Carlos vs Villegas

GR L-24394, August 30, 1968

Facts:
Under Sec. 15 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Rep. Act 409, as amended),
the petitioner and other members of the Uniformed Force Division of the Manila Fire Department
have been required and ordered by the Chief of the Manila Fire Department, upon approval of
the City Mayor, the Commissioner of the Civil Service and the Office of the President, to be 24
hours on duty and 24 hours off duty; this schedule continuous throughout the days of the week
regardless of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays; for an average of eighty-four (84) hours a week.
A petition demanding the enforcement of the 40-hour a week work law with respect to
the Uniformed Force Division of the Manila Fire Department was address to the Mayor and MFD
Chief but replied stating that services rendered beyond a regular period fixed by R.A. No. 1880
will not entitle the employee to overtime pay as a matter of legal right.
Petitioners sent a petition to the President but got no favorable reply.
Issue:
Are the petitioner-appellant and other firemen similarly situated entitled to collect
overtime pay for overtime services rendered?
Held:
No. The Court has explicitly declared that the Eight-Hour Labor Law was not intended to
apply to civil service employees who are still governed by Section 566 and 259 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The nature of work of a fireman requires him to be always on the alert to respond to fire
alarms which may occur at any time of the day, for the exigency of the service necessitates a
round-the-clock observance of his duties, which situation excepts him from the applicability of
Section 562 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act 18809 the Forty-
Hour a Week Work Law.
Rule XV, section 3 of the Civil Service Rules, in pursuant to that of Section 16(e) of the Civil
Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260) reads:
SEC. 3. When the nature of the duties to be performed or the interest of the public service so
requires, the head of any Department or agency may extend the daily hours of work specified for
any or all the employees under him, and such extension shall be without additional compensation
unless otherwise provided by law. Office and employees may be required by the head of the
Department or agency to work on Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays also, without additional
compensation unless otherwise specifically authorized by law.
NAWASA vs NAWASA Consolidated Union
GR L-18939, August 31, 1964
Facts:
The case is a joint stipulation of facts containing multiple issues from several unions on
the implementation of the 40-Hour Week Law (Republic Act No. 1880); alleged violations of the
collective bargaining agreement dated December 28, 1956 concerning "distress pay"; minimum
wage of P5.25; promotional appointments and filling of vacancies of newly created positions;
additional compensation for night work; wage increases to some laborers and employees; and
strike duration pay. In addition, respondent unions raised the issue of whether the 25% additional
compensation for Sunday work should be included in computing the daily wage and whether, in
determining the daily wage of a monthly-salaried employee, the salary should be divided by 30
days.
Issue:
Is NAWASA performing governmental functions and, therefore, essentially a service
agency of the government?
If NAWASA is a public utility, is it exempted from paying additional compensation for work
on Sundays and legal holidays?
Are the intervenors "managerial employees" within the meaning of Republic Act 2377
and, therefore, not entitled to the benefits of Commonwealth Act No. 444?
Held:
No. While under republic Act No. 1383 the NAWASA is considered as a public corporation
it does not show that it was so created for the government of a portion of the State. NAWASA is
not an agency performing governmental functions. Rather, it performs proprietary functions, and
as such comes within the coverage of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
It is a public utility. Because its primary function is to construct, maintain and operate
water reservoirs and waterworks to supply water to the inhabitants. It is exempt from paying
additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal holidays conformably to Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 444. There is, however, no prohibition for it to pay such additional
compensation if it voluntarily agrees to do so.
No. The intervenors’ primary duties do not bear any direct relation with the management
of the NAWASA, nor do they participate in the formulation of its policies nor in the hiring and
firing of its employees. They are required to observe working hours and record their time work
and are not free to come and go to their offices, nor move about at their own discretion.
Section 2 of RA 2377 provides that, a "managerial employee" shall mean either (a) any
person whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which he is
employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof, or (b) ally officer or
member of the managerial staff.
Franklin Baker Co. of the Phils., v. Trajano,
157 SCRA 416
Facts:
Franklin Baker Brotherhood Association filed a petition for certification election among
the ninety (90) office and technical employees which are distinct from the regular employees and
are excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA. The company did not oppose the election
but manifested that 76 of the 90 are managerial employees while 2 are confidential. Thus, they
must be excluded from the certification election, and from the bargaining unit.
The MOLE mediator issued an order allowing the respondent to hold elections. The
Bureau of Labor Relations director affirmed it and declared the 76 are not managerial employees.
Issue:
Are the 76 employees subject to this position managerial employees under the Labor
Code and its IRR?
Held:
No. A managerial employee is defined as one "who is vested with powers or prerogatives
to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions.”
The test of "supervisory" or "managerial status" depends on whether a person possesses
authority to act in the interest of his employer in the matter specified in Article 212 (k) of the
Labor Code and Section 1 (m) of its Implementing Rules and whether such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
The subject employees are not managerial employees because as borne by the records,
they do not participate in policy making but are given ready policies to execute and standard
practices to observe, thus having little freedom of action.
Salazar vs NLRC
GR 109210, April 17, 1996
Facts:
On 17 April 1990, private respondent, at a monthly salary of P4,500.00, employed
petitioner as construction/project engineer for the construction of the Monte de Piedad building
in Cubao, Quezon City. Allegedly, by virtue of an oral contract, petitioner would also receive a
share in the profits after completion of the project and that petitioners services in excess of eight
(8) hours on regular days and services rendered on weekends and legal holidays shall be
compensable overtime at the rate of P27.85 per hour. On 16 April 1991, petitioner received a
memorandum issued by private respondents project manager, Engr. Nestor A. Delantar
informing him of the termination of his services effective on 30 April 1991. Petitioner filed
complaint for money claims against respondent HL Construction. The Labor Arbiter dismissed his
petition, and the NLRC followed the same in toto.
Issue:
Is the petitioner entitled to overtime pay, premium pay for services rendered on rest days
and holidays and service incentive leave pay, pursuant to Articles 87, 93, 94 and 95 of the Labor
Code?
Held:
No. Although petitioner cannot strictly be classified as a managerial employee under Art.
82 of the Labor Code,16 and Sec. 2(b), Rule 1, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, nonetheless he is still not entitled to payment of the aforestated benefits because
he falls squarely under another exempt category - officers or members of a managerial staff as
defined under Sec. 2(c) of, Rule I, Book III of the IRR of the Labor Code.
That petitioner was paid overtime benefits does not automatically and necessarily denote
that petitioner is entitled to such benefits. Art. 82 of the Labor Code specifically delineates who
are entitled to the overtime premiums and service incentive leave pay provided under Art. 87,
93, 94 and 95 of the Labor Code and the exemptions thereto. As previously determined,
petitioner falls under the exemptions and therefore has no legal claim to the said benefits. It is
well and good that petitioner was compensated for his overtime services. However, this does not
translate into a right on the part of petitioner to demand additional payment when, under the
law, petitioner is clearly exempted therefrom.
APEX Mining Company vs NLRC and Sinclitica Candido
GR 94951, April 22, 1991
Facts:
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company,
Inc. on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house. On December 18, 1987, while
she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped
and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate supervisor Mila de la
Rosa and to the personnel officer. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with
her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. Her supervisor offered her an amount
to quit the job but she refused. APEX did not allow her to return to work and dismissed Candido.
The ariber ruled in favor of private respondent. APEX appealed to the NLRC but was denied for
lack of merit.
Issue:
Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a
regular employee of the said firm?
Held:
Yes. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the
premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as
in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that
such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the
employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII,
Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Whether it is a corporation, or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or
any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the
premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company
or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
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