History of the Philippine Army

(1897-1945)

by the
Office of the Army Chief Historian
Philippine Army
Fort Andres Bonifacio, Metro Manila
Volume I
1981

i
 Philippine Copyright

1981 & 2011

by the

Office of the Army Chief Historian

Philippine Army
Fort Andres Bonifacio, Metro Manila

ISBN 978-971-011-307-1

All Rights Reserved

ii
 nd
The text of the 2 edition of Volume 1 is published verbatim. Only
the illustrations were changed with more appropriate pictures.

iii
 History of the Philippine Army

VOLUME I

COUNCIL OF ADVISORS

MAJ GEN JOSEPHUS Q RAMAS, AFP

Commanding General, Philippine Army

BRIG GEN RAMON L CANNU, AFP Dep. Comm.

1
BRIG GEN CIRILO O OROPESA, AFP Chief of Staff
COL MARIANO P ADALEM, GSC (INF) PA ACofS, G1
COL VICTOR B MAMAWAG, GSC (INF) PA ACofS, G2
COL FRANKLIN A SAMONTE, GSC (INF) PA ACofS, G3
COL FIDEL C SAMSON, GSC (INF) PA ACofS, G4
COL PEDRO Y VILLALON, GSC (INF) PA ACofS, G5
COL DALMACIO G PIZAÑA, GSC (INF) PA ACofS, G6
COL ASCENCION V BARCELO, GSC (INF) PA ACofS, G8
COL HERMINIO T SALAS, GSC (FA) PA CO, PACRIS

ARMY HISTORICAL DIVISION STAFF

LT COL WILFREDO F LAGANZON, MNSA (INF) PA - Chief

Deputy Chief MAJ JOSE G MISLANG (INF) PA

Chief, Histories CPT CICERON T NAVARRO (SC) PA
Chief, Historical Services CPT JAIME R RIBAYA (INF) PA
Chief, Admin CPT GAUDENCIO L SAN JUAN (INF) PA

GENERAL EDITORS
3
CAPT LEONARDO S SIBAYAN (INF) PA
4
Ms Yolanda SP Moran
5
Ms Adela S Yuson

1.Concurrent ACofS G7
2.Concurrent Chief, General Editor
3.Chief, Current/Organizational History Section, Histories Branch
4.Historical Writer/Translator, General History Section, Histories Branch
5.Info Writer, Current/Organizational History Section, Histories Branch

iv
 ARMY HISTORICAL DIVISION PERSONNEL

ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

MSgt Juan M Vispo (CE) PA C, Clerk/Personnel NCO

Cpl Discoro G Laynesa (Inf) PA Asst Admin NCO
Ms Celia C Lehman (Secretary)
Ms Evelyn M Alcantara Typist

HISTORIES BRANCH

SSg Ricardo C Valle (Inf) PA NCOIC

SSg George L Bacani (Inf) PA Duty
Ms Carmen B Dagat Typist

HISTORICAL SERVICES BRANCH

MSgt Jaime B Pumakis (Inf) PA NCOIC

SSg Camilo L Mina (CE) PA Asst Curator
Sgt Mario B Labaton (Inf) PA Duty
Sgt Jovito A Cual (Inf) PA Supply Sgt
Sgt Mario A Rondaris (Inf) PA NCOIC, Library
Cpl Ricardo R Quierra (Inf) PA Records NCO
Cpl Anita R Alberto (WAC) PA Librarian
Pfc Antonio A Darang (Inf) PA Driver
Pfc Manuel C Salvador (Inf) PA Filing Clerk
Mrs Othelia P Cuarteros Asst Librarian

v
 A TRIBUTE TO THE FILIPINO SOLDIER

“I know this soldier, and I have fought by his side in Bataan and
in the underground. I have no need for the respectful testimony of his
adversaries or enemies or his allies from the Pacific War, to the internal
wars that we have fought.

I don’t need the testimony of anyone for I am aware of his

qualities…he’s the inferior of none and the equal of the finest warriors in
the world.”

His Excellency FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President of the Republic
Philippines

vi
 DEDICATIONS

To the “Unknown Soldiers and Heroes” who fearlessly fought

their last stand in Bataan……

This book is a “Salute” for their righteous and heroic deeds in

pushing through the portals of outright realization of peace, freedom and
independence of the Filipino People and our country, the Philippines.

vii
 FOREWORD

The History of the Philippine Army is a product of a

comprehensive historical studies and researches of the personnel of the
Army Historical Division

This volume is an account of the beginning of the Army since its

organization as a community defense up to the liberation campaign that
drew to a close in 1945. The exploits of the Army in the past reflect the
constant struggle to the Filipinos in their quest for independence. The
painstaking recollection of history is likewise focused on the organization,
training, logistic, strategical concepts and handicaps of the Philippine
Army in its stages of growth and development.

Although the FILIPINO SOLDIER did not win all battles: with a
glorious cry, he nevertheless stood with the courage, valor and dignity.

Thus, through the publication of this book, the noble tradition of

the Philippine Army shall be recorded, preserved and enhanced for
posterity.

This historical work will serve as an invaluable reference to both

military and civilian personnel who desire to understand their Army in its
proper perspective.

JOSEPHUS Q RAMAS
Major General AFP
Commanding

viii
 PREFACE

A wide scope in the study of history need not be so justified, for

such a relaid fact as the past is really worth to be studied. Indeed, the
past is not considerably dead…It is very much alive. It lives in various
analytical scales we take for granted - in written laws, custom, traditions,
institutions and in beliefs. Notwithstanding its being intangible, it
enhances an environment just as real as the physical universe. In like
manner, the past lives in memories both well guided and misguided by
books, magazines, newspapers, movies, audio visual programs, shrines,
restorations and variety of historical records.

Actually, military historians agree on most “facts” of history. In

regards to some, they disagree as to what should be picked out and
emphasized depending on the importance, for there are several
countless facts to be written. Thus, everyone then differ on the
significance or definition of any specified aspect of the past.

This first volume embraces the period from 1897 to 1945, a very
significant part of the past on the evolutionary existence of the Philippine
Army as one of the major services of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Its content draws out of the explicit origin and succession of
events interrelated in its development and it is further focused on the
personalities who had, at a certain time or another, successfully steered
its way through the perils of the past. Hence, this text is a humble
portrayal of the FILIPINO SOLDIER as it exists today.

There had been so many difficulties encountered in the

protracted research work as regards to this volume. Most sensible of all
is the scarcity of primary sources of information. However, it had been
overcome through a simple medium of conducting interviews which
eventually enabled the completion of a more comprehensive volume.

Although ample care had been taken into effect in the combined
efforts of conceiving this book, under no sense of illusions we have done
everything to stay away from all errors of any facts or interpretations. On
the other hand, comments, suggestions or other improvements from our
readers will be highly appreciated for future edition.

For their contribution in the completion of this volume, we would

like to acknowledge the work extended by Lt Colonel Froilan B Alvior,

ix
Maj Alfredo B Barangan, Capt Filomeno D Pulga, SSgt Jose A Pichay,
Cpl Jover R Najera and Ms Leonora S Natividad.

The researchers, writers, editors and staff of the Army Historical

Division believed that the days expended on the production of this book
will be justified by the many services it will serve for those who turn to it.
It is also our fervent hope and aspirations that this volume will be of afar-
reaching importance to military historians, scholar, students and others
who may find interest on military history.

WILFREDO F LAGANZON, MNSA

Lt Colonel GSC (INF) PA
Chief

Army Historical Division

Philippine Army
Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila
September 21, 1981

x
 CONTENTS

FOREWORD viii
PREFACE ix-x
LIST OF ILLUSTRATION xiv-xv
PART I
SPANISH REGIME

Chapter I – INTRODUCTION 03-11

Early Military Establishments
Need for Security of Community
Origin of Military Organization
Armaments and Implements
Early Filipinos as Tacticians
Military Forces During the Period

Chapter II - FIRST FILIPINO ARMY 12-30

The Katipunan and Andres Bonifacio
Discovery of Katipunan
War Preparations
Outbreak of Filipino-Spanish Hostilities
Tejeros Convention
Biak-na-Bato Republic

Chapter III - REVOLUTIONARY ARMY IN NEW STRUGGLE 31-48

Background
Exile of Aguinaldo
The Spanish-American War
Renewal of Struggle
Treaty of Paris
Filipino-American War

PART II
AMERICAN RULE

Chapter IV - FILIPINO GUERILLA OPPOSITION 51-62

Advent of American Rule
Basis of American Policy in the Philippines
Filipino Nationalism - Consequence of Colonial Policy
Harsh Punishment for Irreconcilables and Rise of Guerrilla
Bands
Sakay and his Resistance Campaigns

xi
 Punitive Measures
Creation of the PC

Chapter V - DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 63-76

Basic Responsibility of the US
Wood-Forbes Mission
Wood’s Administration and Accomplishments
Independence Missions
Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act
Tydings-McDuffie Act

PART III
COMMONWEALTH PERIOD
Chapter VI - INCEPTION OF THE ARMY 79-99
Basic Premise
Approval of Commonwealth Act No.1
Role of MacArthur
Organization and Composition
Rationale for its Development
Handicaps of the Pre-War Philippine Army

Chapter VII - PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 100-114

Establishment of National Defense System
Creation of Military Districts
Training Camps and Mobilization Centers
Emergence of National Crisis
Status of Preparedness
Outbreak of Hostilities

PART IV
THE WAR YEARS

Chapter VIII - THE DEFENSE OF LUZON 117-148

Sneak Attack on Pearl Harbor
Japanese Landings in the Philippines
Hostile Aerial Sorties
th
11 Division in Action
Main Japanese Landings
Wainwright Counter-attacked
Withdrawal to Bataan
Last Delaying Action

Chapter IX - LAST DITCH DEFENSIVE STAND 149-192

Tactical Preparations in Bataan

xii
 Enemy Plan of Maneuver
First Battle in Bataan
Sub-Sector Commands
Battle of the Points
Battle of the Pockets
The Lull
Last and Final Battle
Fall of Bataan
Death March
Siege and Fall of Corregidor

Chapter X - DEFENSE OF VISAYAS AND MINDANAO 193-210

Japanese Invasion
Invasion of Cebu
Fall of Panay
Surrender of Negros Force
The Siege of Mindanao

Chapter XI - RESISTANCE MOVEMENT 211-234

Origin and Growth
MacArthur’s Plan for Organization
Major Guerilla Organization and Leaders
Measures to Assist and Guide the Movement
Typical Guerrilla Operations
Significant Lessons Learned

Chapter XII - PHILIPPINE LIBERATION CAMPAIGN 235-249

Background of Campaign
Strategic Plans
Organizational Forces
Participation of Filipino Guerrilla Units
Phases of Ground Operations
Mindoro Operations
Assault on Luzon

BIBLIOGRAPHY 250-254

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 254-255

APPENDICES

a - Aguinaldo’s Manifesto of October 31, 1896 256-257

b - Constitution of Biak-na-Bato 258-262

xiii
ENDNOTES 263-269

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Charts Page No.

01 21
02 a & b 23

Maps

01 Military Districts 104

02 Japanese Landings on Luzon 119
03 Withdrawal to Bataan 136
04 Battle of the Points 171
05 Battle of the Pockets 176
06 Corregidor 188

Pictures

01 A Datu in battle attire 02

02 Filipino conscripts in the colonial army 02
03 The Filipino soldier as illustrated by a foreigner 11
04 Andres Bonifacio 15
05 Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo 26
06 Gen Artemio Ricarte 28
07 Filipino soldiers pose for posterity 39
08 Army headquarters outside Manila 39
09 Gen. Antonio Luna 44
10 Field Post, Bulacan 48
11 Philippine Scouts, 1902 50
12 Igorot Scouts 50
13 Philippine Constabulary, 1920s 62
14 Commonwealth inauguration, Nov., 1935 76
st
15 1 Anniversary of the Philippine Commonwealth 78
16 Army trainee 78
17 Pres. Manuel L. Quezon 80
18 Signing of the Nat’l Defense Act 83
19 PA High Command, 1936 83
20 Gen. Douglas MacArthur with Col Vicente Lim 88
21 Brig.Gen Jose de los Reyes 93
22 Maj. Gen. Paulino Santos 93

xiv
23 Hon. Teofilo Sison 95
24 Lt.Gen.Jonathan M. Wainwright, 111
25 Maj.Gen.George M. Parker 111
26 Maj. Gen. William P. Sharp 111
27 Women’s Auxiliary Service 115
28 Sto Domingo Church bombed, December 1941 116
29 Bombing sortie to Corregidor, 1942 116
30 Capt. Jesus Villamor 124
31 Lt. Cesar Basa 124
32 Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma 128
33 Japanese soldiers moves toward Bataan 128
34 Trucks going to Bataan 148
35 Jap POWs 170
36 Trail 20 170
37 Fort Drum 188
38 Capt. Ferdinand E. Marcos 224
39 Gen. Alejo Santos 224
40 Col. Macario Peralta 224
41 Gen. Ernesto S. Mata 224
42 Col Ruperto Kangleon 230
43 Col Marcos V Agustin 230
44 Bessang Pass 230
45 Guerilla money 234
46 Liberation leaflet 234
47 Landing of MacArthur in Leyte 249
48 Civilians cross Pasig River on Army Pontoon Bridge 249

xv
 PART I

SPANISH REGIME

1
 A Datu in battle attire, 1600s

Filipino conscripts in the Spanish colonial army, Mindanao, 1880s

2
 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Early Military Establishments

As early as the remote past, there had been a form of crude military
organization. Its establishment came at a time when the early Filipinos
had bound themselves together and founded a system of community life.
However, this did not develop progressively like the other activities
revolving around the mainstream of human endeavor.

Need for Security of Community

There had been several instances during that era when this
military organization was in the verge of total collapse or disintegration.
This could be ascribable to some inherent defects in either its structure
or leadership. Somehow, it managed to survive. Invariably, some
military geniuses among our forebears rose pre-eminently and entered
into the picture to save it from total decay. Thus, its operations were
boosted to greater heights.

This military organization had a very modest beginning. Initially,

it existed with a few number of men armed solely to protect their
community from marauding bands. This practice found universal
acceptance. Undoubtedly, this idea of a military establishment had been
considered the product of Filipino ingenuity and not an entirely foreign
precept which had been implanted into our territory. This was because
they had lived in communities called barangays which they had to secure
from external pressures. A barangay, a derivative of the Malayan word
balangay meaning boat, consisted of tribal families numbering from thirty
to one hundred.¹

The popular, occidental belief that the Philippines was

discovered in 1521 is contrary to facts. Long before, the early Filipinos
had already attained some degree of sophistication of their culture. This
was brought about by their extensive interaction trade, commerce, or
foreign relations with aliens. These were the Chinese, Japanese, Hindus,
2
Siamese, and their blood kin from the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. To
these people, therefore, our forebears owed much of their cultural
orientation. As a proof, the Philippines was first mentioned in a Chinese
chronological account describing how some natives from Ma-i (now

3
known as Mindoro) had arrived at the port of Canton in 982 A.D. to trade
with the Chinese.

This is but one aspect of our early military establishments. Let

us now delve into its origin or genesis.

Origin of Military Organization

On a comparative view, our recorded history does not extend far

and wide. Archeological findings, however, point out to some
unmistakable traces that the early Filipinos had gone through all the
epochs that marked the evolutionary growth of mankind. From the
primeval cultural stage, they had progressed to a higher level of
achievements. Thus, by the time the Spanish colonizers landed on
Philippine soil, the natives were well advanced in the agricultural and iron
stages. Apparently, this was the result of their close inter-relationships
with the other inhabitants of the great Sumatran Empire of Shri-Vishaya.
This empire existed from the eleventh century to the later part of the
fourteenth century. Later, they were assimilated into the more powerful
Javanese Madjapahit Empire which crumbled in 1428. These events
facilitated the conquest of the Philippines by the Spaniards a century
later. Going back to the barangay, let us delve into its ramifications.

Being the basic political unit of the early Filipinos, the barangay
was ruled by a headman called datu. In the course of time, two or more
barangays were merged to form a larger community. This was either by
mutual agreement of the reigning datus, or by forceful measures adopted
by one of them. The leadership of the enlarged community was passed
on to the most powerful or influential chieftain. This merger was
consummated principally for mutual security and protection. In this new
set-up, more men could be spared and armed to police the locality and at
the same time to protect it from aggressors. As more unions came into
being, each headman had to assume more powers and influence. And in
due time, his landholdings expanded. As a consequence, there resulted
the overlapping of territorial boundaries. Hence, tribal wars erupted.

Although there had been no accurate accounts on these tribal

wars, or how these were conducted, there seemed to be one universal
cause that prompted their launching. This was the socio-economic
necessity. One has to examine the customs of our primitive tribes living
in the hinterlands and mountain fastnesses to prove the reality of this
contention. In fact, the same fundamental cause had been the overriding
factor why tribal wars waged in other countries the world over had been

4
fought. These wars were fought by armed protagonists under the aegis
of a leader who was usually the strongest and most powerful in the
community. In most cases, it was the rajah who had to lead his men into
battle.

Armaments and Implements

What were the armaments and implements of war the early

Filipinos used in the pursuit of their belligerent undertakings?
Archeologists had unearthed a number of these weapons. These
consisted of crude stone arrowheads, cudgels, iron lances and stone and
iron flints which were used to ignite their bronze cannons. The existence
of these armaments indicates one conclusive fact; our ancestors had an
armed organization to protect themselves. Otherwise, there could have
never been any need for all these.

In the fifteenth century, gunpowder - a Chinese invention, was

introduced in the Philippines via Java. Its introduction, however, did not
give any impetus towards the development of the Filipinos’ military
organization. A contrary attitude had been noted in Western countries.
In the Philippines, this was largely due to the fact that the early natives
had never been united under a central government before the advent of
the Spanish colonizers, and that whatever military organization they had
was thought of as sufficient to protect their independent village-states.

The Filipino Muslims in the south were the first to appreciate the
importance of a strong military organization. They were also the first to
use a locally invented artillery piece called the lantaka. As a matter of
fact, the first Spaniards to step on Philippine soil were impressed by the
magnificent system of fixed fortifications they had established in the
periphery of their settlements. These were complete with buttressed
earthen parapets, ramparts, observation platforms, and palisades.
These were the distinguished features of their riparian settlements in the
Sulu Archipelago, Lake Lanao region, Manila region, Manila Bay, and
Lubang and Mindoro Islands. That in Lubang Island had been guarded
by the ominous presence of several lantakas.

Early Filipinos as Tacticians

At this juncture, it is ironic to note that the early Spanish writers

had alluded to the Muslim armed raiders who attacked and plundered
almost all settlements along the coastline of the Visayas and Luzon as
pirates. They had likewise called the English who assaulted and sacked

5
the Spanish mainland during the later part of the medieval age as
privateers, a contemptuous and jeering allusion which strayed much from
the truth. Actually, these Muslim raiders were trained warriors who
constituted the expeditionary forces sent from their settlements to
subjugate the inhabitants of other village-states who differed from their
religion. They had a definite objective in using force, a fundamental
criterion of a military organization.

It is noteworthy that the Moros were profound believers of Islam

since the beginning of the fifteenth century. At about this time, most of
the natives of the Philippines were still pagans. Although the Moros
pillaged and carried off to slavery their captives, this was in a very small
scale. This pales in comparison with the wars for conquest of the early
Egyptians, Babylonians, and Persians who carried off to slavery the
whole captive populace. These “pirates” had actually exploited to the
maximum the age-old adage of war that “to the victor belongs the spoils”
as much as the conquerors in the Western hemisphere.

An in-depth analysis of the tactics used by these Muslim raiders

in slipping by their coastal guards and taking their adversary by surprise
brings to the fore the type of warfare which closely resembled the
method used by the commandos and the cloak-and-dagger men of the
last world war. The main difference lies in the more refined manner of
operations which the latter group had opted. Undoubtedly, our great
ancestors understood the art of warfare and that there were military
geniuses among them who practiced or observed many of the accepted
principles of war. In fact, at the coming of the Spaniards, a native prince
of the Island of Luzon had been named by the King of Borneo as the
commander-in-chief of his military and naval forces. It may be recalled
that at the Battle of Mactan, Lapu-lapu overwhelmed a much better
equipped Spanish force under Magellan.

When the Spaniards landed on the shores of Opon on Mactan

Island, Lapu-lapu immediately divided his men into three groups. Two of
these assaulted the flanks of the Spanish force, while the other made a
frontal attack. This disposition of troops manifested that Lapu-lapu
understood tactics.

Lapu-lapu must have been aware of the effects of gunpowder

just as he knew the capabilities of the musket. He must have also known
the limitations of the armor. Hence, the only appropriate chance for him
and his men to charge was only after each time the Spaniards for their
muskets. During the firing, Lapu-lapu’s men had prompted good cover;

6
this minimized their losses. At close quarters, the native warriors slashed
the necks, elbows, and legs of the Spanish soldiers, killing many of them.
Those who survived had to run to their boats, but were followed by native
arrows and lances.

What interests us here, more than the signal victory, is the fact
that in this battle, Lapu-lapu displayed a facile military mind and superior
leadership. He was the master of the situation. Lapu-lapu, therefore,
was a great tactician who knew what principles to apply, thus, gaining
success in battle.

Military Forces during the Period

Suppression of native ideas and activities had been the hallmark

of the Spanish rule in the Philippines. As a consequence, the Filipinos
became wholly dominated by the conquistadores. The only exceptions
were the native (Filipino) Muslims who were never really conquered by
Spanish arms. In the process, they had managed to maintain or retain
their independent status.

Because of this restraint, the Filipinos lost their incentive for their
military organization. This was due to the fact that the security and
protection of their barangays had been wrested by the Spanish Army and
the Guardia Civil. This was prompted not by their loyalty to the Spanish
throne, but by their wish to enjoy certain privileges, such as; exemption
from forced labor and exemption from the payment of certain taxes.
Even with the strict surveillance of the Spanish authorities over the
activities of the subjugated Filipinos, there were few who were able to
form their armies with which to defy the Spanish colonizers.

As early as 1621, Tamblot, a native priest or babaylan, rose to

prominence when he led about 2,000 native Boholanos in an uprising.
At that time, Bohol was under the jurisdiction of the alcalde-mayor of
Cebu. On hearing of the revolt, the alcalde-mayor organized an
expeditionary force of fifty Spanish soldiers and 1,000 Filipinos which he
had personally led into battle.

On New Year’s Day, 1622, the contingent reached Bohol. In a

pitched battle along the shoreline, Tamblot was badly routed due to the
superior number and arms of the enemy. In order to overcome the
numerical superiority of the combined force, Tamblot withdrew his force
“to the summit of a rugged, lofty hill difficult of access.” There, he
fortified his positions and contained his enemy. Six months later, after

7
the arrival of the second contingent to reinforce the first, Tamblot’s army
was overwhelmed.

Although Tamblot did not have any military training, he showed

his knack of establishing good defensive positions, and his maximum
utilization of terrain features to his advantage. These two qualities which
make for good military leader’s qualities was manifested in his campaign
against the Spanish forces sent to subdue him. A century later, the
principles of mountain fighting that he had espoused were used to
advantage by another revolutionary leader Francisco Dagohoy. He
succeeded in making Bohol practically independent from 1744 to 1827.

Another Filipino leader rose to prominence in 1649 when he

organized an army composed of natives of Samar. He was Juan
Sumuroy, a babaylan of Palapag. His uprising was the result of an order
of Governor Diego Fajardo issued in June requiring the conscription of
labor from the Visayas for the Cavite shipyards. In his initial clearing
operations, he succeeded in driving away the members of the Spanish
forces, and government and church functionaries from the town. After
this, he and his men withdrew to an “impregnable hill called the table of
Palapag” where he established an independent settlement complete with
peripheral fortifications. To preclude surprise attacks, he posted sentries
along all avenues of approach and at vantage points around the
settlement.

Notwithstanding his well-concealed defense position, he does

not wait for the successive attack of the Spanish expeditionary forces.
Instead, he made an offensive move by sending out an armed group to
stage an ambush and to destroy the much superior enemy forces.
These had been his routine activity until July 1650. Unschooled and
without any military training, Sumuroy demonstrated good qualities of a
military tactician. He had fully appreciated the importance of making
maximum use of natural terrain features, the need for all-around security,
and the significance of wresting the initiative from the enemy.

A more sweeping revolution took place in Luzon a decade later.

This was led by Andres Malong of Binalatongan (now San Carlos,
Pangasinan). While employed with the Spanish civil government in his
early manhood, Malong gathered about him numerous followers whom
he secretly organized and armed.

His revolt was declared openly on December 15, 1660

destroying the established Spanish civil government at Pangasinan, now

8
known as the town of Bacnotan in La Union. This was then made
possible thru an amphibious assault. Upon his return to his hometown,
he proclaimed himself “King of Pangasinan”. Because of his initial
success, he was fully assured the support and loyalty of every native of
Pangasinan. Said province was already thickly populated that time.

Thereafter, Malong was obsessed with the idea of over throwing

Spanish rule in the country by unifying all the Filipinos and with the use
of force, if necessary. Toward this end, he organized an army of 11,000
men from Pangasinan and Zambales armed with bolos, bows and
arrows, lances and various types of firearms. He then set two of his able
and well-capable field commanders - Pedro Gumapos and Melchor de
Vera to destroy the Spanish forces in the north and south of Pangasinan,
respectively.

Gumapos with 3,000 men marched north through the Ilocos

coasts. On January 8, 1661, he seized the principal city of Fernandina
(now Vigan) after a brief skirmish with the Spanish force.

The less forceful de Vera, with a contingent of 6,000 men,

succeeded in driving the Spanish authorities out of the region which
comprised the present province of Tarlac. While at Magalang,
Pampanga, de Vera decided to return to Binalatongan. He was
prompted to do this by his firm belief that he had routed the cavalry unit
of General Francisco de Esteybar’s command which was sent against
him from the Spanish garrison at Arayat. It was at Magalang where
4,000 of his men were detached from him to be placed under the
command of Jacinto Macadaeg. The latter was sent to Cagayan Valley
to subdue it, but had never reached his destination as he was recalled to
Binalatongan shortly after he had joined forces with Pedro Gumapos at
Vigan.

Meanwhile, Spanish authorities in Manila felt the threat posed by

Malong’s army. To this end, the governor-general authorized the creation
of an army consisting of Spanish regulars and native troops from
Macabebe, Pampanga, with which to engage Malong. One task force, a
bigger part of this army, was placed under the command of General
Francisco de Esteybar. General Felipe de Ugalde commanded the other
contingent.

The original plan called for an assault on Malong’s kingdom by

land and sea. To accomplish this end, Ugaldes’ force landed at
Lingayen, while that of Esteybar started out from the town of Arayat. On

9
the latter’s march northward, Melchor de Vera’s force appeared at
Magalang. Skirting a head-on clash, Esteybar pulled out his troops from
Pampanga and took the sea route, taken previously by General Ugalde.
Upon landing at Lingayen, Esteybar’s force was merged with that of
Ugalde. The combined force was placed under the overall command of
Esteybar. From there, the assault on Malong’s capital began.

At this juncture, Malong recalled Gumapos and Macadaeg to

Pangasinan. However, his two field commanders did not reach the
Kingdom on time and to be of any help to him. By then, the force under
the personal leadership of Malong was engaged by the Spanish troops at
the outskirts of Binalatongan where it was decisively outfought. As a
recourse, he had to seek sanctuary in a forest in southern La Union
where he, together with his mother, was captured and executed later.

The outcome of Malong’s revolt does not interest most.

Attention should be focused on the military aspects of his exploits as
follows:

1. He succeeded in evolving the largest military

organization during his time which was never equalled until the Philippine
Revolution of 1896.

2. Malong excelled in the art of warfare, to some extent, he

was a military strategist and tactician. How he fitted his three
expeditionary forces commanded by Pedro Gumapos, Melchor de Vera,
and Jacinto Macadaeg, respectively, had amply demonstrated his
military genius. Malong had definitely shown his leadership and the
potential capabilities of the Filipinos’ military organization.

10
The Filipino soldier illustrated by a foreign observer and artist, 1899

11
 CHAPTER II

FIRST FILIPINO ARMY

As early as 1892, the campaign for reforms spawned by the propaganda

movement fomented by several wealthy, patriotic Filipinos in Europe with
Spain as its focal point, showed signs of failure. By about this time, a
strong Filipino middle class was gradually emerging in the national
scene. Only a few in this social structure held the conviction that the
reforms prayed for could still be granted. In line with this thinking, the
masses, under the aegis of a strong-willed national leader, continued the
struggle for a better colonial administration. This lasted until 1896.

The Katipunan and Andres Bonifacio

Jose Rizal’s secret arrest on July 6, 1892 and his subsequent

deportation to Dapitan the following day because of his activities in the
La Liga Filipina had several grave repercussions. This news shocked the
1
masses for, to them, he was the “symbol of freedom.”

On the night of Rizal’s banishment, Andres Bonifacio and several

associates, to include Deodato Arellano, convened covertly in a house
along Azcarraga Street (now Claro M. Recto Avenue), Tondo, Manila. It
was in this secret tryst where the group decided to form an organization
simply called Katipunan. Its formulation became a reality when the
attendants signed their membership documents with their own blood
following the ritual of blood compact.

The founders laid down three fundamental objectives of the

Katipunan. These were: to “teach the ideals of patriotism and
democracy, to foster the highest type of brotherhood among the
members, and to promote chivalry and civic virtues for the glory of thier
2
grace”

Under the cloak of secrecy, Bonifacio and his peers slowly

prepared the association for war. They held a series of secret meetings
in Tondo, Montalban, Pasig and other remote places near Manila. In
these meetings, the question of preparing the people for the impending
libertarian struggle was discussed. To ensure success, they agreed to
intensify the membership campaign, to collect funds more vigorously, to
forge and store up crude weapons of war, and to enlist Japan’s aid and
sympathy. They had also agreed to contact Rizal in Dapitan to get his

12
moral support to their cause. By the early part of 1896, events drifted
ominously toward a bloody confrontation with the Spanish authorities.

During the first two years of its existence, 1892-1893, the

Katipunan’s growth and development was slow. It only began a more
vigorous life in 1894. This was caused by the entry into its fold on Emilio
Jacinto, a genius. With Tondo as its secret base, the Katipunan spread
fast to the provinces of Luzon, Mindoro, Marinduque, Mindanao, and in
Panay Island. Many had joined the ranks of the secret society, including
those who had earlier enlisted in the Spanish Army and were assigned in
lonely outpost of the Morolandia.

Meanwhile, on April 12, 1895, Good Friday, Bonifacio, with

several Katipuneros, including Jacinto, left Tondo to the interior towns of
Morong (now Rizal Province). The mission of this selected group was to
reconnoiter for an alternate secret base in the event that the existence of
the society will be discovered. They had reached as far as San Mateo
and Montalban. In those places they saw two caves suitable for the
purpose. They found it safe in those caves for their use as their
sanctuary.

Inside the cavernous tunnels of the cave at San Mateo,

illuminated only by the lit torches held by the katipuneros, Bonifacio held
a secret meeting. Here, they vowed to rise in arms against Spain. To
buttress their fighting stance, they also agreed to step up the tempo in
the collection of weapons and funds with which to begin the revolution.

During this meeting, one of the katipuneros scribbled with a

piece of charcoal on the damp walls of the cave “Viva Independencia
Filipina.” This symbolized their pent-up emotions. After the session, the
group returned to Manila. Here, Bonifacio devoted most of his time and
energy in conducting a more vigorous campaign to germinate the seed of
patriotism espoused by the secret society.

On the night of May 1, 1896, Bonifacio convoked another secret

meeting of the Katipunan. This was held in a very desolate place called
Ugong, near the town of Pasig. The session ended up with a unanimous
decision to enlist the aid of Japan in the revolution and to rescue Rizal
from his exile in Dapitan.

Discovery of Katipunan

Amid the grandiloquent plans of Bonifacio for the Katipunan, the

13
Spanish authorities in Manila soon got a clue on the existence of the
secret society. The Katipunan’s discovery arose from one katipuneros’
indiscretion.

On August 19, 1896, Apolonio dela Cruz and Teodoro Patiṅo,

both of whom were Katipuneros working with the Diario de Manila, had
an altercation. Patiño, a weakling, took umbrage from de la Cruz by the
latter’s revelation of the secrets of the society to his sister, a ward in an
orphanage in Mandaluyong. When informed of this, the porteress, Sor
Teresa de Jesus, of that institution suggested to Patiṅo to reveal all what
he knew to Father Mariano Gil, a Spanish friar and parish priest of
Tondo, Manila.

In the afternoon of that day, the revelation was made.

Accompanied by Patiño, Father Mariano Gil proceeded with haste to the
premises of the printing press. The Spanish friar got inside and began to
search for material evidence to substantiate the revelation of Patiṅo. This
was done in the presence of the owner. He found in the premises the
lithographic stone which was used in the printing of receipts of the
Katipunan. These bore the signature of one Policarpio Turla, whose
locker, when forcibly opened, contained a dagger and some important
documents of the Katipunan. These were turned over to the police. The
Spanish authorities were therefore convinced that the Katipunan really
existed.

Shortly after, Filipinos suspected of being members of the secret

society were arrested and convicted of illegal association and treason.
Those presumed innocent were likewise incarcerated without the benefit
of trial.

Like a shock wave, the news of the Katipunan’s discovery

spread far and wide. From Manila, it soon radiated to the outlaying
provinces. When made aware of this, Bonifacio, through his couriers,
summoned the other leaders of the association to a secret general
assembly to be held at Balintawak on August 24. The primary purpose of
the meeting was to decide on what measures to adopt to meet the
newly-spawned crisis.

On the night of August 20, Bonifacio and the other leaders of the
Katipunan, fearful of their own safety, moved out for Balintawak. They
reached the place before midnight after successfully evading the
Spanish guards posted along the route. Pio Valenzuela joined them the
following day.

14
ANDRES BONIFACIO
Father of the Katipunan

15
 Wary about their fate, Bonifacio and his men, now numbering
about 500, left Balintawak for Kangkong in the afternoon of August 22.
There, they were fed and sheltered by Apolonio Samson, also a
Katipunero. After a brief respite, the group proceeded next to Pugad
Lawin.

On their arrival at Pugad Lawin the next day, Katipuneros

regrouped in the yard of Juan Ramos, son of Melchora Aquino. In the
stormy session that ensued, Bonifacio asked the assembled katipuneros
whether they were prepared to sacrifice and fight the Spaniards to the
end. As if in unison, the men responded overwhelmingly in the
affirmative.

In a sudden outburst of passion, Bonifacio brought out his

residence certificate (cedula) which, to him, represented vassalage to the
Spanish yoke and tore it to shreds. Immediately thereafter, buoyed up by
the open display of patriotism by Bonifacio, the katipuneros stood up,
brought out their cedulas, and tore them to pieces. Then, in a thunderous
voice, the group shouted “Long live the Philippines.” This served as the
battlecry of the katipuneros. This epochal event is now known as the
“Cry of Pugad Lawin”

The “Cry of Pugad Lawin” heightened the Filipinos’ passion for

revolution. This was just the event that Bonifacio had long pined for to
happen. He had full faith that only by force of arms could the Filipinos
hope to obtain concessions of liberal policies in the administration of
governmental affairs by the Spaniards.

War Preparations

Bonifacio, whose brain-child was the Katipunan, had originally

intended that the semi-military organization would be gradually
strengthened and when it became fully armed and well-trained, to be
used for one noble purpose: to serve as a bargaining power to enable
the Filipinos to press their demands for reforms. Unfortunately, its
premature discovery did not give full fruition to Bonifacio’s ambitious
plans for the secret society.

Long before, Bonifacio had girded the Katipunan for an

emergency. By intuition, he knew that, sooner or later, the revolution
would explode. Not wanting to be caught by surprise, he kept the
organization busy by recruiting secretly more members, collecting more
contributions to its loyal supporters and manufacturing more bolos and

16
firearms for distribution to its members. These preparations for
emergency of the Katipunan as ordered by Bonifacio went on unabated
and rose in tempo as the day of crisis neared.

At the same time, Bonifacio and Jacinto prepared a war plan

which would serve as the basis for the Katipunan’s conduct of its military
operations against the Spanish forces. One of the provisions of the plan
called for the establishment of the Katipunan’s general headquarters in a
site near the sea and the mountains. The framers of the plan had in mind
either Bay or Los Baños in Laguna. This site will practically be the capital
of the Katipunan during the crucial days of the revolution. The war plan,
together with other highly confidential papers of the Katipunan, was
entrusted to Jacinto by Bonifacio.

These war preparations were complemented by the adoption of

other radical measures. Bonifacio enlisted the aid of Japan but was
rebuked. He had also brought to his fold the other influential Filipino
exiles, including Rizal. He had sent agent to Dapitan to aid Rizal in his
escape so the latter could return and lead the Katipunan in a violent
upheaval, but Rizal did not accede to Bonifacio’s request.

By this time, the Katipunan had in its fold a total of about 30,000
3
members. Their weaponry consisted for the most part of sharpened
bolos, daggers and flints. The Spanish Army in the Philippines, on the
other hand, had swelled to 1,000 men, including civil guards. At the
beginning of 1896, the same had strength of 18,000 men, 2,000 of whom
were Spaniards. The strictly military force consisted of 17,659 men of
4
whom 3,005 were to be Spaniards.

Outbreak of Filipino-Spanish Hostilities

Meanwhile, rumors that the Spanish civil guards were close

behind the katipuneros soon reached Bonifacio’s ears when he and his
men were still in Pugad Lawin. This prompted him to issue the order to
the katipuneros to be ready to meet head-on the expected hostile attack.
Realizing that the Katipunan had arms much inferior to those of the
Spaniards, Bonifacio instead ordered his men to beat a hasty retreat
toward Pasong Tamo. They arrived there on the next day, August 24. In
the yard of Melchora Aquino, Bonifacio decreed the execution of a
general attack on August 29. Katipuneros operating in adjacent areas
were thus notified of the impending action.

17
 On the morning of August 25, Bonifacio was notified of the
coming of the Spanish civil guards and some infantry men. This was a
small column sent by Governor-General Ramon Blanco to attack the
rebels at Kalookan. At the time, the Spanish Army stationed in Manila
had a niggardly strength: 300 artillery pieces, 400 men assigned in
various detachments, to include sailors in war vessels then in port, and
5
2,000 native soldiers, most of whom were in the field. Not long after, a
burst of gunfire greeted the katipuneros who fired back at the
approaching enemy. The attackers lost one man, the katipuneros on the
other hand, incurred two casualties, both of whom were innocent farms
6
hands. After the brief exchange of fire, both sides retreated to unknown
directions, thus preventing what could have been a bloody aftermath.
This first encounter ushered in the first phase of the Philippine
Revolution
th
The planned attack on Manila on the 29 fizzled out owing to the
Katipunan’s insufficiency of firearms. Instead, Bonifacio and Jacinto led
the insurrectos in an attack essayed at the seizure of the powder
th
magazine at San Juan del Monte on the 30 . With the arrival of fresh
Spanish reinforcements, the katipuneros were repulsed. As a result,
some of the Filipino leaders, among who was Sancho Valenzuela, were
captured, hastily tried, and then publicly executed. In addition, eighty of
the katipuneros perished. Later, remnants of the Katipunan force
attacked Santa Mesa but they were likewise driven back. In this bit of
action, they spilled into the streets, a fact that brought to the fore the
seriousness of the situation. At the same time, it alarmed the Spanish
governor-general who had to take the following emergency steps:

1. Issuance of an order recalling some Spanish troops

from Mindanao who were then engaged in punitive campaigns against
the Muslims.

2. Asking for reinforcements from Spain.

3. Making an appeal to the Spaniards in Manila to

volunteer their services in the defense of the country.

4. Proclamation of the existence of a state of war in the

eight provinces - Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Manila,
Cavite, Laguna and Batangas.

The Battle of San Juan del Monte plunged the provinces and
towns around Manila into a state of general turbulence. On August 31,

18
all the coastal towns of Cavite were up in arms. The insurrectors in
Cavite were led by a young radical, Emilio Aguinaldo, and some patriotic
teachers, notably Artemio Ricarte and Tomas Mascardo. They had
overpowered the Spanish garrisons in different towns. The towns along
the Pasig River also rose in revolt. Those in Batangas, Laguna,
Tayabas, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija and Tarlac followed suit.

Soon, Cavite occupied the center stage as the focal point of the
revolution. Many of the disaffected in the neighboring provinces had
locked to the area to join the revolutionary forces of Aguinado who had
achieved several triumphs so far over the Spaniards.

News of the outbreak of the revolution in Luzon stirred the

patriots in the Visayas into action. A few days after Bonifacio’s attack on
the powder magazine in San Juan del Monte, a band of insurrectos
attacked the Spanish garrison at Passi, Iloilo. The katipuneros, however,
were repulsed by the Guardia Civiles. In the province of Aklan on Panay
Island, the seeds of the revolution were sown by two of Bonifacio’s
7
friends, Francisco del Castillo and Candido Iban, both sea divers.

In Mindanao, certain violent disturbances were recorded. On the

night of September 27, about 300 Filipino soldiers stationed in Fort
Victoria in Iligan rose up in arms. Instigated by some of their comrades-
in-arms, who were all katipuneros, they killed their Spanish officers, after
which they fled to the mountains. In Jolo, Sulu, a Filipino sergeant,
apparently a katipunero, conspired with his fellow soldiers of Regiment
68 to kill their Spanish superiors. Unfortunately, the plot was discovered
on time; a bloody uprising was nipped in the bud.

Meanwhile, Spanish authorities launched an extensive campaign

of terrorism in the hope of putting an end to the nation-wide uprising.
They started off with the arrest of hundreds of Filipinos, to include
prominent intellectuals, in Manila and the neighboring provinces. Fort
Santiago and its cavernous dungeons became a mute witness to the
sufferings of these imprisoned suspects, most of who died of suffocation.

Mass executions in public were also resorted to. Bagumbayan

Field (later renamed Luneta, now Rizal Park) witnessed the first public
execution on September 4 when four Filipino revolutionary leaders
headed by Sancho Valenzuela were felled by bullets from a firing squad.
They were considered the first martyrs of the Katipunan. The second
execution took place on September 12 at Cavite when the province’

19
thirteen martyrs met the same fate. Before the year 1896 drew to a
close, many suspected katipuneros of Tarlac were executed.

More executions were carried out in 1987. Twelve patriots from

the Bicol region perished before a firing squad at the Luneta on January
4. On March 23, nineteen patriotic citizens of Kalibo were executed in
Capiz. Also during the year, about a thousand Filipinos were banished
to Guam and other Spanish penal colonies.

The terroristic campaign had not totally extinguished the flame of

the revolution. Instead, it further infuriated the Filipinos who,
notwithstanding the threat of imminent death, had chosen to fight and die
for the sake of their own freedom. Many had therefore fled from their
homes to join the revolution.

In the meantime, Emilio Aguinaldo of Kawit, Cavite, was fast

becoming popular as a revolutionary leader. His first taste of victory was
recorded on August 31, 1896 when he defeated in one of the operations
in Kawit the Spanish commander of the Guardia Civiles. He had scored
more triumphs in other towns where he had personally led the crudely-
armed and untrained uprising Caviteños. One of his greatest victories in
combat was earned in the battle of Binakayan on November 11 1896. It
was a signal triumph for Filipino arms. In this action, Governor General
Blanco’s regular troops were badly routed. Nothing but the determination
to fight and indomitable courage were the primary factors that
contributed to this series of victories by the katipuneros. Because of his
failure to stop the revolution, Ramon Blanco was relieved from his post
as Governor-General. During his incumbency, which spanned the period
from August 23, 1896 to December 15, 1896, the Spanish forces in the
Philippines had a total number of 360 casualties. Of this number, eighty
seven officers and men were killed, while 273 others were wounded.
The breakdown of these casualties is shown in Chart I.

Succeeding him was Camilo de Polavieja who assumed his post

on December 13, 1896. A brave soldier but nonetheless a tactless
individual, the new Governor-General instituted the following measures
which alienated him from the Filipinos;

1. Suspension of elections in provinces gripped by the

revolution.

2. Issuance of an order for the arrest, deportation and

execution of many Filipinos.

20
 3. Signing for the death sentence of Dr. Jose Rizal.

Polavieja also issued a decree granting pardon and general

amnesty to the leaders, instigators, and promoters of the revolution who
had subsequently cooperated with his administration in the early
resolution of the uprising. This was a measure to wean away the
revolutionaries from their direct participation in the upheaval.
Unfortunately, this policy did not merit the favorable response he had
anticipated from the Filipino patriots.

The execution of Rizal on December 30, 1896 had far reaching

effects to the revolutionists. His death gave them added strength to fight
for a just cause. They fought ever harder if only to avenge his execution.
To the Spaniards, Rizal’s execution was the greatest blunders they had
ever committed.

CHART No. 1- Casualties of the Spanish Forces in the Philippines

during Blanco’s Rule.

At the start of the year 1897, Governor-General Polavieja

intensified the punitive campaign against Filipino radicals. In the
provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, Morong, and Cavite, many fierce battles
were fought. On February 17, the battle of Zapote Bridge was fought
resulting in the killing of General Edilberto Evangelista, a brilliant Filipino

21
engineer. Another young revolution leader, General Flaviano Yenko, lost
his life in a bloody encounter at Pasong Santol, near Imus, on March 3.

Half of Cavite Province was recaptured by Polavieja’s forces by

the end of March. Yet, he had failed so far to crush the revolution.
Notwithstanding the numerous reverses the insurgents had sustained in
many battlefields, they continued to fight with grim determination. The
revolutionary ferment, on the other hand, had not waned a bit.

Highly-frustrated of the prolonged hostilities which further made

him sickly at the same time. Polavieja resigned his position as Governor-
General. He sailed for Spain on April 15, 1897, four months after he had
assumed the reins of government. He was succeeded by General
Fernando Primo de Rivera. The number of casualties the Spanish forces
under him had incurred is shown in Chart 2.

Tejeros Convention

As the din of battle reverberated all throughout the land, there

developed to bitter rivalry between Bonifacio and Aguinaldo. Both
aspired for the supreme leadership of the Katipunan and absolute
command over the revolutionary forces. It must be noted that on
October 31, 1896, just after the first battle at Imus, Aguinaldo, using the
nom de guerre of Magdalo, issued a manifesto* in Kawit proposing the
formation of a Republican Government similar to that of the United
States which was founded on the rigid principles of liberty, fraternity, and
equality. This was a clear challenge to Bonifacio’s supreme authority.

In the same edict, Aguinaldo expressed in clear and unequivocal

terms what the Filipino insurgent army should be. He declared in part:*

“A central committee of the revolution, composed of six members

and a President, will be charged with the continuation of the war, will
organize an army of thirty thousand men, with rifles and cannon, for the
defense of the pueblos and provinces which adhere to the new
Republic Government, which will establish order while the revolution
spreads through all the islands of the Philippines. The form of
government will be like that of the United States of America, founded
upon equality. Every town which adheres to the cause of the revolution
will be defended and protected by the revolutionary army against any
attack of the enemy.”

“The revolutionary army will be composed of three corps of ten

22
CHART No. 2a - Number of Casualties of Polaviejo’s Spanish Forces

CHART No. 2b - Number of Casualties of Rivera’s Spanish Forces

23
thousand men under the command of three generals and a general-in-
chief. The central committee will be composed of a President, a Vice-
President. And, as members, it will have a General-in-Chief, a Treasurer,
an Intendente, an Auditor and a Secretary.”

“Each municipal committee, as soon as organized, will appoint a

captain to form a civil guard in which all citizens will be required to enroll
themselves. This body, in conjunction with the guards assigned by the
8
General-in-Chief, will serve for the protection of the town.”

There is no doubt that Bonifacio was an able organizer.

However, due to his insufficiency as a military leader, he soon lost
popular support. On the other hand, Aguinaldo showed better leadership
qualities thus, enabling him to carve out an enviable combat record in
numerous battle arenas. As a consequence, he was highly popular with
the Caviteños.

As a result of the Aguinaldo-Bonifacio rivalry, a split in the ranks

of the katipuneros soon existed. Those who supported Bonifacio
belonged to the Magdiwang faction; the followers of Aguinaldo had
themselves identified with the Magdalo council. The rift between the two
revolutionary leaders was doing more harm than good to the cause of
the revolution, a fact which neither one had realized. For instance, when
a town under the sway of the Magdiwang wing was attacked by the
Spaniards, Aguinaldo’s followers would not lift a finger to aid the
besieged Magdiwang Forces. The same pattern of action was resorted to
by the opposing camp. In the end, this resulted in the gradual fall of the
revolutionary bastions to the Spanish troops.

To bring about in the ranks of the Katipunans, and to decide

finally on the proposed formation of, a new government, the revolutionary
leaders convened at Imus, Cavite on December 31, 1895. Adherents of
the two rival factions attended the convention which was presided over
by Bonifacio. Inside the session hall, there was a clash of opinion as to
the continuation of the Katipunan as a revolutionary government and the
establishment of a new one to replace it. Nothing tangible was achieved.
Consequently, the leaders agreed to meet again in the future.

In consonance with the agreement reached at Imus, both leaders

of Magdiwang and Magdalo Councils met in convention in the friar estate
house at Tejeros, a barrio of San Francisco de Malabon (now General
9
Trias) on March 22, 1897. Incidentally, this was the birth anniversary of

24
Aguinaldo was unable to attend because he was personally leading his
men in skirmish against General Lachambre’s troops in Imus.

In this convention, Bonifacio had an advantage over Aguinaldo

due to the following: Tejeros was within the jurisdiction of the Magdiwang
faction; majority of those present, including Artemio Ricarte, Pascual
Alvarez, Mariano Trias, Jacinto Lumbrares, and Severino de la Alas,
were Magdiwang men; and Bonifacio was present to preside over the
convention in the absence of his rival. Only one mitigating factor was in
favor of Aguinaldo. It was because that the venue was in Cavite and the
attendances were composed of Caviteños.

The Tejeros Convention opened with Jacinto Lumbreras as

acting presiding officer, and Teodoro Gonzales as secretary. Both were
Bonifacio’s men. At the outset, Santiago Alvarez took the floor to praise
the Caviteños for their numerous successes in battle, while casting
aspersion on those who fled to Cavite due to their humiliating defeat in
battles fought in and around Manila. After these inflammatory remarks,
Severino de las Alas stood up to suggest that the assembly should solve
the problem as to whether a new government should be set up in lieu of
the Katipunan. A heated argument ensued. To cool off the hot-heads,
Lumbreras declared a recess.

An hour later, the session resumed. This time, Bonifacio, the

Katipunan “supremo” presides over as chairman. It was unanimously
resolved then that a new government be established. Bonifacio
immediately acceded to such desire. By this decision, the Katipunan
ceased to exist. In its wake, the Republic of the Philippines was
proclaimed.

Much against his will, Bonifacio had to continue the session. The
election of officers of the new government followed shortly after. Before
the vote could be taken, Bonifacio told the convention that the will of the
majority should be respected. He then reminded the assembly that
whoever should be elected to any position must be given popular
support. This principle was unanimously approved.

The following were elected by majority vote: Emilio Aguinaldo,

President; Mariano Trias, Vice-President; Artemio Ricarte, Captain
General; Emilio Riego de Dios, Secretary of War; and Andres Bonifacio,
Secretary of Interior. When Bonifacio was being proclaimed, Daniel
Tirona, a Magdalo, questioned the former’s election in as much as he
was not a lawyer. His pride hurt and his personality insulted, Bonifacio

25
 GEN. EMILIO AGUINALDO
President of the Revolutionary Government

26
dissolved the assembly and subsequently declared its proceedings null
and void. Notwithstanding this, the Tejeros Convention had
accomplished one thing: laying the foundation of the Filipino Insurgent
Army. Ricarte’s position as Captain-General corresponds today to the
exalted post of Chief of Staff of the AFP.

Bonifacio and his men met again at the friar estate house at
Tejeros the following day. Here, the assembly affirmed their decision of
not accepting the results of the election held the previous day because of
under-handed tactics. This and other reasons rejecting the proceedings
were embodied in a document entitled “Acta de Tejeros.”

From Tejeros, Bonifacio and his loyal followers moved over to

Naic in order to be beyond the reach of the Magdalo men whom they
believed to had been responsible for the anomalies during the election of
officers at the Tejeros Convention. At Naic, the group resolved to
establish a new government. This was separate from that established at
Tejeros under Aguinaldo. The new government would have its own army
under the command of a leader to be chosen by them.

When informed of the consummation of the Naic military

covenant, Aguinaldo ordered the immediate arrest of Bonifacio and his
supporters. After their trial by a military court at Maragondon on the
charge of sedition, Andres Bonifacio and Procopio Bonifacio were
adjudged guilty and condemmed to die by execution. On May 10, 1897,
the Bonifacio brothers were executed by a firing squad at Mount Buntis
in Maragondon. Ciriaco Bonifacio had died earlier in an encounter with
Aguinaldo’s men. The anticlimactic death of Bonifacio ended the bitter
Bonifacio-Aguinaldo rivalry.

Biak-na-Bato Republic

After Bonifacio’s elimination, the flames of the revolution

continued to burn but with a flickering glow. This time, the Insurgent
Army sustained numerous reverse in their struggle for survival. From
Cavite, Aguinaldo’s battered forces fled to Biak-na Bato in San Miguel de
Mayumo, Bulacan. There, Aguinaldo hoped to rally the people to a more
vigorous anti-Spanish campaign. Upon his arrival at said place Aguinaldo
issued a stirring appeal to the people to carry on the libertarian struggle
with more zeal and enthusiasm. In response, the populace staged
daring attacks against Spanish garrisons in the provinces of Laguna,
Tayabas (now Quezon), Pampanga, Pangasinan and other areas.

27
 GEN. ARTEMIO RICARTE
Captain-General of the Revolutionary Army from March 22 1897 to June
22 1899. Elected CG at the Tejeros Convention on March 22, 1897.

28
 A republic was established at Biak-na-Bato on November 1,
1897. It had the following officers: Emilio Aguinaldo, President; Mariano
Trias, Vice-President; Isabelo Artacho, Secretary of Interior; Antonio
Montenegro, Secretary of Foreign Affairs: Baldomero Aguinaldo,
Secretary of Treasury; and Emiliano Reigo de Dios, Secretary of War.
The constitution that created it, fittingly known as the “Biak-na-Bato
Constitution,”* was patterned after that of Cuba.

As stipulated, the republic would exist only for two years. The
“Biak-na-Bato Constitution’ also contains a Bill of Rights that guarantees
the untrampled exercise of the rights of an individual.

Soon after the establishment of the Biak-na-Bato republic,

dawned upon Governor-General Primo de Rivera that continued fighting
was an exercise in futility. Therefore, he had to sue for peace. Many
prominent Spanish residents of Manila wrote letters to Aguinaldo
proposing an amicable settlement of the revolution. However, Aguinaldo
spurned all these proposals.

Now, entered into the scene Pedro A. Paterno, was a prominent

Filipino illustrado. He volunteered his services to Governor-General de
Rivera to negotiate an armistice with Aguinaldo. And after several trips to
Biak-na-Bato, the “Pact of Biak-na-Bato” was concluded. Among its
provisions were the following:

1. Cessation of hostilities with the revolutionary leaders

who agree to live in voluntary exile to Hongkong.

2. Grant of general amnesty to those who could lay down

their arms.

3. Spain to pay an indemnity of P800,000 to the uprising

Filipinos and P900.00 to Filipino families who had suffered as a
consequence of the hostilities.

Aguinaldo further believed that Spain would grant the following

reforms prayed for:

1. Secularizations of the parishes and expulsion of the

religious orders.

2. Restoration of Philippine representation in the Spanish

Cortes.

29
 3. Equality between Filipinos and Spaniards before the law.

4. Adjustment of property, taxes, and parishes in favor of

the Filipinos.

5. Guarantee of individual rights, freedom of the press, and

right of free association.

There was general peace in the country after the signing of the
“Pact of Biak na Bato.” Aguinaldo, with P40,000 check in his possession,
and other revolutionary leaders left Biak na Bato for Sual, Pangasinan
where they boarded a vessel for Hongkong. General Artemio Ricarte
was left behind to supervise the surrender of firearms. Aguinaldo’s group
departed for the British crown colony on December 27 and arrived there
th
on the 30 .

Shortly after the signing of the pact, there were serious violations
to its provisions, for which both sides were equally guilty. Spain reneged
on her pledge to pay the revolutionists an indemnity of P1,700,000. Only
the paltry sum of P600,000 was actually paid. Filipino patriots who
surrendered with their firearms were arrested and given harsh
punishment. The reforms demanded were not granted.

The Filipinos, on the other hand, accepted payment for their

surrender, together with their firearms. Yet, they continued their struggle
as shown by the sporadic clashes that flared up in the provinces
between the Spaniards and the insurgents. Not all the revolutionist
surrendered their firearms.

From then on, uneasy peace prevailed. And, thus seduced more
troubled times for the country.

30
 CHAPTER III

REVOLUTIONARY ARMY IN NEW STRUGGLE

A period of restiveness descended after the signing of the Pact of Biak-

na-Bato. Other Filipino leaders who were left behind did everything within
their power to carry out their part of the bargain. Those who are
suspicious of Spanish intentions, kept their firearms and ammunition for
and in preparation of a continued armed struggle. The Spanish
authorities, on the other hand, did not have complete trust in the
revolutionist. Naturally, there occurred sporadic armed clashes between
the two sides.

Background

After Aguinaldo and his group left for Hong Kong in fulfillment of
their voluntary exile, another provisional revolutionary government was
set up by General Francisco Makabulos of Tarlac. The powers of the
transitory government were exercised by a Central Executive
Committees until a better one can be established for the republic. Under
the constitution written by Makabulos himself, the Central Executive
Committee was to be composed of a President, Vice-President,
1
Secretary of Interior, Secretary of War, and Secretary of Treasury. By
this token, the Filipino insurgents intended not to carry out the terms of
the truce.

On the other hand, lower-echelon Spanish officials started on a

campaign of harassment against many Filipinos who had been
suspected of taking part in the revolution. They were arrested and
subsequently incarcerated. These acts of the protagonists naturally led
to further resentment and hatred. Thus, the chasm widened, and the
revolutionary fervor of the Filipinos continued to glow more brightly.

Meanwhile, the Liberal Party of Spain took the reign of

government. It succeeded the Conservative Party under Governor-
General Primo de Rivera.

As a consequence, the newly-installed ruling party sent General

Basilio Augustin to the Philippines to replace General Primo de Rivera as
Governor-General. By this time, the Ibero-American relationship showed
signs of rupture. Should the rift result into an open war, the new
governor-general would be caught in a dilemma: he was practically
unfamiliar with the actual situation in the Philippines. This was the

31
principal reason why Primo de Rivera was quite hesitant to leave his
post. However, on April 9. 1898, General Augustin arrived to assume his
position. Shortly after, he officially announced his intention of continuing
the pacification campaign left behind by his predecessor.

As expected, the Spanish-American relationship degenerated.

Cuba, another Spanish colony in the Caribbean, was enmeshed in an
internal revolution which was the direct result of Spanish misrule and
despotism. Like the Filipinos, the Cubans had to fight for their own
freedom and independence. Taking advantage of this internal strife, the
United States Government sided with the Cubans. She had to protect
her economic interests amounting to $50,000,000 which was invested in
several business enterprises.

In the meantime, Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the

US Navy, had already nurtured the idea of attacking Manila in the event
the United States and Spain were headed for an armed confrontation.
Through his influence, Roosevelt was able to wrangle the appointment of
Commodore George Dewey a commander of the US Navy’s Asiatic
2
Squadron. To him, Dewey was the most ideal man to carry out
Roosevelt’s planned attack against the Spanish navy in the Philippines.
Shortly after, Roosevelt cabled Dewey to make Hong Kong as his base
of operations. He had also directed Dewey to proceed immediately to
the Philippines with the primary mission of wreaking havoc on the
Spanish fleet once the war between the two countries will break-up.

Exile of Aguinaldo

These developments were being closely monitored by Aguinaldo

and the other Filipino patriots in Hong Kong. Should the Spanish-
American war break out, it would certainly pave the way for the eventual
ejectment of the Spaniards from the Philippines. This was what had
already been made in compliance with Dewey’s instructions. Later,
Rounseville Wildman, the American consul, insinuated to Aguinaldo that
on his return to the country, the latter should establish a dictatorial form
of government to facilitate the prosecution of the war efforts against
Spain. Should peace be restored, a government patterned after that of
the United States will be established.

Before effecting his return to the country, Aguinaldo requested

Wildman to purchase 2,000 rifles and 200,000 rounds of ammunition to
be used by the Filipino revolutionists. As payment, Aguinaldo gave
Wildman P50, 000. Another shipment, costing P67, 000 will also be

32
made. Wildman showing great enthusiasm purchased the items for the
first shipment. The second shipment was never successfully carried out.

The Spanish-American War

Fearing the dire consequences of war with a fast-growing power,

Spain attempted to heal her rift with the United States. Unfortunately,
this move came too late. There were two incidents that led directly to the
Spanish-American misunderstanding.

The first of such incidents arose from a very trivial matter. An

American magazine published the contents of a letter from Deputy de
Lome, Spain’s ambassador to the United States, which was addressed
to an acquaintance in Havana, Cuba, after it had been successfully
filched from its recipient. Among other things, Lome stated in his letter
that President McKinley was a “weakling and low politician.” Angered by
this affront to their Chief Executive, the American, embittered by tales of
woes by American citizens in Cuba, demanded the outright declaration of
war against Spain. The outcry did not wane even after the relief of the
Spain ambassador.

At this juncture, a schism developed with the ranks of the Filipino

exiles. Isabelo Artacho, apparently spurred by selfish motives, wants
Aguinaldo to divide the money among them. This was the amount paid to
the Filipino patriots by the Spanish government in the Philippines.
Aguinaldo refused to accede on this arrangement. Thereafter, Artacho
went to a Hongkong court to file a legal action against Aguinaldo.

Refusing to appear in court, Aguinaldo secretly slipped out of

Hongkong and proceeded to Singapore via Saigon. On his arrival there,
he was sought out by an Englishman who had been an old-time resident
of the Philippines. He was told to see E. Spencer Pratt, the American
consul, who wanted to interview him on matters of mutual interest. What
transpired consented to support the American bellicose venture in the
Philippines. At the same time, he intimated his desire to return to the
Philippines to lead again the Filipinos in their armed struggle against the
3
Spaniards. Pratt arranged for Aguinaldo’s departure for Hongkong.

Unfortunately, Dewey had already sailed for Manila when

Aguinaldo, Gregorio del Pilar, and Leyba arrived in the Crown Colony.
However, he was promptly told by the American consul in Hongkong,
Rounseville Wildman, that arrangements for Aguinaldo’s return to the
Philippines. Then, on February 15, 1898, the USS Maine, an American

33
warship, was precipitately blown up at Havana harbor. While this act of
treachery could not be attributed to the Spaniards, the American
nevertheless became more indignant. This incident spawned a battlecry
“Remember the Maine”

On April 19, 1898, the US Congress passed several resolutions

expressing not only shock over the incident, but also the United States’
desire to help free the Cubans. Spain declared war on the United States.
The next day, April 25, US Congress did the same. Save for the opening
salvo, war had indeed become a reality.

Several minutes after high-noon of April 25, Commodore Dewey

received Secretary of the Navy’s Long’s cable informing him about the
commencement of hostilities between the United States and Spain. The
cable also instructed him to proceed immediately to the Philippines to
capture or otherwise destroy the vessels of the Spanish naval armada
under Admiral Patricio Montojo.

From Mirs Bay, near Hongkong, the US Asiatic Squadron sailed

for the Philippines. In the wee hours of the morning of May 1, 1898, the
fleet steamed into Manila Bay in search of Montojo’s flotilla. Under cover
of darkness, it had successfully eluded the Spanish coastal batteries in
Corregidor. Meanwhile, the Spanish armada was at Sangley Point,
Cavite in a predatory posture ready to pounce on Dewey’s ship.

Stealthily, Dewey’s warships turned back toward Sangley. From

the bridge of the Olympia, his flagship, Dewey could see the outline of
Montojo’s battleships silhouetted against the horizons. When the
Olympia was within effective firing range, Dewey ordered his men to
make the opening salvoes. The heavy naval guns of his war vessels
blasted off toward the enemy. Montojo, on the other hand, fought back
gallantly. His poorly-armed fleet was no match to the Asiatic Squadron.

The Spanish armada was completely destroyed. Spain suffered

great defeat in this naval attack by the US warships. They sustained a
total of 381 casualties – 167 killed and 214 wounded. Dewey’s men
suffered no casualty nor lost any vessel. At 12:30 P.M. of that fateful day,
the Spaniards hoisted the white flag to indicate their capitulation.

News of Dewey’s victory over Montojo in Manila Bay glorified the

whole American nation. The Americans celebrated this event in gleeful
abandon. Most of them were ignorant as to where the Philippines is, so
they pored over maps and geography books in order to pinpoint the

34
place where the great naval battle took place. Dewey became an
overnight celebrity. In appreciation for this feat, the US Congress passed
a special law promoting him to Rear Admiral. Much later, he became an
admiral.

The naval battle at Manila Bay had some significant implications.

Firstly, it marked the ascendancy of the United States as a power to
reckon with in the Pacific. Secondly, it signaled the decline of Spanish
rule in the Philippines.

To consolidate his newly-won victory, Dewey imposed blockade

around the city. He had to do this in as much as he lacks ground troops
to conduct sweeping operations. The land forces to be employed for this
purpose were still in the process of mustering in California. Their arrival
in the Philippines was expected shortly.

Following the Spanish flotilla’s defeat, Governor-General

Augustin rallied the Filipinos to his side by appealing to come for a
rescue. He had adopted a policy of attraction and conciliation. On May 4,
he established a Consultative Assembly and a Filipino Militia, which
moves intended to appease the Filipinos. The Consultative Assembly
would have some prominent Filipinos in its ranks, while the Filipino Militia
will be commanded by the Filipino officers.

On May 28, the Consultative Assembly met for the first time.
Before this body, Augustin promised to grant the reforms and demanded
by the Filipinos. It adjourned on June 13 without any tangible
accomplishments. These peace overtures fell on deaf ears. Instead of
reforms, the Filipinos wanted complete political independence. There
certainly had to be a parting ways.

Renewal of Struggle

Meanwhile, the Filipino patriots in the Crown Colony, now formed

into the Hongkong Junta, met on May 4 to discuss steps to take as a
consequence of Dewey’s naval victory in the Philippines. Precisely
because the situation in the country was critical, Aguinaldo sought the
advice of the members of the Hongkong Junta to guide him in all his
moves. The body voted to allow Aguinaldo to return to the Philippines
and lead the armed struggle.

On the morning of May 17, Aguinaldo and thirteen others left

Hongkong aboard the McCulloch, Dewey’s dispatch boat, and arrived at

35
Cavite on May 19. He brought along with him the firearms and
ammunitions purchased by Wildman. From Cavite, Aguinaldo was
brought to Dewey in latter’s flagship where the two exchanged
pleasantries, after which they conferred on the enhancement of Filipino-
American cooperation in a bid to topple down the Spanish regime.

Shortly after Aguinaldo’s return, many patriotic Filipinos flocked

around him. Many Filipinos who had enlisted in the Spanish army and
those in the Filipino Militia had also defected to his side. They were
ordered to occupy the Spanish shipyard at Dalahikan, Cavite. At the
same time, Aguinaldo secured firearms and ammunition from the ship
captain of the USS Petrel, an American warship. These augmented what
he had landed from Hongkong. Throughout Central Luzon, the
revolutionist rejoiced over Aguinaldo’s triumphant return.

On May 22, 1898, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation which gave

impetus to the renewal of the Filipino’s struggle for independence. He
declared. “Wherever you see the American flag, there flock in numbers;
they are our redeemers.” He had been led to make this proclamation in
his belief that the native populace would not forsake him in the course of
the renewed struggle, and that Americans had come as liberators.

The Filipinos responded overwhelmingly to Aguinaldo’s call to

arms. Everywhere, they rushed to places where they could secure
firearms and ammunition. In just a short while, the ranks of the
revolutionary army had swelled and once again, Aguinaldo was at its
helm. In the provinces and elsewhere, the revolutionist formed into
armed groups and started to harass Spanish garrisons and outpost.

In an engagement at Alapang, near Kawit, Cavite, on May 28,

the revolutionary forces had completely repulsed the Spanish Marines.
Drawing inspiration from this initial victory, the Filipino patriots acquitted
themselves in battles everywhere. At the end of May, some 5,000
4
Spanish officers and men had fallen into the hands of the revolutionaries
as prisoners. The ensuing days saw the collapse of the Spanish forces in
Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Tayabas, Pampanga and other provinces as
a result of the onslaught of the native revolutionist. By June, the whole
Luzon, except the ports of Cavite and Manila, was under Aguinaldo’s
control.

Meanwhile, Dewey continued his naval blockade of Manila Bay

while waiting for reinforcements that were being rushed across the

36
Pacific from the United States. Dewey’s predilection was to prevent
Spanish ships from entering or leaving the bay.

Aguinaldo focused his next attention to the capture of Manila, his

main objective. His forces, jointly led by Generals Gregorio del Pilar, Pio
del Pilar, Artemio Ricarte, Antonio Montenegro, and Pantaleon Garcia,
laid siege on the city. Spanish troops and civilians were trapped. Their
food and water supplies were cut off. To avoid being famished, the city
populace had to drink rain water or from Pasig River and from wells, and
slaughtered horses, dogs, cats, and rats.

Aware that hunger and thirst would eventually tell on the Spanish
troops, Aguinaldo demanded the surrender of Governor-General
Augustin under honorable conditions. The latter, however refused to
yield on such a demand, knowing that this was not provided for in
Spanish Army’s code of honor.

In the wake of his victories in the battlefields, Aguinaldo thought

that the opportune moment had come to establish a government for the
Filipinos. He had in mind that establishment of a revolutionary form of
government. But on the advice of Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, this was
changed to a dictatorial one. Accordingly, on May 24, 1898, Aguinaldo
issued a decree formally establishing the Dictatorial Government to last
until a republic could be formed.

On June 12, 1898 in the porch of his residence at Kawit and

before a motley crowd, Aguinaldo proclaimed the independence of the
Philippines. Rianzares Bautista read the Declaration of Philippine
Independence which was also written by him. For the first time, the
Philippine flag designed by Mrs. Marcela Agoncillo was unfurled. And for
the first time also, the Philippine National Hymn, composed by Julian
Felipe, was played in public. The declaration of independence was the
most significant act of the dictatorship.

The Revolutionary Government came into being on June 23,

when the dictatorship was decreed abolished. As a government, it had a
Revolutionary Congress as its law-making body. It was convoked at the
Barasoain church in Malolos, Bulacan on September 15. The Malolos
Congress was responsible for framing the constitution. Local
Government units were also established in liberated areas. As a
consequence, the Revolutionary Government operated with complete
autonomy.

37
 On June 30, 1898 the first batch of American reinforcements
arrived in the Philippines. Upon arrival of the last batch on July 31, the
American forces were immediately placed under the command of Maj
Gen Wesley Merritt. At the same time, Dewey started to prepare for
battle to determine the final outcome of the Spanish-American war in the
Philippines.

By this time, it dawned on Dewey that the capitulation of Manila

could be secured without bloodshed. Thus, he resorted to the use of his
innate diplomatic ability to achieve the desired end. Through the Belgian
consul in Manila, he negotiated with Governor-General Augustin for the
peaceful surrender of the city. Forewarned of Augustin’s surrender plan,
the Spanish Government relieved him from his post and sent over
General Fermin Jaudenes as the new Governor-General.

Like Augustin, Jaudenes thought that the situation was hopeless

and that surrender was inevitable. A cabal thus was effected between
the American and Spanish sides. To satisfy the rigid requirements of the
Spanish Army’s code of honor, a mock battle was to be consummated
without the participation of Aguinaldo’s forces. After a token resistance,
the Spanish troops would then capitulate. Dewey and Merritt accepted
those terms and conditions without much ado.

American intentions in the Philippines soon became obvious. On

the eve of the mock battle in Manila, which was supposed to begin on
August 10, Brig. Gen. Thomas Anderson wired Aguinaldo with belligerent
undertones. He warned Aguinaldo not to allow his troops to enter the city
without Merritt’s permission. Otherwise, they would be fired upon by the
Americans. This telegraphic warning couched in bellicose language,
generated in Aguinaldo a feeling of enmity.

On the morning of August 13, the planned mock assault on

Manila began. Dewey’s warships subjected Fort San Atonio Abad to
naval bombardment, after which the American ground troops jumped off
toward the city from their pre-designated departure points. The Filipino
revolutionaries, on the other hand, inched their way toward the walled
city. At 11:30 A.M., of that day, the Spaniards raised the white flag which
marked the end of the sham battle. It was not until noon, however, that
the token of surrender was noticed by the Americans.

Back in the United States, negotiations for the termination of

hostilities were already underway. A draft of the protocol of peace had

38
Filipino soldiers pose for posterity during a lull in the battle against the
enemy

Army headquarters outside Manila

39
been submitted to the Spanish Government’s representative, the French
ambassador. The proposed treaty of peace called for the immediate
cessation of the war. It also required the appointment of five peace
commissioners from each side to discuss the terms and conditions
contained in the document. They were to hold discussions in Paris not
later than October 1. On August 12, President McKinley issued a
proclamation declaring the immediate suspension of military operations
in the Philippines. However, it was only on August 16 when Merritt
received the cabled proclamation. The mock battle could have been
avoided.

In Manila, the terms of surrender were finalized in the afternoon

of August 13 by a selected group consisting of six members, three from
each side. The Spanish authorities agreed to surrender all the Spanish
troops and the remaining members of the Filipino Militia. On their part,
the American gave assurances of safeguarding the city, including its
churches, and the free exercise of religious worship. The following day,
August 14, the historic protocol of peace was signed. Brig. Gen. Francis
V. Greene led the American signatories, while Auditor General Nicholas
de la Peña headed the Spanish signatories. This climaxed the end of the
American Spanish war in the Philippines.

Treaty of Paris

As provided for in the Protocol of Peace, Spain and the United

States named their respective peace commissioners to work out on the
terms of the peace treaty in Paris. The American delegation was headed
by former Secretary of State William R. Day with the following as
members: Cushman K. Davies, William P. Frye, George Gray, and
Whitelaw Reid. The Queen Regent of Spain was represented by Don
Eugenio Montero, President of the Spanish Cortes, chairman,
Buenaventura Abarzuza, Jose de Garnica, Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-
Urrutia, and General Rafael Cerero, members.

From October to December 1898, the Peace Commission had a

lengthy discussion. The terms and conditions of the treaty finally agreed
upon when all problems had been threshed out. On December 10, the
Treaty of Paris was signed. During the negotiations, Aguinaldo sent
Felipe Agoncillo, a prominent Filipino lawyer, to observe the
proceedings. However, since the Philippine Revolutionary Government
was not officially recognized, he was not allowed inside the venue.

40
 The Treaty of Paris contained the following salient provisions:

1. Spain to cede the Philippines to the Untied States.

2. The United States to pay Spain the sum of $ 20,000.000

to compensate for improvements made in the Philippines.

3. Spain to cede Guam and Puerto Rico to the United

States.

4. Spain to withdraw her sovereignty from Cuba.

5. The civil and political rights of the inhabitants of the

ceded territories to be determined by Congress.

Many American senators objected to the ratification by the US

Senate of the Treaty of Paris. They anchored their objection on the
ground that its provisions were onerous and discriminatory to the
Filipinos. For his part, Agoncillo, who had gone to the US capital,
lobbied against the peace agreement. However, because of the rupture
in Filipino-American relations, the cause of which had been blamed on
the Filipinos, the dissenters finally voted for ratification. The US Senate
ratified the treaty on February 6, 1899.

Thus this treaty ended Spain’s colonial rule in the Philippines,

which spanned a period of 377 years. Despotism, oppression, and
abuses had been the hallmarks of that era.

Filipino-American War

Soon after the sham battle of Manila, there developed a serious

schism in the ranks of both the American and Filipino military authorities.
This stemmed from several causes, among which were the following:
American demand on Aguinaldo’s troops to vacate certain areas in the
city, refusal by the Americans to allow Aguinaldo’s men to enter Manila,
and limitation of areas actually occupied by the Filipino revolutionary
forces.

To Aguinaldo, these actuations of the Americans were not only

high-handed but provocative as well. It was becoming evident that the
Americans had come as masters masquerading as allies. The Filipino-
American alliance was more farcical than real.

41
 Filipino-American relations deteriorated further with the official
announcement of President McKinley’s “benevolent assimilation” policy.
In broad terms, it stated the American desire to stay in the Philippines for
an indefinite period to implant her sovereignty. This simply meant that
the government would be under American control and supervision. In
accordance with this policy, President McKinley ordered all American
military commanders to continue using force to complete the assimilation
process.

On September 29, 1898, in an effort to strengthen the

revolutionary governmental machinery, Aguinaldo appointed the
following individuals to occupy the positions as indicated: Baldomero
Aguinaldo, Secretary of War; Antonio Luna, Director of War or General-
in-Chief; and Artermio Ricarte, Vito Belarmino, and Emiliano Riego de
Dios, Generals of Divisions. He had also appointed twelve revolutionary
leaders as brigadier generals. By making these appointments,
Aguinaldo know that Filipino-American détente would not last long.

Aguinaldo, wielding his powers as head of the Revolutionary

Government, tried to ease up the tension that had developed by naming
three revolutionary generals to compose the Filipino group to negotiate
with the American authorities. This was communicated to Maj. Gen.
Elwell Otis who, on the other hand had named three American military
officers to compose the American side. Nothing, however, was
accomplished because the American negotiating panel stalled for time
until the arrival of reinforcements. Aguinaldo’s efforts, therefore, to relax
the Filipino-American tension were fruitless.

Meanwhile, on January 21, Aguinaldo proclaimed the Malolos

Constitution, the historic document framed on November 29, 1898 by the
Malolos Congress which established the first Philippine Republic. Two
days later, the republic was inaugurated at Malolos, Bulacan, with
Aguinaldo as President. The Filipino Army pledge its loyalty to
Aguinaldo and the Philippine Republic.

After the inaugural ceremonies, the Republic decreed a universal

conscription of all male Filipino citizens between the ages of eighteen
and thirty-five. At its peak strength, the Filipino Army had about 50,000
men, 20,000 of whom were stationed in the Visayas and Mindanao.*

The Army underwent a re-organization on a regional basis. Each

region organized its own brigade under the command of a general. The
provinces of Bulacan, Batangas, Laguna and the other original eight

42
provinces that revolted against Spain had their separate military units.
There was, for instance, the Bulacan Battalion, Batangas Battalion, and
Laguna Regiment. The prescribed uniform was a thin striped blue and
white coat and trousers (rayadillo). Most of the men were barefooted and
wore straw hats.

There were also special units. The presidential guards were

resplendent in their distinctive gala uniform. President Aguinaldo’s rear
guards under the command of General Gregorio del Pilar, the youngest
revolutionary general, became a legend in Filipino courage.

The infantry was the most effective arm of the military

organization of the Republic. The cavalry and artillery units, still on the
rudimentary stages, played little part in the war against the United
States. Artillery pieces consisted principally of muzzle-loading cannons
captured from the Spaniards. Others were manufactured in Cavite, Col.
Ladislao Jose, a former Assistant Quartermaster Officer in the Spanish
Artillery Regiment, organized the first Filipino Artillery Corps.

There were more soldiers than rifles in the Filipino Army. It was
estimated that it had around 40,000 rifles issued to its soldiers
throughout the country. One-fourth of this number had been allotted to
the troops who were entrenched around the city of Manila when the
Philippine-American War started.

Although distinguished veterans of the revolution against Spain,

most of the Filipino generals were ill-trained. Their military knowledge
were acquired in actual combat. Fortunately, there were many veteran
Spanish officers who joined the Filipino Army in the Spanish-American
war. They made good as field commanders.

Through the efforts of General Antonio Luna, first-rate

disciplinarian, the Filipino officers were drilled, especially in the proper
execution of orders. He also standardized the uniforms by asking his
brother, Juan, the painter, to make a design for each branch of the
military establishment. President Aguinaldo approved the compulsory
use of these uniforms. These were the war preparations of the Filipino
insurgent army.

The inevitable arising from the Filipino-American cleavage,

happened. At about 8:30 P.M. of February 4, 1988 a Filipino soldier,
while attempting to cross the San Juan bridge into the American
positions was shot and killed by Pvt Robert Grayson of the Nebraskan

43
 General Antonio Luna
Director of War, Philippine Revolutionary Government

44
volunteers. This incident provoked the Filipinos into action. Hostilities
erupted.

All night long, the battle raged. It lasted until 5:00 o’clock the
following day. At the end of the action, American casualties stood at 250
killed and wounded. The number of casualties on the Filipino side was
5
estimated at 3,000 men who were either killed or wounded. After this
incident, Aguinaldo ordered his field commanders throughout the country
to prepare the insurgents for an emergency after his failure to persuade
the Americans to stop the hostilities.

At the start of hostilities, Maj. Gen. Elwell Otis had under his
command 838 officers and 20,032 men. Taking into account the number
of ineffective personnel, he had an overall effective fighting strength of
14,000, 3,000 of whom constituted the Provost Guards whose primary
6
duty was to safeguard the great and hostile city of Manila.

More battles were fought in the ensuing days. The insurgents

positions north of San Juan del Monte disintegrated after a fierce naval
bombardment by the American fleet. La Loma was the scene of heavy
fighting, during which Maj. Jose Torres Bugallon, one of General Luna’s
bravest officers, perished. Pandacan was the scene of another bloody
encounter where Filipino sharpshooters killed Major McConville.

The succeeding days saw the fall into American hands of one
insurgent stronghold after another. The waterworks pump house at
Marikina was occupied on February 6. Pateros and Guadalupe fell two
days later. Caloocan, where General Luna had established his
headquarters, was captured on February 10 after bloody skirmish.

Notwithstanding these initial reverses of Filipino Army, Luna

made a daring attack on Manila on the night of February 22. His troops
burned American-occupied houses in Tondo and Binondo. While the
conflagration spread, his forces advanced toward Azcarraga Street
th
where they were finally stopped by the Americans on the 24 . They
retreated after a token resistance.

From then on, there was no way of stopping the momentum of

the American sweeping operations. They pushed northward with primary
objective of capturing Malolos, Bulacan, seat of government of the
Philippine Republic. The American offensive was boosted with the arrival
of reinforcements sometime in March consisting of 35,000 men who
were assigned in twenty-four infantry regiments and one cavalry

45
regiment. This volunteer army was formed pursuant to an act of the US
7
Congress of March 2, 1899.

In the meantime, the provinces south of Manila were besieged

by American troops. Brig. Gen. Henry Lawton’s forces captured
successively the towns of Zapote, Bacoor, and Dasmariñas in Cavite.
Troops under General Wheaton likewise captured Las Pinas and
Paranaque, Morong province, and the towns of Paete, and Santa Cruz in
Laguna. At this stage of the war, the Filipinos had registered their first
major victory over the Americans. In an encounter at Polo, Bulacan, on
March 25, the insurgents were able to repulse Wheaton’s forces, killing
nd
in the process Col. Harry C. Egbert of the 22 Infantry.

Malolos was finally taken on March 31. Aguinaldo had to flee

northward and transferred the seat of government to San Fernando
Pampanga. The capitulation of Malolos convinced Otis that the spine of
resistance had been broken. However, he underestimated the Filipinos’
capacity for further struggle.

After a brief rest in Malolos, General MacArthur’s troops

resumed their northward offensive. At Quingua (now Plaridel), the
Filipino insurgents under the youthful General Pio del Pilar repulsed the
cavalry charge of Maj. J. Franklin Bell on April 25, a skirmish was fought
at the Bagbag River. Calumpit fell to the Americans the next day. On
April 26, Col. Frederick Funston and his troops crossed the Rio Grande
de Pampanga.

On May 4, Santo Tomas in Pampanga was taken after the

gallant stand of General Luna and his men. The capital town of San
Fernando was occupied the following day. From San Fernando,
Aguinaldo transferred the seat of government to San Isidro, Nueva Ecija.

Meanwhile, General Luna and his aide-de-camp, Col. Francisco

Roman, were felled by assassin’s bullets at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
on June 5, 1899. Luna’s death was a serious blow to the Filipinos’
libertarian struggle.

The flames of the war had spread to Southern Luzon, the

Visayas, and Mindanao. Owing to the superiority of American firearms,
these areas were eventually subjugated. The puny Filipino Army,
inadequately-armed and untrained in combat, was no match for the
American military might which by then, had a peak strength of 70,000

46
officers and men. Courage alone was not enough to alter the course of
war.

Aguinaldo, in the meantime, continued to flee northward with the

Americans in hot pursuit. At Tirad Pass in Ilocos Sur, he had established
a temporary stronghold. It was here where the famous battle of Tirad
Pass was fought. General Gregorio del Pilar, commanding Aguinaldo’s
rear guards, made a gallant delaying action to give Aguinaldo’s sufficient
time to escape further to the north. On December 2, at about mid-day,
the “boy general” was felled by a bullet from a Krag rifle.

For over a year after the battle at Tirad Pass, the Americans
were in a dilemma as to the whereabouts of Aguinaldo. Their problem
ended on January 8, 1901 when troops under General Funston captured
Cecilio Segismundo, Aguinaldo’s personal courier, in Nueva Ecija.
Found in Segismundo’s possession were some important documents
addressed to some Filipino insurgent leaders. These papers contained
Aguinaldo’s instructions for Secretary of War Baldomero Aguinaldo to
send reinforcements at Palanan, Isabela. This was at last the answer to
the Americans’ quandary.

Back in Manila, Funston secretly fitted out an expedition to

capture Aguinaldo. This task had the approval of Maj. Gen. Arthur
MacArthur who had relieved Otis as the American military commander.
On March 6, Funston’s party, consisting of five American officers, one
Spanish interpreter, four Tagalogs, and eighty Macabebe scouts, sailed
out from Manila Bay board the Vicksburg.

Knifing through thickly-forested areas in Northern Luzon, the

party arrived at Palanan, Isabela, on March 23. On the same day,
Funston arrested Aguinaldo in the name of the United States
Government in the latter’s temporary living quarters. From Palanan,
Aguinaldo was brought to Manila on board the Vicksburg. On April 19,
1901, he took his oath of allegiance to the United States at Malacanang
Palace. Shortly after, he issued a proclamation calling on all Filipino
insurgent forces to stop the hostilities. Thus ended the fugitive life of the
first President of the Philippine Republic.

Notwithstanding Aguinaldo’s capture, the war continued. Other

insurgent leaders throughout the country had resorted to guerrilla
warfare to harass the Americans at every turn. But the superior arms of
the Americans turned the tide of war against the Filipinos. The Filipino-

47
American War drew to a close in 1902. American sovereignty was thus
implanted.

The Filipino-American War had been a costly venture. On the

part of the United States, she spent some P 600,000,000 to put an end
to the Filipino resistance against her rule. In terms of losses in lives and
property, both sides paid a high price for it. As of September 1, 1900,
the American casualties numbered 268 killed, 750 wounded, and 55
captured. The Filipinos, on the other hand, had 3,227 killed, 694
8
wounded, and 2,864 captured. In addition, 200,000 civilians died from
famine and pestilence, and several million pesos of property went into
waste.

Field Post, Barrio San Ildefonso, San Miguel, Bulacan, 1898

48
 PART II

AMERICAN RULE

49
Philippine Scout Company that captured General Vicente Lukban in
Samar, 1902 (American Historical Collection)

Igorot Scouts, Mountain Province (American Historical Collection)

50
 CHAPTER IV

FILIPINO GUERILLA OPPOSITIONS

American rule in the Philippines is said to have ushered in an era of

suppressed nationalism. Of course, this was highly noticeable only
during the first decade, 1901-1910. To the Filipino, this marked the
turning point in their libertarian struggle. Significantly, the American
period in our country’s history bore the following hallmarks:

1. Launching of a pacification campaign whose immediate

objective was the banishment of uncompromising Filipino nationalist and
then suppression of all nationalistic aspirations of the people.

2. Enactment of the Sedition Law which stopped all

seditious statements against the US government.

3. Banning of the formation of political parties or

aggrupations that spearheaded the movement for complete political
independence.

Advent of American Rule

Shortly after the fall of Manila to the Americans on August 14,

1898 following a mock battle, a military government was set up with Maj
Gen Wesley Merritt at the helm. The military governor exercised the
powers of civil government administrator over areas which at the time
remained unpacified and where pockets of insurrection still existed.

Immediately, the military government waged a pacification

campaign designated to prepare the country for possible transition to civil
authority. Meanwhile, the military governor had taken measures toward
this end. He established civil governments in municipalities then
considered as already pacified. As proof of this, elections were held in
Baliwag, Bulacan and other municipalities in the periphery of Manila. At
the same time, local governments were reorganized in accordance with a
master plan worked out by a committee chaired by Chief Justice
Cayetano Arellano of the Supreme Court. The reorganization scheme
had been deemed as an alternative to diminish the support of the Filipino
masses for the guerilla opposition against the American military
authorities.

51
Basis of American Policy in the Philippines

Meanwhile, back in the United States, the division in Congress

regarding the plans for administration of the newly-acquired territories
gave President William McKinley the opportunity to exercise his powers
in establishing the framework for its policy on these territories.

In 1901, the US Congress passed the so-called Spooner

Amendment which was actually a “rider” to the US Army’s appropriations
bill. This legislative measure gave the American President full power to
administer the Philippines. Thus, the transition from military rule to a
purely civil government, until such time that the Congress could legislate
permanent government for the Philippines.

In the continental United States, President William McKinley

resorted to his broad powers in laying the foundations of American policy
in the Philippines. But before he could possibly set to work, he had
deemed it necessary to form study committees to investigate Philippine
conditions.

The first Philippine Commission had Jacob Schurman as its

chairman. Four other American were appointed by President McKinley
as members. They were Admiral George Dewey, Maj Gen. Elwell Otis,
Dean Worcester, and Charles Denby. In March 1899, it arrived in Manila
and it immediately buckled down to work. This fact-finding body was
directed to study “the existing social and political state of the various
populations.” In addition, it was instructed to report on measures which
should be adopted to maintain peace and order and the public welfare.

A month later, the Schurman Commission announced publicly

the adoption of several fundamental principles upon which to base future
American policy. The most important of these principles were as follows:
maintenance of the supremacy of the United States over every part of
the island; grant of self-government to the Filipino people; guarantee for
the protection of human rights of the inhabitants; and the prohibition on
the use of the people or country as an object of exploitation.

Upon completion of its mission, the Commission submitted to

then President McKinley its final report on January 31, 1900. Among
other things, it contained one salient recommendation: the establishment
of a civil government, a bicameral legislature, and even a system of
1
public instruction. It likewise recommended that the new civil
government should maintain its own finances apart from those of the

52
United States. The insular treasury should carry the brunt of underwriting
the cost of administering the civil government.

The second Philippine Commission was created shortly after to

implement and carry out the recommendation of the preceding fact-
finding body. It had William Howard Taft as its chairman. In his
instructions to the Commission which were issued out in April 1900,
President McKinley served notice “that the government which they are
establishing is designed not for the expression of our theoretical views,
but for the happiness, peace, prosperity of the country and its people and
the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their
habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the
accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of a just and effective
government..”

Included in President McKinley’s instruction to the Taft

Commission was a bill of rights. This was an assurance to the Filipino
people in general that they would enjoy the basic freedom as those
guaranteed in other civilized countries.

Beginning July 4, 1901, the Taft Commission exercised the

broad powers of government which had already been supported by the
American military authorities. It was, therefore, the first civil government
and its chairman, William Howard Taft, became the first American civil
governor whose executive powers extended over all the pacified areas.

William Howard Taft is best remembered by many Filipinos as

the foremost exponent of the policy of “the Philippines for the Filipinos.”
His official stand was widely interpreted as an endorsement of the
2
Filipinos’ fundamental demand for independence. One of his goals was
to prepare the Filipinos for self-government by allowing them to
participate in a popular, democratic form of government. Nevertheless,
the American community in the country which was then dominated by
shrewd businessmen, fortune seekers, the military and carpetbaggers,
raised objections to this policy of Taft. The American uproar was
predicated on the belief that the Philippines should be exploited only for
business, not for political gains. Taft vented his ire on his critics by
telling them to leave the country if they could not accept the fact that the
government was being run “for the Filipinos.” Shortly after, he
recommended to the US Congress that the Filipinos be given adequate
3
representation in the legislative branch of government.

Taft’s campaign for active Filipino participation in the affairs of

53
the civil government and his much-publicized controversy with the
American military which advocated for the continuation of the military
occupation made him very popular with the Filipinos. One of his greatest
achievements was the purchase of friar lands from the religious
corporations. The Filipinos believed that, by birthright, these landed
estates were legitimately theirs. Purchase of over 410,000 acres of friar
lands with a total cost price of $ 7,239,784 had been effected under the
authority of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Governor Taft’s action in regard
to the matter had been prompted out of the fear that the continuous
retention of these vast land holdings by the religious corporations would
lead to violence.

The establishment of the civil government was openly opposed

by Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur. His opposition stemmed from his
argument that the Filipinos needed “bayonet treatment” for a period of
ten years if peace and order were to be fully restored. In reality, however,
the civil government served as a mere façade for American military rule.
The established government, therefore, satisfied the Filipinos’ quest for
political independence.

Filipino Nationalism: Consequence of Colonial Policy

Notwithstanding the public avowals of American authorities,

many Filipino nationalists, known as “irreconcilables” led by Apolinario
Mabini, had serious doubts as to the credibility and sincerity of the
Americans in their expression of amity and friendship towards the
natives. This general sentiment found credence when the United States
passed the Teller Resolution. In this historic document, the United
States Government expressed its disinterest in exercising sovereignty
and jurisdiction over Cuba. Unfortunately, the Philippines was excluded
from the operation of this American policy. And the fear of Mabini was
not after all baseless.

Filipino resistance to American rule continued to mount. By

virtue of this, both American military and civil authorities, determined to
uphold American influence in the country, adopted several repressive
measures which served to strain further Filipino-American relationship.
At the same time, these rendered farcical and meaningless the
“benevolent assimilation” pronouncement of President McKinley and the
bill of rights espoused by the Taft Commission.

On December 20, 1900, or seven months after his assumption of

command over all American military forces in the country, General Mac-

54
Arthur disclosed for the first time the dispensation of harsh punishment to
all those who would abet resistance against the duly-constituted
authorities. Notwithstanding this stern warning, Mabini and his group of
uncompromising nationalists continued to defy American authorities by
refusing to collaborate with them. Mabini personally appealed to the
Filipinos to continue the struggle. As a consequence, the Americans
considered Mabini and his group as stumbling blocks to the complete
pacification of the Philippines.

Subsequently on November 24, 1901 the Philippine Commission

enacted the Sedition Law which meted out the death punishment or long
imprisonment to those who advocated independence or separation from
United States, be it by peaceful or forcible means.

Harsh Punishment for Irreconcilables and Rise of Guerillas Bands

Having thus earned the ire and displeasure of the Americans,

Mabini and other Filipino patriots became marked men. Their continued
presence in the country was at best a nuisance. To the Americans, this
was a contributory factor in prolongation of the guerilla warfare being
waged against them. At the same time, they considered Mabini and his
group as a leverage in the weakening of their authority. Thus, on January
1, 1901, these Filipino patriots headed by Mabini were banished to
Guam. Included in this group were Julian Gerona, Maximo Hizon, Pablo
Ocampo and Artemio Ricarte.

While the American administration was proceeding to implement

its program of conquest, it was at the same time instituting a policy of
deception over the Filipino people. This was a clever ploy to conceal its
real aims. From the behavior of the American troops, it seemed that the
pretext of all-out friendship and sympathy for the Filipino’s cause was
just a temporary expedient. This façade had to be resorted to
conveniently until such time that the main bulk of the American troops
had arrived in the country.

Such demonstration of sympathy was useful in that it delayed the

inevitable clash between the Filipinos and the Americans until the latter
had consolidated their position militarily. This was not the only
consideration though. As past events proved, the repressive measures
introduced prompted the Filipinos to react with vehemence and
belligerence. This was prove to all and sundry “that they did not fight the
4
Spaniards only to succumb to a new colonial master.”

55
 American officials reported the existence of peace and tranquility
in the Philippines. Yet, guerilla resistance continued. This time, it was
widely spread with the participation of the Filipino masses. Various
guerilla bands proliferated to harass the Americans in all nooks of the
country. The rise of these guerilla bands had been direct result of the
refusal of some Filipino revolutionary leaders to lay down their arms. This
was notwithstanding the fact that the American peace propaganda efforts
had induced the mass surrender of thousands of Filipino soldiers.

After the capture of Aguinaldo, General Miguel Malvar assumed

leadership of the Philippine government. He personally led the resistance
movement which continued to harass the American forces at every
opportunity. In the province of Samar, the guerilla uprising was under the
able leadership of General Vicente Lukban. His modus operandi was to
ambush the Americans, then withdraw after inflicting numerous
casualties on them. This tactic soured General Smith that he ordered his
troops to kill all men and children below ten years old and to intensify the
hunt for Lukban. As a result, Samar was converted to an infernal abyss
and Lukban finally capitulated on February 27, 1902. Thus, the guerilla
resistance in that province collapsed. On April 16 of that year, Malvar
surrendered to the American forces.

These events did not end the indigenous guerilla opposition

against the Americans. In 1902, Simeon Ola of Guinobatan, Albay, led
the uprising in Bicol region. To quell this insurrection, the American
authorities sent to that part of the country’s several punitive expeditions.
However, all these failed to contain Ola’s forces. The Americans,
therefore, had to sue for an armistice and to resort to peaceful
negotiations with the Filipino guerilla leader. But Ola balked at the
American initiative and thus the resistance continued. In 1904, he
surrendered and was granted executive clemency by Governor Taft. In
the Visayan provinces of Cebu, Samar and Leyte and Panay, “ Pope”
Isio was the acknowledged overall leader of the resistance forces. In the
neighboring provinces of Leyte, “Papa” Rios had also succeeded in
organizing an “army” of which he was the “generalisimo.” He had also
established a municipal government with himself as its “viceroy.”

The disenchanted masses of the Tagalog provinces of Cavite,

Batangas, Laguna and Tayabas (now Quezon) had likewise rose in
unison to resist the Americans. This came about even after the
proclamation of general amnesty. Guerilla warfare was also carried out in
Central Luzon. Spearheading the resistance was an organization called
“Santa Iglesia.” In the Ilocos, guerilla bands masquerading as

56
“Katipunan” units were in the forefront of the campaign to oust the
American rulers. That group in Paoay, Ilocos Norte, organized by
Valentin Butardo was the most effective among the guerilla bands.

Sakay and his Resistance Campaigns

Macario Sakay led the resistance in the “Tagalog Archipelago”

where he had succeeded in establishing a supreme government of which
he was the President and Commander-in-Chief. In May 1902, he
appealed to the Filipinos to refrain from taking their oath of allegiance to
the Americans. At the same time, he publicly announced his intention of
fighting the Americans to the bitter end in order to gain the independence
of the Philippines.

To suppress this insurrection, thousands of American soldiers

were sent after Sakay. However, these punitive expeditions failed to
effect the capitulation of this guerilla leader. But in 1906, after four years
of opposition, Sakay finally decided to surrender. He anchored his
decision to capitulate on his belief that it would at least hasten the
establishment of a legislature representing the Filipino sentiments.
Unfortunately, he miscalculated his step. As a result, he died by public
hanging in September 1907 after he and his principal assistants were
convicted and found guilty of violating the provisions of the Brigandage
Act of 1902. His aides were meted out long imprisonment terms.

Thus, resistance to American rule came to an end. It failed to

produce the desired results because of the tragic lack of an able and
cohesive leadership which could have provided better direction and
supervision. Notwithstanding its doom, it brought to the fore the Filipino’s
insatiable passion for freedom and independence.

Punitive Measures

To end, if not curb, the raging insurrection spearheaded by the

various Filipino guerilla bands, the American authorities in the Philippines
thought it wise to adopt certain suppressive measures in retaliation for
the widespread opposition. First and foremost, the American military
authorities imposed strict press censorship which was an abridgement of
press freedom. Under this measure, news about the Philippines which
were gathered by American correspondents was subjected to rigid
screening and scrutiny. Those with unsavory connotations were
suppressed; those with palatable icings were passed off as newsworthy.

57
 The second repressive measure came in the form of the Sedition
Law or Act Number 592 which the Philippine (Taft) Commission had
enacted no November 4, 1901. This act made punishable any advocacy
of independence or separation from the United States, whether by violent
or peaceful means. The harsh penalty of death or long imprisonment
would be meted out to any individual guilty of the offense.

To complement the Sedition Law, the Philippine Commission

passed on November 12, 1902 to the Brigandage Act. This repressive
measure was designed to prevent any Filipino from becoming a member
of any armed band. Any individual whose association with an armed
aggrupation, even if proven by circumstantial evidence only, would be
given death or long imprisonment as a penalty.

Sometime later, Act Number 781, or more popularly known as

the Reconcentration Act, came out of the legislative mill, on June 1,
1903. Under this law, the provincial governors were authorized to
concentrate the residents of municipalities which were identified to be
havens of lawless elements in the towns or barrios of municipalities
known for their pro-American collaboration. This policy was a necessary
expedient in the isolation and subsequent capture of revolutionary
leaders and at the same time deprived them of assistance, whether
material or financial, from the masses. While it violated the Bill of Rights
as provided for in the Philippine Bill of 1902, it nevertheless hastened the
process of pacification.

Aside from strict censorship, the American authorities also saw

fit to suppress the establishment of nationalist newspapers and literature.
The Filipino playwrights of that era like Juan Abad, Aurelio Tolentino, and
Juan Matapang Cruz were victims of injustice. Abad was indicted and
convicted for sedition due to the staging of a drama written by him
entitled Tinikalang Guinto (The Golden Chain). He was sentenced to a
two-year imprisonment and was fined $2,000 Tolentino, on the other
hand, was meted life imprisonment for the staging of his play, Kahapon,
Ngayon at Bukas, which was in protest of the American presence in the
country. Later, however, his sentence was reduced to fifteen, then to
eight years. He was eventually pardoned by Governor-General William C
Forbes in 1912. Cruz was sentenced to a long prison term after the
presentation of his play entitled Hindi Ako Patay which contained direct
attacks on the American occupation of the country.

The publication of several Filipino nationalist newspapers was

likewise regarded as inimical to American interest in the Philippines. The

58
newspaper, El Nuevo Dia, which was founded in Cebu by Sergio
Osmena, was twice suspended from circulation since it was considered
as a revolutionary mouthpiece. Another newspaper, the El Renacimiento,
which was established in Manila in 1901 by Rafael Palma, brought more
tragic consequences to Martin Ocampo and Teodoro M. Kalaw, owner
and editor respectively. The appearance in its issue of October 30, 1908
of a libelous editorial entitled “Aves de Rapina” (Birds of Prey) prompted
Dean C Worcester, US Secretary of Interior, to sue for libel. He felt he
was individual alluded to in the editorial. The duo, after trial, were jailed
and ordered to pay P60,000 as moral damages. In 1914, Governor-
General Francis B. Harrison pardoned them.

Beginning 1907, the provisions of the Flag Law became

effective. Officially known as the Act Number 1696 after its enactment by
the Philippine Commission, the law banned the public display of all flags,
banners, symbols and other portrayals used by the various guerilla
bands or resistance groups in the Philippines. It particularly prohibited
the display of all flags and colors of the Katipunan. In 1919, however, the
Flag Law, after several unsuccessful attempts of the Philippine Assembly
to repeal it, was written off as passé.

In the field of politics, the Filipinos were subjected to further

suppression. They were inhibited from forming or joining political parties
which advocated self-rule or independence. To this, the Filipino reacted
swiftly by pointing out that this policy was an emasculation of their
political freedom.

Political aggrupations whose platform confronted with this policy

were granted outright recognition by the American authorities. Those
whose platform ran counter to the American can ideal met with official
disfavor. This led to the early demise of the Nationalista Party which was
founded by Pascual Poblete in 1901, and the Partido Democrata whose
principal organizers were Alberto Baretto, Leon Ma. Guerrero, Justo
Lukban and Jose Ma. de la Viña. Although both parties espoused the
cause of Philippine independence through peaceful means, both failed to
secure their official recognition.

While this particular policy was in effect, the Federal Party was
formed out of the Association de Paz whose membership came from the
elite class of Filipino-Spanish society. The new political party adopted a
platform that openly advocated the annexation of the Philippines to the
Federal Union. From its ranks were chosen prominent Filipinos who
were appointed to important positions in the government. Thus, it had

59
such an exclusive monopoly owing to its advocacy of peaceful
collaboration with the Americans. This was its distinct advantage over all
the other political aggrupations.

In 1906, during the incumbency of Governor General Henry C.

Ide, the ban on political parties was lifted. As a consequence, many
organizations were formed. Some of them were merged into one
aggrupation-Nationalista Party. It advocated complete and immediate
independence.

Creation of the PC

Because of the widespread opposition to American rule, the

Filipinos found it most convenient to band themselves into guerilla
groups that continued to harass the American troops. In the face of
these disturbances, the civil government, under Governor William H.
Taft, could not function effectively.

To remedy the situations, Luke E. Wright, a member of the

Second Philippine Commission in charge of commerce and police
matters, conceived the idea of organizing a force that would hasten the
pacification of the whole country. This armed group would be called the
insular police force. Wright called Governor Taft’s attention “that if he
failed to have an insular police force responsible to him, whose duty was
to maintain public order, his government and the American effort to
establish it in the islands was sure to result in disastrous failure.”

On July 18, 1901, the Philippine Commission had its session. In

its deliberations on that day, the Commission enacted Act Number 175
which authorized the organization of an insular police force whose
primary mission was the maintenance of peace and order, and the
suppression of crimes. When activated and organized later on August 8,
1901, the insular police force was subsequently designated Philippine
Constabulary.

The Philippine Constabulary was immediately placed under the

command of Capt. Henry T. Allen, a Kentucky-born graduate of the US
Military Academy at West Point, New York, and a US Army cavalry
officer. Thus, the tremendous responsibility of organizing it and putting it
on its feet fell on his shoulders. Shortly after his assumption of
command, he was promoted to brigadier general by an enabling act of
the US Congress. On the same day, he issued General Orders Number
1, which authorized the detail to the PC of some sixty-eight officers, all of

60
whom were personally handpicked from the US Army’s Regular Force.
They were subsequently appointed first, second, third and fourth class
inspectors. Allen’s deputy was Capt. David J. Baker, also of the US
Army, who, like Allen, was elevated to the rank of colonel by an act of
Congress.

For the purpose of administering the Philippine Constabulary’s

affairs, the whole archipelago was divided into three districts. The
number of districts was subsequently increased to five. Each district was
under an assistant Chief of Constabulary who was vested with all the
powers and prerogatives of the PC Chief. A province was an
administrative unit and was under the stewardship of a senior inspector.

At the outset, there was no standard procedure on the

recruitment and training of Constabulary troops. This was particularly
noticeable in the provinces. The troops had their training as they went
about their usual business of chasing bandits and other lawless elements
in the countryside.

After several years of operations, the Philippine Constabulary

had carved out a distinguished record of performance. Its fine
achievements centered mostly in the gunning down of the bandits and
other criminally-inclined elements. This was embodied in a favorable
report of Brigadier General Allen to Washington which stated, among
other things, that the Filipino constables were “unquestionably more
5
efficient than the Americans.”

Right from the very beginning, the Americans doubted the loyalty
of the native constables. This stemmed from the fact that at the time,
large bands of insurgents still roamed around. But as time went by, the
native troops hurdled the crucial test on their loyalty as shown by their
distinct combat achievements.

The Filipino constables’ demonstrated loyalty and deep devotion

to duty had its own rewards. Deserving privates and non-commissioned
officers were all given the opportunity to qualify as officers of the PC.

There was another incentive given to the native constables in the

active military service. After qualifying in the entrance examinations, they
were admitted to the PC School which was established at Sta. Lucia
Barracks, Intramuros, in 1905. Their graduation from that school after
two-year study qualified them all for call to active duty as commissioned
officers.

61
 The opening of the PC School marked the beginning of the
gradual “filipinization” of the Constabulary officer corps. This process
was hastened when the US entered World War II where most of the US
Army officers detailed with the PC were recalled to their parent units.
These vacancies were later filled by Filipino officers. Another factor that
hastened the “filipinization” process was the withdrawal of longevity pay
and other extra compensation granted to US Army officers. In view of
this, many American officers had left the service in favor of better paying
jobs in commercial establishments. Others had put up their own
commercial ventures.

Since its inception, the PC had been molded as a nemesis to

criminal and lawless elements. Its records of performance can vouch-
safe for this.

Constables pose for posterity, 1920s. The uniforms were similar to those
issued to policemen in mainland USA then.

62
 CHAPTER V

DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

After the capture of Aguinaldo, the Philippines was bereft of a national

leader. What followed was a spate of misunderstandings between the
Filipinos and Americans. In the process, tensions and chaos developed.
This led to the hasty conclusion of the peace negotiation being held in
Paris, France, where the Filipinos had never been consulted.

Basic Responsibility of the US

On the signing of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898, the

United States acquired territorial rights and sovereignty over the
Philippines. Consequently, she gained the sole and exclusive right to
formulate policies and strategies for the defense of the Philippines. She
exercised this prerogative until the Philippines gained her complete
political independence.

In consonance with her basic responsibility, the United States

had embarked on a vast construction program on the island of
Corregidor which used to be a Spanish outpost for the defense of Manila.
It was so designed to strengthen the defense of Manila by sealing off the
entrance to Manila Bay. Work began after the cession of the Philippines
to the United States.

During the years before World War I, several forts were built on
Corregidor and the adjacent island on the bay. By 1914, the task was
completed. By then, the Americans could very well boast of an elaborate
system of defense in Manila Bay.

It was considered so strong and impregnable that Corregidor

earned the sobriquet as “Gibraltar of the East.” Built in accordance
earned with the tactical doctrines of that era, the forts were designed to
withstand an attack from the sea by the heaviest naval vessels then in
existence. Owing to an inhibition from Washington, no major construction
on Corregidor was made except that on anti-aircraft positions. By about
this time, the United States Government had spent a gargantuan amount
for these defensive installations.

The island of Corregidor is located in Cavite Province at the

entrance to Manila Bay. It is three and one-half miles south of the
southern tip of Bataan and twenty-eight miles west southwest of Manila.

63
Of volcanic origin, the island is shaped like tadpole, one to three miles
wide and five miles long, with an area of more than two square miles. It
rises to a high point of 649 feet near its western end. San Jose, a trading
and fishing community, is the only village on the island. Also called
“bottomside,” San Jose was the seat of government during the Spanish
time. With the establishment of a regular US Army Post in Corregidor, it
was converted into a small community. It was in San Jose where the
headquarters of the Japanese Task Force that captured Corregidor was
set up.
th
Corregidor was strongly fortified by the Spaniards, in the 18
century. However, during the Spanish-American War, its defenses had
deteriorated to such an extent that it offered no resistance to
Commodore George Dewey’s fleet which passed through the island on
May 1, 1898.

Corregidor became a military reservation in 1902. The following

year, the United States Army established a hospital on Corregidor.

In 1908, Fort Mills was established on the island. It was in honor

of Brig. Gen. Samuel M. Mills, Chief of Artillery of the United States Army
from 1905 to 1906. Thereafter, the defenses of Corregidor were gradual-
nd
ly strengthened. In 1909, “H” Company of the 2 Battalion of the Corps
of Engineers was assigned to construct concrete emplacements, bomb-
proof shelters, and trails in different parts of the island. Likewise, Forts
Frank, Drum and Hughes were erected on the neighboring islet of
Carabao, El Fraile and Caballo, respectively. This pioneer company left
for the United States on March 15, 1912.

It was soon to be realized that the fortifications made on

Corregidor were solely to beat off a seaborne attack, making it
vulnerable during an aerial attack. Thus, the improvement of fortifications
was restricted by the Washington Peace Treaty of 1922. With this
restriction, the US Army concentrated its efforts on the construction of an
extensive network of tunnels in Corregidor.

Thus, Malinta Tunnel, as it was called, was the only major

construction on the island after 1922. The tunnel proper is about 825
feet long and twenty-five feet wide. Twenty-four main laterals (thirteen in
the north side and eleven in the south side) were dug from the sides of
the tunnel. Each lateral had an average length of 160 feet and an
average width of fifteen feet.

64
 The second lateral (north side) from the east entrance leads to a
distinct group of twelve laterals. This served as a hospital during the
siege of Corregidor. The third lateral (north side) from the east entrance
served as MacArthur’s USAFFE Headquarters.

In the south side, the first lateral from the east entrance served
as Headquarters of the Harbor Defense Command of Maj. Gen. George
F. Moore. The fourth lateral from the east entrance (south side) leads to
another distinct group of laterals which was used as Quartermaster
supply storage. Gasoline storage was in the first lateral (north side) from
the west entrance.

During World War II, the US forces on Corregidor held out under
steady Japanese attack for twenty-seven days after the fall of Bataan.
Finally, on May 6, 1942, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright was forced to
surrender. Corregidor was recaptured by the United States forces on
February 16 - 22, 1945, and passed to the sovereignty of the Republic of
the Philippines in 1947.

The defense of the Philippines had always been considered by

1
US military planners as the “basic problem of Pacific strategy.” This was
the prevailing view that guided most American strategic planners up to
the outbreak of World War II. The first American official of consequence
to recognize the rationale behind this concept was Admiral George
Dewey who had gained some prominence as a naval hero after his
defeat of the Spanish fleet under Admiral Patricio Montojo in the now
famous Battle of Manila Bay on May 1, 1899. It was he who recom-
mended the establishment of a naval station in Luzon because this was
2
“the most valuable island in the Philippines.”

For a workable island in the Philippines, the US Army and Navy

were called upon to collaborate and cooperate most effectively. They
had their respective representatives in the Joint Board which was
created in 1903: four from the Army’s General Staff, and four from the
Navy’s General Board. Heading the proposal aired in April 1904 by Lt.
Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, US Army Chief of Staff, the Joint Board evolved a
3
series of war plans. This work started soon after Japan’s declaration of
war against Russia.

Among the war or colored plans* so evolved, War Plan “Orange”,

which called for the direct involvement of the Philippines, was frequently
updated by the Joint Board. The frequency of its revision was dictated
by the changes in the “internal scene.”

65
 Sometime on June 18, 1907, the Joint Board recommended to
President Theodore Roosevelt that “the (US) fleet be sent to the Orient
as soon as possible and the Army and Navy forces in the Philippines be
immediately deployed to protect the naval station at Subic Bay.” The
Board stated that the “United States would be compelled to take a
defensive attitude in the Pacific and maintain that attitude until
reinforcements could be sent.”

When the tension between the United States and Japan erupted
almost into a shooting, it was because of the latter’s triumph over Russia
in 1905 and the San Francisco School Board segregation order of 1906.
The following are weaknesses in American’s position in the Pacific
surface.

1. The need for the stationing of a major naval base in the

area.

2. That the Philippines could not be held, except at great

expense and with a large force.

President Roosevelt considered the Philippines a America’s

“heels of Achilles.” However, he “would rather see the US fight all her
life than to see her give them up to Japan or to any other nation under
duress.”

After a long debate, the Joint Board finally recommended the

plan to establish naval bases in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Cavite,
Philippines. The plan also envisioned the setting up of US Army
defensive installations on the islands of Corregidor, Caballo, El Fraile
and Carabao. This scheme of defense was religiously followed until the
outbreak of the war in the Pacific. American military planners also
foresaw that Japan would most likely be the United States’ opponent in
the Philippines.

At one time, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood advocated that a strong

US fleet should be based in the Philippines. This was to ensure the
adequate protection of the islands. However, the US Congress and the
Joint Board held a different view. Finally, these bodies decided that the
fleet facilities should be based in Hawaii. With this decision, the
Philippines was “relegated to a secondary place in strategic plans for the
Pacific and made all hopes for its defense dependent upon the security
of Hawaii and the ability of the fleet to move westward from Pearl
4
Harbor.”

66
Wood-Forbes Mission

This interim arrangement continued to be effective for sometime.

A permanent solution to the defense requirements of the Philippines had
yet to be found.

In March 1912, after Henry Fort Jones had submitted his report
to President Woodrow Wilson on the Filipinos’ “capacity to govern them
self,” the prospect on the grant of independence seemed bright. This
was the time when Congressman William A. Jones introduced a bill in
the lower house of the US Congress which sought to give “qualified”
independence to the Philippines by 1913 and complete independence by
1921. However, the bill was never deliberated upon.

The following year, Congressman Jones introduced the same

bill. By this time, he had been encouraged by President Wilson’s
commitment to the cause of greater autonomy for the country. The bill, in
its modified version, had not set definite date for the grant of
independence. What was so provided was that “independence would be
granted as soon as a stable government could be established in the
Philippines.” Thus, the House of Representatives approved the bill
without any opposition. In the Senate, the legislative proposal found
rough sailing. It was rejected mainly because may Republicans
interposed vigorous objections to it. Besides, there was a lack of material
time to consider its provisions.

Finally, on August 29, 1916, President Wilson signed the third

Jones Bill into law. This was after the House of Representative had
deleted the Clark amendment from the second Jones bill and after the
Senate, in consultation with the lower house, had passed the bill without
the accompanying Clark amendment.

The Jones Law, therefore, became the first organic act of the US
Congress which spelled out the American commitment to grant
independence to the Philippines. It stipulated the withdrawal of American
sovereignty from the Philippines and to recognize its independence as
soon as a stable government had been established therein. It also
declared that control of the Philippines’ domestic affairs be placed in the
hands of the Filipinos so that they would be better prepared to fully
assume the “responsibilities and enjoy the privileges of complete
independence.”

In 1921, there was a change in the administration of the United

67
States Government. This change had likewise brought on a new outlook
in the Philippine problem. President Warren G. Harding, a Republican
and newly installed President of the United States, was not inclined to
“pursue the program of independence envisioned in the Jones Law.” He
made this clear to Senate President Manuel L Quezon when the latter
went to Washington to find out the new President’s policy with regards to
the Philippines.

To justify his action, he decided to create a fact-finding body to

investigate Philippine conditions. President Harding was prompted to
take this alternative in view of the fact that when President Wilson
delivered his valedictory address to the US Congress in December 1920,
which recommended the grant of independence to the Philippines, he
was not satisfied with the contents of Wilson’s message. It was in
complete contradiction with documentary evidences. He wanted a more
accurate and comprehensive report on the Filipinos’ “readiness for
independence.”

Appointed as head of the special investigating mission was Maj

Gen Leonard Wood with William C Forbes as a member. Wood was a
former Chief of Staff of the US Army, 1910-1914. He had distinguished
himself as the first military governor of the Philippine Division, US Army.
Prior to his appointment as chairman of the fact-finding body, he was
being seriously considered by President Harding for the governor-
generalship of the Philippines. Forbes, on the other hand, was Secretary
of Commerce and Police, vice-governor-general, and governor-general
of the Philippines from 1909-1913.

On learning of these appointments, some Filipino leaders

protested the membership of Forbes in a special investigating body.
They premised their stand on the fact that Forbes was a leading member
of the Philippine Society, an organization opposed to grant of early
independence to the Philippines. They were likewise apprehensive that
the mission’s report would turn out to be prejudicial to Harrison’s
administration, and therefore inimical to the Philippines’ aspirations for
an independent statehood. At the conclusion of its investigations, the
Wood-Forbes mission reported to President Harding that “the great bulk
of the Christian Filipinos have a very natural desire for independence.
Most of them desire independence under the protection of the United
States.” The special investigating body concluded its report by stating
that “withdrawal from the Philippines would be betrayal to the Filipino
people…a distinct step backward in the path of progress, and a

68
discreditable neglect of our national duty.” By and large, however, the
findings of the Wooden-Forbes mission, while true and correct, were not
without prejudices and biases.

In a portion of the report, General Wood recommended the

creation of a military organization to help defend the Philippines. He
wrote: The American Government should at once take necessary steps
to organize, train, and equip such a defense force,” The
recommendation, however, was not acted upon simply because the
defense of the Philippines was the sole responsibility of the United
5
States.

The findings and recommendations of the special investigating

body were deemed to have been approved by President Harding. His
subsequent appointment of General Wood as governor-general of the
Philippines stood as concrete evidence of this. However, the report
displeased most Filipino leaders.

Wood’s Administration and Accomplishments

Shortly after his victory, President Harding offered Leonard

Wood the governor-generalship of the Philippines. This was in
recognition of Wood’s proven competence and demonstrated efficiency
as an administrator. However, Wood spurned the offer in as much as he
was not interested in the position. He had his eyes glued on the
Secretary of War portfolio. Prior to this, he had accepted the provostship
of the University of Pennsylvania.

Having been prevailed upon to accept the highest executive

position in the Philippines, Wood finally acceded. His administration of
the country’s affairs was in sharp contrast with Harrison’s stewardship.
He ran the government in accordance with the dictates or mandate of the
Jones Law. His policy of peaceful collaboration with the Filipino leaders
was exemplary. While exercising his vast executive powers, he had
gradually recovered those that had been unwittingly yielded by Harrison
to these Filipino leaders. In the end, he had incurred the ire and
opposition of these highly-placed individuals who had enjoyed the
prerogatives and privileges previously given them.

The animosities that developed between the Filipino leaders on

one hand and Wood on the other soon evolved into an open split. The
following were the factors that contributed directly to this:

69
 1. Ray Conley Case - A detective in the Manila Police
Department, Conley was charged with immoral conduct and misbehavior
in office. As a result, Secretary of Interior Jose P. Laurel suspended him.
When subsequently brought to trial, the court dismissed the case. On
the insistence of Laurel, Wood placed Conley under administrative
investigation. The investigating committee was advised by Wood to
reinstate Conley. Wood finally retired Conley from the service. For this
arbitrary action, Laurel resigned. The other Filipino members of Wood’s
cabinet followed suit. Quezon and Roxas likewise resigned from the
Council of State.

2. Abolition of Board of Control and Council State - The

Board of Control was responsible for the management of government
corporations engaged in business. Declaring that the Jones Law had
vested in him executive control over these corporations and that the
creation of the Board of Control was unconstitutional, he abolished the
same. This was opposed by the Philippine Legislature. The Council of
State suffered the same fate as the Board of Control. Wood governed
the country without the cooperation of the Philippine Legislature.

3. Use of the Veto Power - The Filipino leaders accused

Wood of gross violation of the provisions of the Jones Law. This
stemmed from the fact that Wood resorted to the unrestricted use of his
veto powers. This can best be exemplified by citing relevant figures.
Out of the 411 bills submitted to him for his approval, 124 were vetoes.
This was done in a period of five years.

These constituted the seamy side of Wood’s administration. The

running controversy between him and the Filipino leaders went on
unabated until his death on August 27, 1927.

Notwithstanding several setbacks that he had encountered while

in the office, Wood was still considered an efficient administrator. His
major accomplishments were the following: rehabilitation of the
Philippine National Bank; resuscitation of the government’s financial
condition; revival of the educational, sanitary and public work system.
First and foremost, Wood was the first high American official to come out
openly for the organization of a distinctly Filipino military force that would
operate as part of an adequate system of defense for the Philippines. He
anchored his recommendation that this was a necessity if the Philippines
was to be fully prepared for self-government.

70
Independence Missions

The preamble of the Jones Law, which promised the grant of

independence to the Philippines, impelled Filipino leaders to embark on
the independence campaign. At the end of World War I, this involved the
United States, these leaders found most opportune to renew the struggle
for the independent nationhood. They were motivated by the doctrine of
“self-determination” as espoused by President Wilson when he
enunciated his policy guideline for peace settlement in 1919.

As an initial step, the Philippine Legislature created the

Commission of Independence on November 7, 1918. This body was to
study all aspects of the independence problem. Early that year, the first
independence mission led by Quezon sailed to the United States. On its
arrival at Washington, the mission was received by Secretary of War
Newton Baker in behalf of President Wilson who was at that time in
France. He told the members thereof that the day was not far off when
the Philippines would become an independent country. This was a mere
icing, however. In 1919, all hopes for the early grant of independence
vanished into thin air when the Republican leaders of the US Congress
decided to shelve the question of Philippine independence.

More independence missions were sent to the United States. As

in the first, all these failed to secure the necessary support from the US
Congress. It was then the prevailing consensus in the US that the early
grant of Philippine independence would be inimical to American vested
interests in the Philippines.

In 1930, there emerged a change in the traditional view on the

Philippine question. This was brought about by the result of the
congressional elections held that year where the Democrats gained a
slight margin over the Republicans. Thus, the reins of control of the US
Congress were passed on the Democrats who viewed the Philippine
problem from a non-partisan plank. The prospects for the grant of
independence were indeed very reassuring.

On December 6 of the following year, another independence

mission was sent to Washington. Jointly headed by Sergio Osmeña,
Senate President Protempore, and Manuel A. Roxas, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the mission was in the best position to lobby
for the cause of Philippine independence. The mission allied itself with
some American vested interests and pressure groups in order to obtain

71
the best concession. These aggrupations later became the mission’s
aggressive allies.

Hare - Hawes - Cutting Act

Shortly after, Representative Butler B. Hare filed a bill in the

lower house. Under the proposed legislative measure, independence
would be granted after an eight-year transition period. During this time, a
Commonwealth Government would be functioning under a constitution
ratified by the Filipinos. The bill hurdled its road block.

Another independence measure was introduced in the Senate by

Senators Harry B. Hawes and Bronson Cutting. The bill offered to grant
independence to the Philippines after either a seventeen-year transition
period. Meanwhile, the Hare bill was introduced in the Senate with
several proposed amendments. This was resorted to in order to make it
substantially similar with the pending Hare-Cutting bill. After threshing
out widely-divergent views, both houses of the US Congress agreed to
adopt the Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill as the common independence
measures.

The consolidated measure sought to provide for a ten-year

transition period. At the lapse of this mandated interregnum, the United
States would grant independence to the Philippines. Among the salient
provisions of the bill were the following:

1. Immediate calling of a constitutional convention to

formulate a constitution for the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

2. The Commonwealth Government would be autonomous

in nature, but the President of the United States was empowered to
approve or disapprove constitutional amendments and to control its
indebtedness, currency system, and foreign affairs.

3. Creation of the office of the American High

Commissioner who would act as the representative of the President of
the United States in the Philippines.

4. The US would retain land or other property as

determined by the President of the United States to be used as military
and other reservations

72
 On the economic side, the bill had some pertinent provisions of
far-reaching significance. Among these were the establishment of an
immigration quota for the Filipinos, the tax-free entry of American goods
into the Philippines, and the limitation of imported items from the
Philippines. Free trade between the two countries would culminate at the
end of the ten-year transition period.

The Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill had its setback when President

Herbert Hoover vetoed it on January 13, 1933. His veto was based on
the premise that the bill would be a “repudiation of the United States’
responsibility to her own people, to the Philippines, and to the world.” On
the same day, the House of Representatives overrode his veto. The
Senate did likewise four days later. Thus, the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act
became a signal triumph not only for the Osmeña-Roxas independence
mission, but also for the American agricultural and labor groups whose
only motivation was the protection of their selfish interests in utter
disregard of the welfare of the Philippines or the United States.

In the wake of the passage of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Law a

bitter and acrimonious controversy over it soon surfaced in and out of the
halls of the Philippine Legislature. It also resulted into a rift in the ranks of
the Nationalista Party, then the ruling political grouping. Quezon headed
the anti faction; Osmeña and Roxas were the leaders of the pro
segment.

Because of some objectionable provisions of the law, Quezon

had to react with haste. He personally headed an unofficial mission to
Washington in March 1933 whose members were hand-picked by him. It
was his hope that he could still secure a more acceptable version to the
Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. But he was sadly disappointed. He returned
with the Osmeña-Roxas mission in June of that year after having failed
to convince US authorities to give the Philippines a better independence
measure.

Back home, Quezon lined up his forces in the Philippine

Legislature in preparation for the outright rejection of the Hare-Hawes-
Cutting Law. To achieve this goal, he reorganized both houses of the
legislative body on its opening in July 1933. He subsequently installed a
new leadership, seeing to it that only men or his trust and confidence
were at the helm of the key positions available.

With this preparation, the stage was set for the final showdown.
And on October 17, 1933, as was anticipated by Quezon, the Philippine

73
Legislature rejected the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act on the ground that it
contained four provisions which were deemed inimical to the best
interest of the Philippines. Later, the legislative body designated Quezon
as head of another independence mission to the United States with the
primary objective of securing a better legislation.

In 1934, meanwhile, the Filipino leaders became military-minded.

Prior to this, they paid little attention to military preparedness as a factor
vital to Philippine independence. The new atmosphere prompted the
Philippine Legislature to pass Bill No. 735 which authorized the creation
of a Bureau of National Defense and the inclusion of military education in
the curricula of public schools. The proposed bureau would function as
the sole agency responsible for the planning and coordination of all
matters pertaining to national security.

Unfortunately, Governor-General Frank Murphy vetoed the bill

on the ground that the Philippine Government was not in a position to
meet the financial requirements of a new agency. Besides, it would be
better to avail of the services of the US Army and Navy “experts”
equipped by years of experience and study on the technical aspects of
the military defense of the Philippines.

With the prospect of the establishments of the Commonwealth

Government in 1935 becoming brighter, Filipino leaders took steps to
plan for an applicable defense system. Towards this end, Senate
President Manuel L Quezon requested the US Secretary of War to
recommend to the US Congress to amend an act which was passed on
May 19, 1926. The law authorized the detail of US Army, Navy and
Marine Corps officers and men with government of other American
republics to assist them in military and naval matters, and the
amendment sought would make the provisions of that law equally
applicable to the Philippines.

Tydings - McDuffie Act

While in Washington, Quezon found to his dismay that American

executive and legislative leaders appeared intractable in their position to
give the Philippines a better independence measure. At the time, they
were deeply engrossed in the implementation of President Franklin D
Roosevelt’s “Deal” program whose immediate aim was to solve the
depression problems. In other words, Quezon’s mission to the US capital
was doomed from the very beginning.

74
 Caught in a dilemma as a result of this development, Quezon felt
he would be personally embarrassed if he will return to the Philippines
without the desired legislation. To save face, he had entered into a
secret agreement with Senator Millard E Tydings, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Territories, and Insular Affairs, and Representative
John McDuffie, Chairman of the House Committee on Territories and
Insular Affairs. Their agreement centered on the extension of the life of
the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act to October 17, 1934. This would afford the
Filipinos another opportunity to accept law.

In accordance with Quezon-Tydings-McDuffie agreement on

February 2, 1934, President Roosevelt asked the Congress to enact a
new independence measure for the Philippines. In the Senate, Senator
Tydings introduced a bill which was the replica of the Hare-Hawes-
Cutting Law. Representative McDuffie did likewise in the lower house.
After some lengthy debates, both houses of Congress approved the bill
which was subsequently signed into law on March 24. Not long after, the
Philippine Legislature officially accepted the Tydings-McDuffie Act. The
new law contained a provision allowing the final settlement on naval
bases and fueling stations based on equitable terms and conditions.

The passage of Tydings-McDuffie Act, which was not the first

piece of legislation offering independence to the Philippines, enhanced
the leadership of Quezon. Because of it, he became the undisputed
leader of the Nationalista Party and the government.

As provided for the law, several conditions were to be fulfilled

before the Commonwealth Government could be established. The
following were the conditions to be met: holding of a constitutional
convention to draft a constitution to be submitted to the US President for
his approval: ratification of the constitution through a plebiscite after its
approval; and holding of general elections to choose the officers of the
Commonwealth government after the plebiscite. The law further provided
that the lapse of ten years, the United States would withdraw her
sovereignty over the Philippines and thereafter recognize her political
independence.

The Tydings-McDuffie Act further stipulated that certain

transitory provisions be included in the proposed constitution of the
Philippines. On such provision would grant American citizens equal civil
rights as those enjoyed by Filipino citizens. The other would vest in the
United States control over the Philippines’ currency, trade, immigration
and foreign affairs. Without these aspects integrated into the charter, the

75
chances of its approval by the US President would be very slim. These
were the basic guidelines that the constitutional convention would have
to consider.

In accordance with the mandate of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the

Filipino electorate trooped to designated voting centers on July 10, 1934
to choose the 202 delegates to the constitutional convention. Those
elected represented the cream of the Filipino people. On the morning of
July 30, the convention was inaugurated. After the opening ceremonies,
an election of officers followed. Elected were Claro M. Recto, president;
Ruperto Montinola and Teodoro Santiago, first and second vice-
presidents, respectively; Narciso Pimentel, secretary; and Narciso
Diokno, sergeant-at-arms.

After barely seven months of arduous work, that constitutional

convention came out with the approved draft of the Philippine
constitution. The epochal event unfolded on February 8, 1935. Its
approval by President Roosevelt came about on March 23. On May 14,
the Filipinos ratified it through a plebiscite.

Finally, in the general elections held in September, the Filipino

electorates choose Quezon as President of the Commonwealth. He had
won over his two rivals Emilio Aguinaldo and Gregorio Aglipay. Elected
with him as Vice-President was Osmeña. When the Commonwealth was
inaugurated on November 15, the reins of government were reposed in
the hands of the Filipinos. On their shoulders was heaped the grave
responsibility of shaping their own destiny.

Commonwealth Inauguration, November 1935

76
 PART III

COMMONWEALTH PERIOD

77
 st
1 Anniversary of the Philippine Commonwealth, November 1936

Army Trainee, 1938

78
 CHAPTER VI

INCEPTION OF THE ARMY

After his inauguration as President of the Commonwealth of the

Philippines on November 15, 1935, Quezon had to grapple with three
basic problems, the solution of which would eventually lead to full
political independence. These centered on three pivotal aspects-political
stability, national security, and economy which had to be weaned away
from the American nurturing influence. He considered the problem on
national security as the more pressing and urgent one.

Basic Premise

In his inaugural address, President Quezon stressed the urgent

need to formulate an adequate defense program for the Philippines. He
anchored his stand that a truly independent republic which would be set
up at the expiration of the ten-year commonwealth period would need a
military organization to protect the State from both its internal and
external enemies.

Evidently, the Chief Executive had been influenced to enunciate

that policy on the strength of a provision of law which stated that “the
defense of the State is a prime duty of the government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty, all citizens may be required by law to render
personal military or civil service.” As early as February 15, 1899,
General Antonio Luna had worded the same principle as an “inalienable
right to defend our soil.” This dictum became the basic premise under
which a defense apparatus would be organized and made operational.
Thus, Quezon paved the way for the Commonwealth Government to
make the initial venture into realm of military preparedness.

The official pronouncement of President Quezon was in

complete contradiction vis-a-vis the American position. For one, the
American authorities held the view that the Philippines offered no or little
defense potentials that in case of aggression from without, it would easily
fall into enemy hands in the initial stages of the war. For another, there
was no imbalance of power in the Asian region which could have
necessitated the installation of an intricate defensive network in the
country. And finally, the United States’ occupation of the Philippines was
so uncertain as to require her to plan for the establishment of an effective
1
defense mechanism.

79
PRESIDENT MANUEL L. QUEZON
Philippine Commonwealth

80
 This state of unpreparedness alarmed the Filipino leaders. This
fear arose from several considerations, among which were the following:

1. Japan’s aggressive economic of Asia indicated her

consuming passion to establish a sphere of influence in the area.

2. In case of aggression, Japan would certainly covet the

Philippines because of her rich agricultural and mineral resources.

3. The Philippines, because of her strategic position, lay

directly at Japan’s war path should the latter decide to assume a
belligerent posture.

Apprehensive over these developments, Quezon requested the

US Government to make available to the Commonwealth the services of
General Douglas MacArthur, whose term as Chief of Staff of the US
Army was soon to expire, as Military Adviser and Chief of a Philippine
Military Mission composed of US Army officers. This request was
formally considered in as much as a previous legislation had been
amended which authorized the detail of US Army officers to the
Philippines. Immediately upon his arrival, Quezon conferred upon
MacArthur the honorific title of the Field Marshall of the Army of the
Philippines.

Quezon’s choice of MacArthur as Military Adviser to the

Commonwealth was not without any basis. The latter’s professional
competence and personal qualification suited him best to that exalted
position. “In Quezon’s judgment,” Maj. Dwight D Eisenhower said, “no
other man could generate in the Philippine people the spirit as well as
the willingness for work and sacrifices needed in the development of
2
defense forces that had to be created from scratch…”

On his assumption of his responsibilities as Military Adviser and

head of the US Military Mission to the Philippines, MacArthur
immediately buckled down to work. With the help of his principal
assistants, Maj. Dwight D. Eisenhower and Maj. James B. Ord, he
evolved the framework for the national defense plan with due regard to
the country’s financial capabilities.

Approval of Commonwealth Act No. I

MacArthur and his staff officers at the US Military Mission raced

against time in their efforts to complete their studies on the country’s de-

81
fense plan. In no time at all, the first draft of the plan which would serve
as the basis for legislative action by the unicameral Philippine Assembly
was presented and submitted to MacArthur for final approval. However,
the program, as submitted, had some innate defects.

Recalling later his role in the preparation of the national defense

scheme, Eisenhower wrote:

“During my last months in the Office of the Chief of Staff, Maj.

James B. Ord and I were engaged in devising a defense program which
we hoped would be within the economic capabilities of the Philippine
Government… The defense plan he and I worked up did not recognize
that we already had a principal enemy: money or its lack. We had made
assumptions about the availability of munitions and set a merger pay
scale for the conscript army favorable to a low budget. We came up with
a program of 50 million pesos that is 25 million dollars in an annual
budget.

“Even before we had this outline plan completed, we were called

before General MacArthur who told us that the sums we had been
contemplating were entirely beyond the financial capabilities of the
Philippine Government and that we have had to reduce our estimates by
50 percent. So we started off anew, discarding the earlier plan.

We decided that during the early years, at least the Philippines

could get along with obsolete American Army equipment. We assumed
that we could get it on loan and without cost. We reduced the pay of the
Philippines conscript to a little more that cigarette money, and cut down
the number of officers to the point where this would be dangerously close
to an army of recruits only. We thought that such a makeshift force
would be rejected out of hand as worthless for defense.

“Instead, we were told that Quezon could produce a revenue of

16 million pesos a year for the project, but no more. This made for a
paper-thin plan. Once again, we reduced the number of divisions and
the length of training… All Jimmy Ord and I could do was to assemble
our proposals for a skeleton force that someday might have flesh put on
its bones. We turned it in with fingers crossed. This done, we set about
drafting a law to present to the Philippine Legislature to have the force
authorized.”

In explaining the rationale behind the evolution of the national

defense plan, MacArthur said: “By 1946, when the Commonwealth would

82
 SIGNING OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT
This became the legal basis for the creation of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines

PA HIGH COMMAND, 1936

have a trained military force of forty divisions comprising about 400,000
men. The divisions, whose equipment and weapons were more or less

83
American loans, would be distributed strategically throughout the islands.
In the event of crisis, the hope and expectation was that modern
4
weapons would be supplied by the United States.”

After threshing out all the details of the proposed National

Defense Plan, MacArthur submitted the results of this study to President
Quezon, together with his recommendations. At this juncture, MacArthur
entertained the highest hopes and expectations that the plan would merit
the favorable consideration of both the President and the National
Assembly.

President Quezon, after spending considerable time in going

over MacArthur’s formal report, took immediate steps to have the plan
approved by the National Assembly. It did not take long for that branch
of the Commonwealth to pass and approve the necessary legislation.
And on December 21, 1935, Quezon signed the legislative measure into
law which hitherto became officially known as Commonwealth Act No. I,
or more popularly referred to as the National Defense Act. The law is the
first to come out of the aspiration for the establishment of a military
organization that would secure their independence and freedom. The
National Defense Act became the legal basis for the creation of the Army
of the Philippines. Among other things, it specifically prescribed the
national defense policy of the Philippines, such as the following:

“1. The preservation of the State is the obligation of every

citizen. The security of the Philippines and the freedom, independence,
and perpetual neutrality of the Philippines Republic shall be guaranteed
by the employment of all citizens without distinction of age, sex and all
resources.

2. The employment of the nations’ citizens and resources for

national defense shall be effected by a national mobilization.

3. The national mobilization shall include the execution of

all measures necessary to pass from peace to war footing.

4. The civil authority shall always be supreme. The

President of the Philippines, as Commander-in-Chief of all military
forces, shall be responsible that mobilization measures are prepared at
all times.

5. A national mobilization shall be ordered in any case if

threatened or actual aggression.

84
 6. The national defense organization shall be adopted as
closely as possible to the territorial and administrative organization of the
Philippines.

7. The mobilization plans of financial, industrial, economic,

social, intellectual, and moral forces and resources of the Philippines
shall conform to the provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and
shall be prepared by the executive departments concerned in
accordance with the following policies: the respective responsibilities of
the several executive departments in mobilization planning will be
prescribed by the President; and forces and resources shall be employed
so as to secure unity and continuity of efforts until the threat or actual
aggression of the Philippines shall have been overcomed.

8. No profit incident to war shall accrue to any individual,

corporation, association or partnership.

9. Thus, we see that the basic defense policy revolved

essentially around the Constitutional dictum that “the Philippines
renounces was as instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
5
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.”

Role of McArthur

The passage of Commonwealth Act No.1 was a personal

triumph for McArthur who was its chief architect. His percipience enabled
him to solve a defense plan that ensured for the country adequate
protection from external aggression. The monumental task that he had
successfully accomplished endeared him to the Filipinos, most especially
President Quezon, who had personally chosen him to spearhead a
difficult undertaking.

As envisaged by McArthur in the national defense plan, the

Philippine military establishment would primarily be a “citizen army,” a
concept which had been proven to be effective and successful in
Switzerland. It would have two main components - the Regular and
Reserve Forces. The Regular Force would be “made up of individuals
who follow the professions of arms as a career, and who are constantly
6
in the service of the Government” The Reserve Force, on the other
hand, would “consist of those who able-bodied male citizens between the
7
ages of twenty-one and fifty who have been duly trained for military”.

85
 A gradual development of the Reserve Force was also
envisioned. It would be augmented each year by approximately 40,000
men who would be in cadre training for five and one-half months. This
would be supplemented by short refresher training periods. Under the
master plan, a force of approximately 40,000 reservist would be
organized and until July 4, 1946, the date when Philippine independence
would be granted as a guaranteed by the Tydings-McDuffie Act.

As part of the program, preparatory military training would be

made compulsory in all elementary and high schools. Reserve Officer
Training Corps (ROTC) units would also be established in all colleges
and universities.

To be assured of the uniform development of the “citizen army,”

the master defense plan called for the division of the whole Philippines
into ten Military Districts. These were similar in structure with the corps
areas that existed in the continental United States before World War II.
MacArthur contemplated that mobilization of the country’s manpower and
material resources for training or for any imagined or actual emergency
would be made easier that way. Further, the development of the Army in
conjunction with the national defense preparedness program would gain
added momentum.

An off-shore patrol would also be organized as part of the

military establishment. Owing to the critical finances of the
Commonwealth, MacArthur recommended to President Quezon the
purchase of several Torpedo boats that would harass a potential enemy
and force him to make naval landings in isolated places, but not to
prevent him from making landings on a massive scale. MacArthur also
recommended in the defense plan the formation of an Air Corps as part
of the Army to be created. He envisioned that this element would be
equipped with bombers capable of interdicting hostile surface vessels in
any of the Philippines’ territorial waters. With these essential requisites,
MacArthur was highly optimistic that the basic defense requirements of
the Philippines had been satisfactorily met. In doing this for the country,
MacArthur had been guided by the following fundamental concept:

“It was realized that development of a reasonably adequate

defense in the islands was important to the US as well as to the Filipinos
themselves. Very naturally, the US cannot ignore or forget its thirty-five
years of liberal instruction, patient training, and material as well as
sentimental investment in the Philippines. Not only would the growth of
democracy and democratic institutions in the Western Pacific be

86
completely destroyed should the Philippines ever fall under the
domination of a despotic foreign power, but American pride and prestige
would receive a severe, if not unendurable blow. Local unrest and
strained international relationship would almost certainly create an
embarrassing situation for the US and might conceivably draw us into a
major war.

“To epitomize the foregoing in a single paragraph, it is obvious

that the best interests of both the US and the Philippines will be served
by taking the necessary steps to guarantee the safety of these islands.
Thus, will be assured of the un-interrupted development of the Filipino-
American culture and economy, founded here through the cooperative
effort of the two people. With adequate protection, the country will
flourish as a brilliant product of democracy, contribute to stability and
peace in the Far East, and advance the living standards of its people to
the full extent attainable under efficient use of its own resources.
Without protection, it will inevitably disintegrate and be desolated by
8
destructive forces.”

On the gradual development of a defensive force for the

Philippines, MacArthur said in part:

“Another fundamental principle is the necessity for a gradual,

rather than sudden, growth of the required defense establishment.
Consideration of economy and efficiency preclude an immediate and
complete organization of a force of the necessary eventual strength. A
modern army is a complex organism, and its defensive power is not
measured solely by the number of its soldiers. Suitable armament,
proper organization, professional technique and skill, applicable tactical
doctrine and, above all, trained leadership are the very soul of an army’s
combat efficiency. However, lavish maybe the expenditures, these things
cannot be instantly acquired. They are brought about only through
thoughtful, painstaking, and persistent effort intelligently directed.
Progress in these fields will determine the rate at which the whole
development, including increases in personal strength may logically and
efficiently proceed.

“Nevertheless, it is imperative that our plans reach fruition by the

time the beneficent protection of the US shall have been finally
withdrawn. We have ten years, and only ten, in which to initiate and com-

87
 GEN. DOUGLAS McARTHUR with COL VICENTE LIM,
st
Commander, 1 Army Regiment, 1937

plete the development of our defensive structure, the creation of which,

because of the conditions of our past existence, must now begin at the
very foundations. Not a moment is to be lost. Starting immediately, we
must build economically and gradually, but steadily and surely, so as to
attain within the time permitted us the highest possible efficiency at the
9
lowest possible cost.”

88
 The overall defense plan developed by MacArthur envisioned the
Philippines so well defended that it would cost too clearly for any power
to attempt its conquest. He ably defended his stand by saying:
“Manifestly, the keynote to the defensive arch necessary to
create this relatively strong position in the Philippines is the trained
citizen army which will compel every attack to assume the character of
major overseas operation and will confront the enemy with the certainty
of staggering costs in money and men. Failure to provide such a force
will expose every section of the Archipelago to capture by even a small
organized force and will permit any potential invader to seize and
dominate the Islands at will.

“History is replete with instances to prove that areas that are rich
in actual and potential resources will always fall prey to a predatory force
unless the inhabitants thereof are prepared to impose a cost of conquest
on the invader that will exceed any hope he may logically entertain of
political or economic advantage. This is the degree of protection
envisioned by the Philippine defense plan. Its object is to ensure peace –
a peace of self respect, a peace which upholds the Christian virtues and
defies the threat of rapacious greed, a peace that will mean continued
happiness and freedom for God-worshipping and democratic people.
Without the stability of safety, the very foundations of modern civilization,
life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness – become impossible.

Many, however, raised objections to MacArthur’s national

defense plan on grounds of inadequacy and organic weaknesses. Some
Filipino leaders would forego independence so that full protection could
come from the US. The Japanese propaganda machinery tried to
undermine the plan by discrediting the Quezon-MacArthur team. Russia
even took steps “prejudicing the Far East against the US.”

In an effort to allay these fears and to combat the adverse

propaganda, President Quezon spoke in public saying:

“The purpose of the plan is to prevent war. Its object is peace

without battle. Its possibility of attainment is based upon an adequate
defense establishment. This is to be of such strength as to impose such
a sort of conquest upon a potential invader as would exclude any hope
he might logically entertain any political or economic advantage to be
gained by victory. By thus removing any possibility of conquest
representing an economic shortcut, the chance of predatory attack would
10
be lessened.”

89
Organization and Composition

Right after passage of CA No.1, President Quezon took steps to

organize the Army, pursuant to Executive Order No 11, dated January
11, 1936. Subsequently, he had Col Jose de los Reyes of the PC
recalled from retirement, promoted him to brigadier general, and
designated him Acting Chief of Staff of the Army of the Philippines, Brig.
Gen. Basilio J Valdes and Col Guillermo B Francisco were named
Assistant Chiefs of Staff.

There was widespread jubilation over the creation of the Army.

For the first time in the evolutionary growth of the country, a national
army was established. Since the advent of Spanish rule up to 1936, the
Filipinos had known only of small, detached groups of crudely-armed
men that fought on the shores of Mactan, the rugged hills of Bohol, the
verdant plains of Central Luzon, the mountain ranges of Zambales, and
on the barren foothills of the Ilocos under daring, intrepid leaders who
were all bound by in intangible imponderable – the overgrowing zeal for
the nation, liberty, and solidarity.

Prior to this period there had been any serious effort to weld into
a strong, resilient military structure the desperate elements of the
Philippine body policy. An essential military force established for the
defense of the Philippine territory and the democratic ideology with a
centralized command radiating into all parts of the country had never
been organized.

On his assumption of the office as Acting Chief of Staff, de los

Reyes established his headquarters at the Oriente Building on Reina
Regente Street, Binondo, Manila. Consequently, he formed the Army
Central General Staff whose members were PC officers of the US
11
Army. He likewise formulated regulations to cover the proper
functioning of the fledgling Army.
st
Seven days after the creation of the Army, the 1 Regular Di-
12
vision was activated at Camp Murhpy. It immediately became the regu-
lar component and nucleus of the Army.

The PC became part of the Army of the Philippines when its

transfer to the latter was accomplished on January 21. 1936. Almost
two-thirds of the 10,000 personnel of the Army’s Regular Force came
from the PC. As such, it was reduced to a division under the supervision

90
of a Provost Marshal General. But it still continued to discharge its
regular police duties. Its officers and enlisted men were formed into
teams to initially serve as cadres in the various training centers which
were then in the process of being organized. They were to handle the
instruction of twenty-year old trainees who were expected to register for
mandatory military training beginning January 1937.

Not long thereafter, it was found out that the PC could not
continue exercising police functions while performing Army duties without
adversely affecting either role. This incompatibility hamstrung the Army’s
training program. To solve this dilemma, the PC was divested of its
police powers and subsequently made an integral part of the Army.

The Reserve Force, as stipulated in the National Defense Act,

was to be built up by conscription of twenty-year old Filipino males at an
average annual rate of 40,000. Training of this reserve manpower was to
be undertaken by the military districts. A total of forty reserve divisions
would be organized at the end of the transition period.

On May 4, 1936, Quezon reorganized the Army’s Central

13
General Staff. Col Paulino Santos was recalled to active duty,
promoted to major general, and took command of the Army from de los
Reyes who had become the Provost Marshall General of the PC. Major
General Valdez became Santos’ Deputy Chief of Staff. On the same day,
Col Guillermo B Francisco was appointed brigadier general and
st
designated Commanding General of the 1 Regular Division. Santos’
incumbency as Chief of Staff saw the introduction of two major
innovations: organization of the Regular Army, and the formation of the
Central General Staff which worked out an ambitious military
preparedness program. As part of the latter, military training camps
which cost the government a gargantuan sum were established
throughout the country.

Late in 1936, Santos organized the Central General Staff as

follows: War Plans Division; Intelligence Operation and Training Division;
Supply and Personnel Division; and Constabulary Division. Selected
officers with proven competence filled slots in the Central General Staff.
In October 1937, the headquarters of the Army was transferred
from the Oriente Building to the Bureau of Printing Building along Burgos
Drive, Manila. Here, the Central General Staff underwent another
transformation. The Supply and Personnel Division became two district
entities upon their actual separation. The other general staff offices
remained unchanged. But on June 23, 1938, the Constabulary Division

91
 14
was constituted as the National Police Force. This change was brought
about by the year-long unsatisfactory performance of the State Police
Force which had taken over the police function of the PC. Created on
October 26, 1936, by Commonwealth Act. No. 88, is the State Police
Force, which was an agglomeration of all police forces all over the
country, was abolished by the National Assembly.

Aside from the General Staff Corps, the Army’s Regular Force
had the following arms and services as its components: Infantry, Cavalry,
Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Air Corps, Off-Shore Patrol, Adjutant
General Service, Judge Advocate General Service, Inspector General
Service, Quartermaster Service, Finance Service, Medical Service,
Ordnance Service, Chaplain Service and Corps of Professors.

On January 1, 1939, Maj. Gen. Basilio J. Valdes became the

Army’s Chief of Staff when his predecessor, Maj. Gen. Santos was made
to retire. Brig. Gen. Vicente Lim, graduate of the US Military Academy at
West Point, New York, class of 1914, was named Deputy Chief of Staff.
It was during this period when the Department of National Defense was
15
created to relieve the President as Commander-in-Chief, of direct
supervision and control over the army. The Army Chief of Staff was
placed under the immediate executive supervision of the Secretary of
National Defense. Honorable Teofilo Sison of Pangasinan was the first to
occupy that important position.

The Central General Staff was further revitalized. It consisted of

the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, five Assistant Chiefs of Staff, a
Secretary, and such other officers who were recommended for service in
the general staff by the Chief of Staff and approved by the President. As
reorganized, the Central General Staff consisted of the Strategic War
Plans and Reserve Unit Employment Division; Operations, Training and
Intelligence Division; Supply and Industrial War Plans Division;
16
Personnel Division; and Budget Division. The Operations, Training and
Intelligence Division had established an Intelligence Section on July 21,
1939, a time when war clouds loomed heavily over Europe.

In June 1941, on the suggestion of high-ranking Army officers,

the structural organization of the US War Department General Staff was
adopted as the basis for the further streamlining of the Central General
Staff. This had the concurrence of the American military advisers. As a
result, the Intelligence Division was activated as a separate and distinct
general staff office.

92
BRIG GEN JOSE DE LOS REYES
st
1 Chief of Staff, Philippine Army

BRIG GEN PAULINO SANTOS

Medal for Valor Awardee

93
Rationale for its Development

To professionalize the Army, master development plan had been

evolved. Both its regular and reserve components were to be developed
simultaneously through rigorous training in military service schools and
training camps all of which were established primarily to enhance the
professional growth of all military personnel. Some of these still exist
today.

Of these military educational institutions, the Philippine Military

Academy was tasked to provide college level education to prospective
officers. Its inception, therefore, was a necessity in as much as it had
been the primary source of regular officers for the Army’s Regular Force.

Several service schools were established in Camp Murphy

because of its central location and the presence of adequate housing
facilities which made it the most ideal site as a training venue. All these
st
schools were placed under the administrative control of the 1 Regular
Division. Between July and December 1936, five of these service
schools held their sessions in Camp Murphy. These were the Cadre
School for Regular Officers, while the other was for Reserve Officers,
Mess Management School, and District Training Center.

On June 19, 1936, the Reserve Officer Service School was

inaugurated in Baguio. Its establishment stemmed from the need to have
an adequate number of officers to man the various training cadres. This
school was under the stewardship of Capt. Bonners F Fellers, an officer
of the Coast Artillery Corps, US Army. The institution offered a three-
month course of instructions in basic infantry to professionals who had
previous military training. The ROSS held its subsequent classes during
summer. However, the course was shortened to two months. After the
summer of 1939, the name of this school was changed to Reserve
Officer Training School (ROTS), which continued to function until the out-
break of the war.

Early in 1938 the General Service School was founded in Baguio

with Lt. Col. Telesforo Martinez as its first commandant. This was a
higher-level military service school. It occupied the site of the ROSS and
had branches in Camp Paciano Rizal at Los Banos Laguna, and Camp
Dau, Pampanga. Forty student-officers were admitted into its first class.
Twenty of these camps from the Regular Force, the other half
represented the reserve component represented the reserve component.
The school started its first class of February 1, 1938. The course of in-

94
 HON. TEOFILO SISON
st
1 Secretary of National Defense
November 1, 1939 - July 15, 1941

95
struction, which had a ten-month duration, included subjects on infantry,
field artillery, coast artillery, and special and general staff functions. In
early 1940, Maj Milton A Hill relieved Lt. Col Telesforo Martinez as
commandant.

Military planners visualized that in the long-range development

program of the Reserve Force, a large number of officers would be
needed to man the reserve divisions to be organized. They therefore,
authorized the establishment of a School for Reserve Commission as
another potential source of officers. This service school began its
operations in July 1937. Three such schools were located in Camp Ord,
Tarlac, Camp Kiethly (now Camp Amai Pakpak), Lanao and Camp Dau,
later renamed Camp del Pilar, Pampanga. The first two gave specialized
training in infantry. That in Camp Dau was for the training of prospective
artillery officers.

A number of service schools which gave specialized and

advanced training also existed. These were the Medical Field Service
School and the Infantry School, both of which were located in Camp
Murphy, the Quartermaster School at Numancia Street, Manila, the
Signal Corps School in Fort William McKinley (now Fort Andres
Boniofacio), and the Motor Transport School at Port Area Manila. Of
these institutions, only the Motor Transport School opened its doors to
both officers and men. The rest offered courses exclusively for officers.

The emergence of a national crisis in 1941 necessitated the

establishment of a Division Staff School in Bagiuo. Col. Clifford Bluemel,
a US Army Officer, was its first commandant. Founded on September 29,
1941, the school offered the abbreviated Command and General Course
for prospective division commanders, general staff officers, artillery
officers, and regimental commanders of the ten reserve divisions that
had already been alerted to be called to active duty. It ended its session
in November 15.

Sometime later, a number of Troop Schools were established.

Their opening was in response to the need for more officers for the vastly
expanded Army. Able-bodied individuals who had finished the basic
ROTC course were qualified for attendance in these schools whose
curricula were shortened to two months. The graduates were qualified for
appointment as commissioned officers in the Reserve Force.

The development of the Reserve Force or “citizen army” on the

other hand, was gradual. Then, as now, the rationale behind its

96
development grew out of past experiences. It drew its life-blood and
sinew from lowly tenant-small town clerks, scions of sugar barons, sons
of the landed gentry, college students, village tutors and teachers,
stevedores and pier hands, and heirs of shipping magnates. In short, its
strength represented a cross-section of the country’s populace. Its
establishment, first and foremost, was well-grounded on democracy and
inspired by loyal service, discarding in the process the ascendancy of a
military aristocracy.

In April 1936, twenty-year old Filipino males registered for the

mandatory military training. Out of the registrants 40,000 were selected.
In January of the following year, one half of this number reported to
different cadres throughout the country and for the next five and one-half
months were trained in soldiery. In June of that year, the other 20,000
reported for training. By December, the Army could well count on a
trained reserve of 40,000 young men. It was then hoped that there be no
hitch in the training program so that the target strength for the “citizen
army” after the ten-year Commonwealth period could be realized.

The program, however, went haywire. By 1938, a total of 69,848

young men had acquired the basic military skill. Because of the slow
pace, MacArthur announced in January 1940 that 30,000 twenty-year old
Filipino males be trained annually. By 1946, the “citizen army” would
have in its rolls 300,000 trained reservists. MacArthur anticipated to
achieve this all goal through the efforts of the District Commanders.

When national emergency developed in 1941, the program was

only half-way through in its implementation. By this time, the Army had
its roster of reservist no les than 160,000 troops from whom were
mobilized the men to constitute the ten reserve divisions that were
inducted or mustered into the service of the United States Army Forces
in the Far East (USAFFE).

To complete their training, the reservist of one bliss was to be

mobilized for a period of two weeks one year after completion of their
military education. During this period, they were to be given refresher
courses. But because of budgetary constraints, the Army had only two of
these annual mobilizations, one in 1938 and the other in April 1941.
Likewise, because of fiscal limitations, the annual field maneuvers for
Army units could not be carried out. That held at Camp Cando, Tarlac, in
January 1938 was the only field maneuver participated in by the trained
reservist.

97
 That was how the Army of the Philippines evolved into a highly-
complex organism. Its trained manpower were its brawn and muscles; its
crude armaments provided its initial firepower. It was ready to go into
crucible.

Handicaps of the Pre-War Philippine Army

As Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Commonwealth,

President Quezon was empowered to call out such armed forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
17
insurrection, or rebellion, whenever it became necessary. This power,
however, was rendered inutile by an ordinance which was later
appended to the 1935 Constitution. This ordinance stated that the United
States Army and the United States Navy maintained their forces and
installations in military reservations throughout the Philippines. It also
contained that the American forces exercised exclusive control and
jurisdiction without interference from the Philippine Commonwealth
government. This policy, therefore, enabled the President of the United
States to order and call into service such armed forces organized under
the Commonwealth regime. Col Gamaliel Manikan, a veteran of the
Second World War, aptly described the plight of the Filipino soldiers
under the control of a foreign power. He wrote”

“It was clear that during the Philippine Commonwealth

status, the Filipinos were obligated to fight any war which the US
maybe involved in whether they (the Filipinos) liked it or not.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the Filipinos did not have to
be compelled to serve in the USAFFE when the US declared war
18
against Imperial Japan in 1941.”

The close alliance between the United States and the

Philippines, however, forged a commitment to establish a national
defense system for the latter. In the establishment of this defense
system, MacArthur and his staff deviated radically from universally
upheld concepts in defense. This deviation was the lack of a separate
Philippine Navy as a major defense force. A small Off-shore Patrol
equipped with small fast moving and torpedo-armed PT boats took its
place. Moreover, the building of these torpedo boats did not progress
well. There was an effort to produce the torpedo boats locally by
purchasing the engines after they had failed to get additional boats from
19
other European countries. As early as November 1935, President
Quezon had admitted the the Philippine government had neither the

98
industrial capacity nor the wealth to build up a navy despite the
vulnerability of the extensive Philippine coastline.

The logistics of the Philippine Army being borne by the

Commonwealth government added a serious drain on the meager
Commonwealth resources. The amount of sixteen million pesos covered
expenditures for both Regular and Reserve Forces. However, a policy
was adopted that logistics for the Commonwealth Army on wartime
footing was to be supplied and funded by the US government. A great
bulk of these supplies were not available locally, thus arms, transport,
and other equipment were procured from foreign suppliers.

Field and training manuals used during the pre-war build up were
mostly patterned after those in the US Army and therefore used the
English language exclusively. This language barrier posed numerous
problems. But the barrier was not only limited between the Americans
and the Filipinos, but among the Filipino themselves. Some Filipino
soldiers spoke Bicol, the others Tagalog, while the Americans spoke
neither. The result of the communication gap was inadequate training in
communication and tactics. Worse, obsolescent Enfield and Springfield
1903 rifles used in World War I were the only weapons available to
trainees.

The meager Commonwealth resources also led to the humorous

expression “sundalong cinco” (five centavo-soldiers). While serving the
compulsory five and one half months training the trainees did not receive
their pay, but instead receiving a daily allowance of five centavos or the
total amount of P1.50 a month.

99
 CHAPTER VII

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

After the Commonwealth government of the Philippines had been

established and organized, several pressing problems surfaced which
needed immediate solution. One of these called for the organization of a
defensive structure that would be capable of keeping inviolate the
country’s territory. This was in recognition of the fact that since the
advent of American rule, the defense of the Philippines had always been
the responsibility of the United States Government.

Establishment of National Defense System

Shortly after he sworn into office as President of the

Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, Manuel L. Quezon foresaw the
need to secure and preserve at all cost the promised independence of
the Philippines which would be realized after a ten-year transition period.
Thus, the Filipinos woke up to the reality that the organization of a fairly
adequate system of defense was of paramount importance if only to
ensure the success of self-rule in the country.

Struggling to establish the citizen army prescribed by the

constitution for Philippine defense, Quezon sought the services of
General Douglas MacArthur, then Chief of Staff of the United States
Army, as the Military Adviser to the Commonwealth government.
Assisted by his principal assistants, Majors Dwight Eisenhower and
James Ord, he formulated a national defense plan. This plan was
embodied in the National Defense Act, officially known as
Commonwealth Act No. I, the first legislative measure acted upon by the
Commonwealth government which provided for the legal basis for the
organization of the Philippine Army. Its prime duty was the defense and
preservation of the state.

In compliance with the provisions of the National Defense Act,

military service became obligatory for all twenty-year old male citizens. It
also provided for the establishment of the Army, the main body of which
would come from a small standing Regular Force and a trained reserve
pool at an annual growth rate of 40,000, so that by the end of the
Commonwealth period, the Philippines would have a trained reserve of
400,000 men distributed among forty infantry divisions. Out of this
number, four would be formed in each of the military districts.

100
 General MacArthur described the basic framework of the
Philippines defense plan thus: “My plan for rebuilding a defense plan for
the Philippines was a simple one, patterned after the citizen-soldier
system of conscription effectively established in Switzerland. The
country was divided into ten military areas, each of which would be
charged with their development. One hundred and twenty-eight camps
were constructed, and trainees were assigned to those nearest their
homes. Each camp’s permanent raining cadre consisted of four officers
and twelve enlisted men. The initial instructional groups were from the
Constabulary, which was to become an integral part of the regular
army… In addition to the purely military side of the camps, there was a
broad effort to build up the health and economic well-being of the
1
trainees…”

On January 11, 1936, President Quezon formally established the

Army of the Philippines with all the above-mentioned components with
an annual appropriation of P 16,000,000. The Army’s activation was
consummated through Executive Order Nr 11.

Creation of Military Districts

Quezon, convinced that a viable defense strategy could be

evolved for the Philippine, urged the full implementation of the National
Defense Act. The first to be established was of course the standing
army. The existing Philippine Constabulary was made the nucleus. It
contributed almost two-thirds of its strength to the newly-born Philippine
2
Army. Its officers, therefore, constituted the initial corps of officers of the
Regular Army. The first Filipino officers to be at the helm of the Army of
the Philippines were Jose de los Reyes, a retired colonel of the
Philippine Constabulary who was recalled to active duty and promoted to
brigadier general as Acting Chief of Staff, Brig Gen. Basilio Valdes and
Col. Guillermo Francisco as first and second Deputy Chief of Staff,
respectively.

The organization of the regular force, development of military

camps, and build up of the reserve force were pursued vigorously. For
purposes of administration, training and mobilization of manpower and
resources, the Philippines was formed into ten territorial groups, each
designated as a Military district. At least one division was organized in
each of the ten Military Districts into which the Philippines was divided
under pertinent provisions of the National Defense Act. At the head of
the Military District was a district commander who was responsible for
the coordination of all activities relative to the preparedness within his

101
jurisdiction. In time of war he was responsible for the defense of his
district subject to the control of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. The
composition of the military districts, to include the reserve divisions
assigned to them, was as follows: (Map Nr. I shows the geographical
boundaries of the districts).
st
1 Military District

Hq - Baguio City, Mt Province

Area - Abra, Batanes, Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, Isabela, Mt.
Province
th
Unit - 11 Division
nd
2 Military District

Hq - Tarlac, Tarlac
Area - La Union, Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan and Tarlac
st
Unit - 21 Division
rd
3 Military District

Hq - San Fernando, Pampanga

Area - Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga and Zambales
st
Unit - 31 Division
th
4 Military District

Hq - Lipa, Batangas
Area - Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Mindoro, Palawan and Rizal
st
Unit - 41 Division
th
5 Military District

Hq - Lucena, Quezon
Area - Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Masbate,
Sorsogon, Tayabas and sub-province of Catanduanes
st
Unit - 51 Division
th
6 Military District

Hq - Iloilo, Iloilo
Area - Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Marinduque, Romblon
st
Unit - 61 Division

102
 th
7 Military District

Hq - Bacolod, Negros Occidental

Area - Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental and Siquijor
st
Unit - 71 Division
th
8 Military District

Hq - Cebu, Cebu
Area - Bohol and Cebu
st
Unit - 81 Division
th
9 Military District

Hq - Tacloban, Leyte
Area - Leyte and Samar
st
Unit - 91 Division
st
101 Military District

Hq - Cagayan, Misamis Oriental

Areas - Agusan, Bukidnon, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Misamis
Occidental, Misamis Oriental, Surigao, Sulu and Zamboanga
st
Unit - 101 Division

Training Camps and Mobilization Centers

The year 1936 saw the construction of training camps and

organization of cadres. Thousands of twenty-year old Filipino males
trooped to the registration centers in April 1936. It was a heterogenous
group consisting of high school and college graduates. Some were
illiterates. To house this great number of men and institutional personnel
who were assigned to training chores, campsites were acquired and
barracks were built. Trainees were given theoretical and practical
training in basic military subjects, such as, Military Hygiene, Military First
Aid, Scouting and Patrolling, Rifle Marksmanship and Map Reading.

The first group of 40,000 men was called on January 4, 1937 for
active duty training for five and one-half months. Field artillery training
was concentrated in Camp del Pilar, Pampanga. Specialized training
was given at Fort William McKinley (now Fort Bonifacio). Meanwhile,
Coast Artillery courses were conducted at Fort Mills and Fort Wint on
Corregidor and Grande islands, respectively. Two engineer schools were

103
Map 1: Military Districts

104
established, while the quartermaster and motor transport schools were
established at Port Area, Manila.

Upon completion of the mandatory training, about fifteen percent

or 3,000 trainees were chosen to undergo further training as non-
commissioned officers. Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) units
were established in accredited universities and colleges. There were
seventeen such units that were initially organized. Among these were
those in the National University, San Juan de Letran College, and the
University of the Philippines.

The creation of a satisfactory corps of officers posed a problem

to the development of the Army. Many intelligent young men from the
ROTC were commissioned mostly third lieutenants to help man the
various units of the Army. To mention a few, they were Simeon Valdez,
Carmelo Barbero, Rigoberto Atienza, and later Ferdinand E. Marcos. To
augment expertise, technical knowhow, and profound knowledge,
Filipino officers serving in the US Army (Philippine Scouts), some West
Pointers, Annapolis graduates and experienced integrated Scout officers
were pressed for either temporary or permanent service in the Philippine
3
Army.

In 1939, General MacArthur tested the efficacy of the defense

plans. He ordered the mobilization for training of one infantry division for
maneuver with the US Philippine Division in Camp Cando, Capas,
Tarlac. The outcome was that the discipline and morale were excellent,
but the training and know how on military art and science were sadly
4
deficient. Unfortunately, this was the only mobilization test conducted
because of financial constraints. In fact, a series of mobilization tests
had been slated to be held as an adjunct of the Philippine Army’s full
development.

Emergence of National Crisis

In 1940, the grim specter of war across the Pacific made it

imperative for the Philippines to accelerate its defense preparations.
Japan’s ultimate aim was complete hegemony in Asia and unchallenged
supremacy in the western Pacific. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
order freezing all Japanese assets in the United State and halting all
trade with Japan did not deter the Japanese from occupying Indo-China,
Japan’s aggressive move practically jeopardized American interests in
the Philippines, especially so because east of the country were the huge
naval base on the Marianas and Castille Islands.

105
 Thus, the national defense plan was only half through when
President Roosevelt proclaimed on May 27, 1941 that “…an unlimited
national emergency confronts this country, which requires that its
military, air and civilian defense be put up on the basis of readiness to
repel any and all acts or threats of aggression directed towards any part
of the western hemisphere.”

Earlier, or in March the district commanders were ordered to

mobilize for training purposes. The training areas of the Philippine Army
th
reserve divisions after the mobilization were: 11 Division, San Fabian,
st st
Pangasinan; 21 Division Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac; 31 Division, San
st
Marcelino, Zambales; 41 Division, Tagaytay Ridge, Cavite-Batangas;
st st st
51 Division, San Pablo, Lipa, Batangas; 61 Division, Dingle, Iloilo; 71
st
Division, Camp O’Donnell, Capas, Tarlac; 81 Division, Carmen, Bohol;
st st
91 Division, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija; and 101 Division, Malaybalay,
Bukidnon.

In a stirring message to the Philippine National Assembly,

President Quezon, in response to the state of emergency, said: “…The
Filipino people, desirous of cooperating with the United States in the
execution of this defense program, are ready to bear their full share of
that responsibility. To this end, I have assured the government of the
United States in behalf of the Commonwealth that the entire Philippines -
its manpower and natural resources, is at the disposal of the US in the
5
present emergency.”

On July 26, 1941, President Roosevelt, in accordance with the

Tydings-McDuffie Act, issued a military order calling into the military
service “all organized military forces of the Philippine Commonwealth
into the service of the United States.” Subsequently, MacArthur, who
had retired in 1937, was recalled to active duty and was designated
Commanding General of the new-activated United States Army Forces in
6
the Far East (USAFFE). Upon assuming command of the USAFFE,
MacArthur solemnly announced that “America had ordered me to defend
the Philippines. I must not fail America.”

One of the immediate tasks that confronted MacArthur and the

Filipino leaders was the organization of the former’s headquarters and
command on an efficient basis. This, MacArthur accomplishment by
assigning to the general and special staffs Army officers detailed with the
Office of the Military Adviser to the Commonwealth and those officers
secured from the Philippine Department.

106
 The other pressing tasks were the mobilization, induction and
training of the Philippine Army, whose Reserve Force constituted the
bulk of the manpower of the USAFFE. The procurement of war material
and reinforcements so that the USAFFE could be placed on war footing
was also a priority.

The general staff, even prior to the establishment of the USAFFE

headquarters, immediately buckled down to work to solve the problem of
providing adequate housing and training facilities. The reserve stocks of
the entire Philippine garrison held in the depot of the Philippine
Department were at a low level.

Upon MacArthur’s assumption of command, the following

statement was issued by USAFFE headquarters:

“The general plan for the integration of all armed forces in the
Philippines has been formulated by General MacArthur. It envisions a
progressive incorporation of the reserve divisions of the Philippine Army
into the service of the United States, but until an actual outbreak of
hostilities will not include those echelons which are engaged in the
normal yearly training activities. This will enable the Philippine Army to
continue its uniform development in accordance with the national
defense program of the Commonwealth and at the same time muster for
prompt American army training and service the other components of the
Commonwealth forces.”

On August 26, 1941, as it had been a few months ago,

MacArthur ordered the mobilization of the ten infantry divisions of the
th st st
Philippine Army form the ten military districts, namely, the 11 , 21 , 31 ,
st st st
41 , 51 , up to the 101 Division. Officers and key men of other
divisional units were called to duty a week later. Infantry regiments again
underwent rigid training on infantry courses, up to and including the
regimental level, in the different training areas of the military districts.
Cantonment areas for these units were rapidly constructed all over the
Philippines. Barracks for officers and quarters for men were made
mostly of bamboo and sawali. But these were built in numerous units
7
along the Lingayen beaches to the hinterlands of Mindanao.

The induction of Filipino forces commenced on August 15. The

Philippine Army Air Corpse (PAAC) earned a distinction of being first unit
of the Philippine Army to be mustered into the USAFFE. General
MacArthur personally inducted the PAAC at Zablan Field which is now
the southern end of Camp General Aguinaldo in Quezon City. All its units

107
stationed in Nueva Ecija under Capt. Edwin Andrews, Maniquis Field in
Nueva Ecija under Capt Pelagio A. Cruz, Lahug Field in Cebu under
Capt. Oscar Sales, and Batangas Field under Capt. Jesus A Villamor
were mustered on the same day. Earlier, the PAAC underwent an
intensive training program not only for its pilots but also for its other
personnel assigned to various bases. During this time, USAFFE
headquarters was well established and opened at No. 1 Victoria Street,
Intramuros, Manila. On September 1, 1941, one regiment each of the ten
reserve divisions was inducted, together with key personnel of the other
regiments and special units. This date had been marked as Philippine
Militarization Day.

Later, MacArthur issued orders mobilizing the commanding

generals of the ten Army reserve divisions and their respective staffs to
attend the Division Staff School at Camp Henry T. Allen in Baguio with
Col. Clifford Bluemel as commandant (later, he became commander of
st
the 31 Division). Colonels William Brougher, Albert Jones, and Clyde
Selleck were among the instructors in the school. They were later
th st
promoted to general officers and made commanders of the 11 , 51 and
st
71 Division respectively. Among the Philippine Army officers in
attendance were Brig. Gen. Vicente Lim and Colonels Mateo Capinpin,
Guy O Fort and Luther Stevens. The graduates of this school were sent
to take over their respective commands.

Status of Preparedness

A series of colored strategic plans was formulated by the War

Department in Washington twenty years before the outbreak of World
War II. One of these was War Plan Orange 3 (WPO-3), a US Army-Navy
strategic plan which covered an emergency in which the United States
and Japan would be involved. The latest revision of these plans
envisioned a protracted struggle on Bataan under the following
conditions:

“In the event of a successful Japanese landing on the main

island of Luzon, the Philippine Division and the Philippine Army, if unable
to beat off the landing and subsequent advance of a theoretical enemy,
were to fight delaying actions and withdrew into Bataan Peninsula. The
plan envisioned a six month stand on Bataan by which time aid from the
8
United States would arrive.”

For proper execution of WPO-3, five delay points were

prescribed. This decision, made only under the greatest necessity, was

108
based on positions or lines selected and reconnoitered during
peacetime. These delay points utilized the terrain advantageous in
defense-rivers, high grounds, and swamps. Each was anchored on a
high ground and took full advantage of natural barriers.

The second major defense plan centered on the organization of

the USAFFE into four tactical commands. These tactical commands
were formally organized on November 4, 1941. These commands were:

North Luzon Force - This force, which had been under the
command of Brig. Gen Edward P King Jr. from November 3 to 27, was
placed under the command of Maj. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright on
November 28, 1941. It was given the responsibility of the critical sector in
the country, including the Cagayan Valley, part of the Central Plains
area, Lingayen Gulf, the Zambales Coast, and Bataan Peninsula.
General Wainwright was instructed to protect the airfields and prevent
hostile landings in his area, particularly at those points opening into the
Central Plains and the road net leading to Manila. The ULF consisted of
th st st th
three Philippine Army divisions – 11 , 21 and 31 the 26 Cavalry
th
Regiment (PS), one battalion of the 4 Infantry Regiment on Bataan, two
batteries of 155-mm guns, and one battery of 2.95-inch mountain guns.
st
The 71 Division (PA), though assigned to NLF, could be committed only
on the authority of the USAFFE.

South Luzon Force - This force under the command of Brig. Gen.
George M. Parker was assigned the area generally south east of Manila.
It was tasked to protect the airfields in its sector and prevent hostile
landings. It consisted initially of only two Philippine Army divisions, the
st st
41 and 51 , and a battery of field artillery.

Visayan-Mindanao Force - This force under Brig. Gen. William

Sharp was charged with the defense of the rest of the archipelago. Its
primary mission was to protect the airfields to be built in the Visayas; its
secondary mission was to prevent landings of hostile forces, paying
particular attention to the cities and essential public utilities. This sector
also included the coastal defense of the inland seas. No American or
Philippine Scout troops were assigned to this force, except those in
headquarters and two companies of the 43d Infantry Regiment, PS. For
st st st
the rest, the force consisted of the 61 , 81 , and 101 Divisions, all
Philippine Army units.

Harbor Defense Command - This force under Brig. Gen. George

F. Moore had its headquarters on Corregidor. It was tasked to provide

109
defenses for Manila and Subic Bays. On its activation it assumed
operational control over Forts Drum, Hughes, and Frank located in El
Fraile, Caballo, and Carabao Islands, respectively. The units placed
th th
under it were the 59 and 60 Coast Artillery Regiments, US Army, and
st nd
the 91 and 92 Coast Artillery Regiments, PS.

To complete the defensive set-up, MacArthur designated a

reserve area which lay between the North and South Luzon Forces, to
include the City of Manila and the heavily congested area to the North.
Directly under the control of USAFFE headquarters, the reserve area
st
contained the Philippine Division (less one battalion), 91 Division, PA,
th
86 Field Artillery Battalion, PS, Far East Air Force, and the
headquarters of the Philippine Department and the Philippine Army.

Reserve Force - On Luzon, between the North and South Luzon

forces, was the reserve area, including the city of Manila and the heavily
congested area just to the north. This area was directly under the control
of MacArthur’s headquarters and contained the Philippine Division (less
st th
one battalion), 91 Division, PA, the 86 Field Artillery, PS, the Far East
Air Force and the Headquarters of the Philippine Department and the
Philippine Army.

By then, the defense of the country rested with a ground force

consisting of 12,000 American troops, about the same number of
9
Philippine Scouts, and 110,000 men of the Citizen National Army. The
air arm of the USAFFE, designated the Far East Air Force (FEAF), was
headed by Maj. Gen. Lewis R. Brereton. The US Asiatic Fleet under the
command of Admiral Thomas Hart provided the naval support.
Comparatively substantial though it seemed, the Asiatic Fleet was no
match to the Japanese combined fleet. Aware of the fleet’s limitations,
US naval authorities in Washington conceived that in the event of war it
would retire south of Philippine waters and combined with the ABDA
(American, British, Dutch and Australia) powers to give it a fighting
chance against Japan’s superior naval forces.

MacArthur, recognizing the handicaps of the Philippine defense

plan at the time, stated: “We began an eleven-hour struggle to build up
each force to repel an enemy.The ten-year period so essential for the
successful completion of my basic plan was evidently going to be cut in
half. Too late, Washington had come to realize the danger. Men and
ammunitions were finally shipped to the Pacific, but the crucial question
10
was, would they arrive in time an in sufficient strength.”

110
LT GEN JONATHAN M WAINRIGHT MAJ GEN GEORGE M PARKER
CG, Northern Luzon Force (NLF) CG, South Luzon Force (SLF)

MAJ GEN WILLIAM P SHARP

CG, Visayan-Mindanao Force (VMF)

111
 General Wainwright, commander of the North Luzon Force, also
realized that the training of the reserve units was hardly compatible with
the requirements for actual combat. He said: “There was not much field
training for these men, nor was there any great deal of training in the use
11
of weapons…”

In spite of the accelerated pace of mustering, not one of the

reserve divisions was at full strength because of the sudden outbreak of
hostilities. This tactical surprise was utilized by Japan to the utmost. Lt.
Gen. Toraschico Kawabe, Deputy of the Army General Staff stated that
an important factor in Japan’s decision to go to war and invade the
Philippine was the fear on the part of the Japanese General Staff of
12
General MacArthur’s ten-year plan for the defense of the Philippines.
The plan was on its fifth year and a potential menace to Japan’s
ambitions. The Japanese had to intervene before it was too late.

MacArthur, knowing what he had on hand, advised the US War

Department that equipment and supplies for the Filipino and American
forces were the prime essentials. In the month of August 1941,
MacArthur requisitioned 84,500 Garand rifles, 330 caliber .30 machine
guns, 326 caliber .50 anti-craft machine guns, 450 37mm guns, 217 81-
mm mortars, 288 75mm guns of high speed adapters, and over 2,000
vehicles of all types for the ten Philippine Army divisions. But the bulk of
this war material did not come on time.

A month earlier, General Henry H. Arnold of the newly activated

US Army Air Corps made by far the strongest proposal for large scale
reinforcements of the Philippines which called for the transfer to the
country of four heavy bombardment groups. Although the proposal was
approved, it was not immediately implemented as it could have resulted
in stripping the fields of US as well as other American bases. Moreover,
many of the heavy bombers requisitioned were still in production lines. A
total of eighty-one planes, however, arrived on the second day of
October 1941.

On the other hand, the Philippine Army Air Corps was in a more
difficult fix. Although it had a compliment of approximately seventeen
group officers, 142 pilots, and 1,700 enlisted men, had not attained the
posture of a combat-ready force. The sixty-four aircraft it possessed
were antiquated, in the context of modern warfare, none could be
considered combat worthy.

112
 Another major problem that plagued the USAFFE was lack of
suitable airfields, repair facilities, and adequate air warning system. The
envisioned construction of six major airfields, four in Luzon and two in
Mindanao, in addition to smaller fields for dispersal purposes, was not
completed.

Since the Philippine defense build-up could not lag on any

longer, the War Department requested for a budgetary outlay from the
emergency funds of President Roosevelt and from the appropriations of
the US Army Air Corps. The request was favorably considered. Thus, in
the last quarter of 1941, forty of these airfields and airstrips were in the
process of construction under the Philippine Department’s Corps, of
Engineers, the Philippine Army Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of
Public Works.

MacArthur’s and the Filipino leader’s defense scheme were

sound. Despite the blueprint, the real burden of defense still rested with
the American military and it’s operational War Plan Orange. However,
this plan despite its revision was made increasingly obsolete by growing
13
Japanese air and naval power. Furthermore, the few weapons that
trickled into the Philippine garrison were inadequate technologically.
Supplies were slow in coming and insufficient. It was dangerously late
14
and the US global priorities placed under the Philippine law on the list.

Notwithstanding these tremendous handicaps, MacArthur,

expressive of the sentiments of the Filipino and American forces, said:
“We are doing everything humanly possible with what we have at our
command. We need more – much more. But my men are every inch
fighters; they will contest every foot of the ground. We must not fail. Too
15
much of the world’s future depends on what happen here.”

Outbreak of Hostilities

Barely five years after its birth, the Philippine Army was drawn
into the maelstrom of a global war. The Filipinos aligned themselves with
America and its allies in their struggle against the Axis powers. The
build-up of the Philippine Army did not reach its full fruition when the
Japanese struck.

On November 27, 1941 MacArthur received the following

radiogram from the War-Department:

113
 “Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes…If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the US
desires that Japan commit the first over act. This policy should not,
repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that
16
might jeopardize the successful defense of the Philippines.”

By December 7, the Filipino and American forces were as ready

as they possibly could be in their inadequate defenses. Every disposition
had been made, every man, gun and plane was on the alert. Thus,
pursuit-interceptor planes began night patrols.

The Japanese attack on December 8, 1941 on the Philippines

did not come until some hours after the Pearl Harbor bombarding. The
news was cabled to MacArthur between three and four o’clock the
following morning. By seven, Quezon had committed the full prestige of
his office to the Allied cause. “The zero hour has arrived,” he said, “I
17
expect every Filipino - man and woman, to his duty,”

st
1 Organization, Women’s Auxiliary Service, Biak-na-Bato Academy,
San Miguel, Bulacan, 1941-1942.

114
 PART IV

THE WAR YEARS

115
Enemy bombed Sto. Domingo Church, Intramuros, Manila December
1941. Note soldier securing area from looters.

Japanese bombers performs a bombing sortie to Corregidor Island

116
 CHAPTER VIII

THE DEFENSE OF LUZON

Japan’s belligerent posture had arisen out of necessity. With her teeming
millions of inhabitants to feed, clothe and shelter, there was hardly an
inch of Japanese ground that could serve as a buffer to her fast-
exploding population. In addition, the economic embargo imposed on her
by the United States Government proved to be disastrous to her
interests. As recourse, she adopted an expansionist policy designed to
salvage her sagging economy. This was how Japan was ushered into
the war.

Sneak Attack on Pearl Harbor

The order to attack was given on December 2, 1941. The

Japanese Naval Task Force under the overall command of Vice Admiral
C. Nagumo consisted of a submarine flotilla, command by Rear Adm.
Kyoguro Simamoto, and a Task Force of five aircraft carriers, escorted
by six destroyers, six 10,000-ton cruisers, ten submarines, and around
400 airplanes. Its mission was to knock out the United States Pacific
1
Fleet based on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

At 7:00 A.M. of December 7, the early morning calm was broken.

Some 355 Japanese planes came in form the Southeast over Diamond
Head, over Waikiki, and the business districts, they blanketed these
areas with explosives. A second flight swooped down on Pearl Harbor
and the nearby airfields. This massive Japanese air might wrought havoc
on personnel and facilities, as their bombs, torpedoes, and ammunition
found their mark on moored American warships. The gigantic harbor was
reduced into an inferno. In the hostile action, called “sneak attack,” the
enemy nevertheless sustained some loses. Twenty-nine planes were lost
2
and fifty-five airmen were killed.

On the other hand, five American battleships, three destroyers, a

mine layer, and a large target vessel were sunk. Three battleships, three
destroyers, and numerous smaller vessels were destroyed. Some 2,343
officers and men lost their lives. The US Navy’s losses alone were 2,117
3
dead, 876 wounded, and 960 missing. The US Army sustained 226
killed and 396 wounded. The total number of casualties recorded stood
at 4,615. Of the 200,000 inhabitants of Oahu, 1,500 were killed, and
1,500 were wounded and injured. In addition, a total of 177 combat

117
aircraft had been destroyed - eighty from the US Navy, and the ninety-
seven from the US Army.

After the first stunning shock, the defenders of Pearl Harbor

swung into action. Deeds of heroism and tales of valor were recounted,
but the damage had been done. Washington press called the damage
serious; while Japan boosted that the United States had suffered an
annihilating blow. The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor could have been
averted had Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department, taken the necessary measures in compliance with
the alert order from Washington.

Japanese Landings in the Philippines

At dawn of December 8, the first hostile landing was made on

Bataan Island, midway between Formosa and Northern Luzon. This was
effected by a seizable task force whose primary mission was to make a
survey on the establishment of an airfield suitable for operational use. At
5:30 A.M., USAFFE headquarters received the official announcement
that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. Later in the day, at 11:30 A.M., a
formation of hostile aircraft was reported coming in from the China Sea
and cruising towards Manila. Fighter Planes of the 20th, 17th and 21st
Pursuit Squadrons of the Far East Air Force immediately took off to
intercept the enemy. However, about twenty minutes later, the enemy
had disappeared. The aerial fight reportedly altered its course. It was
sighted over Rosales, Pangasinan, as it flew north towards Formosa.

By the time the first hostile landing was effected on Philippine

soil, the USAFFE’s ground troops were tactically disposed as follows:

“The 11th Division, PA, under Col. William E. Brougher, was on

the Lingayen beach covering the sector from Dagupan to San Fabian,
Pangasinan. The 21st Division, PA, under Col. Mateo M. Capinpin, was
on the beaches around Bolinao on Dasol Bay to Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The
31st Division, PA, under Col. Clifford Bluemel, covered the Central plains
from Dasol Bay to Subic Bay Zambales, the 45th Infantry Regiment, PS,
st
and a battalion of the 1st PC Regiment was in Bagac, Bataan. The 71
st
Division, PA under Col Clyde A. Sellock, and the 91 Division, PA, under
Col. Luther Stevens, were in Camp O’Donnel (Tarlac) and Cabanatuan
st
(Nueva Ecija), respectively, as USAFFE reserves. The 1 Regular
Division under Col Luther Stevens, were in Camp O’ Donnel (Tarlac),
and Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija), respectively, as USAFFE reserves. The
st
1 Regular Division, PA under Lt. Col Fidel V Segundo was along the

118
Map 2: Japanese Landings, December 1941

119
 st
beaches of Batangas. The 51 Division, PA, under Col Albert M. Jones,
was disposed to oppose east coast landings from Mauban to Atimonan
4
(Tayabas)…”

For air support, the Far East Air Force under, Maj. Gen. Lewis H.
Brereton had the following elements and their corresponding number of
5
combat-ready aircrafts.
rd
3 Pursuit Squadron - eighteen P - 40E
th
17 Pursuit Squadron - eighteen P - 40E
th
20 Pursuit Squadron - eighteen P - 40E
st
21 Pursuit Squadron - eighteen P - 35
th
34 Pursuit Squadron - eighteen P - 40B

In addition to these reasonably first-line planes, there were

fourteen obsolete P-26 planes, two A-27 planes and several observation
aircrafts, all of which were lightly armed.

Hostile Aerial Sorties

Before breakfast time on December 8, a flight of thirty-two

Japanese bombers raided Camp John Hay in Baguio and Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. The raiders met no opposition American pursuit planes sent to
intercept them failed to locate the enemy. At 12:15 P.M., the enemy flew
over Clark-Field to drop tons of explosives after raiding Iba, Zambales.
The airfields, buildings, hangars, and aircrafts parked on the ground
6
were destroyed beyond recognition. After fourteen minutes, Clark-Field
faded into limbo.

Under cover of aerial bombardment, daihon-ei or the Japanese

Imperial Headquarters dispatched the Tanaka and Kanno Detachments
from their secret bases in Formosa. The 2,000 man Kano Detachment
landed on both sides of the mouth of Abra River from Sulvec, Narvacan
to San Ildefonso, north of Vigan, on December 10. The main force
landed in Mindoro, southwest of Vigan, where the airport is located. The
Ilocos Sur Constabulary Command under Maj. Sergio Laurente offered
some resistance to the Japanese invading hordes. However, it was
quickly subdued. As a result of this action, Lt. Juan Basa and seven
enlisted men were captured in the afternoon. After securing Vigan, the
Japanese moved northward to seize the airport at Gabu, Laoag, Ilocos
Norte. The Japanese occupied the airport on December 12.

120
 As early as 5:30 A.M. of that day, the hostile landings on Vigan
were detected by a P-40 US Army Air Corps pilot who was on a
reconnaissance mission over the area. Accordingly, FEAF Headquarters
dispatched five bombers with adequate fighter escorts to interdict the
enemy forces. At the end of the day’s air action, the American bombers
and pursuit planes, their last coordinated efforts; had changed two
Japanese transports and ‘sunk one minesweeper. Furthermore, they had
inflicted numerous casualties on board the Murasame, a destroyer, Rear
Admiral Nishimura’s flagship, the Naka, was likewise slightly damaged.

Also on December 10, Zablan Field headquarters of the PAAC

was attacked shortly before noon. Flying on almost tree-top levels, the
Japanese planes strafed the area, riddling the barracks, hangars and
parked aircrafts. Notwithstanding, the suddenness of the attack, five
daring PAAC pilots personally led by Capt. Jesus Villamor, with
Lieutenants Godofredo Juliano, Jose Gozar, Alberto Aranzaso, and
Geronimo Aclan, took off in their P-26 pursuit planes to engage the
marauders in aerial combat. In that aerial encounter, Gozar’s machine-
gun jammed. However, he refused to disengage. Instead, he rammed his
aircraft against that of the enemy a maneuver that terrified the enemy
pilots who immediately fled from the scene. Meanwhile, the quartet of
Villamor, Juliano, Aranzaso, and Aclan was locked in deadly
combat with the other Japanese fighters in a wild dog fight. As a result,
one Japanese fighter plane was shot down. This was the first baptism of
7
fire of the incipient PAAC.

The raid of Zablan Field forewarned other PAAC bases for

possible hostile attacks. After the attack, all units of the PAAC at Zablan
Field were moved over to Wack Wack Golf in Mandaluyong where they
encamped until December 23.

Somewhere in the north, the Tanaka Detachment landed in

Aparri and Gonzaga, Cagayan, on the same date. Its elements
disembarked at Gonzaga after the first wave had successfully landed on
Aparri because of the choppy seas that developed later. A US Army Air
Corps pilot, Capt. Collin P. Kelly, Jr., attempted to interdict the hostile
landing at Aparri but his effort proved futile. He was shot down in the
process. After securing the Aparri Airport, the Tanaka Detachment
st
moved south along the national highway. The 1 Cagayan PC Company
under Capt. Ali-Al Raschid offered a gallant resistance but it was easily
crushed.

121
 On the southern end of Luzon, the Kimura Detachment with
2,500 men landed on Legaspi, Albay, on December 12. After capturing
the town, the detachment, under Maj. Gen. Naoke Kimura, infantry group
th
commander of the 16 Division, sent a motorized company south to
capture Naga, Camarines Sur, while another force was sent northward to
effect the seizure of the adjoining provinces.
th
The PAAC’s Batangas Field, home of the 6 Pursuit Squadron
under Captain Villamor, was attacked on December 12 just as the pilots
and ground crews were about to take their lunch. A flight of fifty-four
Japanese bombers in ‘V’ formation escorted by Zero fighters appeared
over the base cruising on a northerly direction. Without hesitation,
Villamor rushed to his P-26 and took off to intercept the hostile aircraft.
Following closely behind him was Lieutenant Juliano, Lieutenants Cirilo
Mondigo, Aclan, and Manuel Conde took off after Juliano.

Noticing the pursuit planes, the Japanese pilots of the Zero

fighters peeled off from the bomber formation and jumped on the
Filipinos. Realizing the danger to their safety, the Filipino pilots extricated
themselves momentarily from the Japanese bomber formation and met
head-on the on-rushing Japanese Zeroes, A dog fight ensued.

Not long after, Lieutenant Cesar Basa joined his compatriots in

the aerial encounter while the fighting was fiercest. While attempting to
take a vantage position, Basa was ganged up by seven Japanese
Zeroes. He fought with incredible courage despite the odds. Hit and his
plane stitched with bullets, Basa bailed out of his burning plane. In the
process, he was mercilessly gunned down. He was the first Filipino pilot
8
to die in aerial combat.

In the meantime, the four other Filipino pilots struggled gallantly

against the formidable foe. Through their skillful maneuvers an expert
airmanship, they were saved from possible death. Juliano, particularly,
had done a good job by saving Mondigo when the fighting was at its
height.

Several days after the attack on Batangas Field, MacArthur

pinned the Silver Stars with Oak Leaf Clusters on Villamor and the other
Filipino pilots who had taken part in the December 10 and 12 aerial
th
fights. At the same time, the 6 Pursuit Squadron was transferred to the
Langilang Elementary School, Batangas Field, however, continued to be
attacked until December 18. From Langilang Elementary School, the unit

122
moved over to La Loma in Quezon City where it bivouacked until its
departure for Bataan.

Maniquis Field in Nueva Ecija was not spared from Japanese

aerial attacks. The first hostile raid occurred on the same day when
Batangas Field was attacked. Subsequent air actions followed until its
aircraft, installations, and facilities sustained heavy damages.

During this period, several PAAC pilots were detached for

service with the North and South Luzon Forces. Four flew courier
missions for Maj. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright’s command, while three
others performed reconnaissance missions for Brig. Gen. Albert M.
Jones.
th
11 Division in Action

On or about two o’clock, P.M., December 14, a platoon under

th th
Lieutenant William from the 13 Infantry, 11 Division, PA, ambushed a
Japanese reconnaissance patrol aboard two civilian trucks then moving
southward along Route 3 at the vicinity of Dardarat, Tagudin, Ilocos Sur.
The hostile patrol sustained heavy losses; William’s outfit, on the other
hand, did not suffer any casualty. Four of the dead Japanese soldiers
were presented to Brougher in his CP at Manaoag, Pangasinan. Later,
th
the cadavers were presented to Wainwright. This platoon of the 13
th
Infantry was the first element of the 11 Division to extract blood from the
enemy.
st th
At about the same time, Capt. Eulogio Balao’s 1 Battalion, 12
th
Infantry, 11 Division, attacked a company-sized patrol from the Tanaka
Detachment near Tuguegarao, Cagayan, while it was moving south
along National Highway 5. Close quarter fighting ensued and lasted until
sundown. Heavy Japanese reinforcements arrived which prompted Capt
Balao to withdraw his unit under cover of darkness. However, no
casualties had been reported from both sides.
th
A much bigger firefight between the enemy and troops of the 11
Division occurred at Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, on December 16. When the
advance elements of a Japanese battalion reached the area north of the
rd th
Tagudin Cemetery, troops of “L” Company, 3 Battalion, 13 Infantry,
rd
under 3 Lt. Eusebio Callao, laid siege on the advancing enemy. As a
rd
result, 3 Lt. Baltazar Aduna, Callao’s executive officer, perished in
combat, while several soldiers were wounded. The Japanese column, on

123
Capt. Jesus Villamor is awarded the U.S. Distinguished service Cross
with an Oak Leaf Cluster by General MacArthur, Manila, Dec., 1941.

Capt. Cesar Basa

124
the other hand, had more casualties – seventy two dead and four
wounded.

Two days later, a seaborne platoon from the Sugamo Detach-

th
ment on a probing mission was discovered by troops of the 11 Division
near Balingasay point on the tip of Lingayen Gulf. When the boats were
near the shore, the defenders subjected them to small arms and light
artillery fire. Because of the intense gunfire, the Japanese
reconnaissance unit returned to its base with heavy losses.
th
In the Cagayan Valley area, troops of the 11 Engineer Battalion
had their first baptism of fire on December 18. A combat patrol under
Lieutenant Davis with a squad of combat engineers from “B” Company
attacked a three-truck convoy of Japanese soldiers at the outskirts of
Tuguegarao. No Japanese soldier survived from that ambush. The
combat engineers, on the other hand, had not sustained any casualty.

But that time, the Kobata Air Force had already firmly
established its base in Aparri, Cagayan, from where its bombers and
fighters struck freely at any FEAF air base in Luzon, Visayas, or
Mindanao. Beginning December 19, its planes started to bomb or strafe
USAFFE troops on the beaches along Lingayen Gulf. Every moving
object was not spared. The strafing and bombing were extraordinarily
heavy on the third day, December 21. These hostile aerial maneuvers
were intended to soften the USAFFE’s tight defensive network on the
Gulf to allow Homma’s main invasion force, the Tsuchibashi Group, to
land without any opposition whatsoever.

In the meantime, Japanese ground troops that landed on Vigan

were spotted on the morning of December 19, continuing their southward
th th
push. At dusk, they encountered a battalion of the 12 Infantry, 11
Division, disposed on the hills of Bacnotan. La Union and Maj. Arthur
rd th
Noble’s 3 Battalion, 13 Infantry, occupying hastily prepared positions
on the south banks of the Baroro River in the same town. The Japanese
force sustained heavy casualties. Even its advance elements that
succeeded in crossing the bridge because they were disguised as
USAFFE troops were annihilated in hand-to-hand combat. Another
hostile force that approached from the east bank of the Baroro River met
the same fate. Several waves followed but they were likewise
annihilated.

The next day, Japanese planes bombed and strafed the

defenders’ positions. At the same time, the Japanese began to execute

125
flanking movements designed to effect the total destruction of these two
th
battalions of the 11 Division. Finally, to preclude disaster, the
th th
outnumbered men of the 12 and 13 Infantry Regiments withdrew
through the hills east of the town to the north. The supporting field
artillery battery did likewise. The defenders had one NCO killed and
several Americans captured. Among those who joined the withdrawing
th
troops were Lt. Col. Martin Moses, CO of the 12 Infantry, and Major
Noble. They were able to rejoin their units much later.
st
On December 21, the 71 Infantry Division, and a field artillery
battalion under the overall command of Lt. Col. Donald Van Bonnett
were ordered northward to hit the head of the Japanese column coming
from Ilocos Sur and delay its fast sweep southward. However, without full
compliance of the order, Van Bonnett received another order the
following day directing him to withdraw his regiment via the Naguilian
Road to Baguio and proceed south via Kennon Road. The withdrawal
order came in the wake of events that occurred the night before. Capt.
st
Guillermo Nakar’s 1 Battalion clashed with the Japanese spearhead
nd
advancing on the Manila Road. That same evening, the 2 Battalion
under Capt. Jose V. H. Banzon was also committed when the enemy
st 9
tried to outflank the 71 Infantry by attacking from the south. Their
positions became untenable, hence, the withdrawal.

Main Japanese Landings

Also on December 21, Maj. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright,

Commanding General of the North Luzon Force, forwarned all his
subordinate commanders through telegrams that a convoy of eighteen
transports, escorted by destroyers and cruisers, were sighted and
proceeding toward Lingayen Gulf. It was estimated to arrive at about
2:00 P.M. of the next day.

At precisely the time mentioned in the message, the head of the

convoy appeared at the mouth of the Gulf. The beach from Lingayen to
San Fabian, Pangasinan was subjected to naval shelling. Two 75-mm
self-propelled batteries and a 155-mm battery supporting the 21st
Division, PA, countered with deadly effect. After an hour of naval
gunfight, the hostile destroyers pulled out toward the beaches of
Damortis, La Union, which were likewise subjected to heavy shelling.
Under cover of darkness, the advance element of the Japanese assault
forces steamed toward the beach. When the enemy ships were within
effective range, the defenders subjected them to intense small arms and

126
artillery fires. Most of the landing boats were destroyed. Thus, the hostile
attempt to land was foiled.

The enemy convoy then moved towards Agoo, La Union. The

beaches of Sto.Tomas and Agoo were subjected to heavy bombardment.
Since there were no defensive installations nor beach defense positions
in the area, the Japanese received no counterfire. This prompted
General Masaharu Homma to land his troops there.

Early in the morning of December 22, Homma’s main assault

th
force, the Tsuchibashi Group, composed of the mechanized 48
th
Division, reinforced, and one regiment from the 16 Division, began to
land. As the first wave reached the shore, it came under small arms fire
from a group of civilian volunteers of the 11th Division. However, the
opposition was easily overcome. Thus, the landing barges swept ashore.

General Homma split his assault forces into two groups. These
were the Tsuchibashi and Kamijima Groups, each of which was
motorized and heavily equipped. The first group was ordered to drive
through Damortis to Rosario, La Union, crush the Filipino-American
forces, push through the western part of Central Luzon, and drive
straight ahead towards Manila. The Kamijima Group, on the other hand,
was to drive along the western coast of Pangasinan, knock out and crush
the Filipino-American forces, and push south on the east side of the
central plains of Luzon towards Manila.

The Japanese strategy was to hit the defending forces

simultaneously with a view of effecting a double envelopment every time
resistance was encountered along the route. These would keep the
USAFFE unit commanders from guessing where the next blow would
land. As such they would commit light mobile forces and keep large
reserves to meet the next enemy blow.

In his attempt to destroy the enemy on the beaches of La Union,

General Wainwright requested USAFFE headquarters for permission to
attack before the Japanese could debouch into the broad plains of
Central Luzon. But before his request could be approved, the armored
spearhead of the Japanese 48th Division had broken through the lines of
the 26th Cavalry Regiment, Philippine Scouts. The opportunity for
eventual triumph had been lost forever.

By the time the Japanese landed on Agoo, La Union, Wainwright

had ordered the attachment of the 26th Cavalry, PS, under Col. Clinton

127
 LT GEN MASAHARU HOMMA
th
Commanding General, 14 Army, Japanese Imperial Forces, coming
ashore at Lingayen Gulf, December 22, 1941.

Japanese soldiers advancing towards Bataan, 1942

128
 th
Pierce, with the 11 Division. Shortly thereafter, Brougher ordered the
th th
26 Cavalry and a battalion of the 13 Infantry to attack the enemy. The
attack, with a company of light tanks from Brigadier General Weaver’s
Provisional Tank Group on the spearhead, became a defensive action on
the Damortis-Rosario line. In this action, the 26th Cavalry was badly
routed. It lost about 200 men- dead, wounded, and missing. In addition,
of its seventeen tanks that were used, only six returned.

When another hostile force landed in Bauang, La Union on

December 23, troops of the Headquarters Battalion, 12th Infantry, and
the 71st Infantry made every effort to thwart the landing. However, the
attempt proved futile because of the unbearable pressure from the
Kamijima Detachment. It was here where Homma established his CP.
rd
At the Bacnotan-San Gabriel-San Juan area, the 3 Battalion,
th
13 Infantry, was confronted by a much superior enemy force. In the
rd
ensuing firefight, the 3 Battalion was badly battered.
st
In Bauang, meanwhile, the 71 Infantry under Von Bonnett was
hit from the rear. As a result, the unit was eventually cut off from the rest
of the NLF. To preclude decimation, Von Bonnett withdraws his regiment
via the Naguilian Road then to Baguio. He was expected to rejoin the
NLF at Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, but was not able to do so.

Wainwright Counterattack
th
On December 23, Wainwright ordered the 26 Cavalry, PS, to
counterattack. The assault force was supported by a platoon of light
nd
tanks from the 192 Tank Battalion, US Army. Before it could maneuver
into its position, the tank spearhead came to grip with the full force of the
Tsuchibashi Group. Under such a circumstance, the PS unit had to fight
from hastily-prepared position south of Damortis.
th
At 12:30 P.M., the 26 Cavalry disengaged from the enemy in
order to occupy its second line of defense some five kilometers east of
Damortis. It was to hold this position throughout the night until the
nd
following day. A platoon of tanks from the 192 Tank Battalion was
ordered to establish positions in front of the second line. But at one
o’clock P.M., the Japanese attacked in full force. Tanks, artillery, naval
gunships, and dive bombers gave able support to the infantry.
th
Outflanked and out-maneuvered, the 26 Cavalry had to fallback.

On or about eight o’clock P.M., the American tanks were pulled

129
out from the front on orders of the tank commander. Shortly after, hostile
th
tanks had overrun the 26 Cavalry’s position. Thus, it had to beat a
th
hasty retreat south of the Bued River. When it reorganized later, the 26
Cavalry had an effective combat strength of 175.

In an attempt to recover lost ground, Wainwright ordered another

th
counterattack at Sison and Pozzurobio. The 11 Division, reinforced by
st st th
the 71 and 91 Division, PA, 26 Cavalry, PS, and a platoon of tanks
was to bear the brunt of the action. However, the gallant efforts of
USAFFE troops to dislodge the enemy ended in failure due to the steam-
roller drive of the Japanese mechanized force. Consequently, when the
st
enemy counterattacked, the 71 Division, PA, had to withdraw under the
th st th
covering fire of the 26 Cavalry. Later, the 71 Division and the 26
Cavalry regrouped and established a new battle position at the junction
of National Highway 3 and the Pangasinan provincial road at Binalonan,
here to fight another delaying action.

Finally, the defenders’ resistance cracked up under the giant

pincer movement. The Japanese occupied Binalonan. It was here where
Wainwright had thought of launching another counterattack from the
banks of the Agno River. But before he could formulate his plan,
MacArthur ordered him to execute War Plan Orange 3.
st
Meanwhile, in Tayabas (now Quezon), the 1 Regular Division,
PA, under Brig. Gen. Fidel V. Segundo had been ordered to undertake
the defense of the eastern coasts of the province in conjunction with
st
Brig. Gen. Albert Jones’ 51 Division, PA. For this purpose, he had
constituted the 1st Infantry Regiment under Capt. Alfredo M Santos and
st
the 1 Engineer Battalion under Capt. Adamin Tallow as the main
defense force.

Captain Santos disposed the three battalions of his regiment as

st st rd
follows: 1 Battalion under 1 Lt. Godofredo Mendoza and the 3
st
Battalion under 1 Lt. Felicisimo Aguinaldo were deployed at Mauban
nd
and Tignuan, Infanta, respectively. The 2 Battalion under Capt.
Honorato Ramos was placed as regimental reserve and bivouacked
close to the RCP in the woods at the general vicinity on the confluence of
the Luisiana-Lucban and Luisiana-Infanta roads.

Captain Tallow on the other hand, had dispatched “A” Company

under 2nd Lt. Benjamin Tayag to Mauban with instructions to start
immediately the construction of beach obstacles in coordination with
st nd
Mendoza’s 1 Battalion. 2 Lt. Raul Alviña’s “B” Company was sent to

130
Tignuan with the same mission to be accomplished in collaboration with
rd
the 3 Battalion. Headquarters and Headquarters Service and “C”
Companies were bivouacked close to the Division CP at Pagsanjan,
Laguna.

On December 24, Lt. Gen. Sasumo Morioka, commander of the

th
16 Division, anchored his eighty-vessel Tayabas Task Force off Lamon
Bay. At 1:30 P.M., landing barges raced toward the shore of Mauban. As
the boats reached the shore, they came under effective small arms and
th
artillery fires from a battery of the 86 Field Artillery, PS, which was
st st
attached to the 1 Battalion of the 1 Infantry. Many ranking Japanese
officers who had joined the first assault wave were either killed or were
10
drowned. Only then did Morioka realize the grave error he had
st
committed by discarding some principles in amphibious landing. The 1
Battalion scored a great triumph.

Surprised, the Japanese suspended their landing operations. At

seven o’clock in the morning, the amphibious landing was resumed after
Japanese warplanes were called in. They then subjected the Mauban
beach to a combined naval and aerial bombardment with incredible fury.
st
Notwithstanding this, however, the men of the 1 Battalion stood their
ground and fought with extraordinary courage.

When the naval-aerial bombardment was over, the Japanese

sent ashore the second assault wave. On the third wave were Japanese
artillery units which were emplaced in the environs of Mauban. By about
st
noontime, the 1 Battalion was greatly outnumbered and in the verge of
envelopment. Realizing the futility of further resistance, Captain Santos
after consultation with Brigadier General Segundo, ordered the
st
withdrawal of the 1 Battalion to the interior. This unit finally established
itself on a hilly terrain at the eastern fringes of the town of Sampaloc.
st
This was the 1 Regiment’s second defense position.

At about the time when Japanese landing operations were taking

place in Mauban, hostile troops had aleady established beachheads at
st
Atimonan where elements of the 51 Division, PA, were deployed. The
fighting there was bloody. But just like that at Mauban, the friendly
resistance was easily crushed.

On the second defense line along the Mauban-Sampaloc Road,

nd
Captain Santos placed the 2 Battalion under Captain Ramos after its
arrival from Pagsanjan as his backbone of defense. Here, Santos hoped

131
to make a better performance against the invaders. He placed the
st
remnants of the badly- battered 1 Battalion in reserve.

Like what happened in Mauban, the enemy was in for another

nd
surpise in Sampaloc. When he appeared, the 2 Battalion opened up
with a searing automatic rifle and small arms fire. The Japanese
sustained heavy losses. But with the employment of hostile warplanes
and artillery pieces, the tide of battle changed. It was during this fighting
when Captain Ramos, together with several officers and men, were
blown to bits.

Faced with the dilemma on the possible complete decimation of

nd
his 2 Battalion, Santos requested General Segundo to rush
reinforcements to Sampaloc. A provisional combat team was thus
organized under Captain Tallow and thrown into the Sampaloc front.
Even with the arrival of this reinforcement, the enemy continued to press
on with his attack. Once more, it dawned on Santos that raw courage
alone on the part of his men was not enough to salvage the situation.
Withdrawal from this battle arena was the next best thing to do.

Captain Santos received the order to evacuate Sampaloc on

December 25. At three o’clock P.M., the withdrawal was carried out. By
about this time, the men were on the verge of physical exhaustion where
st
it was next to impossible to continue with the struggle. By daylight, the 1
Infantry was in the suburbs of Luisiana where it positioned itself for any
eventuality.

In Luisiana, Jones, who had assumed command of the South

Luzon Force from Parker, ordered Captain Santos on the night of
December 25 to prepare back to Sampaloc to engage the enemy. At that
time, the Japanese had completely overrun Sampaloc and had advanced
to barrio Piis, midway between Lucban and Sampaloc. At daybreak of
st
December 26, the 1 Infantry was at the vicinity of Piis where it fought
savagely with uncommon valor. Because of the incessant hostile
st
pressure, the 1 Infantry was in imminent danger of annihilation.
Subsequently, Captain Santos ordered the withdrawal of his troops.
st
Towards noontime of December 26, the 1 Infantry reached
barrio Kabalate in the general vicinity of Mauban-Lucban and Lucban-
Luisiana Road junction. Here, the unit saw another pitched battled. At
this juncture, Major McKea with about a battalion-sized compliment of
Philippine Scout troops arrived from Fort McKinley. This unit was

132
 st
immediately committed into battle, occupying the north flank of the 1
Infantry.

The arrival of this reinforcement, however, did not alter the

situation. With his artillery and air force making a systematic
bombardment of friendly positions, the enemy staged another
counterattack. Slowly but surely, the will to resist on the part of the
defenders was fast disintegrating.

Meanwhile, reports had filtered in that the Japanese force that

landed on Atimonan succeeded in overwhelming the resistance put up
st
by the 51 Division, PA, in that town and was now driving westward on
the road to Pagbilao. Realizing this new threat to their forces, Major
McKea and Captain Santos had to order the withdrawal of their units to
Luisiana, Laguna. By this time, part of the hostile force that landed in
Mauban was inching its way to Cavinti by taking the mountain trails from
Sampaloc. To stave off disaster for their units, McKea and Santos
decided to establish a battle position in Cavinti. The duo then dispatched
a detail to destroy the cable laid across the Botocan River from the
Botocan Hydroelectric Plant in order to delay the enemy’s advance.

In Cavinti, sporadic clashes between patrols of the opposing

forces occurred. However, these subsided momentarily. The lull gave the
st
1 Infantry time to evacuate its wounded to the provincial hospital in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, and at the same time to bury its dead.
st
The spirited resistance by elements of the 51 Division in the
towns of Pagbilao, Lucena, Sariaya, Candelaria, and Tiaong soon
crumbled after four days of continuous pressure. Later, the enemy set
his eyes on the capture of San Pablo City, an event that could prejudice
the defenders.
st
In the wake of this reality, the joint forces of the 1 Infantry and
Philippine Scouts had to be pulled back to Pagsanjan. At about ten
o’clock A.M., December 28, these elements had successfully reached
Calauan. There, Major McKea and his troops were ordered to rejoin their
st
parent unit at Fort Mckinley, leaving behind the 1 Infantry. At this
juncture, the Japanese column chose to take the Pagsanjan-Famy-
Taytay Road in its drive toward Manila, a movement that brought it close
rd st
on the heels of the withdrawing 3 Battalion, 1 Infantry.
st
The 1 Engineer Battalion minus its “B” Company, after
disengaging from the enemy in Piis on the morning of Christmas Day,

133
had fallen back to Pagsanjan where it remained bivouacked until
December 28. From there, the unit, together with the service elements of
st
the 1 Regular Division, was ordered to proceed to Betis, Pampanga.
st
The 1 Engineer Battalion established its bivouac area on a mango
groove along the Minalin Road.

On December 29, Brigadier General Jones ordered Captain

st
Santos to move the 1 Infantry Regiment at once to Pampanga. By
st
daybreak, it had reached the bivouac area of the 1 Engineer Battalion.
st st
On the same day, the 1 Infantry Regiment and 1 Engineer Battalion
st
had reverted back to the operational control of the 1 Regular Division.
rd
In Pampanga, the 3 Infantry Regiment under Capt. Vivencio
Orais was deployed on the Angeles-Arayat-Magalang Road. It had
occupied this position since December 23. Fortunately, the unit was in
comparative peace which enabled Captain Orais to train his men in the
rudiments of war and to build up his unit’s strength and equipment.
rd
Finally, after its uneventful stay in that area, the 3 Infantry was ordered
to move over to Bacolor, reaching there in the early morning of
December 30. From Bacolor, two of its battalions proceeded to their
assigned assembly areas along the Pilar-Bagac Road. The regiment’s
withdrawal to Bataan had been completed.
st st
Like the other elements of the 1 Regular division, the 1
Medical Battalion under 1Lt. Francisco Altarejos was ordered on
December 30 to withdraw to Bataan. Together with the Division Service
st
Troops, the 1 Medical Battalion reached its designated assembly area
in Bataan the following day.
st
After having lost contact with the Division Headquarters, the 1
st
Infantry Regiment and 1 Engineer Battalion were completely isolated,
resulting to a certain degree of confusion. To remedy the situation, the
regimental commander, Captain Santos, had to hurry to San Fernando,
Pampanga then to Bataan where Segundo had established his CP. It
st
was here where the 1 Regular Division commander instructed Santos to
move his regiment at once to Bataan. Before midnight of January 1,
st
1942, the Infantry Regiment and 1 Engineer Battalion had arrived at
rd
their assembly areas after the weary and tiresome trek. The 3 Battalion,
st st
1 Infantry, and “B” Company, 1 Engineer Battalion, had finally rejoined
their parent organizations.

134
Withdrawal to Bataan

Apparently, MacArthur’s decision to execute the phased

withdrawal of the USAFFE to Bataan had been influenced by the furious
fighting in Northern Luzon on December 22-23. From all indications,
however, this decision arose because of the inability of NLF troops to
stop the enemy’s southward drive.

On receipt of the order putting into effect War Plan Orange 3,

Wainwright directed elements of the NLF to occupy a series of
successive defensive lines to delay the enemy preparatory to the
completion by the USAFFE of its phased withdrawal to Bataan. The five
delay points, to be occupied under cover of darkness, were as follows:

Delay Point No. 1 (D-1) - This was along the Urdaneta-San

Carlos -Aguilar line, about midway between the base of Lingayen Gulf
and Agno River. This was parallel to the Urdaneta-Sta Barbara section of
National Highway No. 3. Withdrawal into this line would be completed in
the evening of December 23-24

Delay Point No. 2 (D-2) - It was a line behid Agno River from
Mangatarem on the western flank and running through the towns of
Bayambang, Sto.Tomas, Rosales, and Tayug. This line was much longer
than D-1. It was to be occupied on December 24-25.

Delay Point No. 3 (D-3) - This line extended from Sta. Ignacia,
Tarlac, to San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and traversed the towns of Gerona in
Tarlac, and Guimba and Munoz, Nueva Ecija. It would be occupied on
December 25-26.

Delay Point No. 4 (D-4) - It stretched from Cabanatuan through

Zaragosa, La Paz, and Tarlac, and anchored on the high grounds west
of Tarlac. This was much shorter than the previous ones. It was to be
occupied on December 27-28.
.
Delay Point No. 5 (D-5) - This line stretched across the broad
valley from Bamban, Tarlac, to Sibul Springs in San Miguel, Bulacan, at
the foot of the Sierra Madre Mountains in the east. Considered as the
main delay point, the enemy would be halted along this line to eneble the
SLF to funnel through the Calumpit Bridge and clear San Fernando,
Pampanga before its withdrawal to Bataan.

135
MAP 3 - Withdrawal to Bataan

136
 In line with the plan of withdrawal, combat engineers of the NLF
were given two missions to accomplish: maintenance of roads and
bridges ahead of the retreating columns, and destruction of bridges and
blocking of the roads already covered up to stop the enemy’s advance.¹¹
In addition, frontline units were instructed to construct obstacles in front
of the first delay point. The construction of barriers south of this line was
st
the primary responsibility of NLF combat engineers, principally the 91
st
Engineer Battalion of the 91 Division, PA.

On December 23, Wainwright ordered the NLF to occupy D-1.

However, because of the delayed receipt of the order, the line was
th th
actually occupied the following day. The 11 Division, PA, less its 12
st
Infantry was assigned the Urdaneta Calasiao area, while the 21
Division, PA under Brig. Gen. Mateo Capinpin would occupy the left
(west) side with its right flank anchored at Dagupan.
th
When the 11 Division was ordered to occupy D-1, Brougher, its
Commanding General, transferred his CP from Manaoag to Sta. Barbara
with its rear echelon at San Manuel, Tarlac. Once he had reestablished
th th
his CP, Brougher disposed elements of the 11 Division as follows: 11
th
Infantry at the Sta. Barbara-Calasiao area on the left and 13 Infantry,
less one battalion at Urdaneta on the right. One FA battery was attached
to each of these two regiments to support their defensive operations.
st
The 21 Division, on the other hand, moved out for D-1 at seven
rd st
P.M., December 24. Its last element-3 Battalion, 21 Infantry—occupied
positions along the San Carlos Road after crossing the Agno River by
bancas when the sun rose the following day.

Earlier that day, the Bataan Defense Force was constituted with
Maj. Gen. George M. Parker, Jr. as its commander. At the same time,
st st
the 31 and 41 Division, PA, were ordered to leave for Bataan to
become part of the BDF, together with the Philippine Division and the US
Army Air Corps Provisional Regiment. Also ordered withdrawn to Bataan
during this period was the PA Air Corps which became the “flying
infantry” by virtue of the fact that it had been left planeless a few days
from the onset of the war.

In the afternoon, President Quezon and US High Commissioner

Francis B. Sayre, together with their respective official as well as private
families, left for Corregidor on board an inter-island steamer. From then
on, the “Rock” became the seat of the Commonwealth Government. That
night, MacArthur and his staff officers also left for Corregidor.

137
 Once it had taken Binalonan, the Tsuchibashi Group was split
into two columns. One was sent south to Urdaneta via Route 3; the other
st nd
was sent east to Tayug. The first column consisted of the 1 and 2
th
Formosa Regiments and the 4 Tank Regiment. Lumped together in the
th
second column were the other elements of the 48 Division.
th
By about two o’clock in the morning of December 25, the 13
th
Infantry, reinforced by a battalion from the 11 Infantry, clashed with the
advance elements of the first column which was then heading toward
Urdaneta. Fighting between these forces lasted the whole morning.
Because of the unbearable pressure exerted against these elements of
th
the 11 Division, the Japanese soon gained the upperhand. By
th
noontime, Urdaneta was under hostile hands. The 13 Infantry sustained
heavy losses. Among the casualties was Capt. Alfredo Peckson, Division
th rd
Signal Officer, and CO 11 Signal Company. Captured was 3 Lt.
th
Vicente Singson of the 11 FA.
th
After this action, the 11 Division had to fall back to D-2 south of
Agno River from Bayambang to the road junction at Carmen. Placed also
st st
on this line was the 1 Battalion, 21 Infantry, which was assigned to
defend Carmen. On the west portion of this line which extended 2,000
th th
yards farther to the west was the 13 Infantry. The 11 Infantry, on the
other hand, held the rest of the Division sector, to include Bautista. Also
st
posted on D-2 were the following elements: 21 Division, PA, on the left,
nd th
and 92 Combat Team under Col. John H. Rodman, and 26 Cavalry,
th
PS, on the right; 194 Tank Battalion, Less Company “C” under Col.
Ernest B. Miller, along the Agno River Between Carmen and Route 13, a
nd
stretch of twenty-five miles; and 192 Tank Battalion under Col.
12
Theodore Wickord, from Carmen to Tayug a distance of sixteen miles.
th
Also on the 25 , the FA Regiment was ordered to move to Sta.
st
Maria, Pangasinan, where it was expected to see some action. Its 1
st
Battalion, under 1 Lt. Hugo B. Fernandez, was to bear the brunt of the
fighting. However, nothing untoward happened so that at one o”clock
A.M. of December 26, it moved on to Mabalacat, Pampanga, where a
reorganization of the regiment was to be effected.
th
On December 26, the enemy attacked the 11 Division’s sector.
Tanks, heavy artillery pieces, and dive-bombers combined beautifully
with the infantry to make the siege a success. By four o’oclock, Plaridel
th
Bridge fell into enemy hands, thus bottling up the 11 Division between
st
Carmen and Bayambang. The 21 Division withdrew and occupied
positions on the Gerona-Camiling line.

138
 th th
Under this tight situation, the 11 and 13 Infantry Regiments
could not withdraw in accordance with WPO3. The only escape route left
open to them was, the railroad track from Bautista. With a freight car
commandeered by Capt. Simeon Valdes, Division G-4, and made
available to these elements, the withdrawal was successfully carried out.
th
These units then joined the 11 Division on D-2.

After the fall of the city of Manila into Japanese hands,

MacArthur forthwith declared it an “open city.” This was to spare the
metropolitan area from the ravages of war. As such, all combatant
military installations were withdrawn to deprive the city of its military
characteristic. At the same time, High Commissioner Sayre addressed a
stirring message to the US Government to send the necessary help in
order to stave off the further destruction of lives and property.

In the meantime, the enemy had captured the road inter section
th
at Carmen south of Plaridel Bridge. On learning that the 26 Cavalry had
th
withdrawn from its positions prematurely, Wainwright ordered the 11
Division to fall back to line D-3 through Carmen on Route 3. Before this
st
movement could be effected, the Japanese had already routed the 1
st
Battalion of the 21 Infantry at Carmen. Maj. Robert Besson, the
Battalion commander, was taken prisoner of war, and about 200 of his
men were casualties. After several hours, the Japanese were in
complete control over Carmen and Rosales. Likewise, Route 3 was
completely sealed off as an exit.
th
Now, with its route of withdrawal closed, the 11 Division was
indeed in a tight fix. Its escape could only be effected through the Manila
Railroad on the western fringes of its sector. At about 11: 00 PM.,
th
Brougher announced at Moncada,Tarlac, that the 11 Division was
falling back by rail. To accomplish this, he had requested Wainwright to
make tanks available to establish road-blocks at the railway crossing at
Moncada.

Lack of transportation, however, surfaced as the primary

th
stumbling block toward the completion of the 11 Division’s withdrawal.
To solve this problem, Captain Valdes again commandeered a
locomotive, several freight trains, and approximately 150 private busses
from the Trinidad Garage, Pantranco, Benguet Auto Line, and Dangwa
Transportation Company to load troops, food, ammunition, and other
important equipment. A few minutes before four o’olock A.M., December
27, the hastily-assembled vehicular convoy cleared the railway crossing
at Moncada. The withdrawal was a fait accompli.

139
 th
Early in the morning of the 27 , line D-3 was occupied. On this
th st st
line were the 11 , 21 , and 91 Divisions. Providing them direct support
were the Provisional Tank Group and several 75-mm (SPM) guns.
st
Occupying the right flank of the line was the 91 Division. Its positions
were across Route 5 and on the south bank of a small river near San
st
Jose, Nueva Ecija. The 21 Division was deployed between Gerona and
Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac.
th
The 11 Division occupied the Gerona-Guimba line. Brougher
th
established his CP at Victoria. On the right side was the 11 Infantry.
th
The 13 Infantry occupied the left flank. Here on line D-3, the NLF’s stay
was an uneventful one.

Delay Point No. 4 (D-4) was occupied as mandated. Later that

evening, December 27, Wainwright announced his decision to “abandon
D-5 as the final line of defense”. Instead, he ordered the NLF to hold D-4
“at all costs until ordered withdrawn.” The delaying action on this line
would enable the SLF to clear Calumpit Bridge.
st
The 91 Division was on the eastern edge of the Central Plains,
to include the mountains to the east. Its route of withdrawal was through
Route 5 down to Plaridel then westward to Calumpit. On the center was
th
the 11 Division. Its area was between Carmen, a barrio ten miles west
of Cabanatuan, and Route 3. The secondary roads within its sector
would be used in its withdrawal. Occupying the western edge of the line
st
was the 21 Division. It was to withdraw along Route 3 to Angeles, then
finally to Bataan.
st
It was here where the enemy attacked the 21 Division in force
with complete artillery and air support. The fighting raged from December
27 to 29. However, the Division held its own under the enemy’s
onslaughts and kept the Japanese at bay for three days.
th
At dusk of December 28, the 11 Division withdrew to the Tarlac-
La Paz-Zaragosa line. The troops had no contact with the enemy on this
th
line. For the first time since its withdrawal from Lingayen Gulf, the 11
Division enjoyed a full day’s rest.

Meanwhile, US President Roosevelt cabled the Filipino people

on December 28 his reassurance that their freedom would be protected
at all costs. This announcement was meant to boost the morale of
Filipino and American troops who had by then sustained numerous

140
reverses in various battle arenas in the Philippines. The entire resources
of the US stood behind that solemn vow.
rd
On December 29, a platoon under 3 Lt Marciano Achanzar of
st th
“B” Company, 1 Battalion, 11 Infantry, attacked an enemy group
encamped across the bridge near Zaragosa cemetery. The Japanese
were having breakfast when the attackers came. With machineguns and
mortars in close support, the enemy fought back. Fearful of the dire
consequences, the platoon had to withdraw after blasting the span when
all friendly troops had passed over. Achanzar was awarded the Military
Merit Medal for this singular feat of heroism.

That night, about 1,000 stragglers belonging to units of the NLF

that had been cut off in the north reported to Col. Juan S. Moran, Chief of
th
Staff of the 11 Division, at Concepcion, Tarlac. With this group were Lt.
st st
Col. Donald Von Bonnett, CO of the 71 Infantry, 71 Division, and Capt
th
Amado Bautista, Division Engineer Officer, and CO, 11 Engineer
th th
Battalion, 11 Division. Majority of these stragglers came from the 12
th
Infantry, 11 Division, which was immediately ordered reconstituted and
restored to full combat duty status.
nd
Early the next day, a sentinel of the 192 Tank Battalion spotted
the bicycle column of the elements of the Kanno Detachment
approaching Zaragosa. When the bicycle-riding Japanese soldiers were
within effective firing range, the guns mounted at the American tanks
spewed fire with deadly effect and accuracy. Approximately, eighty-two
of the enemy troops were killed.¹³ It was still dark when the action ended.

Shortly after, the American tank commander moved his platoon

across the Zaragosa Bridge. He was prompted to do this on his fear of
hostile infiltration. After the movement was completed, the tank
commander asked the combat engineers to demolish the bridge which
th
was done in haste. This left troops of the 11 Infantry stranded on the
other side.

At daylight, elements of the Kanno Detachment came across the

th
roadblock set up by the 11 Infantry. Part of the hostile force attacked
from the north. To avoid complete encirclement, Lt. Blas Alejandre, CO,
rd
of the 3 Battalion, had to withdraw his troops across the river where he
expected to have a strong defense along the river line. By noontime,
Alejandre, troops were well entrenched.

141
 th
Not long after, Japanese 75-mm guns of the 48 Mountain
rd
Artillery Regiment were brought into the 3 Battalion’s positions. After
twenty minutes of incessant bombardment, the Japanese ground troops
rd
closed in to the position. Against these odds, the 3 Battalion withdrew
on the Zaragosa-La Paz Road. Fortunately, Colonel Kanno ordered a
halt on the Japanese advance to gain ample time for heavier artillery
armaments to be brought in.

At 2: 15 P.M., a Japanese anti-gun went into action against the

defenders. It remained active until it was rendered out of commission but
not before it had knocked down the lead tank of Lt. Nat Grand’s platoon.
Without much ado, the tank unit vacated its position. After this armored
protection was withdrawn, the Japanese unleashed their heavy artillery
barrages aimed at total decimation of the 3rd Battlion.
rd
A pall gloom descended on the 3 Battalion. In a heroic bid to
th
rescue the unit, Maj. Russel Volckmann, acting CO of the 11 Infantry,
decided to counter the enemy’s attack at three o’clock P.M. Momentarily,
there was a temporary cessation of hostile artillery firing. This provided
rd
the leverage for the trapped 3 Battalion to withdraw further west via the
La Paz road. At 4:30 P.M., unit was well established in its new defensive
positions. The slackening of the enemy’s artillery barrages was caused
by the Japanese mistaken notion that the counter attacking force was
much superior in strength and armaments.
rd
From its new position, the 3 Battalion was ordered to withdraw
further. It was during this time when Wainwright ordered all elements of
rd
the NLF to occupy line D-5. The 3 Battalion was the last element of the
th
11 Infantry to clear Zaragosa. It was also the last element of the NLF to
arrive at D-5.

For its heroic defensive stand against the enemy at Zaragosa,

rd
the 3 Battalion paid a heavy toll. Plucked from its ranks were 394
14
officers and men who were either killed or seriously injured. Among
those wounded was its commander, Lieutenant Alejandre. While the
unit’s losses were considerable, its performance in combat was an
enviable one. By holding the enemy at bay for twenty-four hours, it
thwarted the enemy’s rapid advance to Tarlac. Thus, it prevented the
enemy from launching a large-scale attack against that town. At the
same time, it prevented the Japanese maneuver to cut off the left anchor
of the NLF’s line.

142
 th st
On line D-5, the 11 and 21 Divisions were posted on the right
th
and left flanks, respectively. The sector assigned to the 11 was a semi-
circle extending eastward from the Magalang Concepcion Road along
the southern bank of the Pampanga River. It traversed the northern and
st
eastern bases of Mt. Arayat. The 21 Division, on the other hand, oc-
cupied the hilly terrain south of Bamban River and stretching eastward
15
to Highway 3.
st
In the meantime, Wainwright ordered a regiment of the 71
st
Division, reinforced by about 500 men from the 91 Division, to establish
and occupy a new defensive line north of Baliwag, Bulacan. This
nd
composite force had the support of the 2 FA Regiment. The contingent
had barely been organized for that mission when another order came
st
directing the men from the 91 Division to occupy a new line north of
Calumpit Bridge. Indications tended to show that a new Japanese
offensive against that area was being hatched.

At 10:30 A.M., December 31, the Japanese launched a furious

st
attack against the positions of the 91 Division. Although the line
st
wavered, the 91 Division stood its ground and fought back with tenacity.
All day long, the Division held its line, holding the enemy at bay and
paying a high price for his venture. By midnight, the South Luzon Force
had crossed Calumpit Bridge, then wended its way to Bataan. It
completed its withdrawal in the evening of that day.

At about 6: 15 A.M., of New Year’s day, the Calumpit Bridge was

demolished. Thus, the main force of Homma’s assault group had to fight
along the Angat river line. Its advance elements were within a stone’s
throw from the bridge when it was blown up.

In its successful withdrawal to Bataan, the SLF had been

th st st th st
assisted by the 11 , 21 , and 91 Divisions. The 11 and 21 Divisions
made a gallant stand north of San Fernando, Pampanga, which
prevented the enemy from making a rapid advance toward Calumpit
st
Bridge that could have prejudiced the SLF’s movement. The 91
Division, on the other hand, made a similar gesture that contributed to
the success of the withdrawal.

Last Delaying Action

th st
After that action in San Fernando, the 11 and 21 Divisions
were ordered to make a final five-day delaying action on the ten-mile
Guagua-Porac line. These two elements were to hold that line at all

143
costs to permit the complete organization of defensive positions in
Bataan.

A portion of the line from Porac halfway to Guagua, which was

st
the north or left flank, was defended and held by the 21 Division. To its
th th
rear in reserve was the 26 Cavalry PS. The 11 Division’s line extended
st
from the limiting point of the 21 Division to Guagua. Weaver’s
Provisional Tank Group was placed in support of both divisions.

On January 1, 1942, Brougher ordered Lt. Col. Glen Townsend

th
to withdraw his 11 Infantry to Guagua via the Magalang Road through
Mexico and San Fernando. The movement would be carried out
beginning eight in the evening. However, at 4:30 P.M., a Japanese
reinforced infantry battalion with complete artillery support was then
nd
pushing south from Concepcion attacked Townsend’s men. The 2
Battalion under Maj. Helmert Diusterhoff, supported by two 75-mm SPM
guns, made a gallant struggle which resulted to heavy losses on the part
of the enemy. The Japanese made several attempts to puncture the line,
th
but each venture failed. Consequently, the 11 Infantry dashed off to
freedom. It reached Guagua at about two o’clock A.M., the next day. The
th th
12 and 13 Infantry Regiments were also able to withdraw on the same
day.
th
After this successful withdrawal, the 11 Division was
reassembled in the Bilis-Sta.Rita-Porac area. Here, Brougher disposed
th th
his troops as follows: 11 Infantry, Porac; 12 Infantry, Lubao, as
th th
Division reserve; 13 Infantry, Betis; and 11 FA Regiment, Gauagua-
Lubao Road, as general support. Brougher established his CP south of
Lubao. Thereafter, he exhorted his men to make an unwavering stand on
the Guagua Lubao Road.

At this juncture, Homma ordered that ground operations against

the USAFFE be stepped up. His immediate objective was to prevent the
westward withdrawal of McArthur’s forces. To this end, he assigned the
Uejima and Kanno Detachments to accomplish this task. However,
because of the slow-paced movements of these elements, Homma later
th
withdrew an infantry regiment from the 48 Division and sent it to
Guagua to close all routes of withdrawal. The Takahashi Detachment
was likewise sent to Porac to accomplish the same task. This Japanese
force advanced to Bamban,Tarlac on January 1.

From Baliwag, Bulacan, the Tanaka Detachment moved over to

Calumpit to assist the Takahashi Detachment. But before the Tanaka

144
 th
Detachment could reach Calumpit, the 7 Tank Regiment rushed to that
vicinity. After a series of tactical clashes with the USAFFE, it occupied
the bridge on January 2. The Tanaka Detachment crossed the river and
entered San Fernando at 6:30 of that day.

Early in the morning of January 2, the Japanese exerted pres-

st
sure on the center of the 21 Division’s line. This developed later into a
major assault as hostile artillery units and aircraft were brought in to
st
wreak havoc on the Division. Without losing time, the guns of the 21 FA
Regiment, in direct support of the Division, boomed into action and
counter fired with deadly accuracy. Thus, an artillery of heavy magnitude
st
ensued. All through the day, the 21 Division held its lines against the
enemy’s furious onslaughts.

By evening, the attack became more intense as more Japanese

infantry troops, with light tanks and armored vehicles on the spearhead,
were thrown into action. In the afternoon of the next day, the Division’s
line was punctured, and its rear installations were threatened when a
Japanese force had succeeded in making an infiltration through the
MLR.
When informed of this situation, General Capinpin left
st
immediately for the 21 Infantry’s sector. There, he found the unit totally
cut off from the Division headquarters. Shortly after, he decided to make
rd
a counterattack by employing the 23 Infantry, his reserve element. At
the same time, he took personal command of the counter-attack force.
Drawing inspiration from Capinpin’s brilliant leadership and serene
disposition under fire, the men rallied behind him which enabled them to
push back the numerically-superior enemy.
th th
Meanwhile, advance elements of the 16 and 48 Divisions
entered and occupied the City of Manila on January 2. Consequently, a
clash of divergent opinions developed within Homma’s staff. One school
of thought advocated the giving of priority attention to military
government. The other espoused the continuation of field operations
aimed at the complete destruction of MacArthur’s forces. Eventually,
Homma decided to press the attack to a successful conclusion.
th
Subsequently, Homma ordered the 48 Division to move its main
assault group northward across the Pampanga River and pursue the
USAFFE westward from Balanga, Bataan. The Takahashi Detachment,
then at Mabalacat, advanced to Dinalupihn, Bataan through Porac to cut
off further withdrawals. The Tanaka Detachment, then at Calumpit, drove
southwest from San Fernando to Hermosa, Bataan.

145
 To prevent the rapid Japanese advance toward Bataan, the
USAFFE constituted the Layac Force which was composed of two
st st
regiments of the 71 Division, 31 Infantry Regiment, US, and remnants
th rd
of the 26 Cavalry, PS. The 23 FA Regiment was in support. This force
occupied the crossroad to protect Route 7 leading to Olongapo on
January 2, through Lubao, Sta. Cruz, and Dinalupihan. In close support
th
of these ground operations was the 5 Air Group.

In the morning of January 3, the Takahaski Detachment, while

cruising along Route 7, hit the right flank of the Guagua Porac line. The
th th
11 Infantry’s positions at Porac and the 13 Infantry’s line at Betis bore
th
the brunt of the hostile attack. However, after the guns of the 11 FA
Regiment roared into actions from firing positions at Sta. Rita and
Guagua, the Japanese advance was temporarily halted. It was resumed
when Japanese 75-mm guns came in to support the main assault force.
th
Hit during the Japanese artillery bombardment was the CP of the 11
Infantry.
th
That afternoon, the 13 Infantry’s line gave way to a Japanese
column spearheaded by tanks of the 7th Tank Regiment. Northern
Guagua was immediately seized. Next to be hit by the same force was
rd th th
the 3 Battalion, 11 Infantry, which was on the left of the 13 Infantry. It
sustained a total of 150 casualties. Notwithstanding this the two friendly
st nd th
units held on to their positions until the 1 and 2 Battalions of the 11
Infantry made good their escape. Contact with the enemy was thus
broken off.

A counterattack was poised by a composite force made up of

th nd
several elements of the 11 Division and “A” Company, 192 Tank
Battalion. The attempt, however, was not carried out when it was
discovered that some friendly units were firing their mortars against the
troops of the tank battalion. With this discovery, disaster was averted.

Not long after, Brougher ordered the immediate withdrawal of the

th
11 Division south of Lubao. This daylight movement was forced upon it
due to the fact that the Japanese were close behind and intent on
destroying it. Fortunately, the movement was completed despite several
attempts by Japanese bombers to interdict the long vehicular convoy that
wended its way along Route 7.

The following day, January 4, fresh Japanese troops were

st
thrown into a frontal assault against the 21 Division. Overwhelmed, the
Division had to withdraw to a new position arriving there by about

146
 th
midnight. The 26 Cavalry, PS, provided the covering fire from the flank.
th
Thus, the enemy shifted his attention to the 11 Division’s sector.
th th
Throughout the day, the 11 and 12 Infantry Regiment, supported by
th
the 11 FA Regiment, engaged the advance elements of the enemy
debouching into Bataan. His right flank threatened, together with his
supply route and communication lines to Bataan, Brougher had to order
further withdrawal.

Late that afternoon, Wainwright received the information on the

th
Japanese breakthrough at Guagua. Without delay, he ordered the 11
st
and 21 Divisions to establish and occupy a new line south of the
Gumain River. These elements were to withdraw at nighttime.

That night, the two Army Divisions effected their withdrawal.

th
Brougher ordered the elements of the 11 Division to take Route 7
passing through Guagua and Lubao. However, this avenue of approach
th
had been sealed off by Tanaka Detachment which bottled up the 11
Infantry and other USAFFE units in the area. Thus, another alternate
route had to be taken. This was through San Jose, then along Route 74
to Dinalupihan. From this town, they turned southeast toward the Layac
th th
Junction, the gateway to Bataan. This was where the 11 Infantry, 11
nd
Division, and “A” Company, 192 Tank Battalion, US, rejoined after they
had been cut off by hostile action.
th
Troops of 11 Division were sent forward to the next line along
Route 7 below Lubao and Sta. Cruz, a short distance Outpost Line of
Resistance north of the line. The Outpost Line of Resistance was
th
occupied by about 200 men from the 13 Infantry and under the overall
command of Capt. John Primrose. To support the Outpost Line of
th
Resistance, the 11 FA Regiment provided ten guns, plus several 75-
mm SPM pieces. Primrose and his troops were withdrawn from the
Outpost Line of Resistance when their replacements arrived.

The Guagua-Porac line was abandoned after some desultory

fighting. Subsequently, the USAFFE troops moved out to their new
positions on the western and southern edges of the Gumain River. The
th
11 Division occupied a line approximately one mile south of the river,
st
while the 21 Division was positioned along the banks.
th st
After a brief occupation of the new positions, the 11 and 21
th
Divisions were ordered to take the last lap to Bataan. The 11 Divisions
st
was to withdraw first, followed by the 21 Division. Tasked to cover this
th
movement was the 26 Cavalry, PS. Shortly after midnight of January 5,

147
both these divisions had crossed the Layac Junction. At one o’clock PM,
January 6, the Layac Bridge was demolished on orders of Wainwright,
after all USAFFE troops had successfully funelled into Bataan.

From that time on, the defense of the vital Layac Junction was
passed on to the Layac Force. This contingent was given the mission to
cover the withdrawal of the NLF into Bataan, and to stop enemy advance
on Route 7 to give ample time for the Bataan Defense Force to establish
the Abucay-Morong line.

Thus, the USAFFE’s withdrawal to Bataan from both ends of

Luzon had been accomplished. However, it paid a high price for it. It
sustained some 13,000 casualties, 12,000 of whom came from the NLF,
and 1,000 from the SLF. Homma’s forces, on the other hand, had 2,000
casualties, to include 627 killed in action, 1,282 wounded and seven
16
missing

The USAFFE’s gallant stand on Bataan had yet to unfold. Its

ordeals had just begun.

USAFFE trucks proceed to Bataan, December 1941

148
 CHAPTER IX

LAST-DITCH DEFENSIVE STAND

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in the Philippines, US war planners

envisioned the holding of a last-ditch defensive stand against the
Japanese Imperial Forces on the peninsula of Bataan. They foresaw that
because of its lush vegetation and thickly-forested outgrowth, Bataan
could very well be that rallying point. As embodied in War Plan Orange 3,
the USAFFE would contain the enemy by means of a series of delaying
actions on a relatively short front flanked by Manila Bay and the sea,
while waiting for reinforcements from the continental United States.

Tactical Preparations in Bataan

Bataan Peninsula is an island in Luzon due west of Manila

across the bay. It is approximately thirty miles long and averages about
fifteen miles in its width. Traversing the peninsula from north to south
are steep mountains which are volcanic in origin. There are two principal
highways, one which runs north and south, paralleling the east coast on
Manila Bay. The other cuts across the mountains and connects the
south-north road with Bagac and Morong on the west coast. To the
northwest is Subic Bay, site of the United States naval base in Olongapo.
Two miles off the southern point of the peninsula is the islands fort of
Corregidor.

With its arrival in Bataan, the USAFFE was eventually

reorganized in anticipation of the enemy’s onslaughts. The USAFFE, by
this time, consisted of 12,000 Americans, 67,164 Filipinos, and 25,000
Filipino civilians, all imbued with the willingness to fight. It hoped to
accomplish its two-pronged objectives: to put up a good defensive stand
until the promised aid from America would come, and to stall for a time to
prevent the early conquest of the Philippines which the Japanese war
expert had calendared fifty days from the start of the war.

The defense of Bataan began on January 7, 1942. On that day,

the erstwhile North and South Luzon Forces were ordered disbanded.
Activated in their places were the I and II Philippine Corps. Wainwright
was named Commanding General of the first unit, while Parker was
recalled from Bataan Defense Command to assume stewardship of the II
Philippine Corps. Corps areas were delineated. A line running north to
south from Mount Natib to the Mariveles Mountains marked their
st
boundaries. West of the line was the defensive area of the 1 Philippine

149
Corps; east of this line, or the Manila Bay side, was the area of
responsibility of General Parker. The Service Command under Brig.
Gen. Allen C. McBride was tasked to defend the tip of the Peninsula.
Placed under the operational control of the I Philippine Corps were the
st st
following units: 1 Regular Division, PA; 91 Division with attached
st th
elements of the 71 Division, PA; and 45 Infantry Regiment. PS. Slated
th
to joint it was the 26 Cavalry, PS. In addition, it had miscellaneous units
as service elements. All in all, the I Philippine Corps had an aggregate
strength of 22,500 men.
st
Wainwright placed the 1 Regular Division on the beaches of
th
Morong for defense operations. The 45 Infantry, PS, was positioned on
st
the Pilar-Bagac Road. In Corps reserve was the 91 Division, plus the
st
attached elements of the 71 Division, PA.

The Abucay-Mauban line extending from Mauban to Mount

Silanganan, was designated as the Main Line of Resistance. Occupying
rd st
the MLR were the 3 Infantry, 1 Regular Division, on the west, one
st st
battalion of the 31 FA, 31 Division, PA, on the right, and Company “K”,
st st 1
1 Infantry, 1 Regular Division, PA, on the rightmost position.

Wainwright had also designated an Outpost Line of Resistance

(OPLR) which paralleled the MLR. This line extended eastward to Mt.
rd nd st
Silanganan from barrio Mayandati. The 3 Infantry and 2 Battalion, 1
st
Infantry, both of the 1 Regular Division, were placed along the OPLR.
st
The 31 Division, PA, under Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel, was on
the beach south of the MLR. Its area of responsibility extended from the
th
regimental reserve line at Saysayin Point. A battalion of the 45 Infantry,
PS, whose mission was to defend the Bagac Bay side, was an
augmentation force. Its southern flank was occupied by a battalion of the
st nd
31 Infantry. For its artillery support, the 92 Coast Artillery Regiment,
PS, assigned a battery of two 155-mm guns against Saysayin Point,
2
while another was deployed near Bagac Point while another was
deployed.

In order to provide artillery support to the I Philippine Corps, a

force had been formed under the command of Lt. Col. Halstead C.
st st
Fowler. The units placed under Fowler were the 71 FA, minus the 1
st rd
Battalion, two batteries of the 91 FA and a battery of the 23 FA. A
battery each of SPM guns and 155-mm howitzers completed the artillery
force structure. Fowler’s command had a combined firepower of thirty-

150
three pieces ranging from the 2.95-inch mountain guns to heavy
howitzers.

The II Philippine Corps, on the other hand, was increased in

number than the I Philippine Corps with a total strength of 25,000 men
because of the fact that USAFFE headquarters had anticipated that the
Japanese Imperial Forces would effect a breakthrough in its area of
responsibility. Units placed under it were the US Army Air Corps
th th st st st
Regiment (Provisional), 57 Infantry, PS, 11 , 21 , 41 , and 51
nd st nd th
Divisions, PA, 302 Engineer Combat Regiment, PA, and 1 2 , and 4
nd
PC Regiments. The 2 CAC Regiment on Bataan, equipped with 8-inch
guns, was likewise absorbed by Parker’s command.

Parker established his MLR which ran westward from Mabatang

to Mt. Natib. The right portion of the lane was the most critical because of
the existence of the East Road where the enemy was expected to make
th
its breakthrough point. Thus, he placed the 57 Infantry in this weak
spot.

General Wainwright outlined the distribution of his forces as

follows:
st
“The 1 Regular Division, PA occupied the main battle position;
st
the 31 Division, PA, guarded the beach from Morong southward to the
th
Caibobo Point; the 45 Infantry Regiment, PS, to organize a reserve
battle position along the Pilar-Bagac Road, ten to twelve miles to the
st
rear; the 91 Division, PA was in Corps reserve; the 26th Cavalry, PS
(cut off at Layac) was still working its way through the mountains to rejoin
3
the 1st Corps.”
th st
On the west of the 57 Infantry’s sector was the 41 Division
whose three regiments were positioned abreast. This line extended to
the high grounds above the Balantay River. The rest of the MLR was
st
defended by the 51 Divison, PA, whose operational area included the
st st
left flank of the 41 Division and the slopes of Mt. Natib.The 51 Infantry
rd
was on the right, while the 53 Infantry occupied the left flank. In reserve
nd
was the 52 Infantry.

For its artillery support, the II Philippine Corps had the following
th th
units: 24 FA Regiment, PS, 86 FA Regiment, PS, with twelve 155-mm
th
GPF guns; one battery, 88 FA Regiment, PS, with eight 75-mm pieces,
st
and 301 FA, PA, with sixteen GPF guns and two 155-mm howitzers.
These augmented the artillery regiments organic to the PA divisions.

151
 th st
Guns of the 86 and 301 FA Regiments were emplaced west of Abucay
to protect the main battle position and the East Road. In the support of
th st th
the 57 Infantry was the 1 Battalion, 24 FA. One of the batteries was
emplaced on the MLR, while the other two were emplaced near Abucay.
st nd th
In direct support of the 41 Division were the 2 Battalion, 24 FA, and a
th
battery of the 88 FA, which were positioned southwest of Abucay.

Enemy Plan of Maneuver

Prior to the launching of the full-scale offensive on Bataan which

was designed to compel the USAFFE into meek submission, Homma
had reorganized his Fourteenth Army based on the following
assumptions:
th
1. That the Philippines would be garrisoned by the 16
th
Division and the 65 Mixed Brigade on its arrival from Takao (Formosa).
th th
2. The 48 Division and the 5 Air Group would be shifted
to another area of operations.
th
After the 65 Mixed Brigade, under Lt. Gen. Akira Nara, hit the
beaches of Lingayen Gulf on New Year’s day, it was immediately tasked
to seize Bataan where Homma expected to meet a token resistance in
view of the absence of strong defensive installations. This mission was
th
an awesome one for the 65 Mixed Brigade, considering that its 6,500
officers and men “were unfit for combat duty” as Nara claimed.
Nonetheless, it had to accomplish this task.
th
To effect the seizure of Bataan, the Nara Group, as the 65
Mixed Brigade was more popularly known, was to be split into two
columns. One column was to drive through the eastern coastline to
Abucay and Balanga, while the other one was to take the opposite route
through Morong and Bagac. Its main assault group was to drive south,
and a much smaller one would advance from Bagac. Then it would
eventually push further through Mariveles.
th th
The transfer of the 48 Division and the 5 Air Group to the
Sixteenth Army in the Netherlands Indies was effected on January 2 on
orders of Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, commander of the Southern
Army, whose recommendation on the seizure of Java to be advanced
earlier than scheduled had been approved by the Japanese Imperial
Headquarters in Tokyo. Thus, even before the start of the crucial battle in

152
Bataan, Homma had been deprived of the services of the best ground
and air units with which to prosecute the vital Philippine Campaign.
th
The units of the 65 Mixed Brigade left under the disposal of
th
Homma were the following: 9 Infantry Regiment, one combat engineer
regiment, one FA battalion equipped with 75-mm guns, and a medical
th
outfit. In addition, the 48 Division had left behind two FA battalions
whose primary equipment were 75-mm mountain guns but which were
th
pulled out later. For armored support, Homma had the services 0f the 7
Tank Regiment. The following elements completed Homma’s artillery
st th
support: 1 Field Heavy Artillery Regiment with 150-mm guns; 8 Field
th
Heavy Artillery with 105-mm pieces; and 9 Heavy Artillery Battalion
equipped with 155-mm howitzers. An air unit under Col. Kamataro Hoshi
provided the necessary air protection.

First Battle in Bataan

Bataan had its first baptism of fire on January 6 at about eight

o’clock A.M., when outpost guards of the Layac Force reported the
sighting of advance patrols of the enemy driving down Highway 7 from
rd
Lubao, Pampanga. On receipt of this report, the 23 FA Regiment
unleashed a murderous artillery barrage on the advancing Japanese
column which led to its dispersal. After the first volley, the enemy
counter-fired with devastating effects. The artillery duel lasted throughout
rd
the day. As a result, the 23 Field Artillery lost all but one of its guns. The
st
31 Infantry Regiment, US, and the two infantry regiments of the 71st
Division, PA, bore the brunt of the Japanese artillery attacks.

In the afternoon, more Japanese combat patrols were sent out to

probe the Fil-American line. At dusk, the enemy attacked the limiting
st st
point of the 31 Infantry Regiment-71 Division line. A large number of
reinforcements was thrown in to break through the line. Consequently,
rd st
the USAFFE line wavered. At this juncture, the 3 Battalion, 31 Infantry,
US, was ordered to make a counterattack. However, more Japanese
infantry men kept on coming. At ten o’clock P.M., the line became
untenable. An immediate withdrawal was ordered.
st st
The 71 Division, PA, fell back with the 31 Infantry providing the
st st
covering fire. Later, the 31 Infantry withdrew after the 71 Division had
made a safe passage. The resulting confusion that ensued caused the
th
26 Cavalry Regiment, PS, to be cut off from these two units. Therefore,
it had to withdraw through the dense-wooded areas in order to rejoin the

153
main body of Wainwright’s I Corps. It reached friendly lines after three
days of evasive maneuvers.

The following day, January 7, the Japanese sent out probing

patrols on the Abucay-Morong line which was ordered established
following the seizure of the Culis-Hermosa line. These were meant to
determine the strength of the Fil-American forces on the MLR. In the
evening, the Japanese began to exert pressure on the Abucay-Morong
line. By this time, the USAFFE had about thirty tanks and ten aircrafts to
lend support to its ground troops. In the absence of the USAFFE’s air
arm, the powerful artillery had taken over.
th th
Also on the 7 , the 57 Infantry was subjected to a heavy siege.
Each hostile attack, however, was repulsed. Both sides sustained heavy
th
losses. The successive hostile attacks prompted the 57 Infantry to fall
st
back. But with the timely arrival of the 21 Division, PA, on the scene, the
broken line was restored.
th
On the 8 , the enemy started shelling the Abucay-Mt. Natib-
rd
Morong line, a portion of the MLR which was assigned to the 43 Infantry
st
Regiment, 41 Division, PA. Because of intense strafing and bombing by
hostile aircraft, which had almost obliterated the foxholes and the near
decimation of the unit, the MLR had to be shifted to previously prepared
positions in the rear.

Later that day, an enemy assault force approximating a regiment

th
in strength besieged the 45 Infantry Regiment, PS, astride the main
st
highway in Abucay and Lim’s 41 Division on the left. However, the
hostile attack was repulsed with the enemy losing heavily.
Notwithstanding their numerous losses, the Japanese pushed inland into
st
the Mt. Natib area. There, they hit the 51 Division under Brig. Gen.
nd
Albert Jones. Immediately, the 52 Infantry was relieved from
th
attachment with the 11 Division and rushed to Mt. Natib.
st st
The 41 Division’s sector, specifically the 41 Infantry Re-
giment’s area, was shelled again on January 9. However, the batteries
st th
supporting the 41 and 57 Infantry Regiments counter-fired which
succeeded in effectively silencing the hostile artillery battery. Several
Japanese infantry units made many attempts to close in at night, but
these were mowed down at the barbed wires by the machine gunners
firing from their concealed positions.

154
 More attempts were made by the Japanese to penetrate the
positions along the Mabatang - Hacienda Abucay line. But each attempt
st
ended in failure as the gallant men of the 41 Division held their lines
against all odds. In several instances, the enemy made frontal assaults
st
against the 41 Infantry Regiment but these were effectively checked.

On January 10 and 11, a reinforced Japanese infantry unit

st
succeeded in pushing back a platoon of the 41 Infantry on the left most
sectors. Without giving the enemy the opportunity to exploit his gains, the
support platoon of that regiment counterattacked. The enemy was
rd nd
pushed back. At the same time, the 3 Battalion of the 32 Infantry
st
Regiment, 31 Division, which was the regimental reserve and whose
right flank was threatened, made a similar maneuver. It was a successful
one. The original line was restored before night fall.
nd
The next day, a sector of the 42 Infantry Regiment was
threatened by the enemy coming in from the draw in its direct front. To
st
avert possible disaster, a volunteer squad from the 41 Engineer
Battalion led by Lieutenant Murl Shreck, assistant unit adviser crept up to
lay down booby traps. After they had installed these detonating devices,
the combat engineers fired at the enemy to attract his attention and then
withdrew. Shortly after the volunteer squad’s return, explosions were
heard from the draw. The booby traps detonated and the Japanese were
blown to pieces.
st
Without taking chances, Brigadier General Lim deployed his 41
Division reserve on the right flank of his sector. He did this to prevent the
unnecessary exposure of that portion of his sector if and when the
th
Japanese succeeded in pushing the 57 Regimental Combat Team
back.

This actually happened in the afternoon of January 13 when the

st th
41 Engineer Battalion moved into its predesignated positions. The 57
RCT had been pushed back on the Abucay Road. It was here where the
combat engineers had their baptism of fire.

Throughout the night, the Japanese assaulted the engineers.

These attacks were sustained until dawn. By four o’clock P.M. of the next
th
day, the 57 RCT, which had withdrawn earlier, was ordered back to
st
Mabatang. Brig. Gen. Mateo M. Capinpin, CG of the 21 Division, PA
th
was told to carry out the order. One compelling reason why the 57 RCT
was ordered to return to Mabatang was due to the fact that the sector it
had previously abandoned was being held by only one battalion.

155
 The Japanese made a light and exploratory attack on the
Mabatang sector on January 14. This was followed by a heavier assault
th
on the exposed left flank of the 57 RCT. Advancing in column, the
Japanese came under artillery from USAFFE batteries. The enemy,
however, countered in support of the assault force. In spite of his heavy
losses, the enemy threw in more men into the attack. In the morning, the
nd th
Japanese succeeded in penetrating the line held by the 2 Battalion, 57
st th
RCT. A company of the 1 Battalion, 57 RCT, counterattacked but the
action failed to dislodge the enemy.
th
To reinforce the badly-battered 57 RCT, two battalions of the
st st
21 Infantry Regiment, 21 Division, were attached. In the relief of one
company, a gap was left open into which an enemy platoon stumbled by
rd nd
accident. The 3 Battalion, 22 Infantry Regiment, was thrown into the
th
scene to support the 57 RCT in its effort to recover lost ground.
nd
In the morning of January 15, the entire 22 Infantry Regiment
counterattacked in the face of very heavy enemy artillery shelling and
aerial bombardment. This was one of the furious battles fought in the
nd
Abucay front. The 22 Infantry Regiment threw the enemy back. Thus,
th
the 57 RCT had regained its lost territory. After six days of fierce
nd
fighting, the 22 Infantry Regiment was able to drive deep into enemy
territory, restored the line, and captured valuable enemy supplies and
materials.
th
After this engagement, the 57 RCT withdrew to Signal Hill for
rest and reorganization. It was there where its command had been
passed on from Colonel Funk to Colonel Fry.

On the same day, January 14, Japanese infantry troops from

Mabatang made a reconnaissance in force. This was an attempt to
th
exploit the withdrawal of the 57 RCT from its positions. If successful,
the attack would give the Japanese access to Balanga after isolating the
th st
11 and 51 Divisions from the provincial road which was the MSR of the
II Philippine Corps.
st
Meanwhile, troops of the 41 Engineer Battalion awaited eagerly
the approach of the same enemy group. They had been ordered earlier
by Brigadier General Lim to resume their fighting stance while on rest
after an all-night battle. When the Japanese were within range, all their
armament, including attached MG’s blasted away at the enemy. The
enemy, however, fought back with small arms, MG’s and mortars.
Fighting raged until four o’clock P.M. when the enemy, failing to inch

156
farther, withdrew in confusion. Scores of dead Japanese soldiers were
st
left behind. At about six o’clock P.M., the 21 Infantry Regiment
st
executed a successful passage of lines through the 41 Engineer
Battalion’s sector.

On that same day, the enemy intensified the pressure against

nd
the 42 Infantry Regiment’s sector. Hostile artillery bombardment was
likewise intensified. Fresh enemy troops were thrown into the assault to
nd
replace the casualties inflected by troops of the 42 Infantry. At this
stage, it was becoming apparent that the Japanese policy seemed to be
“continuous assaults without regard to casualties, hoping to crush the
defending forces by sheer superiority in number.” As they charged, the
Japanese were, however, mowed down by infilade MG fire. When the
Japanese had passed over the planted land mines and reached the
barbed wire entanglements, they flung themselves on to the wires. Other
waves of Japanese soldiers coming from behind walk over the bodies of
nd
their comrades-in-arms to jump down on the 42 Infantry Regiment’s
troops who were stealthily waiting or running to meet the enemy with
their lowered bayonets.
st st
At five o’clock A.M. of January 16, the 1 Battalion, 41 Infantry
Regiment, counterattacked. It was to push the enemy back some 2,500
yards. The counterattack force however, met a stiff opposition by enemy
troops from Mabatang to the right. In a subsequent drive, they
succeeded in regaining their lines just behind the original MLR of the
57th RCT.

Casualties of the Division continued to mount. Enemy artillery

and mortar fires became more accurate with men in foxholes directly hit.
Even MG emplacements were reduced. Medical aidmen were
inadequate to administer first aid treatment to the wounded. Therefore,
chaplains volunteered to assist these medical aidmen.
st
Time and again, the 41 Division was able to throw back the
Japanese onslaughts. It had been able to exact a heavy toll from the
enemy before he could withdraw. Thousands of dead Japanese soldiers
were found in Abucay after the din of the initial battle died down.

Earlier, on January 14, Brigadier General Segundo ordered the

st st
reserve battalion of the 1 Infantry Regiment of his 1 Regular Division
back to Morong to reestablish the OPLR. He had also recalled part of the
force from Mt. Silanganan and placed it in new OPLR. At the same time,
he ordered two of the supporting artillery battalions to be redeployed in

157
order to be able to give effective fire support to the units at Morong.In the
evening, strong combat patrols were dispatched as far as practicable to
the Northern suburbs of the town.

Contact with a strong enemy force that was preparing to cross

the Bataan River north of Morong was established early the next day.
After succeeding in fording the river, the Japanese launched a strong
attack against the combat patrols. The friendly lines were pushed back.
rd
At the time, Lieutenant Ledda’s “I” Company, 3 Battalion, was on the
path of the on rushing Japanese. It therefore bore the brunt of the hostile
attack. Nevertheless, it put up a gallant delaying battle until it was able to
withdraw to the OPLR when its lines became untenable. In a matter of
two hours, Morong fell into enemy hands.

Fighting became more furious at the OPLR. Although outgunned

st
and outnumbered, the 1 Infantry’s Regiment’s troops fought back with
incredible gallantry. They resisted as stubbornly as the Japanese were
stubborn in pursuing their assault. There was no let-up in the fighting
even while casualties on both sides mounted. Toward noon time, Major
st
McCollum, who had taken over the command of the 1 Infantry from
Capt. Alfredo Santos, was grazed on his left temple. His wounding
caused his immediate evacuation to the rear for hospitalization. Thus,
st
command of the 1 Infantry was temporarily passed on to Col. Kerie
Berry. Four days later, Capt. Irving Mendelson, regimental adviser,
st
assumed command of the 1 Infantry.

Hearing of the hostile attack on the I Philippine Corps’ main

battle line, Wainwright drove to Morong in the afternoon. There, he saw
for himself how precarious the situation was. Before leaving the
battleground, Wainwright ordered the attachment of troops “F” and “G”,
th st
26 Cavalry, PS, with Segundo’s 1 Regular Division.

With these two elements, Segundo saw the opportunity to deal a

telling blow to the Japanese. Two possible courses of action were left
open for him to exploit. Either he continued to hold on to a static
defense by strengthening the Division’s MLR with these additional
troops, or he could stage a counter-attack. Of these two alternatives, he
chose the latter which was the bolder one. He disregarded the great
risks involved.

On the arrival of Troops “F” and “G” later in the afternoon,

Segundo formed a provisional combat team composed of the cavalry
st rd
men, troops of the 1 Engineer Battalion, and elements of the 3

158
Infantry. With his team on the spearhead, the counter-attack force had
the primary mission of recapturing an enemy-held force territory.

The counter-attack was slated to begin at six o’clock A.M. of

January 16. Prior to its launching, Fowler’s artillery force laid siege on
Morong. Bombardment ceased shortly before H-hour to enable the
assault troops to start the offensive.

At the commencement of the counter-attack, scores of men were

wounded and killed in the furious close-quarter fighting that ensued.
Notwithstanding this, there was no let-up in the bloody fighting. Imbued
with a “do-or-die” spirit, the friendly troops fought courageously until they
had succeeded in driving a wedge into enemy lines. Before long, the
battlefield was littered with the dead and wounded. Tired from the
relentless hand-to-hand fighting, the enemy began to yield some ground.
And toward noontime, Morong was recaptured, after which the friendly
troops reorganized for the pursuit. This task, however, was not pursued
to completion. The enemy was driven out of Morong with the Batalan
River as an escape route.

Another sanguinary fighting flared up that night when the same

hostile force had succeeded in recrossing the Batalan River. As in the
preceding affair, the enemy incurred heavy losses. Despite this,
however, he launched several sorties designed to crack the friendly line.
The line held; the enemy failed desperately in their attempts.

Late in the afternoon of January 17, a large Japanese force

began to exert heavy pressure against the OPLR. Thus, the units of the
st
1 Regular Division strung on the line were in grave danger. To avert
complete decimation, they had to beat a hasty retreat toward the MLR at
Nagbalayong. The withdrawal was completed in the evening.

In the morning of January 18, the Japanese regained the

initiative in the fight after discovering that the friendly troops had
abandoned the OPLR. They drove through Morong after overwhelming
the feeble resistance offered by a taken force left behind in the town.
Shortly after, the Japanese began a withering attack against the MLR,
fighting became much heavier as darkness set in. However, a stout
defense was put up.

Determined to subdue the defenders, the Japanese kept on

pounding the friendly lines. At the same time, they shifted the weight of
their attack to the east. A possible envelopment for the friendly troops

159
was in sight. To meet this newly spawned threat, Segundo extended the
MLR to the east, thereby forming a continuous line from the coast up to
where the rifle-equipped artillery battalion was positioned. The men
were spread out thinly over a stretch of three kilometers into the interior.
In the meantime, contact with the FA outfit had never been established
by virtue of the fact that it had withdrawn prematurely from its sector.

Without losing hope, Segundo ordered the launching of another

counterattack, with the sole purpose of recapturing the OPLR at Morong.
st
To carry this out, one battalion of the 1 Infantry was employed. Well-
planned and properly executed, the counterattack was a resounding
success. Before noontime, the OPLR at Morong was established. From
there, combat patrols were sent to probe the area towards the east.
Fortunately, contact with the enemy was not established.

At the reestablished OPLR, the friendly troops reorganized and

started to strengthen their main battle line. This brief interlude was
broken when the enemy waged a more vigorous assault against the
OPLR by nightfall. Late that night, the line crumbled; the defenders fell
back on the MLR.

Early in the morning of January 19, the badly battered and

outnumbered friendly troops staged a daring sortie essayed at the
recapture of the OPLR. With dogged determination and bulldog
courage, the troops leaped out of their foxholes and rushed headlong
toward the hostile lines. Surprised by this counterattack the Japanese
reeled back. And by noon time the defenders had recaptured the OPLR.

At night, the enemy launched a counterattack. They were able

to break through the OPLR at several points. Once more, the battle
shifted to the main battle position. For the next two days, the enemy had
slackened in his spirit to fight. More fresh troops were thrown into the
fray, giving more pressure to the frontline.

On January 20, four enemy transport were sighted on the north

st
of Morong. This development made the situation in the 1 Regular
Division’s sector more critical. From all indications, these hostile vessels
brought in more men and supplies to be used in the war front. The
friendly forces’ 155-mm guns emplaced in the vicinity of Mauban Point
gave salvoes in the midst of the convoy. However, their shots were too
inaccurate because of the absence of sighting mechanisms that no direct
hits were scored. As a result, the four transports reached their
destination unscathed.

160
 The next day, these 155-mm guns engaged another enemy
transport while leaving Subic Bay. It immediately turned back without
any damage. Later that day, a small Japanese boat sailed straight for
rd
the shore where troops of the 3 Infantry Regiment were positioned. As
soon as it was close enough to the shoreline, the friendly troops opened
fire with all their automatic and small arms. The boat and its unwary
occupations were destroyed completely.

At night, the battle arena shifted to the MLR. The Japanese sub-
jected it to incessant attacks at several points. Yet, the line did not
waver; however, it was felt that it would soon crumble. Sheer courage
alone would not alter the course of the battle.

As a last recourse, Segundo recalled the provisional combat

force under Captain Santos from Mt. Silanganan. This group reinforced
rd
by the company under 3 Lt. Isabelo R. Castro, was committed in the
battle of Morong on January 21. Santos was given specific orders to
restore the Division’s OPLR. This was accomplished in the afternoon.
Immediately after, the Japanese launched a counterattack with the sole
objective of destroying the USAFFE as fast as possible and to eliminate
at once the obstacle posed by the OPLR.

Blood spilled freely in the fighting. In spite of the terrific

poundings by the enemy, the OPLR stood in defiance. Nevertheless, it
was becoming evident that in just a short while, it would soon sap. The
defender’s physical exhaustion had sapped their determination to resist
any longer. Considering this factor, and to save them from complete
annihilation, Segundo forthwith ordered their immediate withdrawal to the
MLR.

Tenaciously, the enemy pursued the withdrawing friendly troops

until the MLR where another pitched battle took place. The Japanese
had driven a wedge into the line. In the meantime another hostile force
made some exploratory sorties in the east in order to locate the extend of
the right (east) flank of the MLR. Finding that this portion was exposed,
the Japanese lost no time in subjecting it to concerted assaults.

The right flank reeled back. This happened because the two
companies assigned to secure the hill which was previously occupied by
an artillery battalion had withdrawn just prior to the Japanese attack. One
company came from one of the attached engineer battalions. The other
st
was a rifle company from the 1 Infantry Regiment. For this manifestly
cowardly act, the two company commanders were court martialled which

161
resulted in their dismissal from the service. In addition, the other one
was meted out a stiff prison term with hard labor.

Mustering all the power within their command, the brave

defenders in the Morong frontline struck back at the enemy. Their
efforts, however, proved too feeble. There was no way of tilting the
balance in their favor.
st
Meanwhile, in another front, the Japanese laid siege on the 51
Division’s sector. This occurred on January 20 after the enemy failed to
st
breach the Abucay formerly held by the 41 Division. Because of the
st
heavy and overbearing pressure, the 51 Division fell back by about a
kilometer to its rear. This enabled the infiltrating Japanese troops to
reach the western slopes of Mt. Natib from where they started to harass
the rear installations of the friendly troops.
st
The 31 Infantry Regiment (US) was thrown in to replace the
st
hard-pressed 51 Division, PA. Also ordered moved to from its positions
th st
near Morong was the 45 Infantry Regiment, PS, to reinforce the 31
th
Infantry. However, the 45 Infantry took the wrong route on account of
darkness. Thus, confusion followed. As a result, the adjacent flanks of
the friendly troops fired at each other. The fighting between these forces
lasted for more than an hour. Many casualties were recorded.

At the culmination of the mistaken encounter, the two PS

regiments regrouped to engage the enemy in a bloody skirmish. They
succeeded in reestablishing the friendly lines. Mt. Natib was recaptured
and the battle fought was one of the bloodiest in the entire Bataan
campaign.
th th
In the 11 Division’s front, the Japanese 20 Infantry Regiment
nd th
attacked the positions held by Company “F”, 2 Battalion, 11 Infantry
Regiment. This element was manned mostly by the natives of Mt.
Province. It was threatened by an envelopment.

This fact reached Brougher. Immediately after, he ordered an

armored counterattack to be supported with two troops. But the
counterattack force was confronted with two problems; the avenue of
approach ended into rugged terrain, and the area was covered with thick
bamboo thickets and wild underbrush that penetration was almost
impossible.

162
 These difficulties were surmounted. The tanks had negotiated
the route with the infantry unit commanders and his men, all Igorots,
guiding them through the lush undergrowth. As the armed column closed
in on the enemy, the doughty Igorots fired their small arms with lethal
effects.
It was indeed a successful operation. Almost all the Japanese
were annihilated. Because of this daring exploit, MacArthur praised them
by saying: “…. I have never known the equal of these Igorots riding the
tanks.”
That same day, January 20, Lieutenant Colonel Fowler, CO of
the FA Group supporting the 1 Philippine Corps, while driving down the
st
Morong-Bagac Road on his way to the 1 Division’s rear CP, was
ambushed between Kilometer Posts 167 and 168. Fawler was seriously
wounded. Medical aid man from Lieutenant Tablante’s “F” Collecting
st
Company, 1 Medical Battalion, arrived on time to evacuate him to the
rear for treatment. At almost the same time, Col. Jones Haskins, former
st st
senior instructor of the 91 FA Regiment, 91 Division, PA, and Artillery
Officer of the 1 Corps, perished in another ambush at the vicinity of
Kilometer Posts 167 and 168.
Later, Fowler and the aid man gave their personal account of the
ambuscades. Through them, it was established that the Japanese had
succeeded in positioning themselves between the frontlines and the rear.
Thus, the flow of communication and supplies between the two points
had been interrupted.

Once Segundo learned of these ambuscades, he ordered all

st
units of the 1 Regular Division that could be spared from the frontlines
and beach positions to be formed into a provisional task force. With five
rifle companies composing it, the task force was dispatched to the rear
with a specific order to destroy the enemy.

The provisional task force had not made any headway in its
heroic efforts to annihilate the enemy. Instead, it was thrown back
sustaining terrific losses in the process. Taking advantage of his higher
position, the enemy made a quick telling thrust which enable him to drive
a wedge through the ranks of the provisional task force. A blocking force
was thus established astride the Morong-Bagac Road. As such the only
available route for motor transportation to reach the friendly frontline
troops was totally cut-off. Moving in complete freedom, the enemy sent
out probing sorties to the shorelines.
st
These developments endangered the 1 Regular Division. Now

163
 boxed in, harassed from the three directions and continuously subjected
to aerial strafing, the unit was doomed to perdition. To preclude this
possibility it had to fight the enemy in order to prevent him from
debauching into the beaches within its sector. Thus, Segundo
maneuvered the provincial task force to the west flank of the enemy. If
successful, the Division would still be in possession of the coastal trail
from Morong to Bagac.

At the same time, Segundo left for Bagac to ask from Wainwright
reinforcements for his division. In the evening, Wainwright sent word that
st
help was on the way for the beleaguered 1 Regular Division.
st
In the morning of January 21, the 1 Battalion of Lt. Col. Manuel
nd nd
V. Atanacio’s 2 PC Regiment, 2 Regular Division, which had been
rushed from the Limay-Lamao area to the 1 Philippine Corps on urgent
appeals of Wainwright, was committed into the flight. From its bivouac
area in the vicinity of the junction of the Pilar-Bagac and Morong-Bagac
Roads, this battalion under Maj Jose A Arambulo moved up north to
Kilometer Post 165, south of Mauban Ridge, where it set up a line along
the axis of the road.

The next day, reports filtered in that enemy was having some
movements along Mauban Ridge. Thus, Arambulo sent his “A” Company
st
under 1 Lieutenant Rizalino Ma. Garcia to probe the region generally
west of the area. The probing patrol was to forestall any hostile design of
gaining access to the beaches.
st
Garcia’s unit moved in skirmish formation with the 1 Platoon
closest to the west side of the road. On approaching Mauban’s Ridge,
st
the 1 Platoon was fired upon from the concealed positions. Unable to
fight back, it took the other side of the road and continued eastward
along a draw at the southside of the ridge. Skirting the area, the platoon
moved to the northeast in the direction of a series of promontories where
heavy firing was clearly audible. On those hills where some friendly
troops were emplaced, the platoon joined them rather than risked being
isolated. It rejoined its parent unit at Kilometer Post 165 by nightfall.
st
Early the next day, January 23, the 1 Battalion, less its “C”
st
Company under 1 Lt. Ramon Centeno which was left behind at
Kilometer Post 165 as blocking force, moved over to Cavalry Hill. Near
the east side of the Mauban Ridge, the battalion was attacked. At this
juncture, Arambulo decided that only one company could very well

164
 st
handle the situation. For this purpose, “D” Company under 1 Lt. Vicente
Albarillo was committed.

With “A” and “B” Companies, the battalion reached Cavalry Hill
th
on time to avert what could have been the debacle of the 26 Cavalry,
PS. Earlier that morning, the Japanese launched a “banzai charge”
against the cavalry men which dislodged them from their positions. The
th
26 Cavalry was already prepared to execute e retrograde movement.
Immediately, Arambulo deployed his two companies behind the
beleaguered cavalry unit and advanced forward to meet the enemy.

A short while later Arambulo’s men were in line with the cavalry
men, drove past them, and soon began absorbing the enemy’s
th
pummeling blows. This tactical maneuver enabled the 26 Cavalry to fall
back without yielding an inch of ground to the enemy.

In one quick swoop, Arambulo cleared the crest of Cavalry Hill of

st
all hostile elements. Then, swinging back his “B” Company under 1 Lt.
Amado Baroquillo to the east side of Mauban Ridge, together with “D”
Company, he started vigorous assault against the enemy entrenched on
the ridge. “C” Company, in the meanwhile, was ordered to move up and
while continuing to maintain a blocking force on the road, would block the
west side to prevent any hostile movement toward the shoreline.

In the meantime, the assaulting friendly forces from the opposite

(east) side had driven a wedge on the enemy’s line atop Mauban Ridge.
By noontime, the point of the wedge established contact with elements
of “C” Company positioned on the western side. These friendly troops
succeeded in driving the enemy’s blockning force from the Morong-
Bagac Road that traversed Mauban Ridge. During the brief period when
that portion of the road was under the control of friendly units, several
st
trucks fully loaded with the wounded and tired troops of the 1 Regular
Division passed through to the rear.

Shortly, the enemy, after breaching the cordon, counter attacked.

The Constabulary men, however, fought with daring and tenacity. But
against the insurmountable odds, they had to yield some grounds. In the
process, many of them were isolated from their parent organizations.
Some had to fight their way out through hostile ranks which enabled
them to rejoin their units later. That portion of the Morong-Bagac Road
fell once more into enemy hands.

The ever-mounting hostile pressure compelled Arambulo to

165
abandon Mauban Ridge. He did this after inflicting serious damage to the
st
enemy and after allowing some elements of the 1 Regular Division to
use the Morong-Bagac Road as an escape route.

Late in the afternoon, Arambulo regrouped his forces and formed

several blocking units which were positioned at critical points in his area.
At Cavalry Hill, “A” Company was still entangled with the enemy. On the
western side of Mauban Ridge Arambulo ordered an attack against
enemy. This action succeeded in neutralizing the enemy’s effort to try to
debouch into the shorelines.

Early in the morning of January 23, Segundo received

Wainwright’s permission to abandon Morong. Wainwright could have
realized the futility of further resistance in this particular frontline. The
st
withdrawal of the 1 Regular Division from Morong was to commence at
ten A.M.

At Nagbalayong, the men received the withdrawal order with a

mixed feeling of relief and sadness. At last, after fighting for the last three
days under emaciated conditions and beyond physical endurance, they
were being pulled out from that nightmarish situation. Certainly, this was
a welcome news to them. On the other hand, they were saddened
because this projected withdrawal could only mean the construction of
USAFFE’s area of operations. With its maneuverability delimited, sure
defeat for the USAFFE was anticipated.
st
The withdrawal of the 1 Regular Divisions north of the town
Bagac was carried out successfully. Three battalions took turns in
providing the covering shell for the withdrawing troops. These were the
st st st
1 Battalion, 1 Infantry Regiment, under Capt. Alfredo M. Santos; 1
rd st nd
Battalion, 3 Infantry Regiment, under Capt Algas; and 1 Battalion, 2
PC Regiment, under Major Arambulo.
st
There was a minimum loss of men on the part of the 1 Regular
Division in the course of its withdrawal. Two fortuitous events made this
possible.

Firstly, the Japanese concentrated their attention on the possible

st
incursions of Major Arambulo’s 1 Battalion against their positions at
Mauban Ridge. Secondly, the enemy was preparing for all-out attack to
be launched beginning January 26.

166
 In another sector of the 1 Philippine Corps line, a Japanese in
Infantry battalion made a “banzai charge” of January 23, This suicidal
st
unit was almost wiped out by the 31 Infantry Regiment, US. However, it
sustained heavy losses as a result of this action.

By about that time, an enemy unit had infiltrated the thickly

forested area on the eastern undulations of Mt. Natib. The Provisional
US Army Air Corps Regiment was ordered to close the 3,000 yard gap
that existed between the I and II Philippine Corps. Its effort to do so
st
ended in failure. The same fate was experienced by the 31 Division,
PA, which had likewise been ordered to plug the loophole. This was
primarily due to the dense jungles that disrupted the Division’s
movement.

While the fight on the Morong-Bagac was still in progress,

Wainwright ordered the withdrawal of all his forces to reserve battle
positions on a line close to and running parallel to the Pilar - Bagac
Road. This withdrawal was to be effected on January 26. Wainwright
took this action because of the following grounds.

1. It would move both I and II Philippine Corps back to less

mountain terrain.

2. To relieve the hostile pressure on the II Corps line.

3. To draw the USAFFE troops from Mt. Silanganan which

separated the two corps.

Close on the heels of the withdrawing I Corps units were the

Kimura Detachment and Nara Group. In the east flank, the Japanese
th
were surprised to find that the organized resistance on the 11 Division’s
sector had considerably weakened. They had not realized that the
withdrawal was so affected to keep the friendly line continuous.

As a result of the withdrawal of the Fil-American troops, the line

was constricted. At the same time, it eliminated the almost insur-
mountable Mounts Natib and Silanganan which had prevented a more
effective coordination and liaison between Wainwright’s I Corps and
Parker’s II Corps. There were better securities for the flanks on the
China Sea and Manila Bay side. However, the Fil-American troops lost
the Pilar-Bagac Road as their MSR. To take care of this contingency, a
new road had to be built. This was known as the Orion-Bagac Road.

167
Sub-Sector Commands

On the new Orion-Bagac Road, the USAFFE units were dis-

th st
posed from east to west as follows: 11 Division, 1 Regular Division,
nd st rd st
92 Infantry Regiment, 91 Division, 3 Battalion, 71 Infantry
st nd
Regiment, 71 Division and two battalions of the 72 Infantry Regiment
st
at Bagac. The rest of the 71 Division, PA, was on beach defense. In
th th
Corps reserve were the 45 Infantry and 26 Cavalry Regiments, both
PS units.

The I Corps area was divided into three sub-sectors. Brig. Gen.
th
William E. Brougher, CG, 11 Division, PA, was in command of the right
th
sub-sector. Initially, he had with him his own division, 11 which was
nd
withdrawn from the II Corps. But after January 1942, the 2 PC
Regiment was made available to him. The left sub-sector under Brig.
st st
Gen. Albert M. Jones had the remnants of the 71 and 91 Division, and
st
1 Regular Division. Later, Jones was relieved by Brig. Gen. Luther R.
Stevens when the former assumed command of the I Philippine Corps.
Brig. Gen. Clyde A. Selleck was placed in command of the south sub-
sector which consisted of the following elements: ground units of the
th th
Provisional US Army Air Corps Regiment, 65 QM Pack Train, 12 QM
nd st
Regiment (PS), 2 Anti-Tank Battalion, PA, and 1 PC Regiment.
th
Sometime later, Brig. Gen. Clinton Pierce of the 26 Cavalry Regiment,
PS, became the commander of this sub-sector.

Elements of the II Philippine Corps were disposed from right to

st st
left as follows: 31 Infantry Regiment, 31 Division, PA; Provisional US
nd st
Army Air Corps Regiment; 32 Infantry Regiment, 31 Division, PA; and
st st
51 Regimental Combat Team (remnants of the 51 Division, PA).
Positioned on the beaches below Orion were the PA Air Corps
th
Provisional Regiment, PA, Training Cadre Battalion and 4 PC
Regiment.

Parker’s operational area had five sub-sector commands. Col

Constance Irwin was in command of Sub-Sector “A” which extended
from the beach of Orion southward to Limay. Placed in this area were
st
the 31 Infantry Regiment, PAAC Provisional Regiment and PA Training
Cadre Battalion. Sub-Sector “B” under Col. Irwin Doane had the
Provisional US Army Air Corps Regiment, Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel
was given command of the Sub-Sector “C”. The units under him were the
nd st st st
32 Infantry Regiment, 41 Infantry Regiment, 41 Division, and 51
rd
RCT. Sub-Sector “D” under Brig. Gen. Maxon Lough had the 33
st st st
Infantry Regiment, 31 Division, and 41 Division, less the 41 Infantry

168
Regiment. Maj. Gen. Guillermo B. Francisco commanded Sub-Sector
nd
“E”. The 2 Regular Division was assigned in this area.

Battle of the Points

By this time, Bataan had already become a symbol of defiance.

At the same time, it had generated in the Japanese warlords in Tokyo a
feeling of displeasure toward Homma who had so far failed to terminate
the organized resistance against his forces. By virtue of this, Homma
ordered a renewed offensive against the I Philippine Corps on the west
coast of Bataan.
nd
In the morning of January 23, Lt. Col. Narijoshi Tsunechiro’s 2
th
Battalion, 20 Infantry Regiment, landed surreptitiously on Longos-
kawayan Point, west of Mariveles. In the afternoon, unusual movements
in the thick undergrowth on Puccot Hill was in progress. This attracted
the attention of members of the USAFFE observation detachment while
they were going down the watch tower. The observer’s challenge was
met with a volley of fire from Japanese troops. After a brief exchange of
fire, all the members of the observation team were mowed down to
death.

Immediately, the Provisional Naval Battalion was dispatched to

the scene to dislodge the enemy. However, it failed to accomplish its
th
mission. Sometime later, the 57 Infantry, PS, together with some
th
elements of the 45 Infantry, PS, and two FA Battalions, were rushed to
the area. In the ensuing firefight that lasted for two days, the hostile
force was eliminated. It had sustained some 400 casualties. The
USAFFE troops, on the other hand, had twenty two dead and sixty
wounded.

Shortly after, the battle of Aglaloma and Quinauan Points began.

It started on January 24 and came to a close on February 8, or a period
rd
of two weeks. The Japanese unit involved in this action was the 3
th
Battalion, 20 Infantry Regiment, which was shipped off from Subic Bay
with a two-pronged mission: to disrupt lines of communication and supply
routes, and to attack the left flank from the rear. Lined up against this
st nd
hostile group were the following USAFFE elements: 1 and 2
st rd th
Battalions 1 PC Regiment; 3 Battalion, 45 Infantry, PS; V Interceptor
st th
Command, US Army Air Corps Provisional Regiment; 21 and 24
st th
Pursuit Squadrons; 71 Division, PA; Company “B”, 57 Infantry PS; and
rd
Company “A”, 803 Engineer Battalion, US Army. The 12-inch mortars of
Battery Way on Corregidor made a saturation mortar shelling on the

169
Japanese prisoners captured in early 1942 on the western coast of
Bataan. Most fought to the death at the Battle of the Points.

Japanese advancing along Trail 20, April, 1942

170
Map 4: Japanese landings on Bataan and Battle of the Point

171
enemy’s beach head. Fierce fighting ended with the remnants of the
Japanese force flushed out from the jungles. About 600 Japanese troops
perished, while the USAFFE had incurred a total casualty toll of
st rd th
almost500. The 1 Regiment and 3 Battalion, 45 Infantry, PS, were
cited for gallantry in action.

It is noteworthy that in this battle of the points, the PA Air Corps

Provisional Regiment committed to wage an offensive action. Capt.
Eustacio Orobia of this unit made a distinction by earning for himself a
Gold Cross Medal for his gallantry.

The battle of Canas-Saysayin-Silaim Points started out from an

nd
insignificant incident. Desirous of the learning the fate that befell the 2
th
Battalion, 20 Infantry Regiment, General Morioka commander of the
th st th
16 Division, dispatched the 1 Battalion, reinforced 20 Infantry
Regiment to Anyasin and Silaim Rivers. In the evening of January 27,
hostile landings were made.

Informed of this development, General Wainwright evolved an

rd
operational plan with the participating units tasked as follows: 3
th st
Battalion, 57 Infantry, PS to attack along Anyasin River; 1 Battalion,
th st
57 Infantry, and a battalion from the 1 PC Regiment to strike against
rd
left flank; 3 Battalion, 45 Infantry, PS to sweep the enemy off Saysayin
st th th
Point from the right flank. The 1 Battalion, 12 Infantry, 11 Division
th
was to hold the beach north of Saysayin Point. The 17 Pursuit
Squadron was directed to eliminate small pockets of resistance. The
nd
192 Tank Battalion was tasked to provide both artillery and tank
support.

All avenues of approach having been sealed, the enemy

completely isolated from all sources of assistance, had no way out.
Beleaguered and encircled, the Japanese troops finally made a
breakthrough and dashed off to the sea to end their struggle. Only about
thirty four of them survived from the disastrous action. The battle of the
points culminated in a rousing triumph for the USAFFE.

Battle of the Pockets

As the Battle of the Points raged, Homma launched a massive

th
counterattack against the USAFFE on the 26 of January. The 5,000-
man Kimura Detachment, which had successfully breached the Abucay-
Mauban line, was tasked to make the attack against Wainwrights I
th
Philippine Corps, while General Nara’s 65 Mixed Brigade was ordered

172
to advance to the OPLR of the II Philippine Corps, and then proceed to
south to the MLR. More Japanese troops were made available to the
Kimura Detachment.

The following Japanese ground was ordered deployed against

nd th
the I Philippine Corps: 122 Infantry Regiment (-) elements of the 65
th th
Brigade, and 20 Infantry Regiment, 16 Division, under Col. Yorimasa
Yoshioka.

On that day, almost all the USAFFE troops were positioned on

the Orion-Bagac Road. This was the I Philippine Corps reserve battle
position. At the same time, this was designated the final defense line
after the Pilar-Bagac Road had been vacated.

A preliminary attack began when Kimura dispatched some of his

ST
troops against the 91 Division, PA. This unit was holding the left
extremity of the line near the vicinity of Bagac. For the next two days, the
st
Japanese troops assaulted the 91 Division’s position. However, each
attack was foiled by the gallant defensive stance of these Philippine
Army troops. On the second day, the Japanese troops discovered a
st
breakthrough point. This was provided by a gap in the 1 Regular
th
Division’s sector. The area had just been vacated by the 45 Infantry PS,
which made a premature withdrawal from its lines.
th
On January 29, the bulk of Yoshioka’s 20 Infantry Regiment
th
was already positioned in the area of Colonel Townsend’s 11 Infantry,
th st
11 Division. A provisional battalion of the 51 RCT which was then
moving north along the trail 7 had discovered the presence of these
Japanese troops in the area. This day marked the beginning of the Battle
of the Pockets.

A counterattack was poised against the hostile force. Tasked to

make the assault was the FA Battalion which had earlier replaced the
th st
54 Infantry, PS. The 1 Regular Division was ordered to reinforce this
nd th
unit. Another USAFFE unit, the 2 Battalion, 11 Infantry Division
attacked from the left. Its effort paved the way for the complete sealing of
the gap. A Japanese commander and his company were totally
encircled.

To prevent annihilation, the Japanese commander broke through

st
the cordon by fighting his way out in the rear area of the 1 Regular
Division. He had reached as far as the Cotar River where ferocious

173
fighting was taking place. This was later known as “Battle of the Little
Pocket”. On February 8, the hostile force was eliminated.
th
Meanwhile, the bulk of Colonel Yoshioka’s 20 Infantry
Regiment had already established a base of operations in the jungles.
st th
This was behind the limiting point of the 1 Regular and 11 Division.
th
Approximately 1,000 yards in front of the 11 Division’s sector and near
the junction of Trail 5 and 7 was the area called the “Big Pocket”

From this point, Yoshioka launched a series of probing attacks

against the I Corps. However, each sortie ended in failure as the
defenders stood their ground in stout defiance to the enemy. By
February 15, the pockets were reduced. Homma’s forces were badly
battered. This culminated the first battle in Bataan.
th
In the “Battle of the Pockets”, the 11 Division acquitted itself
well. This was its most glorious hour. Bataan, by that time, had acquired
the enviable reputation “as the world’s greatest citadel of democracy in
Asia.”

The Lull

A period of lull followed the first battle. Except for some

sporadic, minor skirmishes between the two opposing forces, temporary
quiet settled in the whole frontlines of Bataan. This interregnum was
devoted to the regrouping and reorganization of combat elements. The
stalemate began on February 16 and culminated on April 1.

On the part of MacArthur, the period of lull gave him the

opportunity to prepare the USAFFE for further action. By then, the
USAFFE was crowded in the southern tip of Bataan, an area less than
200 square miles. During this period, the USAFFE had an aggregate
strength of 79,500. The Philippine Army alone had some 59,000 officers
and men. Units of the Philippine Scouts had a combined personnel
complement of 8,000. Some 12,500 officers and men were with the
various combat units of the US Army. Moreover, there were 6,000
Filipino civilian employees, and 20,000 refugees, which contributed not
only in the construction of the area but also in the aggravation of the food
problem.

The USAFFE still held the Orion-Bagac line as its final battle
position. This was behind the Pilar-Bagac Road. The operational areas
of the two corps were separated by an imaginary line running southward

174
from the northern portion of Bataan. It ran parallel with the Pantingan
River, crossed the Mariveles Mountains, and emptied into Mariveles Bay,
passing through the Panikan River.

After MacArthur’s departure for Australia on March 11,

Wainwright took over the command of the USAFFE which was promptly
redesignated United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP). Maj. Gen.
Edward P. King, Jr. became the overall commander of the friendly
forces. Jones succeeded Wainwright as commander of the I Philippine
Corps. Parker retained his post as II Philippine Corps commander.

In the new I Corps area, the following units were deployed and
nd th st st
given specific defensive areas: 2 PC Regiment, 11 , 1 and 91
st st
Divisions. Attached for operations with the 91 Division were the 71
nd st
and 72 Infantry Regiments of the 71 Division. These elements held
nd
position in a line running east to west. The 2 PC Regiment occupied
the right flank, the limiting point of the II Corps on the Pantingan River
Valley, a dangerous zone leading to the rear of the Orion-Bagac Road.
st
On the defense left was the 91 Division whose task included the
defense of the West Road and the areas extending southward to the
Binuangan River. Assigned to defend the beaches below the Binuangan
st th
River were the 1 PS, Regiment a battalion of the 88 FA Regiment, PS,
th th
and miscellaneous Air Corps units. The 45 Infantry and 26 Cavalry
Regiments, PS was in Corps reserve. All the units under the I Corps had
a total strength of 32,600 men.

For its artillery support, the I Corps was allotted a total of sixty-
six pieces. Of the fifty armaments, most were 75-mm guns. Two of the
155-mm pieces were howitzers.

In the II Corps area, the following elements occupied their

st
respective sectors as indicated: 31 Infantry Regiment, the eastern
anchor of the line stretching along the coast from Limay to Orion;
st
Provisional US Army Air Corps Regiment, to the left; and 31 Division,
st
minus a one-mile area up to the limiting point of the 51 RCT. On its left
st st
anchor which rested in front of Mt. Samat were the 21 and 41 Division,
nd
PA. The 2 Regular Division, less two regiments, was given the
responsibility to defend the beaches from Limay to the southernmost
boundary of the II Corps. One tank company and one SPM battery
nd rd
augmented 2 Regular Division. Parker had designated the 33 Infantry
Regiment, less one battalion, and two combat engineer battalions as his
Corps reserve.

175
Map 5: Battle of the Pockets

176
 Parker received more artillery support than the I Corps. This was
because his sector was expected to bear the brunt of the enemy’s main
effort. Seventy-two of these artillery pieces were 75-mm guns while
twelve were 2.95-inch mountain guns, and 155-mm GPF’s. In addition,
the two corps was provided with thirty-one naval guns exclusively for
beach defense. The airfields and rear areas of the II Corps were to be
th th
protected by the 200 and 515 Anti-Craft Artillery Regiments, US.

One defensive measure that was introduced was the mining of

probable avenues of approach. In the I Corps area, three large mine
fields were constructed where approximately 1,400 pill boxes were
planted. A total of thirty-five depth charges, all shipped from Corregidor,
was likewise planted in strategic locations. The 11th Division, for
instance, had installed in its whole battlefront “a palisade of bamboo
poles twelve feet high” which although crude and primitive, provided
good concealment for its troops.

Training was also conducted during the lull. Past mistakes and
deficiencies committed during encounters were emphasized for
correction. Above all, they were taught to advance cautiously in the
jungles while making an attack. This was in recognition of the Japanese
ingenuity for constructing foxholes and MG nests in forested areas.

For want of anything else to do, the USAFFE men were

demoralized. They had nearly fallen for the Japanese propaganda
gimmicks which had started to pervade the atmosphere. On the part of
the Filipino soldiers, their sagging morale was buoyed up by the following
message of President Quezon before his departure for the US via
Australia:

“I urge all Filipinos to be of good cheer, to have faith in patriotism

and valor of our soldiers in the battlefields, but, above all, to trust
America and our great President, Franklin D Roosevelt. The United
Nations will win this war. America is too strong and powerful to be
4
vanquished in this conflict. I know she will not fail us.”

With the above preparations, the USAFIP was ready for the
crucial second and final battle. To be reassured, Wainwright left
Corregidor for Bataan to confer with King and his subsector
commanders. He also inspected the disposition of troops. By that time,
the USAFIP had about 70,000 officers and men 28,000 of whom were
combat effective.

177
 On the Japanese front, the lull did not only provide the necessary
breathing spell for the troops but also gave the Japanese High
Command in Tokyo to assemble the much needed reinforcements for
Homma’s Fourteenth Army. At the time, the Fourteenth Army was very
5
much depleted in strength. Its total number of casualties stood at 6, 984.

Before these reinforcements could be assembled, the Japanese

War Ministry formed and dispatched a five-member team of observers to
the Philippines. Headed by General Muto, Chief of the Military Affairs
Bureau, Ministry of War, the observers were unanimous in their findings
that “Bataan could be subdued only if additional troops were given to
General Homma and that “a reorganization of the Fourteenth Army was
in order.”

Acting favorably on the team’s recommendations, Dai-honei

th
ordered the immediate redeployment of the 4 Division under Lt. Gen
Kenzo Kitano from Shanghai to the Philippines. This unit, with a
complement of 11,000 officers and men, would provide the Fourteenth
Army its fresh nucleus of infantry strength with which to terminate the
final battle in Bataan. In addition, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters
directed the immediate shipment to the Philippines of more artillery and
air force units. These were to be withdrawn from other theaters of
operations, particularly China and the southern areas.

The following Japanese ground units had likewise been ordered

st
for shipment to the Philippines: Nagano Detachment (21 Infantry Group
nd th
and 62 Infantry Regiment); Kawaguchi Detachment of the 18 Division
th th
(35 Infantry Brigade and 124 Infantry Regiment); Kawamura
th th st
Detachment from the 5 Division (9 Infantry Brigade and 41 Infantry
th st
Regiment); 10 Independent Garrison Unit; 1 Artillery Group. The
th nd
Japanese Air Force sent in the 60 and 62 Heavy Bomber Regiments.
rd
Drawn from the Japanese Imperial Navy was the 23 Air Flotilla, which
6
was equipped with eighteen land bombers and nine fighter aircraft.

On February 26, the 4,000-man Nagano Detachment under Maj.

st
Gen. Kamiechiro Nagano, commander of the 21 Infantry Group, landed
th
at Lingayen. This was followed the next day by the first group of the 4
Division. On March 3, Homma ordered all frontline units to move forward
to probe the USAFIP’s MLR nine day’s later, reconnaissance line of the
th
Gogo Rivers. On the same day, the 65 Mixed Brigade advanced to the
areas north of the confluence of the Tiawir and Maldica Rivers and
Liang.

178
 The next day, the Nagano Detachment sent out a combat patrol
to establish the Abo-abo-New Maluya-Pilar line.

Japanese reinforcements units, supplies, and equipment

th th
continued to arrive in a steady stream. The 16 Division and 65 Mixed
Brigade each received 3,500 infantry troops. Throughout the month of
th
March, elements of the 4 Division came in one after the other. On
rd
March 17, the 23 Air Flotilla landed at Clark Field.

When this massive movement of troops and supplies was

completed Homma’s Fourteenth Army was fully reinforced. The following
units came in: one infantry division from Shanghai; five heavy artillery
regiments from Hongkong; one infantry group and three infantry
battalions from French Indo-China; five infantry battalions and three
mortar companies direct from Japan; one infantry brigade and one
infantry regiment from Borneo; one infantry brigade and one infantry
regiment from Singapore; and two heavy bombardment groups from
Timur to provide aerial support. With these fresh troops, Homma was
confident of terminating successfully the ground operations against the
USAFIP in Bataan.

Last and Final Battle

By that time, Homma had already decided on where to make the

main thrust. He surmised that an attack against the I Corps would meet
tough resistance because of the terrain. An assault against II Corps’ right
flank, on the other hand, would be more disastrous as he anticipated that
Wainwright would certainly deploy more troops in this area. Therefore,
Homma opted to make the main effort through the northeastern and
northwestern slopes of Mt. Samat because of two principal reasons: the
USAFIP would least expect a frontal attack against the 65-foot cliffs; and
Homma wanted to take this key terrain to enable his artillery observers to
have a commanding observation and thus assure maximum support to
7
his attacking troops. This area happened to be between the limiting
st st
point of the 21 and 41 Divisions on the northern undulations of Mt.
Samat.

Based on his decision, Homma deployed his forces as follows:

th
two battalions of the 16 Division and two battalions from the Ikuta
Detachments to contain the I Corps front from Bagac to the Pantingan
th
River; 65 Mixed Brigade, from the Pantingan River to the western edge
th
of Mt. Samat; 4 Division, from eastern edge of Mt. Samat to the bend of
the Pilar-Bagac line; and Nagano Detachment from the bend to Pilar.

179
Massed on a five–kilometer frontage and a four-kilometer depth west of
th
Balanga, and behind the left half of the 65 Brigade and a small portion
th
of the right half of the 4 Division were artillery units, mortars and heavy
th
infantry guns. The 16 Division, minus two battalions of the Ikuta
Detachment were held as force reserve.

So, on March 18, Homma caused the massing of about 20,000

men in front line of the II Corps. This force was strongly supported by
tanks and artillery pieces. To give it mobility, it had approximately 1,000
vehicles. By virtue of these, it was concluded that the enemy was
preparing for a massive assault against the right flank of the II Corps.
Another was also poised farther west at the junction of the I and II Corps.

Four days after that, Homma issued a preliminary order

containing the following salient aspects of the plan of maneuver in the
8
final battle.

1. The attack would be spearheaded by the Japanese

Imperial Army. Accordingly, several elements were given specific tasks.
The Nagano Detachments was to send advance forces to the
Calungasan River, while its bulk would be held in reserve at Abucay; the
th
4 Division would hold Tiawir River from Liang to the west of Pilar; the
th
65 Brigade to be deployed from Liang to the confluence of the Maldica
th
and Tiawir Rivers; and the 16 Division to take the Gogo and Bagac-
River line.

2. The Division’s right flank near Mt.Samat would be the

area where the main effort would emanate. Then a south easterly attack
would be pursued from the salient thus created.

3. All units would be in their lines of departure between

March 31 and April 1.
th
4. Initially, the 16 Division would create a diversion in the
western sector. Subsequently, it would move out to the vicinity of the
Abo-abo River in preparation for the exploitation of a breakthrough.

5. Intense artillery and air preparations would be conducted

th
while infantry troops’ movement would continue. The 4 Division would
receive priority artillery support.

To ensure success of the whole ground operations, Lt. Gen.

Takeji Wachi, Homma’s Chief of Staff, summoned all unit commanders

180
to a conference at the Fourteenth Army’s CP at San Fernando,
Pampanga. He impressed upon them that “the Battle of Bataan had
summoned great significance, and that nothing less than overwhelming
victory was expected.”

Air preparations began on March 24. These were carried out

extensively for the next seven days. The USAFIP’s artillery positions in
southern Bataan were systematically pounded by Japanese Army and
Navy bombers. The Japanese Navy on the other hand, tightened the
naval blockade outside Manila Bay. In the meantime, Japanese Army
heavy artillery units fired at Corregidor, concentrating their barrages on
the shore batteries on Caraballo and El Fraile islands.

Finally, on March 28, Homma set April 3, Jimmu Tennosai

(commemoration day of Emperor Jimmu), as the opening day for the
final battle in Bataan. This date coincide with the death anniversary of
the first monarch of Japan.

On April 1, a feint attack against the I Corps began. Its right

sector sustained the greatest impact of the intense artillery and aerial
st
bombardment. Shortly after, the enemy attacked II Corps. Lim’s 41
th
Division, which was to the east of the 11 Division’s sector, received a
terrific pounding. At the same time, the hostile artillery barrages became
more intense. The USAFIP men thought that the Fourteenth Army had
lunch its final offensive.

Then that fateful day came. At nine o’clock A.M. April 3, about
150 heavy artillery pieces roared into action. This was followed by the
saturation artillery bombardment that lasted for six hours. Almost all the
USAFIP’s strong points and artillery batteries were neutralized. At three
o’clock P.M., the frontline units jumped off from their designated lines of
departure.

After jump-off, hostile air artillery units concentrated on Fil-

American positions and gun emplacements in and around Mt. Samat.
th
The 4 Division, which was on the spearhead, proceeded to envelop Mt.
Samat from the left. Its four battalions, disposed to the right, attacked
from Liang, while its two battalions on the left advanced up the Tala
River. The first day saw the enemy driven back from the forward
positions of the MLR. The next day, the enemy intensified its artillery and
aerial attacks. And by evening, that portion of the MLR in Mt. Samat was
overrun.

181
 th
In the west, the diversionary operations of the 16 Division were
launched as scheduled. There was less fighting in that front. Most of the
th
activities of the 16 Division and Ikuta Detachment centered on artillery
th
firing. On the night of April 4, the 16 Division moved over to the Maldica
River in preparation for the exploitation of a breakthrough.

At 12:50 P.M., April 5, Mt. Samat was besieged again. A

sweeping advance to the Limay River was made the following day. A day
after, the Nagano Detachment raced towards the Caponilan River and
st
Mt. Orion from where it pursued the USAFIP to the northeast. The 41
Division was engaged heavily on the southeastern slopes of Mt. Samat
and the upper Tala River.
th th
The 7 day of April saw advance elements of the 4 Division
approaching Limay River. Charging up the Pantingan River toward the
th th
northern base of Mt. Mariveles was the 65 Brigade. The 16 Division,
on the other hand, was completing its movement to the Abo-abo-Maldica
area. On the same day, Homma ordered the exploitation of the southern
coast of Bataan and to chase the USAFIP to Mariveles. By this time,
USAFIP troops were ordered withdrawn from the Pilar-Bagac line and to
establish a new defense line astride Mariveles. However, this order was
never carried out.

As the situation worsened, Wainwright and King conferred on

ways and means of stopping the hostile advance. As a result, King
st th
ordered Jones and Parker to withdraw the 1 and 4 PC Regiments from
their beach defense positions. These were to be thrown against the
Japanese. King had to resort to this desperate act knowing before hand
that all his reserve forces and those of the two corps had already been
committed.

Wainwright on the other hand had a different scheme of action.

He wanted the I Corps to make an easterly counterattack along Trail 8.
By so doing, an unbroken line would be established with troops of the I
Corps tied up with those along the Mamala River. Unfortunately
however, Wainwright had no inkling that the Mamala line was already
vacated and that Parker’s front had disintegrated. Notwithstanding this,
th
he ordered King to prepare the 11 Division for the counterattack which
was slated for launching at 1600.

Forthwith, King sent his G-3, Col. James V. Collier, to Jones to

transmit Wainwright’s instructions verbally. In response, Jones told
Collier of the impossibility of complying with Wainwright’s order. He cited

182
three important reasons behind this, the most significant of which was
th
that it required at least eighteen hours to pull the 11 Division out of the
line to prepare it for the counterattack. Thus, Wainwright gave King the
discretion to execute his order. On the strength of Jones’ opinion, the
directive was never complied with.

On April 8, Limay River was completely sealed off. At the same

time, hostile air reconnaissance reports indicated that the USAFIP was
withdrawing toward Cabcaben and Mariveles. Another report revealed
that USAFIP shipping was concentrated in Mariveles, Cabcaben, and
Sisiman Bays. This indicated that the USAFIP had planned to evacuate
the peninsula. To preclude this, Homma issued an operations order
indicating therein the specific tasks of participating units. This was
designed to effect the immediate destruction of the USAFIP.
Substantially, the order follows:
th
“1. The 4 Division will pursue the enemy from the sector
north of Cabcaben - Mariveles road towards the hills northeast of
Mariveles.
th th
“2. The 16 Division will move up on the left of the 4
Division, take command of the Nagano Detachment, clear the area
between the Cabcaben-Mariveles road, and pursue the enemy from the
area south of the road towards the hills east of Mariveles.
th
“3. The 65 Brigade will swing west, cross the upper
reaches of the Pantingan River, and prepare for further operations in the
west central area.

“4. Initially, the main force of the artillery will move to

positions in the area southwest of Limay and then gradually displace to
th th
the area north of Cabcaben. It will then support the 4 and 16
Divisions, neutralize enemy fortress guns in Corregidor, and shell enemy
craft in Manila Bay.

“5. The air units, besides continuing to render support to

th th
the 4 and 16 Divisions, will observe enemy movements along the west
coast and enemy shipping in Mariveles, Sisiman, and Cabcaben Bays.
They will bomb and strafe the enemy retreating along the Cabcaben-
9
Mariveles road, enemy shipping, on Corregidor Island.”

With these moves, the doom of the gallant Fil-American troops

was not far off. Only a miracle could stave off this possibility.

183
Fall of Bataan

It dawned on Wainwright that farther fighting could only end in

disaster unconceivable hardships and deprivations. Thus, on April 8,
Wainwright wired MacArthur in Australia and the War Department in
Washington, D.C. about hopelessness of the situation.

The War Department did not response positively to Wainwright’s

message. On the other hand, MacArthur reacted sharply by stating:
“I am utterly opposed under any circumstances or conditions to
ultimate capitulation to the command if food fails. You will prepare and
10
execute an attack.”

In the afternoon, King held a conference with all his subordinate

commanders. He impressed upon them the crucial need of the hour: to
terminate the fighting to prevent further carnage and slaughter. All
agreed with him. He also instructed them to “destroy all weapons,
equipment, and material, except motor vehicles.” King realized the need
for vehicles to transport his surrendered troops to concentration camps.

Immediately, King informed Wainwright about his decision to

surrender the Bataan echelon of the USAFIP. The latter tried to
dissuade King from negotiating an armistice. But everything was too
late.

On April 9, 1942, at three o’clock A.M. Col. Everett C. Williams,

Chief Artillery, and Maj. Marshall H. Hurt, Jr., King’s emissaries, left for
the Lamao Agricultural Experimental Station to start the peace
negotiation process. They were aboard a jeep with a white flag on the
bumper. The Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in
eastern Bataan received Williams and Hurt. Williams was taken
hostage, while Hurt was allowed to return to fetch King for surrender
negotiations.

At dawn, King and his party, composed of Collier, Hurt, Maj.

Wade Cothran, and Capt. Achille Tisdelle, King’s aides, arrived at the
Lamao-Agricultural Experimental Station. The armistice talks began after
a three-hour wait by King.

Col. Matoo Nakayama, senior operations officer of the

Fourteenth Army and personal representative of Homma, was hesitant to
proceed with the surrender negotiations unless Wainwright was
personally present. Only after King had convinced Nakayama that he

184
was acting on his own initiative on behalf of his forces on Bataan did the
process begin. No less than an unconditional surrender was imposed on
him.

At ten o’clock A.M., of that fateful day, the “Voices of Freedom”

radio inside Malinta Tunnel, Corregidor broadcast the sad news of
capitulation through Lieutenant Norman Reyes. The surrender message,
11
written by Lieutenant Salvador P. Lopez,” reads:

“Bataan has fallen. The Philippine-American troops on the war

ravaged and bloodstained peninsula have laid down their arms. With
heads bloody but unbowed, they have yielded to the superior forces and
numbers of the enemy.

“The world will long remember the epic struggle that Filipino and
American soldiers put up in the jungle fastnesses and along the rugged
coasts of Bataan. They have stood up uncomplaining under the constant
and grueling fire of the enemy for more than three months. Besieged on
land and blockaded by sea, cut off from all sources of help in the
Philippines and in America, these intrepid fighters have done all that
human endurance could bear.

“For what sustained them through all these months of incessant

battle was a force that was more than merely physical. It was the force
of unconquerable faith-something in the heart and soul that physical
hardships and adversity could not destroy! It was the thought of native
land and all that it holds most dear, the thought of freedom and dignity,
and pride in these most priceless of all our prerogatives.

“The adversary, in the pride of his power and triumph, will credit
our troops with nothing less than the courage and fortitude that his own
troops have shown in battle. All the world will testify to the almost
superhuman endurance with which they stood up until the last in the
force of overwhelming odds.

“But the decision had come. Men fighting under the banner of
unshakable faith are made of something more than flesh, but they are
not made of impervious steel. The flesh must yield at last, endurance
melts away, and the end of the battle must come.

“Bataan has fallen, but the spirit that made it stand… a beacon to
all liberty-loving peoples of the world…cannot fail!”

185
 In the wake of the fall of Bataan, many atrocities were committed
by the enemy. These were done as tokens of vengeance. For instance,
Fil-American troops assembled at the Mariveles airfield to surrender
were bombed and strafed by Japanese aircraft. Two hundred died in this
st
incident. Another group of 298 officers and men of the 91 Division, PA,
was slaughtered in a secluded place not far off the road near the junction
of trails 8 and 29. Several incidents of this kind occurred.

Many others also died in the various battle zones.

Notwithstanding the surrender, the Japanese continued their operations
against the USAFIP.

In the battles fought in Bataan, some 258 officers and 5,409

men of the USAFIP died in action. Japanese casualties, on the other
12
hand, numbered 1,400.

The tremendous use of the Japanese firepower tilted the balance

in favor of the enemy. For the duration of the whole campaign in Bataan,
the Fourteenth Army used a total of 241 guns. Of this number, 133 were
field and mountain artillery pieces of the 75-mm and 100-mm types. The
Japanese also used 108 120-mm howitzers or larger caliber guns. About
9,000 rounds of ammunition were spent by Japanese Imperial Army
artillery guns alone. Some 907 tons of bombs were dropped by hostile
aircraft. In the second and final battle alone, about 563 tons were poured
all over the peninsula.

Death March

Homma issued the march order for the surrendered USAFIP

men on April 9. The prisoners of war were ordered to assemble in their
respective areas prior to their respective areas prior to their departure for
Balanga, the designated assembly point. Those on the west coast of
Bataan were to congregate at Mariveles, then march off to Balanga.
From Balanga, Bataan, the captives were to negotiate by foot the
unpaved road to San Fernando, Pampanga via National Highway No.7, a
distance of about sixty-five miles. From there, they were to be hauled off
to Camp O’Donnell, Capas, Tarlac, a pre-war cantonment area of the
Philippine Army. Homma had chosen Camp-O’Donnell as a con-
centration camp.

The agonizing trek known as the “death march” began at daylight

of April 10. Herded into groups of 500 to 1,000 the emaciated, haggard
and weak prisoners of war took the first leg of their ordeal-laden route.

186
About 12,000 US soldiers, to include 5,000 marines, 65,000 PA
personnel, 6,000 Filipino civilian employees, and 10,000 Filipino
refugees joined the trek, with the exception of most women and children
who were ordered released. Also in “death march” were ten American
and Filipino generals. However, they were spared from the rigors of
marching as they were aboard cars from Orani, Bataan, to San
Fernando.

On the first day of the march, the prisoners walked for hours until
12:00 noon under the blistering heat of the summer sun. They were
given no breaks, food, or water. Enroute, they were tortured, humiliated,
manhandled, or even bayoneted to death. Aside from these barbaric
acts, the captives were deprived or divested of their valuable personal
possessions. At the end of the tortuous route, at San Fernando, about
600 Americans and over 8,000 Filipino soldiers were accounted as
13
dead.

From San Fernando, the prisoners were transported to Camp

O’Donnell by train or bullcarts. Shortly after, some were transferred to
the concentration camp at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and the Old Bilibid
Prison in Manila. However, most of them remained at Camp O’Donnell.
The harsh, severe realities of prison life had their telling effects on the
captives. Thus, after seven weeks of confinement, approximately 1,600
Americans and 26,000 Filipinos succumbed to the inevitable death.They
died either from disease, starvation, exhaustion, or torture. In Camp
O’Donnell, the number of Filipino officers and men who perished at the
14
end of the concentration period reached a staggering total of 29,180.
Those fortunate enough to survive joined guerilla outfits after their
release.

Shortly after the war, two Japanese personalities came out in the
open to debunk the grim connotation of the term “death march.” Poet
Tatsuo Terashita, who was here during the turmoil, said: “The so-called
“death march” was a total lie designed to whip up anti-Japanese feelings
among the American people. It was a slogan invented by the Americans,
just as they chanted “Remember Pearl Harbor” Lt. Gen Takeji Wachi,
Homma’s former Chief of Staff, called it a concoction “for propaganda
purposes.” Finally, it was indeed a misnomer. The Japanese soldiers’s
training grind included marches on long stretches of land without any
transportation.

The horrible consequences of the “death march” which could

187
 FORT DRUM
Erected in the 1900s on the neighboring islets of El Fraile.

CORREGIDOR ISLAND
Battery Gun in action against the enemy

188
have been avoided, arose from the three fatal defects. These were the
following:

1. The Japanese underestimated the number of prisoners

to be taken in. Homma’s Fourteenth Army staff calculated it to be
between 25,000 and 40,000 men. This was lesser than the actual
prisoner strength.

2. Homma erred in his appraisal on the actual physical

conditions of the USAFIP troops. He believed that the opposing side had
more food supplies than his own forces.

3. The last defect stemmed from the preceding cause. After

suffering from the deprivations of war for a long time, naturally the
15
Japanese had to take umbrage on the prisoners.

Siege and Fall of Corregidor

Bataan’s satellite island of Corregidor, after the former had been

reduced, was targetted next for seizure by Homma. On this four-mile
long, tadpole shaped island was the headquarters of the Harbor Defense
Command under Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen) George F. Moore who had
been given the primary responsibility to defend it.

In December 1941, Corregidor’s defensive armaments consisted

of thirteen 3-inch guns, three 6-inch disappearing guns, nine 12-inch
disappearing guns, twelve 12-inch mortars, one 8-inch gun, two 19-inch
disappearing guns and twenty-two 155-mm howitzers. These armaments
were allocated to nineteen battery positions. The smaller - caliber
weapons were rendered in operation during a nine-day saturation
bombing of the “Rock” during the period from December 31, 1941 to
January 8, 1942. Only the larger ones remained.

Prior to the launching of the final attack against Corregidor,

Homma had assembled all available artillery pieces in the Fourteenth
Army’s inventory in Luzon. He massed them in the vicinity of Hospital
No.1 in Mariveles and near Hospital No.2 in Cabcaben. He had also
strengthened the artillery position at Ternate, Cavite.

These hostile artillery emplacements made a daily bombard-

ment. Overhead, Japanese bomber and fighter aircraft made their
bombing and strafing sorties against USAFIP positions. In addition, the
Japanese Navy intensified its naval gunfire operations. These

189
bombardments demoralized further the USAFIP troops who were on
starvation diet because of the critical food situation.

Despite the enemy’s extensive artillery firing, the USAFIP’s

batteries in and around Corregidor had not retaliated. They were
inhibited from doing so for fear that once they fired, their locations would
be unnecessarily exposed. Thus, they would be subjected to enemy
artillery, air, or naval bombardment. Hence, they remained ineffective
throughout the siege on Corregidor.

The Japanese increased the tempo of their heavy artillery

shelling during the rest of April and the first week of May 1942. On April
29, for instance, the birth anniversary of Emperor Hirohito, Japanese
combat aircraft had made a total of fourteen bombing and strafing runs.
The heaviest hostile bombardment occurred on May 4. During that day,
some 16,000 shells were poured on Corregidor. Damaged and destroyed
were communication facilities, search lighting installations, and several
37-mm and 75 - mm guns.

Because of the searing artillery firing, Corregidor was likened to

a desert. No tree or blade of grass stood. In the midst of these
explosions, the “Voice of Freedom” radio managed to broadcast the
message that “Corregidor still stands”. Apparently, this was meant to
boost the morale of USAFIP troops and to salvage a flickering cause.

From all indication, Corregidor was doomed. The defenders

brave and unwavering in their defiance lacked the means with which to
reverse the tide of battle. All that they could do was to seek refuge in
their sand-bagged bunks, cringe in fear, and wait for the worst to
happen.

The next day, they were hounded again by hostile aircraft and
artillery that brought more terrifying explosions. That night, an
amphibious landing was essayed between Infantry and Monkey Points.
The attempt failed; the invaders were fired upon when they approached
the shoreline. As a consequence, the Japanese incurred heavy losses.
However, the survivors managed to sneak through between Infantry and
Cavalry Point.

More amphibious landings were effected. On May 6, at 3:30

P.M., the enemy had firmly established a beachhead. An advance to the
inland was made, overwhelming in the process every conceivable
opposition. From then on, there was no stopping the enemy.

190
 At about 10:00 A.M., Wainwright had formed his decision to
surrender his forces. He was influenced by the grim prospects of
complete decimation. On the same day, he wired President Roosevelt
the following message:

“With heart broken and head bowed in sadness but not shame, I
report to your Excellency that today I must arrange terms for the
surrender of the fortified islands of Manila Bay.

There is a limit to human endurance and that limit has long since
been past. Without prospect of relief, I feel it is my duty to my country
and to my gallant troops to end this useless effusion of blood and human
sacrifice.

If you agree, Mr. President, please say to the nation that my

troops and I have accomplished all that is humanly possible and that we
had upheld the best tradition of the United States and its Army.
May God bless and preserve you and guide you and the nation
in the effort to ultimate victory.

“With profound regret and continued pride in my gallant troops, I

16
go to meet the Japanese Commander.”

Roosevelt’s response to Wainwright’s communiqué follows:

“During the recent weeks, we have been following with growing

admiration the day-to-day account of your heroic stand against the
mounting intensity of bombardment by enemy planes and heavy-siege
guns.

In spite of all the handicaps of complete isolation, lack of food

and ammunition, you have given the world a shining example of tenacity,
resourcefulness, and steady courage. The calm determination of your
personal leadership in a desperate situation sets a standard duty of our
soldiers throughout the world. . .

You and your, devoted followers have become a living symbol of

17
our aims and the guaranteed victory.

Wainwright immediately ordered his troops to implement

“Pontiac”. This was the code-name of an operation plan calling for the
destruction of all weapons heavier than the caliber.45 pistol. He had

191
also directed the destruction of all equipment, supplies and motor
vehicles. The remaining operational naval vessels were likewise ordered
to be scuttled.

At about that time, the formal surrender document had already

been prepared for the signature of Wainwright. Immediately after its
signing, Brig. Gen. Lewis Beebe, Wainwright’s Chief of Staff, broadcast
the text of the capitulation communiqué. At 12:00 noon, May 6, 1942,
the white flag of truce was hoisted over a prominent position in
Corregidor. All firing ceased.

In the afternoon, the surrender negotiations were held in

Cabcaben, Bataan. Nothing less than an unconditional surrender of all
Fil-American forces was imposed on Wainwright. This was an alternative
better than the further useless sacrifice of human lives.

When the surrender came, there were 11,574 officers, enlisted

men, and civilians on Corregidor, the “Gibraltar of the East.” This number
was broken down as follows: US Navy Personnel - 2,275; US Marines -
1,570; US Army troops - 3,743; PS Personnel - 1,280; PA men - 1,447;
and civilians - 1,259.

192
 CHAPTER X

DEFENSE OF VISAYAS AND MINDANAO

From the standpoint of strategic planning, the Visayan and Mindanao

island groups held little significance in the conduct of sustained
defensive operations. This is borne out by the fact that as early as
September 1941, USAFFE headquarters had ordered the movement to
st st
Luzon of the 71 Division from Negros and the 91 Division from Leyte to
bolster the USAFFE’s defensive network on the island. On the other
hand the Japanese forces envisioned to make the Visayas and
Mindanao as staging areas for their planned invasion of Australia.

Japanese Invasion

As war came to the Philippines, Col. William F. Sharp

strengthened the organizational structure of the Visayas-Mindanao
Force. He accomplished this by authorizing the activation of provisional
units within his territorial jurisdiction and assimilating them into his
contingent. Sharp had previously asked USAFFE headquarters to grant
him the authority to do so which was approved.

Initially, however, the Visayas-Mindanao Force consisted of the

st st st rd
following as its major components: 61 , 81 , and 101 Division, PA; 3
nd st rd
PC Regiment; 2 Infantry Regiment, 1 Regular Division, PA; 73
st rd st
Infantry Regiment, 71 Division, PA; 93 Infantry Regiment, 91 Division,
th
PA; and two companies of the 45 Infantry Regiment, PS. These were
st st
deployed as follows: 61 Division, Panay Island; 81 Division, Cebu
st rd nd
and Bohol; 101 Division, Mindanao; 3 PC Regiment, Mindanao; 2
rd rd
Infantry Regiment, Mindanao; 73 Infantry Regiment, Negros; 93
rd
Infantry Regiment, Leyte and 43 Infantry Regiment, Mindanao.

The six provisional infantry regiments that were activated were

th th th th
the following: 64 and 65 Infantry Regiments in Panay; 74 and 75
th
Infantry Regiments in Negros; 94 Infantry Regiment in Leyte; and MP
1
Regiment in Cebu. Their organization came in the wake of the
redisposition of forces wherein most of the original components of the
Visayas-Mindanao Forces were shipped to Mindanao when the situation
there became more precarious. These new units complemented the
puny force that was left behind to defend the Visayas island group.

193
 For the defense of the Visayas and Mindanao, Sharp adopted
the concept that had been successfully employed in Luzon. It called for
the defensive forces to occupy positions on probable landing areas
where a delaying action would then be fought if hostile landings could not
be stopped. A quick withdrawal to the mountain redoubts would be
subsequently effected where defensive positions had been previously
prepared. There, they would hold out long enough to allow the arrival of
reinforcements.

In the Visayas, several areas had been pinpointed and

st
predesignated as such. Mt. Baloy in Panay had been chosen by the 61
Division. The Negros Forces selected the Mt. Canlaon area as it
sanctuary. Brig. Gen. Bradford Chynoweth had chosen the mountain
fastnesses north of the Cebu-Toledo road.

The scheme of defense for Mindanao included the putting up of

beach defense positions in Cotabato, Davao, Misamis and Agusan.
When these positions would became untenable, the defensive forces
would fight delaying actions and withdraw into the interior to finally
regroup in Bukidnon where they would establish a perimeter defense.
Because of the presence of deep ravines and valleys, this defensive
structure would be very impregnable. As such, they would succeed in
making a strong opposition to the Japanese for an indefinite period of
time. Thus, Mindanao would be kept open as the backdoor for
MacArthur’s forces in Australia through which aid would flew in.

These improvisations were resorted to in view of some serious

deficiencies of the Visayas Mindanao Force. Generally speaking, Sharp’s
command was woefully and inadequately equipped. It had no artillery
pieces to fall back on. Its’ supply of ammunition of all types were very
limited. Under these circumstances, it could not be expected to oppose
the enemy within a considerable period of time.

Realizing the need to hasten the delivery of supplies intended for

the VMF, USAFFE headquarters assumed direct control over the
garrisons in Panay and Mindoro on February 4, 1942. In another move,
MacArthur, before his departure for Australia in March, authorized the
splitting of the VMF into two commands. The Visayan Force was placed
st
under Brig. Gen. Chynoweth who relinquished command of the 61
Division, PA to his Chief of Staff, Col. Albert Christie. Sharp retained
command of the Mindanao Force. This action was essayed at the
development of more effective defense plans for the two territorial
subdivisions.

194
 The Visayan Force had a total personnel complement of 20,000
broken down into five separate garrisons. These were commanded by
the following: Christie - Panay Garrison; Col. Theodore Cornell - Samar
and Leyte; Col. Irvine Scudder - Cebu; Col. Roger Hillsman - Negros;
2
and Lt. Col. Arthur Grimes - Bohol.

Christie’s Panay Garrison was the largest of the five

aggrupations, having in its fold some 7,000 officers and men. The bulk
st th
of this strength came from the 61 Division which consisted of the 64
th
and 65 Provisional Infantry Regiments and some replacement units.
st nd
Detached from this Division were the 61 and 62 Infantry Regiments
st
and the 61 FA Regiment, all of which were shipped to Mindanao. Some
Constabulary units were made part of Christie’s command.

The Cebu Garrison had 6,500 men, to include those in the

Visayan Force headquarters. Integrated into the Cebu Force were the
nd rd st
82 and 83 Infantry Regiment of the 81 Division, Cebu MP Regiment,
a PAAC detachment, and other units. The strength of the other garrisons
was as indicated: Negros, 3,000 men; Samar and Leyte, 2,000 men;
and Bohol, 1,000 men.

In the islands of Cebu and Panay, the USAFFE men constructed

tank obstacles, trenches, and MG emplacements. They also prepared
demolition charges and some crude detonating devices. Construction of
airfields in all the islands was likewise stepped up. There were eight
airways in Panay alone. Negros, on the other hand, had an air and sea
warning system that could be used by the defenders.

Mindanao, on the other hand, was pitifully prepared for defense.

This could be gleaned from the fact that the hostile landings in Davao
and Jolo in the early part of the war succeeded because there was a
feeble or no resistance offered. Concerned over its security, because
Mindanao had become a more important enemy objective next to Luzon,
Sharp transferred the VMF headquarters from Cebu to Kawayan, del
Monte, Bukidnon, in January 1942.

At the same time, Sharp ordered the transfer of some VMF units
st
from the Visayas to Mindanao. Among these elements were the 81
st nd rd
Division, PA, under Brig. Gen. Guy O. Fort, less its 81 , 82 , and 83
st nd st
Infantry Regiments, 61 and 62 Infantry Regiments and 61 FA
st rd st
Regiment of the 61 Division, and 73 Infantry Regiment, 71 Division.
st nd
Later, the 81 Infantry Regiment, a battalion of the 82 Infantry

195
 rd st
Regiment, and 93 Infantry Regiment, 91 Division, were also
transferred to Mindanao.

As part of the defense preparations for Mindanao, five sector

commands were created. These were the Agusan Sector under Col.
Ben Hur Chastaine, Cagayan Sector; Col. William P. Moore, commander
nd
of the newly-activated 102 Division, PA; Lanao Sector, Brig. Gen. Guy
O. Fort; Zamboanga Sector, Col. William F. Dalton, who was later
succeeded by Lt. Col. Albert T. Wilson when he was sent to Bukidnon to
command the Puntian Sector; and Cotabato-Davao Sector, Brig. Gen.
st
Joseph P. Vachon, commander of the 101 Division in a concurrent
capacity. The last sector, because of its size, was further divided into
three sub-sectors. These were the Cotabato, Digos, and Carmen Ferry
Sub-Sectors.

On January 14, 1942, Sharp spelled out the mission of the VMF
as follows: “To hold the island of Mindanao or a large part of the island
of Mindanao possible. The central plateau of Mindanao . . . must be held
at all costs. If units are forced to withdraw by overwhelming enemy
3
superiority, they will withdraw to the central plateau mentioned.”

Sharp’s Field Order No.1 also assigned units to the five sector
st rd
commands. The Agusan Sector had the 81 and 93 Infantry Regiments,
PC units in Surigao and Agusan, and local volunteer guards; Cagayan
st st
Sector-Cagayan Brigade, composed of the 61 and 81 PA Regiments,
th th
and 30 Bomber Squadron of the 19 Bombardment Group, US local
st rd
PC and volunteer guard units, Headquarters and 1 Battalions, 103
st nd nd
Infantry Regiment, 101 Division, 2 Battalion, 102 Infantry Regiment,
rd st st
and 3 Batttalion, 101 Infantry Regiment; Lanao Sector - 81 Division,
st, nd rd th th
61 , 62 and 73 Infantry Regiments, 14 Bomber Squadron, 19
Bombardment Group, local PC and volunteer guard units, and one bolo
st nd
battalion; Zamboanga Sector - 1 Battalion, 102 Infantry Regiment, two
rd
companies of the 43 Infantry Regiment, PS and local PC and volunteer
st nd
guard units; and Cotabato-Davao Sector - 101 Division, 2 Battalion,
nd rd th
82 Infantry Regiment, 3 PC Regiment, 28 Bomber Squadron, and
4
volunteer guard units.

In the same order, the following minor changes in the disposition

of troops were effected:
nd st
1. 2 Infantry Regiment, 1 Regular Division, to take its
position and include to its defense the municipality of Cotabato.

196
 rd
2. 73 Infantry Regiment to establish positions at Iligan
Camp Overton-Maria Cristina Falls area which covered the two vital
approaches to Dansalan, Lake Lanao through the coasts of Iligan.
st
3. 81 Engineer Battalion to be positioned at Sitio
Baringbingan in the Manungan-Abaya area on the north side of Lake
Lanao with its ACP at Dansalan and RCP at the Bubong Forest near the
Siguan River.
st
4. 61 Infantry Regiment to be assigned at the Ganassi-
Malabang area on the southwestern tip of Lake Lanao, with its
headquarters at Ganassi.
nd
5. 62 Infantry Regiment was assigned in Lanao, to
include Misamis Occidental, with its headquarters at Kolambugan,
Lanao.
st
6. 81 Field Artillery Regiment was dispatched to Misamis
st
Oriental for attachment with the 101 Division, PA.

Another redeployment of troops was made on February 24. The

rd
two companies of the 43 Infantry Regiment, PS, were transferred from
the Zamboanga Sector to Lake Pinamaloy near the Bukidnon –Cotabato
boundary to become the nucleus of the Southern Force Reserve. A
provisionl infantry battalion was organized out of local PC and volunteer
guard units for their replacement.
rd
The 93 Infantry Regiment was relieved from the Agusan Sector
and redeployed to Del Monte, Bukidnon to form part of the Norhtern
rd
Force Reserve. As a replacement, the 3 PC Regiment was transferred
to the Agusan Sector. The Surigao Provisional Battalion was also
organized to become part of this sector.

Relieved from the Lanao Sector for redeployment to Lake

nd
Pinanalay was the 62 Infantry Regiment which had been ordered for
integration into the Southern Force Reserve. The Lanao Sector acquired
th
the services of the 84 Infantry Regiment.
th
The Cagayan Sector lost the Headquarters Squadron of the 19
nd nd
Bombardment Group. This was replaced by the 2 Battalion, 82
Infantry. Also slated to be redeployed to Talakag, Bukidnon, to constitute
st
the sector’s reserve was the 61 Infantry Regiment.

197
 One unit was activated to become an element of the Cotabato-
st st
Davao Sector. This was the 1 Provisional Infantry Battalion of the 101
Division.

With these preparations, Sharp was confident of upsetting the

Japanese timetable for the early conquest of the Visayas-Mindanao
Forces. The VMF was capable of prolonging its organized opposition to
the Japanese Imperial Forces.

Homma, on the other hand, envisioned the employment of a

token force to subdue the Visayas and Mindanao. This mission was
given to the 5,000-man Sakaguchi Detachment Maj. Gen. Shizuo
Sakaguchi. Homma’s pre-invasion plan called for the staging of two
separate landings in southern Philippines. The Miura Detachment,
(named after Lt. Col Toshio Miura), will land in Davao, while the
Sakaguchi Detachment will invade Sulu archipelago. Miura’s force
st rd th
consisted of elements of the 1 Battalion, 33 Infantry Regiment, 16
Division, and some engineer and service units from the Fourteenth Army.
th
The Sakaguchi Detachment, on the other hand, had the 146 Infantry
th
Regiment from the 56 Division, an artillery battalion, and an armored
unit, all from the Sixteenth Army under Lieutenant General Iwamura.

From their staging area in Palan Island, the Miura and Sakaguchi
Detachments will be under the direct control of the Sixteenth Army. After
the seizure of Davao, the former will revert back to the control of the
Fourteenth Army. The Sakaguchi Detachment, after capturing Jolo,
where it will establish a base of operations wiil return to Tarakan in
Borneo.

On the arrival in the Philippines in April 1942 of the Kawagachi

and Kawamura Detachments, Homma formed a task force and
dispatched it to the south to compel into submission Sharp’s Visayas-
Mindanao Force. These elements came in when the final and last battle
in Bataan had drawn to a close. The Kawaguchi, Kawamura
Detachments were tasked to occupy the Visayas and Mindanao
successively. Later, the Ikuta Detachment was sent to Mindanao to
relieve the Miura Detachments.

Conveyed in sixteen transports, escorted by four battleships, of

th
which three where destroyers, the task force consisted of the 11
Infantry Regiment which was reinforced by elements of another regiment
th
of the 5 Division under Major General Kamawaki. The Japanese
Imperial General Staff in Tokyo, pulled out the Kamawaki Detachment

198
from Borneo for redeployment to Cebu. This was done in order to bring
to a close the Philippine campaign and in appreciation or recognition of
the dilemma of Homma, who was rebuked for the slow-paced operations
in the islands.

Invasion of Cebu

At early dawn of April 10, the Kamawaki Force landed on a

beach thirty kilometers south of the little town of Naga, Cebu. Disposed
along the beaches on the time to oppose hostile landings was a segment
of Chynoweth’s force which was poorly equipped with four caliber .50
MG’s and six 81-mm mortars without any artillery piece in support.

When the enemy appeared, Chynoweth ordered a night

withdrawal to the hills on the west. During this movement, the
withdrawing forces lost most of their equipment, including one radio
transmitter.

At sunrise, the Japanese planned to move inland along the

Toledo-Cebu road towards Camp 7 where Chynoweth’s headquarters
was located. Realizing that they had gained complete control over the
road networks, the Japanese forces decided not to make an inland
movement. They immediately occupied the USAFFE’s camp where they
st
announced that they had “boxed in” the 81 Division and that the whole
island of Cebu was already under their control.

Immediately after arrival in the hills, Chynoweth reorganized his

forces. He was able to reassemble a regiment-sized unit which was
hastily whipped up into a combat force. With it, he was ready to prolong
the resistance with the hills of Cebu as his base of operations.

Meanwhile, the Cebu MP Regiment under Lt. Col Howard

Edmunds with about 1,100 men engaged the Japanese in a hand-to-
hand fight. The regiment was given the mission to delay the enemy long
enough to allow the demolition teams to complete their work. They were
to return to the hills after that.

At 9:30 A.M. April 10, the battle of Cebu City started. A hostile
force that had landed on the beach of Ermita and at Pier 1,2, and 3
rushed toward the shore where the Cebu MP Regiment had its first line
of defense extending from Ermita beach to Pier3. In the ensuing firefight,
the defenders were quickly overwhelmed because of the enemy’s
superiority in number and armaments. As a consequence, they withdraw

199
to their second line of defense which was from the Martirez Mango
Avenue down to Fuente Osmena Park. There, their defensive positions
were disintegrated.

Another engagement took place at 11:00 A.M. at the Martirez

Road-Mango Avenue junction. A Japanese patrol, half of which was in
civilian clothes, stumbled in the Cebu MP Regiment’s position. The
close-quarter fighting ended after several minutes when the Japanese
withdrew towards the Loriga Cemetery. On the other hand, the USAFFE
troops moved over to the UP Junior College campus at Lahug to await
further development. From there, they proceeded to Capitol Hill and
finally to Bonbon, Camp 4.

The Japanese continued their advance. At Bonbon, they clashed

with the USAFFE troops. In this action, Lieutenants Domingo Flores and
Ernesto Arriola perished. The defenders had to move back to Adlawan.

Enemy forces landed in several places in Cebu. One contingent

made its way in Talisay, eleven kilometers south of the city. Another
landed at Danao, forty kilometers to the north, while still another
established a beachhead at Toledo on the other side of the island.

The hostile landing at Tabonoc, Talisay was opposed by “A”

st nd
Company of the 1 Battalion, 82 Infantry Regiment. No less than the
st
Company Commander, 1 Lt. Salvador Ibay, died in action. Another
rd
officer, 3 Lt. Magno Tolentino, suffered the same fate.

It was during this time when Edmunds realized the serious

handicaps of his Cebu MP Regiment. Consequently, he abandoned his
troops and proceeded to Mindanao via Tacloban. Unfortunately,
Edmunds and his party reached as far as Talacogon, Agusan where they
surrendered.
rd nd
In Toledo, the 3 Battalion, 82 Infantry Regiment, had
established defensive positions from the Ilihan Mountains to barrios
Magdugo and Media Onse, a distance of eight kilometers. Its “I”
Company’s defensive area was from Argao to Santander; “K” Company,
from Toledo to Santander; “L” Company, from Magdugo to Uling, Naga;
and “M” Company, from Cantabaco to Talisay.

When a 300-man Japanese force landed at Bato and at the

wharf behind the Toledo Municipal Hall on the morning of April 10, the
rd
combined strength of 3 Lt. Ricardo Bargayo’s “M” Company and

200
Lieutenant Acantilado’s “K” Company was thrown in to resist the enemy
at the pier. In the fighting that followed, the Filipino defenders made a
st nd
defiant stand. After the initial action, the 1 and 2 Platoons of “K”
rd
Company were pulled out from the scene of encounter to join the 3
Platoon in the premises of the church. This was to allow them to
replenish their ammunition for further action.

Realizing the odds against his troops, Bargayo ordered a

withdrawal to the Ilihan Mountains. In the meantime, Acantilado’s “K”
Company was fighting the enemy in the town plaza to enable “M”
Company to withdraw safely. During this encounter, one officer and two
enlisted men “K” Company became casualties. Lieutenant Acantilado
was hit twice at the thigh; First Sergeant Joaquin was wounded on the
right knee; and Private Virtucio had a shoulder wound. The wounded
enlisted men were armed with BAR’s that helped stem the tide of the
enemy’s advance.

Another fierce fighting broke out at the Ilihan Line when a large
body of fresh Japanese infantry troops stormed that mountain redoubt.
Both sides sustained heavy losses. On the part of the enemy, the
number of casualties was estimated to be 600, including ten truckloads
of men. Bargayo’s “M” Company, on the other hand, had about thirty-
nine men as survivors. From the Ilihan Mountains, the defenders
nd
withdrew to Media Onse, the second line of defense of the 82 Infantry
st
Regiment. This was the sector assigned to 1 Lt. Alexander Chiongbian.

Media Onse, Toledo, became the scene of another encounter.

The Bohol Force under Major Grimes had just arrived to reinforce the
nd
82 Infantry Regiment. As the men were preparing their defensive
positions, around sixty Japanese vehicles were approaching their sector.
Grimes and his men fired on the convoy; fighting ensued. Grimes was
captured with a bayonet wound on his hip. A Filipino officer, Lieutenant
Garces, was likewise captured.

Chynoweth was therefore surprised to learn of Major Grimes’

captured. Above all, he was surprised to know that there had been no
explosions on the route where the Japanese convoy had passed
through. This was previously planted with demolitions to impede
Japanese movement through this avenue of approach. In fact,
Chynoweth had personally inspected this explosive device just to be
assured of their usefulness.

April 11, at 2:00 A.M., Japanese troops with complete armored

201
support entered Cantabaco, Toledo, where the remnants of “M”
rd
Company, 3 Battalion, had finally established positions. Bargayo’s men
battle against the enemy, in a fierce hand-to-hand combat. As a result,
ten of the defenders became casualties, thereby reducing the original
number to twenty-nine. After this encounter, the unit proceeded to Uling,
nd
Naga, where the 82 Infantry Regiment had established its CP.
rd nd
In the evening, the whole 3 Battalion, 82 Infantry Regiment,
transferred to Uling, Naga. This was the designated assembly area in
case of the unit’s disbandment. Later, due to some changes in the plan,
the unit moved over to Alimango, a sitio of Sudlon, Toledo.
rd rd
Meanwhile, a unit of the 83 Infantry Regiment under 3 Lt.
Legorio had a head-on collision with the Japanese at Camp 6, Toledo.
The enemy was nearly decimated. About 150 Japanese troops were
killed in action. In addition, the Filipinos captured sub-machineguns, light
mortars, one saber, and several Japanese rifles.
nd
The 2 Infantry Regiment was disbanded on April 14 when its
commander, Col. Emigdio David, issued out his verbal order to this
effect. However, he allowed the officers and men to join guerilla
organization in their respective areas.
rd
On the beaches extending from Bogo to Talisay, the 83 Infantry
Regiment under Maj. Rufus H. Rogers had established a strong
defensive network. The entire length of these beach defense positions
was known as the McLenahan Line in honor of Major McLenahan, senior
rd
American adviser and CO of the 3 Battalion.

At 10:00 P.M. of April 9, the Japanese subjected a portion of the

st
McLenahan Line near the 1 Battalion’s CP at Sitio Dita to a frontal
assault in the hope of making a breakthrough point. The hostile attack
continued until 5:00 P.M. of the next day. Fighting back with grim
determination, the defenders stood their grounds notwithstanding the
great odds against them. When the line became untenable after two
rd
days and two nights of continuous fighting, 3 Lt. Marcos Dalao, acting
st
CO of the 1 Battalion, was given the permission to withdraw to Barrio
Payahan, sixteen kilometers away.

In this action, five officers and several enlisted men died in

nd
action. The officers were 2 Lt. Antonio Cavalida, Operations Officer,
rd rd
3 Lt. Jose P. Roca, CO Combat Support Company, 3 Lt. Crispulo
rd
Cinco, 3 Lt. Segundo Sarce, and Lt Pellicer. Cavalida and Roca,

202
together with several enlisted men, were captured alive by the Japanese
but were subsequently bayoneted to death.

Several days later, another encounter took place in a different

locale. This occurred in the evening of April 16 at Pulang Bato, Toledo.
A Japanese force on board forty trucks and two automobiles had just
nd
debouched into that area where troops of the 2 Battalion were at an
ambush position. The ensuing firefight lasted until 1:00 P.M. When
Japanese baby tanks, mortars, and aircraft were brought in to wreak
havoc on the defenders, the resistance was overwhelmed and the
USAFFE troops withdrew toward the mountain fastnesses of Asturias
and Danao. The enemy pursued them; however, the chase was not
completed primarily because the USAFFE troops had already funelled
the forested areas.

This was the last battle of significance in Cebu. On April 17,

rd
1942, Major Rogers ordered the disbandment of the 83 Infantry
Regiment after receiving Chynoweth’s order to capitulate. The officers
and men advised to return to their homes at their own risk. Some of
them fled to the mountains and to Mindanao to join the underground
movement.

Fall of Panay

After the capitulation of Cebu, the Japanese launched an all-out

st
attack on the 61 Division, PA, on Panay Island under Brig. Gen. Albert
th
Christie. A task force consisting of the headquarters of the 9 Brigade
st
and 41 Infantry Regiment, reinforced by artillery and engineer units,
5
made a three-pronged attack. One segment of this force hit Capiz in the
north, another landed in Iloilo, while the last one landed on the west
coast of Antique.
st
At the time, the 61 Division was disposed on Panay as follows:
rd nd
Deployed in Iloilo was the 63 Infantry Regiment. Its 2
st
Battalion, supported by “B” Company of the 61 Engineer Battalion, was
th
tasked to defend Iloilo City. The 64 Infantry Regiment was given the
th
Mission to delay enemy movements from Capiz to Cuartero. The 65
Infantry Regiment, poorly equipped and inadequately manned, became
st
the warning service unit, while the rest of the 61 Engineer Battalion was
th
to support the 65 Infantry Regiment, and to demolish installations on the
approach of the enemy.

203
 The hostile force that had been assigned to take Iloilo landed on
the shores of Tigbauan and Oton on April 16. Surprised, the troops of
nd st
the 2 Battalion and “B” Company, 61 Engineer Battalion, were routed.
They immediately beat a hasty retreat to the interior. After the seizure of
Iloilo City, the Japanese drove towards the interior town of Lambunao,
approximately forty-eight kilometers north of the city. The occupation of
Lambunao had been effected without any resistance.

Two days after the landing at Tigbauan and Oton, the Japanese
st
at Lambunao moved to Mount Baloy to effect the capture of the 61
Division headquarters. They used the trail at Dila-Dila as their avenue of
st rd
approach. This area was occupied by troops of the 1 Battalion, 63
Infantry Regiment, under Capt. Julian C. Chaves, who had been waiting
in ambush. On the approach of the enemy, the ambushers opened fire.
Heavy fighting, to include hand-to hand combat, lasted for two days.
Chaves had the upper hand. Many Japanese troops perished. The
st
hostile advance was halted. Seven men of the 1 Battalion were killed in
action.

For this feat, Chaves was promoted to major. A week later, he

became a lieutenant colonel. Two company commanders who had
participated in this encounter were likewise given spot promotions. They
were Lieutenants Perfecto Osman and Licerio Bautista. One enlisted
st
men, Sgt. Romulo Laxo of the 61 Engineer Battalion, was bestowed a
battlefield commission as an officer. Christie was given a brevet rank of
6
brigadier general.
st
Lt. Col. Macario Peralta, Jr. 61 Division G3, went on a
reconnaissance mission to Alimodian, Iloilo, in the first week of May.
With him was the PC Detachment attached with the division
headquarters. While at Buhay, a barrio of Alimodian along the provincial
road, Peralta noticed an approaching Japanese patrol on board a truck.
Without losing time, Peralta deployed the men for an ambush. The action
that followed ended with four dead Japanese soldiers. One was captured
alive and presented to Christie in his headquarters.

They were no other encounters in Iloilo after this last one. The
enemy was presumed to be consolidating his forces of mopping-up
operations to be executed later.

Meanwhile, the Japanese troops that were assigned to seize

Capiz landed as scheduled at Culasi, Antique, a small municipality by the
sea about seven kilometers from the provincial town of Capiz. Before

204
their landing, the Japanese shelled the harbor for about fifteen minutes.
Without receiving any counter-fire the enemy disembarked from the
ships without encountering any opposition or the semblance of it. At the
th
time, the 64 Infantry Regiment under Lt. Col. Antiquio Janairo had not
established defensive positions on the beaches. Rather, it was deployed
along the road leading to the interior towns of the province.

In Antique, the enemy landed at San Jose without much

th
difficulty. The 65 Infantry Regiment under Lt. Col. Marian Griño had not
taken steps to prevent the landing. What it did was to withdraw to the
interior to wait for reinforcements until it could build up its capability to
fight. From San Jose, the enemy fanned out, capturing in the process
the towns of Sibalum and Valderama.

The Japanese eventually occupied the Carawisan Mines

compound located in the mountain fastness of San Remigio as their
base of operations. Bivouacked in that area was the “M” Company of the
rd
3 Battalion. Preparations were made to effect the raid of the Japanese
garrison. For this purpose, a special platoon of three officers and thirty-
six enlisted men was formed.

While preparing for this venture, the unit was hit instead by the
Japanese. This occurred on May 10. Fighting erupted and lasted the
whole afternoon of that day. As a result, the Special Platoon sustained
several casualties, five of whom were from the squad under Lt. Nilo U.
Buenaflor. All the officers survived. Those identified as casualties from
Buenaflor’s squad were Corporal Badilles and Privates First Class
Legaspi and Tolentino.

This was the only action in Antique worthy to be mentioned. In

st
the meantime, the negotiations for the surrender of the 61 Division that
had begun were proceeding smoothly. Finally, on May 22, 1942, Brig.
Gen. Albert J. Christie, Commanding General, issued the order to
surrender. He was compelled to do this by force of circumstances and
by compulsion from superior authorities. The officers and men were
given until last day of the month to comply with the decree.
st
When the 61 Division was reassembled later for the mass
surrender ceremonies, only one-third of its peak strength showed up.
The rest fled to the hills to engage in guerilla warfare. In this group were
Peralta, Lt. Col. Nicanor S. Velarde, Division G2, Lt. Col. Leopoldo
st
Relunia, Division Engineer and CO, 61 Engineer Battalion, and Lt. Col.
Julian Chavez, hero of the battle at Dila-Dila.

205
 The prisoners of war were sent to Jaro, Iloilo, for incarceration.
After six months, they were shipped to Luzon to be concentrated in the
prisoner - of - war camp at O’Donnell, Capas, Tarlac. Thus, ended the
organized resistance on Panay Island.

Surrender of Negros Force

The Island of Negros was targeted next by the Japanese for

capitulation after they had wrested complete control over Cebu and
Panay. Negros at that time was garrisoned by troops of the Negros
Force under the overall command of Col. Roger Hillsman. Elements of
th th
this contingent were the 74 and 75 Provisional Infantry Regiments,
and a PC company. These two regiments were poorly equipped with no
artillery piece to support. It was held then that the defense of Negros
would easily crumble.

Hilsman had originally established his headquarters at La

Castellana, near Magallon, in the central section of Negros. But as the
situation grew worse, he moved over to La Carlota. Finally, he settled in
Fabrica from where he could easily withdraw to Mount Canlaon. A
Canlaon, Hilsman had planned for the conduct of total defense.

The Japanese had no need to organize a task force to effect the

seizure of the island. This was because Hilsman had already received
Sharp’s order to surrender on May 21. When the order came Hilsman’s
Negros Force was entrenched on Mt. Canlaon ready for a protracted
defense. Forthwith, Hilsman sent his representatives to Iloilo to negotiate
with the Japanese commander for the surrender of his troops.

All troops of the Negros Force were ordered to assemble at

Fabrica where the official surrender was to be made. One company of
Japanese troops was landed at Bacolod from where they departed for
the designated assembly area.

The surrender was almost doomed from the start. At Bacolod,

the sub-sector commander, Maj. Ernesto S. Mata, ordered his troops to
blow up the pier, gasoline tanks, and other installations which was
7
successfully carried out. Surprised, the Japanese moved into action.
They called for some planes from Iloilo to bomb and strafe the beaches.
In the course of the bombing and strafing sorties, the Japanese realized
that resistance was but feeble, posing no major threat to safety.

206
 In due time, the capitulation was over. Only one-third of the
officers and men of the Negros Force decided to surrender. Thus drew to
a close the organized opposition on Negros Island. Those who did not
capitulate affiliated themselves with the Negros Guerilla Force under the
joint leadership of Majors Mata and Abcede.

The Siege of Mindanao

After the landing of the Miura Detachment in Sta. Ana, Davao, on

December 20, 1941, and the Sakaguchi Detachment in Jolo, Sulu,
Japanese operations in Mindanao were confined within the periphery of
st
the initial landing sites. Troops of the 101 Division, PA, under Brig. Gen.
Joseph Vachon had been responsible for not allowing the enemy to
debouch into the inland areas.

Therefore, the early conquest of Mindanao was held in

abeyance. Homma simply lacked the manpower to be redeployed to
achieve this objective. His pre-occupation was the immediate reduction
of Luzon, particularly the Bataan garrison, after which the campaign to
capture the Visayan Island would follow. All throughout this period,
Mindanao remained open as MacArthur’s backdoor.

The fall of Cebu, Panay, and Negros in the Visayan Island group
having been accomplished, the Japanese Imperial General Staff in
Tokyo decided that the Philippine campaign must end at once. To
rd th
accomplish this, the 23 Infantry Brigade and 124 Infantry Regiment
were pulled out from other operational areas and ordered to Mindanao.
In addition, the invasion forces committed in the Visayas were
redeployed to Mindanao.

On the other hand, Sharp disposed his forces as follows:

st st
1. 101 Infantry Regiment, 101 Division, PA – along
Digos Bay in Davao to prevent the Japanese troops in Davao City from
debouching into the interior plains of Davao and Cotabato.
st st rd
2. 61 FA, 81 FA. And 103 Infantry Regiments – along
the coasts of Misamis to prevent hostile landings from the Visayas.
st rd
3. 81 Infantry and 93 Infantry Regiments – along the
coasts of Agusan to block enemy landings.

207
 4. Lanao Force – along the shoreline of Cotabato to
prevent hostile landings and to stop the Japanese at Davao City in
entering Cotabato.

At 1:00 P.M., April 29, 1942 a Japanese convoy of eight

transport escorted by destroyers appeared at the entrance of the
Cotabato harbor. Smaller watercrafts were also sighted steaming toward
nd
the mouth of the Cotabato River. Immediately, the 2 Infantry Regiment,
st
1 Regular Division, under Lt. Col. Calixto Duque went into position in its
sector, ready to oppose the enemy. Duque’s battalion commanders were
briefed on the specific task of their units prior to their departure for their
respective operational areas.

Japanese naval guns started shelling the port of Cotabato and its
facilities at 4:00 A.M. Simultaneously, gasoline and oil dumps in the town
of Cotabato were exploded, engulfing the whole area in flames. A
st
detachment of the 101 Engineer Battalion had set off the conflagration
in compliance with previous instruction to burn this strategic installation
on the approach of the enemy.

After the terrific pre-invasion preparation fire, the Japanese

assault forces waded ashore. One task force, suspected to be the
equivalent of a regimental combat team, and supported by air, and naval
units, struck at Parang.

On the shores eagerly awaiting the appearance of the invading

nd
forces were men of the 2 Infantry Regiment who lack combat
experience and training. As the first assault wave approached the shore,
the defenders opened fire with their MG’s emplaced in well-concealed
positions. This drew the retaliatory fire from Japanese ground, air, and
naval units. The intense hostile barrages caused the defenders line to
waver at first. It eventually remained firm. Notwithstanding the enemy’s
heavy looses in men, the second assault wave was sent in. Its leeward
movement, however, was temporarily stopped by the enfilade MG fire of
nd
2 Infantry Regiment’s men. Not the least discouraged, the Japanese
nd
managed to land and established a beachhead. In this action, the 2
Infantry Regiment lost one officer and nineteen men.

An hour later, another assault wave swept ashore. This time, the
Japanese had much stronger air support. The beach defense positions
nd
of the troops of the 2 Infantry Regiment were dived-bombed and
strafed intensively that rendered the friendly lines untenable.

208
Immediately, the frontline units were withdrawn to their second line of
defense.

At 11:00 A.M., of the same day, the Japanese forces had

established another beachhead on the southwestern portion of the Polloc
Harbor. Into this beachhead more Japanese troops were poured and
they started to consolidate their gains. To avoid being outflanked by the
much superior enemy, Duque and his troops fought strongly on the
flanks to allow the rest of the unit to withdraw to Cuba, four kilometers
east of the Parang. They had previously prepared positions which they
constituted their second line of defense. The withdrawal was completed
without the loss of a single life.

More serious fighting took place in the five sectors occupied by

troops of the Mindanao Force. As each day passed, the Japanese
became more furious in their attacks. They were determined more than
ever to terminate the vital Philippine campaign. On the other hand, the
defenders, boxed in by Japanese ground, air, and naval forces, could do
nothing to stem the tide of the hostile advance. They were nearing the
verge of physical exhaustion. The promised “aid” from the US mainland
had not arrived and therefore their hope of prolonging the struggle faded
into limbo.

On the fall of Corregidor on May 6, 1942, Sharp ordered his

troops to cease firing. And on May 8, at 8:00 P.M., Wainwright’s voice
was heard over the radio station KZRH giving orders to Sharp to
surrender his Mindanao Force. Failure to do so would mean more
deprivations, more hardships, and more horrible things to happen to the
officers and men of the Luzon Force who were being held as hostages
8
rather than as prisoners of war.

By force of these circumstances, Sharp surrendered on May 14.

st
Vachon and remnants of his 101 Division capitulated earlier, on May 10.
st
Finally, on May 27, the officers and men of the 81 Division under Fort
9
formally surrendered to the Japanese at Dansalan, Lanao. Many officers
and men of the Mindanao Force opted to lead hunted lives by joining the
underground movement. The prisoners of war were herded to the
Japanese concentration Camp at Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

This ended the last chapter of the annals of the organized

resistance in the Philippines. In using a large body of Japanese troops to
reduce Mindanao, Homma cited his desperation as the foremost reason
behind it. He said:

209
 “I was desperate, and one can easily understand my position -
why I had to have that surrender.

Yamashita had finished his campaign in Malaya; Iwamura had

finished his in the Dutch East Indies; Sakai had captured Hongkong. I
was the only one left. Tokyo was displeased. People were saying things
10
about the slow campaign in the Philippines.

210
 CHAPTER XI

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Even while the battle on Bataan was raging, MacArthur had already
envisioned the formation of small, highly mobile armed contingents to
conduct harassing operations behind enemy lines. It was his considered
view that should the organized opposition suddenly terminate in either
success or failure, there would still be military forces operating in the
country to provide him and his staff headquarters in Australia with vital
intelligence on the build-up of hostile forces. He needed this information
in the preparation of a master plan for a counterattack designed to effect
the early conquest of the Philippines from the clutches of the Japanese
Imperial Forces.

Origin and Growth

Guerilla warfare is not considered a novelty in the Philippines.

Long before, the early Filipinos had been exposed to this kind of tactical
action whenever foreigners deigned intrude in to our soil. During the
Spanish colonial rule, which lasted for more than three centuries, the
resort to this type of warfare was necessary expedient. The Filipinos had
to fight back the abusive Spaniards, particularly the friars, regardless of
the odds, as an open expression of defiance.

Lapu-lapu became the first Filipino to sow the seed of the

resistance in the Philippines. The drama unfolded in Mactan Island in
Cebu at dawn of April 27, 1521.

This first outburst of resistance sparked a nationwide movement

that spread like wild fire. In Manila, the first in a series of revolts that
rocked the urban area occurred in May 24, 1570. King Soliman led his
people in frontal clash with Martin de Goiti’s invasion force. Soliman
suffered defeat.

Other revolts flared up in the provinces. There was, therefore, a

chain reaction. Throughout the Spanish Regimes, more than 100 revolts
had been staged by the Filipinos. All these assumed the characteristics
of guerilla warfare.

What moved the Filipinos to offer resistance against Spaniards in

the Philippines? Several factors contributed to this. But first we have to
examine Spain’s aim in colonizing the Philippines because these

211
objectives led to the introduction of measures that caused wide-spread
dissension and resentment in the Filipinos.

Spain, in her bid to establish ahegemony in Asia, wanted a

springboard upon which to launch her conquest of other lands designed
to monopolize the flourishing spice trade in the Far East. The Philippines
provided the answer. Thus, he set three goals in establishing her
colonial authority in the country, namely, to spread Christianity; to seek
1
economic wealth; and to acquire political glory.

The first objective stemmed from Spain’s desire to spread the

benefits of Christianity to the pagan Filipinos, the second arose out of the
need to provide the teeming Iberians with basic economic necessities,
and the third was an off-shoot of Spain’s ambition of becoming the
“greatest empire on earth.” Great was this desire that Phillip II even
2
boosted that the “sun never set upon his dominion.”

To carry out these basic economic necessities, Spain introduced

several measures that gave the Spaniards particularly the friars, a wide
latitude of abuse. Some of the more significant ones evolved were the
encomienda system, exaction of tribute, and the polo to own lands.

Encomienda - This was the right granted by the king to a

Spaniard who had helped in the pacification of a country. Under this
system, the encomiendero was given the right to collect taxes from the
people of the community assigned to him. A public encomienda was
owned by the crown, while private encomiendas belonged to Spanish
citizens. In 1591, 267 encomiendas, with 667,612 inhabitants, existed.
The numerous abuses committed by the encomienderos prompted the
th
Spanish authorities to abolish the system at the turn of the 18 century.

Tribute - This was imposed as a symbol of vassalage. One

family - husband, wife and minor children – paid one tribute. Unmarried
men and women paid one-half tribute each. Eight reales represented one
tribute which was paid in cash or in kind. Later, twelve reales became the
equivalent of a tribute. In 1884, the cedula tax was introduced to replace
the tribute.

Polo - The hated tribute did not exempt Filipino males, sixteen to
sixty years of age, from the polo or forced labor. Exemption was granted
only after payment of a fine. The most common forms of forced labor
resorted to were buildings and repair of roads and bridges, construction
of public edifices and churches, cutting of timber in forest, working in

212
shipyards, and rendering services either as sailors or soldiers in military
expeditions.

The abuses appealed to the Filipino’s sensitivities. Thus, a series

of upheavals surfaced as decadent voice of protest against Spanish
misrule and oppression. Generally, these revolts were motivated by the
aspirations of the Filipino’s to regain the lost independence of their race,
abuses of the Spanish authorities, the hated tribute, oppressive forced
labor, loss of lands and religious intolerance.

These early revolts were all dismal failures. Of the reasons

3
advanced, absence of nationalism and lack of national leaders emerged
as the factors that seriously affected the final outcome of these revolts.
During the period of these uprisings, nationalism was a far hue prior to
1872. Aside from these, there were no leaders to champion a national
cause.

As early as June 1578, Spanish authorities started sending out

punitive expeditions to Muslim lands in a futile attempt to subdue the
defiant Muslims. The first was headed by Governor Sande. The
Spaniards besieged Jolo and later occupied it after a courageous and
desperate defense by Sultan Panguian. This initial baptism of fire of the
Muslims ushered in an era of classic resistance to the Spanish rule.

In retaliation for the invasion of their ancestral lands, the Muslims

launched a series of successful forays into Spanish strongholds in
Mindanao, Visayas and Luzon. Their daring raid of Malate in Manila,
center of government, was a mock defiance to Spanish authority. To
accentuate their hatred, the Muslims burned churches and government
buildings, captured Spanish officials and innocent citizens and looted
private homes. The success of these retaliatory moves forced the
Spaniards to withdraw their outpost in Jolo in 1646 and Zamboanga in
1662.

These belligerent acts prompted Spanish authorities to wage a

more vigorous campaign of retribution to end the rising tide of Muslim
power. The effort, however, proved futile. It only enraged the Muslims;
they resisted with rare brand of courage in defense of their racial
patrimony.

The Spaniards softened somewhat in their attitude. As a

consequence, they adopted policy of attraction to temporarily halt further
bloodshed and to win the Muslims over to their fold. They concluded

213
treaties with the Muslim in 1645, 1726 and in 1737. The measure failed;
the Muslims continued in their warpath.

Spain resumed her punitive drives. In addition, patrolling the sea

lanes by armed ships, construction of more watch towers along the coast
from Mindanao to Luzon, and concentration of inhabitants in large towns
to protect them better from Muslim depredations were the passive
measures she adopted. All these did not yield the desired results.
Spain’s attempt to subdue the Muslims merely ended in a stalemate in
1898.

The Filipino-Spanish War of 1896 is a classic example of

Guerrilla warfare. Against a well-equipped enemy, the Filipino insurgents
had no chances of success unless through predatory incursions.
Guerrilla tactics were likewise openly employed during the insurrection
against the United States.

After their initial but hopelessly abortive efforts to draw the

Philippines into the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in 1942
through intensive propaganda, quisling emissaries, promises of immunity
from arrests, and outright bribery and subversion, the nervous,
apprehensive Japanese invaders suddenly turned sullen and savage.
They had launched a massive campaign of debauchery. Wholesale
arrest, torture killings, and punitive expeditions that sometimes wiped out
whole villages became the standard fare of the day. It was against this
backdrop that the Philippines resistance movement against the
Japanese was born out of necessity for self preservation.

MacArthur’s Plan for Organization

With his long and intimate acquaintance with the Philippines, her
topography, and the Filipino psyche, MacArthur knew significance of the
white, uncharted areas still appearing in the maps. These were blank
spots where no white man had ever set foot. He wanted to establish
guerrilla units in some of these areas. This was the basic premise that
guided him in planning for an effective resistance campaign against the
Japanese Imperial Forces.

This was also the primary reason why he deffered his departure
for Australia notwithstanding the order of President Roosevelt for him to
do so in February 22, 1942. He did not want to leave the Philippines
because he knew that the Japanese Imperial Forces had lost heavily in
Bataan. In view of this, he had planned to execute an early counter-

214
attack against them. This was not without any basis. The slowdown in
Japanese resistance would provide him the breakthrough or leverage to
continue a guerrilla type of warfare in northern Luzon.

For Central Luzon, MacArthur’s concept was to make the lush,

thickly-vegetated mountain fastnesses as bastions for guerrilla outfits
that would be organized sometime later. In implementation of this plan,
USAFFE headquarters summoned Maj. Claude A. Thorpe in January
1942 and ordered him to initiate guerrilla activities behind enemy lines.
He had succeeded in organizing the “USAFFE Guerrilla Army Forces.”

As early as December 1941, MacArthur had instructed the

commanders of USAFFE units in the Visayas and Mindanao to prepare
for an indefinite resistance against the Japanese Imperial Forces. In
compliance with this instruction, Col. Bradford Chynoweth, Commanding
st
Officer of the 61 Division, Philippine Army, on Panay Island, had
st
adopted several measures to implement it. One of this called for the 61
Division to establish centers or resistance whenever feasible. In the
mountains of Panay, Mount Baloy in Lambunao, Iloilo, was the most
suited for the purpose. When defensive positions became untenable, the
st
61 Division would adopt guerrilla tactics and techniques in their
4
operation.”

Chynoweth also ordered the execution of Operations “Baus Au.”

This involved the large-scale movements of goods, supplies and
weapons into the mountain fastnesses of Panay to be used later in
guerrilla warfare. The most important items were brought up to Mt.
Baloy. Just after the war, USAFFE troops who fought on Panay reported
that these supplies, particularly food items, stored in caches in the
5
mountains were sufficient for their consumption for several more years.

Major Guerrilla Organizations and Leaders

Many resistance groups grew and proliferated during the entire

Japanese occupation of the Philippines. However, only the following had
been identified as the major ones that contributed to the hastening of the
liberation of the country:

1. USAFIP, NL - The resistance movement in Northern

Luzon was sired by an American, Walter Cushing, co-owner of the
Batong Buhay Mines in Abra. On December 12, 1941, two days after the
Japanese occupation of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Cushing organized a group of
200 men, mostly employees and laborers of the mining firm, for possible

215
service in the Army. They were immediately trained for combat. The
necessary firearms for this small force were obtained from the Philippine
Army training camp at Bangued, Abra.

When Cushing learned of the atrocities being committed by the

Japanese in Vigan, he lost no time in seeking revenge. Personally
leading a group of guerrilleros, Cushing ambushed a truckload of
Japanese soldiers in Dardarat, Tagudin, Ilocos Sur. This was on
December 14. Thus, the first shot of resistance was fired by this group
and Cushing thereafter was acclaimed as the “Father of the Philippine
Guerrilla movement.”

Several days later, his guerrilla band made a daring attack on

the Japanese garrison at Candon. The action was so fast and the
effects lethal that the Japanese contingent was almost wiped out. As an
act of retribution, the Japanese Imperial Forces committed more
atrocities against innocent civilians. But Cushing’s guerrilla force was
quick to respond to these acts of terrorism.

Meanwhile, the USAFFE’s phased withdrawal to Bataan began

in earnest on December 24, 1941 as mandated by War Plan Orange 3.
By then, General Homma’s Fourteenth Army troops had blocked off most
of the major road arteries in Northern Luzon leading to Manila. Under
such a circumstance, many units under Wainwright’s North Luzon Force
were cut off from their parent organizations. Among these elements were
th st rd
the 11 Infantry, 71 Infantry, 43 Infantry, Philippine Scouts, and Troop
th
“C”, 26 Cavalry Regiment also from the Philippine Scouts.
ST
On January 8, 1942, Capt. Guillermo Nakar, CO, 1 Battalion,
st rd
71 Infantry, Capt. Everett Warner of the 43 Infantry, and Capt. Manuel
th
Enriquez, G-2 of the 11 Division, Philippine Army, had a chance
meeting at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. The trio agreed to make an indefinite
resistance against the Japanese Imperial Forces. Subsequently, they
formed a guerilla unit with an initial strength of 800 officers and men,
mostly stragglers from the Philippine Army and Philippine Scouts units,
st
and civilian volunteers. They designated it the 1 Provisional Guerilla
Regiment with Captain Warner as Commanding Officer and Captain
Enriquez as Executive officer and concurrently CO, Headquarters
6
Battalion. It had two rifle battalions and a headquarters battalion.

Radio contacts were immediately established with USAFFE

headquarters through which the unit’s existence was reported. In
response to this, MacArthur congratulated Warner, Nakar and Enriquez

216
 st
in their resourcefulness in forming the 1 Provisional Guerilla Regiment.
MacArthur further instructed them to avoid direct contact with the
Japanese and concentrated in the production and dissemination of
combat intelligence.
st
Shortly after its organization, the regiment’s 1 Battalion and
th
Troop “C”, 26 Cavalry, under Capt. Ralph B. Praeger, raided the airfield
at Tuguegarao, Cagayan. More than 100 Japanese were accounted for
as casualties. In addition, many Japanese planes on the ground were
destroyed. These results pleased USAFFE headquarters that it
commended all the officers and men who participated in the daring
attack.

On February 2, 1943, Warner resumed command of the

regiment after recovering from illness. He established his RCP at
Masaya, Isabela. On the same day, Warner was able to reestablish radio
contacts with the USAFFE headquarters through which he received
st
instructions from MacArthur directing him to redesignate the 1
th
Provisional Guerilla Regiment into the 14 Infantry, USAFFE.
th
Among the 14 Infantry’s notable achievements was the
recapture of Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, from the Japanese on March
15, 1942, during which the Japanese Military Administrator of the
province, Miyamoto, was killed. Several weeks later, the command of the
th
14 Infantry was passed on to Major Nakar after Warner had left the
Philippines.

Meanwhile, Lt. Col. John Horan had organized in Kiangan, Mt.

st rd
Province, the 121 Infantry out of the remnants of the 43 Infantry, PS.
Cushing’s guerilla outfit, which was then operating in the Ilocos region
was integrated into the new unit.

With the fall of Bataan, the Japanese launched offensive

th
operations in the north against Horan’s forces and the 14 Infantry. The
fighting was so heavy; however, the guerillas managed to hold their
ground. At about this time, Horan received orders from Wainwright to
surrender. He did so with most of the Americans in his headquarters.
Capt. George Barnett immediately reorganized the remnants of Horan’s
guerillas.

During this time, several US Army officers who had escaped

from Bataan arrived in the Mt. Province. Among them were Lt. Col.
Martin Moises, Lt. Col. Arthur Noble, Maj. Russel W. Volckman and

217
 th
Capt. Donald D. Blackburn, all of the 11 Division, PA. In September
1942, Moses and Noble issued joint orders to resume the resistance and
to step up the tempo of guerilla operations.

Irked by the persistent guerilla attacks, the Japanese massed

two full regiments and launched three attacks radiating from Baguio.
These broke the guerilla forces and forced their troops to go into hiding.
Several American and Filipino guerilla leaders were captured. Among
them were Nakar, Moses and Noble.

In June 1943, Major Volckman suddenly found himself the new

leader of a fighting guerilla unit. He issued orders which enabled him to
keep his command and its weapons intact. Volckman next directed his
efforts toward revitalizing his guerilla organization and improving the
means of controlling its activities. He renamed his unit as the US Army
Forces in the Philippines. North Luzon (USAFIP, NIL). The whole of
North Luzon was divided into five districts, each garrison by a particular
guerilla unit under a commander. To facilitate communications, he
established message centers.

The following were the major components of the USAFIP, NL:

TH th th th st
11 Infantry, 14 Infantry, 15 Infantry, 66 Infantry and 121 Infantry.

Capt. Donald D. Blackburn was responsible for organizing the

th
11 Infantry Regiment out of the diverse elements of the Cagayan-
Apayao Force, a guerilla outfit formed by Capt. Ralph B. Praeger of the
th
26 Cavalry and Governor Marcelo Adduru of Cagayan. This was in
compliance with an order of Major Volckman which was issued in
th th
October 1943. The 11 Infantry, an old unit of the 11 Division, PA was
officially activated as a distinct guerilla outfit in January 1945. It had Lt.
Col. Donald D. Blackburn as Commanding Officer, and Maj. Rafael
Pargas as Executive Officer.
th
The 15 Infantry was organized in mid-1944 in Ilocos Norte by
Capt. John P. O’Day following the mysterious disappearance of
Governor Roque Ablan of the province who had been the foremost
leader of the resistance movement in that particular area. It was officially
activated in November of the same year Maj. Robert H. Arnold relieved
Captain O’Day from temporary command of the regiment. The latter
became the outfit’s executive order.
rd nd th
Desperate elements of the 43 Infantry, PS, 2 Battalion, 11
rd th
Infantry, PA, and 3 Battalion, 12 Infantry, PA, were merged to form the

218
 th th
66 Infantry. On October 8, 1943, the 66 Infantry was officially activated
rd
and placed under the command of Maj. Calvert Parker of the 43
Infantry, PS. It operated in Mt. Province. This regiment was responsible
for the rescue of the members of the family of President Sergio Osmena
in Baguio in 1944. Maj. Dennis Molintas later took command of the unit
with Maj. Santiago C. Nuwal as his Executive Officer.

After the surrender of Lieutenant Colonel Horan in May 1942, the

st
reigns of the 121 Infantry were held successively by several American
and Filipino guerilla leaders. During his tenure, Capt. George M. Barnett
had actively led the regiment from the later part of 1943 to May 1945.

During this time, the USAFIP, NL, had stepped up its operations
to reduce the “Yamashita Pocket” in Bessang Pass. Due to illness,
Barnett relinquished his command to Maj. Eulogio Balao.

The USAFIP, NL, was largely responsible for effecting the

successful liberation of Northern Luzon from the Japanese Imperial
Forces. Its origin and growth is a typical example of the evolution of a
guerilla outfit.

2. USAFFE Luzon Guerilla Army Forces - When Maj.

Claude Thorpe had established his headquarters at Mt. Pinatubo, near
the Pampanga-Zambales boundary, he immediately ordered all USAFFE
personnel in Central Luzon to report to him with their firearms and other
vital war equipment that they could gather. When Bataan fell, he had
already divided the whole of Luzon into four commands. These were the
Northern Luzon Command under Capt. Ralph B. Praeger; East Central
Luzon Command, Capt. Joseph Barker; West Central Luzon Command,
Capt Ralph McGuirre and Southern Luzon Command, Capt P. Spies.
Thorpe named his command USAFFE Luzon Guerilla Army Forces.

In September 1942, the Japanese launched a large-scale

operations against guerilla units in Central Luzon. At the time, Thorpe
and Barker were out in the field inspecting their units. The two were
captured and subsequently executed. Capt. Bernard Anderson, a US
Army Air Corps Officer, succeeded Thorpe as Commanding Officer.
Thorpe’s execution brought about one tragic consequence: the guerillas
that he had organized in Central Luzon were not unified. It also signaled
the gradual disintegration of the USAFFE Luzon Guerilla Army Forces.

3. East Central Luzon Command - After Baker’s death, Lt.

Edwin Ramsey assumed command of the East Central Luzon

219
Command. Instead of subordinating himself to Anderson, he immediately
established his own headquarters at Montalban, Rizal and set about
enlarging his outfit with subsequently became an independent element.
From his headquarters, Ramsey exercised control over his scattered
forces operating in Manila, Western Nueva Ecija, Eastern Bulacan, and
Cavite.

Due to its expanded structure, Ramsey had to establish several

military districts within his operational area. This was effected on
December 31, 1943 when he had reorganized his command. The
following were created: North Bataan Military District, Manila Military
District, Pampanga Military District, and West Pangasinan Military
District. Maj. Amado N. Bautista commanded the Manila Military District.
The Pampanga Military District was under the leadership of Col. Jose
Lingad.

From its initial strength of thirty-three officers and 395 men on

May 15, 1942, the East Central Luzon Command spawned into a large
organization: As of June 30, 1945 it had in its roster 3,700 officers and
39,500 men.

4. West Central Luzon Command - Capt. Ralph McGuire,

like Ramsey, also seceded from the USAFFE Luzon Guerilla Army
Forces whose command was passed on to Captain Anderson. After
McGuire’s death, Capt. John Boone, a former enlistedman of the US
Army, assumed command. He continued operating independently until
Lt. Col. Gyles Merril succeeded in convincing him to merge with the
Zambales Military District under Merril’s personal leadership. The
Zambales Military District was organized on October 15, 1944 and
operated in the provinces of Zambales and Bataan. Merril’s command
had a total strength of 1,141 officers and men.
th
5. Luzon Guerilla Army Forces - A former officer of the 26
Cavalry Regiment, PS, was responsible for organizing this guerilla outfit
on May 20, 1942. He was Capt. Robert Lapham who preferred to
operate independently rather than subordinate himself to any guerilla
leader. American and Filipino alike. Because of the rapid expansion of
his outfit, Lapham soon established military districts. These were the
Nueva Ecija Military District under Capt. Harry McKinzie, Pangasinan
Military District under Capt. Ray Hunt, and Tarlac Military District under
Capt. Albert Hendrickson. The Luzon Guerilla Army Forces were most
active in ambushing enemy patrols. It also took active part in the landing

220
operations by the Americans. As of latest count, the LGAF had 7, 660
officers and men.

6. Ang Mga Maharlika (The Noble One) - This guerilla outfit

was commanded by Capt. Ferdinand E. Marcos whose main concern
was intelligence gathering. This unit consisted of two major sub-units,
namely: the Dragon Hunters and the Northerners. At first, this unit
operated in the northern part of Luzon, then to Manila, Cagayan,
Pangasinan, Bulacan and Baguio.

The unit’s headquarters personnel were:

Capt. Ferdinand E. Marcos - Commanding Officer

ST
1 Lt. Pacifico E. Marcos - Executive Officer
Capt. Aurelio Lucero - G1
nd
2 Lt. Angel Limjoco - Assistant G1
nd
2 Lt. Fortunato Guzman, Jr. - G2
rd
3 Lt. Florencio Cabanos - Assistant G2
Maj. Narciso Ramos - G3
st
1 Lt. Dante Q. Nagtalon - Assistant G3
nd
2 Lt. Liberato Bonosu - Assistant G3
rd
3 Lt. Vicente Allas - Assistant G3
Maj. Simeon Valdes - G4
rd
3 Lt. Glicero Opinion, Jr. - Assistant G4

With the unit branching out to the different provinces in

Luzon, the following were named Commanding Officers:
st
Capt. Vicenta Raval - 1 District
(Ilocos, La Union, Abra and Cagayan)
st
1 Lt. Trinidad Batayong - Executive Officer
nd
Maj. Romulo Manriquez - 2 District
(Mt. Provine, Isabela and Nueva Viscaya)
rd
Capt. A. Corrales - 3 District
(Northern Tarlac and Pangasinan)

The Maharlika unit had strength of 8,200. Later, it was affiliated

with the USAFIP, NIL.

7. “Hukbo Ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon” or “People’s Anti-

Japanese Army” - At the outbreak of the war, the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CCP) continued with its united front policy. The few armed
groups that operated under the aegis of the “National Anti-Fascist”

221
United Front, staged numerous raids and ambuscades against the
Japanese Imperial Forces. In a conference convoked by Luis Taruc at
Batibat, Concepcion Tarlac, on March 29, 1942, the conferees formally
organized the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon, or Hukbalahap. Luis
Taruc was chosen as Commander-in-Chief; Casto Alejandrino, Vice-
st
Commander-in-Chief; and Jose de Leon, 1 Deputy Commander.

After extensive recruitment and propaganda campaigns, the

Hukbalahap grew in strength. As a result, five military districts were
established in 1942. The first Military District operated in Southern
Pampanga with Bernardo Poblete as Commander. Felipa Culala headed
nd
the 2 Military District whose operational area covered the towns of
Baliwag and San Ildefonso Bulacan, and Apalit, San Simon, San Luis,
rd
Candaba, Sta. Ana and part of Arayat, all in Pampanga. The 3 Military
District, which operated north of Mt. Arayat, was under Pacifico Briones.
th
Jose de Leon took command of the 4 Military District which operated
Nueva Ecija. Operating from Mexico through Bacolor down to Lubao and
th
Floridablanca was the 5 Military District under Abelardo Dabu. A sub-
military district for Southern Luzon under Pedro Villegas was created
much later.

The Hukbalahap was most active in 1943 when practically all the
guerilla units laid low in deference to superior orders. By late 1944, it had
a strength of 100,000 men. This force made attacks on Japanese
shipping, garrisons and convoys. During this period, the Hukbalahap
came to grips other guerilla units. The Hukbalahap contributed
significantly to the final defeat of the Japanese Imperial Forces.

8. Bulacan Military Command - From an inauspicious

beginning, this guerilla outfit grew by leaps and bounds. Organized by
Col. Alejo Santos on July 3, 1942, it operated in the whole province of
Bulacan. In its entire operations, it struck terror in the hearts of the
Japanese that it earned the reputation as a nemesis of the yellow-
skinned invaders. When the Americans arrived, it had an overall strength
of 7,548 officers and men.

9. Anderson’s Guerillas - The secession of several

guerrillas caused the eventual disintegration of the USAFFE Luzon
Guerilla Army Forces upon the assumption of command of Maj. Bernard
Anderson. Out of the few units that it had successfully welded together
under his leadership, he formed his own guerilla outfit. He named it
Anderson’s Guerillas. In 1944, Anderson had considerably expanded his
unit that at peak strength, it had some 6,664 officers and men. Some of

222
his units operated in the provinces of Tayabas, Laguna, Batangas,
Bulacan and Nueva Ecija.

10. Fil-American Irregular Troops - This guerilla unit was or-

ganized on October 4, 1942 by Col. Hugh Straughn, a retired US Army
officer. Through extensive recruitment activities, the FAIT outgrew its
initial strength of 106 men. This rapid pace of its development prompted
Straughn to organize several regiments and on off-shore patrol that
operated in Laguna Bay. On November 15, the FAIT had four brigades
which were placed under the command of the following: Col. Agustin V.
st nd
Marking, 1 Brigade; Col Emilio Acosta, 2 Brigade; Col. Manuel T.
rd th
Dikit, 3 Brigade, and Col. Dionisio Banting Jr. 4 Brigade.

Among Straughn’s commanders, Marking was the most

independent-minded that as a result he preferred to operate
independently. Marking’s attitude was resented by Straughn. An enmity
between the two developed that ended in a showdown in December
1942. During the incident, Marking ordered the arrest of most of the
officers under Straughn. To appease him, Straughn reorganized the
guerilla forces in Manila and in the Southern Luzon provinces. These
were merged to the same Marking’s Guerilla.

The FAIT operated in Manila, Rizal, Laguna and Cavite. When

the Japanese stepped up their punitive campaign against the guerilleros,
three of Straughn’s brigade commanders were captured. They were
Colonels Dikit, Acosta, and Banting. Colonel Straugnh was eventually
captured on August 5, 1943. This broke down structure of the Fil-
American Irregular Troops.

11. Marking’s Fil-American Guerillas - Marking’s guerila unit

existed as early as April 1942. It was eventually assimilated into the
ranks of Straughn’s Fil-American Irregular Troops. Marking’s established
his headquarters at Antipolo, Rizal. In May 1944, Marking’s Fil-American
Troops came into being. This organization was reported to be one of the
largest single guerilla units in Luzon. It played a significant role in the
operations of the Allied Liberation Forces east and south of Manila.

12. Hunters ROTC - a group of PMA and ROTC cadets

organized this guerilla aggrupation at San Juan del Monte, Rizal, in
January 1942. Miguel Ver, a PMA cadet, became its CO with Eleuterio
Adevoso as his Executive Officer. Initially, it engaged in guerilla activities
in Manila and its environs. After the fall of Bataan, it established its

223
CAPT FERDINAND E MARCOS GEN ALEJO SANTOS
Pres., Philippines, 1965-1986 SND, June 11, 1959-Dec 31, 1961

COL MACARIO PERALTA JR. GEN ERNESTO S MATA

SND, Jan 1, 1962-Dec 30, 1965 SND, Jan 21, 1967-Feb 8, 1970

224
stronghold in the mountain fastnesses of Antipolo, Rizal upon the death
of Ver, Adevoso took over command of the Hunters ROTC. When it was
granted official recognition, it had in its roster a total of 7,660 officers and
men.

13. President Quezon’s Own Guerillas - Col. Vicente Umali

organized this unit on May 7, 1942. In the latter part of 1943, Southwest
Pacific Area headquarters took notice of the anti-Japanese activities in
Tayabas of this outfit. After the fall of Bataan, numerous Army officers
and men who had successfully escaped from the war-ravaged peninsula
joined the ranks of the PQOG. Among these Bataan veterans who
sought membership in this organization were Col. Primitivo San Agustin,
Maj. Herminio Tayag, and Maj. Ismael Lapuz. Many civilians volunteered
to join. As a consequence, the PQOG had about 10,000 personnel.

14. Bicol Region Guerilla Forces - Of all areas in the

Philippines, the Bicol region had the most muddled situation insofar as
the resistance movement is concerned. As early as December 18, 1941,
Lt. Wenceslao Q. Vinzons, a former governor, had organized the first
guerilla outfit in Camarines Norte. Several months later, he was captured
and executed. Francisco Boayes became the new leader of Vinzon’s
resistance group which continued to operate throughout the Japanese
occupation.

In the province of Sorsogon, Maj Licerio Lapus, provincial

Constabulary commander, was the recognized leader. Maj. Francisco
Sandico organized the “Bicol Brigade” in Albay. In Camarines Sur, Lt.
Col. Montano Zabat was the organizer. No one among these guerilla
leaders was able to knit these desparate elements into one big
resistance group because of the bitter rivalry for overall leadership. This
situation existed until the end of the Japanese occupation
TH
15. 6 Military District - The resistance movement on Panay
Island was the end-result of Lt. Col Macario Peralta’s refusal to capitulate
to the enemy in May 1942. With about 1,200 well-armed officers and
7
men of the 61st Division, PA of which he was the Division G3, Peralta
st
opted to continue on with the resistance by organizing the 61
Provisional Regiment. On June 1, 1942, he assumed command of all
st
USAFFE forces in the island of Panay. The 61 Provisional Regiment
later became the nucleus of the Free Panay Forces.

In an effort to enlarge his command and thereby expand his

intelligence coverage, Peralta took under his personal leadership the

225
guerilla forces in Negros and Cebu. Thereafter, he formed the IV
Philippine Corps. The existence of the IV Philippine Corps was short
lived. It was disbanded in late 1942 on orders of the SWPA
headquarters. The reestablishment of the pre-war military district was
th
effected. Peralta was named CO of the 6 MD with territorial
responsibility over the islands of Panay, Romblon and Guimaras. With
enough supply, particularly food items, which had been stored in the
th
mountain fastnesses in compliance with Operation “Baus Au”, the 6 MD
forces had effectively neutralized the Japanese Imperial Forces in Panay
th
Island. At war’s end, the 6 MD had in its roster 21,740 officers and
men.
th
16. 7 Military District - Due to the inadequate supply of
firearms and ammunition, the USAFFE forces on Negros Island,
th th st
composed mostly of the 74 and 75 Infantry Regiments of the 71
Division, PA, realized the futility of offering an organized resistance
against the Japanese. The whole island was then divided into five sub-
sectors, each garrisoned by a reinforced infantry battalion. This was how
Col. Carter McLennan, Negros Force commander, disposed his troops in
the defense of the area.

On May 9, 1942, Col. Roger Hilsman, who relieved Colonel

McLennan as Negros Force commander, ordered his troops to prepare
for virtual surrender. Majors Ernesto Mata and Salvador Abcede,
st th
commanders of the 1 and 5 sub-sectors, respectively, refused to do
so. Instead, they brought their forces to the mountains and there
organized for guerrilla warfare. Major Abcede had organized a guerilla
unit in central and southern Negros Occidental. Major Mata, on the other
hand, had organized another force in the north. Major Abcede tried
nd
unsuccessfully to form the 72 Division out of the existing guerilla units.
On the arrival of Maj. Jesus Villamor in January 1943, he immediately
th
assumed command of the 7 Military District. He was later replaced by
th
Major Abcede when the former was recalled. The 7 Military District had
a total membership of 11,741.

17. Cebu Area Command - Recognized as leaders of the

resistance movement in Cebu were Harry Fenton, an ex-radio
announcer, and James Cushing, a mining engineer. The former
commanded the guerilla unit in the north, while the latter was in
command of those in the south. Thus, a dual command was established.
Fenton was in command of the administrative headquarters; Cushing, on
the other hand, commanded the operational elements. When the
Japanese launched a series of searing operations, during which time the

226
guerilla unit was disbanded. Fenton suspended his anti-Japanese
activities. Cushing left Negros to recuperate from malaria.

In April 1942, Fenton and Cushing reorganized their disbanded

units in compliance with instructions from GHQ, SWPA. By this time, the
Cebu guerilleros numbered about 9,000, one half of whom was armed.
When Cushing left Negros, Lt. Col. Ricardo Estrella, his Chief of Staff;
was left in command. It was during this spell when Fenton was arrested
tried and finally executed. On the return of Cushing, Estrella was likewise
tried and executed. This left Cushing the absolute commander of the
guerilla forces in Cebu. Shortly after, he organized his forces into
regiments and named his unit Cebu Area Command. By June 1944, it
had about 25, 000 men as members. This strong force prevented the
Japanese Imperial Forces form inflicting serious depredations against
innocent civilians in Cebu.

18. Bohol Area Command - As of 1942, several guerrilla

units were already actively operating in Bohol. The guerrilla outfit Behind
the Cloud, which was operating in the Northern and Southern Bohol, the
East Bohol Battalion was very active. In November 1942, all the guerrilla
rd
leaders elected 3 Lt. Ismael P. Ingeniero as their overall commander.
He established his headquarters at Carmen. Under his personal
direction, the newly unified guerrilla command became active in
harassing the Japanese who had occupied a small portion of the island.
Ingeniero’s outfit was granted official recognition as the Bohol Area
Command with 13,308 personnel.

19. Leyte Area Command - When the Japanese had landed

in Leyte, members of the Leyte Provisional Regiment, USAFFE, fled to
the mountains with their firearms, equipment and supplies and there
formed guerilla units initially called “Vigilanta groups”. Aside from their
main objective of fighting the Japanese, these groups were to eliminate
bads of bandits or lawless elements. In Norhern Leyte, five guerrilla
outfits were actively operating. These were the Pamanian, Nuique,
Miranda, Erfe, and Balderian groups. Those in Southern Leyte were
under the unified command of Col. Ruperto Kangleon, erstwhile
th
commander of the Army’s 9 Military District who had escaped from the
Japanese concentration camp at Butuan, Agusan.

Except for the guerrilla units under Blas Miranda and Erfe, those
under Alejandro Balderian were merged with the Kangleon group to
become the Leyte Area Command. Kangleon had already reestablished
the provincial government of Leyte with ex-governor Salvador K.

227
Demetrio as head. He had likewise reorganized the Leyte Area
Command into three regiments, two of which garrisoned Leyte, and the
other in Samar which was disbanded later. In its entire operations
against the Japanese Imperial Forces, the Leyte Area Command, with its
3,530 personnel had earned the admiration of the SWPA Headquarters

20. Samar Area Command - Capt. Pedro Merritt, a PC

officer stationed at Samar, was the earliest organizer of the resistance
movement in that area. His guerrilla force operated in the northern
section of the province. With the support of Lt. Col. Macario Peralta, Jr.
th
CO of the 6 MD in Panay, Merritt refused to come under the authority
of Kangleon of the Leyte Area Command when the latter sent his Chief
of Staff, Lt. Col. Juan Caushing, to convince Merritt to have his unit
merged with Kangleon’s group. In Southern Samar, Capt Manuel Valley
was the recognized resistance leader. His guerilla outfit was absorbed
nd
by Kangleon’s 92 Division.
th
21. 10 Military District - When Maj. Gen. William H. Sharp,
commander of the Mindanao Force of the USAFFE, surrendered the
island of Mindanao following Gen. Wainwright’s instructions, only a
small portion of his command did so. The main bulk fled to the hills to
be reorganized into various resistance groups. The first to foment the
resistance movement in Mindanao was Capt. Luis Morgan, an American
mestizo who was a PC officer. He had initially consolidated the groups
of surrendered USAFFE men in Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga, and
Lanao. By mid-September 1942, Morgan found himself at the head of a
growing guerilla force. It was during this time when he learned that Lt.
Col. Wendell Fertig was somewhere in Lanao hiding. He immediately
offered his command to Fertig provided two conditions were met: that
he be made Fertig’s Chief of Staff, and that he be authorized to remain
in the field.

In October, Col. Fertig assumed command of the Mindanao-Sulu

Guerrilla Forces. He started organizing his command into regiments.
After establishing radio contact with SWPA Headquarters in Australia, a
submarine arrived in Mindanao on February 1,1943 which carried tons of
supplies for the guerrilla forces. His command was later redesignated
th
10 Military District with more than 37,000 troops assigned to six
divisions and one separate regiment. Throughout the Japanese
occupation in Mindanao, Fertig was the supreme leader of the resistance
movement after persuading Morgan to sail for Australia in 1943.

228
 22. Sulu Area Command - In late 1942, the Sulu Command
was the first guerrilla unit to be organized on the island. Soon, it became
the biggest when it’s started expanding by absorbing into its fold smaller
groups. Under this expanded set-up, the command divided its
operational area into eight sectors. Sometime later, Lt. Col. Alejandro
Suarez, former provincial commander of Sulu, arrived to take over
control of the Tawi-Tawi and Siasi sectors.

Suarez set out in unifying guerrilla forces in the Sulu

th
Archipelago. After establishing contact with 10 MD headquarters in
th
Agusan Valley, Suarez was given authority to organize the 125 Infantry
Regiment with three battalions. In February 1944, Suarez became the
Sulu area commander as ordered by headquarters, SWPA. This was a
necessary expedient since there was difficulty in maintaining contact with
th
the 10 MD headquarters. When the Sulu Area Command started to
acquire more firearms and ammunition, it actively engaged in ground
operations designed to contain the Japanese Imperial Forces in their
garrisons.

Measures to Assist and Guide the Movement

For the resistance movement in the Philippines to flourish and

succeed, General MacArthur and his staff officers had conjured several
measures toward the fulfillment of that objective. Among the steps taken
were the following:

1. Intelligence Penetration. Shortly after the fall of

Corregidor, MacArthur had lost contact with the Philippines. His only link
was the radio station operated by Captain Nakar in Northern Luzon that
provided him with intelligence information about the country. But after
August 22, 1943 he was completely isolated. This was the reason why
he had to resort to an intelligence penetration of the Philippines.

At the start of the underground work, the chief problem that

confronted the project was the lack of knowledge of the Japanese
Military Police, counter espionage methods, and the coverage on the
extent of the Japanese subversion of the Filipinos. Thus, a Philippine
sub-section was created as a miniature branch of G-2 which concerned
itself with intelligence.

Initially, the G-2’s Allied Intelligence Bureau took care of

intelligence penetration of the Philippines in 1942. But in the latter part
of 1943, the Philippine Regional Section (PRS) was established and

229
COL RUPERTO KANGLEON COL MARCOS V AGUSTIN

Bessang Pass, Suyo, Ilocos Sur

The backdoor to the Northern Luzon stronghold of the Japanese Army

230
placed under the supervision of General Courtney Whitney which took
over the job. Whitney then selected 500 men from Filipino units of the
US Army on the west coast of the United States and Hawaii. They were
brought to Australia for special training on intelligence operations.

As part of the project, preliminary survey of the guerrilla situation

in southern Philippines was effected. For this purpose, MacArthur
choose three gallant officers who were well known to the Filipinos to slip
the islands by submarine from Australia to undertake these missions
fraught with the gravest danger. President Quezon, on his own initiative,
also selected his personal physician to make the same survey. They
were Capt. Jesus Villamor, an officer of the Philippine Army Air Corps
who volunteered to lead the “Planet Party”, the first AIB mission to the
Philippines, that landed in Negros via USS submarine, USS “Gudgeon”
and made the survey from December 27, 1942 to November 1943; Lt
Cdr. Charles “Chick” Parsons of the Luzon Stevedoring Company who
handled the supply runs by making four trips from Australia to the
Philippines from February to March 1943; Capt. Charles Smith, an
th
officer from Colonel Fertig’s 10 MD, who was sent back to Mindanao
with supplies for the guerrillas; and Maj. Egmidio Cruz who performed a
personal mission for President Quezon by travelling through submarine
from Washington D.C. to the Philippines via Australia, from May 3, 1943
to February 28, 1944. Except for Captain Smith, the other three officers
were awarded the Medal for Valor, the Philippines’ highest award for
8
heroism.

2. Operation of Guerrilla Units. MacArthur issued the

policy that operations of guerrilla units should be confined to intelligence
gathering and communications. He knew that aggressive actions would
bring about reprisals to the people and would expose the intelligence
operations of the PRS.

3. Counter-Propaganda. To upset the pernicious effects of

Japanese propaganda which had by then saturated the country,
MacArthur authorized the widespread distribution in the Philippines of
various items, such as, cigarettes, matches, chewing gum, chocolate
bars, and pencils. Each package bore the crossed Philippine and
American flags on one side, and the quotation “I Shall Return” on the
other. Millions of such items were shipped to the Philippines. Another
counter-propaganda outlet was the Free Philippines, a pictorial magazine
which reviewed the progress of the war. Printed in big, bold letters on its
cover was the phrase “I shall return”. The magazine was distributed in
great number.

231
 4. Establishment of a network of radio stations. With the
specially-trained Filipino radio experts as nucleus, a network of radio
stations was established in the Philippines. Together with guerrilla
intelligence operatives, the radio network became the eyes and ears of
MacArthur in the country.

Typical Guerrilla Operations

The various guerilla units had evolved certain tactical concepts

within their respective operational areas. However, the following had
been identified as the most typical ones that had been proven to have
achieved some measure of success:

1. Ambush. Ambushes were conducted against the

motorized columns, supply lines, and repair crews working on roads,
bridges, and other structures. On an average, the ambush partly usually
consisted of platoon-sized units. However, in each case the size of the
group was tailored to fit the task. Except for the “lie low” period during the
latter half of 1943 and the first half of 1944, all guerilla units resorted to
ambuscades at every favorable opportunity.

2. Raid. Garrisons, isolated outposts, airfields, and supply

dumps were the usual targets of the raids. The size of the raiding party
was predicated on the type of target to be attacked. As in ambushes,
raids are usually launched at every favorable opportunity.

3. Intelligence. Intelligence activities consisted mainly of

collecting relevant information, counter-intelligence, psychological
warfare, and keeping the civilian populace informed of the real situation
in the Philippines and the rest of the world. Civilians were of great
assistance in obtaining intelligence information. Many auxiliary
intelligence agencies were formed during the period. During the “lie low”
period, the gathering of intelligence information was the main pre-
occupation of the guerilla units. Information gained through intelligence
efforts was of far-reaching value to the guerillas in their operations, as
well as to the Allied forces in the preparation for their return to the
Philippines.

4. Demolition. Although mass demolition was accomplished

after every raid or ambush, other operations were conducted for the sole
purpose of destroying enemy facilities. Bridges, roadways, railroads,
water points, command posts, and supply installations were typical

232
demolition targets. The primary purpose of demolition work was to
harass the enemy or otherwise disrupt and impede his operations.

5. Construction of Air Strips. Some guerilla units did much

in the construction of air strips or airfields. One airstrip large enough for
fighter aircraft operations was constructed in Bucay, Abra in October
1944. During the Allied operations in northern Luzon in 1945, this airfield
was used extensively by liaison aircraft. Airfield construction and
rehabilitation of existing ones were more extensive in some of the
southern islands.

6. Assistance to Allied Operations. The clearing operations

conducted by the guerilla forces had contributed significantly to the early
capitulation of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines. Without
the assistance of the indigenous guerilla groups, the liberation campaign
would have dragged on for a longer period of time, thus causing
insufferable losses in lives and property.

Significant Lessons Learned

During World War II, the people of the Philippines refused to give
in to the Japanese notwithstanding the surrender of the regular military
forces. Guerilla units were formed early, and this kept alive the
resistance movement in spite of the concerted Japanese efforts to stamp
it out. Throughout the war, these freedom fighters harassed the enemy at
every turn and interfered with his operations. In addition, these same
guerilla forces were of great assistance in the return of the Allied Army
and the subsequent liberation of the Philippines.

In retrospect, the resistance movement will go down the pages of

Philippine military history as a glorious triumph for the Filipino ingenuity.
It showed that a captive people in an enemy occupied territory can resist
indefinitely with only raw courage and dogged determination sustaining
them provided they have the will to fight. Furthermore, the success of
guerilla operations will depend, to a large extent, on the aggressiveness
and ingenuity of guerilla leaders.

Prior to the termination of organized resistance, a guerilla

organization, when activated, must be created with operational plans.
The training of regular military forces in all aspects of guerilla warfare will
also help facilitate the continuation or prolongation of the armed struggle.
Another aspect to be considered is the establishment of clearly-defined

233
operational areas and the delineation of responsibility. This will preclude
the possibility of overlapping of responsibility.

Both from the standpoint of logistics and tactics, a continuous,

careful planning and study of the terrain must be made if only to ensure
the success of guerilla operations. The study will permit its use to the
maximum advantage by guerilla forces.

Finally, the principles of war must be properly observed and

adhered to by guerilla leaders. The principles of unity of command, in
particular had been grossly violated because of the conflict of interests
and personalities. These tenets had been handed down as standard
military doctrines.

Emergency Circulating Note issued in Iloilo, 1941. This is also known as

guerilla money during the occupation years.

Liberation leaflets for guerillas dropped from the sky by the US Army Air
Corps, 1944-45

234
 CHAPTER XII

PHILIPPINE LIBERATION CAMPAIGN

In the context of the overall American strategy, the Philippines would not
be left alone to fend for herself in case of belligerency. This was the
basic doctrine which the United States Government had hewed as
closely as possible. And when the opportune time came, the US did not
fritter much valuable time away to put this precept into full force and
effect.

Background of Campaign

From the time of General Douglas MacArthur’s departure from

Corregidor in March 1942, the Philippines constituted the principal
objective of his plans. Throughout the strategic planning on ways and
means to defeat Japan, he stood firm in his stand of retaking the
Philippines on strategic and moral grounds. He stressed the strategic
position of the Philippines whose early seizure would not only prevent
the flow of supplies from the south to Japan, but would also provide air,
naval and logistical bases for future operations against the Japanese
homeland. Aside from military consideration, there was concern to
redeem the thousands of Filipino and American forces in the Philippines
after their humiliating defeat in 1942.

The liberation of the Philippines was part of a conceived plan.

However, as the tide of war changed, the Joint Board planners decided
to change the strategic plans as narrowly conceived in the pre-war
Orange Plans. These plans lost their validity and usefulness when the
“Europe First” policy was promulgated. Therefore, they have no decisive
or significant influence on the battles that followed.

Work on a long-range plan for the defeat of Japan started in

August 1942. This called for a revision of the machinery required for the
overall direction of the war in the Pacific. Thus, the Pacific Theater of
Operations was divided into separate areas of responsibility. Two of
these, the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) under the command of
General MacArthur as Supreme Commander and the Pacific Ocean Area
(POA) with Admiral Chester Nimitz as Commander-in-Chief, were directly
concerned with operations against the Japanese. The Southwest Pacific
Area was constituted on April 18, 1942 and covered the following areas,
namely, the Philippines, New Guinea, the Bismark Archipelago, the

235
Solomon Islands, Australia, and the Netherlands East Indies, excluding
Sumatra.

On May 8, 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan

entitled “Strategic Defeat of Japan”, with the primary objective of
securing the unconditional surrender of Japan, an objective that would
1
necessitate an invasion of the home islands.

The acquisition of successive island bases which lay in the

Pacific would have three advantages: they would provide security,
shorten the sea routes, and neutralize the Japanese bases which could
disrupt the Allied lines of communications. The Southwest Pacific
operations, therefore, were to be conducted along the New Guinea
Coast. Those in the Central Pacific were to be conducted along the
Japanese-mandated islands. Although no specific islands were
mentioned in the strategic plan, the Philippine Archipelago, because of
its strategic position and its long possession by the United States,
2
naturally loomed large in the planning.

The possibilities of expediting the Pacific campaign and

bypassing objectives were discussed on June 12, 1943 at a conference
in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Despite bitter opposition, MacArthur stood firm
on his original stand. He argued that the seizure of the Philippines was
essential in order to establish air bases vital to future operations. He also
contended that assault forces could be launched at short range with
effective air support and with every assurance of success. Finally, he felt
that to sacrifice the Philippines for the second time would be
unforgiveable. These arguments won the approval of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Thus, the way was paved for the return to the Philippines.

Strategic Plans

The first overall plan naming the Philippines the final objective in
the Southwest Pacific Area was prepared at the conclusion of the Buna
campaign early in 1943. The scheme for winning the war in this area
was envisaged in Plan “Reno”. It was based on the premise that “the
Philippines, lying directly athwart the main sea routes from Japan to the
sources of her vital raw materials and oil in the Netherlands Indies,
Malaya and Indo-China, was the most strategic objective in the
3
Southwest Pacific Area.” Thus, whoever controlled the air and naval
bases in the Philippines logically controlled the main artery of supply to
Japan’s factories.

236
 However, the changing situations in combat during the course of
the war necessitated several changes in the original Reno plan. In
August 1943, Reno I was succeeded by Reno II and in October, still
further modifications were published in Reno III. The strategic objectives
set forth under the new Reno IV plan were expanded, to include the
“securing of land, naval and air bases in the Southern Philippines from
4
which to launch an attack upon Luzon in the north”.

A new plan for the re-conquest of the Philippines which took off
from Reno V was drawn. This was published on July 10, 1944 under the
code name of musketeer. The primary goal of musketeer I was the
destruction of hostile forces in the Philippines and the prompt seizure of
the Central Luzon area to provide air support and naval bases for
possible operations. Initial lodgments were to be made at Sarangani Bay
in Southern Mindanao on November 15, and at Leyte Gulf on December
20. Later, musketeer II of August 29 expanded the original plan and had
as its main objective the “prompt seizure of the Central Luzon area to
destroy the principal garrison, command organization, and logistic
support of hostile defense forces in the Philippines to provide bases for
5
future operations against Japan.” Specifically, the plan provided that
after Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger’s Sixth US Army had liberated the greater
part of Luzon, Lt. Gen. Robert Eichelberger’s Eight Army would occupy
the Central and Southern areas of the Philippines

In MacArthur’s Princeton I plan, however, he laid the groundwork

for three series of operations: one called Victor for the Visayas; a
second, called Oboe, to be conducted by Australian troops starting with
Mindanao, and a Peter series providing for the re-conquest of the East
Indies.

A change in the Allied invasion timetable was adopted when

Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet discovered a serious aerial weakness of the
enemy on September 9-10, 1944. Also, SWPA land-based bombers had
caused severe damage to enemy air installations in the Philippines.
Further investigations from Filipino guerrillas disclosed that the time was
ripe for the Allied reconquest. The Mindanao operations earlier
contemplated were dropped. In line with these developments, Mac-
Arthur’s views were requested on the proposed acceleration of
operations. His reply was as follows:
rd
“In view of COM 3 FLT’s latest report on carrier operations in
the Philippine Islands area, I am prepared to move immediately
6
the execution of King II (Leyte) with target date of 20 Oct 44.”

237
 In the planning, it was recognized that Leyte occupied a
commanding position in the Philippines. Because of its strategic
position, the establishment of air logistical bases to support operations in
the Luzon-Formosa-China Coast areas was held feasible. No illusions
were harbored as to the significance of the Leyte operations. Referring
to the impending reconquest through Leyte, MacArthur spoke, thus:

“I knew it was to be the crucial battle of the war in the

Pacific. On its outcome would depend the fate of the Philippines
and the future of the war against Japan. Leyte was to be the
anvil against which I hoped to hammer the Japanese into
submission- the springboard from which I could proceed to the
7
conquest of Luzon for the final assault against Japan itself;”

The softening of enemy positions on Leyte was carried out from

October 9 to 20. At daylight of October 20, the cruisers commenced
bombarding the beach of Leyte. The destroyers lifted their fire and
directed it at the inland areas, at the flanks of the beaches, and at
important roads and towns. Fifteen minutes before H-hour, the landing
beaches were raked with rocket and mortar fire. Thousands of guns
were throwing their shells with a “roar that was incessant and deafening.”
Ominous pillars of smoke rose as the rocket vapor trails criss-crossed
the sky.”

With the Japanese forces taken by surprise, the two major

components of the Sixth Army landed abreast – the X Corps to the north
and the XXIV Corps in the south on the eighteen-mile front along the
beaches from Tacloban to the south in Dulag. To carry out the initial
st
phase of the operations, the X Corps, consisting of the 1 Cavalry and
st
the XXIV Division (minus 21 Infantry Regiment) were given the missions
of capturing the Tacloban airdrome on the Cataisan Peninsula, and to
secure Hill 522 on Palo which dominated the route into the interior.
st
The 21 Infantry Regiment was ordered to gain control of the
th
Panaoan Strait. On the other hand, the XXIV Corps consisting of the 7
th
and 96 Infantry Divisions, were to capture the airstrip at Dulag.

As the two army corps were advancing inland, General

MacArthur, leading a powerful armada, arrived in Leyte. The Supreme
Commander described this momentous event as follows:

“At Red Beach, our troops secured a landing and began

moving inland. I decided to go with the third assault wave.

238
 President Osmena, accompanied by General Basilio Valdes,
the Philippine Army Chief of Staff, and General Carlos
Romulo, my old aide who had joined me in Bataan in 1942. . .
I took them in my landing barge and started for the beach. . .

As we slowly bucked the waves towards “Red Beach”, the

sounds of war grew louder. We could now hear the whining roar
of airplane engines as they dove over our heads to strafe and
bomb enemy positions inland from in beach. It took me only 30
or 40 long strides to reach dry land, but that was one of the most
8
significant --- I ever took.”

Ashore, a mobile broadcasting unit was set up amidst a

drenching tropical storm. MacArthur delivered a stirring message to the
Filipinos: “People of the Philippines, I have returned. By the grace of
Almighty God, our forces stand again on Philippine soil, consecrated in
the blood of our two peoples. We have come dedicated and committed
to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily
lives and of restoring upon a foundation of indestructible strength, the
liberties of your people. .”

At the end of A-day, the X Corps had secured Hill 522, secured a
firm beachhead in an area extending from the tip of the Cataisan
Peninsula to the vicinity of Palo, and captured the Tacloban airdrome.
The XXIV Corps, on the other hand, although short of its A-day
objectives, was able to form its night perimeter along the edge of the
Dulag airstrip.

The overall Allied plan for the ground operations in the capture of
Leyte comprised of four main phases. Phase I covered preliminary
landings to secure the small islands lying across the entrance of Leyte
Gulf. Phase II included the main amphibious assaults on Leyte from
Dulag to Tacloban and called for the seizure of the airstrip, an advance
through the Leyte Valley, and the opening of the San Juanico and
Panaoan Straits. The third phase consisted of the necessary overland
and shore-to-shore operations to complete the capture of Leyte and the
seizure of southern Samar. The occupation of the remainder of Samar
and the further neutralization of enemy positions in the Visayas were
contemplated in the last phase.

The Japanese forces, on the other hand, had “developed an

elaborate strategy of combined and inter-dependent Army, Navy and Air
9
Force actions, known as “SHO Operations,” to protect their possessions

239
against the Allied advance. SHO I applied to the defense of the
Philippines and was effected on October 18, 1944, just two days before
the Leyte landing. Specifically, there were two tactical concepts
embodied in the plan. First was the policy of annihilation at the
beachhead and the other, a policy of resistance in depth. This strategy
provided, among others, keeping at all costs the lines of communications
open to the sources of Japan’s raw materials in the Netherlands Indies.
General Shigenori Kuruda was replaced by General Tomoyuki
th
Yamashita on September 23, 1944, and on the 9 of October, formally
assumed command of the Fourteenth Army. The control of the Visayas
and Mindanao was vested in the Thirty-Fifth Army with General Sosaku
Suzuki as commander.

As the Allied attack drew near, there arose a disagreement

among the Japanese military leaders. Imperial General Headquarters
felt that the decisive battle should be fought in Luzon and only delaying
actions should be taken in other areas. It was also the consensus of
some to adopt a strategy which would provide giving complete freedom
to American convoys and carriers in the journey to the Philippines.
When they would be sufficiently close to make retreat difficult, the main
strength of the Japanese Army, Navy and Air Forces would descend
10
upon them and deliver the knockout blow.

However, the acceleration of the Leyte invasion date caught the

Japanese with their “defense fortifications incomplete.” Maj. Gen.
Yoshiharu Tomochika, Chief of Staff, Thirty-Fifth Army, declared thus:
“This American invasion two months in advance of our estimation, in my
opinion, was one of the basic reasons for the period collapse of our own
11
defenses in the Philippines.”

The day after the Allies landed, General Yamashita activated

Sho Ichi Go (Victory Operations No. 1). He made it clear that the
Japanese Army, in cooperation with the total forces of the Air Force and
Navy, was to make a major effort and destroy the American forces on the
island. The Japanese forces were willing to “risk the loss of their entire
mobile fleet for one opportunity of maneuvering cruisers and battleships
12
to within target range of the troops and supply transports in Leyte Gulf.”

Admiral Toyoda, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet,

was fully aware of the hazards involved when he stated:

“There was no possibility of the land-based forces in the

Philippines having any chance. . . It was decided to send the

240
 whole fleet taking the gamble. If things went well, we might
obtain unexpectedly good results; but if the worst should happen,
there was a chance we would lose the entire fleet; but I felt that
13
the chance had to be taken. . .”

The Japanese High Command, at this critical period, ordered

that the decisive stand be made on Leyte. However, Yamashita was
hesitant to pour his troops on Leyte for hasty deployment at the expense
of his Luzon defenses. On interrogation after his capture in Luzon, he
disclosed that he “insisted that sending reinforcements to Leyte was not
his idea, and that he was against committing additional strength. . .”
Despite objections, he was ordered to dispatch reinforcements
immediately and “annihilate the enemy invading Leyte.” In accordance
with these orders, he scrapped his original plan which called for the
employment of delaying tactics on Leyte and commanded that the
Japanese forces would fight the decisive battle of the Philippines on
Leyte.

Original Forces

Tasked with the mission to liberate the Philippines was the US

Sixth Army under the command of Lt. Gen Walter Krueger. The Sixth
Army was comprised of the following corps with their respective
commanders:

I Corps Maj. Gen. INNIS SWIFT

IX Corps Maj. Gen. CHARLES RYDER
X Corps Maj. Gen. FRANKLIN SIBERT
XI Corps Maj. Gen. CHARLES HALL
XIV Corps Maj. Gen. OSCAR GRISWOLD
XXIV Corps Maj. Gen. ROBERT HODGE

These corps formed a cross-section of the two theaters of

operations in the Pacific Area, and the Central Pacific Area.

The Sixth Army was formerly known as the Alamo force. Its
principal components were the X and XXIV Corps. The former consisted
st th
of the 1 Cavalry and 24 Divisions, while the latter was composed of the
th th nd th
7 and 96 Divisions. In reserve were the 32 and 77 Infantry
Divisions.

The air and naval complements were provided by the Allied Air
and Naval Forces under the respective commands of Lt. Gen. George

241
Kenny and Vice Adm. Thomas Kinkaid. The Allied Naval Forces
consisted principally of the US Seventh Fleet which transported and
established ashore the ground assault force. On the other hand, General
Kenney’s forces were ordered to neutralize air and naval forces within
range of the Philippines. The Allied Air Forces consisted of the Fifth Air
Force, the Central Air Force, and the Royal Australian Air Force.

Serving as covering force for the operations was the formidable

Third Fleet. Admiral Halsey had coordinated his operations with those of
MacArthur, but he was directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Ocean Area.

To perform engineer functions and give general logistics support

was the Sixth Army Service Command (SASCOM). The US Army
Service of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, commanded by General
Frink, also furnished logistical support for the operations.

Approximately 174,000 troops were made available for the initial

assault phase of the operations. However, a total of about 202,000
14
ground troops were committed to the Leyte operations. All of the
assault divisions were reinforced with tank battalions, amphibian trucks,
and tractor battalions, joint assault signal companies, and many attached
service units.

The Eight Army and the Allied Land forces commanded by

General Blamey were to take over missions previously assigned to the
Sixth Army.

The participation of Filipino guerilla units was a crucial factor in

the liberation campaign. Soon after the Leyte landing, President Osmena
recognizing the guerillas as invaluable sources of strength issued
Executive Order No. 21 which placed into the service of the Philippine
Army all personnel serving with recognized guerilla units. Thus, a total of
five divisions were mobilized out of these elements. These divisions were
immediately placed under the operational control of General Krueger’s
Sixth Army.

On the other hand, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters

plan for defense called for the employment of ten divisions and five
brigades distributed as follows: Five divisions and two brigades in Luzon,
four divisions a and two brigades in southern Philippines, and one
division and two brigades in China and Formosa. General Yamashita

242
was in control of the entire Luzon area, while the Visayas and Mindanao
were placed under the operational control of General Suzuki.
th
Five combat units of the 16 Division comprised the Leyte
garrison which totaled 27,300 Japanese officers and men. These units
th rd th
were the 20 Infantry Regiment, 33 Infantry Regiment, 16
th th
Reconnaissance Regiment, 7 Independent Tank Company, and 16
Division Headquarters Troops. Out of the total number of 27,300
personnel, 14,125 were combat troops, 2,100 were base defense troops,
and 11,075 were service troops.

The Fourth Air Army, consisting of two divisions in the

Philippines, provided the air support. It was principally tasked to attack
American transport and interdict American shipping. It was likewise given
the opportunity to attack American combatant vessels. Its mission
covering Mindanao, Celebes and Northern Borneo would be confined to
checking the American attempts to establish bases in Valmahera and
Western New Guinea and the destruction of American planes in the
area. For the purpose, the Japanese air force would use bases in the
southern Philippines.

Meanwhile, the First Air Fleet under the Southern Area Fleet was
stationed in the Philippines with headquarters in Manila. Admiral Soemu
Toyoda, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet with headquarters
in Tokyo, controlled the entire naval forces.

The total estimated number of Japanese troops in the Philippines

was 180,000. Of this number, around 80,000 were deployed in Luzon
50,000 in the Visayas and another 50,000 in Mindanao.

Participation of Filipino Guerilla Units

Following the disorganization of the USAFFE forces during the

rapid Japanese advance which eventually led to their defeat, many units
were isolated from their commands. These groups became the nuclei of
guerilla units that sprouted all over the country. This gained momentum
during the Japanese occupation when numerous organizations came
15
into being and created a major problem to the occupying force.

General MacArthur had long recognized the effectiveness of

guerilla warfare. Anticipating the fall of Corregidor, he ordered General
Wainwright to direct the remaining units in the Visayas and Mindanao to
engage in guerilla operations. In the beginning, however there were

243
some doubts as to the efficacy of waging guerilla tactics. When
widespread warfare was employed in many countries against the
German and Japanese invaders, official US Forces played a counter
revolutionary role when they came in contact with such guerillas. Thus, in
the Japanese-occupied Philippines, “American led and American
advised” - Filipino guerillas conducted a lie-low policy until the US Army
arrived. They were “opposed to organizing Filipinos to fight an all out
16
struggle against the Japanese.” The Filipino guerillas mainly operated
and patrolled in enemy-held territory and gave the Americans valuable
information of Japanese movements and dispositions. They also
guarded supply dumps and depots, bridges and other installations in the
rear areas.

Roughly, these guerilla units that participated in the campaign

fell into three categories: The first type was those that were organized
around a nucleus of unsurrendered US and Philippine Army troops. The
second categories are those of purely local origin and under the
leadership of prominent civic individuals. And the last category covered
those which were an outgrowth of pre-war semi-political organizations.

Working hand-in-hand with the Filipino guerillas were the Allied

intelligence parties sent by GHQ, SWPA. These intelligence nets were
organized, trained, and dispatched from Australia through the Allied
Intelligence Bureau (AIB). This agency coordinated all intelligence
activities of the guerillas. Later, however, the Philippine Regional Section
(PRS) handled these operations. This autonomous organization later
became the lifeline of the guerilla movement, making provisions for arms,
ammunitions, and other supplies vital to the resistance.

The cooperation of the guerillas proved to be a crucial factor to

the Allies’ amphibious operations. In addition to providing intelligence on
the enemy and terrain, they also provided security to advance parties
sent by General Headquarters. Shortly before MacArthur’s assault forces
were due for the reconquest, he issued an alert to the effect that “your
forces be committed to limited offensive action with the specific mission
of harassing the movement of the enemy within your area and as far as
possible contain him in present position. Intelligence coverage must be
intensified in order that I be fully and promptly advised all major chances
in enemy disposition or movement.” In compliance with the alert the
various guerilla units began to strike openly against the Japanese forces.
They seized airfields and set up strong point behind the retreating enemy
troops to form a wall against further escape.

244
 Throughout the campaign, these guerilla units made far reaching
contributions in ground operations. Guerillas usually launched an
offensive action prior to Allied landings to clear or isolate the objectives.
Thus, when the Allies landed, they found that the guerillas had cleared
the Japanese from the beaches and were ready to assist in the advance.
Finally, when organized enemy resistance had been broken and the
enemy scattered, the Americans would turn over mopping up operations
17
to the guerilla troops so they could prepare for the next operations.

Earlier, the problem on jurisdiction arose between the various

guerilla units. They were divided among themselves and separated in to
rival factions “engaged in a bitter struggle for power.” There was no
definite chain of command; no lines of authority were established. This
lack of unity could be attributed to the fact that the commanders of the
various guerilla commands “conducted the resistance through their own
18
initiative.” To bring about unity, pre war military district were
reactivated. Thus, de facto leadership were recognized. Since they were
either American or Philippine Army officers, they fell in readily with the
19
old-time command area.

During this period, a breed of leaders emerged who provided the

direction and leadership for the guerillas. Among the more outstanding
leaders of the guerilla movement were Col. Wendell Fertig, CO of the
th
10 Military District with a force of 20,000; Col Ruperto Kangleon in
Leyte with approximately 3,500 Guerillas; Col Macario Peralta, Jr., in
th
Panay with around 10,000; Col Salvador Abcede in the 7 Military
District with about 8,000; and Col. Russel Volckmann in Northern Luzon
20
with about 8,000.

At the close of the campaign, the guerilla forces killed about

10,000 Japanese troops. Together with the Sixth and Eight Armies, they
could claim substantial credit for the success of the liberation campaign.

Phases of Ground Operations

The day after the Leyte landing saw the construction of vital
American air base for the Allied operations. At this time, the suicidal
kamikaze pilots had caused considerable havoc to Allied beachhead
installations. The explosion of ammunition dumps or oil storage tanks
became an almost nightly occurrence. Except for the vicious air
bombardment of Corregidor at the outbreak of the war, never before in
the Pacific had he Japanese blanketed the Allied position with such
21
powerful, sustained and effective air action. While the Japanese were

245
disembarking their reinforcements and maneuvering into positions for
counter-attacks, General MacArthur’s troops continued to drive inland
and along the coast in two-pronged attack and envelopment.

By the end of October, the XXIV Corps had secured a rough

square bounded by Tanuan, Dulag, Degami and Buraruen, about ten
miles inland at the westen edge of Leyte Valley. Meanwhile, in the zone
th
of the X Corps, the 24 Division, after securing Hill 522, moved west
through the Leyte Valley along Highway No. 2. Jaro, approximately
fifteen miles inland from Palo, was reached on October 29 in the face of
st
stubborn resistance. The 1 Cavalry Division, on the other hand, cleared
both sides of the San Juanico Strait, and by south-western Samar.
Similar amphibious operations took some of the cavalrymen around the
northeastern tip of Leyte past Babatnagon to Barugo on Carigara Bay.

At this time, several counter-attacks increasing intensity

indicated that the Japanese intended to make a determined stand at
Carigara, a key terminus of the valley towards Leyte’s east coast. On
November 2, a combined attack on Carigara was launched by both the
st th
1 Cavalry and the 24 Divisions. However, they found the town
abandoned by the enemy who had withdrawn into stronger positions into
Ormoc.

As the battles raged, the continuous rainfall became a setback to

the scheduled progress of operations for both forces. Communication
lines were disrupted, important roads were turned into rivers of mud, and
the swampy soil continued to delay the Allied conditioning of the vital
airstrips.

By the middle of November, MacArthur saw the need of

nd th
strengthening his army in Leyte. Thus, the 32 Division and the 12
Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, both veterans of previous
campaigns, were sent into action in the area of the X Corps.

In a desperate bid to gain the initiative, the Japanese forces

resorted to airborne actions to disrupt the Allied advance. Their efforts,
however, were miscarried. By December 7, the third anniversary of the
bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Ormoc landing was launched. General
MacArthur described the actions in his communiqué as follows:

“By this maneuver, we have seized the center of the

Yamashita line from rear and have split the enemy forces in two,
isolating those in the valley to the north and along the coast to

246
 the south. Both segments are now caught between our columns
22
which are pouring in from all fronts…”

The Japanese forces, which fought valiantly in the Ormoc

corridor in order to hold their Leyte lifeline, found it impossible to cope up
with General Krueger’s three-way offensive. At the close of the year, the
last connecting road between the enemy’s chief remaining port of the
entry for reinforcements and his troops was sealed. General MacArthur
now controlled all major supply and communication routes of the enemy.
On December 25, 1944 he declared Leyte secure, except for minor
mopping-up operations.

Mindoro Operations

Occupation of Mindoro as an immediate prelude to the main

assault on Luzon was outlined in the final Musketeer plan. To conduct
the ground operations in Mindoro, codenamed Love III, General Krueger
constituted the Western Visayas Task Force under the command of
General William Dunckel. The delay in the development of the Leyte
airdromes and the continuing need for support of the Leyte ground forces
delayed the contemplated attack. This action was set back from
December 5, to December 15. The primary purpose of Mindoro’s seizure
was to establish airfields from which land-based aircraft could bomb
selected targets in Luzon which, at the same time, could protect the
supply and assault shipping routes of Lingayen Gulf. Although the
direction and timing of General MacArthur was in general, correctly
estimated by the Japanese, a statement made by Maj. Eizo Hori,
Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Area Army, assumed that the next
assault after Leyte would be made somewhere in the western Visayas,
23
probably in Panay or Negros.

The landing phase of the invasion was accomplished without

loss of a single Allied soldier. Mindoro was slightly defended by the
Japanese. The Sixth Army operations in the objective areas consisted
mainly of patrolling and light skirmishes. Japanese main efforts to
interfere were limited by air and naval forces. Ground operations in
furtherance of this plan were undertaken by the Eight Army which took
over control of the Mindoro operations from the Sixth Army on New
Year’s Day 1945. In all the offensive actions undertaken by the Allies,
substantial assistance was rendered by the organized guerilla forces in
the Philippines. Concurrent with the ground operations, steps were taken
to mislead the Lingayen invasion plan. Transport planes made dummy

247
drops over the Batangas-Tayabas area to simulate an airborne invasion.
24
Mindoro was indeed “a tough little operation from start to finish”

Assault on Luzon

The battle for Luzon was at hand and General MacArthur’s

campaign in the Southwest Pacific Area neared its climax. The Luzon
landing operation was announced in a communiqué of January 10:

“Our forces have landed in Luzon. In a far flung amphibious

penetration, our troops have seized four beachheads in Lingayen
Gulf… The decisive battle for the liberation of the Philippines and
25
the control of the Southwest Pacific is at hand…”

Shortly after the final bombardment of the landing beaches, the

divisions started to fan out. The I Corps proceeded towards the Central
Plains, and the XXIV Corps pushed south for its objective at Clark Field.
Hostile resistance was most stiff in the Bamban-Clark Air Base – Fort
Stotsenburg area. In a matter of three weeks, the Allied forces started
the drive to Manila.

The drive toward Manila by the XXIV Corps started on February

after scouring the Pampanga River and the Malolos-Cabanatuan City
line which was supported by the II Corps. The divisions completed their
operations in their respective zones without much opposition. By
st
midnight of February 5, the 1 Cavalry had taken Santo Tomas
University, liberating 3, 521 Allied internees with the assistance of
Filipino guerillas and stood on the north bank of the Pasig near
26
Malacanang. The capture of the old Bilibid prisons, meanwhile was
completed, resulting in the freeing of about 1,024 prisoners of war. On
orders of General MacArthur, Manila was not subjected to aerial attacks
by the Allies to spare the historic buildings and churches in the city. But,
unfortunately, the Japanese forces destroyed almost all vestiges of
history in their retreat.

Meanwhile, the Battle of the Clouds, the hardest fought enemy in

the Bessang Pass area. Bessang Pass which is located in Suyo, Ilocos
Sur was the backdoor to the Northern Luzon stronghold of the Japanese
forces. The overall strategy of the reoccupation required the capture of
Bessang Pass by June 15, 1945. The latter part of May showed the
enemy falling back. Suicidal attempts to hold this line seemed futile.

248
 By June 13, the Japanese position was untenable from
st th th
continuous artillery and mortar barrages. The 121 , 15 and 66 Infantry
nd
Regiments, supported by the 122 Field Artillery Battalion (US) and the
th
5 US-Air Force, closed in on the Pass from different directions. Taking
advantage of the situation, then Lt. Col. Eulogio Balao, commanding the
st
121 Infantry launched an all night offensive. The next day, June 14, a
GI towel was raised as a signal flag for victory. However, Northern Luzon
was completely mopped-up on August 8, 1945, the day Hiroshima was
bombed. Not long after, Japan signed the terms of surrender on board
battleship “Missouri” at Tokyo Bay, on the second day of September,
which formally marked the end of the Second World War.

Leyte Landing, October 1944

Civilians cross Pasig River on an Pontoon Bridge, Manila, 1945

249
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Books

Abaya, Hernando V. Betrayal in the Philippines, New York:

American Stratford Press Incorporated, 1946

Abraham, Msgt. Abie. Ghost of Bataan Speaks. New York:

Vantage Press Incorporated, 1971.

Agoncillo, Teodoro A. The Revolt of the Masses. Quezon

City:University of the Philippines Press, 1973.

Agoncillo, Teodoro A. and Guerrero, Milagros C. History of

the Filipino People Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing:
th
Alvior, Maj. Froilan B. A Brief History of the 11 Division,
Philippine Army. Quezon City: Cintoner Printing Press,
1973

AGFO Register Committee (ed). General and Flag Officers of the

Philippines. Quezon City: Bustamante Press 1977.

Ancheta, Celedonio A. (ed). Triumph in the Philippines: 1941-

1946. Manila: National Book Store, 1977.

Baclagon, Col. Uldarico S. (Ret). Military History of the

Philippines. Manila: St Mary’s Publishing, 1975.

Blount, James H. The American Occupation of the

Philippines1898-1912. New York: Knickerbucker Press, 1913.
st
Catalan Lt. Col. Primitivo M. A Brief History of the 71
Division, Philippine Army. Quezon City: Cintoner Printing
Press, 1973
st
__________. A Brief History of the 81 Division,
Philippine Army. Quezon City: Cintoner Printing Press, 1973.
st
__________. A Brief History of the 101 Division,
Philippine Army. Quezon City: Cintoner Printing Press 1977.

Cannon, Hamlin M. Leyte: The Return to the Philippines.

250
 Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1945.
st
Cariño, Maj. Arnulfo B. A Brief History of the 21 Division,
Philippine Army. Zita Publishing Corporation, 1977.

Considine, Robert. General Wainwright’s Story. New York:

Doubleday and Company, 1945.

Constantino, Renato. The Philippines: A Past Revisited.

Quezon City: Tala Publishing Service, 1975.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. At Ease: Stories I Liked To Tell.

New York: Doubleday and Company, 1976.

Falk, Stanley L. Bataan, the March of Death. New York:

Modern Literary Editions Publishing Company, 1962.

General Staff. Reports of MacArthur (The Campaigns of

MacArthur in the Pacific). Washington: US Government
Printing Office, 1944.

Hayden, Joseph R. The Philippines: A Study in National

Development. New York: McMillan Company, 1947.

Ind, Allison. Bataan, the Judgement Seat. New York: Mc-

Millan Incorporated, 1944.

Clayton, James D, (ed). South to Bataan, North to Mukden.

Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1971.

MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences. New York: MacGraw

Hill Book Company, 1964.

_________. Duty, Honor, Country. USA: Time

Incorporated, 1965

_________. Japanese Operations in the Southwest

Pacific Area. (Vol.II, Part I) Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1946.

Manikan, Col. Gamaliel L. (Ret). Guerilla Warfare on Panay

Island in the Philippines. Quezon City: Bustamante
Press,1977.

251
Miller, Francis T. General Douglas MacArthur, Philadelphia;
John C. Winston Company, 1945.

Morganstorm, George, Pearl Harbor, the Story of the Secret

War, New York: The Devin –Air Company, 1947

Morrisons, Samuel E. The Liberation of the Philippines:

Luzon, Mindanao and Visayas. Boston: Little Brown
and Company, 1963.

Morton, Louis. The Fall of the Philippines. Washington, D.C:

US Government Printing Office, 1962.

________. Strategy and Command: The First Two

Years. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1962

PAF Historical Committee. Guardian of the Philippine Skies.

Manila: Vilfran Press, 1969.

Pomeroy, William J. Guerilla and Counter-Guerilla Warfare.

New York: International Publishers, 1964.

Quezon, Manuel L. The Good Fight. New York: Appleton

Century Company, 1946.

Steinberg, David J. Philippine Collaboration in World War II.

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967

Taylor, John R. The Philippine Insurrection Against the

United States. (Vol. I) Pasay City: Eugenio Lopez Found-
ation, 1977.

Willoughby, Maj. Gen Charles A. (Ret). The Guerilla Resist-

ance Movement in the Philippines. New York: Vantage
Press Incorporated, 1972.

Yap-Diangco, Maj. Robert T. The Filipino Guerilla Tradition.

Manila: MCS Enterprises Incorporated, 1971.

__________Philippine History. Manila: The Modern

Book Company , 1965

252
 B. Legal and Legislative References

Constitution of the Philippines (1935)

Commonwealth Act No. 1, (December 21, 1935)
Commonwealth Act No. 56, (January 18, 1935)
Commonwealth Act No. 430, (June 23, 1936)
Commonwealth Act No. 343, (May 3, 1939)
Executive Order No, 26, Office of the President dtd May 4, 1936

C. Government Publications

Field Orders No. 1, Headquarters, Visayas-Mindanao Force,

dtd Jan. 14, 1942
General Orders No. 1, United States Army Forces in the Far
East, Jul. 27, 1941
General Orders No. 6, Manila dtd Jun. 22, 38
General Orders No. 499, GHQ, AFP dtd June 4, 1958
General Orders No. 641, GHQ, AFP dtd December 4, 1946
GHQ, SWPA, Estimate of the Situation and Rough Draft
RENO PLAN, Feb.25,43
________. Basic Outline for MUSKETEER II, Aug. 29,44
________. RENO IV, Mar. 6, 44
________. Communique No. 975, Dec. 8, 44
________. Communique No. 1088, Jan. 10, 45
Interrogation Files, G-2, Historical Section, GHQ
Jalandoni, Maj. Gen Rafael L. Annual Report to the PA Chief
of Staff to the Secretary of National Defense October 20,
1944 to December 31, 1946.
Quezon City: Camp Murphy, 1946
CINCSWPA Radio No. 17747 to JCS, CINCPAO, Sept. 14, 44
Radiogram, Marshall to MacArthur, Nov. 27, 41 WPD 4544-3.
After Battle Report, USAFIP NL. La Union: Camp Spencer,
1945.
Military History Branch, AFP. The Japanese Plan of Maneuver in
the Final Battle of Bataan. Quezon City: General Headquarters

D. Periodicals

Espiritu, Nieves. “The First Filipino Guerilla Regiment in

World War II,” The Philippine Armed Forces Journal,
IX (Aug 10, 56), 36

253
Homma, Masaharu. “Giant Pincers,” Armed Forces Journal, I
(Dec 1947), II

Tan, Brig. Gen. Leoncio S. (Ret) “Commonwealth Era:

Preparations for War,” Army Journal, (June 1974), 13, 25, 36.

E. Unpublished Works

Defense Preparations (AHD Studies)

Philippine Liberation Campaign (A Handout)
Ramos, Col. Fidel V. “The National Defense Act. A
Reexamination”. (Unpublished thesis). Fort Andres Bonifacio:
National Defense College of the Philippines, 1969
Combat History Division. Triumph in the Philippines, I
Manila: AFWESPAC, 1946.
Batemen, 1Lt. J. C. Philippine Campaign, 1941-42 Head
quarters, AFWESPAC: Combat History Division.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABDA - American, British, Dutch and Australian

AIB - Allied Intelligence Bureau
Bde - Brigade
Bn - Battalion
Brig. Gen - Brigadier General
CA - Commonwealth Act
Capt. - Captain
Co. - Company
CO - Commanding Officer
CG - Commanding General
CP - Command Post
Cpl - Corporal
Col - Colonel
CPP - Communist Party of the Philippines
Daihon-I - Japanese Imperial Headquarters
Div - Division
FA - Field Artillery
FAIT - Filipino-American Irregular Troops
FEAF - Far East Air Force
Gen. - General
GHQ - General Headquarters
Hq - Headquarters
HUKBALAHAP - Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon
Inf - Infantry
Lt. Col. - Lieutenant Colonel
2Lt. - Second Lieutenant

254
1Lt. - First Lieutenant
Lt. Gen. - Lieutenant General
LGAF - Luzon Guerilla Army Forces
Ma-I - Mindoro
MD - Military District
MSgt - Master Sergeant
Maj - Major
Maj Gen - Major General
MLR - Main Line of Resistance
MP - Military Police
NLF - North Luzon Force
OPLR - Out Post Line of Resistance
PA - Philippine Army
PAAC - Philippine Army Air Cops
PAAF - Philippine Army Air Force
PC - Philippine Constabulary
PMA - Philippine Military Academy
PN - Philippine Navy
Pfc - Private First Class
POA - Pacific Ocean Area
PQOG - President Quezon’s Own Guerilla
PRS - Philippine Regional Section
PS - Philippine Scout
Pvt - Private
ROTC - Reserve Officer Training Corps
ROTS - Reserve Officer Training School
ROSS - Reserve Officer Service School
RCT - Regimental Combat Team
SASCOM - Sixth Army Service Command
SLF - South Luzon Force
Sgt - Sergeant
SSgt - Staff Sergeant
SWPA - South West Pacific Area
SHO-ICHI-GO - Victory Operations No. 1
TSgt - Technical Sergeant
US - United States
USAFFE - United States Army Forces in the Far East
USAFIP -United States Army Forces in the Philippines
USAFIP, NL - United States Army Forces in the Philippines,
North Luzon
VMF - Visayan-Mindanao Force
WPO 3 - War Plan Orange 3

255
 AGUINALDO’S MANIFESTO OF OCTOBER 31, 1896

The Philippines is now a witness to be speculate unparalleled in

her history, a movement for the conquest of her liberty and her
independence, the noblest the highest of all her rights; here, too, the
inspiration of a heroism that shall place her on a plane of equality
with civilized nations. We know that the progress of a nation has a
liberty and independence for its firm foundation; thus must the citizen
treasure this as the noblest and most sublime sentiments before
which should fade the fear for the safety of our interests and our
families, and for which we should not hesitate to shed blood that we
may break the chain of slavery borne by us during three centuries of
tyranny and abuses. This truth, that revolution is inspired by justice
and right, is exemplified in the history of all civilized nations, for none
of them would tolerate the least aggression against its territory
without being ready to sacrifice its last drop of blood in defense of its
national integrity.

Filipino citizens! We are not a savage people, let us follow the

example of civilized European and American nations; now is the
occasion for shedding our blood for the last time, that we may
achieve our beloved freedom.

The Spaniards, conquerors of this beloved land, accuse us of

ingratitude and claim that, after they have civilized us, we now
express our gratitude to them by impairing their authority; this is false
and misleading argument. For the civilization brought to this island
by Spain during the lapse of three centuries, is superficial and
fundamentally vicious, for she has tried to keep the masses in dense
ignorance, to extinguish the fire that burn in the hearts of a group of
Filipinos who, for no reason other than that they were educated, are
the victims of persecution by the government. As a result, many
have been deported and other tyrannies have been practiced.
Moreover, in compensation for the great benefits we have received
during three centuries, has not Spain been rewarded by our very
blood and sweat - Spain which, not satisfied with shamelessly
exploiting us, calls us carabaos, drones, monkeys, and other vile
epithets?

Filipinos! . . . The time has come for us to shed blood in order to

win our right to freedom. Let us march under the flag of the
Revolution whose watch words are Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.

256
 A Central Revolutionary Committee, composed of six members,
with their president, will have charge of carrying on the war, and will
organize an Army of 30,000 men, with guns and cannons for the
defense of the towns and provinces under the Revolutionary
Government which shall proportionately establish order as the
revolution gains headway throughout the Islands. The form of
government shall be similar to that of United States in spirit, deriving
its powers from the principles of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. Any
town that joined the revolution will be defended and protected by the
revolutionary Army against the attack of the enemy.

Each town shall elect by popular suffrage a Municipal Committee

composed of a President, a Vice-President, a Secretary, a Judge
and two Town Members who shall administer the affairs of the
government and dispense with justice; and these committees shall
be entirely independent of the Central Committee, but they shall be
under compulsion of supplying men, foodstuffs and war tax for the
sustenance of the Army. Each Municipal Committee, as soon as
organized, shall appoint Captain who shall in turn organize the
citizen’s guards to which all qualified citizens shall be compelled to
join. This corps, in conjunction with detachment which Commanding
General will designate, shall constitute the defense of the town.

In the name of the Revolutionary Committee, I have the honor to

ask you to propagate this decree in the manner you deem
convenient as a contribution we ask of you for the liberty of our
beloved country. Magdalo (Kawit), October 31, 1896.

(Signed) EMILIO AGUINALDO

Magdalo

257
 CONSTITUTION OF BIAK-NA-BATO

In Biak-na- Bato on the first day of the month of November of the year
one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven, the Representatives of the
people of the Philippine Islands assembled for the purpose of modifying the
Constitution of this Republic of the Philippines, drawn up and proclaimed in
the town of Naic, province of Cavite, on the twenty-second of March of this
year, in accordance with the provisions of Decree No. 29 of current year
after a long discussion, have unanimously agreed upon the following:

Constitution or the Fundamental Law of

the Republic of the Philippines

The separation of the Philippines from the Spanish monarchy and their
formation into an independent state with its own government called the
Philippine Republic has been the end sought by the Revolution in the
th
existing war, begun on the 24 of August, 1896; and therefore, in its name
and by the power delegated by the Filipino people interpreting faithfully their
desires and ambitions, we, the representatives of the Revolution, in a
meeting at Biak-na-Bato, Nov. 1, 1897 unanimously adopt the following
articles for the Constitution of the State:

ARTICLE I. The Supreme government of the Republic shall be vested in

a Supreme Council, composed of a President, a Vice-President, and four
Secretaries, for the conduct of our Foreign Relations of War, of the Interior
and the Treasury.

ARTICLE II. The powers of the Supreme Council of the government

shall be:
st
1 . To adopt measures for maintaining and developing its existence,
issuing such orders as it believes adequate for the preservation and security
of the civil and political life of the nation.
nd
2 . To impose and collect taxes, to issue foreign and domestic loans,
when necessary, and to issue paper money, to coin money and to
appropriate the funds collected to the purposes required by the several
branches of the States.
rd
3 . To authorize privateering and issue letters of marque and reprisal, to
raise and organize troops and to maintain them, to ratify treaties, and to
make a treaty of peace with Spain, with the ratification of the Assembly of
Representatives.
th
4 . To try as judicial body, should they link necessary, the President or
any of the members of the Council, who should be accused of crimes,
cognizance of which appertains to the Judicial Power.

258
 th
5 . To have the right of supervision and supreme direction of military
operations, when they believe it to be necessary for the consummation of
high political ends. To approve, reform or modify the regulations and orders
for the Army; prepared by the Captain-General of the Army; to confer grades
and promotions, from that of the first lieutenant and to confer honors and
rewards granted for services in war, at the recommendations of the said
Captain-General of the Army.
th
6 . To select and nominate a Captain-General and a Lieutenant
General.
th
7 . To convene the Assembly of Representatives when necessary, in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

ARTICLE III. The Vice-President shall fill ad interim the office of

President in case of vacancy.

ARTICLE IV. For each Secretary, there shall be a Sub-Secretary, who

shall aid in the dispatch of business and shall, in case a vacancy occurs, fill
ad interim the place of such Secretary. He shall have, while so acting, a vote
in the Council of Government.

ARTICLE V. The President, Vice-President, Secretary and Sub-

Secretary can hold no other office in the Republic.

ARTICLE VI. The President, Vice-President, Secretary and Sub-

Secretary shall be more than twenty-three years of age.

ARTICLE VII. The basis of every election and appointment to any office
in the Republic shall be aptitude for discharge of the office conferred.

ARTICLE IX. The decisions of the Council of Government shall be

determined by a majority vote, and all the members of the same shall take
part in its deliberations.

ARTICLE X. The executive power shall be vested in the President, or

his absence, the Vice-President, and shall have these powers: To approve
and promulgate the acts of the Supreme Council of the Government; to
strive for the execution within the period of nine days; to issue decrees, rules
or instructions for their execution, to receive ambassadors and to execute
treaties.

ARTICLE XI. In case of definite vacancies in the office of the President,

Vice-President and the Secretaries, by death, resignation or other legal
causes, the Assembly of Representatives shall meet for the election of other
to fill the vacant offices.

259
 ARTICLE XII. Each Secretary shall have a vote in the passage of all
resolutions and measures of whatever kind, shall be able to take part in the
deliberations thereon.

ARTICLE XIII. The Secretaries shall have the right to choose and
nominate their own assistants and other officials of their respective
departments.

ARTICLE XIV. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall have charge of: All
correspondence with foreign nations regarding treaties agreements of all
kinds: appointment of Representatives to said nations: issuing instructions
and authorizing the expenses of said officials as by act of the Council of
Government who reside in foreign parts, and preparations of passport for
foreign lands.

ARTICLE XV. The Secretary of the Interior shall be charge with:

Collection of all statistics concerning the Republic, opening of roads and
bridges; advancement of agriculture, industry, commerce, art, professions
and manufactures, public instruction and posts, depots of cattle and horses
for the use of the revolution; establishments of the police for the protection or
security of public order, and for the preservation of the liberties and
individual rights, established by this Constitution, and the custody of the
property of the State.

ARTICLE XVI. The Secretary of War is in charge of all military

correspondence; of the increase and decrease, of the organization and
instruction of the Army; as head of the staff, is in charge of enlistment and of
providing clothing, hospitals, rations and ordinance.

ARTICLE XVII. The Secretary of the Treasury shall have under his
charge all receipts and payments of the Treasury, making collections and
payments in accordance with the regulations and decrees issued by the
Council of Government; coining money and issuance of paper money; the
public debt, administration of the property of the State, and the further duties
pertaining to the Treasury Department.

ARTICLE XVIII. The Secretaries shall have charge of the drafting of all
laws, correspondence, regulations and decrees appertaining to their
respective officers.

ARTICLE XIX. The Captain-General of the Army shall have command of

all the armed troops in the towns, forts and detachments; the direction of the
operations of war, except in the case of reserved for the Council of
Government, as set forth in Article 2, No.5 and shall give such orders as he
deemed necessary for the discipline and safety of the troops.

ARTICLE XX. The Lieutenant-General shall serve as Captain-General

of the Army, ad interim, in case of vacancy.

260
 ARTICLE XXI. Each province of the Philippines may have a
representative delegate elected by universal suffrage, who shall represent it
in Assembly.

ARTICLE XXII. Religious liberty, the right of association, the freedom of

education, the freedom of the press, as well as freedom in the exercise of all
classes of professions, arts, trades and industries are established.

ARTICLE XXIII. Every Filipino shall have the right to direct petitions or
present remonstrances of any import whatsoever, in person through his
representative to the council of Government of the Republic.

ARTICLE XXIV. No person, whatever may be his nationality, shall be

imprisoned or held except by virtue of an order issued by a competent court,
provided that this shall not apply to crimes which concern the Revolution, the
government of the Army.
ARTICLE XXV. Neither can any individual be deprived of his property
or his domicile, except by virtue of judgment passed by a court of competent
authority.

ARTICLE XXVI. Every Filipino is obliged to serve the Revolution with

his services and property to the extent of his capacity.

ARTICLE XXVII. The debts and other obligations contracted prior to the
promulgation of this Constitution by the Generals and other Chiefs of the
Revolutionary Army, as well as their notes and orders, are hereby
recognized and ratified today, also all subsequent debts, certified by the
government.

ARTICLE XXVIII. The officials of the Council of Government are entitled

to the considerations and respect due their rank, and if they be constant in
them, they shall be entitled to pensions according to regulations to be
published on the subject.

ARTICLE XXIX. The Council of Government has the power to remove

any official from office if there be sufficient reason for it. Formal charges will
be laid for the action of a court to be called the “Sworn Tribunal.”

ARTICLE XXX. The Supreme Council of Grace and Justice to be

established by the Supreme Council of Governments, shall have authority to
make decisions and affirm or disapprove the sentences rendered by other
courts, and to dictate rules for the administration of justice.

ARTICLE XXXI. The Supreme Council of Grace and Justice shall be

independent in its functions and shall not be interfered with by any power or
authority.

261
 ARTICLE XXXII. Every official of the Republic shall render assistance
to the others in the discharge of his duties.

ARTICLE XXXIII. When the necessary Army is organized, a navy shall

be created for the protection of the coasts of the Philippine Archipelago and
its seas; then a Secretary of the Navy shall be appointed and the duties of
his office shall be added to this Constitution.

ARTICLE XXXIV. This Constitution shall be in force here in the

Philippines for the period of two years from the date of its promulgation, in
case that the Republic shall not have terminated within that time. Upon the
expiration of that period, a session of the Assembly of Representatives shall
be called for a new constitution and the election of a new Council of
Government and Representatives of the people.

As it has been thus decreed by the Representatives of the Filipino

people, and in the name of the Republic ordered by the Assembly thus
constituted. We, the undersigned, pledge with our word and honor fulfillment
of what is set forth in this Constitution at Biak-na-Bato, November 15, 1897.

President, Emilio Aguinaldo, Severino de las Alas. Pascual Alvarez.

Mariano Llanera. Mamerto Natividad. Isabelo Artacho. Vicente Lukban y
Riles. Melencio Carlos. Simeon Tecson. Mariano Noriel. Baldomero
Aguinaldo. Salvador Estrella. Pantaleon Garcia. Escolastico Viola. Julian de
la Cruz. Ciriaco Sartore. Jose Ignacio Paua. Agustin de la Rosa. Celestino
Aragon. Gregorio H del Pilar. Andres Presbitero. Benito Natividad. Pedro
Dungon. Eduardo Llanera. Herminio Miguel. Deodato Manahan. Pedro
Gualdes. (?) Ambrocio de la Cruz. Matias San Bño. Miguel Catahan.
Clemente Valencia. Modesto Porciuncula. Claro Fuelo. (?) Emiliano Tecson.
Benvenuto Ramirez. Francisco M Soliman. Maximo Cabigting. Ramon
Tombo. Artermio Ricarte “Vibora”. Sinfroso de la Cruz. Agapito Bonson.
Valentin Diaz. Tomas Aquino Linares. (?) Cipriano Pacheco. Manuel Tinio.
Anastacio Francisco. Servillano Aquino, Wenceslao Viniegra, Doroteo
Lopez. Vito Belarmino, Secretary. Antonio Montenegro, Secretary. Teodoro
Gonzalez, Secretary.

262
ENDNOTES

Chapter 1
1. Teodoro A. Agoncillo, Milagros C. Guerrero, History of the
Filipino People (Quezon City: R. P. Garcia Publishing Company,
1973), pp. 45-46.
2. Ibid p.24

Chapter 2

1. Agoncillo and Guerrero, History of the Filipino People…p. 169

2. Gregorio F. Zaide, History of the Katipunan (Manila: Loyal Press,
1939), p. 4
3. Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Revolt of the Masses (Quezon City:
University of the Philippine Press, 1956), p. 122
4. John R. M Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United
States, I (Pasay City: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971), p. 62
5. Ibid. p.63
6. Agoncillo, The Revolt of the Masses…p. 155.
7. Ibid. p. 156.
8. Taylor, The Philippines Insurrection…p. 288.
9. Zaide, The Philippines Revolution…pp.45-46.

Chapter 3

1. Agoncillo and Guerrero, History of the Filipino People…p.210

2. Ibid., p. 216.
3. Ibid., p. 218.
4. Agoncillo and Guerrero, History of the Filipino People…p. 221.
5. James H. Blount, American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898 –
1912 (New York and London: The Knickerbocker Press, 1913, p.
193.
6. Ibid., pp. 186-187.
7. Ibid., p.224.
8. Ibid.,

Chapter 4

1. Agoncillo and Guerrero, Historyn of the Filipino People, pp.282-

283.
2. Renato Constantino, The Philippines: The Past Revisited
(Quezon City: Tala Publishing Service, 1975), pp. 209-210.

263
3. Agoncillo and Guerrero, History of the Filipino, pp. 340-341.
4. Ibid., p. 280.
5. Lt. Col Froilan B. Alvior, ed. General and Flag Officers of the
Philippines (Quezon City: Bustamante Press, 1977), p. 5.

Chapter 5

1. Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

(Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department
of the Army, 1962), p.2.
2. Ibid., p.5.
3. Ibid., p.22.
4. Ibid., p.24.
5. Col. Fidel V. Ramos, The National Defense Act a Reexamination
(Unpublished Thesis) (Fort Bonifacio: National Defense College
of the Philippines, 1969), p.12.

Chapter 6

1. Constitution of the Philippines, Article II, Section 2 (1935)

2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Like to Tell (New York
Doubleday and Co., 1967), p. 219.
3. Ibid., p. 220.
4. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1964)., p. 104.
5. Constitution of the Philippines, Article II, Section 3 (1935)
6. Maj. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Report on the National Defense in
the Philippines (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1936) p. 26
7. Ibid.,
8. Ibid., pp.11-13.
9. Ibid., p. 20-21.
10. MacArthur, Reminiscences…p. 103.
11. Commonwealth Act. No. 1, Section 23, Paragraphs A and B
(December 21, 1935).
12. General Orders No. 56, Headquarters, Army of the Philippines
dated January 18, 1936.
13. Executive Order No. 26, Office of the President (May 4, 1936).
14. Commonwealth Act No. 343 dated June 23, 1938 as
implemented by Executive Order No. 153.
15. Commonwealth Act No. 430 dated May 3, 1939.
16. General Orders No. 6, Malacanang Palace, Manila dated June
22, 1938.
17. 1935 Constitution, Art VII, Section 10, para.2.

264
18. Colonel Gamaliel L. Manikan (Ret), Guerilla Warfare on Panay
Islands in the Philippines Quezon City: Bustamante Press, Inc.,
1977), p.4.
19. AHD, History of the Philippine Army (Unpublished), p. 22.

Chapter 7

1. MacArthur, Reminiscences…, pp. 103-104.

th
2. Major Froilan B. Alvior, A Brief History of the 11 Division,
Philippine Army (Quezon City: Cintoner Press, 1973), p.17.
3. Brig. Gen. Leoncio S tan (Ret), “Commonwealth Era: Preparation
for War,” Army Journal (June 1974), p. 13.
4. Ibid, p. 36.
5. Joseph R. Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in National
Development (New York: MacMillan Co., 1947), p.738.
6. General Orders No. 1, United States Army Forces in the Far
Eadt, July 27, 1941.
7. Tan, “Commonwesalth Era…, p. 36.
8. Masaharu Homma,”Giant Pincers,” Armed Forces Journal I
(December 1947), p.11.
9. Ibid., p.109.
10. MacArthur, Reminescences. P. 109.
11. Robert Considine, General Wainwright’s Story (New York:
Doubleday and Company, 1945), p.8
12. Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in
the Pacific Prepared by his General Staff (Washington: US
Government Printing Office 1966), p.2.
13. David J. Stienberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II
(Stanford University Press, 1962), p.22.
14. Ibid.
15. Francis T. Miller, General Douglas MacArthur (Philadelphia:
John C. Winston Company, 1945), p200.
16. Radiogram, Marshall to MacArthur, 27 Nov.41, WPD 4544-3.
17. Manuel L. Quezon, The Good Fight (New York. Appleton -
Century Company, 1946), p. 185.

Chapter 8

1. After Battle Report, USAFIP, NL. (La Union: Camp Spencer,

1945), pp. 156-158
2. George Moprganstom, Pearl Harbor, The Story of the Secret
War (New York: The Devin-Air Company, 1947), p.vii.
th
3. Alvior, A Brief History of the 11 Division…p.18.

265
4. Combat History Division, “Into Darkness,” Triumph in the
Philippines, I (Manila: AFPWESPAC, 1946), p.46.
5. Alison Ind, Bataan, the Judgement Seat (New York: Mc Millan
Company, Inc., 1944), p.85.
6. Ibid., p.99.
7. PAF Historical Committee, Guardian of Philippine Skies (Manila:
Vilfran Press, 1969), p. 17.
8. Ibid., p.18.
st
9. Lt. Col. Primitivo M. Catalan, A Brief History of the 71 Division,
PA (Quezon City: Cintoner Printing Press,1973), p. 57.
10. Robert Considine, General Wainwright’s Story (New York:
Doubleday and Co., 1946), p.30.
11. Morton, The Fall of the Philippines…p.168.
12. Ibid.,p.171.
13. Ibid., p.184.
14. D. Clayton James, ed., South to Bataan, North to Mukden
(Georgegia: University of the Georgia Press 1971), pp.1-51.
st
15. Maj. Ranulfo B. Carino, A Brief History of the 21 Division,
Philippine Army. (Quezon City: Zita Publishing Corporation,
1977), p. 99.
16. Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, p.230.

Chapter 9
st
1. 1 Lt. J.C Batemen, Philippine Campaign, 1941-42
(Headquarters, AFWESPAC: Combat History Division, G1),
P.19.
2. Morton, The Fall of the Philippines…p.240.
3. Celedonio A. Ancheta, ed., Triumph in the Philippines: 1941-
1946, (Manila: National Book Store, 1977), p.38.
4. Hernando J. Abaya, Betrayal in the Philippines (New York:
American Book-Stratford Press, Inc. 1946) pp.25-26.
5. General Douglas MacArhur, Japanese Operations in the
Southwest Pacific Area, Vol.II, Part I (Washington, D.C: US
Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 108. This figure covered
the period from January 9 to February 8, 1942 only.
6. Ibid., pp. 111-112.
7. Military History Branch, AFP, The Japanese Plan of Manuever in
the Final Battle of Bataan (Quezon City: General Headquarters),
p. 9.
8. MacArthur, Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific
Area…p.112.

266
9. MacArthur, Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area,
p.119.
10. Master Sergeant Abie Abraham, Ghost of Bataan Speaks (New
York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1971), p.35.
11. Manuel E. Buenafe, ed., The Voice of the Veteran (Manila:
Philippine Educational Foundation, 1971), pp.3-4.
12. MacArthur, Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific
Area…p. 127.
13. James, South to Bataan, North to Mukden… pp.1-51.
14. Maj. Gen Rafael Jalandoni, Annual Report to the PA Chief of
Staff to the Secretary of National Defense, October 20, 1944 to
December 31, 1945. (Quezon City: Camp Murphy, 1946), p. 15.
15. Stanley L. Falk, Bataan: The March of Death (New York: Modern
Literary Editions Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 51-55.
16. Abraham, Ghost of Bataan Speaks…p. 60.
17. Abrahan, Ghost of Bataan Spekas…pp. 60-61.

Chapter 10
st
1. Lt. Col. Primitivo M. Catalan, A Brief History of the 81 Division,
Philippine Army (Quezon City: Cintoner Printing Press, 1973), p.
44.
2. Ibid., p. 90.
3. Field Order No. 1, Headquarters. Visayas-Mindanao Force,
dated January 14, 1942.
st
4. Catalan, A Brief History of the 81 Division…p.52.
5. Col. Uldarico S. Baclagon (Ret), Military History of the
Philippines (Manila: St. Mary’s Publishing House, 1976), p. 166.
6. Manikan, Guerilla Warfare on Panay Island…p.36.
7. Baclagon, Military History of the Philippines…p.168.
8. Celedonio A. Ancheta. Ed., Truimph in the Philippines, 1941-46
(Metro Manila: Navotas Press, 1977, p. 111.
st
9. Lt. Col. Primitivo M. Ctalan, A Brief History of the 101 Division,
Philippine Army (Quezon City: Cintoner Printing Press, 1977),
pp. 60-61.
10. Ancheta, Triumph in the Philippines…p. 112.

Chapter 11

1. Gregorio F. Zaide, Philippine History (Manila: The Modern

Company, 1965), p. 58.
2. Ibid, p. 100.
3. Ibid., p. 108.

267
4. Col Gamaliel L. Manikan (Ret), Guerilla Warfare on Panay Island
in the Philippines (Quezon City: Bustamante Press, Inc., 1977),
p.31.
5. Ibid.
6. Nieves Espiritu “The First Filipino Guerilla Regiment in World
War II. “Philippines Armed Forces Journal IX, August 10, 1956,
p.36.
7. Manikan, Guerilla Warfare on Panay Island…p. 40.
8. General Orders Number 499, GHQ, AFP dated June 4, 1958;
General Orders No. 641, GHQ, AFP, dated December 4, 1946;
and true copy of citation signed by President Quezon.

Chapter 12

1. M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 2
2. Ibid.
3. GHQ, SWPA, Estimate of the Sitaution and Rough Draft, Reno
Plan Feb. 25, 43
4. GHQ, SWPA, RENO IV, Mar. 6, 44.
5. GHQ, SWPA, Basic Outline for MUSKETEER II Aug. 29, 44.
6. CINSWPA Radio No-17744 to JCS, CINCPOA, 14 Sept. 44
7. DDouglas MacArhur, Duty, Honor, Country (USA: Time
Incorporated, 1965), p. 89.
8. MacArhur, Reminiscences…p. 216.
9. Reports of General MacArhur (Washington, D.C US Government
Printing Office, 1970), p.312.
10. Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines..p. 85.
11. Interregotaion Files, G-2, Historical Section and GHQ.
12. Reports of General MacArthur…p. 203.
13. Ibid.
14. Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, p. 26.
15. Baclagon, Military History of the Philippines, p. 175.
16. William J. Pomeroy, Guerilla and Counter-Guerilla Warfare (New
York: International Publishers, 1946), p. 33.
17. Baclagon, Military History of the Philippines…p. 295.
18. Maj. Robert T. Yap-Diangco, The Filipino Guerilla Tradition
(Manila: MCS Enterprises, Inc.., p. 80.
19. Maj. Gen Charles A Willoughby (Ret), The Guerilla Resistance
Movement in the Philippines (New York: Vantage, Inc., 1972 p.
70.
20. Data taken from a handout on the “Philippine Liberation
Campaign”

268
21. Reports of General MacArthur, p. 225,
22. GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 975, Dec. 8, 44.
23. Interrogation Files, G-2, Historical Section, and GHQ.
24. Samuel E. Morrison, (The Liberation of the Philippines; Luzon,
Mindanao and the Visayas (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1963), p. 51.
25. GHQ, SW, Communique No. 1088, 10 Jan 45.
26. Data taken from a handout on “Philippine Liberation Campaign”

269