have disposed the same again unless the previous
act was rendered invalid or ineffective.

The validity of the Deed of Donation was never assailed by the defendant. In fact, it was impliedly recognized as valid by
defendant by registering the same to the Registry of Deeds.

It is the honest belief of this Court, given the circumstances, i.e., the existence of the vendor and the vendee in the Deed
of Absolute Sale and the registration of the Deed of Donation despite the supposed previous execution of (the) Deed of
Absolute Sale, that there was no valid deed of sale executed and that the true and real agreement between
Gregorio Santos and Rolando Santos was that of a donation.
Furthermore, considering that defendant himself registered the Deed of Donation, he cannot now close his eyes and deny
the existence of the same by alleging that there had been a deed of sale executed previously." (Appealed Decision, supra,
at pp. 238-239)

xxx

While a person may dispose of his property by donation, there is a limitation to the same. The law provides that no person
may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by will, and any donation which may exceed
the foregoing is considered inofficious. x x x The donation shall be inofficious in all that it may exceed this limitation.
(Article 752, Civil Code) The said donation may correspondingly be reduced insofar as it exceeds the portion that may be
freely disposed of by will (ART. 761).

xxx

It has been undisputedly shown that the subject property was the only property of the deceased Gregorio Santos at the
time of his death on March 10, 1986 (Exhibit 'K', Original Record, p. 163); and that he made no reservation for the
legitime of the plaintiff-appellee, his daughter (See paragraph 2, Complaint and paragraph 2, Answer, Ibid., at pp 1 and
12) and compulsory heir. Clearly, the rule on officiousness applies. x x x

xxx

Defendant-appellant finally argues that since plaintiff-appellee knew of the donation since 1978, while the donor Gregorio
Santos was still alive, her assailing the said donation only on January 11, 1991 or thirteen years after, has effectively
barred her from instituting the present action. The foregoing is apparently groundless and without merit.

The inofficiousness of a donation cannot be determined until after the death of the donor because prior to his death, the
value of his estate cannot be determined or computed. Determination of the value of the deceased's estate will require the
collation of all properties or rights, donated or conveyed by gratuitous title to the compulsory heirs in order that they may
be included in the computation for the determination of the legitime of each heir and for the account of partition (Art.
1061, Civil Code)."3

Hence, the instant petition.

The findings of the courts below that (1) Gregorio donated to petitioner the subject lot; (2) the Deed of Absolute Sale is
void; and (3) Gregorio's only property is the said lot - are all
factual in nature which are not within the domain of this Court for it is not a trier of facts.4 Basic is it that findings of fact by
the trial court, especially when affirmed on appeal, as in this case, are conclusive and binding upon this Court.5

The issues which involve questions of law are: (1) whether the donation is inofficious; and (2) whether the respondent's
action has prescribed.

I. Whether the donation is inofficious.

It bears reiterating that under Article 752 of the Civil Code, the donation is inofficoius if it exceeds this limitation - no
person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by will. InImperial v. Court of
Appeals,6 we held that inofficiousness may arise only upon the death of the donor as the value of donation may then be
contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor deceased.

At this point, we emphasize that as found by the trial court, Gregorio did not sell the lot to petitioner. He donated it. The
trial court also found that the donation is inofficious as it impairs
respondent's legitime; that at the time of Gregorio's death, he left no property other than the lot now in controversy he
donated to petitioner; and that the deceased made no reservation for the legitime of respondent, his daughter and
compulsory heir. These findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Pursuant to Article 752 earlier cited, Gregorio could not donate more than he may give by will. Clearly, by donating the
entire lot to petitioner, we agree with both lower courts that Gregorio's donation is inofficious as it deprives respondent of
her legitime, which, under Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary estate of the father and
the mother. Since the parents of both parties are already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to one-
half (1/2) thereof.

II. Whether respondent's suit is barred by prescription.

In Imperial v. Court of Appeals,7 we held that "donations, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment
of legitime (as in this case), are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason, we must resort to the
ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be
brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation
to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code,8 to the extent that they impair the legitime of
compulsory heirs.

From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? In Mateo v. Lagua,9 involving the reduction, for inofficiousness, of a
donation propter nuptias, we held that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-
decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be
determined.

Here, Gregorio died in 1986. Consequently, respondent had until 1996 within which to file the action. Records show that
she filed her suit in 1992, well within the prescriptive period.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
40728 are hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense that the subject deed of donation being inofficious, one half
(1/2) of the lot covered by TCT No. 14278 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila is awarded to Constancia Santos Alana,
respondent, the same being her legitime. The remaining one-half (1/2) shall be retained by petitioner, Rolando Santos, as
his legitime and by virtue of the donation.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 118449. February 11, 1998]

LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and
RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.

DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two
children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings
of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael
and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo
Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his
widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of
10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property) covered
by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
(P135,000.00), evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan
ng Titulo TCT NO. T-36734.[1] In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela
property was issued to Estrellita.[2] On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela
property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four
Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00).[3] In June of the
same year, Estrellita bought from Premiere Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with
improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque (hereafter Paraaque
property) using a portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance
was deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred. Estrellita and
her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident
popularly known as the Vizconde Massacre. The findings of the investigation conducted
by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters.[4] Accordingly, Carmela,
Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of
Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his
daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares,[5] with Rafael and
Salud, Estrellitas parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the
properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael
and Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and the Paraaque property. The
total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other related expenses in the burial
of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00).[6] The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the
bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Saving Account No. 104-
111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other fifty
percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Paraaque property and the car were also
given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership and
participation as heirs[7]in the said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita instituted an
intestate estate proceeding[8] docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and
the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special
Administratrix of Rafaels estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as
guardian ad litemof Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother. Herein
private respondent Ramon filed an opposition[9] dated March 24, 1993, praying to be
appointed instead as Salud and Ricardos guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon
filed another opposition[10] alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the
Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not les than Six Million Pesos
(P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for courts intervention to
determine the legality and validity of the intervivos distribution made by deceased
Rafael to his children,[11] Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own
petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled InMatter Of The Guardianship Of
Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas and averred that their legitime should come
from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his
lifetime.[12] Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of
representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita. [13]
In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as
the Guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the Special
Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The courts Order did not include petitioner in the slate
of Rafaels heirs.[14] Neither was the Paraaque property listed in its list of properties to be
included in the estate.[15] Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994,
removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his wards property without
the courts knowledge and permission.[16]
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner ten
(10) days x x x within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the
pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any
pending motion that has been filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and
Teresita de Leon. In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994,
stressing tha the was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he
has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in
its Order dated February 2, 1994.[17] Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion
dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding
and asked that the Paraaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be collated. [18] Acting on Ramons
motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted the same in an Order which
pertinently reads as follows:
xxxxxxxxx

On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in instant case

and considering the comment on hi Manifestation, the same is hereby granted.[19]

xxxxxxxxx
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon
opposed.[20] On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration. It provides:
xxxxxxxxx

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde

were then financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable
consideration the property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased
Rafael Nicolas in the latters ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further
goes, said spouses were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. And Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, de-facto separation,
from the family for sometime and returned to the Philippines only after the
occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.

To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially

incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde
claims that they have been engaged in business venture such as taxi
business, canteen concessions and garment manufacturing. However, no
competent evidence has been submitted to indubitably support the business
undertakings adverted to.

In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the

property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.

Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by

her father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was
purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of property by the
deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby

DENIED. (Underscoring added)
[21]

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of
Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals [22] denied
the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the
Valenzuela property as the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters incidental
and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the
estate of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court). [23] Dissatisfied,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Finding prima facie merit, the
Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate courts Order, which respondent
Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela property from
Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of the
Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who
intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass,
the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made according
to law and the will of the testator.[24] Collation is only required of compulsory heirs
succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by
donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. [25] The purpose for it is
presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in making a
donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on
account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessors will is to treat all his heirs
equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary.[26] Collation does not impose
any lien on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought
to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the
time it was donated,[27] the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which
conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.[28]
The attendant facts herein do no make a case of collation. We find that the probate
court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.

First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of
Rafaels compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;

(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and ascendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in

Nos 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned,

shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this
Code.

With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a
creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. [29] As such, petitioner may
not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or
allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding, [30] which
petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.[31]
 Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or
ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate
proceedings.[32] Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.[33] In the case at bench, however, we note
that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to
determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and
Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned
parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the
contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matter
outside the probate courts jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an
appropriate action. We reiterate:

x x x we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of testate
or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased,
although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to
the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the
ownership or existence of the right or credit.[34]

Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is
premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory
stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has
been impaired to warrant collation. We thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59
Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:

We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the
provisions of article 1035 of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to
[35]

allege and prove that the donations received by the defendants were
inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitimate or hereditary
portion to which they are entitled. In the absence of evidence to that effect, the
collation sought is untenable for lack of ground or basis therefor.

Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate
court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque
property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of a deed of sale, is the
Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply
by reason thereof. Indeed collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory
basis.[36] The order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was
gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the
Paraaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,[37] by Premier
Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and
petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the Paraaque property is not
one of Rafaels heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of collation against petitioner is
unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to
herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it stands, collation
of the Paraaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties
gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact
does not obtain anent the transfer of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a
public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any claims, rights, ownership and
participation as heir[38] in the Paraaque property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died
ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more
than the value of the Valenzuela property.[39] Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela
property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela
property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination
by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992.]

DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN SUAREZ-DE LEON and REGINIO I.
SUAREZ, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALENTE RAYMUNDO, VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION VITO
and VIRGINIA BANTA, Respondents.

Villareal Law Offices, for Petitioners.

Nelson Loyola for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; PROPRIETARY INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN, DIFFERENT AND ADVERSE FROM
THEIR MOTHER. — The legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of petitioners
in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the
property not because of their mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not
barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

The ultimate issue before Us is whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-owned by
petitioners and registered in the name of petitioner’s deceased father. Marcelo Suarez, whose estate has not been partitioned or
liquidated, after the said properties were levied and publicly sold en masse to private respondents to satisfy the personal judgment
debt of Teofista Suarez, the surviving spouse of Marcelo Suarez, mother of herein petitioners. c hanro bles law l ib rary

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: c han rob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of several valuable parcels
of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty
Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate
principal amount of about P70,000 as damages. 1
The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel
of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the
private respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a certificate of sale
which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.

On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action 2 against private
respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auction sale
and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that being strangers to the
case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-
owners, can neither be levied nor sold on execution.

On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private respondents a final deed of sale 3 over the properties.

On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed with Branch 151 a Motion for Reconsideration 4 of the Order
dated October 10, 1984, claiming that the parcels of land are co-owned by them and further informing the Court the filing and
pendency of an action to annul the auction sale (Civil Case No. 51203), which motion however, was denied. chan roble s.com:c ralaw:red

On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining private respondents from transferring to third parties
the levied parcels of land based on the finding that the auctioned lands are co-owned by petitioners.

On March 1, 1985, private respondent Valente Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 a Motion to Dismiss for failure on the part of
the petitioners to prosecute, however, such motion was later denied by Branch 155, Regional Trial Court, Pasig.

On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 an Ex-Parte Motion to Dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute. This
was granted by Branch 155 through an Order dated May 29, 1986, notwithstanding petitioner’s pending motion for the issuance of
alias summons to be served upon the other defendants in the said case. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was later
denied.

On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739 an Order directing Teofista Suarez and all persons
claiming right under her to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale; to desist from removing or alienating improvements thereon;
and to surrender to private respondents the owner’s duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.

Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the Orders of Branch 151 dated October
10, 1984 and October 14, 1986 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739.

On December 4, 1986 petitioners filed with Branch 155 a Motion for reconsideration of the Order 5 dated September 24, 1986. In
an Order dated June 10, 1987, 6 Branch 155 lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of alias summons. cha nrob les law l ibra ry : red

Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated February 25, 1985, 7 May 19, 1989 8 and
February 26, 1990 9 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 and further ordering respondent Judge to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The
appellate court rendered its decision on July 27, 1990, 10 the dispositive portion of which reads: jg c:chan roble s.com.p h

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned orders dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989 and
February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled, further respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case
No. 51203." 11

Hence, this appeal.

Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner and private respondents and the developments
subsequent to the filing of the complaint, We cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and the manner of publicly selling en masse the
subject properties for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should have been the subject of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case.

"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." c ralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Article 888 further provides: cha nrob les.co m.ph : vi rtual law lib rary

"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the
mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as
hereinafter provided." cra law virtua1aw li bra ry

Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides: jgc:c han robles. com.ph

"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime
of each of the legitimate children or descendants." c ralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.

The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother.
Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as children of their deceased
father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect the ir own
interest.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby
REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and to
annul the sale with regard to said portion.
chan robles law lib rary

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.