Topic: Causation

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. & ARMANDO U. CARBONEL vs. IAC and LEONARDO DIONISIO
No. L-65295. March 10,1987
Facts:
 Dionisio: was driving at around 1:30 a.m. from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. During the
drive home, his headlights suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford
dump truck some 2-1⁄2 meters away from his car. The dump truck was parked in such a manner as to
stick out onto the street. There were no "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump
truck.
 Carbonel: with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out
early the following morning, drove the truck home.
 Dionisio: tried to avoid a collision but still smashed into the dump truck. Commenced an action for
damages in the CFI claiming that the proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which
Carbonel had parked the dump truck.
 Phoenix and Carbonel: countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a
curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and
supervision of the dump truck driver.
 TC: rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel
 IAC: affirmed the decision of the TC
Issue: Whether Carbonel was negligent in parking the dump truck
Held: YES
Ratio:
 Private respondent had no curfew pass during the night the accident took place. The certification by a
major assigned in Pampanga that respondent has a curfew pass is not credible as it lacks the necessary
details.
 Information gathered by a traffic investigator from persons who saw how the accident took place is
admissible as part of the res gestae.
 The theory of petitioners that the negligence of the truck driver in parking his truck on the street
without any early warning devices is merely a passive and static condition, while the negligence of the
car driver in ramming against the truck was the efficient, intervening cause, is a theory that has already
been almost entirely discredited.
 The improper parking of truck created an unreasonable risk for anyone driving on that street for which
the truck driver should be held responsible as the negligence of a car driver bumping that truck was no
more than a forseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck driver.
 Employer's failure to exercise vigilance over its employee evident from the improper parking of the
truck on the street at night along employee's residence.
Issue: Whether Dionisio is liable for contributory negligence
Held: YES
 Petitioner's theory that respondent deliberately shut off his headlights as he turned the intersection
where his car later on bumped a parked dumptruck is more credible than respondent's claim that his
car's lights suddenly turned off.
 The fact that a driver smelled of liquor does not necessarily mean he is drunk.
 Negligence of car driver who bumps an improperly parked truck is merely contributory.
 Doctrine of "last clear chance" is a common-law theory adopted to mitigate the harshness of the
"contributory negligence of the plaintiff rule under which in common-law countries plaintiff is barred
from any recovery, unlike in our system of law where the Civil Code expressly states that it will merely
reduce the amount to be recovered.
 Doctrine of last clear chance in common law cannot be applied as a general rule in negligence cases in
our civil law system.
 Contributory negligence may result in 20% reduction of damages.
 The demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio.
Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00
as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private
respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix
who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's
fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to
reimbursement from Carbonel.18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of
damages made by the respondent appellate court.