Democracy does not need a populace of philosopher-kings

PLAP 2270, Section 109 at 2PM

April 25th, 2014

PLAP 2270:

Central to the study of public opinion and political behavior is the question of democratic

citizens’ competence to develop and apply their rational views on a receptive government.

Popular perception expects the ideal citizen to behave as if an objective philosopher-king

towards issues of public policy, able to influence policy from the grass-roots. However, study of
public opinion development through Professor Winter’s course has illustrated the falsehood of

the individual’s opinions existing in a vacuum, being instead an aggregation from external

stimuli. At first glance, the lack of agency and general uninformed nature possessed by the

individual citizen appears damning to the question of democratic competency. However,

democracy is only incompatible with our misperception that our culture is one of rugged

individualism. Rather, limitations of individuals’ knowledge are mitigated by signals and

influences from more informed sources with shared affinities to the low-information voter.

Democratic competency does not require the individual possess a philosopher-king’s rationality

and agency, but rather a reciprocal relationship of influence between the individual and opinion-

forming groups who possess greater leverage on public policy.

A mutual exchange of influence and agency between the governed and governing is

crucial for any democratic society to claim themselves as such. Zaller’s RAS model and the

general recognition of elites’ weight in shaping public opinion challenges our ideals of grass-

roots democracy, yet does not argue for a completely one sided relationship. There is no

guarantee that the received considerations will be accepted – fears such as Albert Speer’s claim

of Hitler ‘depriving people of their independent thought’ were invalidated. On the contrary,

media has frequently allowed the dispossessed a means of challenging the state monopoly on

communications: cassette tapes during the 1978-79 Iranian revolution to twitter or Facebook

today.

Rather, those broadcasting the receiving considerations must consider contemporary

public opinions and craft a successful narrative or their ‘product’ will not have any buyers. As

Andrea Louise Campbell notes, political elites are obligated to ‘have an ear to the ground to

discern what issues will play well with the public’. Yet more harmful to the relationship
enshrined in RAS is the growth of the internet and 24/7 news channels: they have increased the

capacity for an individual to isolate what considerations they receive based on ideology.

Subsequently, the obligations imposed upon broadcasters of those considerations are

increasingly ideological purity rather than factuality or detail. This danger is mitigated by the

fact that broadcasting elites are not omnipotent. Campbell, Layman and Green note the profound

example of American Catholics and their support for abortion rights (with similar views towards

gay marriage) despite the narrative broadcast from the Vatican. Conversely, the Democratic

Party’s predominantly liberal social policies as they pertain to LGBT rights have not been

received by African Americans, despite their tremendous loyalty to the Democratic Party.

Integral to the analysis of public opinion and policy is the “Chicken and the egg”

question: which is the dominant party in shaping the other, and which possess the greatest

agency. Research presents a narrative strongly illustrative of aggregate opinion from national

surveys proving congruent with implemented policy: Page and Shapiro citing a two-thirds rate of

harmony between policy change and public opinion change, typically when the latter’s

transformation is substantial. Stokers and Miller compared the differences in the relationship of

public opinions and policies, suggesting domestic concerns are more representative of public

opinion than foreign policy. This is not surprising, as foreign policy issues which less directly

resonate with citizens will accrue less attention. The philosophy of detached investment on

distant foreign issues captured by Gamson’s focus group on the Israel-Palestine crisis is less

likely to occur if the topic pertained to terrorist threats against the United States or American

lives.

Deferring to a group view on policy should not be dismissed out of hand as laziness or

apathy, as McGuire and others pessimistic on democratic competency suggest. The individual’s
membership or association with any such group is largely by choice; for factors such as gender

or race, the citizen may still choose not to follow the cues of their identifying association. If

policies supported by the larger group are so antithetical to a member’s internalized values and

norms, said member will either seek out a competing group or afford primacy to a different

category of association. For example: changing religious belief to fit one’s overall philosophy, or

associating more with one’s race instead of gender or vice versa. Thus, Hetherington is correct to

suggest deference on policies and opinions is a means of approximating an individual’s position

within their pre-existing ideology or partisanship.

Such associations provide far greater leverage with the conglomeration of individual

public opinions. Deli Carpini and Keller’s survey illustrated low-income black women know the

least about politics – yet the “black utility heuristic” described by Dawson mitigates the passivity

or limited public agency which these women would otherwise possess. In fact, the notion of

linked fate among African Americans is far more beneficial to democratic competency than an

ideal of the perfectly rational individual citizen. The latter would encourage self-interest above

all given the irrationality of sacrificing interests on the basis of racial kinship. Yet the communal

sense of solidarity favors “what is best for the entire [racial] group” over the individual.

Opinion-forming groups, entrusted with the agency and legitimacy to rationally advocate

for its’ associative members interests in public policy, allow individuals to draw upon

information and considerations predisposed to their general philosophies. There is the inherent

risk of group-think or positions being adopted which are irrational to the individual, yet the

bounty of material addressed in Professor Winter’s course resolutely challenges any fantasies of

a purely rational citizen existing in a vacuum. Democratic competency ultimately does not

demand every individual citizen be a veritable philosopher-king steeped in objective rationality.

Coalescing under associative opinion-forming groups, whether race, socio-economic class,

religion or political affiliation, both offer cues and information to facilitate individual’s

knowledge and allows citizens to aggregate vested interests in a much more assertive capacity on

public policy.

Bibliography