Separation of powers

“Power corrupts and absolute Power tends to corrupt absolutely.”

The concept of ‘separation’ may mean three different things:

a. that the same persons shall not form part of more than one of the organs of
government, for example, that Ministers should not sit in Parliament;
b. that one organ of government should not control or interfere with the exercise of
its function by another organ, for example, that the judiciary should be
independent of the Executive;
c. that one organ of government should not exercise the functions of another, for
example, that Ministers should not have legislative powers.

Definition of Separation of Powers

Simply put, separation of powers is the distribution of political authority that provides a
system of checks and balances to ensure that no single branch becomes too powerful or
infringes on the rights of the citizens. Baron de Montesquieu, an 18th-century French
enlightenment thinker, is credited with his use of the term 'separation of powers;'
however, separation of powers was utilized by ancient Greeks. The United States is based
on this idea of separate branches of government with distinct responsibilities. Power is
separated in the U.S. government in two important ways. First, power is divided between
the national and state governments, and second, power is divided amongst the three
branches of national government.

A “pure doctrine” of the separation of powers might be formulated in the

following way: It is essential for the establishment and maintenance of political
liberty that the government be divided into three branches or departments, the
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. To each of these three branches there
is a corresponding identifiable function of government, legislative, executive, or
judicial. Each branch of the government must be confined to the exercise of its
own function and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of the other
branches. Furthermore, the persons who compose these three agencies of
government must be kept separate and distinct, no individual being allowed to be
at the same time a member of more than one branch. In this way each of the
branches will be a check to the others and no single group of people will be able
to control the machinery of the State.

Montesquieu’s Doctrine
Let us shift from seventeenth-century England to eighteenth-century France and from the
methodological individualism of Hobbes and Locke to the methodological collectivism of
Montesquieu and Rousseau. Working from a perspective that there is a general will apart and
above the sum of the opinions of individuals, Montesquieu’s work focuses primarily on the law
and on manners of governing rather than the question of who governs. Like Locke, Montesquieu
argues that the powers of government should be separated. Montesquieu’s plan of separation
between executive, legislative, and judicial powers is what the United States Constitution
follows. Montesquieu asserts that the climate and environment affect men as individuals as well
as society. Although many of his specific ideas seem quite silly now, we must give credit to
Montesquieu for being perhaps the first social and political thinker to seriously consider the
environment.

Effects of this Doctrine

The doctrine of separation of powers as propounded by Montesquieu had tremendous impact on
the development of administrative law and functioning of Governments. It was appreciated by
English and American jurists and accepted by politicians. In his book ‘Commentaries on the
Laws of England’, published in 1765, Blackstone observed that if legislative, executive and
judicial functions were given to one man, there was an end of personal liberty. Madison also
proclaimed: “The accumulation of all powers, legislative and executive and judicial, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few or many and whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” The Constituent Assembly of France
declared in 1789 that there would be nothing like a Constitution in the country where the
doctrine of separation of powers was not accepted.

History of the Separation of Powers

The idea that the welfare of society is enhanced by the preservation of some distinction and
balance between the powers of various components of the society, has had a place in western
thought from the earliest times. It is to be found in Plato’s Statesman and Laws particularly in the
balance which the philosopher sought between the powers of the nobility and those of the people.
In Book 4 of his Politics Aristotle identified the three powers of the State as the deliberative, the
magisterial and the judicative. Although Aristotle identified the separate powers in that way he
stopped short of suggesting that they should be exercised by different organs of the State.
Nevertheless this identification of the distinct powers or functions of the State, might be regarded
as the seed from which the modern doctrine of separation of powers has sprung.

Ideas of this kind were current during the period of the Roman republic but in imperial times
were subordinated to the absolute power of the supreme, often deified, emperor. Nevertheless the
continued, albeit weakened, survival of republican forms as well as the existence of a coherent
and sophisticated body of law distinct from, although not superior to the will of the emperor,
kept alive an understanding of the distinct functions of the State.

Absolutist tendencies in the monarchies of the nation states which emerged in Western Europe in
the Middle Ages, although influenced by Roman notions of sovereignty, were much mitigated by
other principles. It was universally held in western christendom that the Divine law both revealed
and natural, was binding upon all, rulers and ruled alike. It was not only binding upon the
conscience of the monarch, which could be prodded by the judgment of churchmen and nobles,
but could operate to relieve subjects of their duty of allegiance and to justify them in disobeying
the royal authority or even rebelling against it. The notion that the king was "under God" was no
mere hierarchical notion but was also a moral notion with important political implications.

Our political institutions have been inherited from England and it is therefore appropriate to shift
the focus of this consideration of the development of the notion of the separation of powers from
Europe generally to England in particular. The idea that royal power was subject to Divine Law
and its corollary with respect to the subject’s duty of allegiance and obedience, prevailed in
England as well as in the rest of christendom, and operated as a fetter on absolute royal authority.
A further fetter existed in the form of the Common Law. Derived from the customary laws
existing at the time of the Norman conquest, it was fashioned y the Norman lawyers and the
king’s judges, into a unified and coherent body of law which was independent of legislation and
the royal prerogatives. The king was bound to respect the law. In Bracton’s famous dictum, "The
king is under no man, but under God and the law". The king’s judges, who applied this law,
although holding office at the pleasure of the king, were no mere mouthpieces of the sovereign,
but were, in a true and independent sense, exercising the judicial power of the realm.

The gradual growth and authority of the institution of parliament added a further dimension to
the separate exercise of the distinct powers of the State which Aristotle had identified.
Legislation was enacted by the king in Parliament. The executive power was exercised by the
king through the high officers of State. The judicial power was exercised by the king’s judges.

The degree of independence of the royal power with which these functions could be exercised,
depended of course to a great extent upon the outlook policy and strength of the particular
monarch. The despotism of the Tudor monarchs saw the eclipse of any real independence in the
exercise of the legislative power by parliament. The conduct of the trial of the former lord High
Chancellor, Sir Thomas Moore, for treason, was a clear enough indication that the independence
of the exercise of the judicial power was also in eclipse in any matter in which the monarch had
an interest. Such restraint as the notion

That the monarch was "Under God" might have exercised upon a self-willed monarch, was
considerably undermined by the introduction into the realm of the principle that the religion of
the prince was the religion of the people. That principle took root on the continent in the conflicts
of the reformation period and quickly spread to England. It was preached by the Archbishop of
Canterbury, Thomas Cranmer, at the coronation of the boy-king Edward VI, no doubt in the
expectation that the young king’s authority could be used to convert the nation to the new
religion. It was appealed to, as the pendulum swung with the accession of Mary, the catholic, and
swung again with the accession of Elizabeth, the protestant. The powers of the State were
concentrated in the sovereign and there was little restraint upon the sovereign’s despotic will.

Yet another novel political doctrine, originating on the continent, took root in England to the
peril of the independent exercise of the separate powers of the State. The doctrine of the divine
right of kings to govern was enthusiastically espoused by the Stuart monarchs. It places the king
above all legal political and ecclesiastical restraints. The impact of that doctrine upon the
independent exercise of the judicial power by the courts soon became evident and led to the
famous confrontation between King James I and Sir Edward Coke, the Chief Justice of the Court
of Common Pleas. The story has been so often told as to be hackneyed. Nevertheless the
influence of Coke’s courage upon succeeding generations of judges has been so enduring that a
paper on the separation of powers would be incomplete without an account of that historic
encounter. James I was, of course, the first of the House of Stuart to occupy the throne of
England and he was a convinced adherent of the doctrine of the divine right of kings to govern.
The crisis arose over the activities of the Court of High Commission. This was not one of the
regular courts, but was an administrative tribunal established by the crown for the regulation of
the church. It began to extend its activities beyond church affairs and was seen as an instrument
for the extension of royal authority beyond its lawful limits. Faced with the prospect of this
administrative tribunal which decided its cases not according to law, nor indeed to any fixed
rules, and the decisions of which were subject to no appeal, extending its authority so as to
deprive citizens of legal rights, the Court of Common Pleas stopped the High Commission’s
proceedings by way of Writ of Prohibition. The judges were summoned before the king on a
Sunday morning, 10th November 1612. At the conference the Archbishop of Canterbury
maintained that the judges were the delegates of the king who could therefore take from the
judges any cause and decide it for himself. Coke answered on behalf of the judges that by the
law of England, the king in person could not adjudge any cause; all cases, civil and criminal,
were to be determined in some court of justice according to the law and the custom of the realm.
The king replied:

"But I thought law was founded on reason, and I and others have reason as well as judges."

"True it is", Coke replied, "that God has endowed Your Majesty with excellent science and great
endowments of nature. Your majesty is not learned in the laws of your realm of England, and
causes which concern the life or inheritance of goods or fortunes of your subjects are not to be
decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and judgement of the law, which law is an
art which requires long study and experience before that a man can attain to the cognisance of
it."

At this, it is said, the king was much offended, saying that in such a case he would be under the
law, which it was treason to affirm. The word "treason" coming from the lips of a Stuart king
who entertained such exalted notions of the rights and powers of the monarch, was enough to
send a chill into the heart of the most intrepid. But the great Chief Justice boldly answered in the
words of Bracton, that the king ought not to be under any man, but "under God and the Law."
The ending is not a happy one. Judges held office during the pleasure of the crown, and Coke
was removed from office. But the echoes of that famous encounter have continued to ring down
the ages, and remain an inspiration to judges wherever the judiciary is subjected to improper
pressure by political authority.

The principle of the exercise of judicial power independently of royal power, was distinctly
unattractive to the Stuart kings. They asserted an absolute power of appointment and dismissal of
judges. James II dismissed a Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, a Chief Baron of the Exchequer
and two puisne judges. Those practices of the Stuart kings as well as their claim to dispense from
compliance with the laws passed by parliament, led, paradoxically, to the establishment of the
conditions which now underpin the independence of the judiciary. The struggle between the king
and parliament led to the development of the theory of an independent judiciary and when the
Stuarts were overthrown by the revolution of 1688, the new regime was determined that such
excesses of royal power would not be repeated.

The constitutional changes which followed the revolution of 1688 emphasized the distinction
between the legislative and the executive power. The Bill of Rights of 1689 prohibited and the
suspension of laws by the crown without the consent of parliament and the levying of taxes
except by grant of parliament. The legislative power was thereby placed firmly in the hands of
parliament and distinguished from the crown’s exercise of executive power. The separation and
independence of the judicial power was provided for in the Act of Settlement 1701. The judges
were no longer to hold office only during the king’s pleasure but were to have security of tenure
during good behaviour. The king’s power to remove judges would be exercised only upon an
address of both Houses of Parliament. Judicial salaries were fixed.

In the years following the 1688 settlement there was a separation of personnel not only between
the judges who exercised the judicial power and those who exercised the other two powers, but
also between those who exercised the executive power and those who exercised the legislative
power. The king’s ministers who exercised executive power were not members of the
parliament. Political imperatives ensured that that degree of separation did not survive. Control
by the parliament of legislation and of the provision of the money necessary to carry on the
business of government, indicated the desirability of government being carried on b ministers
who were members of the parliament and commanded its confidence. Thereafter the influence of
the crown even over executive government steadily declined and the foundations of
constitutional monarchy were firmly laid. Even George III’s attempt to reassert royal power was
implemented not so much by direct constitutional intervention as by the creation, by means of
manipulation and patronage of a party of "king’s friends" in the parliament.

The constitutional arrangements which existed in England in the 18th century, being the
separation powers resulting from the post-1688 Settlement upon which responsible government
was engrafted, flowed into the constitutions of the Australian colonies and, hence, into the
constitutions of the present Australian states. By the time the Federal Constitution was framed,
however, other influences were at work.

In 1748 Montesquieu published "The Spirit of the Laws". The great French political thinker was
profoundly influenced by the post-1688 English Constitution as he understood it, although he
does not appear to have appreciated how blurred the separation of powers was in practice in 18th
century England. Montesquieu’s exposition of the doctrine of the separation of powers was the
first fully developed theoretical recognition and formulation of the doctrine. It had a profound
influence on all subsequent European and American Constitutions and upon subsequent political
and legal thought. In view of the great influence of his work, it is worth quoting, as of particular
interest to the subject matter of this conference, Montesquieu’s justification of the separation of
the judicial power from the other two powers. In Chapter 6 he wrote:

"Again there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed
to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive
power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression."
Framers of the Constitution of the United States of America were greatly influenced by
Montesquieu’s thought as well as by the post-1688 constitutional arrangements in England. They
opted for a complete legal separation of powers. The legislative power in the Supreme Court of
the United States and such other courts as the Congress might establish. The President was not a
member of Congress or answerable to it and the principle of responsible government was
therefore excluded. The independence of the judiciary of the legislative and executive powers
was seen to be of fundamental importance. In The Federalist papers Alexander Hamilton
expounded the principle of judicial independence in the following passage:

"According to the plan of the convention, all judges who maybe appointed by the United States
are to hold their offices during good behaviour; which is conformable to the most approved of
the State constitutions, and among the rest, to that of this State. Its propriety having been drawn
into question by the adversaries of that plan is no light symptom of the rage for objection which
disorders their imaginations and judgments. The standard of good behaviour for the continuance
in office of the judicial magistracy is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern
improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the
despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and
oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any
government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.

Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a
government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its
functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it
will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honours,
but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but
prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The
judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either
of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may
truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.

This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. It proves incontestably
that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; The
celebrated Montesquieu, speaking of them, says: ‘Of the three powers above mentioned, the
judiciary is next to nothing.’ –Spirit of Laws.-PUBLIUS; that it can never attack with success
either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against
their attacks. It equally proves that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from
the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter;
I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive.
For I agree that ‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative
and executive powers.’ Idem. And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to
fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the
other departments; that as all the effects of such a union must ensue from a dependence of the
former on the latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separation; that as, from the natural
feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced
by its co-ordinate branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and
independence as permanency in office, this quality may therefore by justly regarded as an
indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the public
justice and the public security."

The power of the courts to declare null and void an act of the Congress was not expressly
conferred by the United States’ Constitution. It was nevertheless understood to be essential in a
constitution which placed limitations upon legislative power. Hamilton wrote:

"The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited

Constitution. By a limited Constitution I understand one which contains certain specified
exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder,
no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other
way than through them medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this all the reservations of
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing."

That power was, of course, judicially established by the Supreme Court in the great case of
Marbury v Madison (1803) 1 Cranch 137.

SEPARATION OF POWERS IN UK

Separation of powers is when the state is divided into three different governmental bodies
(legislature, executive and judiciary); and all three bodies have separate and independent powers
and areas of responsibility. The effect of separation of powers, is removing the amount of power
in any groups hands, so in essence it makes it difficult for them to abuse it. I would be discussing
three obvious breaches of separation of power, and whether they are beneficial or detrimental to
the system.

When discussing about the breach of the separation of powers in the United Kingdom, it can be
related to the Lord Chancellor. He has been a part of all three governmental bodies for years
(legislature, judiciary and executive).

The lord chancellor is involved in legislature, by been in the upper chamber as the speaker of the
House of Lords, which means he is in charge and in control of every decisions that comes out of
the House of Lords, and has a vote. As been the head of the House of Lords, he represents the
house in both international and domestic events.

He is also a major team player in the judiciary aspects of things, by been able to sit as a senior
judge in the court of appeal, the Privy Council or the appellate committee. The Lord Chancellor
is also the holder of the great seal, and the head of the judiciary in both England and Wales, and
also the president of the Supreme Court. He also played a major role in the appointments of
judicial posts and Law Lords, because the prime minister would consult him on suitable
candidates.
Prior to the constitutional reform act 2005, the Lord Chancellor held unto all three aspects of the
governmental bodies. Previously Lord Hailsham defended the judges by saying “the
independence of the judiciary and the rule of law should be defended from inside the cabinet as
well as inside parliament”. The Lord Chancellor also acted as a spokesperson for the judges for
many years, by defending their interference with the executives, until recently when the
disadvantage outweighed the advantage that it is a major breach of the separation of powers.

The constitutional Reform Act 2005, redefined the office of the Lord Chancellor, which made
sure there was a major separation of power between the executive, judiciary and legislature. The
Lord Chancellor is no longer the head of the judiciary, and does not sit as a judge or the speaker
in the House of Lords. He is still involved with the judiciary process, but with less influence. The
act prohibits the office holder of the Lord Chancellor from holding judicial office.

The Lord Chancellors role in the United Kingdom has been an ongoing debate for years, and
have been widely criticised. A bit of separation has been put in practice, but the Lord Chancellor
role is still in certain aspects involved in all three parts of the governmental body. It is yet to be
decided, but if a definite separation is made, it would be beneficial to all three aspects of the
governmental body.

Delegated legislation is another major form of separation of powers. Delegated legislation can
also be known as subordinate legislation, which occurs when executive's bodies are given the
power to make laws, instead of the parliamentary body (legislature), for example local councils
by-laws. Delegated legislation has a major overlap involving the executives performing a
legislative function.

Legislations may be made by ministers (in the form of rules and regulation), local authorities (in
the form of bylaws), public bodies (in the forms of rules and regulation), judges (in the form of
rules of court), government departments (in the form of codes of practice, circulars and
guidance) and the House of Commons (in the form of resolutions of the house).

Delegated legislation raises questions relating to the supremacy of parliament, because in a

parliamentary year about 3,000 laws are passed; but the volume of legislation reveals its
importance as a source of law.

Although the powers are in the hands of executive bodies, they are under strict instructions to
only pass legislation that are intra vires, which are within the legal powers that are conferred by
the act; but if the executives go against the rules, the legislation they pass will then be made ultra
vires by the courts, which abolishes the law.

By restricting the executives, the courts are trying to put legal controls on the legislation made,
and also trying to show that giving the powers to the executives are not violating the separation
of powers. Chester v Bateson is an example of the courts control over the use of delegated
legislation.

A major practical benefit of the laws created by delegated legislation is flexibility. Although
there are both political and legal controls over delegated legislation, because “it should be
remembered that the vast majority of domestic legislation which is passed is delegated, not
primary Acts of parliament.”

The benefits of delegated legislation, is that unlike an act of parliament, it cannot be challenged
in a court of law; which could possibly delay the process. They can also be passed due to the
local needs, which can be well-suited in meeting the different needs of local communities.

Judicial reviews can challenge delegated legislation in courts, because they are the only once
with the control. if a piece of legislation is made against the statutory procedures, they can be
struck down; they can also get challenged on the grounds of irrationality, which was held in
Kruse v Johnson, where it was held that a by-law which was unequal in its operation as between
different classes.

If the power of delegated legislation is retrieved, it could affect inner-cities and communities,
because it is a reliable way out to solve problems instead of waiting for parliament. The
parliamentary body would also feel under a lot of pressure, due to the amount of work load
waiting to be answered, which would slow down the process of laws been made and needs been
met.

The Privy Council is another form of a breach in the separation of powers. The Privy Council are
the inner council of advisers to the queen; they are also the chief policy making governmental
body. There are over 500 members of the Privy Council, and they comprise of people who hold
or have held political or judicial offices, for example peers, cabinet ministers, senior judges,
prime ministers and the archbishops.

The Privy Council has an overlap in relation to the separation of powers, relating to the executive
and judicial function of government.

The main function of the Privy Council is judicial, because it makes orders in council and also
grants royal charters to public bodies, which are also known as non-statutory orders. The Privy
Council can also make laws in the form of delegated legislation, which includes transferring
power from one to another. They still remain the highest court of appeal for commonwealth
nations, and for certain courts and tribunals. The judicial committee members are law lords or
ex-law lords. The Privy Council are also an advisory body to the queen, for example to advise
the queen whether or not to declare war, which used to be their main function previously.

The idea of the Privy Council been an executive body but has an overlap by performing both the
legislative and judiciary function is a major issue in United Kingdom, because it losses it major
function, and now makes legislations. The overlap can also be ascribed to the members for
example the Lord Chancellor is one of the active members of the privy council, but also has a
major role to play in the House of Lords and also as a judge, which could be one of the major
downfall to the overlap.

The amount of overlap between the three governmental functions is such that no clear separation
of power can be said to exist. A major advantage to having a clear separation of power is the
sense of efficiency in government, and not having too much power in the hand of certain
individuals which could lead to dictatorship. It also creates a sense of closeness in the
relationships between all three functions.

The fundamental rule of separation of power is to create a balance in order to enable

effectiveness. Although a separation of power is needed, but if there was no interaction between
all three functions, a government would not be possible, because all three organs of the
government help and work together in order to improve each other efforts. For example if the
executive has no input in legislation, then the government's policies could not be implemented.

CRITICISM• It is not desirable because if there is complete separation of powers , the different
organs of the government will not be able to work in co-operation and harmony. As a result,
there would be frequently deadlocks which may bring the governmental machinery to a
standstill.• According to Mill, ”the separation of powers will result in a clash between the three
organs of government, as each one will take interest only in its own powers”.• If all branches are
made separate and independent of each others, each branch will try to safeguard its powers and
will not protect the powers of other branches. In such case administrative efficiency cannot be
attained
• The theory of separation of powers makes a mistake in assuming that the three branches of
government are equally powerful and can be independent of one another.• The growth of
administrative adjudication is another development which is against the doctrine of separation of
powers. The executive is being vested with judicial powers as well as other duties otherwise the
officers do not feel secure while performing their duties. The Westminster System (UK) renders
more necessary an independent judiciary to stand between the government and the governed.

IMPORTANCE OF THE THEORY OFSEPARATION OF POWERS• It aims at individual

liberty. It is a safeguard against despotism. • Its basic principle that concentration of powers
leads to dictatorship is true for all time and ages.• The separation of powers saves the people
from the arbitrary rule of the executive .• This theory lays down the principle that governments
should act according to certain well established rules or law.• Each organ acts as a check upon
the others.• It is desirable for maintaining the efficiency in the administration.
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA• The American
constitution is based on the theory of separation of powers.• According to article 1 of the
constitution of the United States, “all legislative powers therein granted shall be vested in a
Congress.” The legislature alone exercises law making power.• According to article 2 of the
constitution of the United States,”the executive power shall be vested in a president of the united
states. He is not responsible to the congress.”• According to article 3 of the constitution of the
united states, “the judicial power shall be vested in the supreme court.” the judiciary is
independent of the executive and the legislative.• A concrete evidence of this theory is seen in
American constitution as the position of president under the constitution has been secured by
providing fixed tenure of office, the legislature is not
Subject to any executive control, and a judge cannot be removed once appointed.• Congress
consists of two houses- Senate and House of Representatives . Both are directly elected by the
people for a fixed period.• Neither the president nor the congress are responsible teach other.•
President is not empowered to remove a judge after he is appointed on the post.• The senate has
got no power to choose , control or dismiss the executive or the judiciary; the executive also
cannot dissolve the legislature and dismiss judges.
CONCLUSION• In the modern world, the Separation of Powers has come to not only mean
organs such as the Executive, the legislature and the judiciary but also institutions such as the
press and academic institutions.• Thus, in a modern society, implementation of Separation of
Powers doctrine in its strictest sense, the way Montesquieu envisaged it to be in his book The
Spirit of laws is an extremely difficult task. Even civil institutions wield a lot of power in all
spheres of governance. So that they do not exceed their powers and work within the limit that
the constitution has made for them.