Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
Operations
SOE and MI5 during the Second World War
Christopher J. Murphy
Security and Special Operations
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Security and Special
Operations
SOE and MI5 during the Second World War
Christopher J. Murphy
© Christopher J. Murphy 2006
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
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save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
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Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication
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The author has asserted his right to be identified
as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2006 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
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175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
Companies and representatives throughout the world
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave
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Macmillan is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom
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ISBN-13: 9780230002418 hardback
ISBN-10: 0230002412 hardback
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Murphy, Christopher J. (Christopher John), 1976
Security and special operations : SOE and MI5 during the Second World
War / Christopher J. Murphy.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0230002412 (cloth)
1. World War, 19391945“Secret service“Great Britain.
2. Great Britain. Special Operations Executive. Security Section.
3. Great Britain. MI5. I. Title.
D810.S7M79 2007
940.53 1“dc22 2006046060
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
For my parents, Olive and John Murphy
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Contents
Acknowledgements viii
Note on Sources ix
Introduction x
3 Security Abroad 50
vii
Acknowledgements
The archival research on which this book is based was made possible
by a Leverhulme Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship at the Centre for
Contemporary British History at the Institute of Historical Research. I am
grateful to my colleagues at CCBH, particularly Pat Thane and Michael
Kandiah, for their support during my time there. I would also like to
thank Philip Murphy of the University of Reading for his continued
support and advice. Michael Strang at Palgrave Macmillan and his
assistant Ruth Ireland have ensured a smooth publication process and
my thanks are due to them, and to project manager Vidya Vijayan.
Information about SOE’s Security Section is not always easy to locate
in the SOE archive, as much of it is buried in the files of the opera-
tional Country Sections; my thanks are due to Duncan Stuart, former
SOE Adviser at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who pointed
me in the right direction with a single sheet of paper. Howard Davies
at The National Archives arranged the release of numerous Personnel
Files of members of the Security Section – along with the PFs of those
it investigated – which provided much useful information, and I am
grateful for his assistance. First-hand accounts from members of the
Security Section are particularly difficult to come by; fortunately, some
such testimony has been preserved by the Imperial War Museum Sound
Archive. My thanks are due for permission to reproduce extracts from
its interviews here.
Two friends deserve special thanks: Christian Ellingsen for taking the
time to read and comment on the whole manuscript; and Carl Rann
for his computer skills that saved Chapters 1 and 8 when they vanished
into the electronic ether.
viii
Note on Sources
Some aspects of SOE and MI5 activity during the Second World War
are considered too sensitive to be released into the public domain even
today. When this is the case, the original papers are photocopied, the
offending words blanked out and the ‘redacted’ version substituted in
the file. Such redactions are indicated by [ ] throughout the text.
ix
Introduction
Much has been written about the activities of the Special Operations
Executive (SOE), the body responsible for conducting sabotage and
fermenting resistance on an international scale during the Second World
War. Yet despite this vast literature, little attention has been given to
the work of SOE’s Security Section, an absence which is striking when
one considers the attention that has been given to some of SOE’s oper-
ational failures, which raise questions about the nature of, and attitude
towards, security within the organisation. In the case of the consid-
erable memoir literature that has attached itself to SOE, the absence
of the Security Section can be explained by the nature of its work. As
Mark Wheeler has observed, ‘What the ex-operatives of SOE have not
abandoned is their desire to carry on by literary means the bureaucratic
in-fighting and the rearguard defence of their organization’s functions
and achievements which proved necessary from its very birth in 1940.’1
As the Security Section was brought in when things went wrong, an
examination of its work would hardly be the best means of defending
the legacy of SOE. Certain aspects of the Security Section’s work, while
in themselves successful, inevitably draw attention to deficiencies else-
where in the organisation. For example, while a holding facility for
failed recruits at Inverlair was run efficiently and without incident by the
Security Section, it was made necessary due to problems with SOE’s early
recruitment and training practices that hardly show the organisation in
a good light.
The release of the surviving SOE-related archive, combined with SOE-
related papers found in recently released MI5 files and oral testimony,
allows this absence to be addressed. It quickly becomes apparent that
the Security Section was not popular within SOE. As former Security
Officer Aonghais Fyffe recalled during an interview, ‘We weren’t very
popular we were always looked upon with a slight suspicion.’2 Resent-
ment, or at least irritation, towards ‘security’ could be provoked simply
by stepping into an SOE building and being asked to produce an identity
pass. A security officer recorded the trials faced by security watchmen:
I do not think it would be unfair to say that for the most part
they are much more reliable in inspecting passes than some of
our personnel are in producing them for inspection. It really is a
x
Introduction xi
1
2 Security and Special Operations
experiences, his very valuable contacts and last, but not least, because of
his charming personality’. Boyle was later recalled by another security
officer, Aonghais Fyffe, as a kind, approachable man, never dictatorial
or domineering, who was ‘highly respected’. In a description evocative
of the fictional spymaster George Smiley, he recalls how Boyle would
attend meetings and listen to the proceedings with his eyes closed. The
difference, in Boyle’s case, being that he did so while smoking a pipe,
and ‘on one occasion he actually did close his eyes and dropped his
pipe!’7 But, as M.R.D. Foot notes, behind the kind facade of ‘dear old
Archie Boyle’ lay a ‘keen and suspicious mind, honed by twenty years’
experience of air intelligence’.8
Boyle joined SOE on 7 July 1941 as policy adviser to Nelson. Given
responsibility for the Intelligence and Security Directorate, his appoint-
ment coincided with an extensive shake-up of SOE’s existing security
machinery. SOE’s original Security Section (D/T Section) had been a
very small scale affair. Established in October 1940, it had been headed
by Lt Col Edward Calthrop, who divided his time between security
and his other duties as SOE’s liaison officer with the Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS). A keen sportsman who had served in France and Belgium
during the First World War, he had been confined to a wheelchair in
the early 1930s, and went on to become SIS Head of Station in Brussels.9
Under Calthrop, D/T Section was responsible for rudimentary matters of
security, also supporting the fledgling Country Sections in their search
for suitable recruits by ‘furnishing them with names obtained from the
records of aliens registered with the Police’.10
Calthrop’s staff consisted of Captain E.R.W. Breakwell – who was soon
replaced as his deputy by E.C. Whetmore – J.D. O’Reilly, and a civilian
administrator. Born in London in September 1896, Edwin Charles Whet-
more had been studying for a degree in Modern Languages at King’s
College London when the First World War broke out. He left King’s,
becoming a Second Lieutenant in the Durham Light Infantry in May
1915, and was wounded in France the following year. In April 1918
Whetmore became an officer in the Intelligence Corps, proceeding to
hold a number of military posts during the 1920s before becoming
involved in the textile export business.11
John (‘Jack’) Dermot O’Reilly was seconded from Scotland Yard, and
given responsibility for SOE’s liaison with the police. He was godfather
to SOE’s well-known cryptographer Leo Marks, who recalled being given
a severe dressing down from him for being ‘the first NDO [Night Duty
Officer] in the history of SOE who had failed to report a single one of
the scraps of paper which the security department deliberately left lying
The Origins and Development of SOE’s Security Section 3
3-day notice when a party was due to undergo training, along with
details of its composition – the size of the party, nationality, training
centre to be used – so that the most appropriate personnel could be
allocated. In order to allay any suspicions, Calthrop emphasised that
‘F.S. personnel are clearly instructed that their outward function is not
contra-espionage, but that of assisting trainees in every possible way,
including their contacts with the training staff’, acting as interpreters
if necessary. Their presence, however, invariably drew suspicion from
those undergoing training, especially those who had escaped from occu-
pied Europe: ‘Usually there is a period of a few days when the students
look upon me with some suspicion and the idea of “Gestapo” at the
back of their minds’, wrote Lt Turnbull in April 1943.30 Peter Lee recalls
that the Commandants of the Special Training Schools also thought
that Field Security ‘were part of the Gestapo’.31 The schools were run by
regular army officers, who ‘had an almost paranoiac dislike of anything
to do with security, which they regarded as something to do with espi-
onage and spies’.
As well as dealing with such suspicion and hostility, the job was
physically demanding, as Field Security personnel participated fully in
the training process, ‘assisting instructors when necessary as interpreters,
and giving the trainees every help both in absorbing the instruction, and
in adjusting themselves to the conditions of our service’.32 Reporting on
a recruit in his early forties, a man who refused to be outdone by any
of the younger trainees, C.S.M. Thomas recorded that ‘Only the most
earnest pleading can restrain him from over-doing all his training’; his
determination to show his fitness was proving ‘a little discouraging for
us weaker vessels who stagger along painfully behind on cross-country
runs etc’.33
The Field Security NCOs who accompanied recruits on their training
were ‘purposely not shown any of the individual dossiers on recruits
held at H.Q. before training commenced’, to prevent the formation
of any preliminary opinions.34 Rather, they followed the principle of
‘really getting to know a person by living and working with him’. As
such, Field Security personnel required ‘a natural faculty for assessing
another man’s character correctly, quickly and without prejudice’ in
addition to ‘an expert knowledge of the languages and countries of
the trainee’. In order to ensure that this criterion was met, candid-
ates were ‘hand picked’ and underwent interviews at the Intelligence
Corps Depot – a special concession made to SOE by the Commandant,
Lt Col Brooks.
The Origins and Development of SOE’s Security Section 7
Weekly reports on trainees were prepared, and submitted to Lee via the
School Commandants. Copies were then forwarded by Security to the
Country Section concerned. It was later claimed that these reports were
‘of great assistance’, as ‘important details were occasionally revealed
to the F.S. N.C.O.s which were not likely to be admitted in formal
interviews conducted by commissioned officers’:
The importance of the service provided by Field Security was not always
appreciated by the Country Sections, which exhibited a certain hostility
towards any kind of interference in their operational affairs, even when
it was in their own best interest. Lee recalls having to exhibit a consid-
erable degree of tact when dealing with the Country Sections. Of
the process whereby Field Security Reports were prepared for Country
Section heads, he notes,
I always used to go through all the reports with them [the FSP NCOs]
before I sent it to the Country Section head, to make quite sure
that my NCO and I really understood the form we had to be very
careful what we said – couldn’t upset operations by just being stupid.
But at the same time, we had to warn the Country Section head if
we’d found anything that was liable to jeopardise their operations
once they went into the field. After all, it’s fairly important for people
to stay alive in a set-up like this 39
Difficulties arose with Belgian Section Head Hardy Amies in the case
of an unnamed mechanic who, while a capable wireless operator, was
considered by Field Security to be ‘absolutely appalling’, exhibiting a
fondness for drink, no responsibility with money and a tendency to pick
up ‘the most awful women’. Lee duly informed the Belgian Section of
these concerns, but his report was overruled and the mechanic sent to
the field, where he promptly picked up a peroxide blonde and took her
to the Palace Hotel in Brussels, which was ‘absolutely stiff with Gestapo
people’. According to Lee, as a result of his arrest 18 people were shot.
In particularly serious cases, Security could take further steps to make
its concerns known, as it did in the case of the Dutch Section agent
Arnoldus Albert Baatsen, alias Bouwman. Bouwman’s behaviour initially
raised concern in November 1941, when he was given leave to spend
The Origins and Development of SOE’s Security Section 9
the weekend in Cambridge but was seen at the Salisbury Hotel in Hert-
ford ‘with a female companion who he introduced as a friend from
London’. Upon his return, the ‘seriousness of this action from the
security point of view’ was impressed upon him.40 By December 1941
Bouwman was being considered ‘as a candidate for the Cooler’, described
by Lee as having ‘gone sour’.41 It was noted that ‘the rest of the party
with whom he was working had little or no confidence in him, and
he was becoming a bad influence on them’.42 Pending a decision on
his disposal, Bouwman was held at the Field Security Depot in King-
ston. Lee was unsurprisingly thrown when he discovered in late January
that a complete volte-face had taken place and that Bouwman had been
chosen for a mission. He wrote to Lakin, noting that ‘I have not had
until yesterday anything in writing that he was to be used on an opera-
tion, or that he was not in fact being considered as a candidate for the
Cooler.’ Lee questioned this decision to ‘use a man who has such a poor
security record and seems to be a foolish, theatrical and boastful type’.
So serious was Security’s concern that Senter appealed directly to SOE’s
Director of Operations, Colin Gubbins:
I feel that I must bring to your notice the fact that Bouwman has
been reported to us on many occasions for extreme lack of discretion.
I suggest that you should be satisfied that the importance of the
project entrusted to Bouwman justified this risk.43
However, even this was not enough to prevent Bouwman being sent
to the field, as the Head of the Dutch Section Charles Blizard turned
security’s concerns on their head, portraying them as strengths that
could prove advantageous in the field. Defending his agent, Blizard
wrote that he did not see the matter in the same ‘somewhat gloomy
light’ of the Security Section:
We shall part with General Lakin with regret. Our relations with him,
both official and personal, have been of the happiest, and we hope
that his health will improve with the less exacting duties of his new
post. Much the same applies to Senter, than whom there could be no
more acceptable successor to General Lakin, and whom we shall be
glad to continue to help in any way we can.47
This did not bode well for the suggestion that the inspection of passes
should be stepped up to include personnel leaving buildings; as Mott
observed, it was ‘a question whether the undoubted gain in security
control of access would justify the friction which would certainly
be caused’. Such friction was likely to find expression at a high level;
irritation at having to show a pass, Mott explained, was ‘chiefly to
be found in the upper strata of our community’. Security also had to
balance its concerns with the needs of operations. For example, Mott
thought it would be impossible to introduce a more rigorous vetting
process for proposed members of staff without upsetting the Country
Sections:
the recent Belgian trouble illustrates this, and we really ought to have
within our own Organization a standardized check on all returning
Agents so as to avert this danger. As the war gets ‘closer’ into the
enemy, I suspect that he will increase his efforts in this direction; and
it is potentially a very real danger.60
of the location of its offices, the Special Security Section quickly became
known as Bayswater. Essentially SOE’s own counter-espionage section,
Bayswater developed close links with MI5 and later with Section V
of SIS.
Bayswater was headed by Major Richard Henry Atkinson (‘Dick’)
Warden, a member of the Security Section since January 1941. Described
by Lee as a ‘wonderful character’, Warden was born in December 1908
in London, and educated at Harrow and Cornell University. Following
university, Warden returned to England and became well-known as an
amateur steeplechase rider, riding in the Grand National, before going
on to spend 3 years as an assistant racehorse trainer in Chantilly. Warden
served in the Intelligence Corps from 21 October 1940 to 15 January
1941, at which point he joined SOE as a Field Security Officer. In May
he joined the Security Section for ‘special external security work’. His
duties consisted of ‘Security work connected with students and opera-
tional security of the Shetland Islands’, along with ‘Some experience of
small scale raiding parties with S.T.S.62’. Warden proceeded to become
an assistant liaison officer with MI5, dealing with both Travel Control
and the London Reception Centre (LRC), the MI5-run facility which
screened travellers from overseas upon their arrival in the UK. In his first
confidential report, Senter described Warden as ‘alert and sophisticated.
He can be trusted to carry out any job with intelligence, assiduity and
resource.’ Boyle concurred with this view, adding his own opinion that
Warden was a ‘very painstaking and efficient officer with unorthodox
but effective methods’. Senter repeated his remarks in his next two
reports on Warden, although when signing off the second one Boyle
inserted a rider: ‘A good officer, though perhaps slightly immature in
judgement.’
Miller’s early practice of interrogating agents prior to their departure
to the field, providing them with valuable experience of interrogation
method, soon had to be discontinued owing to pressure of work in
conducting interrogations of returning agents, along with investigations
into groups in the field ‘who were suspected of having fallen into the
hands of the enemy’.66 The Security History later claimed that, through
its work, Bayswater was able to appease the concerns of MI5 as to the
state of SOE’s operational security:
What the Security History failed to mention was the uphill struggle
Bayswater faced in making the Country Sections fully appreciate the
importance of the security interrogation of returning agents. A further
Routine Order was issued on 2 July, which refined the instructions
given in January and emphasised the importance of the new security
procedure, which was clearly being ignored by some Sections:
had been arranged, SOE having acquired the services of two Customs
officials for this purpose, while the practice of allowing students to take
leave in restricted areas had been stopped in March.
Boyle wrote to Findlater Stewart again on 27 April, highlighting the
action taken by the SSP to ensure SOE’s security prior to D-Day at its
first three meetings.95 From Boyle’s summary, it is clear that an imme-
diate impact upon existing security arrangements had been made. He
informed Findlater Stewart that steps had been taken to make all SOE
personnel aware of the issues raised by the War Cabinet Security Panel’s
report; a letter had been drafted to be sent to all Directorate heads,
informing them of the need to convene meetings to emphasise the need
for employees to avoid ‘careless talk’, along with a brief paper on the
subject.96 In addition, a summary of the War Cabinet Security Panel
security paper had been compiled, highlighting the issues of relevance
to SOE.97 These papers were amended and agreed at the second SSP
meeting on 20 April, and a telegram version, to be sent to all Missions
and Groups overseas, was also prepared. Boyle also informed Findlater
Stewart that ‘We have tightened up our arrangements for the support of
outgoing agents and have borrowed the services of two Customs Officers
to assist’, and that arrangements had been made ‘for the censorship of
all Allied courier which passes through our hands, both incoming and
outgoing’.98 In addition, he noted that the Panel had ‘reviewed the ques-
tion of Allied personnel who have access to this Headquarters for liaison
purposes’, and had ‘given particular attention to the question of wireless
transmitters under our control in the country’, particularly those used
by students during their training. Boyle noted that all wireless exer-
cises which gave students use of transmitters ‘without full control’ had
been discontinued, and that the secure storage of transmitters at Schools
and Stations had been addressed. On the thorny issue of the continued
despatch of agents to the field Boyle informed Findlater Stewart that
each case would be ‘specifically referred to Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman,
so that he may decide whether despatch before D-day is operationally
necessary’. He also drew attention to SOE’s ‘very close working arrange-
ments with M.I.5’, which would facilitate Findlater Stewart’s wish ‘of
consultation with M.I.5 in any case where any doubt might arise’. Boyle
closed by noting that he would be ‘most grateful if you would let us
know of any other points that occur to you which you think might
usefully be examined by our Security Panel’.99
As the manner in which Boyle dealt with Findlater Stewart indic-
ates, not only was good security vital, so too was the ‘spin’ put on
it. Tightening SOE’s security arrangements was not in itself sufficient,
The Origins and Development of SOE’s Security Section 23
25
26 Security and Special Operations
By this point, similar problems were also being faced by the Spanish
Country Section. On 27 January, Whetmore was notified of ‘consider-
able unrest’ among the Spaniards in training at STS 21, ‘owing to the fact
that an indiscretion on the part of one of the officers had disclosed the
information that one of the party was not considered to be reliable and
should be removed’.22 The proposed removal of the recruit, L/Cpl Juan
Martin (a.k.a. Nicolas Del Rio), raised the problem of his accumulated
knowledge:
The lack of options for dealing with the removal of unsuitable recruits
led to the quite extraordinary situation whereby the Training Section
had no option but to keep Martin in training, thereby continuing
to accumulate knowledge about SOE, as there was simply nothing
else to do with him.23 Martin, however, continued to cause trouble,
and by 19 March it was proposed that a ‘surgical operation’ was
necessary to remove the ‘undesirable elements’ within the training
party.24 Listed among them, Martin was now described as a man
‘not to be trusted’. A note scribbled across the bottom of the letter
suggests that both he and another recruit, Jose Muntane, were returned
to the Pioneer Corps; an unsatisfactory move but the only option
available.
By April, the need to weed out unsuitable recruits at an early stage,
prior to their gaining sensitive information about SOE, was being
stressed by the Training Section. A circular was sent to all Training
School Commandants, which noted,
from which they have come. Apart from lectures by the O.C. on the
subject of security generally they will not have been taught anything
which is outside the normal scope of ordinary military training At
the end of the period of Para-Military training the conduct and
standard of students will again be scrutinised closely. All those who
are in any way below the standard of our requirements or who are
felt to be insecure will be removed Even after this training the risk
of anything of value being given away is not very great.25
Such increased scrutiny was now being applied to the Italian trainees;
by 5 April, in addition to Purisiol, Bertoli had also come under close
observation, with a view to being ‘thrown out after the para-military
course’.26 Two days later the SOE officer monitoring the Italians, known
by the codename ‘JA’, wrote to Whetmore. He expressed his growing
belief that both Purisiol and Bertoli would ‘have to be thrown out’.27
By 14 April, arrangements had been made with Whetmore for Purisiol
to be removed and employed temporarily on the staff of one of SOE’s
Field Security Stations, first at Hertford and subsequently at Guildford.28
Bertoli had also been removed from the training group by April 13, and
was sent to Garramor (STS 25) for holding. He was considered ‘physic-
ally and morally unfit for the course’, and it was now thought certain
that he had ‘volunteered in order to get out of internment’.29 Over the
following weeks, Whetmore tried in vain to secure employment for Puri-
siol away from SOE, arguing in a letter to the Military Liaison Officer to
the Home Office that ‘to re-intern him would mean that a potentially
useful individual would be rendered idle’.30 However, Purisiol’s poor
health and argumentative personality, along with his poor command of
English, made him an unattractive prospect.31
No concern had yet been expressed about Rosa who, along with the
remaining recruits, had completed the para-military stage of training.32
However, his report from Meoble was less than encouraging:
It was noted during training that Rosa had not seen his wife for over a year,
and suggested that if he could be granted leave to visit her ‘it would
be a great relief to him and might encourage his efforts’.34 The request
Inverlair No. 6 Special Workshop School: ‘The Cooler’ 31
was granted, and appeared to have the desired effect; upon his return,
L/Cpl Beaumont noted that ‘His few days leave has refreshed this student
and made him much more contented.’35 However, doubts about Rosa’s
suitability soon began to grow; a paper written the following week noted
that ‘Nobody has quite made up his mind about him.’36
Despite such uncertainty, it was agreed that Rosa should complete his
SOE training with an intensive course in sabotage, ‘especially against ships
and electric railways’, at one of the Beaulieu Finishing Schools.37 Rather
than removing him before the final course – which would remove any
lingering doubt as to the job he was being trained for – it was thought
that this revelation would provide the final ‘test’ of his character. Beau-
mont noted that he ‘would like to see his reaction to the final stage
of training before passing an opinion on him’.38 Rosa’s reaction was
certainly decisive. On 29 April, London received a phone call from the
Commandant of Beaulieu, Lt Col J.W. Munn, who reported that Rosa
‘has stated quite firmly that he will not go any further with any work
indicated by the nature of the training which he is receiving’. Munn was
told to ‘lay off the training’ until the matter had been discussed.39 At
the request of the Chief Instructor S.H.C. Woolrych, Rosa was quickly
removed from Beaulieu and taken to Bellasis, where he was interviewed
by an SOE officer who confirmed that Rosa was ‘useless for our purposes’.40
The case of Rosa further complicated the issue of how to deal with
failed recruits, as it was universally acknowledged that he was not a
troublesome bad influence, nor was he unreliable; he was simply not
suited to the rigours of life as an SOE agent. As Whetmore pointed
out, Rosa was ‘a misfit’, who remained ‘very well disposed and content
to serve as an ordinary soldier’.41 Indeed, following his removal from
training, Rosa received a number of glowing reports. L/Cpl Alexander
recorded that Rosa had ‘been a real help’ with the cooking and ‘done
extremely well’. He was later taken to ‘Section HQ’ where, according
to Sgt Rees, he proved to be ‘extremely useful He has made a most
favourable impression from the date of his first arrival.’42
Meanwhile, further ‘pruning’ of Spanish recruits in training was
discussed on 27 May. By this point it had been concluded that the
recruit referred to only as ‘Romeo’ was ‘a talker and unreliable’. Yet
there remained no satisfactory solution in such cases, the only available
option being to return Romeo to the Pioneer Corps:
I said ‘Sir, I want NCO’s. Not the sort of “shut your bloody mouth,
man!” ’, I said, ‘I want men who have a fatherly attitude to the men
under them This is very important, sir. I want men who have
families of their own, and can understand young people.’61
As a result of his request, Fyffe was given Simon Vass as his adjutant.
Born in Cawdor, Nairnshire, in December 1892, Vass enlisted in the
Cameron Highlanders in November 1909, serving in India, France and
Salonika. He went on to serve with the King’s African Rifles in East Africa
from May 1917 to October 1919, and was posted to the army reserve
upon his return to the UK. In November 1921, he was discharged and
pursued a career with the Post Office, joining the Cameron Highlanders
as a territorial in April 1924. Vass joined SOE in December 1941. Fyffe
recalls that he was ‘a great help, my Adjutant, very fatherly figure. When
I was away Vass ran the place like clockwork.’62 He remained at Inver-
lair until November 1943, at which point he was transferred to SOE’s
Training Section.
Fyffe remembers Rosa and Bertoli, both of whom were already resident
at Inverlair at the time of his appointment. He recalls that Rosa ‘would
36 Security and Special Operations
never have fitted in’, and was ‘physically unfit to be an agent’, while
Bertoli ‘wasn’t strong mentally or physically’.63 However, they did have
other skills that were very much appreciated. By 10 July, Rosa was ‘acting
as cook’ at Inverlair, and ‘working very well’.64 A later report noted that
both he and Bertoli were ‘constantly occupied in the cookhouse’, where
they were ‘working well and giving us no trouble’.65 A further early
report recorded that Rosa ‘is a great asset to the establishment. He has
acted responsibly and has co-operated well, is always punctual with the
meals which continue to be excellently prepared.’66 Purisiol’s arrival at
Inverlair was delayed by a brief spell in hospital at Fort William (under
the guise of ‘Andrew du Pont, a Free Frenchman’). Taking up residence
at Inverlair on 24 July, it was noted that Purisiol ‘works well and gives
no trouble. He has proved extremely helpful and we are all very pleased
with him.’67 Fyffe recalls Purisiol as a ‘great chap, I had a lot of time for
him’. However, he believes that Purisiol ‘couldn’t have made an agent
because he was so outstandingly ugly. He’d be recognised anywhere –
once seen, never forgotten. He had no teeth at all, except two gold tusks,
two incisors.’68
Fyffe was aware that he was sitting on a potential powder keg, given
the mix of nationalities at Inverlair, some of which were ‘at daggers
drawn we had to try and jolly them along together’.69 In addition,
detention itself could cause resentment and fuel trouble. Reports on
Rosa’s behaviour were initially positive (‘Works hard and by producing
excellent meals does a great deal to sustain the morale of the estab-
lishment’; ‘A decent, reliable and hard working man, and a first class
cook, who does wonders with army rations’), but cracks began to show
as time wore on. By mid-July, L/Cpl Pickering recorded that he was
‘apt to get rather moody at times’.70 He made some attempt to explain
this, noting ‘This is probably due to the sense of confinement suffered
by all the students at Inverlair House.’ Of potentially greater concern,
Pickering continued, was Rosa’s belief that he ‘will only be here for a
matter of three or four weeks’, leading to a belief that ‘a prolonged stay
at this place would have a very bad effect on him if he remains here
long he will become discouraged and difficult to handle’. Cpl Holland
emphasised the point on 31 July, observing that Rosa ‘seems to think
his stay is only temporary’. In early August, Glanville Brown recorded,
‘He seems to think that when I go back he will return with me and I
do not know what effect it will have on him when he finds out that
this is not the case.’ The result, Beaumont noted in late September, was
depression, which manifested itself in the form of a considerable drop
in the standard of cooking: ‘there seems at present to be a certain ill-will
Inverlair No. 6 Special Workshop School: ‘The Cooler’ 37
Purisiol had grown increasingly disenchanted with his lot. Cpl Mendes
reported an ‘outburst’ which occurred on 30 October:
Would very much like to lay hands on those responsible for his
presence back here. Expressed himself in unusually violent terms on
this subject. After this outburst has calmed down and reconciliated
himself with his boiler.76
All around the Lochaber area there was an abundance of metal which
was the left-over debris from the various constructions connected
with the Aluminium works and the tunnels for the conveyance
of water to the works at Fort William. There were iron rails from
the miles of narrow gauge railways, steel joists, corrugated sheets,
aluminium in sheet and extruded wire form, all left as unwanted
rubbish. I arranged with the Fort William board, some of whom
I knew from before my Inverlair days, that we would clear the area,
moor and hill, of the bits and pieces and turn them over to the iron
works in Lanarkshire. This was agreed and we sent, I think, three or
four railway wagons of metals to these works But a lot of useful
material we retained, and a small foundry was set up at the Lodge,
where we erected a forge, blown by hand bellows made from old
truck tyres.80
Such activity helped to keep the residents busy, and had a particularly
positive effect upon Purisiol. In May 1942, Fyffe reported that since a
forge had been acquired, Purisiol ‘has been like a bairn with a new toy’,
making ‘all kinds of things out of the scrap metal’.81 The work also made
a valuable contribution to the training carried out at nearby Aviemore:
With the help of such activity, there were few instances of trouble at
Inverlair. Certain precautionary measures had, however, been taken.
Prior to Fyffe’s arrival, Glanville Brown had ‘set aside one room, which
was a larder – a cold store, in fact – as a cell’, although Fyffe was advised
by Whetmore not to use it too often. Fyffe recalls that he ‘tried to be
friendly’ with the men at Inverlair, but on one occasion a stricter line
had to be taken, following an incident in which a resident Dutchman
struck a Belgian, seemingly without motivation:
He was a man who feigned sickness every so often, and this partic-
ular morning he feigned sickness and he missed his dinner, and the
Belgian was mess orderly that day in the men’s canteen, and he just
came downstairs and bashed the Belgian, just like that, without any
explanation And then, of course, he was restrained by the others
standing around, and then the fracas outside the mess and my office
at lunchtime, and he was breaking the walls!83
There was also one occasion on which two residents tried to escape, by
which point Fyffe had left Inverlair, becoming head of Military Security
in London. Boyle noted in 1944 that during the three years of its exist-
ence ‘we have been fairly lucky we have only had one escape from
the Cooler’. The man, ‘a guest from S.I.S.’, had been recaptured within
12 hours.84
Over the 4 years of its existence, a total of 82 men were sent to
Inverlair, one of whom was sent there twice, while two others were held
on behalf of SIS.85 Fyffe is keen to dispel the myths that have developed
surrounding Inverlair since the end of the war, particularly the negative
implications that the word ‘Cooler’, slang for prison, gives to those who
ended up there. As he points out, Inverlair
40 Security and Special Operations
was a place [for] those unfortunates – male only – who were unable to
complete the [training] course. Not necessarily through their fault at
all, they simply couldn’t manage to take all the stresses and strains of
the various exercises they were required to do they were wrongly
selected by the Country Sections – they hadn’t done their home-
work on these particular individuals I had to keep them happy,
for their short or longer stay – and some stayed years. They were
not malcontents at all. I know they were referred to as being ‘in
the Cooler’, but that was miles and miles from the atmosphere at
Inverlair certainly there was no restraint.86
I do not know of what this course consisted and upon this point I
should be most grateful if you would let me have your considered
opinion as to the danger involved, should these men be returned to
their A.M.P.C. Company, in view of the information they may have
acquired at Beaulieu. If you consider that this course was sufficiently
secret to warrant a period of incarceration, then we shall have no
alternative to consider them as candidates until their information
dies down.92
42 Security and Special Operations
It is quite clear that a bad mistake was made ever to have recruited
such a completely irresponsible young man to work as a W/T oper-
ator for an important organisation. He himself admits to having
his photograph taken, dressed in his parachute kit, to having given
demonstrations of his arrival, to pretending to be joint head of the
organisation, to having been sent by the British to spy on his leader
Griffin and to having deliberately passed on untrue information to
his chief.
The reports which we have received from his own Section may exag-
gerate his crimes and show up the organisation for which he was
working in better colours than that which they deserve. My own
view is that Griffin himself committed a number of grave blunders
and was, right from the start, a very bad example to such a young
and inexperienced agent. This, however, cannot excuse Badger and
Inverlair No. 6 Special Workshop School: ‘The Cooler’ 43
and youthful irresponsibility in the field’. It was also pointed out that
‘Col. Marissal, of Belgian 2eme Section, strongly supports the above
recommendation’.105 The recommendation that Holvoet be sent to the
Cooler was approved, and Holvoet arrived at Inverlair early in October.
At Inverlair, Holvoet became ‘Number 59’. The first report on his
behaviour, written within days of his arrival, noted that he ‘seems a
quiet type, and a good worker, although perhaps a little immature. I do
not expect any difficulty with him.’106 A later report from November
again drew attention to his immaturity, but was otherwise uncritical,
considering him a ‘good type’ who ‘might well be used yet’.107 A report
from 30 November noted that he had ‘behaved very well I feel sure
that he has learned his lesson and that he will profit by it He is quite
a good influence in the house, and has made many friends.’108 Having
spent over 2 months at Inverlair, on 16 December the Belgian Section
was asked whether there was any objection to Holvoet’s release being
set in motion. No objection was forthcoming, and his case was reviewed
in early January.109 Holvoet was sworn out of SOE on 12 January, and
returned to his unit the following day.110
In line with Security Section’s belief that Inverlair was not a permanent
solution for problematic recruits, efforts to find Purisiol a suitable job
continued; as we have seen, these progressed as far as his attending
an interview in London. However, this was unsuccessful, and Puri-
siol returned to Inverlair. Whetmore wrote to Fyffe on 5 November,
instructing him to ‘impress on Purisiol that he must make every effort
to improve his English’:
it is not consistent with good policy to place under restraint for the
rest of the war a student who ‘goes stale or goes bad’.
We are handling several hundred students. The qualities which are
required in the finished product are rare, consequently the number
of rejects is large. If failures on any account had to be kept under
Inverlair No. 6 Special Workshop School: ‘The Cooler’ 45
This man is not secure. He has a craving for drink and is constantly
trying to slip off and have one. He is [in] debt, having borrowed
money from me and from other students. He is a chain-smoker. He
was the first to find a woman in the district, and when she asked
him where he was stationed, in spite of security talks and constant
stressing, he told her that ‘he was not allowed to say.’ He shirks
anything that is arduous if there is not a drink at the end of it, and
will never have it that he is in the wrong – very argumentative.122
A report in late August indicated that Armanet ‘has not improved in the
slightest. He continues to try all the “old soldier’s” trick[s], and plays on
the idea that he understands no English. He has now had his last chance
to reform.’128 The ‘promise of summary action being taken against him’
had resulted in a considerable improvement in Armanet’s behaviour by
early October:
This man has made great strides during the last few weeks; he
was always the ring leader in any trouble, and tried to play the ‘Old
soldier’ on every occasion. The sight of the guardroom was sufficient
to cool his ardour in this direction, and since then he has been a
model worker.
(‘He does not wish to get a job in a factory but earnestly hopes to
remain in a fighting unit of his own forces.’) The report pointed out
that Armanet ‘is an excellent craftsman and an expert on railways, and
might be of real use to some Sapper unit’. He was sworn out of SOE
on 11 December, by which point the more disagreeable aspects of his
character had reappeared:
Looking back at the work of the Security Section in January 1946, with
SOE within days of dissolution, Boyle recalled the difficulty that had
been experienced in ‘keeping fully in touch with S.O.E. overseas on
Security matters’.1 SOE established Missions in North Africa, Egypt, Italy
and India, all of which had their own security needs. Matters of overseas
security did not originally fall within the remit of the Security Section in
London, but greater participation developed over time, although never
to the extent of seeing all of SOE’s security needs directly controlled by
London. The involvement of a London-based section in overseas affairs
was not without its own problems, particularly the risk of being inter-
preted as unwelcome interference in the Mission’s sphere of responsib-
ility. In order to successfully ‘franchise’ the security practice developed
in London overseas, the Security Section had to be careful not to offend
the sensibilities of the Mission Commanders.
The Security Section’s first significant links abroad were forged in
September 1942, at which point the head of SOE’s Cairo Mission
reported to London that the security situation there was ‘unsatisfactory’,
and requested assistance.2 The poor state of security during the Mission’s
early days was recorded by the Countess of Ranfurly, who worked for
SOE Cairo for a brief spell in an administrative capacity. On 27 February
1941, she wrote,
50
Security Abroad 51
of her concerns (‘I told him briefly but strongly with great emphasis
on security).’ She also proceeded to discuss the situation with General
Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East, who, she discovered, was
also ‘worried over their lack of proper security’. She agreed to act as his
informant, duplicating ‘worrying’ documents for him at night. The irony
of the situation was apparently lost on the Countess, whose security
concerns thus led her to commit a serious breach of security. During the
summer, assisted by Ranfurly’s willingness to provide internal papers,
an ‘Anti-SO2 Dossier’ was compiled by SOE’s enemies in Cairo, which
included criticism of security matters.4 However, upon reading through
the ‘dossier’, SOE Staff Officer Bickham Sweet-Escott was in no doubt
that much of it was based ‘on mere hearsay I am no lawyer, but
it was quite obvious to me that none of these reports could possibly
for one moment be treated as evidence in any court of law, and that
they proved nothing’.5 Ranfurly left SOE at the end of June 1941, but
was informed in August that SOE was ‘being cleaned up’.6 Whatever
action was taken at this point failed to make a significant impact on
the security situation; a Mission Security Section was created at some
point prior to September 1942, but this quickly lost the confidence
of the operational Country Sections and ended up doing very little
security work.7
By the time the request for security assistance from London was made,
the Mission was undergoing an extensive reorganisation, which aimed
to ‘assimilate the Cairo organisation to that of SOE in London’.8 In
response, the Security Section obtained a suitable officer from MI5,
Major Godfrey A. Gillson, who underwent an SOE training course and
was attached to the Section in London for a few months. Arriving
in Cairo in March 1943, Gillson soon discovered the enormity of the
task before him. ‘My job here’, he later wrote, ‘has not been so much
re-organization of this department, but the reformation of Security.’9
The lack of attention that had been given to security meant the records
of previous security cases were – at best – incomplete, while the previous
half-hearted attempts to improve security provision meant that Gillson
faced the ‘mistrust’ of the Country Sections; the situation between the
Security Section and the Country Sections had deteriorated to such an
extent that the Country Sections ‘were attempting to carry out their
own security needs’, with security personnel ‘handling the disposal of
bodies and practically nothing else’. As Gillson noted,
For the first week after I arrived I had three incoming telephone
calls and one visitor. There was a complete lack of confidence in the
52 Security and Special Operations
From experience gained here, the Second War Capital, where one
would have expected Security to have had a recognised and assured
position it is reasonable to infer that if, in this most important of our
centres, Security was a Cinderella, the same probably applies to other
Missions.27
Gillson had felt a need for global security co-ordination since his arrival
in Cairo. His first progress report to London, written in April, had
concluded with the observation that a greater exchange of personnel
between London and the Missions would be necessary in order to attain
‘something like a “pattern” of Security for all countries’.31 By June, his
opinion had hardened:
This is all very well but D/H 147 [Gillson] is our security officer and
is of more use and necessarily useful to us here than running around
collecting reports for D/CE.
D/CE should have an inspector to do this. D/H 147 has too much to
do to go home now.
This sort of defence of the power of the Head of Mission ensured that
the London-based Security Section failed to achieve total control over
SOE security on a global basis as advocated by Gillson.
Adequate security provision was similarly overlooked in the case of
SOE’s North African Mission, Massingham. Security had been considered
during the initial planning stage for the mission in October 1942. Advoc-
ating the creation of a North African Mission in a paper to Hambro,
Gubbins noted that ‘We shall need there a microcosm of what we have
here in London.’34 As such, the proposed draft organisational chart for
the mission included an ‘Intelligence and Security’ branch. However,
this was not considered of sufficient priority to see Peter Lee arrive in
Algiers as the Mission’s Security Officer until May 1943, a few weeks
after his field security staff. As Lee recalls,
They didn’t send us out there until the mission had been established.
They went out there in November–December 42 – my men didn’t get
out there ’til April. So that’s four months with no real security taking
place at all. The paramilitary side of our organisation, the uniform
side, couldn’t see any reason at all why they shouldn’t go driving
around North Africa with ‘SOE’ in reflective paint on their jeeps –
couldn’t see anything wrong with it! So we spent a lot of our time in
the four, five months I was in North Africa trying to instil reasonable
security attitudes in the minds of these very efficient operational
chaps.35
Security Abroad 57
this is the first time in my experience with the firm when it has been
possible for security to get in at the beginning and start level with
all the other departments and in some small measure help to get
the thing going. It is invigorating to be here with all one’s services
contacted before the work starts in earnest and not be in the usual
position of trying to catch up on six months work.38
Although ‘security work proper’ did not start immediately, Lee noted
that the early arrival of security personnel meant they were ‘fully in the
picture and know the background to our set-up’, and were consequently
‘much more useful as security men than they would be if they arrived
later’. He also pointed out that their very presence ‘encourages other
departments to think and plan along secure lines where in the past this
subject has received scant attention’.
Lee’s early optimism was short-lived, as he came to appreciate the
inadequate number of security officers at his disposal. SOE’s security
arrangements in Italy soon became more complicated. On 8 November,
Lee wrote that ‘The man who was D.CE5 in April 43 has arrived’; a refer-
ence to Arthur Baird, who had arrived in Italy with Advance Force 133,
an offshoot of the Cairo Mission, heading its security representation.39
It did not take long for the idea of ‘pooling’ the security personnel of
both forces to be raised. Lee saw this as the perfect way to overcome the
shortage of security personnel he faced. He noted that ‘some of the best’
Field Security personnel were attached to Baird’s unit, and was particu-
larly irritated to find that they were ‘being used on non-linguist jobs’,
which he considered ‘a tragedy in view of the chronic shortage of FSP
for this theatre’. Lee’s hope for a quick pooling arrangement was overly
optimistic. By the time of his next report, he was still bemoaning his lack
of adequate security staff, which meant that ‘Security work in general
is being skimped willy-nilly’, a situation that was ‘further aggravated
58 Security and Special Operations
During the initial phase of our life here we all had to lend a
hand at doing some job which was not strictly our own. Since then,
however, I have been asked, and even ordered, on many occasions to
do jobs which were absolutely no part of my duties I have bought
countless pairs of stockings and packages of cosmetics for officers to
send home; I have bought table-lamps, typewriters, and office equip-
ment; I have spent a lot of time finding and employing domestic
staff, carpenters, electricians, mechanics, and the like If someone
wishes a request for something to be made to the mayor or the police,
I am sent. If civilians are to be turned out of requisitioned property
elsewhere, I am sent.41
In terms of contact with Baird, Lee noted that ‘We exchange circulars
and generally keep each other informed of this and that’, but there was
no indication that any further progress had been made on the idea of
pooling staff, much to Lee’s concern:
The shortage of staff exacerbated the problems Lee faced over the issue
of vetting, on account of the lack of MI5 representation in the area:
stressed that his Section ‘cannot possibly accept responsibility for saying
that all recruits taken on by MARYLAND are O.K.’
The security situation had ‘not improved’ by Lee’s next report in
late December.43 To make matters worse, even the most basic security
precautions were being neglected:
Lee wrote again on 19 January, noting that security had ‘struggled along’,
helped by the arrival of a number of new security officers (‘a blessing but
it will not be until next month that their numbers will be felt’).45 Some
progress had been made on the subject of pooling security personnel,
although nothing had been finalised.
Improvements to security arrangements in Italy, including action on
the issue of unified security representation, resulted from a visit by
Senter to the Mediterranean in February–March 1944, in response to
‘an invitation from Cairo to send a senior Security officer from England
to report and advise’.46 He arrived at Massingham on 28 February, and
travelled on to Cairo on 5 March. He remained there until 18 March,
travelling to Bari that day. He visited Naples on 20 March, travelling
on to Monopoli 2 days later. On 24 March he returned to Cairo, where
he prepared a report and recommendations for Major General W.A.M.
Stawell, who had taken over SOE Cairo in November 1943 and since
60 Security and Special Operations
moved forward into Italy, where he headed the newly constituted Special
Operations Mediterranean (SO(M)). Senter acknowledged the ‘impossib-
ility of obtaining a complete view of this highly complex problem in
the time available’, and moved to pre-empt Mission sensibilities by
emphasising that he had ‘not approached the problem with the idea
that London practice is necessarily applicable to Mediterranean prob-
lems’. By this point, however, London’s position when dealing with the
Missions had been strengthened, as Senter was quick to point out:
In the past the arrangement has been that every group or mission
overseas was regarded as self-contained for all services, and commu-
nications on most matters have been indirect and not fully system-
atic. In view of CD’s policy decision of January of this year that all
technical services overseas should be in direct communication with
their opposite number at home, some modification of the past policy
is called for this does not imply any derogation from the prin-
ciple of unified command in the theatre, but rather that the Security
officers should be fully in touch with Security policy and practice
elsewhere, so as to be able more fully to advise the Force Commander
on whose staff they serve.
the operations meetings and to see traffic from the field’. He also felt
that, time permitting, it ‘would be advantageous for Major Oughton
to travel to London for, say, a month in order to study headquarters
practice in the Special Section’.
Senter acknowledged the extensive work that had been carried out by
Gillson in raising the standard of security at the Cairo Mission. However,
he pointed out that Gillson had not tackled operational security, an
absence which needed to be addressed. Having held discussions with
the Country Sections, Senter was confident that they would ‘welcome
the extension of Security along operational Security lines’. He noted
that James Klugmann of the Yugoslav Section (with whom Senter had
also met in order to assess his potential security risk to SOE as a
known Communist) ‘welcomed the prospect of developing operational
security’.47 Due to staff shortages, Klugmann noted that study of the
implications of a casualty in the field upon the security of other agents
‘might well require one or two weeks intensive work’; a situation that
could be improved with the provision of adequate operational security.
While Senter believed that the Security Section should ‘be encouraged
to work in more closely on the operational side so as to develop
operational security’, it was clear to him that the section ‘was hardly
in a position to undertake extensive new work’. He urged two new
security appointments ‘without delay’: a general assistant for the section
head, who could stand in for him in his absence, and an interrogating
officer.
Senter’s most extensive recommendations were reserved for Italy.
Here, he had already reached agreement with Stawell for the appoint-
ment of a GSO1 Security. After much deliberation, the post was filled by
Lt Col Hoyer Millar, formerly of 21 Army Group, who, ‘after the usual
attachment and training with S.O.E. in London, went out to the Medi-
terranean to co-ordinate all Security measures there’.48 Senter’s target
was the nature of the security organisation in Italy that Hoyer Millar
would oversee. He emphasised the ridiculousness of a situation that saw
security officers of Maryland and Advance Force 133 working in the
same building but entirely separately, and argued that such artificial
barriers needed to be broken down:
agreed in toto to the S.I. paper which I had submitted to him at his
request.’50 A three-page paper outlined the three main functions of SIP,
which conformed closely to Bayswater in London:
The Panel was formed quickly, and by the end of May its work had
‘progressed tremendously’.52 Discussions were held with representatives
of Section V of SIS (Lee noted that liaison between SIP and Section V
was ‘friendly and close’) to ensure that the Panel’s records were main-
tained in a fashion which would allow for easy handover ‘when the
time comes’.
Before long, with Senter back in London, the new security arrange-
ments in Italy ran into trouble as the original issues of turf warfare, offset
by Senter, resurfaced, masked by organisational and procedural issues
over a proper establishment for the Panel. Despite having the support of
General Stawell, the Panel had never been placed ‘on a very satisfactory
footing’:
i. This is where the raw material, i.e. recruits, returned agents, etc. is
available.
ii. It is necessary to carry out day to day checks against the records
of other organisations, i.e. S.C.I., P.W.B., etc. which are installed, at
present, in Rome. The move of the Panel was in fact co-ordinated
with that of these other organisations.54
Hoyer Millar tried to persuade Holdsworth that, rather than having lost
a security officer, he had gained access to a larger security staff, but met
with only partial success (‘while this is accepted it is, I’m afraid, not with
great enthusiasm’).55 Holdsworth’s belief that the Panel was of little or
no relevance was based upon the para-military nature of the activities
now being conducted, which in his view rendered it ‘only of academic
or post-war interest’.
Holdsworth was not alone in this analysis: as Hoyer Millar observed,
there was a ‘considerable volume of opinion’ at SO(M) that considered
the work of SIP to be ‘purely academic and of little value to the
Country Sections or is work which is really the responsibility of some
other organisation’. Entering the dispute on 30 July, J.G. Beevor echoed
Holdsworth’s point, arguing that ‘The speed at which events in Italy
are moving and the development of open Partisan guerrilla activities
have gone far to remove Italy from our category of a purely clandes-
tine country where a more highly developed security organisation is the
first necessity.’56 Beevor believed that the ‘immediate priority needs of
SOM and its units is to meet urgent operational commitments in the
next three months which may well be the climax of the war’, and felt
Security Abroad 65
I know from considerable experience over the last three years that
operational sections of an organisation such as ours do not always
instantaneously perceive the need for advanced Security arrange-
ments, and it has been an up-hill job in some places advising opera-
tional sections of the need for creating, for example, adequate records
if our operations are to be attended with due Security and if we are
to conduct a profitable two-way liaison with other Security author-
ities I believe that some operational sections tend to underrate
the work that is required and the staff that is required to conduct
profitable liaison with other Departments.
He closed by noting his support for Hoyer Millar in his struggle: ‘if there
is anything at all that we can do to reinforce your efforts, I hope you
know that calls from you have a high priority’. Senter provided further
reinforcement later in August, by which point he had received copies of
further correspondence between Hoyer Millar and Beevor on the work of
the Panel. He encouraged Hoyer Millar to discuss the points he had made
with Beevor, to the extent of suggesting that Hoyer Millar should show
him their correspondence on the subject. While he hoped Beevor would
‘realise that I do not underrate his difficulties on the priority side’, Senter
maintained his belief that Security Intelligence was a necessity, not a
luxury, for work in the field, emphasising that it was ‘a contribution
to operational security’.60 The Panel was not abolished; Senter wrote
again on 5 September, by which point he was ‘delighted’ to hear of the
progress Hoyer Millar had made in securing an establishment – and with
it a future – for the Panel, noting ‘I am sure that as the campaigning
phase approaches, you will find, as we have found in France, that the
C.I. side is fully employed.’61
Maintaining the connection between London and the Mediterranean,
Roche visited Italy later in the year, and expressed ‘great satisfaction’
Security Abroad 67
with the security arrangements in place. Hoyer Millar notified both Lee
and Baird of Roche’s approval, adding his own thanks for the ‘very
great deal which you have done towards the present satisfactory state
of affairs’.62 By December, Lee reported that SIP’s ‘information, records
and methods of interrogation’ concerning operations in Italy were ‘as
nearly complete as is possible’:
There is no longer the almost desperate scramble for odd bits and
pieces of information which characterised the previous months.
Instead, when a ‘returned Joe’ appears, we know almost immediately
what to ask him and in most cases we have a shrewd idea as to
whether or not the subsequent interrogation is likely to be difficult.63
The position of security in Italy did not, however, remain stable for
very long. In late November, Lee permitted an Inspector of Army Equip-
ment to enter an SO(M) establishment, where he found ‘many breaches
of existing regulations’.64 Hoyer Millar wrote to Lee on 21 December,
berating him for his attitude towards regulations and administrative
affairs:
The incident, little more than an irritant in itself, was the final straw for
Hoyer Millar, who wrote to Senter on 16 January, having ‘very reluct-
antly decided that the time has come when we must, I’m afraid, replace
Peter Lee’.66 Hoyer Millar revealed that he had felt this to be neces-
sary for some time, having concluded that Lee ‘seems temperamentally
unsuited to ensure smooth running either with his own staff or with
Maryland’. While Hoyer Millar readily admitted that Lee ‘did a first-class
job in bringing the S.I.P. into the world and in running it under difficult
conditions’, he pointed out that he was ‘also responsible for it being a
little beloved and rather unhappy child’. Although relations with Mary-
land were ‘infinitely more cordial now than they have ever been and
the service which the S.I.P. can provide is at last being appreciated’, Lee
was ‘still not “persona grata” with Maryland (nor Maryland with him)’,
and the improvement in relations was due to the care exercised by Lee’s
68 Security and Special Operations
staff in their dealings with Maryland. Hoyer Millar’s concern for the SIP
staff was revealed as he continued:
As Hoyer Millar put the point more bluntly in a letter to Roche, ‘he is
clearly, from the point of view of his own staff, unnecessarily difficult
to work for and I assess the staff at a higher value than Peter himself’.67
Aside from such issues of personality, much of the problem stemmed
from Lee’s interest in post-war intelligence issues:
A lack of language skills meant that the role of Field Security officers
accompanying agents on training courses was far more limited than
elsewhere, as it was realised that ‘information obtained in other theatres
by security personnel in the course of accompanying duty could only
be gathered from the Country Section officers who alone were qualified
to express an opinion’.74
One very real, as opposed to cultural, difference for security work in
India resulted from the ‘geographical disposition’ of the Mission. In the
official history SOE in the Far East, Charles Cruickshank highlighted the
logistics of work in India, where it ‘took a day and a half by air from Delhi
to Colombo, and five days by train. Delhi to Calcutta took six hours by
air, and thirty by train. It was a day’s flight from Calcutta to Kunming
over “the thump” – the Himalayas – weather and the Japanese air force
permitting’.75 The distances separating the Mission’s main centres led
to ‘the decentralisation of security control, in order to assure prompt
action where necessary’, along with an unprecedented reliance upon
telephones to discuss secret matters. The Mission was divided into five
security areas: Headquarters (Meerut), Calcutta, Ceylon, Poona–Bombay
and Madras. A Security Officer was stationed at the ‘principal H.Q.’ of
each area, responsible to both Guild and the local Area Commander.76
Security Abroad 71
The Security Section also found itself responsible for the surveil-
lance of Chinese recruits during their stay in India, a task that was
unheard of in London, where it was a point of policy ‘to abstain from
Security measures of a “snooping” character and to rely upon close
relations between the Security department of the organization and the
appropriate outside Security authorities to bring to notice any personal
Security cases’.77 The situation in India was quite different. A ‘large
percentage’ of the agents employed by the Mission were Chinese –
three out of every four agents in training in the spring of 1944 were
Chinese – which was of some concern to the Government of India as
‘it was considered highly probable that the Chinese agents supplied to
the Mission were expected to report back to China matters of interest
to their own Government’.78 The Mission initiated negotiations with
the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which resulted in the creation of a Chinese
Intelligence Section (CIS). Working under cover of the Calcutta Police,
CIS had ‘the two-fold object of maintaining a watch on the activities
and contacts of the Mission’s Chinese agents and keeping the police
supplied with information about Chinese intelligence and other activ-
ities in Calcutta’. Established in March 1945, CIS was headed by Lt Col
K.M. Bourne, CBE, MC. Close liaison was maintained with the Security
Section, ‘under appropriate cover arrangements’, which supplied ‘all the
necessary information about the Mission’s Chinese employees’. By the
autumn of 1945, when CIS was ‘beginning to show a return’, the end
of the war ‘resulted in the decision that S.O.E. should withdraw from
participation in the scheme’.79
In other respects, the difficulties facing Guild were familiar to those in
other theatres. As Lee discovered in Italy, a serious problem was posed
by the lack of an organisation ‘corresponding to M.I.5 in the United
Kingdom or S.I.M.E. in the Middle East, through whom we can carry
out almost all our enquiries’. The most appropriate alternative was the
IB of the Central Government, a police security intelligence department
which worked ‘under the auspices of the Viceroy and the Home Depart-
ment of the Government of India’.80 The Director of the Bureau, Sir
Denys Pilditch, proved to be ‘most helpful and well-disposed towards
this organisation’.81 While it was admitted that the vetting procedure
established was ‘by no means as thorough’ as that carried out in the UK
in consultation with MI5, liaison with IB, in conjunction with access to
local police force records, proved satisfactory: ‘the number of rejects on
security grounds proved the value of the innovation’.
Another familiar problem concerned the need for suitable arrange-
ments for the detention of unreliable agents, divided into the usual
72 Security and Special Operations
that their duties were routine and did not involve ‘the more intricate
tasks’ of accompanying and surveillance carried out by Field Security
in the UK, the appointments proved successful.83 Operational activity
in the Far East increased during the winter of 1944–45, which ‘taxed
the section’s resources to the utmost’. Reinforcements, including four
Field Security Officers, arrived from December onwards, which helped
to narrow ‘the gap between the Section’s responsibilities and its ability
to fulfil them’.
4
Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation
The relationship between SOE and MI5 got off to a rather inauspicious
start. Senter later recalled that ‘in MI5, as in other departments, some
who afterwards became friends of S.O.E. apparently began by regarding
it as an unorthodox and somewhat irresponsible newcomer’. He went on
to single out O.A. (‘Jasper’) Harker, Deputy Director General of MI5, and
T.A. (‘Tar’) Robertson, head of B1(a), the Section that dealt with double
cross agents, as two early supporters of SOE.1 Boyle concurred with
Senter’s comments, observing that ‘Until S.O.E. became accepted by
the always (and rightly) suspicious permanent Security officials, troubles
were frequent.’2 One of the most significant hurdles the relationship
between SOE and MI5 faced in the early days was the lack of adequate
liaison machinery, which led to some rather roundabout efforts to make
contact. In November 1940, an unnamed member of SOE contacted
the Deputy Chief of SIS, Valentine Vivian, asking for assistance in a
matter that clearly came under the auspices of MI5. A somewhat puzzled
Vivian telephoned Calthrop, who explained that SOE had no direct
liaison with MI5. As such, Calthrop went on to note that he would be
immensely grateful if Vivian would contact MI5 and obtain the required
information on SOE’s behalf. Vivian agreed to help, albeit reluctantly –
concerned that the incident had the potential to establish an undesirable
precedent (‘S.O.(2) is no longer a part of our organisation and we are
not responsible for its administrative work’).3
The fledgling SOE was keen to learn from MI5, particularly about
its experiences of German agents and saboteurs despatched to the
UK. Anthony Blunt, who had joined MI5 in June 1940, assisted
Whetmore in his efforts to gain such information, introducing him
to Lord Rothschild, an anti-sabotage specialist employed in B Division.
It is likely that Rothschild was able to provide Whetmore with such
details of the kind of specialised equipment used by German saboteurs
74
Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation 75
Such has been the hasty manner of their training and dispatch that
one rather important matter has usually been overlooked – i.e. they
have not been taught how to descend by parachute, with the result
that several have sustained injuries which have prevented them from
immediately making their escape.8
The MI5 refused to reconsider. Harker argued that it ‘would not be prac-
tical’ to place Langdon in a position comparable to Senter. However, he
did concede that in ‘doubtful cases’, in which the appropriate Divisional
contact was unclear, Langdon ‘would be available for consultation about
the best method of procedure’.19
Further amendments to the liaison procedure – to which Lakin noted
that SOE attached ‘the greatest importance’ – were made in January
1942, on account of Whetmore’s departure and Senter’s promotion.
While Lakin wanted as much to remain unchanged as possible, he was
‘anxious that some delegation of [Senter’s] functions on specific matters
should be immediately agreed’.20 As such, he proposed that while MI5
should still refer to Senter on day-to-day matters, heads of Divisions
and Sections should be warned that ‘these matters may be dealt with
on his behalf by officers responsible to him’, nominating Dick Warden,
Arthur Baird and Hugh Park for this work. MI5 raised no objections to
the development.
Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation 79
While MI5 wanted its liaison with SOE regularised to involve dealing
with a limited number of people, it had little appetite to see all of its
dealings with SOE automatically canalised through the Security Section,
believing that it could benefit from direct contact with other parts of
the organisation. On 6 August 1941, the day on which the Security
Section became recognised as the only conduit through which MI5
would receive requests from SOE, Liddell recorded in his diary:
The more I see this type of work the more certain am I that the closest
co-operation should exist between our various departments in order
that we may derive the fullest benefit from each others experiences.
In response, Senter noted that both Boyle and Lakin were ‘in
wholehearted agreement with your conclusion in favour of close
co-operation’.27 Robertson ended up attending the course at Beaulieu
himself. As with the syllabus, the course made a considerable impact
on him, and upon his return to the office he encouraged Petrie, Harker,
Liddell and Brigadier Allen, the Director of C and D Division, to read
his paper on the subject.28 He recorded that he had come away feeling
‘deeply impressed not only with the substance of the lectures but
with the immensely efficient way in which they were delivered by the
instructors’. Discussions with the Chief Instructor at Beaulieu, S.H.C.
Woolrych, and his staff left Robertson ‘with the feeling that I had learnt
a great deal more about counter-espionage method than I have learnt
during the time I have been in M.I.5. I was, in fact, quite unable to add
anything to their store of knowledge.’29 Robertson proposed that further
interchanges of personnel should take place (‘certain chosen people
from M.I.5 engaged on counter-espionage work would I know benefit
greatly by attending a course of instruction as I did’). Additionally, he
Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation 81
believed that it ‘might be very useful for certain members of the Special
Training School to come up to M.I.5 for a short time in order to get first
hand knowledge of the activities of this organisation’. Robertson went
on to outline a number of ways in which MI5 could foster further links
by providing greater assistance to SOE’s training schools. Referring to
the ‘96 Hour Exercises’ for agents, he wrote ‘I am sure that M.I.5. can
help very considerably in making these possibly more realistic than they
are at the moment’, by involving ‘certain selected Chief Constables’,
who would ‘have to be taken into our confidence to a certain extent in
order to ensure that they play to the fullest possible degree’. Robertson
also encouraged a greater exchange of information:
spend some time at MI5.32 The invitation was made on 5 June, and
Lakin accepted on Woolrych’s behalf the following day.33 An intensive
programme was prepared for the visit, which took place over 15–20
June.34
Woolrych wrote to Robertson, expressing his thanks for ‘one of the
most interesting weeks I have ever spent’, on 23 June.35 In response,
Robertson expressed his belief that the visit ‘will lead to much closer
relations between your department and mine, which I personally feel is
of the highest importance’.36 Robertson also wrote to Senter. Forwarding
a ‘note on the types of secret ink which are at present being used by the
Germans’, which Woolrych had requested during his visit, he expressed
the belief that the visit had been ‘most useful from both points of view
and will certainly open up the way to further and closer co-operation
between our two Departments, especially with regard to the exchange
of information which may be of use to the School at Beaulieu’.37
Perhaps as a response to these developments, in June Lakin wrote
to Harker, proposing the creation of a series of SOE/MI5 ‘Panels’,
designed to ‘stabilise and extend the liaison which already exists’.38
He suggested two Panels which would take MI5’s liaison with SOE
beyond the Security Section to include the highest possible contacts
elsewhere, although emphasising that these were designed to comple-
ment, not replace, the existing liaison procedure. The first Panel would
build on the foundations of Robertson’s visit to Beaulieu, and deal
with training matters. It would aim to encourage the ‘exchange of
ideas on the training of our agents, co-operation in regard to 96-Hour
Schemes, co-operation in regard to test “grilling” of our agents, and
the reciprocal attachment of selected officers’. The second Panel would
deal with SOE’s communications, as it was recognised that there was
a need for an ‘intensified effort’ to ensure that communications were
secure. Lakin also suggested that it might prove useful to consider the
establishment of a third Panel in which SOE’s operational Country
Sections would participate.
Lakin’s proposal found immediate favour within MI5. White wrote to
Harker on 25 June, noting that Lakin’s ideas were ‘quite acceptable to
us’.39 He was particularly keen to develop further the idea of a Country
Section Panel, pointing to the limitations MI5 faced in its dealings with
the Security Section:
Strictly from the M.I.5 point of view I think that the third type of
Panel suggested might prove to be the most useful. The Country
Sections do have information which would be valuable to us and
Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation 83
I believe that the Security Section of S.O.E. do not always get it. This
is not their fault, however, and I feel that a free exchange between
S.O.E. Country Sections and their opposite numbers here will be of
considerable benefit to us.
London’. Mrs Goldsmith proceeded to tell Stassen that her husband ‘had
recently gone through a Commando training school’. Stassen – who did
not really work for the French Consul, but had told Mrs Goldsmith this
‘because she did not want her to know what her employment really was’
(something which was also a mystery to MI5) – proceeded to report the
conversation.
Park forwarded the information to Maurice Buckmaster, Head of F
Section, on 28 December (‘it would appear that Mrs. Goldsmith should
be warned not to advertise the fact that her husband is in the British
Intelligence Service in France’)51 and wrote to Glover on 1 January,
noting SOE’s concern ‘that Mrs. Goldsmith appears to be a somewhat
indiscreet person’. Park noted that he would ‘very much like to have her
interviewed and warned not to advertise the fact that her husband is in
the British Intelligence Service in France’, and asked Glover to arrange
this.52 An MI5 officer saw Mrs Goldsmith on 8 January, reporting:
At first she denied that she had ever told anyone that her husband
was working for the British Intelligence in France or elsewhere, or
that anything was said at the party about his activities. After I had
pointed out that this was obviously absurd, she admitted that there
had been some talk at the party about her husband. She said that she
was not responsible but that her mother had talked on a previous
occasion to the Americans who were at the party and that they had
again referred to this at the party.53
The officer ‘made it clear’ to Mrs Goldsmith that he did not accept her
denial, and ‘warned her that she must not talk about her husband in
any way in the future’, and also instructed her to ‘tell her mother that if
the Authorities discovered that she was talking about Goldsmith in the
future she might find herself in gaol’.
The seriousness with which loose talk was treated can be seen again in
the case of Marie Therese Le Chene, another F Section agent. A report on
Le Chene during her training had recorded that she was ‘excitable and
talkative’, qualities that, unless kept under rigid control, ‘might prove a
danger’.54 These eventually proved a greater irritant than a danger, but
nonetheless occupied both the Security Section and the MI5 for much
of August–September 1943. On 21 August a security officer informed
Buckmaster that a ‘reliable source’ – later revealed as Mrs Bateson,
an SOE FANY – had reported that Le Chene had ‘informed a person
who knows nothing whatever about our work or organisation that she
“worked for the Secret Service in Baker Street and that she went to France
86 Security and Special Operations
on a destroyer and has recently returned from that country” ’.55 The
information had been contained in a letter Mrs Bateson had received
from her mother. The Security Officer asked that arrangements be made
for Le Chene to be seen about this ‘bad breach of security’. Buckmaster
met with her on 24 August, and quickly concluded that she was ‘a silly
old woman’.56 He suggested that she ‘should be formally reprimanded’,
and, while leaving her ultimate fate to security, noted that he was ‘not
averse’ to her facing serious punishment (‘which I think she thoroughly
deserves’). MI5 was informed by the Security Section on 27 August that
Buckmaster had decided to dispense with her services and, concerned
that Le Chene would ‘probably harbour rather bitter feelings’ against
SOE, asked MI5 to keep a watch on her, providing her address.57 Before
Le Chene’s departure from SOE could be arranged, further trouble arose.
On 1 September, Mrs Bateson presented another letter she had received
from her mother to F Section, which was forwarded to the Security
Section. It began,
Dearest M, Mrs. and Captain Le Chene have now both got safely back
(Secret Service) They are so interesting. Their H.Q. is 23, Nottingham
Place and Mrs. Lechene is having an interview with your MTC Head,
Mrs. Gammel, I think
As such, the French Section felt that Le Chene was very dangerous, being
‘exactly the sort of person who is, because of her complete inability to
hold her tongue about her work, a potential source of valuable inform-
ation to any enemy agent who might come upon her’. Mrs Bateson,
meanwhile, was ‘seriously perturbed by her mother’s capacity for gossip’,
and felt that ‘it would be a good thing if someone saw her and tried to
bring home to her the danger of careless talk’.
Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation 87
although she committed the offence of telling her friends that her
work had taken her underground to France and had brought her back
safely I could not elicit from any of her friends any evidence that she
had told them of the nature of her work.
discharge, and that she should be given a ‘very strong security talk’. In
the meantime, steps were taken to ‘keep an eye on her private address’.
Le Chene was given a ‘strong swearing out talk’ on 4 October, at which
point she refused to sign the Official Secrets Act without first seeking the
advice of her husband, also an F Section agent.61 Informed of this, MI5
felt that one of its officers should visit the couple. An unnamed officer
met with them on 3 December, stressing ‘that there must be no further
complaints of any loose talk’, with which the matter was considered
closed.62
Not all cases of leaked information were concluded as easily, and
despite considerable effort from MI5 remained unsolved. Two such
cases had particularly worrying implications, as SOE notified MI5 that
information received from the field indicated that the Germans had
knowledge of its operational plans, raising the fear that a traitor was at
work in London. The first case arose in August 1942, when SOE received
a telegram from its mission at Stockholm which warned that there ‘is
evidently a traitor in London’. The message stated that the Germans
had known of the despatch of a group of agents to Denmark, and were
also aware that the men concerned had attended a ‘goodbye feast’ in
London prior to their departure. The news came as a particular blow as
the agents were part of the ‘TABLE’ operations, an attempt by SOE to
develop a sabotage network in Denmark.63 Notifying Dick White, Senter
confirmed that a group of Danish agents had gathered at the Three
Vikings, a Danish restaurant in Glasshouse Street, Soho, on 22 July, and
that the group had included two men who had subsequently left for
Denmark.64
There is no faint trace of irony in the fact that the subsequent investig-
ation to find the traitor was headed by Anthony Blunt. Having explored
the possible channels of communication through which the informa-
tion could have been transmitted to the Germans, by December Blunt
had arrived at the tentative conclusion that, despite SOE’s fears, it was
unlikely that the leak was ‘due to a conscious traitor’. Rather, he felt
it was probably the result of an alcohol-fuelled lunch that had been
‘fairly loud and fairly indiscreet’.65 The agent who had arranged the
lunch, known only as Birktoft, admitted to Blunt that the group had
‘talked shop’ at the restaurant. While he explained that they disguised
names and ‘always spoke of “Umbrellas” instead of parachutes’, Blunt
was left with the impression that ‘any intelligent person listening to
their conversation would have known at once that something fairly odd
was being discussed, and could almost certainly have formed a pretty
good idea of what was going on’.66 As such, he felt it likely that the
Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation 89
of the suspicions against him, and that there is nothing further in his
case to follow up’.
The source of the leak remained elusive. In September, Wethered wrote
to Blunt before he reluctantly ‘put the files away’:
Wethered was still waiting for a list of BCRA personnel ‘who might
have been involved with the leakage’.89 When he finally received the
list on 8 December it consisted of surnames only, which caused further
frustration.90 Meanwhile, evidence of insecurity at the offices of the
BCRA began to reach MI5, adding to the suspicion that the Free French
were the source of the leak. This included a claim made by a student in
training who alleged that he had overheard a secretary from the BCRA
office in Duke Street discussing operational matters in a nearby cafe that
was also frequented by the staff of the Selfridges department store, some
of whom appeared to be taking considerable interest in what they could
overhear.91
One particularly promising lead was brought to Wethered’s attention
by SOE’s police liaison officer, Jack O’Reilly, in December. A source
from his Special Branch days informed him that a woman working
for the counter-espionage branch of the BCRA, Mlle. Lemaire, had
admitted to providing secret information to her lover, Jean Denis
Absine, an adjutant in the Belgian Army.92 Their affair over, Absine was
continuing to demand further information from her ‘under the threat
of exposure’.93 Wethered informed Maxwell Knight, and asked him to
interview Lemaire as soon as possible. (‘I can think of no one better
qualified than you to carry out such a ticklish interview.’)94
Further investigation led to a dead end as it became apparent that
Lemaire was not the source of the leak under investigation. Knight inter-
viewed Lemaire on 4 January. Initially evasive, she eventually discussed
‘her indiscretions and ABSIL’s [sic] questions to her’.95 Lemaire admitted
looking up names from Free French records at Absine’s request, but when
Absine himself was interviewed by Wethered he explained that they
were personal acquaintances, and his only motive in asking for inform-
ation was to try and discover what had happened to them.96 When
Lemaire had abruptly ended their relationship, Absine had threatened
to reveal that she had provided confidential information ‘in order to
induce her to return to him’. Later in January Wethered conceded in a
letter to Cyril Miller that it was ‘going to be one of those cases which
have little chance of being solved’.97
Other SOE cases that came to involve MI5 appear in comparison to be
relatively trivial, yet were similarly time-consuming. A letter from B1(l),
the section responsible for ‘Espionage through Merchant Shipping Crews
and Personnel of Air Liners’, in March 1943 alerted Park to the Belgian
Seaman Jan Baptiste Schools. Schools had worked briefly as an informant
for B1(l), but soon gave it up, noting that he ‘didn’t like to make friends
with anyone and then have to quiz them just to obtain information’.98
Liaison with MI5 (i): Cooperation 93
In response, the officer noted ‘I will see what I can find out and let you
know.’107 From ‘our contact in Liverpool’, he discovered that Schools
went down to the Registry Office three days before the wedding with
the woman who is now his wife and gave notice of his intention to
marry her, subsequently carrying out his intention Our contact
says that whilst there was some trouble at the beginning between
Schools and his wife, they now appear to be quite happy.108
He concluded that ‘it does not seem as if there is any justification for
School’s anxiety’. The information was quickly passed on to the Belgian
Section, along with a copy of the marriage certificate.109
Further problems followed. Park wrote to his MI5 contact in
November, informing him that ‘The matrimonial troubles of Schools
have broken out again.’110 Park outlined the details of two incidents that
had occurred. First, following a telegram from Schools’ father-in-law,
‘notifying him that his wife Peggy had gone away and that her address
was not known’, a telegram was received from Mrs Schools herself,
stating that she was in London. However, this had been received too
late for Schools to meet her, leaving him with ‘no further information
as to his wife’s whereabouts’. This was followed by an altogether ‘more
serious matter’ of indiscretion on Schools’ part:
we have discovered that his wife has been told that Schools will be
returning to Belgium to do underground work. She also knows that
he has taken a course in parachute jumping so that if she had any
intelligence she can probably guess the means by which he will be
sent to Belgium.
had ‘not told her anything more than that he is returning to Belgium
by parachute at some vague date in the future’, and had ‘certainly not
given her any information about the mission which he is to carry out’.112
Park also saw Mrs Schools alone, and while she initially ‘denied that
she knew anything about her husband’s work’, she later admitted that
he ‘had told her something’. As this tallied with Schools’ own account,
Park was satisfied that her knowledge was limited.
Robertson provided further information on 17 November, noting that
one of his sources had ‘paid a visit to St. Helens on 10th November, and
called at Mrs. Schools’ home’.113 While Mrs Schools was not present,
the source ‘spoke to two of her sisters’, who noted that Schools was
‘expected to return to St. Helens any day now for his last leave before
going “overseas” ’:
96
Liaison with MI5 (ii): Conflict 97
When Gulbrandsen was first interrogated here the story he told was
exactly what did happen. By that is meant all he had to conceal was
that the escape was arranged. Otherwise he was narrating events that
actually took place and so he could not be ‘broken’ by questioning.
They reason out, quite rightly, that on arrival in England he will not
be searched and therefore can bring in with him all the impediments
of a spy, that he will be treated in an informal and friendly manner
and that any sort of hostile interrogation of an agent, who has risked
and almost lost his life in our service, is extremely distasteful and
improbable, that in telling his story there will be no point on which
he will have to lie and therefore no possibility of ever catching him
out and that the agent will be debarred from telling the truth to the
British, not only by his feeling of shame at having betrayed them but
also for fear of reprisals against himself and against the hostages who
remain in German hands.
It was this part of the German ‘plan’, the execution of a real lie (‘a story
which he can tell and which so far as the escape is concerned, is the
literal truth’), that particularly concerned Harmer:
having escaped from German detention. Here, MI5 readily adopted the
opposing stance to that exhibited by SOE: while SOE gave its agents the
benefit of the doubt, MI5 was convinced of Nygaard’s ‘guilt’ from the
outset, on the basis of inconclusive evidence mixed with gut instinct;
the ‘vague feeling of uneasiness’ described by Harmer in his paper on
escape cases. Despite its determination to think the worst, MI5 could
not escape the fact that their suspicions lacked solid evidence, and a
long and protracted dispute with SOE’s Norwegian Section, carried out
through the filter of the Security Section, followed.
The account of Nygaard’s escape, as he related it, was indeed fortu-
itous, but it was not wholly implausible. Having been beaten up severely
by the Gestapo, he ‘confessed to having had some dealings with an
underground organisation’, but made no mention of his connection
with the UK. Having provisionally accepted his story, the Gestapo
decided to move him from their headquarters to the local prison:
Satisfied with the existing procedure, Senter pointed out to White his
reluctance to see any increase in the level of suspicion facing the
returned agent, stressing the concern that too great an emphasis on
security could inadvertently hamper SOE’s operational considerations:
touch with the enemy or been captured by the enemy during the
course of their mission abroad when any of your agents fall under
suspicion either from your side or from ours, or fall into the category
of those who have been in touch with the enemy or been captured
by the enemy, we should be called in at once by you or, if we initiate
the case, should be entitled to receive from you all the relevant back-
ground information.19
Along with Warden and Miller, Senter met with White, Robertson
and Milmo on 16 March to discuss the situation. A solution of sorts was
found in the agreement that an MI5 officer should be sent on second-
ment to work at Bayswater; it was agreed that White should propose
such an arrangement to Petrie.20 Following the meeting Senter wrote to
White, noting that SOE ‘accepted the principle that, where one of our
returned agents came to this country and where there were any circum-
stances of suspicion the position and responsibility of the Security
Service must be fully recognised’.21 Yet while recognising the ‘funda-
mental security responsibility which it is yours to discharge and our
anxiety to co-operate along the most efficient lines’, Senter continued to
press SOE’s operational concerns, arguing that an overly sensitive MI5
would damage SOE’s operational prospects needlessly, and ensured that
White’s comments on this matter were also placed on record:
You also recognised that, where there was residual suspicion falling
short of suspected espionage, it would be wrong in the national
interest to consign the returned agent to Camp 020 [Latchmere
House, West London, where captured enemy agents were held and
interrogated by MI5] or otherwise to treat him so that, upon his
coming completely ‘clean’, he would be of no further use to this
organisation.
The recent Nygaard case is a good example where I think we all feel
the man may not have told the whole truth about the circumstances
of his escape, but where no one feels that there is any question of
his having undertaken any mission to work for the enemy in this
country.
a recent arrival from France. Bloch had been acting as courier for ‘Hilaire’
(George Starr), who was based in Agen, delivering messages to Pertshuck
for transmission by Bloom to London – linking yet another circuit
with the blown transmitter.34 Bloch’s interrogation also raised a further
instance of poor security that left Wethered exasperated. Having been
instructed to return to England via Spain to report on the situation in
the field, Starr gave Bloch a four-page letter, written ‘en clair’, addressed
to the French Section Operations Officer Captain Morel, in which he
detailed recent developments. Bloch was instructed not to worry if
she was searched by the Spanish police and the letter discovered and
confiscated ‘as it would be forwarded by the Spanish Authorities to
the British Embassy at Madrid’.35 Wethered noted that it was ‘incred-
ible that HILAIRE, an Englishman trained in this country by S.O.E.,
should have been so improvident’, referring elsewhere to his ‘unbeliev-
able stupidity’.36 He returned to the issue of overlapping between circuits
in a wide-ranging report on his investigative work later in the summer,
by which point he had come to realise the widespread nature of the
practice:
Agents in the Field are of course bound to enlist certain local inhab-
itants in the course of their job. They are not supposed, however,
to make contact with other organisations. Unhappily it appears
that in almost every case different parts of the same organisation
and even different organisations are aware of each other’s activities.
Consequently when as in the BISHOP case penetration is effected in
any one sector, other sectors and other organisations may also be
affected. The evils of this in the Field are obvious, and in investigating
the matter complications are considerable because of the various
points at which penetration seems possible.37
Meanwhile, the Nygaard case continued to drag on, and the first signs
of Country Section resentment began to emerge. Jack Wilson soon made
clear his intention to keep a close eye on developments when asked
by Miller for further particulars on the Lark organisation in February.
While Wilson had no objection to providing such information, he
added, ‘I must also be informed I hold myself personally respons-
ible for all security cases of this nature and will not be pushed aside.’38
Wilson proceeded to protest Nygaard’s innocence, discussing the case
with Lt Breida, a member of the staff of the Norwegian Commander-
in-Chief, informing Warden that he had ‘no doubt in his own mind
Liaison with MI5 (ii): Conflict 107
that Nygaard’s story is entirely bona fide, and that there is no reason to
believe that the enemy connived at his escape’.39
By the end of April, Wilson had grown increasingly impatient with
MI5’s handling of the affair. On 6 May, an unnamed MI5 officer wrote
to Warden, agreeing that ‘it is time we made up our minds about this
case’. After ‘very careful consideration’, it had been agreed that an MI5
officer (likely Wethered) should interview Nygaard, ‘telling him that a
large amount of consideration has been given by different people to
his case, and that no one feels they can accept the story of his escape’.
While the officer did not believe that Nygaard had been given a mission
to complete in the UK by the Germans, he thought it ‘quite possible
that he was allowed to escape on condition that he did something
for the Germans in Norway’. Even before the interview had taken place
it was clear that, as far as MI5 was concerned, Nygaard’s career as an
SOE agent was finished:
I explained to Nygaard that the story of his escape had not been
accepted. I produced the limited bluff technique, and Nygaard agreed
that his story must seem to be a strange coincidence to anyone
reading it I then asked him if any fact had occurred to him which
made it appear possible that the escape had been arranged, perhaps
without his direct complicity. He assured me that there was no
such fact, and that he did not honestly think that such a thing
had happened. Although he fully appreciated the position he was
in, Nygaard adhered to his belief that he had had great luck and
that the escape was genuine. I discussed with him this matter for a
considerable time, and was unable to extract any sort of admission
from him.41
108 Security and Special Operations
The MI5 officer wrote to Warden 3 days later, noting that ‘we have
reached a decision in the case of Herluf Nygaard’. He was ‘satisfied with
the account of the events leading up to his escape’, but felt that it
was ‘quite possible’ that the Germans had arranged the escape itself,
although ‘both Harvey and I were satisfied that Nygaard himself played
no part in this arrangement’. Despite this apparent clearance of Nygaard
of the charge of collusion with the enemy, MI5 refused to give up its
suspicion. Again, the officer noted that ‘there is no doubt in our minds
with regard to Nygaard’s proper destination’:
The point on which I felt a difficulty was the use of the word ‘decision’
and the substance of that ‘decision’ – namely that this agent of ours,
against whom I gather there is no residual suspicion, should be posted
away from the work on which we are employing him.44
In the light of SOE’s response, MI5 quickly backed down and clarified
its position; the ‘decision’ was re-branded as a ‘recommendation’ which
was thought to be in keeping with Wilson’s own views on the case.
It is difficult to find this explanation altogether convincing; the more
compelling explanation remains that MI5 felt that suspicion alone was
a sufficient indicator of guilt, and intended to work on that assumption
unless challenged.
As we have seen, the Security Section did what it could to defend the
Norwegian Section against the debilitating effects of excessive caution
on the part of MI5. However, at the same time it had to defend the posi-
tion of security within SOE, and ensure that arrangements made with
MI5 were adhered to, which meant maintaining a difficult balance. By
the summer of 1943, it is easy to see why Wilson was disenchanted with
the procedure for dealing with returned agents who had escaped from
German custody. With the ongoing Nygaard case no doubt in mind,
in July he appealed to the Head of SOE’s operational London Group
Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman for ‘some exception’ to Routine Orders to
be taken in the case of the return of one of his agents who had briefly
found himself in enemy hands:
When he arrives back in the U.K. this N.C.O. will have spent a consid-
erable number of weeks in a neutral country, rendered his report to
our branch in Stockholm and been questioned there by both S.O.E.
and the Norwegian authorities.
I take it that some exception, therefore, will be made to the general
procedure as laid down in this Routine Order. In the circumstances
of the case, to segregate a member of an Allied Army immediately on
his return to the U.K. could easily create bad blood and be taken in
the nature of an insult.45
Despite the Security Section’s sympathy with, and support for, Wilson
over the severity of MI5’s approach to such cases, and their joint prot-
estations over Nygaard, it now had to support the MI5 case in order to
110 Security and Special Operations
The Security Section had to front two opposing sides of the same argu-
ment, taking the opposite stance with the Country Sections to that
which it took when discussing procedure for returned agents with MI5.
The precarious balancing act in which the Security Section was
engaged was made even more difficult by Wethered’s attempts to extend
the scope of his investigative liaison position. After 2 months in post, he
wrote a lengthy paper for White, detailing how the liaison process had
worked in practice. While he conceded that the ‘system for dealing with
cases of S.O.E. agents who return to this country under suspicion seems
to be working satisfactorily’, Wethered was concerned by ‘the problem
of liaison and interchange of information between our two Organisa-
tions’; while the work for which he had been appointed was proceeding
satisfactorily, he wanted to do more.47 Specifically, he wanted greater
access to SOE papers in order to extract any information which could
be of use to MI5. Wethered also wanted to expand his investigative role
to become more proactive in seeking out trouble, by gaining access to
information that would reveal ‘Organisations in the field whose traffic
is suspicious but does not suggest to the S.O.E. Section that the Organ-
isation is necessarily blown’.48
The cause of Wethered’s concern was his investigation into the Bishop
case, which had opened his eyes to the difficulties of conducting security
investigations, as the French Section proved reluctant to cooperate fully
with him. As his investigation into the Bishop case progressed, Wethered
harboured a growing suspicion that pertinent information was being
deliberately withheld by the Section. His initial inquiries at the LRC
Information Index, which held information obtained from new arrivals
in the UK, were hampered by scanty information provided by the French
Section (‘If S.O.E. could be prevailed upon to give us the surnames
used in France by the various agents mentioned, there would quite likely
be traces’).49 His patience was soon tested further as he learned, quite by
chance, of the arrest of another agent in France linked to Rabinovitch
Liaison with MI5 (ii): Conflict 111
(the wireless operator who had fixed Bloom’s set).50 Thinking that this
may have a bearing on his ongoing investigation, Wethered quickly
made a request for further information, and learnt that the agent,
‘Spindle’, was ‘connected with the BISHOP organisation’. He expressed
his frustration that such potentially important information was not
automatically brought to his attention in a note:
look into the matter. We were all under the impression, in partic-
ular F and myself, that the investigation was being done in the
‘blown’ set connection, but apparently from the M.I.5. end the
matter was being treated as an investigation on the penetration side.
I discussed this quite frankly with Dick White, Robertson and [ ]
and it has been agreed that the M.I.5. investigation rather went off
the rails.53
I had hoped that it was clear – especially from our meeting on the
31st May – that the arrangements for you to deal with S.O.E. agents
returned from abroad who had had hostile contacts must not be
allowed to upset the existing liaison arrangements with your Depart-
ment, especially in view of the importance attached by both our
Departments to adherence to these published arrangements.57
This may seem a small matter, but, unless I raise this point with you
and stress the fact that Geoffrey Wethered is not appointed as general
114 Security and Special Operations
liaison officer for all purposes with S.O.E., then I think the liaison
arrangements with defined functions which have been settled over
the last two years and sanctioned by the Heads of your Department
are likely to be needlessly upset.58
A few days later, Senter emphasised the need for MI5 to adhere to
existing channels for the purposes of liaison in a letter to White:
we are anxious to give full effect to the strong wishes of the Heads
of both our departments, that the prescribed liaisons should not be
disturbed, and I am also anxious that Hugh Park, who is respons-
ible for the general day to day liaison with your department, should
continue to deal with all the sections he has dealt with over the
past two years Neither Warden nor Miller has any concern with
these general enquiries. That is why I raised with you the question
of whether possibly some of the sections in your organisation might
not be under the impression that Geoffrey had been appointed as
a general liaison officer. In making this point, I am not doubting
Geoffrey’s discretion or any of his other admirable qualities but
merely trying to say why I think we should take care to see that the
various channels that have been established, continue to function.62
Wethered felt that the Knight case constituted a ‘very serious example
of inefficiency and incompetence’ which was ‘serious enough for some
representation to be made to S.O.E.’ about the actions of F Section:
of the arrangements made between the Security Section and MI5, how
many other agents who had been in contact with the enemy were being
returned to the UK by their Country Sections surreptitiously?
Justifiably shocked by what his investigation had uncovered,
Wethered noted on the covering minute to White and Liddell that
‘I think you will agree that the situation revealed should not be left
without comment.’ He suggested that ‘the Director General should be
acquainted with the facts, in case he thought that any recommendation
should be made with a view to ensuring that similar mistakes are not
made again by S.O.E.’.64 Having read Wethered’s paper, White described
the Knight case as
The principal dilemma for B Division was its need to balance such legit-
imate concerns for security against considerations of realpolitik. Pushing
its concerns too forcibly upon SOE was likely to lead to the opposite
of the desired result. White’s desire for a tactful approach to SOE by
means of a quiet word with Boyle was echoed by Liddell, who had
been approached by Duff Cooper and asked whether Liddell thought he
should go to the top and discuss the Knight case with SOE’s Minister
Lord Selborne. Liddell disapproved of the idea:
Mr. Duff Cooper seeing Lord Selborne, which could only give the
impression that we had sneaked to a higher authority. If S.O.E. once
thought that we were trying to beat them with the big stick they would
simply dry up and we should never hear about any of their bad cases.
Mr. Duff Cooper saw this point and agreed to leave the matter in
my hands.66
During the investigation into Barry Knight, there were many occa-
sions when Major Wethered and myself asked Commander Senter
for certain papers or for certain information In spite of the ever-
ready co-operation extended to us by Commander Senter, there were
many instances where either there were interminable delays before
Commander Senter was himself given the information by the Section
from which he sought it, or the information was not forthcoming at
all. There was even a considerable delay before Commander Senter
was able to obtain the personal file of Barry Knight which was in the
possession of the French Section; while in another instance there
was information available in the French Section which was not
disclosed to Commander Senter on request.
There is no indication that the Security Section ever achieved the exten-
sion to its powers advocated by Knight.
The well-known case of F Section agent Henri Dericourt (‘Gilbert’)
provides a further clear illustration of the tensions between operational
and security priorities, and also reveals the growing sense of hostility
towards security on the part of SOE’s Country Sections as the ‘benefit of the
doubt’ shifted from favouring the agent under suspicion to favouring the
case against him, resulting in potentially debilitating effects on operations
in the absence of sufficient or compelling evidence of guilt.
In November 1943, Bayswater was called in to investigate allega-
tions made against Dericourt, who arranged landing sites for aircraft
bringing F Section agents to France, by Jacques Henri Frager (‘Louba’),
who informed London that he had been told by ‘Colonel Hein-
rich’ (who turned out to be the Abwehr Officer Hugo Bleicher)
that Dericourt was working for the Germans. The allegation was
felt to constitute ‘a grave question of operational security’.69 On
Liaison with MI5 (ii): Conflict 121
his treachery, two men and a woman, who were landed some time
in August, were picked up by the Gestapo, very shortly after their
arrival.
Miller pointed out that the description ‘strongly indicates Gilbert, who
was, in fact, operating in those districts’. However, it was pointed out
that ‘H.Q has been unable to trace the two men and woman’ mentioned.
The second allegation originated with SIS, and was less conclusive. On
6 December, Wethered wrote to Senter, notifying him that informa-
tion had been received from a returning SIS agent at the LRC that
‘unquestionably refers to Gilbert’, which claimed that he was known
to the Gestapo. Wethered’s certainty, however, was soon questioned
as it became unclear whether the information referred to Dericourt
or another agent, ‘Archambaud’. A further allegation that arrived via
an SIS source tipped the balance of suspicion against Dericourt. On
26 January, Miller visited an SIS Station and ‘interviewed one of their
agents, recruited in the Field and recently come out of France for
training’. Known as ‘Perrier’, Miller described him as ‘a young man of
a particularly impressive type; I am quite convinced of his accuracy
and was much impressed by his intelligence. I unhesitatingly accept the
statements he made to me as being statements of truth.’ Prior to his
departure, Perrier had been given ‘a number of documents to take with
him to England’. One of these was of particular significance:
for questioning (‘I personally think that we are justified in asking for
an operation to bring him out’). The plan was approved, and ‘Opera-
tion Knacker’ was mounted on 4 February. Dericourt refused to return
to the UK immediately, eventually returning to the UK on the night
of 8/9 February. His first interrogation was conducted by Warden on 9
February, followed by a second interrogation by an MI5 officer 2 days
later. ‘On both occasions’, Senter wrote, ‘he gave the impression of being
truthful, but it must be added that he confined his answers strictly
indeed narrowly to the points put to him.’78
Relations between the Security and the French Sections now began to
grow tense, with strong echoes of the earlier Barry Knight case. Senter
wrote to Mockler-Ferryman, informing him that arrangements had been
made for Dericourt and his wife to be absent from their accommodation,
in order that ‘special microphone arrangements’ could be put in place.
The French Section, however, failed to ensure that this plan was adhered
to, with ‘the most embarrassing consequences’:
Gilbert and his wife were both there when the mechanic arrived to
carry out his instructions and, not only were his suspicions excited
to such an extent that the whole important check may fail, but his
suspicions may mean that unnecessary publicity has been given to a
secret security measure.79
Senter emphasised ‘how seriously we must take all cases of agents who
return from abroad with any circumstances of suspicion attaching’,
pointing to the stance adopted by MI5:
Senter predicted that MI5 would conclude that Dericourt did not present
a security threat in the sense of having returned to the UK with a mission
to carry out for the Germans, and that SOE ‘must take the responsibility
of deciding in terms of our own operational security whether it is
safe to send him back to the field to resume his work’.81
The advice of MI5, communicated by Wethered having been agreed
with Liddell, followed along the lines predicted by Senter. Wethered
pointed out that the case was ‘extraordinarily complicated’, and that
the suspicions against Dericourt were ‘serious and unexplained’, leaving
only two possible explanations:
I think, in view of the recent J.I.C. enquiry, that M.I.5 are justi-
fied in raising the points about the Air Ministry and the Chiefs of
Staff if by any chance a similar enquiry should arise out of casual-
ties following on the continued use of Gilbert, M.I.5 would, I have no
doubt, be asked as to what their part in the investigation had been
and what advice they had felt bound to tender.82
It was also at this point, after Dericourt had been brought from France to
answer allegations rather than as a ‘real’ suspect, that MI5 decided
to shift the goalposts in terms of how suspicious SOE agents should
be handled. In the eyes of MI5, suspicion was now sufficient to act
upon in the absence of conclusive evidence of guilt, a hardening of
policy that was of particular significance in the case of the Dutch agents
126 Security and Special Operations
‘Chive’ and ‘Sprout’ (covered in Chapter 7), who were being investig-
ated simultaneously with Dericourt. On 13 February, White explained to
Senter:
we have come to the view that our attitude in all cases of an unsat-
isfactory nature must be stiffened so as to give security interests, and
not the individual, the benefit of any residuary doubt. The question
is at present in course of discussion between ourselves and the Home
Office.83
It would be too easy for me to ask that [Dericourt] should be sent back
to the field on the assumption that should he be a German agent no
added danger would ensue through pickup operations, as the men
will not know more about D-day plans than the men who have left
in the last six months.
But I do not propose to do so. I do not propose to do so, because
I want to state that at great trouble and risk we brought the man
back to this country and with the completely nullifying result that
nothing can be proved against him.
I fully understand [Senter’s] point of view, and how difficult it is
to give a clearance certificate to anybody under such circumstances.
I am not asking for such a certificate, but on the other hand I am not
prepared to send that man back to France to carry on operations for
my Section and to be faced with the possibility one day of a normal
Lysander incident, in which case the J.I.C. would undoubtedly
decide that the whole of the F. Section organisation in France is
blown and that such an accident constitutes proof that Gilbert is a
German agent.
The paper continued to push for a decision to be made, arguing that the
case of Dericourt should ‘be brought to a definite conclusion one way or
the other Gilbert should either be held in this country as a German
Liaison with MI5 (ii): Conflict 129
I told him that as far as I was concerned I was quite prepared to stand
on your judgement especially in view of the remarkable record for
right judgement which you and your people have got, and [Sporborg]
agreed that on form we were most likely to be right but he was not
happy about the position in view of F’s insistence and grief.
During his discussion with Sporborg, Boyle emphasised that ‘one thing
which we could never depart from was our anxiety to put and keep
M.I.5. fully in the picture, and in the ultimate M.I.5. had the right to
make the recommendation that a man coming to this country should
be shut up for security reasons’.92 He also offered to put the case to
an arbitrator or ‘neutral adviser’, a suggestion which Sporborg appears
to have taken up; a one-page SIS summary of the case was written by
‘V.B.5f’, who concluded that ‘In my opinion, looking at the facts of the
case it is difficult to assess whether Gilbert is working for the Germans
or not I suggest that until Gilbert’s position is clarified there should
be no question of his leaving the country.’93
Having reviewed the case, Sporborg backed down. On 19 February,
he told Senter that he ‘had come to the conclusion that there was a
stronger prima facie case against Gilbert than he had been led to believe’,
and that he proposed to give Mockler-Ferryman final responsibility for
‘deciding whether he felt able or bound to go on using Gilbert’. Senter
already knew that Mockler-Ferryman ‘personally thought the risk was
too great to take, as if even an accident happened to Gilbert, we should
be in a position of great difficulty in view of the warnings we have
had’. On Monday 21 February, in Senter’s presence, Sporborg phoned
130 Security and Special Operations
The frustration felt by the French Section over the power of suspi-
cion to upset operational considerations continued to be felt in the
Norwegian Section over the Nygaard case. Further ‘proof’ of Nygaard’s
collaboration with the Germans emerged when a wine and spirit ration
card in his name was found in the hands of the Gestapo; MI5 quickly
concluded that this was a perk given to collaborators. By 30 December
1943, still waiting for MI5 to clear Nygaard almost a year after his return
to the UK, Wilson noted that he was ‘beginning to feel very strongly
that British justice, as such, is being laid wide open to attack’. Despite
Wilson’s protests, MI5 continued to stall; the case was likely caught up
in the same shift of policy in support of suspicion prior to Overlord as
that of Dericourt. Wilson’s growing impatience was apparent in June
1944, at which point he wrote to Warden noting that he was ‘still subject
to bombardment by the Norwegian High Command in regard to M.I.5’s
extreme discourtesy in not giving any final decision’ on the case:
132
Approaching Section V 133
Liddell closed by noting that he was ‘anxious to help him [Boyle] so far as
it is possible to do so’. In response, Vivian prohibited MI5 from providing
Boyle with a copy of Curry’s work. Instead, Liddell was informed that
Boyle should be told to contact Section V directly: ‘if he will let us
know exactly what he wants, we will try and write it up for him in
a form which can be communicated to his Country Sections’.8 Liddell
informed Boyle of the situation, and received an indignant response
(‘Your letter makes me feel that I have been asking for charity! We
are merely anxious to extend the field of collaboration with you and
S.I.S.’). Boyle closed his letter with a veiled threat:
This left Liddell in a tight spot. He had no wish to jeopardise the cooper-
ation MI5 received from the Security Section, but at the same time had
no desire to incur the wrath of SIS, and potentially jeopardise MI5’s
own access to ‘most secret’ material. Liddell tried to explain to Boyle
how his hands were tied (‘I must apologise if my letter made you
feel that I was treating you like a pauper. It was the last thing in the
world that I intended to do’), and pointed to the difficulties caused
by SIS:
unfortunately we are not always our own masters owing to our work
being so inextricably mixed up with that of S.I.S. who place restric-
tions on the circulation of their information not only to outside
contacts but to those in our own office.
One thing that I can say without any reservation is that the help
and co-operation that we get from you is of the greatest value and
that it is, in so far as our own work is concerned, our intention to
reciprocate one hundred per cent. I shall moreover do everything I
can to encourage S.I.S. to agree to the release of collated information.
I will let you know as soon as I hear about Curry’s volume on the
German S.S.10
both SOE and SIS. A free exchange of information on the subject proved
impossible, as a minute by Curry to Petrie, regarding the distribution of
his initial reports on the issue, made clear:
In the midst of this stand-off between SOE and SIS, B Division came
to see the means by which is could potentially further its own involve-
ment in matters of counter-espionage overseas. B Division was keen
to improve its own ability to investigate cases of suspect SIS agents
returning to the UK; the German penetration problem was not limited
to SOE. Liddell recorded his views on the situation in his diary. Having
read Curry’s ‘extremely good memo’ on the subject, he noted that
‘What emerges more than anything is that lack of unity as between
ourselves, S.I.S. and S.O.E. is a serious menace.’19 Curry stressed the
inability to neatly compartmentalise counter-espionage into differing
spheres of responsibility for MI5 and Section V:
May I presume that, in the first place, such cases are invariably
reported to Section V. by the P. Section when the reason for suspi-
cion occurs in the mind of the controlling officer. If this is the case,
then I further presume that Section V. will notify us when cross-
examination is called for, so that we may detach an officer to carry
this out. In order to be prepared for such cases we have appointed
Major Wethered to specialise in this kind of work Perhaps you
will let your Section V. officers know that he is the correct person
to apply to in the first instance when cases of the kind mentioned
above occur.
After further internal discussion, it was decided that the letter should
not be sent. White recorded the discussion that took place between
Robertson, Wethered and himself:
Again, the letter was not sent. On 6 May, White recorded that Liddell
was ‘not necessarily opposed to the despatch of the letter’, but he
first intended to hold discussions with Boyle on the subject.25 White
informed Wethered of this, adding ‘it may be that we shall then jointly
approach S.I.S. on the whole subject of counter measures against penet-
ration of our services’.26
While MI5 papers continued to refer to problems with both SOE and SIS
in terms of suspect agents, it is clear that their main difficulty concerned
the latter; White wrote to Senter on 13 May, expressing his agreement
that ‘the existing arrangements are satisfactory and suitable for covering
the interchange of information between us’.27 The problem for B Division
remained extracting necessary information from Section V. In particular,
the ‘main obstacle’ was ‘the attitude of Cowgill’; this was the conclusion
drawn by Wethered in June. As we have seen, Wethered had been reprim-
anded for interfering unnecessarily in the liaison process between SOE’s
Security Section and MI5. Instead of acquiescing, and limiting himself to
his appointed work with Bayswater, he responded by ‘giving some thought
to the possibilities of pushing the triangular conception of liaison etc.
a little further in the direction of S.I.S’, and discussed the matter with
unnamed members of B Division. He noted that it seemed ‘very unlikely
that we should ever be able to achieve what we want, but it is perhaps worth
while to continue to try’. He believed that this would mean circumventing
Cowgill, and that some ‘preparatory unofficial moves’ in this direction
should be made – in other words, bypassing Section V and dealing with
the operational P Sections directly.
Wethered noted that he already had the support of an unnamed
member of SIS (‘[ ] is already fairly well disposed towards the general
principle’), and believed that it ‘might be worth while to enlist the
interest of one or two other people in the plan’. Wethered’s plan was
based upon the exploitation of the SOE material he now had access to
Approaching Section V 141
Wethered was confident that any such move would end in failure, thus
allowing MI5 to pick up the pieces (‘If they did this I feel sure that
their proposal would not succeed, and it might then be agreed that I, or
someone from this office, would be their best representative’). Wethered
now arrived at what MI5 would gain from such an arrangement:
At its most basic level, Wethered’s goal was to provide SIS with
SOE-derived information, in exchange for which it would gain a greater
142 Security and Special Operations
Section V for S.I.S. and the Security Directorate for S.O.E. should work
to the fullest exchange of information, but should also in each case act
as a filter and consult the other party before imparting certain inform-
ation to the operational branches of the organisation concerned.32
The exact impact of the agreement upon the Security Section’s access
to Ultra/ISOS material is unclear. However, Senter later noted that,
following Glenalmond, relations with Section V underwent ‘a consider-
able improvement’, and emphasised the importance of the Glenalmond
Treaty in generally improving relations between the Security Section and
Section V at a working level. The agreement also included the appoint-
ment of an SIS liaison officer, a move which successfully resulted in the
exchange of ‘an increasing volume of information’.33
Approaching Section V 143
This agreement does not of course in any way affect any standing
agreement between Senter and Wethered in which the security of
the U.K. or British Empire is involved. Senter will deal direct with
Wethered on these matters as in the past. I hope that this new agree-
ment will result in increased security for both S.I.S. and S.O.E. abroad
and consequently be of assistance to you in providing more informa-
tion about suspicious persons, who may at some distant date attempt
to visit Great Britain or the British Empire.36
144 Security and Special Operations
In reply, White agreed that the arrangements were ‘both practical and
necessary’, and added his belief that there should be ‘close liaison’
between Wethered and the unnamed SIS officer involved.37
Once this arrangement between the Security Section and Section V was
put in place it was protected fiercely, as Wethered found out when he
was accused by Senter of trying to bypass it. This time Wethered roused
Senter’s wrath over the case of a returned Dutch agent, Koot. Senter
informed White that Harvey had brought the case to Wethered’s atten-
tion, ‘without any reference to the Head of Acting Head’ of Bayswater,
and permitted his presence at Koot’s interrogation. Senter believed that
the case was ‘an S.O.E. mystery which it was for us to clear up in the
first instance’, but accepted that there may have been ‘scope for some
doubt’ about the agent.38 What annoyed Senter was the way in which
procedure for liaison between the Security Section and Section V had
been ignored.
The extent of Senter’s fury when told of the incident by Harvey was
described by Wethered in a minute to White on 11 October:
Harvey was surprised to find that Senter flew into a temper and in
fact sacked Harvey on the spot, though I understand that at the end
of the interview he modified this decision Senter told him that he
Approaching Section V 145
Rather than being overly concerned about the efficacy of SOE’s ‘indi-
vidually arranged channel’, it can be suggested that Senter’s anger was
caused by the fact that Wethered’s actions were likely to undermine
the Glenalmond Treaty before the new procedure had been properly
established, combined with the fact that he was aware of the suggestion
put forward by Wethered earlier in the year that would have seen MI5
‘triangulate’ liaison between SOE and SIS.
White wrote to Senter on 12 October, noting that he had ‘gone
into the matter rather carefully’ with Wethered, and had arrived at
the conclusion that ‘he appears to me to have acted in perfect good
faith throughout I think you must really clear him of any intention
to intrude unnecessarily into S.O.E. affairs.’40 Addressing the ‘proced-
ural point’ with which Senter was most concerned (‘that reference
was made to Section V. by Wethered when you are anxious that all
S.O.E. enquiries which require Section V. assistance should be made by
S.O.E. direct to Section V’), he assured Senter that MI5 ‘would natur-
ally never dream of challenging your right to insist on this procedure
being adhered to’. The allegation that ‘one of the girls’ in the B1(a)
Registry had contacted a friend at Section V ‘asking if there were
Section V. traces on one of the names that emerged’ was explained
as a new arrangement between B Division and Section V, where a
member of B Division was now stationed (‘the enquiries did not in
fact go from an M.I.5. girl to a Section V. girl but remained within
the orbit of M.I.5. personnel’). White concluded by pointing out that
he had specifically chosen Wethered for the liaison position with
SOE ‘because I knew him to be a discreet and tactful person, who
146 Security and Special Operations
what the Air Commodore is insistent upon and has agreed upon with
Cowgill, is that the situation should not arise where Geoffrey, for
example, is in the position of going to Section V and saying ‘I have
come to see you about this S.O.E. case’, or ‘this S.O.E. agent’ as the
case may be. The purpose of the Glenalmond Treaty is to establish
a close liaison between our Security Department here and Section V,
which would cover, among other things, such enquiries.
This letter appears to have seen the end of the incident. Senter added a
‘PS’, in which he noted that he had discussed the matter with Wethered
in person, ‘and we see no difficulty in practice’:
in any such case that triangular meeting [sic] should take place so
that Warden can speak at first and as to the S.O.E. organisation or
personnel involved, and Geoffrey can discuss at first hand with him
and [ ] any help that Section V can give in clearing the matter up.
148
Security Aspects of the Nordpol Affair 149
doubts’ about both SOE’s Chief Organiser ‘Bill’ (K.W.A. Beukema toe
Water) and his reception committees. However, while the Head of the
Dutch (N) Country Section, Seymour Bingham, conceded that one inter-
pretation was that Bill ‘may be under the control of the Germans’, he
attacked the messenger, pointing to the lack of evidence that the set
that had transmitted the message was actually in the hands of the OD:
Some six months ago ‘C’ smuggled two wireless sets via Sweden to ‘X’
in Delfsijl [sic], who had been sending interesting military informa-
tion. ‘X’ was unable to operate these sets but notified ‘C’ by his usual
route when he had managed to give one to the Radio Chief of the
O.D. in Holland. The final disposal of the second set is unknown to
us, but queries about is seem to embarrass ‘C’ considerably. It is not
known to me whether there is any other proof except ‘X’s’ message
that set number one is in fact in the hands of the O.D.
Bingham argued that it was likely the set was, in fact, being operated by
the Germans. In order to clarify the position, he requested a ‘thorough
investigation by an unprejudiced authority’.2
On 25 June, a meeting was held between Bingham and Charles
H. Seymour, Head of the SIS Dutch Section, at which Cyril Harvey
of the Security Section was also present. Harvey recorded the dead-
lock that ensued: ‘S.I.S. considered Bill to be under German control
or at any rate very seriously compromised, whereas S.O.E. considered
the O.D. wireless transmitter to be thoroughly unreliable and possibly
under German control’.3 As such, it was agreed that ‘the facts should
be examined dispassionately and independently in S.O.E. and in S.I.S.
by some persons not concerned with operational side’, and that having
done so the examiners ‘should meet and compare notes and see whether
they could arrive at any agreed conclusions’. Harvey was appointed
as the SOE examiner. He duly investigated the case (Leo Marks recalls
being questioned by Harvey about agents’ codes), and compiled a report
entitled ‘Bill and the O.D.’ which was circulated on 9 July.4 In a letter to
Senter, he noted that ‘I understand from N. that someone in S.I.S. is now
examining the O.D. transmitter on their behalf, from the security angle,
and I take it that in due course my report will be sent to S.I.S., and their
report will reach me.’5 While Harvey’s report highlighted a number of
areas of concern, he found no reason to conclude that Bill was under
German control, and some reason to support Bingham’s suspicion that
the OD wireless set had been compromised. As his report was based
upon SOE material, this was hardly a surprising conclusion. Of greater
150 Security and Special Operations
He said that he had put this matter up to his ‘Chief’, who had ruled
that it was inadvisable to start such an investigation, before they had
received further information through this channel; he was, however,
unable or unwilling, further to elucidate this statement.8
Security Aspects of the Nordpol Affair 151
Although Seymour ‘said that he would again take the matter up with his
“Chief” ’, Wells noted that ‘throughout the conversation it was apparent
from his attitude, that Captain Seymour had no real intention of doing
anything whatever in the matter’. Having received no reply to his letter
to Cowgill, Senter wrote to an unnamed SIS officer on 28 July, drawing
attention to Wells’ conversation with Seymour, and emphasising SOE’s
continued interest in the case:
I am not quite clear how we now stand. Our interest in the matter is
a natural one in being advised by you if our agent is compromised
and I should be most grateful if you would look into the matter and
let me know.9
Once again, no reply was received. While the Security Section continued
to wait, on 6 August a further internal paper on the subject, ‘Crossed
Lines in Holland’, was prepared by the Dutch Country Section, which
elaborated upon the Section’s concerns over the reliability of the O.D.
wireless link. In conclusion, the paper reiterated the need for collabora-
tion with SIS:
With mounting suspicion over the state of the SIS investigation, Senter
took his concerns to Boyle, who agreed to write to Claude Dansey, Vice
Chief of SIS (VCSS), about the matter.11 The letter, drafted by Senter and
drawing on his unanswered correspondence, was sent on 18 August.12
It had the desired effect, and a reply was received from Dansey within
days, in which he claimed ignorance of the whole affair:
the VCSS’s suspicions that the Germans knew all about out work in
Holland, and in fact almost had it under control’.14 As such, Dansey’s
protestations of ignorance were likely greeted with some considerable
scepticism. A meeting between Boyle, Bingham and Col Cordeaux,
an SIS Deputy Director with responsibility for the Netherlands and
Scandinavia (the aforementioned DD/Navy), followed on 31 August.
The following day, Cordeaux wrote to Boyle, and ‘disavowed any
allegation against the S.O.E. main agent, Bill’. However, he agreed
that the original plan – that Section V ‘should make an investiga-
tion concerning the security of the O.D. organisation’ – should still
proceed.15
Rather than warning SOE of its ‘certain knowledge’ that the Germans
had penetrated its organisation in Holland, by the beginning of
September SIS had actively distanced itself from such allegations. Boyle,
however, was not deterred: having finally won a Section V investigation
into the security of the OD, he now pushed further. He told Cordeaux
that he was ‘disappointed that Section V and our chosen represent-
ative from the Security Section do not appear to be permitted to
discuss the matter’, and continued to invoke the spirit embodied in
the Security Section’s recent agreement with Section V, the Glenal-
mond Treaty, noting that ‘As you know by “C” ’s authority, we have
a very happy working liaison with Section V.’16 In his reply, Cordeaux
pointed to the internal politics involved: ‘I know you understand that
my sole fear is that my Dutch colleagues will get to hear that I have
been discussing details of our Organisation with another department.’
He proposed a compromise, which would see a more limited exchange of
information:
Cordeaux rightly anticipated that Boyle would not be satisfied with such
a summary, and would ask for a meeting between the security officers
who had compiled the reports. As such, he authorised an unnamed SIS
officer to show Senter the full report. Cordeaux did this on the condition
that ‘the contents of the report must not be disclosed to anyone else’,
save for Boyle himself.19 Harvey was instructed to revise his original
report, which he sent to Senter on 14 October, emphasising that ‘the
information given in this paper is in no sense guaranteed and may very
well be inaccurate’.20
Instead of dealing with the report personally or sending Harvey, Senter
nominated Warden, Head of Bayswater, to discuss the reports with the
unnamed Section V officer.21 Warden met with the officer in mid-
October. He ‘produced a report dealing with the security of the O.D. but
he said that the S.I.S. Country Section refused to allow the S.O.E. Special
Section to have this report’. However, Warden ‘was invited to read it
then and there, which he did’. Again, there appeared to be no cause for
alarm. Warden’s recollection of the report was that it ‘did not deal with
any question of the insecurity of S.O.E. in Holland’.22
The Section V investigation soon became the cause of controversy.
There were already suspicions within the Security Section that SIS
knew more about the situation than it was letting on. Senter met with
Vivian on 25 November, and raised the question of tension between
the two organisations. He pointed out that ‘we had the impression
that S.I.S. were holding back information, possibly because of some
personal reason connected with our officer in question’. Vivian prom-
ised to look into the matter, and rang Senter the following day. He
confirmed that relations between the two Dutch Country Sections
‘were bad’. More significantly, Senter recorded that ‘Section V were
unable to state definitely whether information was being withheld from
them on that account’; a point that raises the question of tensions
within SIS itself, and the limitations such divisions imposed upon the
154 Security and Special Operations
Boyle could be forgiven for thinking that his desire to see the joint
investigation originally mooted in June had come full circle. By
suggesting that the Dutch Country Sections should deal directly with
each other, Dansey set the proposed investigation back to square one;
it was precisely because an arbitrator was necessary that the Security
Section had initially become involved in the affair. In response, Boyle
explained that investigations of this nature were ‘handled under the
machinery contained in what has come to be known as the “Glen-
almond Treaty” ’, of which Boyle understood Dansey to be fully
cognisant.31 Having refreshed Dansey’s memory of the origins of the
agreement, Boyle noted it meant that ‘Section V would deal with any
traces relating to names, etc., disclosed and would be entitled to
impart information they obtain from your Country Section, so that full
discussion could take place’. He expressed his hope that Dansey would
‘see no difficulty in allowing the enquiry to proceed on these lines’,
expressing his belief that ‘the liaison is a useful one – especially in
dealing with the problem of penetration’. Dansey made his disregard
Security Aspects of the Nordpol Affair 157
it is clear that for two years the enemy have been picking up our
agents in Holland as they descended from the aircraft, occasionally
amusing themselves by shooting down the aircraft on its return and
continually amusing themselves by very skilfully deceiving us with
the traffic.34
158 Security and Special Operations
agents had proved to be spies. The answer was that although suspi-
cion had attached to some of them there was no proven case. Equally
there was no proven case against any agent who had come out and
been reported to us by SOE. There were cases of agents who had given
others away and bought their freedom on the grounds that they were
going to work for the enemy. There was however no reason to think
that they intended to carry out their assignments.
In the light of the revelations from Dourlein and Ubbink, MI5 was
invited to reconsider the cases of three Dutch agents who had recently
returned to the UK, while it was also recognised that a decision was
needed on the future running of traffic to the transmitters in Holland
now known to be blown, a matter on which MI5 was immediately
consulted. The Dutch were ‘very anxious that we do everything in our
power to keep this wireless traffic going, as they consider that it is an
added safeguard for the lives of the prisoners’.39 A certain amount of
contact was maintained until late March, at which point a member
of Bayswater wrote to Robin Brook’s new deputy, P.L. Johns (D/R.LC),
noting the drop in communication which meant that contact had not
been made for between 17 days and 2 months. ‘One could speculate
indefinitely as to the reason for this’, the security officer wrote, ‘but
presumably the enemy think that Chive and Sprout must have reached
here by now, or even, a possible but hardly likely theory, have only
just grasped the fact that the two had escaped’. As such, he concluded
that ‘there would seem to be little purpose in continuing the traffic any
longer Any hope of profiting from the situation would therefore
seem to be removed.’40 On 31 March, Mockler-Ferryman replied: ‘I agree.
It is not worth while going on with this.’41 His judgement was proved
correct the following day, when the now infamous April Fools’ Day
message was received.
The Security Section was also obliged to explore allegations made by
Ubbink and Dourlein that there was a traitor in Baker Street. When
interviewed upon their escape from Haaren, a cable received from Berne
noted that while they had made no definite accusations of a traitor at
work in London, the statement ‘It may be Bingham’ had been made; a
reference to the Head of the Dutch Country Section Seymour Bingham,
a point which Ubbink raised again later.42 The suggestion that the head
of SOE’s Dutch Country Section may be working for the Germans, albeit
slight, had to be investigated. On 25 November, Senter met separately
with Harker and Vivian. Regarding an internal inquiry into Bingham,
Harker ‘said that M.I.5 would be glad to help in any way possible’.43
160 Security and Special Operations
Senter wrote to Boyle, informing him that when discussing the case
of Bingham with Johns he had been ‘careful to report that there is no
Security objection in the sense that has been suggested, against this
officer, so far as any available evidence goes, and I should not make that
allegation’. Senter did, however, tell Johns that Bingham was ‘a most
unsatisfactory officer to deal with and two recent cases have come to
my notice where he has tried to obtain information from junior officers
or secretaries, in connection with the current investigation’.44 Senter
wrote to Boyle on the subject again the following day, noting that ‘It is
extremely difficult to get a clear-cut line as to what should and should
not be discussed with N (Bingham) in connection with this. I can say
that the interrogation has not taken the matter any further and the
position remains that there is no case against N. I should personally be
quite happy for him to be told this.’45 Boyle wrote to Mockler-Ferryman
regarding Bingham on 23 February, noting in view of Senter’s analysis
of the case that it ‘would be wrong and unfair to N to allow the
somewhat vague allegations which have been made against him to affect
one’s judgement’. However, Boyle suggested that Bingham ‘should be
informed that no case has been proved against him but that since a
suspicion exists in certain Dutch minds it will be impossible to obtain the
fullest co-operation with the Dutch while he holds his present post and
he will therefore, be transferred to another post in S.O.E.’.46 Bingham
was removed from N Section 3 days later.47
Attention now shifted to the interrogation of Dourlein and Ubbink.
The first interrogation report was circulated on 9 February. Having read
the report, Hugh Park felt that it raised a number of concerns about the
men, pointing particularly to the inconsistencies in the statements they
made when interrogated in Spain, and since their arrival in London (‘At
first sight there would certainly seem to be some grounds for suspecting
that the escape from Haaren was a put-up job, and that these 2 agents
have returned to the U.K. with the connivance of the enemy’).48 He felt
that there was ‘at least a strong case for a further very careful interrog-
ation of the two men in question’. Wethered, in his first paper on the
case, was less concerned, noting that ‘no view of the general position
seems to involve Chive and Sprout in suspicion as double agents’.49
While there were certainly a considerable number of unanswered ques-
tions, the possibility that the Germans had arranged their escape seemed
to Wethered to be ‘scarcely possible’:
Without their information we should not have known that the organ-
isation of which they were members, has been controlled by the
Security Aspects of the Nordpol Affair 161
Although Dourlein and Ubbink were not formally served with deten-
tion orders until Saturday 28 May, the decision to detain them was
effectively taken as early as February – the result of a revision of policy
by MI5 that saw concern for Overlord take precedence over the liberty
of the individual. As we have seen in Chapter 5, MI5 did not have
to believe that Dourlein and Ubbink’s escape had been orchestrated
by the Germans for some sinister purpose in order to claim that their
detention was necessary for national security. White echoed Wethered’s
sentiments in a letter to Senter on 13 February 1944:
The evidence available and the statements made by Chive and Sprout
do not in themselves constitute any definite reason for assuming
that the escape of these two agents can have been arranged by the
Germans or that they are telling lies about their activities.50
Senter made no apologies for insisting upon this condition, but acknow-
ledged that it would likely be difficult to meet: ‘the authorities in this
country do not appear to have devised suitable detention arrangements,
except for really big cases, i.e. German agents or near-German agents’.
Although Senter acknowledged that the lack of total understanding
of the situation, combined with the allegations the men had made
against Bingham, made it difficult to recommend that the men should
be ‘handed over to the Dutch as rejects to resume their positions in
the Dutch Armed Forces’, in insisting upon near impossible conditions
for their detention, it can be suggested that SOE was actually trying
to force MI5 into accepting that course of action. Whether or not
this was actually the case, this was how SOE’s attitude was perceived
within MI5, where it was met by a combination of bemusement and
irritation.
On 15 April, Hale minuted Wethered, noting that he had origin-
ally been informed by Roche that ‘he doubted whether if Chive and
Sprout were detained it would be necessary to make any special arrange-
ments for them not to associate with other detainees’. However, Roche
had contacted Hale the previous day, and notified him that SOE ‘had
formed the view that there would be no objection to releasing these
men to the Dutch Army, but they would object to their detention in
association with other detanus’. In what Hale considered ‘these baff-
ling circumstances’, he requested a meeting with Wethered to discuss
the case further.63 On 19 April, Wethered wrote to Milmo, noting that
‘some difficulty’ was being experienced with SOE on the subject of
the disposal of Dourlein and Ubbink. He explained that SOE ‘continue
to insist on segregation and make the additional illogical suggestion
that the men could without harm be released to the Dutch Army’,
adding ‘I personally am convinced that both must remain in deten-
tion, probably for the duration, but at any rate during the OVER-
LORD period.’64 Milmo responded on 29 April. He also felt that the
two men ‘should be detained during the OVERLORD period’, feeling
that their case fell ‘within the category which it has been decided as
a matter of high policy must be interned during the present period’.
He felt that SOE’s position was ‘not only illogical but verging upon the
ludicrous’:
With little progress on the fate of the two men being made, Roche wrote
to White on 10 May, explaining that ‘the position is fast becoming
desperate’:
As the two men had been detained for some 14 weeks following their
arrival in the UK on 1 February, Roche raised the question of their
release, wondering ‘if it would not be possible for them to be returned
to the Dutch forces with a warning that they must not be employed
on intelligence duties or in any of the danger areas’. White replied on
16 May, expressing MI5’s continuing resolve to see the two men held,
despite SOE’s conditions. Maintaining his original view of the case,
he wrote,
I think we must take the line that both men should be detained
during the present period. The case is a complicated one but the
possibility that there are facts which have not come out in interrog-
ation cannot be altogether overlooked.67
White also noted that MI5 ‘should not think it necessary to press for
the internment of these men after the Overlord period’. Having decided
that ‘the circumstances of the cases did not warrant the admission of
these two men to Camp 020’, the holding and interrogation facility
for captured enemy agents in West London, he informed Roche that
MI5 had taken ‘the only remaining alternative of giving the agreed
facts in summary to the Home Office and asking them to convene a
meeting between representatives of our two organisations so that the
immediate future of [Dourlein] and [Ubbink] during the Overlord period
might be resolved’. A reply was awaited from the Home Office, and
White instructed Hale to ‘represent to the Home Office that the matter
is urgent’.
Security Aspects of the Nordpol Affair 167
The meeting between SOE, MI5 and the Home Office took place on
18 May. Sir John Moylan accepted MI5’s position that ‘Until a month
or two ago these two men might have been allowed their liberty with a
warning to the Dutch authorities’, but that it was now necessary for the
men to be held until after D-Day.68 SOE’s wish to see the men released to
the Dutch authorities was further rejected on the basis of SOE’s previous
recourse to internment, Sir John observing that ‘the grounds for suspi-
cion against these two men were far stronger than others in which an
order had been made’. As such, Sir John concluded that ‘if M.I.5. asked
for an order, [the] Home Secretary would feel bound to grant it’. MI5 ‘felt
bound to ask for an order for a period’, which was accepted by Roche
who added that SOE ‘did not wish them to come in contact with other
detainees’.
Ian Roy of the Home Office Aliens Department sent Detention Orders
for the two men to Hale on 25 May, noting that Sir John had ‘agreed
that they should be detained temporarily in Brixton Prison incom-
municado and in solitude (except in each other’s company)’, and
that the Governor of the Prison was making the necessary arrange-
ments.69 Dourlein and Ubbink were served with Detention Orders
under Article 12(5)A on Saturday 28 May, and detained in segrega-
tion cells at Brixton Prison.70 Discussion turned immediately to the
question of their release and subsequent employment. Although MI5
expected ‘further consultation about this matter nearer to the relevant
time’, it was noted that the proposal put forward by Col de Bruyne,
head of the Dutch intelligence service with which SOE collaborated,
that ‘both men should be reverted to their pre-war professions of the
Navy and the Dutch Merchant Navy respectively’, would likely prove
‘suitable’.
Wethered wrote to de Bruyne on 6 June.71 After answering a number
of questions related to the detention of the two men raised by de Bruyne,
Wethered reiterated the view that ‘we do not feel that it is necessary
from a security point of view for the two men to be detained when
the present invasion period is over’. On 7 June, Wethered wrote to
Senter, confirming a recent telephone conversation on the case, again
reiterating that the detention of the two men was considered essen-
tial only ‘until the conclusion of the OVERLORD period’. He noted
that de Bruyne’s proposal that the men should return to their pre-war
naval professions had been approved by the Home Office, and that the
case would be reconsidered ‘in the course of the next few days’.72 This
information subsequently formed the basis of a letter from Senter to the
Dutch Minister of War on the case.73
168 Security and Special Operations
This was a matter upon which we had no strong feeling, but the
S.O.E. officer represented it strongly to Sir John Moylan, who decided
accordingly upon Brixton as the only place where complete segrega-
tion was possible. They could of course have been detained in other
camps, but in none of these would it have been possible to arrange
for their segregation, as pressed for by S.O.E.77
With such comments, not only did MI5 succeed in ‘calling SOE’s bluff’,
but it also managed to have the last word on the matter, ensuring that
the Dutch authorities knew where to direct their anger at the detention
of the two men in Brixton Prison. Liddell also assured Bland that both
Security Aspects of the Nordpol Affair 169
170
Double Cross and Deception 171
field known to be under enemy control, with the aim of deceiving the
Germans while they believed they were deceiving SOE.
When London was satisfied that an agent in the field was ‘blown’, and
that any messages received that purported to be from that agent were,
therefore, of German origin, MI5 was invited to consider the possibility
of trying to make further use of what was an otherwise finished agent.
A preliminary paper would be prepared for Tar Robertson from which
a decision would be taken as to whether the agent could be considered
blown, and if so whether there was any potential for deception. Two
important figures in preparing these briefs for Robertson were Chris-
topher Harmer, a solicitor who joined B1(a) Section in March 1941, and
C.P. Harvey.3 Conspiratorial suggestions that SOE agents were deliber-
ately sent to their deaths thus give way to what could be considered a
similarly cold-hearted sense of pragmatism: even blown agents remained
of potential value to the war effort.
Communication between SOE and MI5 when an agent in the field
was thought to be operating under enemy control was a matter of high
policy agreed between the two organisations at an early stage. As we
have seen, MI5 first revealed its interest in blown SOE agents in July
1941. At a meeting attended by Petrie, Harker and Liddell for MI5, and
by Nelson, Boyle and Taylor for SOE, one of the MI5 representatives
expressed an interest in being kept informed ‘of any S.O.2. agent abroad
who is suspected of having come under enemy control’. The overture
was rebuffed; the minutes recorded that MI5 was reminded that ‘in such
cases S.O.2. would normally keep “C” fully advised, and the latter would
automatically make the information available to M.I.5’.4 In November,
Robertson wrote to Harker, and asked him to raise the matter again with
either Boyle or Lakin:
Free French – led Harmer to conclude that ‘I cannot see that we could
ever use Sealing Wax in the way in which this sort of case can be of
most interest to us, namely for deceptive questions’:
A further factor that was significant in deciding whether blown SOE trans-
mitters could be used for deception purposes concerned the context of
the operator and the circuit. Beyond the involvement of the Free French,
Harmer explained his decision that the set could not be used ‘in the way in
which this sort of case can be of most interest to us, namely for deceptive
questions’ on account of the position of the set’s operator, who was
Concluding that Sealing Wax would not ‘justify the exertions which
would have to be put into it’, Harmer did believe that MI5 should be ‘as
helpful as possible’, and assist SOE in an advisory capacity in sending
out messages with ‘the sole objective of helping eventually to get Sealing
Wax into the Free Zone where he can escape’.
Contrary to Harmer’s advice, the case was not immediately dropped.
On 30 September, an SOE–MI5 meeting was held at which the ‘future
running’ of Sealing Wax was discussed. It was ‘agreed by all parties
that this case should be run in future by Major Foley, in conjunction
with Colonel Hutchinson who would liaise with the Fighting French’.15
Foley, the SIS representative on the Twenty Committee, felt that Sealing
Double Cross and Deception 175
Wax held potential for deception purposes – if only the Free French
could be cut out of the loop:
drew attention to a further report that had been received from North
Africa, which stated,
Virtually the whole Sea Urchin group appears to have been arrested.
Capt. Sermont [sic] himself has committed suicide. It is alleged that
the wireless operator, probably the one recruited on the spot, talked. As
a result of this, over fifty other arrests were immediately carried out.26
The case was further complicated when a reply to Miller’s message was
received on 15 April, which led him to question whether the set was
actually transmitting under German control. Writing again to Harmer,
he noted,
Harmer wrote further on the Sea Urchin case, which he now described
as a ‘complicated set-up’ on 29 April. This followed further discussion
with Miller and Wethered, and further consideration of the fact that
the organisation had two separate wireless links with London. The Free
French Section continued to have ‘complete confidence’ in the first set,
operated by Sea Urchin Minor (Lt Hellier). The operator of the second
set, who had been ‘recruited on the spot’, was ‘believed to have been
the proximate cause of the break up of the organisation’, and was now
‘thought by S.O.E. to be working under control’.28
A joint SOE/MI5 conference was held on 30 April to discuss the case.
Robin Brook, who supervised SOE’s operations in France, Belgium and
Holland, David Keswick, Brook’s predecessor, and Dick Warden repres-
ented SOE, while Tar Robertson and Christopher Harmer attended for
MI5. It was agreed that ‘if it could be shown conclusively that the set
was working under control, the policy governing the messages should
be dictated by Colonel Dudley Clarke’, who ran deception in the Middle
East through ‘A’ Force. The question of whether Sea Urchin Minor was
free or controlled was now hotly debated. A further meeting was held at
Dorset Square, the headquarters of the Free French Section, the following
day, attended by the Section Head Captain James Hutchinson, three
of his officers, Warden and Harmer. At this meeting, the Free French
Double Cross and Deception 179
Section representatives ‘gave it as their opinion that the Sea Urchin set
was being worked by Sea Urchin Minor, who was still free. They did not
think the messages at all suspicious.’29 Dissatisfied with this, Harmer
‘drew their attention to the fact that the bluff check had always been
present and the true check omitted, which they agreed was evidence
of some value to support the theory that he was working under duress.
Once again, however, they all expressed the opinion that identity checks
were of no value at all.’ Pressing the point further, Harmer recorded
that he ‘then pointed out to them the fact that the operator at the
other end had not made the proper reply to the check question. They
again said that they did not regard this of much importance, because he
might have forgotten it.’ The check question had since been repeated
in a further message, but Harmer was disturbed by the attitude of the
Section:
Any lingering doubts over the status of Sea Urchin Minor soon vanished.
On 3 May, Harmer was informed by Brook and Warden that a message
had been received from Massingham, SOE’s Mission in Algiers, which
stated that ‘the Sea Urchin set is incontrovertibly in enemy hands’.
Brook felt that this was sufficient to hand control of the case over to
MI5 to use ‘for strategical deception’.30 Notified by Harmer, Robertson
agreed to bring the case to Bevan’s attention again.31
Having studied Harmer’s papers, Foley wrote to Robertson on 3 May
requesting a meeting to discuss the case. Perhaps remembering the
Sealing Wax incident, Foley was concerned that Sea Urchin would
‘involve very serious dangers if it is used for strategic deception’.32 At a
meeting held on 6 May, he ‘expressed doubts whether it was wise, in
view of the Fighting French interest, to put across deceptive messages
180 Security and Special Operations
pair met to discuss the case 2 days later. As a result of their discussion,
Robertson drafted a letter to appraise Foley of the situation, but asked
Senter for his views before sending it.43 The draft was a blunt, and largely
negative, summation of SOE’s position in Belgium. Robertson went so
far as to suggest that at least half of the transmitters SOE had dropped
into the country were ‘certainly’ under enemy control, while most of
the remainder were ‘probably’ under enemy control. As such, Robertson
concluded, ‘For these blown transmitters to be run by B.1.A would be
asking for trouble. For all practical purposes we should be playing the
game blindfolded.’
In addition to the involvement of the Sûreté and the confusion
surrounding the extent of German penetration, a further factor that
mitigated against the use of Belgian sets for deception was the context
within which messages were sent to Belgian agents. For the deception
to succeed, this could not simply change overnight, a point which was
raised by Robertson:
Robertson did raise the possibility of using the Belgian sets to revive
Plan Iago, but emphasised the need for quick action: ‘there is no time
to lose since one cannot go on making excuses for not sending supplies
by air in the ordinary manner for very long’.45
Double Cross and Deception 183
I saw Major Robertson of M.I.5 with D/CE this morning. We are all
agreed that the chances of the Crow W/T Operator still being at large
are 50–50. The position is to be watched very carefully and any signals
from him which appear to be suspicious are to be communicated to
Major Robertson.57
Later that day, Stockholm was notified that Jacobsen had been sent
a message asking for his address, and told to make his way to Stock-
holm if he faced ‘real difficulties’.58 Stockholm cabled London 2 days
later, by which point it was thought ‘overwhelmingly probable’ that
messages from Jacobsen were actually under German control.59 Senter
and Robertson discussed the matter further on 17 August, at which point
Double Cross and Deception 185
After discussion it was agreed that the essential thing was to carry
on the case in an apparently normal fashion, and that this could be
effected by instructing Crow that an important task might be given
to him in the near future, and that in the meantime his organisation
was to reconnoitre roads and railways in the district and to report
upon any unusual movement on them.66
It now seems certain that Crow wireless is being used by the enemy.
The case is being dealt with in consultation with Major Robertson
of M.I.5., and it is intended to try and use Crow to disseminate
important false rumours.68
MI5 was duly informed of the next message received from Crow, and
provided with a copy of the reply that was sent following consultation.69
The draft text of a further message was forwarded to the Security Section
and MI5 on 17 October. An unexpected development occurred later in
the month, as MI5 was informed that news had reached London via the
Stockholm Mission that Jacobsen had been rescued from prison, and
was likely on his way to Sweden.70 As such the case appeared to be at
an end, as Gubbins pointed out in a letter to Wilson:
If the above reply has an enemy origin it is a much more clever one
than the previous messages, since the mention of funds and tobacco
is just the sort of think we would expect from one of our people in
the field sending an entirely independent message.74
it is desired to keep the Crow case in its present state for the time
being it is thought that it may be very useful later on. I would
therefore like to discuss with you some plan for keeping the Germans’
interest alive for several months to come. This would appear to
involve the sending of money and the details I have in mind are to
tell them about some bogus expedition or keep them waiting in some
specified locality in Norway for the arrival of new contacts. I will ring
you up in a day or two if I may and come and discuss this.76
The MI5 officer’s next letter, dated 14 November, has not survived,
but Wilson’s response indicates that it explained that MI5 considered
the case to have potential for future use as a means of spreading rumours
of an early Allied landing, likely to correspond with plans that were
being formulated for the double cross agents ‘Mutt’ and ‘Jeff’.77 Wilson
had strong reservations about using the set for such a purpose:
If things were going badly he was to send a remark about the weather
including the word ‘not’, e.g. ‘the weather is not bad’. If what he said
about the weather was a positive statement, either that the weather
was good or it was bad, then that would mean that he was getting
along alright.
Dear Borghild,
How are you? I have not heard anything from you since I last wrote,
but there are many postal difficulties nowadays. I have been ill for
some time, but am much better now. How are you getting on?
I heard some news about Jacob last week. He has been very ill, and
has now had a nervous breakdown. I gather he may have gone a bit
crazy. In other respects all goes well here.
I should like to meet you again soon. I think it will be soon too, the
War must stop sometime. The strain for the soldiers on the eastern
Front must be beyond endurance, with the cold and the frightful
conditions, in addition to the fighting. The weather has not been too
bad here this winter, and now, with summer coming it ought to be
much better.
I start my old work soon; it will be fun, and I am looking forward
to it.
Well I hope to write again. In the meantime, enjoy yourself.
Best wishes,
Yours ever,
FRITZ85
190 Security and Special Operations
As the MI5 officer explained, the letter covered five key points:
The letter was shown to Wilson, who ‘approved it with certain slight
alterations’. Arrangements were made for an officer to meet with
Gulbrandsen on 5 March in order for him to copy out the agreed text
by hand.
Having established Gulbrandsen’s position, further thought was now
given to the use of his channel for deception. On 7 March, Munthe
sent Wilson a list of ‘imaginary plans for operations’ which ‘might be
conveyed to the enemy by war of plausible feint’:
in the most arctic conditions’. He similarly thought that (4) was ‘excel-
lent since any reinforcements sent to the Far North by the enemy
automatically increase his shipping needs and administrative problems
such as leave, rationing, etc’.88 In contrast, he did not believe (2) to
be convincing enough, while he objected to (3) as ‘if at any time we
wished to take Norway, or part of it, this is the district where we should
really have to operate’. The officer proposed ‘the suggestion of large
scale landing of parachute troops in South Trondelag, with a view to
attacks on submarine installations, sea-planes, airfields and oil installa-
tions which are numerous in that area’.
Wilson wrote to Senter on 9 March noting that he had discussed his
request for deception plans with his staff, and noted that ‘we find it
rather difficult to produce any novel ideas’. Wilson’s attitude towards
deception remained ambivalent, as it had been during the Crow case.
He remained particularly concerned that ‘there is always the danger
that when we are misleading the enemy, we might also mislead our
own friends’. Wilson had some experience of this, following rumours
that had been ‘put about of a possible Allied landing in Norway in the
immediate future’, which ‘disturbed our local organisations consider-
ably, and were apt to make the younger members more active and more
talkative than was safe’. While Wilson was not totally opposed to decep-
tion plans on such grounds (‘I realise that it is a danger that has to
be faced’), he emphasised his belief that ‘the very greatest care should
be taken in regard to rumours which may have the effect of causing
those who are loyal to the Allied Cause to endanger themselves unneces-
sarily’. Wilson followed this ‘destructive criticism’ by suggesting three
potential rumours: of a landing party of guerrillas and saboteurs at Joste-
dalsbre and expeditions to Narvik and Lofoten, as originally proposed by
Munthe, along with the suggestion of ‘a large scale landing of parachute
troops in South Trondelag, with a view to attacks on submarine install-
ations, sea-planes, air-fields and oil installations, which are numerous
in that area’.89
No further papers on the use to which Gulbrandsen was put have
been released, and as such it is not possible to tell how much further
immediate use was made of Gulbrandsen as a conduit for deception, or
how effective this was. Gulbranden’s MI5 dossier is of little help, as the
file was filleted in 1960, leaving a mere handful of the original docu-
ments. However, the index sheets offer some clues as to the missing
content. They record a ‘B.1.a note on S.O.E. Deceptions – Plan Pruden-
tial’, dated 18 April 1943.90 While it has proved impossible to find any
further references to this plan – it is not mentioned in the minutes
192 Security and Special Operations
Harmer has written a note about using blown SOE sets for decep-
tion. He points out many difficulties, the principle one being that
the concern of the SOE section officer is to extricate his agent from a
difficult position. This policy would not be consistent with deception.
The result is that they fall between two stools. The deception is unsat-
isfactory and the agent is generally shot. I have recommended that
the use of blown SOE sets for deception should be discontinued and
that SOE should work out some plan both with their agent before he
goes and within their own organisation, to ensure that the maximum
is done to extricate a controlled agent from his predicament.91
If, of course, S.O.E. are at any time able to offer an exceptionally good
opportunity in this connection we might perhaps look at it again, but
generally speaking, I think we had better leave this matter alone.92
In response, Robertson noted that he was ‘very glad’ that Bevan agreed
with the points made in Harmer’s report. He added that he had discussed
Double Cross and Deception 193
the matter further with Senter, who had ‘put forward what I think is a
very good suggestion, on which I should be glad if you would let me
have your views’:
Robertson felt that this was ‘probably the best way of handling this
situation in future’ and, anticipating Bevan’s agreement, proposed to
inform the Twenty Committee at its next meeting.93 Bevan did not
think that Senter’s suggestion called for any revision of the opinion he
had previously expressed, and agreed to keep the suggestion ‘in mind’:
should the occasion ever arise when we are prepared to use an S.O.E.
blown set, I will indicate through you the area on the Continent
where we would like to use such a set if available. As a start, we could
do no harm if we pointed out to S.O.E. that we are interested in the
Pas de Calais and would like the offer of a suitable blown set in this
area any time during the next six months or so.94
Noah – who had been recruited in the field, and whose real name was
not even known by SOE in London – had been arrested, likely caught
through the use of Direction Finding equipment. Marriott concluded
that ‘no exploitation of Noah’s transmitter on conventional lines is
possible’, as news of his arrest was known to be circulating in the under-
ground press: ‘it must be assumed that the Germans will very rapidly
suppose that the news of Noah’s arrest has reached us’. Further, Noah
was ‘only an operator it is obvious to the Germans that he was
not himself intended to be a collector and purveyor of intelligence’.
Marriott did, however, see one potential use for the transmitter: ‘to
send a message straight away to the Germans informing them that we
recognise that they are controlling the transmitter, and thereafter, if the
Germans continue to play, to use the channel as a direct line to the
Germans’.98 Marriott forwarded his paper to Bevan, noting his under-
standing that ‘you may in the near future wish to take action for the
express purpose of lowering the German will to resist, and it occurs to
us that you might find some use in a case of this sort for that purpose’.99
Bevan declined the offer, as Marriott later recorded: ‘L.C.S. stated that
the use of a direct line to the Germans was not yet possible, and they
expressed the view, with which I agree, that if and when it does become
possible we shall be able to find a better case to use than this one’.100
Throughout the war, SOE remained on the fringes of deception
activity, although not through any lack of intent; rather, the lack of
greater involvement was largely dictated by circumstances. While there
is more evidence of SOE involvement in deception activity than has
previously been acknowledged, there remains nothing to suggest that
such involvement included the deliberate sacrifice of agents’ lives.
9
Unfinished Business
The Security Section had faced its greatest challenges in the months
preceding Overlord, both in terms of general security issues – issuing
reminders warning against ‘Careless Talk’ – and the strict control of
operational security through Bayswater, while simultaneously dealing
with the fallout from the Nordpol affair and the ambiguity surrounding
Dericourt. Following Overlord, the Section remained under consider-
able pressure, clearing an increasing volume of returning agents through
Bayswater and tying up numerous loose ends. Such unfinished business
included efforts to discover the fate of missing agents and further explor-
ation of prior security questions through the interrogation of captured
German personnel, in conjunction with MI5. Such tasks were conducted
as staff numbers dwindled, as SOE moved towards its own dissolution
in January 1946.
Prior to Overlord, the Security Section had contributed to the Special
Force Detachments that represented SOE with the Armies in the field.
Formed in January 1944, their purpose was ‘to explain to the army
operational staffs what resistance could and could not do’.1 A security
officer was attached to 21 Army Group, along with further security
personnel at each army headquarters, taken from either the staff of
the Security Directorate or from officers who had been attached to
Bayswater.2 The security officers ‘found themselves mainly assisting
Army C.I. and Civil Affairs staffs to identify and to establish the bona
fides in overrun areas’, and were ‘instrumental in facilitating the return
of S.O.E. agents in the U.K. from liberated areas’.3 Bayswater became
the rear link for the security officers attached to the SF Detachments,
feeding them with counter-intelligence material and answering any
enquiries.
Within days of the launch of Overlord, Warden wrote to MI5 with
the details of three French circuits which were now known to have
been blown (SATIRIST, DELEGATE and BUTLER).4 Informed that little
further investigation could be conducted through the LRC Information
195
196 Security and Special Operations
where he spent some time with Hoyer Millar.28 Upon his departure from
Cairo, Col Henry Benson of HQ Force 133 wrote to Boyle, noting that
Roche ‘has been an invaluable help to me’:
The matter was raised again in February, at which point Wells once
again repeated his warning: ‘I would stress the point made by [Senter]
that, despite all our efforts to get speedy treatment for Dutch arrivals in
this country, their cases are so unavoidably complicated that they are
bound to take some time.’33
At the end of March, Dobson received a telegram from the field refer-
ring to ‘some line crossers’, who had produced ‘recommendation papers
from underground organisations stating that said line crossers had infilt-
rated SD on their behalf’. However, under ‘extensive cross examin-
ation’, they were revealed to be working for the SD and had, in fact,
penetrated the underground resistance. The message ended, ‘Advise all
your channels to be extremely careful with such persons.’ On top of the
signal, Wells wrote, ‘A complete vindication for the ultra-careful policy
adopted by this Directorate’, to which Senter added simply ‘Yes’.34
Staff shortages continued to make life difficult for the Security Section.
In April, Senter wrote to Boyle, noting that ‘With the severe depletion
of staff in the BSS Section (Bayswater) owing to officers and secretaries
leaving for posts abroad and otherwise, we are finding it difficult to cope
with the many duties that are falling on BSS’.35 During a medical exam-
ination in May, Senter himself was found ‘unfit for further service and
sent on sick leave prior to being invalided’.36 Roche, who had returned
to London from Cairo in April, now received his final promotion within
the Security Section, succeeding Senter as Boyle’s Deputy. In June, Park
was appointed Head of Section as Roche’s replacement. Also in June
Frank Soskice, who had replaced Cyril Miller as Bayswater’s Interroga-
tion and Case Officer in May 1944, left SOE to contest a seat in the
general election.
As was the case in London, the Security Sections of SOE’s over-
seas Missions were also reduced during 1945. By June, the security
establishment in Cairo consisted of one Field Security Officer, ‘acting
under the orders of the liquidator of S.O.E. affairs there’.37 At the India
Mission, preparatory liquidation work began in May, the main liquid-
ation task assigned to the Security Section there being the compilation
of a record of all non-British personnel employed by, or connected to,
the Mission ‘since its earliest days’, along with the ‘final scrutiny and
disposal of documents’.38 In September, the staff situation ‘underwent a
transformation’, as officers returned to the UK for demobilisation. The
Section headquarters moved to Meerut in December, maintaining only
a minimum staff in Calcutta, Colombo and Kuala Lumpur, to ‘ensure a
satisfactory maintenance of routine security until the final winding up
in each area’.
202 Security and Special Operations
In Italy, the Security Section was ‘kept working at full pressure’ until
May, at which point it was able to turn its attention to liquidation.39
Despite Hoyer Millar’s calls for Peter Lee’s removal in January, he
continued to head the Security Intelligence Panel, and vigorously
pursued the long-term aspects of the Panel’s intelligence activities. At
a meeting on 23 March, during a visit by Hoyer Millar to London, a
proposal put forward by Lee for the formation of a Political Sub-Section
of SIP was discussed.40 It was unanimously agreed that the proposal
should not be approved, and that Lee was ‘racing ahead in this matter
with long-term objectives which go beyond the proper scope of S.O.E.’.
It was emphasised at the meeting that the function of SIP was ‘to attend
primarily to the Operational Security of SOM’.
In contrast to Lee, Hoyer Millar remained level headed about the role
of security in Italy and the limitations of its role during the ‘liquidation
phase’ of SO(M):
provided we can restrain Peter Lee’s side of the section from chasing
clues which are only going to be of interest to some organisation in
twelve months’ time, we should have completed the bulk of our work
for SO(M) by the end of July’.42
Unfinished Business 203
Hoyer Millar had spoken to Lee several times about the need to curb
his enthusiasm (‘I have explained to him that the work which he
contemplates doing is of interest only to other security organisations
and not to SO(M)’), but Lee had ‘definitely made up his mind that there
is going to be work for him to do out here for some time to come’. As
such, Hoyer Millar felt that ‘the time has come when we should obtain a
definite bid from Section V for our records and whatever personnel they
wish to go with them; otherwise there is a danger of the SIP prolonging
its existence indefinitely’.
By Hoyer Millar’s next letter in June, the winding up of security in
Italy was almost complete: ‘The process of liquidation here has gone
very much more quickly than we anticipated the work of this Security
Intelligence section is virtually at an end’, although some security repres-
entation would continue to be necessary due to a small number of
outstanding missions.43 He saw no reason why Section V’s Italian repres-
entative should not inherit the records, and with them such staff as he
was prepared to take on, by mid-July, at which point the remainder of
SIP could be liquidated. He was increasingly concerned for the future
for his now defunct staff, writing to Roche that ‘the main thing is to
place people as well as we can’.44 It appears that Section V agreed to
employ two members of the section (their names have been redacted
from the released documents), one of whom was returning to England
‘for training’. It was also agreed that Arthur Baird would remain at SO(M)
until its ‘final liquidation’, while two further security officers would
remain to deal with the missions that remained operational. Hoyer
Millar returned to the UK in late July; whether Section V did indeed
inherit his Section’s records remains unclear.45
Back in London, closure was brought to the Nordpol affair during the
summer following the arrest of Hermann Giskes, who had masterminded
the deception.46 In response to the news, the SHAEF Counter Intelli-
gence War Room in London cabled its interest in interrogating him.47 As
a member of the War Room, D.I. Wilson, observed, Giskes could ‘prob-
ably provide more information on German penetration activities than
anyone else’.48 On 16 May, Wilson wrote to Wells, informing him that
both Giskes and his deputy Gerhardt Huntemann were in the hands of
12 Army Group, and arrangements were being made for their transport
to the UK for ‘detailed interrogation’ at Camp 020. Wilson wrote that he
would ‘be grateful if you would let me know what particular points you
would like to have clarified if these individuals prove to be forthcoming’.49
Wells responded immediately, noting that the men were of ‘the greatest
possible interest’ to SOE, ‘since they, between them, practically ran
204 Security and Special Operations
Wells also offered his services, and those of another Bayswater officer,
both having ‘specialized in the Dutch troubles’, to brief the War Room
case officer concerned in preparation for the interrogation of Giskes and
Huntemann. In addition to discussing SOE’s activities in Holland, Wells
provided ‘a complete report of the S.O.E. operations in Holland with
which these two Germans were concerned’, along with ‘the complete
set of traffic for which Huntermann [sic] and Giskes were jointly
responsible’.51 A non-technical paper on codes was prepared by SOE’s
Signals Directorate, while Wells also ‘arranged that 020 can refer to me
at any time when they may have a query to raise’.
On 5 June, Camp 020 circulated a Progress Report on Giskes, which
noted that ‘the case is of such proportions that, up to the present,
it has only been possible to skirt the fringes in very general terms’. It
was predicted that ‘some time must elapse before a complete report on
the case can be made available’.52 The Progress Report was sent to the
Security Section on 18 June.53 A further Progress Report was circulated
on 27 June, which dealt with the arrest of Allied agents in Holland ‘not
connected with Nordpol’ along with Giskes’ and Huntemann’s know-
ledge of British intelligence.54 Nor did the ‘Camp 020 Interim Report’
that followed (circulated on 25 July) cover the Nordpol deception; this
was saved for a separate report circulated in July, entitled ‘Report on the
Investigation into the “Nordpol” Affair: Based on the interrogations of
Giskes and Huntmann’ [sic].55 Wilson sent four copies of the Report,
along with copies of the Interim reports on Giskes and Huntemann,
to the Security Section on 26 July, noting ‘It seems to me that these
documents give a very clear account of the matter.’56
Giskes and Huntemann both engendered a certain amount of respect
at Camp 020. The ‘Monthly Summary’ revealed a sense of professional
Unfinished Business 205
Attention was also drawn to the ‘clever use’ that was made of staged
sabotage during the course of the deception (‘in particular an old hulk
of about one thousand tons loaded with wrecks of old and damaged
aeroplanes was deliberately blown up in full view of the public of
Rotterdam’). With his own experience of running double agents, Tar
Robertson, now Director of the War Room, was particularly interested in
the Nordpol Report, noting that it was ‘most amusing to read how the
Germans encountered the same difficulties as we did in running double
agents, and especially in conducting bogus acts of sabotage’.58 Robertson
was interested to discover whether the Germans had taken ‘the precau-
tion of operating wireless sets from the districts where the agents were
supposed to be located’, recalling that this ‘was considered of primary
importance in cases we were running’. The question was subsequently
put to Giskes, who noted that sets were, ‘whenever possible, operated
from the locality in which it was intended that they should be used’.59
Attention soon turned not to what Giskes and Huntemann had
revealed, but the question of who would be permitted to learn about it.
The Nordpol Report was initially given strictly limited circulation, seen
outside MI5 by SOE and Section V only.60 Wilson wrote to Robertson
asking for his views on the extent to which the paper should be distrib-
uted, and SOE’s failure thus broadcast. He was reluctant to ask SOE its
opinion, fearing that the organisation ‘may try and limit distribution
of a report on a matter in which they were particularly unsuccessful’.61
Robertson noted that such discussion was unavoidable; ‘clearance from
S.O.E.’ would be required for the report to be given wider circulation, and
he instructed Wilson to discuss the matter with the Security Section.62
Roche replied to his enquiry on the subject in August. Noting that ‘I
gather that normally reports of this kind receive a fairly wide distribu-
tion among Secret Services of Allied nations in the hope that they may
gain information of value and raw appropriate lessons’, he gave SOE’s
view that copies should not be given to the French or Belgian author-
ities, ‘as they were not directly concerned’. SOE had ‘no objection to a
206 Security and Special Operations
copy going to the Dutch Secret Service’, on the condition that SOE could
also send a copy to its Dutch equivalent, the BBO. Roche accepted that
the American OSS would inevitably receive a copy, ‘as they are more or
less partners in these interrogations’.63
No such closure was brought to the Dericourt case by the interrogation
of Hugo Bleicher at Camp 020 during the summer. Described by West
as ‘one of the Abwehr’s most successful and imaginative investigators’,
Bleicher had not been directly involved with Dericourt, whose associ-
ation with the Germans was made through the SD. Bleicher himself had
penetrated SOE’s French networks via Roger Bardet, the trusted deputy
of Jacques Frager who, as we have seen in Chapter 5, made the original
allegation against Dericourt based on information provided by Bleicher,
known at that point only as ‘Colonel Heinrich’, in late 1943 (as Foot
notes, inter-secret service intrigue and rivalry was not the sole purview
of the British: ‘many German counter-espionage agents were more inter-
ested in promoting the status of their own organization as compared
with its rivals at home than in actually coping with the activities of
allied agents in the field’).64 Interrogated during July, Bleicher noted that
he ‘told Frager to beware of Gilbert, who was really a Gestapo agent’.65
When asked for further details of the nature of Dericourt’s contact with
the Germans, Bleicher stated that he ‘worked for the B.d.S., Avenue
Foch, Paris. He worked first for Stubaf. Boemmelburg and then, when
Boemmelburg left for Vichy, for Stubaf. Kieffer.’ Bleicher had no know-
ledge of how long Dericourt had worked for the SD, but believed that
he ‘had certainly been doing so for some time by April, 1943’.
The Security Section remained unconvinced by Bleicher’s allegations.
Roche felt unable to reach a conclusion on the basis of Bleicher’s testi-
mony; either Bleicher was telling the truth, or he was continuing to
maintain a story he had originally fabricated in 1943, perhaps to deflect
attention away from his own informant Roger Bardet.66 Roche was not
entirely satisfied with this as an explanation, as it raised the question
of ‘why, as Bardet’s villainy has now been discovered, Bleicher should
continue to blame Gilbert if he is not to blame’. In a letter to Wilson
he noted that another officer, Major Delaforce, also found it ‘very diffi-
cult to ascertain which of these two possibilities is the correct one’, and
was concerned by the imperfect nature of Bleicher’s testimony (‘Bleicher
does not claim any first-hand knowledge of Dericourt’s treachery but
says he obtained it second-hand’). He also pointed out that ‘in practic-
ally every point where we are able to check Bleicher’s allegations against
Dericourt, Bleicher’s recollection is faulty or he is telling lies and, in
some cases, is confusing Dericourt with a totally different person’.
Unfinished Business 207
Where records did exist, Fyffe recalls that they were ‘absolutely
meticulous’:
All the details, gold teeth, the progress of the man or woman through
the camp, when they were ill, what illness they had. Sometimes there
was an entry which mean that he had disappeared into the night,
into the mist. The implication was they had managed to escape but
didn’t escape death. The other little entry was shot while trying to
escape. Of course, there again, it didn’t really mean what it said on
the paper. The man or woman was just shot.75
Such records were not always easy to come by. A Czech ex-inmate of
Flossenburg, ‘who had worked on the records under the Germans’ told
Fyffe in November that ‘the records of the British were kept separately
from the rest and were destroyed by the S.S. before the liberation to
prevent them falling into Allied hands’.76
In addition to reviewing records, interviews with those involved were
conducted where possible; Fyffe recalled that ‘some folks were quite keen
to talk, some weren’t’.77 On 24 October, he interviewed the governess of
the Women’s Prison at Karlsruhe, Fraulein Becker, who he described as ‘a
typical civil servant, who had not actively helped the prisoners, but who
210 Security and Special Operations
had never, at any time, been responsible for ill treating them’.78 Becker
and one of her staff ‘did all that they could to help which was not very
much as they stated that all their records had been seized at the libera-
tion by the French, and according to them destroyed’. Becker was able
to identify a number of French Section agents who had been transferred
there from Avenue Foch in Paris. However, her information stopped
short of their ultimate fate (‘She confirmed what we already knew of
their departure from the prison, but could give us no information about
their destination, as she had not been in the Gestapo confidence, and
was merely told to get the prisoners ready to leave’).
On 2 November, Fyffe visited the Flossenburg concentration camp,
accompanied by Polish Jew named Silberberg, who had been a prisoner
in the camp for 9 months. Silberberg was ‘able to give us a good deal of
information about the camp’, but was unable to elucidate on 15 British
officers who were known to have been held there, save for the fact
that ‘the only British officer known to have survived at the liberation
was one Thomas Swan of Glasgow, though he could give us no further
details about this man’. It was hoped that Silberberg, who was a ‘member
of a Jewish committee which is in touch with ex-inmates of all the
concentration camps’, would be able to obtain ‘valuable information in
answer to a questionnaire which was left with him’.
Fyffe returned to the UK on 20 December and reported to Boyle, who
now headed a skeleton Security Section. Both Tom Roche and Dick
Warden had both left SOE in September, followed by Hugh Park in
November. SOE was officially dissolved on 15 January 1946, at which
point ‘the amalgamation of S.I.S. and S.O.E.’, and the creation of a
‘Special Operations Branch of the Secret Service’ came into force.79 While
research has drawn attention to the ‘rump SOE’ that was thus incorpor-
ated into SIS, there is little to indicate any substantial migration from
the ranks of its Security personnel.80 Senter resumed practice at the Bar
in 1945, became Deputy Chairman (London) of the Northern Assurance
Company Ltd from 1951 to 1953, and proceeded to become a member of
the General Council of the Bar in 1954. Hugh Park joined a new Cham-
bers and was later called to the bench, and is now best remembered for
sentencing Britain’s largest LSD ring in 1978, while Richard Warden,
the former head of Bayswater, returned to his pre-war occupation of
training and racing horses, becoming a close friend of Sheik Mohammed
of Dubai, whom he persuaded to train and race horses in Britain.81
Archie Boyle died in 1949.
One post-war security link can be seen in the case of Norman Mott,
whose association with the legacy of SOE continued long after the
Unfinished Business 211
do take the deuce of a lot of time, if, like myself, one is not very
conversant with the layout of field matters. However, we are plugging
away at it, and, I suppose, it will come to an end sometime, though
just at the moment, I seem to be no nearer the conclusion than I was
three months ago.
It was at this time that the notorious fire took place at Baker Street, the
cause of much speculation and conspiracy theory. To Mott, it appears
to have been more of an irritant, as he wrote in March:
Senter’s reluctance did not deter the Foreign Office (‘Mr. Attlee is advised
that your knowledge of the security arrangements in force at that time
might be of interest to Dr. Donker, and hopes that you will find it
convenient to meet him’).90 Senter visited the Foreign Office in early
October, at which point he revealed certain concerns over Miller’s likely
testimony:
From what the archives reveal of Miller’s investigation into the Nordpol
affair, as we have seen in Chapter 7, it can be suggested that Senter
was concerned that Miller would raise allegations of non-disclosure
of pertinent information by SIS – which was hardly likely to present
‘British Intelligence’ in a favourable light. The meeting between Dr
Donker, Senter and Miller took place on 5 October. The record of the
meeting, released to The National Archives in redacted form, indic-
ates that Senter gave a very carefully worded account of the ‘correct
Unfinished Business 213
This study has made extensive use of SOE files now open to the public at The
National Archives, Kew. The efficacy of such research on SOE is regularly brought
into question on account of the incomplete nature of the SOE archive. A number
of factors combined to reduce SOE’s paperwork in size following the liquidation
of the organisation, at which point its archive passed into the possession of SIS:
a fire at Baker Street in 1946, a weeding process from the mid-1940s to late 1940s
which saw the destruction of many administrative and financial records, and
a further weeding process in the early 1950s which reduced even further the
number of financial and administrative records and also saw the destruction of
policy files.1
Of these factors, the most well-known is the fire at Baker Street, which has
provided something of a focal point for conspiracy theorists. However, it is
clear that SOE papers did not need to be ‘accidentally’ destroyed: the author-
ised weeding that followed was clearly a far more destructive force than the fire
which, as we have seen in Chapter 9, destroyed the ‘work in progress’ of Norman
Mott’s Liquidation Section. Duncan Stuart, former SOE Adviser at the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, has drawn on ‘reliable anecdotal evidence’ to illus-
trate that the first weeding exercise was not necessarily conducted with ‘appro-
priate diligence’: two unnamed officers ‘competed in joyously tossing whole
files, unread, into a waste-bin situated between them’.2 This description of the
nature of the weeding process is supported by David Stafford, who notes that
another weeder, John Edward Wyke (who joined SIS following service with SOE
in the Middle East), ‘approached the task with a dashing verve that bordered on
recklessness’:
In the half-deserted old Baker Street headquarters of SOE, sitting with his
chair tipped at an angle and his feet on the desk, he would pore over the
mountains of files. Behind him was a large waste-paper basket. He would pick
up a file, nonchalantly glance at the title, rapidly reach a decision and then,
with the flick of a practised wrist, consign the condemned documents over
his shoulder to bureaucratic oblivion.3
To give some idea of the scale of destruction that took place during this process,
Duncan Stuart notes that between August 1946 and May 1947 the equivalent of
119 filing cabinets full of papers were destroyed. In 1949, it was estimated that
some 100 tons of material had been destroyed.4 Less detail is available about the
amount of material destroyed during the 1950s, although a report written by
an SIS officer in early 1950 recommended the ‘maximum possible destruction
and reduction’ of material.5 The number of occasions on which the records were
transferred to different storage locations inevitably resulted in further documents
214
Postscript on Sources 215
being lost, the archive being housed at varying points at Marsworth Airfield
and Windsor House, before arriving at a more permanent home at Century
House.
By 1967, the surviving SOE files – more accurately described as ‘bundles of
paper – tied with tape’ – required reorganisation.6 SIS, ‘conscious that the SOE
files lack order’, initiated a sorting process, but this was designed by the organ-
isation for its ‘own purposes’ and not necessarily suitable ‘from a historical
research aspect’. It was estimated that the procedure would take at least 2 years
to complete. The nature of the organisation of the files was raised again in
1969, by which point SIS accepted that its treatment of the SOE archive was
‘a wholly regrettable story of wholesale and indiscriminate destruction, mainly
on account of lack of storage space’.7 It was now felt that the current reorgan-
isation would be adequate for the needs of both SIS and research by the SOE
Adviser, and SIS did not think any further re-organisation for the purposes of
historical research would be necessary.8 However, a professional archivist from
the Public Record Office, Bernard Townshend, was soon appointed to carry out
a further reorganisation of the SOE archive, a task that took him 5 years to
complete. Having completed the reorganisation, Townshend reported that there
was ‘documentary evidence’ that at least 87 per cent of SOE’s papers had been
‘destroyed’.9
Certainly, as a percentage this figure is disappointingly high and leads, quite
reasonably, to the question of just how useful any work that relies on what
remains can be. However, it is worth considering what this raw percentage
actually means in terms of quantifying the surviving paperwork. The surviving
13 per cent means that some 4573 files are now available to researchers at The
National Archives in the HS1–HS8 series, their contents ranging from the occa-
sional single sheet of paper to (more frequently) papers an inch thick, while a
further 137 files remain closed under Section 3.4 of the Public Records Act. In
addition, SOE’s Personnel Files will continue to trickle into the public domain
over the next decade or so. The National Archives catalogue indicates some 1654
such files, but as these tend to contain approximately seven sub-files on indi-
viduals, the true figure in terms of individuals covered is far higher, somewhere
in the region of 11 000. It is also perhaps worth remembering that the incomplete
nature of the archival record is not a problem exclusive to the study of SOE, and
setting the figure of surviving SOE papers against that of material currently sent
to The National Archives by government departments. Such a comparison was
made during a review of the selection criteria for the preservation of MI5 records
conducted by the Advisory Council on Public Records in 1998:
Were a similar study of the SOE archive conducted today, in order to conform with
current retention procedure, perhaps even less than 13 per cent would survive.
Such observations should not, however, be taken as advocating undue compla-
cency on the part of those conducting research into SOE. Any account of SOE’s
Security Section that attempted to work solely from the 64 files catalogued
under ‘Security’ in the HS8 series would certainly be unnecessarily limited. Yet
Townshend’s organisation of the SOE archive along broadly geographical lines,
mirroring the organisational structure of SOE’s operational Country Sections,
along with smaller functional collections such as Security, offers the tempting
illusion that a study of a given aspect of SOE can be completed by reference
to a single self-contained series of files within the archive. Not only would this
overlook those parts of the archive that do not easily conform to geographical or
functional headings, but additionally there is much to be found about SOE in the
files of other government departments. Indeed, while the SOE files were in the
process of being transferred to Kew, the Public Record Office produced a Source
Sheet offering details of where SOE material could be located amongst the records
of the Prime Minister’s Office, Air Ministry, Foreign Office and War Office. This
‘outside looking in’ approach to SOE has a long history, adopted most success-
fully by David Stafford in Britain and the European Resistance, a history of SOE
written without access to a single SOE file. In terms of the current study, beyond
the fact that security runs throughout the files of SOE’s Country Sections (in
addition to the Personnel Files of various individuals of security concern), much
security-related SOE material is to be found amongst the files of the Security
Service, MI5.
As a service that could hardly be described as ‘secret’, SOE offered a safe
means whereby the British intelligence community could contribute to the Open
Government initiative of the early 1990s. Indeed, SIS could appear to be contrib-
uting to this opening of the archives to the public, albeit by offloading SOE files
that it had inherited, rather than created.11 The release of MI5 material into the
public domain – files of a still active organisation that had only been placed on
a statutory basis for less than a decade by the time of the first release of papers
in November 1997 – was far more significant, and MI5 became ‘the guinea pig
in tentatively opening part of the historical archives of traditionally the most
secretive part of the state’.12
As with SOE, MI5’s historical archive is also incomplete. Some indication of its
condition was recently provided by former Director General Sir Stephen Lander,
who acknowledged that ‘given that the Service has worked continuously for over
90 years, there is rather less material than might have been expected’.13 By way of
explanation, Sir Stephen drew attention to the small number of staff engaged by
MI5 at various points during its existence, wartime bomb damage (‘We have
the German Luftwaffe to thank for the destruction of a proportion of our records
when in September 1940 a bomb hit a Wormwood Scrubs outbuilding that
housed our registry’) and an ‘inconsistent approach to file destruction’ which
resulted in the destruction of much material ‘that we wish had not been following
both world wars’. Files relating to SOE did not escape this destruction: a number of
such files were destroyed in their entirety after 1945, and appear to have included
among their number volumes entitled ‘Handling and Traffic Policy for Blown
SOE Transmitters’ and ‘Recruiting of Staff by the I.S.R.B.’, in addition to a file
on France likely to have been concerned with the penetration of the well-known
Postscript on Sources 217
Introduction
1. Mark Wheeler, ‘The SOE Phenomenon’, Journal of Contemporary History, 16(1)
(1981), p. 515.
2. Author’s interview with A.A. Fyffe, 05.11.2001.
3. All references are to documents held at The National Archives (TNA): Public
Record Office (PRO), Kew, unless otherwise stated. HS8/840, D/CE.6 to D/CE,
28.10.42.
4. HS9/23/3, Report by Lt. Turnbull, STS 6, 23.04.43.
5. Imperial War Museum Sound Archive (hereafter IWMSA), Interview with Peter
Murray Lee (7493/10), Reel 5.
6. In a desperate attempt to bolster the staff of the code department, Marks sent
a memo to the Ministry of Labour. The memo, in which Marks referred to
SOE, had been written on ISRB headed notepaper, and was quickly brought
to the attention of Boyle and Senter, who confronted Marks: ‘Brandishing my
memo as if it were scorching his fingers, he [Senter] informed me that no one
in his right mind would make any reference to SOE on a sheet of notepaper
headed INTER SERVICES RESEARCH BUREAU, thereby blowing Baker Street’s
cover! I’d committed a major breach of security.’ (Leo Marks, Between Silk and
Cyanide: A Codemaker’s War, p. 333.)
7. IWMSA Interview with Lee, Reel 5.
8. W.J.M. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, p. 382.
9. KV4/171, Senter to O.A. Harker (JS/3304), 08.05.45.
218
Notes 219
54. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 5. Further support for Fyffe’s employment
came from Maj. T.H.H. Grayson of Thame Park. At the end of the month, in
a wide-ranging letter to Lt. C.H. Scott, he wrote ‘I strongly recommend Fyffe
for the employment you mentioned He would, in my opinion, do the
job well’ (HS6/961, Grayson to Scott (STS/CR/24), 29.07.41). On 1 August
Scott replied, noting that ‘I passed on your message about Fyffe to Major
Whetmore’ (HS6/961, Scott to Grayson, 01.08.41).
55. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 5.
56. Fyffe, ‘Group 26 at Aviemore’. I am grateful to Major Fyffe for allowing me
to see this paper.
57. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 6.
58. Fyffe, ‘The Protected Area of Western Scotland and its Military Occupation
from 1940’, p. 30.
59. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 6.
60. Fyffe, ‘The Protected Area of Western Scotland and its Military Occupation
from 1940’, pp. 31–2.
61. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 6.
62. Ibid., Reels 6–7; HS9/1521/6, Papers in Vass’ Personnel File.
63. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 6.
64. HS9/1280/8, Report from L/Cpl Stokes, 10.07.41, The Cooler.
65. HS9/1280/8, L/Cpl Stokes, The Cooler (undated).
66. Ibid.
67. HS9/1218/2, Note (undated).
68. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 6.
69. Ibid., Reel 7.
70. HS9/1280/8, Papers in Rosa’s Personnel File.
71. HS6/884, cited in D/CE3 to J.A. (DCE3/680), 20.11.41.
72. HS9/1218/2, Extract from D/CE3 to D/CE, 19.3.42.
73. HS9/1218/2, Report from Cpl Saunders, 18.09.41.
74. HS9/1218/2, Report from L/Cpl Beaumont, 25.09.41.
75. HS9/1218/2, Report from Inverlair, 04.10.41.
76. HS9/1218/2, L/Cpl Mendes 30.10.41, The Cooler.
77. HS9/1218/2, L/Cpl Blacka, 13.11.41.
78. Fyffe, ‘The Protected Area of Western Scotland and its Military Occupation
from 1940’, pp. 32–3.
79. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 6.
80. Fyffe, ‘The Protected Area of Western Scotland and its Military Occupation
from 1940’, p. 32.
81. HS9/1218/2, ‘No. 5’, From Fyffe, 05.05.42.
82. Fyffe, ‘The Protected Area of Western Scotland and its Military Occupation
from 1940’, pp. 32–3.
83. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 7.
84. HS6/736, A/CD to CD (marked ‘Draft’), 03.07.44.
85. HS7/31, History: Security Section, p. 3.
86. Author’s interview with Fyffe, 05.11.01.
87. HS6/736, A/CD to CD (marked ‘Draft’), 03.07.44.
88. HS8/841 and HS8/857, ‘Internment Facilities for Special Cases’, 26.07.44.
89. HS6/961, H to D/T.1 (H/OR/1824) Copies to M.Z. and D/Fin2, 30.06.41.
90. HS6/961, D/T.1 to H (Copy to MZ), 01.07.41.
224 Notes
3 Security abroad
1. HS8/432, A/CD to D/His (ACD/86A/8411), 03.01.46.
2. HS7/31, History: Security Section, p. 12.
3. Lady Ranfurly, To War With Whittaker: The Wartime Diaries of the Countess
of Ranfurly 1939–45, pp. 79, 82, 92.
4. Although he refrained from referring to Countess Ranfurly by name,
when discussing the ‘anti-SO2 dossier’, Bickham Sweet-Escott noted that
it included ‘copies of reports and telegrams which were supposed to show
that our organization was ineffective it was obvious at once that they
could have been obtained only from our files. It is symptomatic of the
atmosphere of Cairo in those days that we later established beyond any
reasonable doubt that they had been extracted by two people who had
been taken on by us at the express request of someone in G.H.Q. In other
words, it looked very much as if a spy had been deliberately planted on us
by the soldiers’ (Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, p. 75).
5. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, p. 74.
6. Lady Ranfurly, To War With Whittaker, p. 104
7. As Mackenzie notes, the period is difficult to explore closely ‘as the majority
of the Cairo files were destroyed in the “great panic” on June 1942’ (Mack-
enzie, The Secret History of SOE, p. 182).
8. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, p. 508.
9. HS8/838, Security Progress Report (XC/SA/15), 05.06.43.
10. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, p. 170.
11. HS8/838, D/H.147 to A.D.3, D/CE, copies to C.O.S., D/HV (XC/SA/15),
13.06.43.
12. HS8/874, D/HV to D/FIN Copy to D/CE.1, W Section (DHX/KV/528),
21.12.42.
13. HS8/874, D/CE.1 to D/HV (DCE1/KV/4616), 22.12.42.
14. HS8/838, ‘Security – General & Preliminary Report’ (XC/SA/15), 14.04.43.
15. HS8/838, D/H 147 to D/HV and D/CE, 09.05.43.
16. HS8/838, D/HV to D/H147, 09.05.43.
17. HS8/838, D/HV to D/H147, 10.05.43; D/HV to D/H147, 12.05.43.
18. HS8/838, D/H.147 to D/HV and D/CE, 13.05.43.
19. HS8/838, Security Progress Report (XC/SA/15), 05.06.43.
20. HS8/838, Gillson to Roberts (XC/SA/15), 01.06.43.
21. HS8/838, Gillson to O’Sullivan (XC/SA/15), 01.06.43.
22. HS8/838, Security Progress Report (XC/SA/15), 05.06.43.
23. HS8/874 and HS8/838, Security Progress Report, August 1943.
24. HS8/874, ‘Security Middle East’, D/H.147 (undated).
25. HS8/838, D/H.147 to A.D.3, D/CE, copies to C.O.S., D/HV (XC/SA/15),
13.06.43.
226 Notes
56. HS6/875, Beevor to SOM Adm Ech, ‘A’ Branch, Copies to G/I/ I(b) SOM, No.
1 Special Force, 30.07.44.
57. HS6/875, D/H.928 to D/CE (I/312/9/16), 28.07.44.
58. HS6/875, Hoyer Millar to Senter (I/312/14/22), 03.08.44.
59. HS6/875, Senter to Hoyer Millar (JS/10/11/1814), 10.08.44.
60. HS6/875, Senter to Hoyer Millar (JS/10/11/1852), 16.08.44.
61. HS6/875, AD/P to D/H.928, through D/CE (ADP/10/11/2001), 05.09.44.
62. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Lee, Baird (I/312/95), 25.10.44.
63. HS8/885, AM.200, ‘Security Intelligence Panel Monthly Report No. 10 –
December, 1944’, 29.12.44.
64. HS8/873, Lt Col (AA & QMG) to G.I.(b), 11.12.44.
65. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Lee (PERS/1011/IB), 21.12.44.
66. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Senter (PERS/1151/IB), 16.01.45.
67. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Roche (PERS/1153/IB), 16.01.45.
68. HS8/873, Hoyer Millar to Senter (PERS/1151/IB), 16.01.45.
69. Senter reluctantly gave his support (‘I am satisfied on what you say that in
everyone’s interests, the change ought to be made, but I am also very
conscious of the unique contribution that he has made, and I do not think there
are many people who could have produced such results in the time’), while
Roche was ‘sorry but not surprised’ at the news, telling Hoyer Millar that ‘When
I got back to London last November I told ADP that I feared it was only a
question of time before Peter’s “intransigence” rendered a change inevitable’.
(HS8/873, John to Hoyer (JS/96/2748), 06.02.45; Tom to Hoyer, 06.02.45.)
70. HS7/116, History of the Security Section – Indian Mission.
71. HS8/872, Notes left by Lt Col Gillson at Meerut, February 1944: Proposed
Duties of Indian Mission Security Section.
72. HS7/116, History of the Security Section – Indian Mission.
73. HS8/872, ‘Security Report No. 1, Force 136’, B/B.637 to B/B.100, 14.06.44.
74. HS7/116, History of the Security Section – Indian Mission.
75. Charles Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East, p. 89.
76. HS7/116, History of the Security Section – Indian Mission.
77. HS8/846, ‘Report to the Director of Special Operations, Mediterranean Area,
from Deputy to Head of the Division of Intelligence, Security, Liaison and
Personal Services, S.O.E., H.Q., London’, 28.03.44.
78. HS7/116, History of the Security Section – Indian Mission.
79. The History continued to note that ‘It can safely be said that had the war
continued, Lt. Col. Bourne’s organisation would have paid the Mission a
handsome dividend’ (HS7/116, History of the Security Section – Indian
Mission).
80. Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, p. 151.
81. HS7/116, History of the Security Section – Indian Mission.
82. HS7/31, History: Security Section, p. 13.
83. HS7/116, History of the Security Section – Indian Mission.
6 Approaching Section V
1. KV4/120, D.G. White, ‘Report on Section V in Relation to the Problem of an
M.I.5/M.I.6 Joint Section for C.E. Work’.
2. F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War,
Volume 4, p. 10.
3. KV4/120, D.G. White, ‘Report on Section V in Relation to the Problem of an
M.I.5/M.I.6 Joint Section for C.E. Work’.
4. Hinsley and Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 4,
p. 180.
5. HS7/31, Note by John Senter, p. 4.
6. KV4/173, Boyle to Liddell (ARB/RET/2627), 20.01.43.
7. Curry, The Security Service 1908–1945, pp. 205–6.
8. KV4/173, Vivian to Liddell, 10.02.43.
9. KV4/173, Boyle to Liddell (ARB/JF/2925), 17.03.43.
10. KV4/173, Liddell to Boyle (51/30/65/DB), 22.03.43.
11. KV4/173, Liddell to Vivian (51/30/65/DB), 22.03.43.
12. KV4/173, Vivian to Liddell, 28.03.43.
13. KV4/173, Liddell to Vivian (51/30/65/DB), 30.03.43.
14. KV4/171, Note by Liddell, 16.04.43.
15. HS2/243, , MI5 to Warden, 22.04.43.
16. HS2/243, , MI5 to Warden, 22.04.43.
17. HS2/243, Warden to , MI5 (RHW/KV/342), 23.04.43. Emphasis added.
18. KV4/208, Minute 8, Curry to D.G., 04.05.43.
19. KV4/191, Liddell Diary, 03.04.43.
234 Notes
14. Foot, SOE in the Low Countries, p. 174, citing V/CD to AD/E, Copies to CD
and A/CD, TSC in Holland 21.
15. HS6/748, Senter to , Broadway (JS/17/1a/720), 08.12.43; HS6/737, AD/P
to D/R (Copy to ACD), 09.12.43, covering ‘Insecurity of Dutch Secret Organ-
isations: S.I.S./S.O.E Enquiries, 1943’; HS6/735, D/CE.G to AD/P, ‘Dutch
Investigation Report Appendix IV: Exchange of Information between S.O.E.
& S.I.S.’, December 1943.
16. HS6/737, Boyle to (other papers indicate that Cordeaux was the recip-
ient) (ARB/81/3951), 06.09.43.
17. HS6/737, Cordeaux to Boyle, 10.09.43.
18. HS6/746, AD/P to N, Copy to D/CE.G.A (ADP/352), 11.10.43.
19. HS6/746, Cordeaux to Boyle, 05.10.43.
20. HS6/746, D/CE.GA to AD/P (DCEGA/KV/762), 14.10.43.
21. HS6/737, AD/P to D/CE.SS (ADP/6/426), 18.10.43.
22. HS6/737, AD/P to D/R (Copy to ACD), 09.12.43, covering ‘Insecurity of
Dutch Secret Organisations: S.I.S./S.O.E Enquiries, 1943’; HS6/735, D/CE.G
to AD/P, ‘Dutch Investigation Report Appendix IV: Exchange of Information
between S.O.E. & S.I.S.’, December 1943.
23. HS6/748, AD/P to A/CD, Copy to V/CD, AD/E. (ADP/6/631), 26.11.43.;
Philip H.J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying, pp. 102, 156.
24. KV4/120, R.D. Gibbs, 07.08.42.
25. HS6/735 and HS6/737, AD/P to D/CE.G, Copies to: V/CD, A/CD, AD/E
(ADP/24/0/643), 29.11.43.
26. HS6/748, D/CE.G to AD/P (DCEG/KV/872), 15.12.43.
27. HS6/748, AD/P to BSS/G through BSS (ADP/17/1a/811), 16.12.43.
28. HS6/737 and HS6/748, AD/P to D/R (ADP/17/1a/819), 18.12.43.
29. HS6/737, A/CD to A.C.S.S. Copy to DD/SP, 18.12.43; HS6/748, A/CD to
V.C.S.S. Copy to DD/SP, 20.12.43.
30. HS6/749, V.C.S.S. to A/CD, 25.12.43.
31. Boyle included detailed references to the paper-chase that led him to this
conclusion: ‘I understood that you were in agreement with these arrange-
ments. I had correspondence with Cowgill (my letter to him of the 14th
July last) and (my letter to him of the 24th July last) and a letter from
Cowgill of 5th August last suggesting an amendment to cover a point raised
by you about your seeing names submitted. In that letter, Cowgill says
“the agreement of all in S.I.S. has now been obtained”: that was subject
to the outstanding point you had raised, which he covered and which we
accepted’. (HS6/749, A/CD to V.C.S.S. (ACD/81/4460), 28.12.43.)
32. HS6/749, V.C.S.S. to A/CD, 31.12.43.
33. HS6/748, AD/P to BSS.G through BSS (ADP/17/1a/900), 30.12.43.
34. HS6/735, BSS/G to AD/P (BSSG/KV/963), 11.01.44.
35. HS6/735, AD/P to D/R Copies to A/CD and BSS/G (ADP/4/3/1048), 14.01.44.
36. KV4/191, Liddell Diary, 22.02.43.
37. KV6/34, Wethered (B.1.B) to Baxter (B.1.D), 16.07.43.
38. KV4/192, Liddell Diary, 13.12.43.
39. HS6/735, N to D/RP, 25.01.44. Also see N to D/RP, 25.01.44; A/DP to D/R,
28.01.44; A/DP to DR, 29.01.44.
40. HS6/745, BSS/GC to D/R/LC (BSSGC/KV/1182), 23.03.44.
41. HS6/745, AD/E to D/R.LC (Copy to BSS/GC), 31.03.44.
236 Notes
42. HS6/737, Telegram From Berne, Personal to A.D.E. from J.O., 22.11.43.
43. HS6/748, AD/P to A/CD, Copy to V/CD, AD/E (ADP/6/631), 26.11.43. Also
see HS6/738, ‘The Question Bingham’; N to AD/P, 10.02.44; N to AD/E,
18.02.44; AD/P to A/CD (ADP/4/3/1237), 21.02.44.
44. HS6/738, AD/P to A/CD (ADP/4/3/1237), 21.02.44.
45. HS6/738, AD/P to A/CD (ADP/4/3/1249), 22.02.44.
46. HS6/738, A/CD to AD/E Copy to AD/P (ACD/81a/4799), 23.02.44.
47. Foot, SOE in the Low Countries, p. 206.
48. HS6/735, ‘Notes on the Interrogation Reports of “Chive” and “Sprout” ’,
D/CE.1 (undated).
49. KV6/34, ‘Chive/Sprout’, 05.02.44.
50. HS6/735 and HS6/738, White to Senter (L.397/Holland/1(B.1.B)),
13.02.44.
51. HS6/735 and HS6/738, AD/P to V/CD through A/CD Copy to D/CE
(ADP/3/3/1225), 18.02.44.
52. HS6/735 and HS6/738, Senter to White (JS/4/3/1226), 18.02.44.
53. HS6/735, Senter to White (JS/4/3/1254), 22.02.44.
54. HS6/738 and HS6/735, BSS/A to DR/LC, Copy to L/SV (BSSA/KV/1089),
28.02.44.
55. HS6/738, BSS/A to D/CE Copy to L/SV (BSSA/KV/1087), 28.02.44.
56. HS6/738, BSS/A to L/SV (BSSA/KV/1176), 23.03.44.
57. KV6/35, Wethered, 30.03.44.
58. KV6/35, Wethered to Hale, 30.03.44.
59. HS6/738, HS6/736 and KV6/35, ‘Memorandum’, 03.04.44.
60. HS6/738, ‘Extracts from Fourth Interrogation of Chive’, 06.04.44.
61. HS6/738, , SIS to Warden, 09.04.44.
62. HS6/736 and HS6/738, AD/P to V/CD through A/CD (Copy to D/CE, DR/LC)
(ADP/4/3/1281), 13.04.44.
63. KV6/35, Minute 92, Hale to Wethered, 15.04.44.
64. KV6/35, Minute 97, Wethered to Milmo, 19.04.44.
65. KV6/35, Minute 101, Milmo to Wethered, 29.04.44.
66. HS6/736 and KV6/35, Roche to White, 10.05.44.
67. HS6/736, White to Roche (L.397/HOLLAND/1/B.1.B), 16.05.44.
68. HS6/736, D/CE to ADP (DCE/5350), 19.05.44.
69. KV6/35, Roy to Hale, 25.05.44.
70. HS6/736 and KV6/35, Wethered to Wells (L.397/HOLLAND/1(B.1.B)),
02.06.44.
71. KV6/35, Wethered to de Bruyne (L.397/Holland/L(B.1.B)GPW),
06.06.44.
72. KV6/35, Wethered to Senter (L.397/Holland/1(B.1.B.)GPW), 07.06.44.
73. KV6/35, Senter to Wethered (JS/4/3/1588), 07.06.44.
74. KV6/35, Wethered to Corin, 10.06.44.
75. KV6/35, Wethered to de Bruyne (L.397/Holland/1(B.1.B.)GPW), 15.06.44.
76. KV6/35, Bland to Liddell, 14.06.44.
77. KV6/35, Liddell to Bland (L.397/Holland/1/DB), 17.06.44.
78. KV6/35, Wethered to Hill (L.397/Holland/1/B.1.B/GPW), 16.06.44.
79. For this continued debate, see KV4/91, HS8/841, HS8/842 and
HS8/857.
Notes 237
9 Unfinished business
1. HS7/31, History: Security Section, p. 12; Foot, SOE in France, p. 390.
2. HS7/31, History: Security Section, p. 14.
3. Ibid., p. 14(2).
4. KV6/27, Warden to Wadeson (RHW/(II)6/477), 09.06.44.
5. KV6/27, Wethered to D.D.B., 12.06.44.
6. KV6/27, Wethered to Warden (L.397/France/16(B.1.B.)GPW), 15.06.44.
7. KV6/27 and KV4/208, White to Senter (L.397/FRANCE/16/DDB), 26.06.44.
8. KV6/27, ‘Report on Three French Blown Circuits’, G.P. Wethered, 25.06.44.
9. KV6/27 and KV4/208, Senter to White (JS/8/7/1693), 20.07.44.
10. KV6/27 and KV4/208, White to Senter (L.397/FRANCE/16/DDB), 22.07.44.
11. KV4/201, Robertson to Senter (S.F.51/32/Misc.11(ADB)), 08.08.44.
12. KV4/201, Senter to Robertson (JS/2/1/1812), 10.08.44.
13. KV4/201, Robertson to Senter (S.F.51/32/Misc.11(ADB)), 08.08.44.
14. HS9/1556/8, Papers in Warden’s Personnel File.
15. HS7/31, History: Security Section, p. 11.
16. See HS6/439.
17. HS7/31, History: Security Section, p. 11.
18. HS7/31, History: Security Section, p. 15.
19. HS8/873, Senter to Hoyer Millar, 06.02.45.
240 Notes
54. KV2/962, ‘Progress Report in the cases of Giskes and Huntemann’, 27.06.45.
55. KV2/962, ‘Report on the Investigation into the “Nordpol” Affair: Based on
the interrogations of Giskes and Huntmann’, Camp 020, July 1945.
56. HS6/750, Wilson to Delaforce, 26.07.45.
57. KV2/963, Extract from Camp 020 Monthly Summary, 01.08.45.
58. KV2/963, D/WR to W.R.C.4.A (Mr Wilson), 10.08.45.
59. KV2/963, Camp 020 to Wilson, 17.08.45.
60. KV2/963, W.R.C.4.A to Bird, 26.07.45.
61. KV2/963, W.R.C.4.A. to D/WR, 26.07.45.
62. KV2/963, Camp 020 to Wilson, 17.08.45.
63. HS6/772, AD/P to Lt Col Dobson (ADP/3529), 13.08.45.
64. Foot, SOE in France, pp. 115–16.
65. KV2/1132, Beddard to Stephens, 14.07.45.
66. KV2/1132, Roche to Wilson, 08.08.45.
67. KV2/1132, ‘Summary of Interrogation of Bleicher’, S/Ldr Beddard, 15.08.45.
68. HS8/880, AD/P to A/CD (ADP/3403), 18.06.45.
69. HS8/880, CD to Directors, Regional & Section Heads (CD/8101), 19.06.45.
70. HS8/880, AD/P to BSS/D (ADP/3404), 19.06.45.
71. HS8/881, CD to Directors, Regional & Section Heads (CD/8255), 11.08.45.
72. See for example HS8/880, D/CE to D/S, Copy AD/E (DCE/2044), 29.06.45;
HS8/881, D/CE to DR/JED Section (DCE/2055), 02.07.45; HS8/882, D/CE to
RF (DCE/4224), 29.08.45; D/CE to H (DCE/4482), 01.11.45.
73. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 9.
74. Ibid., Reel 10.
75. Fyffe, quoted in David Stafford, Secret Agent: The True Story of the Special
Operations Executive, p. 231.
76. HS9/324/4, Fyffe to Atkins, Copy to Major Mott, 10.11.45.
77. IWMSA Interview with Fyffe, Reel 10.
78. HS9/324/4, Fyffe to Atkins, Copy to Major Mott, 10.11.45.
79. CAB 121/305, Gubbins to Hollis, 11.01.46.
80. See Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Unquiet in Death: The Post-War Survival of the
“Special Operations Executive”, 1945–51’, in A. Gorst, L. Jonman and
W.S. Lucas (eds.) Contemporary British History: Politics and the Limits of Policy
1931–61; and Philip H.J. Davies, ‘From Special Operations to Special Polit-
ical Action: The “Rump SOE” and SIS Post-War Covert Action Capability
1945–1977’, Intelligence and National Security, 15(3) (Autumn 2000).
81. Park’s obituary, Daily Telegraph, 30.01.01; The Times, 22.02.01. Warden’s
obituary, Daily Telegraph, 02.08.90.
82. Duncan Stuart, ‘ “Of Historical Interest Only”: The Origins and Vicissitudes
of the SOE Archive’, Intelligence and National Security, 20(1) (March 2005),
p. 19.
83. HS8/882, Mott to Atkins (NGM/1785), 08.03.46.
84. HS8/882, Mott to Atkins (NGM/2034), 30.04.46.
85. HS8/882, Mott to Atkins (NGM/2174), 04.06.46. The inadequacies of the
accommodation provided were described more graphically by Leo Marks:
‘we were incarcerated in the noxious bowels of a sub-basement where it was
as difficult to breath as to think’ (Between Silk and Cyanide, p. 595).
86. HS8/882, Mott to Atkins (NGM/2201), 13.06.46.
242 Notes
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Index
248
Index 249
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 72, Roche, Lt Col the Hon Thomas
83, 206 Gabriel, 10, 18, 20, 42, 43, 49,
‘Omelette’, see Gulbrandsen, Tor 52–3, 64, 66–7, 68, 91, 165, 166,
(‘Anchor’, ‘Omelette’) 167, 198–200, 201, 203, 205–7,
Operation Animals, 170 208, 210
Operation Knacker, 123 ‘Romeo’, 31
Operation Torch, 170 Rosa, Leonida Guiseppe, 25, 27, 28,
Oratory School, 26 30–1, 32–3, 35–7, 49
Orde Dienst (OD), 148, 149, 152–3 Rothschild, Lord, 74, 77–8
O’Reilly, John Dermot (‘Jack’), 2–3, 4, Roy, Ian, 167
49, 92, 93 ‘Rud W’, 177
Oughton, Major J.M., 60–1
‘Overcloud’, see Le Tac, Joel Scammaroni (a.k.a. Captain Sarment,
(‘Overcloud’) ‘Sea Urchin Major’), 176–7
Schools, Jan Baptiste, 92–5
Palace Internment Camp, 26, 28 Schools, Mrs (‘Peggy’), 93–5
Park, Hugh Eames, 18, 46, 78, 84, 85, Scurr, Chief Inspector John, 93
92–5, 114–15, 160, ‘Sea Urchin Major’, see Scammaroni
201, 208, 210 (a.k.a. Captain Sarment, ‘Sea
Pertschuck, Maurice (‘Eugene’), 105 Urchin Major’)
Petrie, Sir David, 3, 10, 76, 77, 80, 81, ‘Sea Urchin Minor’, see Hellier, Lt
83, 96, 103, 104, 137, 138, 171, 197 (‘Sea Urchin Minor’)
Pickering, L/Cpl, 36 ‘Sealing Wax’, see Le Tac, Joel
Picquet-Wicks, Eric, 174, 180 (‘Overcloud’)
Pidcock, Captain, 163 Searle, L/Cpl, 26–7
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), 20,
Pilditch, Sir Denys, 71
39, 77, 83, 96, 99, 113, 121, 122,
Plan Iago, 175, 182
127–8, 129, 132, 136, 138, 148,
Plan Prudential, 191–2
149, 150, 153, 154, 210, 211
Political Intelligence Department
ISLD, 52, 72
(PID), 181
Section V, 16, 63, 121, 132–3, 134,
‘Pot A’, see Amboise (‘Pot A’)
137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144,
The Prisoner, 25
145, 146, 147, 150, 152–4, 155,
Purisiol, Rinaldo, 25, 26–7, 28–9, 30,
197, 202–3, 205
32–3, 36–8, 44–6, 49
Security Intelligence Panel (SIP),
Pyle, Squadron Leader, 77
62–8, 202
Selborne, Lord, 17, 118–19
Rabinovitch, Adolph (‘Catalpha’), Senter, John Watt, xii, 3, 4, 9, 10, 14,
105, 110 16, 18–19, 20, 21, 43, 59–62, 63,
Ranfurly, Countess of, 50–1 65–6, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79–80,
Ray, Lt, 90 82, 84, 88, 90, 101–3, 104, 105,
Raymondi, 177 108–10, 111–15, 119, 122–4,
Rees, Sgt, 31 125, 127, 129, 135, 136, 142, 143,
Reirsen, Olaf, 101 144–7, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153,
Robertson, A.H., 94 154–5, 157–8, 159, 160, 161–2,
Robertson, T.A. (‘Tar’), 74, 79–81, 82, 164–5, 167, 171, 172, 181–2, 183,
101, 102, 103, 105, 112–13, 139, 184, 185, 188, 191, 193, 196–7,
171, 175–7, 178, 179, 180, 182–4, 198, 201, 210, 212–13
185, 188, 192–3, 205 Seymour, Charles H., 149, 150–1
252 Index
131, 136, 153, 163, 176, 178, 179, White, Dick, 75–6, 80, 81, 82–3,
180, 195–6, 197–8, 202, 210 84, 88, 91, 101–4, 110, 112–13,
Wavell, General, 50–1 115, 118, 133, 138, 140, 142,
Wells, Captain R.A. (‘Tom’), 150–1, 143–4, 146, 147, 161, 162, 163,
162, 163, 200–1, 203–4, 209 164, 166, 172, 196
West, Nigel, 206 Wilson, D.I., 203, 204, 205
Wethered, Geoffrey Peter, 89–92, 97, Wilson, J.S., 100–1, 106–9,
104–6, 110–14, 115–19, 121, 122, 130–1, 184, 185, 186–8,
124–5, 127, 131, 139, 140–2, 143, 190, 191
144–6, 147, 158, 160–1, 165, 167, Woolrych, S.H.C., 31, 80,
168–9, 178, 180, 196–7, 217 81–2
Wheeler, Mark, x Wyke, John Edward, 214
Whetmore, Edwin Charles, 2, 3–4, 5,
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34–5, 40, 41,
44, 75, 77, 78 Yeo-Thomas, Forest (‘Tommy’), 91, 121