ADMIN LAW PRINCIPLES

1. Classification cases:

Pangasinan vs PSC GR 47065

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action
and at the same time to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue con-
centration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. Thereby, the
"rule of law" was established which narrows the range of governmental action and
makes it subject to control by certain devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting
delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities
have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by the legisla-
ture alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the mass of judi-
cial pronouncement, he finds a great deal of confusion. One thing, however, is apparent
in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of
delegatus non potest delegari or delegata potestas non potest delegari, attributed to
Bracton (De Legius et Consuetedinious Angliae, edited by G. E. Woodbine, Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1922, vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Ro-
man Law (D. 17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subor-
dinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all mod-
ern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939.) Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life,
the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty
of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation
of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the
court. (Dillon Catfish Drainage Dist, v. Bank of Dillon, 141 S. E. 274, 275, 143 S. Ct.
178; State vs. Knox County, 54 S. W. 2d. 973, 976, 165 Tenn. 319.) In harmony with
such growing tendency, this Court, since the decision in the case of Compañia General
de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioner (34 Phil., 136), relied
upon by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its seal of approval to the "delegation
of greater powers by the legislature." (Inchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility Com-
missioner, 44 Phil., Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446; People vs. Fernandez &
Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal & Os-
meña, G. R. Nos. 46076, 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939; and Robb and Hilscher
vs. People, G. R. No. 45866, promulgated June 12, 1939.).

US vs Ang Tangho

THE POWER TO DELEGATE.—The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to

enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does
nothing mor£ than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regula-
 tions to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no dele-
gation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not
define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done
to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-Geheral,
the act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

POWER VESTED IN THE LEGISLATURE.—By the organic act and subject only
to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclu-
sively in the Legislature, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the
Philippine Islands.


OPINION LIMITED.—This opinion is confined to the right of the Governor-Gen-
eral to issue a proclamation fixing the maximum price at which rice should be
sold, and to make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and to that extent holds
that it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. It does not decide or
undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of Act
No. 2868.

COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS, petitioner,

vs.
THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, respondent.

In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law “down the general rules
of action under which the commission shall proceed.” nor does it itself prescribe in
detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment
and discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as
to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or
what it shall act upon.

The Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its powers and functions
in favor of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with respect to the matters
therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902. The Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information
which the State wants but has authorized and board to obtain the information which
the board wants.
Asuncion vs. de Yriarte, 28 Phil. 67

Simply because the duties of an official happens to be ministerial, it does not necessari-
ly follow that he may not, in the administration of his office, determine questions of law.
We are of the opinion that it is the duty of the division of archives, when articles of in-
corporation are presented for registration, to determine whether the objects of the cor-
poration as expressed in the articles are lawful. We do not believe that, simply because
articles of incorporation presented foe registration are perfect in form, the division of
archives must accept and register them and issue the corresponding certificate of incor-
poration no matter what the purpose of the corporation may be as expressed in the arti-
cles. We do not believe it was intended that the division of archives should issue a cer-
tificate of incorporation to, and thereby put the seal of approval of the Government
upon, a corporation which was organized for base of immoral purposes. That such cor-
poration might later, if it sought to carry out such purposes, be dissolved, or its officials
imprisoned or itself heavily fined furnished no reason why it should have been created
in the first instance. It seems to us to be not only the right but the duty of the divisions of
archives to determine the lawfulness of the objects and purposes of the corporation be-
fore it issues a certificate of incorporation.



Classsification of Admin agencies

Crisostomo vs CA

Administrative Law; Schools and Universities; Statutes; P.D. 1341 did not abolish, but
only changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce into what is now the Poly-
technic University of the Philippines—what took place was a change in academic status
of the educational institution, not in its corporate life.—P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but
only changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce into what is now the Poly-
technic University of the Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778
had converted what was then the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine
College of Commerce. What took place was a change in academic status of the educa-
tional institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the expansion of
its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization.

PCPSCA vs COA

Same; A reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervi-
sion by any agency of the State, unlike government-owned and -controlled corporations.
—A reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision
by any agency of the State, unlike government-owned and -controlled corporations. No
government representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private
corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by
the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally
accorded to private corporations, such as the powers to hold property, to sue and be
sued, to use a common seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal opera-
tions: the petitioner shall be managed or operated by its officers “in accordance with its
by-laws in force.

Buklod vs Zamora

Constitutional Law; Political Law; Public Offices; Abolition; General rule has always
been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature; Except
where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence; As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the
executive department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to
inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain law may grant him the broad au-
thority to carry out reorganization measures.—The general rule has always been that
the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the
legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is
either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where
the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legisla-
ture that brought it into existence. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus,
agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s power of
control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws
may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Authority of the President to effect organizational changes
in the department or agency under the executive structure recognized in the Larin case.
—We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the au-
thority of the President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency
under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Re-
public Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads Of departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a com-
prehensive review of their respective mandates, missions,objectives, functions, pro-
grams, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which are
no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down,
phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the streamlined or-
ganization and improved overall performance of their respective agencies. Section 78
ends up with the mandate that the actual streamlining and productivity improvement in
agency organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders is-
sued for the purpose by the Office of the President.Same; Same; Same; Same; The
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) is subject to the President’s con-
tinuing authority to reorganize.—The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Fi-
nance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the President’s
continuing authority to reorganize.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reorganization is carried out in ‘good faith’ if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient; Circumstances which may
be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made
as a result of reorganization.—Reorganization is carried out in ‘good faith’ if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act
No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad
faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit:
(a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing
pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and
another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents
are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency con-
cerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the orig-
inal offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of
an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity.—We hold that petitioners’ right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is
better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is
neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Except constitutional offices which provide for special im-
munity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an
office or its salary.—Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office.
Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.

Bagaoisan vs National Tobaco

Political Law; Legislative Power; Abolition of Office; Exception; The general rule has al-
ways been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature.—The
general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the
power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by
authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it
may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception,
however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of
a particular office,or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorga-
nization measures.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reorganization; Security of Tenure; Republic Act No. 6656
provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization.—It having been
duly established that the President has the authority to carry out reorganization in any
branch or agency of the executive department, what is then left for us to resolve is
whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been
regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out
in ‘good faith’ if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be con-
sidered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a
result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of
positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where
an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is creat-
ed; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of ap-
pointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the
same functions as the original offices; and (e) where the removal violates the order of
separation.

domingo vs Zamora

Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Office of the President; Power to Reorga-

nize; Executive Order 81 is a valid exercise of the President’s delegated power to reor-
ganize the Office of the President.—Since EO 81 is based on the President’s continuing
authority under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, EO 81 is a valid exercise of the Presi-
dent’s delegated power to reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants the
President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorga-
nize his office “to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.” The Office of the Presi-
dent is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the
Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President
in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of
the President is the command post of the President. This is the rationale behind the
President’s continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Abolition of an office and transfer of functions or agencies,
distinguished; The distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees.
—This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees. The aboli-
tion of an office in good faith necessarily results in the employee’s cessation in office,
but in such event there is no dismissal or separation because the office itself ceases to
exist. On the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not result in the em-
ployee’s cessation in office because his office continues to exist although in another de-
partment, agency or office.
Liban vs Gordon

Same; Same; Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC); Public Officers; Constitu-
tional Law; The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution; Not being a government official or employee, the Philip-
pine National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office
or employment.—The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither
does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC
Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive
branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitu-
tion. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or
Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an
official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being agovernment official or
employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or em-
ployment.
Same; Same; Same; Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is not government-
owned but privately owned.—The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned.
The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including
students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign
of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one be-
tween 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon contributing
P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners, whether residents or
not, can be members of the PNRC.

Biraogo vs PTC

Presidency; Philippine Truth Commission (PTC); Reorganizations; Administrative

Code of 1987 (E.O. 292); Words and Phrases; To say that the Philippine Truth Commis-
sion (PTC) is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section
31, Chapter 10, Book III, of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, is a misplaced supposition,
even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term “restructure”—an “alteration of an
existing structure”—the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President
prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.—The question, therefore, before the
Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorga-
nize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 con-
templates “reorganization” as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1)
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolish-
ing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to an-
other; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other De-
partment/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the
President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of econ-
omy or redundancy of functions. These points to situations where a body or an office is
already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation
of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly,
the answer to the question is in the negative. To say that the PTC is borne out of a re-
structuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition,
even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term “restructure”—an “alteration of an
existing structure.” Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the
President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Control; The power of control is entirely dif-
ferent from the power to create public offices—the former is inherent in the Executive,
while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent
duty to faithfully execute the laws.—In thesame vein, the creation of the PTC is not justi-
fied by the President’s power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modi-
fy or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the
power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former
is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation
from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The Court declines to recognize
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public
office—P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the
convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution.—The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justi-
fication for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachro-
nistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including
the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes
of the decree, embodied in its last “Whereas” clause: WHEREAS, the transition towards
the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of the
national government. Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability
and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became
functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Sec-
tion 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Faithful Execution Clause; The creation of the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.—
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D.
No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to en-
sure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: Section 17. The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall en-
sure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied). As correctly pointed out
by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of govern-
ment is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President’s power to conduct investi-
gations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws—in this case, fundamental
laws on public account-ability and transparency—is inherent in the President’s powers
as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and
to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or
in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
Same; Same; Same; Residual Powers; The powers of the President are not limit-
ed to those specific powers under the Constitution—one of the recognized powers of
the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to
create ad hoc committees, a power which flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.—The Executive is given much
leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of
the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated
duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to as-
certain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department
of Health v. Camposano, 457 SCRA 438 (2005), the authority of the President to issue
Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the ad-
ministrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the
anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld.
Same; Same; Same; The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist
is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execu-
tion and enforcement of the laws of the land.—It should be stressed that the purpose of
allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the per-
formance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies
created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the
Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the gov-
ernment structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-ex-
istent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
Same; Same; Appropriations; There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive
of the power to appropriate funds where there is only allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated.—On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses
the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it
to say that there will be no ap-propriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Execu-
tive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify
the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words
of the Solicitor General, “whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission.” Moreover, since the
amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules
and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; No quasi-judicial powers have been vested in
the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who
come before it; Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine ques-
tions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.—In-
voking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports
 of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated,
no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate
rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that “Quasi-judicial powers in-
volve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is
to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in en-
forcing and administering the same law.” In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved
in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the ju-
diciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative
agencies.

Presidency; Separation of Powers; Public Office; It is settled that, except for the
offices created by the Constitution, the creation of a public office is primarily a legislative
function.—The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of gov-
ernment. This principle is one of the cornerstones of our constitutional democracy and it
cannot be eroded without endangering our government. The 1987 Constitution divides
governmental power into three co-equal branches: the executive, the legislative and the
judicial. It delineates the powers of the three branches: the legislature is generally limit-
ed to the enactment of laws, the executive department to the enforcement of laws and
the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies. Each
branch is independent and supreme within its own sphere and the encroachment by
one branch on another is to be avoided at all costs. The power under scrutiny in this
case is the creation of a public office. It is settled that, except for the offices created by
the Constitution, the creation of a public office is primarily a legislative function. The leg-
islature decides what offices are suitable, necessary or convenient for the administration
of government.

Same; Same; Same; Power of Control; The power of control does not involve the
power to create a public office, neither does the President’s power to find facts or his
broader power to execute the laws give the President the power to create a public of-
fice.—The President’s power to create ad hoc fact-finding bodies does not emanate
from the President’s power of control over the Executive branch. The President’s power
of control is the power to reverse, revise or modify the decisions of subordinate execu-
tive officials, or substitute his own decision for that of his subordinate, or even make the
Dili office decision himself without waiting for the action of his subordinate. This power of control
ang PTC?
does not involve the power to create a public office. Neither does the President’s power
to find facts or his broader power to execute the laws give the President the power to
create a public office. The President can exercise the power to find facts or to execute
the laws without creating a public office.
 Other Powers cases

Marcos vs Maglapus

Constitutional Law; Executive Department; President Duterte is not bound by the

alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to
have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte.—The presidential power of
control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of the
Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be lim-
ited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound
by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos fami-
ly to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte.

Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; President Duterte’s decision to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) involves a political
question that is not a justiciable controversy.—The Court agrees with the OSG that
President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB in-
volves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his
powers under the Constitution and the Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and
military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his
wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.

Carpio vs Executive

Administrative Law; The presidential power of control was held to mean the power of
the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with
that of the latter.—This presidential power of control over the executive branch of gov-
ernment extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk
and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to mean “the
power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate offi-
cer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the for-
mer with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Ex-
ecutive.”

Same; Same; The “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency” equally accepted as a corol-
lary rule to the control powers of the President.—Equally well accepted, as a corollary
rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.”
As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time
and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Same; Same; Same; The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over
the members of the Cabinet who in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and
other offices under their respective jurisdiction in the executive department.—Thus, and
in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members
of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices
under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”

Same; National Police Commission; There is no usurpation of the power of control of

the NAPOLCOM under Section 51.—We agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solici-
tor General that “there is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under
Section 51 because under this very same provision, it is clear that the local executives
are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. XXX As such deputies, they are
answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions under
that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and
binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM.”

Same; Same; Same; The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP Members to the Peo-
ple’s Law Enforcement Boards and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation
of the Commission’s power of control over the PNP.—The grant of disciplinary powers
over PNP members to the “People’s Law Enforcement Boards” (or the PLEB) and city
and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the Commission’s power of control
over the PNP.
Same; Same; The police force not being integrated with the military is not a part of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.—It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provi-
sion herein assailed precisely gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the na-
tional police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President.
This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with the military, is not
a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government, it
properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of
executive control.
Same; Same; Same; The President, as Commander-in-Chief is not a member of the
Armed Forces.—Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of comman-
der-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process during which
the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the in-
ternal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates
nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant
view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces.
He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent
only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly
civil in nature.” His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a
testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme
over the military.”



Tecson vs Salas

Constitutional law; President; Power of control over all executive departments; Villena
ruling still valid.—Insofar as the power of control over all executive departments, bu-
reaus or offices is concerned, the Villena ruling applies with undiminished force. No
doubt can be entertained then as to the continuing vitality of the Villena doctrine con-
cerning the plenitude of authority lodged in the President implicit in the power of control
expressly granted him by the Constitution. Nor should any restrictive significance be at-
tached to the wording in the Mondano decision as to the implications of such concept
considering that there was no need in such case for a more elaborate treatment, all that
was necessary being to distinguish it from supervision.
Civil Service Act; Personnel; Transfer of personnel; Detail to Office of the President not
considered a transfer.—Detail of a Superintendent of Dredging, Bureau of Public Works
to the Office of the President pursuant to a directive of the Executive Secretary acting
by presidential authority, is not removal or transfer.
Same; Same; Same; When transfer is allowed.—Transfer of a Civil Service employee
from one position to another is allowable under the Civil Service Act so long as there be
no reduction in rank or salary, such transfer therefore not being considered disciplinary
when made in the interest of public service.

Same; Same; Power of President to order detail government employees.—The power of

the President to order the detail of a government employee from one office to another is
granted. While the Constitution guarantees the security of a public official’s term, as well
as his right to be compensated, there can be no disputing that the overriding concern is
that the task of government be performed well. One in public service, therefore, should
not lack awareness that whatever talents he may possess should be beneficially em-
ployed for the public welfare, the determination as to where they should be devoted be-
ing ordinarily left to the discretion of his superior.
Constitutional law; Separation of powers; Judiciary cannot inquire into motives for exer-
cise of Presidential or Congressional power.—It is not for the judiciary to inquire into the
motives that impelled the exercise of presidential or congressional power. The concept
of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the three depart-
ments of the government. At the very least, the presumption is to be indulged in that the
exertion of a legitimate governmental power springs from a belief that thereby public in-
terest is served and the common weal promoted.

DENR vs DENR employees

Administrative Law; Department of Environment and Natural Resources; Rules of Pro-

cedure; Rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner,
as rules of procedure are used only to help secure and not to override substantial jus-
tice.—This Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be simply disregarded for
these prescribedprocedures ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Time and
again, courts have been guided by the principle that the rules of procedure are not to be
applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as rules of procedure are used only to help
secure and not to override substantial justice. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the power of this Court to
suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.
Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Powers; Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency; Under this doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the executive department, and the multifarious executive and administrative functions
of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the Executive Departments.—It is
apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency, thus: Under
this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads
of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multi-
farious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such depart-
ments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless dis-
approved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Ex-
ecutive. This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for
under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Reorganization; The trial court should have taken judicial notice of
R.A. No. 6734, as implemented by E.O. No. 429, as legal basis of the President’s power
to reorganize the Executive Department, specifically those administrative regions which
did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM.—The trial court should have taken judicial
notice of R.A. No. 6734, as implemented by E.O. No. 429, as legal basis of the Presi-
dent’s power to reorganize the executive department, specifically those administrative
regions which did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM. It is axiomatic that a court
has the mandate to apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in determining whether
the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on the com-
plaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of
the questions before it. In resolving the motion to dismiss, the trial court should have
taken cognizance of the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial depart-
ments because they are proper subjects ofmandatory judicial notice as provided by
Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is basic in our form of government that
the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the Executive
or Legislative Department.—It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary can-
not inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative
department, for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is
devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to
any of the other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wis-
dom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other depart-
ments.

Taule vs Santos
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Election Law; The jurisdiction of the Comelec is
over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of
the electorate.—The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined
through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the
expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote. Specifically, the term “election,” in the con-
text of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of vot-
ers, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes
which do not characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay.
“Election contests” would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the
title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner,
is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute and in the case
of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the proclamation of
the winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed. The jurisdiction of the
COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng
mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law
whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The COMELEC exercises
only appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials de-
cided by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts which likewise have limited jurisdic-
tion. The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by
law to supervision of the election of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the
sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective organization.
Same; Same; Same; Election protest of officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay; The
Secretary of Local Government has no power to assume jurisdiction over election
protest involving officers of the kati-punan ng mga barangay.—Construing the constitu-
tional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local govern-
ments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or
regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary
to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect
give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a
purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the
basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may
be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the
Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political
affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to
general supervision over local governments. Indeed, it is the policy of the state to en-
sure the autonomy of local governments. This state policy is echoed in the Local Gov-
ernment Code wherein it is declared that “the State shall guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national develop-
ment and social progress.” To deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to re-
view the regularity of the elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the
avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local governments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The respondent Secretary not having the jurisdiction to
hear election protest involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of the parties is to the
ordinary courts.—Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election
protest filed by respondent Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the
FABC on June 18, 1989 as null and void, the respondent Secretary acted in excess of
his jurisdiction. The respondent Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election
protest involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of the parties is to the ordinary
courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the
protest.

Same; Same; Same; Law on Public Officers; The President of the Philippines or his al-
ter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who
does not meet the minimum qualification to be president of the federation of barangay
councils.—In the present controversy involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the law
is likewise explicit. To be appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in the
sangguniang panlalawigan is the president of the katipunang panlalawigan. The ap-
pointee must meet the qualifications set by law. The appointing power is bound by law
to comply with the requirements as to the basic qualifications of the appointee to the
sangguniang panlalawigan. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Secre-
tary of Local Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the
minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils. Augus-
to Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is a member of the federation but he
was not even present during the elections despite notice. The argument that Antonio
was appointed as a remedial measure in the exigency of the service cannot be sus-
tained. Since Antonio does not meet the basic qualification of being president of the
federation, his appointment to the sangguniang panlalawigan is not justified not-
withstanding that such appointment is merely in a temporary capacity. If the intention of
the respondent Secretary was to protect the interests of the federation in the sanggun-
ian, he should have appointed the incumbent FABC President in a hold-over capacity.
For even under the guidelines, the term of office of officers of the katipunan at all levels
shall be from the date of their election until their successors shall have been duly elect-
ed and qualified, without prejudice to the terms of their appointments as members of the
sanggunian to which they may be correspondingly appointed. Since the election is still
under protest such that no successor of the incumbent has as yet qualified, the respon-
dent Secretary has no choice but to have the incumbent FABC President sit as member
of the sanggunian. He could even have appointed petitioner since he was elected the
presi-dent of the federation but not Antonio. The appointment of Antonio, allegedly the
protege of respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner’s charge of political inter-
ference by respondent Governor in the organization. This should not be allowed. The
barangays should be insulated from any partisan activity or political intervention if only
to give true meaning to local autonomy.





Carino vs CHR

Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Commission on Human Rights; Court declares the

Commission on Human Rights to have no jurisdiction on adjudicatory powers over cer-
tain specific type of cases like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political
rights.—The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has
the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, or even
a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to
try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged hu-
manrights violations in volving civil or political rights. The Court declares the Commis-
sion on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the funda-
mental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot try and decide cases (or hear and deter-
mine causes) as courts of justice or even quasi-judicial bodies do.—But it cannot try and
decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial
bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.