Republic of the Philippines defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original
SUPREME COURT complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING
and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590,
dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order denying
amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the
court below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in
Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she
became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff
had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages
and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since
the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing
arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the
complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining
this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child,
although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the
purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa
mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in
his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of
the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the
testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may
be accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if
they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not
contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid,
besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is
true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with
the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is
not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first
part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his
Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code,
clearly points this out:
1
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el
sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que
constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no
determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino
que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page
271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man
to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original
complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff
herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and
the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case
be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this
decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and
set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether
or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article
21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is
twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian
citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City;
before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married
after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then
visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their
approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live
2
with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a
week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of
Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already
married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment
ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and
granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of
the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or
because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus
claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to
live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place
because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and
finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain.
Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a
result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses,
and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of
P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the
defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan
City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City,
College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue,
Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered
on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus
ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation
expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner
and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose
morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner,
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent,
d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered
by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture
and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court
and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the
evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent
Court as follows:
3
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never
had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first
met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as
his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her
hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and
inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs
Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or
with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents
and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in
October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they
agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon.
When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987,
defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave
her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night
until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant,
but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live
with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that
he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the
time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer
who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her
godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant
to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so
because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated
by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of
his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started
preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited
many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court
erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering
him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the
trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29
years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted
that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had
boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed
to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by
the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and
defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of
the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be
photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those
depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's
pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he
usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54,
tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he
allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56,
tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious
study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic)
some kind of special relationship between them? And this special relationship must
indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated
not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the
restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to
her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which
she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after
she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and
must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly
admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S.
Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in
Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did
not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he
4
felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry
plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that
made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest
and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud
and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant
are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are
even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from
a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of
the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should
indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the
moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to
do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he
raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the
case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed
any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not
professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never
maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not
conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is
not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable
because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly
allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial
court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his
controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been
solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation
with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned
on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for
consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to
be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had
also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special
circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition
and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in
support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the
credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate
courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter
court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of
substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower
court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where
there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-
9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401
5
[1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10)
The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242
[1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts
must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the
Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of
breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other
action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is
this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart
Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes,
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the
interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-
year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be
proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl
is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of
marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and
though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents
cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents
would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader
than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal
acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to
be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be
covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus,
Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of
6
the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has
become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and
to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and
sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-
in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent
surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of
lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the
private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school
teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance
found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by
her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even
before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if
there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not
convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and
conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a
breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman
has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no
seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from the
path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is
the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a
recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of curiosity
of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the
commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity
by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
7
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from
1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual
relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible
with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had
the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his
embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that
defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise.
Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other
cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently
retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been
carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual
lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs.
Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962).
(In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal
knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery
of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of
moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the
vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or
qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age,
has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be
the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The
court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman
under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age
may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as
there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act
is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or
dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that
granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the
latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto;
hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The
latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury
or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or
later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex
"C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in
need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial
assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept
a proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of
the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by
him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at
all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances
could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise
to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive
the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his
life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their
women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant
disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give
8
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in Republic of the Philippines
the performance of his obligations. SUPREME COURT
Manila
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
EN BANC
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent
may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, vs.
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
is merely in delicto.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party
on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by
transaction was itself procured by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is
fraud. 36 worse, complete public humiliation.

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by
Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been
interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It Dear Bet —
does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f.
Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209). Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair
today.
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be
said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a
petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their scandal.
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and
Paquing
infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA
LOVE .
SO ORDERED.
PAKING
9
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff
adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955,
judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages;
P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut.
But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before
it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving
at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition
for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day
his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition
for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City
— the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted
two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired
on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956
calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however,
defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were
nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition.
Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a
quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by
default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a
valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to
his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against
plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due
to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like
this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun
Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary,
or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it
having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province
of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is
sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent
to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default
and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the
judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil
Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs.
Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an
actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of
the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may
be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that
"any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set
for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was
bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but
two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note
for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He
enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he
10
wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and
was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive.
No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really
assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of
P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages,
defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under
Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is
devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly
acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however,
is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's
judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163794 November 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Romeo T. Acosta (formerly Jose D.
Malvas), Director of Forest Management Bureau, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources,petitioners,
vs.
HON. NORMELITO J. BALLOCANAG, Presiding Judge, Branch 41, Regional Trial Court,
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro and DANILO REYES, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated June 4, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 52261, which affirmed the
Joint Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch
41, dated December 28, 1998.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in 1970, [private respondent Danilo] Reyes bought the subject 182,941-square-
meter land at Bgy. Banus, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro [subject land] from one Regina
Castillo (or Castillo) in whose name it was titled under Original Transfer Certificate of Title
No. P-2388 issued pursuant to Free Patent No. V-79606. Right after his purchase, Reyes
introduced improvements and planted the land with fruit trees, including about a
thousand mango[es], more than a hundred Mandarin citrus, and more than a hundred
guyabanos. He also had the title transferred in his name and was issued TCT No. 45232.
Reyes so prized this land which he bought in good faith. Unfortunately, it turned out that
about 162,500 square meters of this land is part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro
11
and, therefore, cannot be subject to any disposition or acquisition under any existing law,
and is not registrable.
Thus, in the Complaint (Annex "A", pp. 15 to 21, rollo) for "Cancellation of Title and/or
Reversion" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (or OSG) in behalf of the Republic
[petitioner], as represented by the Bureau of Forest Development (or BFD), it was
explained that the source[,] Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-2388 of Castillo,
issued pursuant to Free Patent No. V-79606, is spurious, fictitious and irregularly issued
on account of:
a) ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (162,500) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, of the land covered by OCT No. P-2388 was, at the time it was applied for
patent and or titling, a part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro, per BFD Land
Classification Map Nos. 2319 and 1715. Copy of said maps are attached hereto as Annexes
"B" and "C";
b) The 162,500 square meters covered by OCT No. P-2388 are entirely inside the 140
hectares Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of Atty. Augusto D.
Marte4 [Atty. Marte], copy of the Map of AFFLA No. 175 and AFFLA No. 175 are attached
hereto as Annexes "D" and "E";
c) Neither the private defendant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
of the property because the rightful occupant is Atty. Augusto D. Marte by virtue of the
Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement [AFFLA] No. 175, issued to him by the Ministry of
Natural Resources in 1986 to expire on December 21, 2011;
d) Since the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 45232, in the name of defendant Danilo
Reyes, is a part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro, per BFD Land Classification Map
Nos. 2319 & 1715, the same cannot be the subject of any disposition or acquisition under
any existing law (Li Hong Giap vs. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693; Veno vs. Gov't of P.I. 41
Phil. 161; Director of Lands vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5). (pp. 18 to 19, rollo)
Aside from the documentary evidence presented to support these allegations, the
Republic presented as well and called to the witness stand:
a) Armando Cruz, the supervising cartographer of the DENR, who explained that based on
Land Classification Map No. 1715 (Exh. "A") which was later amended to LC Map No. 2319
(Exh. "B"), the plotting shows that the 162,000 square meters covered by OCT No. 2388
are entirely inside the 140 hectares of the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175
in favor of Atty. Marte and the alienable and disposable area of Castillo's land is only
around two (2) hectares;
b) Alberto Cardiño, an employee of the DENR who conducted the survey on the land
under litigation, corroborated the testimony of Cruz that only two hectares is alienable
and disposable land; and
c) Vicente Mendoza, a Geodetic Engineer, who expounded on the procedure before the
title could be issued to an applicant for a disposable and alienable public land. He clarified
that he did not make the survey for Castillo but upon presentation to him of the carpeta
in open court he noticed that, while it appears to be valid, it however has no certification
of the Bureau of Forestry - an essential requirement before title could be issued.
For his side, Reyes presented evidence showing his extensive development of and
investment in the land, but however failed to traverse squarely the issue raised by the
Republic against the inalienability and indisposability of his acquired land. His lame
argument that the absence of the Certification by the Bureau of Forestry on
his carpeta does not necessarily mean that there was none issued, failed to convince the
court a quo.
Hence, Judge Edilberto Ramos, the then Presiding Judge of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, held5 that:
The defendants in this case did not assail the evidence of the plaintiff but concentrated
itself to the expenses incurred in the cultivation and in the planting of trees in that
disputed areas. Aside thereto, the plaintiff cited that it is elementary principle of law that
said areas not being capable of registration their inclusion in a certification of ownership
or confer title on the registrant. (Republic of the Philippines, et al. vs. Hon. Judge Jaime de
los Angeles of the Court of First Instance of Balayan, Batangas, et al., G.R. No. L-30240) It
is also a matter of principle that public forest [are non-alienable public lands. Accession of
public forests] on the part of the claimant, however long, cannot convert the same into
private property. (Vano v. Government of PI, 41 Phils. 161)
In view thereof, it appears that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants and therefore it is hereby declared that Free Patent No. V-
79606 issued on July 22, 1957 with Psu No. 155088 and OCT No. P-2388 in the name of
Regina Castillo and its derivative TCT No. 45232 in the name of Danilo Reyes is hereby
declared null and void; and the defendant Danilo Reyes is hereby ordered to surrender
12
the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 45232 and to vacate the premises and directing
the defendant Register of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, to cancel the title as null
and void ab initio; and declaring the reversion of the land in question to the government
subject to the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175, to form part of the public
domain in the province of Oriental Mindoro.
The two-hectare lot, which appears disposable and alienable, is declared null and void
for failure to secure certification from the Bureau of Forest Development.
The counter-claim of the defendant is hereby denied for lack of merit, with cost against
the defendant.6
Reyes appealed the aforementioned RTC Decision to the CA. In its Decision 7 dated
September 16, 1996, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. His motion for reconsideration
was denied.8
Thus, Reyes sought relief from this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. But in our
Resolution9dated June 23, 1997, we resolved to deny his petition for failure to sufficiently
show that the CA had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment. On
November 24, 1997, this Court denied with finality Reyes' motion for reconsideration. 10
On February 4, 1998, Reyes filed a Motion11 to Remove Improvements Introduced by
Defendant Danilo D. Reyes on the Property which is the Subject of Execution in
Accordance with Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
(motion).12 There he averred that: he occupied in good faith the subject land for around
thirty years; he had already spent millions of pesos in planting fruit-bearing trees thereon;
and he employed many workers who regularly took care of the trees and other plants.
Reyes prayed that he and/or his agents be given at least one (1) year from the issuance of
the corresponding order to remove his mango, citrus and guyabano trees, and that they
be allowed to stay in the premises within that period to work on the cutting and removal
of the said trees. He also asked the RTC that in the meantime that these trees are not yet
removed, all the unharvested fruits be appropriated by him, as provided for by law, to the
exclusion of all other persons who may take advantage of the situation and harvest said
fruits.
Petitioner opposed the motion, citing the principle of accession under Article 44013 of the
Civil Code. It further argued that the subject land, being timber land, is property of public
dominion and, therefore, outside the commerce of man and cannot be leased, donated,
sold, or be the object of any contract. This being the case, there are no improvements to
speak of, because the land in question never ceased to be a property of the Republic,
even if Reyes claimed that he was a purchaser for value and in good faith and was in
possession for more than thirty (30) years. Moreover, petitioner averred that, assuming
Reyes was initially a planter/sower in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot be of
absolute application since from the time the reversion case was filed by the petitioner on
May 13, 1987, Reyes ceased to be a planter/sower in good faith and had become a
planter/sower in bad faith.14
Meanwhile, on March 2, 1998, Atty. Marte filed a Complaint for Injunction With an
Ancillary Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order against
Reyes for allegedly encroaching upon and taking possession by stealth, fraud and strategy
some 16 hectares of his leased area without his permission or acquiescence and planted
trees thereon in bad faith despite the fact that the area is non-disposable and part of the
public domain, among others.
But the respondent RTC dismissed the said complaint in the assailed Joint Order and ruled
in favor of Reyes, finding Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, applicable. The RTC ratiocinated:
Under the circumstance, it is but just and fair and equitable that Danilo Reyes be given the
opportunity to enjoy the fruits of his labor on the land which he honestly believes was
legally his. He was not aware that his certificate of title which was derived from OCT No.
P-2388 issued in 1957 by the government itself in the name of Regina Castillo contained
legal infirmity, otherwise he would not have expoused (sic) himself from the risk of being
ejected from the land and losing all improvements thereon. Any way, if the court will
grant the motion for the defendant's (sic) Danilo Reyes to remove his improvements on
the disputed property, it will not prejudice Augusto Marte, otherwise, as the court sees it,
he will immensely [benefit] from the toils of Danilo Reyes.
and then disposed, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to remove improvements filed by
defendant Danilo Reyes dated January 28, 1998 is hereby GRANTED pursuant to the
provisions of section 10, paragraph (d) of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
he is given a period of one (1) year from the issuance of this ORDER to remove, cut and
appropriate the fruit-bearing trees which he had planted in the property in disputes (sic).
13
The COMMENT filed by the Office of the Solicitor General dated August 11, 1998 is hereby
denied for lack of merit.
The [C]omplaint for Injunction filed by Augusto D. Marte on March 2, 1998 against Danilo
Reyes is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed its Motion for Reconsideration 15 which was denied by
the RTC.16Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA via Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure17ascribing to the RTC grave abuse of discretion and acting without
jurisdiction in granting Reyes' motion to remove improvements.
However, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, and affirmed the ruling of the RTC,
in this wise:
It is notable that in the course of the suit for "Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion" there
was not an iota of evidence presented on record that Reyes was in bad faith in acquiring
the land nor in planting thereon perennial plants. So it could never be said and held that
he was a planter/sower in bad faith. Thus, this Court holds that Reyes sowed and planted
in good faith, and that being so the appropriate provisions on right accession are Articles
445 and 448 also of the Civil Code.18
Hence, this Petition based on the sole ground that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
HOLDING THAT THE MOTION TO REMOVE IMPROVEMENTS FILED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS BUT AN INCIDENT OF THE REVERSION CASE OVER WHICH THE TRIAL
COURT STILL HAS JURISDICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DECISION IN THE
REVERSION CASE HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.19
The OSG posits that Reyes' assailed motion is barred by prior judgment under Section 47,
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure because said motion merely sprang from the
civil case of reversion tried and decided on the merits by the RTC, and the decision is
already final, after it was duly affirmed by the CA and by this Court. The OSG stresses that
one of Reyes' assigned errors in the reversion case before the CA was that the RTC "erred
in not granting his (Reyes') counterclaims as well as his claims for improvements." The
OSG claims that such assigned error was duly resolved by the CA when it held, to wit:
The non-award of appellant's "counterclaims" is understandable.
To begin with, no evidence whatsoever was presented by the appellant to sustain his plea
for damages. In fact, appellant never testified to prove his allegations as regards his
counterclaims.
Then, too, there is no showing that appellant paid the docket fees for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over his purported counterclaims (Metal Engineering Resources Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 273).
Lastly, the allegations made in the Answer in support of the so-called "counterclaims"
clearly negate the nature of the claims as compulsory counterclaim like that of
reimbursement of the useful expenses (Cabangis vs. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 414).20
Thus, the OSG posits that the issue of the improvements cannot be made the subject of
the assailed motion on the pretext that such removal of improvements is merely
incidental to the reversion case. The OSG submits that the consideration of the issue is
now barred by res judicata. Lastly, the OSG argues that: the RTC and CA cannot vary a
decision which has already attained finality; for purposes of execution, what is controlling
is the dispositive portion of the decision; the RTC, except to order the execution of a
decision which had attained finality, had long lost jurisdiction over the case; and the RTC
erred and acted without jurisdiction when it granted Reyes' motion to remove the
improvements when the dispositive portion of the decision in the reversion case did not
provide for the removal of the same.21
In his Comment22 on the OSG petition, Reyes avers that the points raised by the OSG are
merely rehashed arguments which were adequately passed upon by the CA. He fully
agrees with the ruling of the CA that: he is a planter/sower in good faith, as such, Articles
445 and 448 of the New Civil Code are applicable; his motion is not entirely a new case,
but merely an incident to the reversion case, a consequence of its grant and a legal
solution to an important issue overlooked, if not ignored by the State and by the courts in
their decisions in the reversion case; under Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, he is allowed to remove the improvements; and the instant Petition failed to
abide with the proper manner as to the "proof of service" required under Section 13, Rule
13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Most importantly, Reyes avers that the land on
which about 1,000 mango trees, 100 mandarin citrus trees and 100 guyabano trees are
planted, was leased by the government to Atty. Marte, who entered into the possession
of the subject land when the trees were already bearing fruits. Thus, if said trees are not
removed, Atty. Marte would be unduly enriched as the beneficiary of these fruits without
even spending a single centavo, at the expense of Reyes. Reyes posits that it is a well-
14
established fact, unrebutted by the petitioner, that he planted these trees and to deny
him the right to remove them would constitute a grave injustice and amount to
confiscation without just compensation which is violative of the Constitution.
The OSG counters that copies of the instant Petition were properly served as shown by
the photocopies of the registry return cards. Moreover, the OSG avers that granting,
without admitting, that another person would stand to be benefited by the improvements
that Reyes introduced on the land is beside the point and is not the fault of the petitioner
because the particular issue of the improvements was already resolved with finality in the
reversion case. The OSG claims that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or
orders of a superior court, for to do so will negate the principle of hierarchy of courts and
nullify the essence of review - a final judgment, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole
world.23
The instant Petition lacks merit.
In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State
ownership of the disputed land.24 Indeed, the ownership over the subject land reverted to
the State by virtue of the decisions of the
RTC and CA and our Resolution on the matter. But these decisions simply ordered the
reversion of the property to the State, and did not consider the improvements that Reyes
had introduced on the property or provide him with any remedy relative thereto. Thus,
Reyes was left out in the cold, faced with the prospect of losing not only the land which he
thought he owned, but also of forfeiting the improvements that he painstakingly built
with his effort, time and money.
We cannot agree with the OSG that the denial by the CA of Reyes' counterclaim in the
reversion case had the effect of completely foreclosing whatever rights Reyes may have
over these improvements. We note that the counterclaim was denied because Reyes
failed to prove that it was in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim, and he did not pay
docket fees thereon, even as the CA found that Reyes "never testified to prove his
allegations as regards his counterclaims." Yet, the records of the reversion case reveal
that Reyes adduced ample evidence of the extent of the improvements he introduced and
the expenses he incurred therefor. This is reflected in the findings of the CA in the case at
bench, and we concur with the appellate court when it said:
But this Court notes that while Reyes was half-hearted in his opposition to the reversion,
he instead focused on proving the improvements he has introduced on the land, its extent
and his expenses. Despite these proofs, the Decision of April 13, 1992 made no mention
nor provision for the improvements on the land. With this legal vacuum, Reyes could not
exercise the options allowed the sower and planter in good faith. This thus left him no
other alternative but to avail of Paragraph (d) of Section 10 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure in order to collect or get a return of his investment as allowed to a sower
and planter in good faith by the Civil Code.
Correlatively, the courts in the reversion case overlooked the issue of whether Reyes, vis-
à-vis his improvements, is a builder or planter in good faith. In the instant case, the issue
assumes full significance, because Articles 44825 and 54626 of the Civil Code grant the
builder or planter in good faith full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention
of the premises until reimbursement is made. A builder or planter in good faith is one who
builds or plants on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof, unaware of any flaw
in his title to the land at the time he builds or plants on it. 27
On this issue, we are disposed to agree with the CA that Reyes was a planter in good faith.
Reyes was of the belief that he was the owner of the subject land; in fact, a TCT over the
property was issued in his name. He tilled the land, planted fruit trees thereon, and
invested money from 1970. He received notice of the Republic's claim only when the
reversion case was filed on May 13, 1987. The trees are now full-grown and fruit-bearing.
To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in favor of the State --
because the decision in the reversion case declaring that the land is part of inalienable
forest land and belongs to the State is already final and immutable -- would inequitably
result in unjust enrichment of the State at the expense of Reyes, a planter in good faith.
Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest.28 This basic doctrine on unjust
enrichment simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at another's expense.29 There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience.30 Article 22 of the Civil Code states the rule in this wise:
ART. 22. Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
15
The requisites for the application of this doctrine are present in the instant case. There is
enrichment on the part of the petitioner, as the State would come into possession of --
and may technically appropriate -- the more than one thousand fruit-bearing trees
planted by the private respondent. There is impoverishment on the part of Reyes,
because he stands to lose the improvements he had painstakingly planted and invested
in. There is lack of valid cause for the State to acquire these improvements, because, as
discussed above, Reyes introduced the improvements in good faith. Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not commit any error in ruling that Reyes is entitled to the benefits of Articles
448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
Thus, even if we accept the OSG's submission that Reyes' entitlement to these benefits is
not absolute because he can no longer claim good faith after the filing of the reversion
case in 1987, still, there is no gainsaying that prior to that ― all the way back to 1970 ―
he had possessed the land and introduced improvements thereon in good faith. At the
very least, then, Reyes is entitled to these benefits for the 17 years that he had been a
planter in good faith.
However, we are mindful of the fact that the subject land is currently covered by Agro-
Forestry Farm Lease Agreement (AFFLA) No. 175 issued by the Ministry of (now
Department of Environment and) Natural Resources in favor of Atty. Augusto D. Marte,
which will expire on December 21, 2011. By the terms of the AFFLA, the lessee shall,
among others, do all in his power to suppress fires, cooperate with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) in the protection and conservation of the forest growth in the area
and undertake all possible measures to insure the protection of watershed and
environmental values within the leased area and areas adjacent thereto. This obligation to
prevent any damage to the land subject of the lease is consonant with fundamental
principles and state policies set forth in Section 16,31 Article II and Section 4,32 Article XII of
the Constitution.
To allow Reyes to remove the fruit-bearing trees now full-grown on the subject land, even
if he is legally entitled to do so, would be risking substantial damage to the land. It would
negate the policy consideration underlying the AFFLA -- to protect and preserve the
biodiversity and the environment, and to prevent any damage to the land. Further, it
would violate the implicit mandate of Article 547 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without damage to the principal
thing, the possessor in good faith may remove them unless the person who recovers the
possession exercises the option under paragraph 2 of the preceding article.
In this light, the options that Reyes may exercise under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code have been restricted. It is no longer feasible to permit him to remove the trees he
planted. The only equitable alternative would be to order the Republic to pay Reyes the
value of the improvements he introduced on the property. This is only fair because, after
all, by the terms of the AFFLA, upon the expiration of the lease or upon its cancellation if
there be any violation or breach of its terms, all permanent improvements on the land
shall pass to the ownership of the Republic without any obligation on its part to indemnify
the lessee.
However, the AFFLA is not due to expire until December 21, 2011. In the interim, it is
logical to assume that the lessee, Atty. Augusto D. Marte, will derive financial gain from
the fruits that the trees planted by Reyes would yield. In fact, Atty. Marte may already
have profited therefrom in the past several years. It is, therefore, reasonable to grant the
Republic the right of subrogation against the lessee who may have benefited from the
improvements. The Republic may, thus, demand reimbursement from Atty. Marte for
whatever amount it will have to pay Reyes for these improvements.
As to the OSG's insistent invocation of res judicata and the immutability of final
judgments, our ruling in Temic Semiconductors, Inc. Employees Union (TSIEU)-FFW, et al.
v. Federation of Free Workers (FFW), et al.33 is instructive:
It is axiomatic that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. Any act which
violates such principle must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of
conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of
what are ordinarily known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon which judicial
powers had been conferred.
The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of a final judgment are: (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
In the exercise of our mandate as a court of justice and equity, 34 we rule in favor of Reyes
pro hac vice. We reiterate that this Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of
judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final
16
judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.35Indubitably, to order the
reversion of the subject land without payment of just compensation, in absolute disregard
of the rights of Reyes over the improvements which he, in good faith, introduced therein,
would not only be unjust and inequitable but cruel as well.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 4, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that:
1) The Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, is hereby
DIRECTED to determine the actual improvements introduced on the subject land, their
current value and the amount of the expenses actually spent by private respondent
Danilo Reyes for the said improvements thereon from 1970 until May 13, 1987 with
utmost dispatch.
2) The Republic, through the Bureau of Forest Development of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, is DIRECTED to pay private respondent Danilo Reyes
the value of such actual improvements he introduced on the subject land as determined
by the Regional Trial Court, with the right of subrogation against Atty. Augusto D. Marte,
the lessee in Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),Petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE, ZENAIDA
VERCHEZ-CATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO CATIBOG, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon
Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On even date, her daughter Grace Verchez-Infante
(Grace) immediately hied to the Sorsogon Branch of the Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she engaged to send a telegram to her sister
Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) who was residing at 18 Legal St., GSIS Village, Quezon
City1 reading: "Send check money Mommy hospital." For RCPI’s services, Grace
paid P10.502 for which she was issued a receipt.3
As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida no response was
received from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru JRS Delivery Service,
reprimanding her for not sending any financial aid.
Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida, along with her husband Fortunato
Catibog, left on January 26, 1991 for Sorsogon. On her arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed
having received any telegram.
In the meantime, Zenaida and her husband, together with her mother Editha left for
Quezon City on January 28, 1991 and brought Editha to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in
Quezon City where she was confined from January 30, 1991 to March 21, 1991.
The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on February 15, 1991. 4 On
inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, a messenger of RCPI replied that he
had nothing to do with the delivery thereof as it was another messenger who previously
was assigned to deliver the same but the address could not be located, hence, the
telegram was resent on February 2, 1991, and the second messenger finally found the
address on February 15, 1991.
17
Editha’s husband Alfonso Verchez (Verchez), by letter of March 5, 1991,5 demanded an
explanation from the manager of the Service Quality Control Department of the RCPI,
Mrs. Lorna D. Fabian, who replied, by letter of March 13, 1991,6 as follows:
Our investigation on this matter disclosed that subject telegram was duly processed in
accordance with our standard operating procedure. However, delivery was not
immediately effected due to the occurrence of circumstances which were beyond the
control and foresight of RCPI. Among others, during the transmission process, the radio
link connecting the points of communication involved encountered radio noise and
interferences such that subject telegram did not initially registered (sic) in the receiving
teleprinter machine.
Our internal message monitoring led to the discovery of the above. Thus, a repeat
transmission was made and subsequent delivery was effected. (Underscoring supplied)
Verchez’s lawyer thereupon wrote RCPI’s manager Fabian, by letter of July 23,
1991,7 requesting for a conference on a specified date and time, but no representative of
RCPI showed up at said date and time.
On April 17, 1992, Editha died.
On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their
respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay
in delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of the late Editha to their
damage and prejudice,8 for which they prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
damages9 and attorney’s fees.10
After its motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue11 was denied12 by Branch 5
of the RTC of Sorsogon, RCPI filed its answer, alleging that except with respect to
Grace,13 the other plaintiffs had no privity of contract with it; any delay in the sending of
the telegram was due to force majeure, "specifically, but not limited to, radio noise and
interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the
telegraphic message";14 the clause in the Telegram Transmission Form signed by Grace
absolved it from liability for any damage arising from the transmission other than the
refund of telegram tolls;15 it observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees; and at all events, any cause of action had been barred by laches. 16
The trial court, observing that "although the delayed delivery of the questioned telegram
was not apparently the proximate cause of the death of Editha," ruled out the presence
of force majeure. Respecting the clause in the telegram relied upon by RCPI, the trial court
held that it partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion.
Finding that the nature of RCPI’s business obligated it to dispatch the telegram to the
addressee at the earliest possible time but that it did not in view of the negligence of its
employees to repair its radio transmitter and the concomitant delay in delivering the
telegram on time, the trial court, upon the following provisions of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 2176 – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being at fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 1173 defines the fault of (sic) negligence of the obligor as the "omission of the
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time, or the place."
In the instant case, the obligation of the defendant to deliver the telegram to the
addressee is of an urgent nature. Its essence is the early delivery of the telegram to the
concerned person. Yet, due to the negligence of its employees, the defendant failed to
discharge of its obligation on time making it liable for damages under Article 2176.
The negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to the presumption of negligence
on the part of the employer.17 (Underscoring supplied),
rendered judgment against RCPI. Accordingly, it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, to wit:
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the following amount:
1. The amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages;
2. The amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees; and
3. To pay the costs.
18
SO ORDERED.18
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of February 27, 2004, 19 affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
Hence, RCPI’s present petition for review on certiorari, it raising the following questions:
(1) "Is the award of moral damages proper even if the trial court found that there was no
direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts?"20 and (2) "Are the
stipulations in the ‘Telegram Transmission Form,’ in the nature "contracts of adhesion"
(sic)?21
RCPI insists that respondents failed to prove any causal connection between its delay in
transmitting the telegram and Editha’s death.22
RCPI’s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or
breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-plaintiffs-
herein-co-respondents.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
(Underscoring supplied)
Passing on this codal provision, this Court explained:
In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of
its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the
obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any
kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor
thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for
recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the
interests of the promissee that may include his "expectation interest," which is his
interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract been performed, or his "reliance interest," which is his
interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as
good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made; or
his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that
he has conferred on the other party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for
their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every
infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been
injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence x x x or of
the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.23 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible
time. It took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it.
RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and interferences which
adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message.
Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not locate the address of Zenaida and it was
only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper,
x x x it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have
occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed
to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One’s
negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to
another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or
injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is
found to be partly the result of a person’s participation – whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to act – the whole occurrence is humanized and removed
from the rules applicable to acts of God.
xxxx
Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous
event that could not be foreseen or, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words,
there must be an exclusion of human intervention from the cause of injury or
loss.24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering the
telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of the non-
transmission and the non-delivery so that she could have taken steps to remedy the
situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.
19
In an earlier case also involving RCPI, this Court held:
Considering the public utility of RCPI’s business and its contractual obligation to transmit
messages, it should exercise due diligence to ascertain that messages are delivered to the
persons at the given address and should provide a system whereby in cases of
undelivered messages the sender is given notice of non-delivery. Messages sent
by cable or wireless means are usually more important and urgent than those which can
wait for the mail.25
xxxx
People depend on telecommunications companies in times of deep emotional stress or
pressing financial needs. Knowing that messages about the illnesses or deaths of loved
ones, births or marriages in a family, important business transactions, and notices of
conferences or meetings as in this case, are coursed through the petitioner and similar
corporations, it is incumbent upon them to exercise a greater amount of care and
concern than that shown in this case. Every reasonable effort to inform senders of the
non-delivery of messages should be undertaken.26
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RCPI argues, however, against the presence of urgency in the delivery of the telegram, as
well as the basis for the award of moral damages, thus:27
The request to send check as written in the telegraphic text negates the existence of
urgency that private respondents’ allegations that ‘time was of the essence’ imports. A
check drawn against a Manila Bank and transmitted to Sorsogon, Sorsogon will have to be
deposited in a bank in Sorsogon and pass thru a minimum clearing period of 5 days before
it may be encashed or withdrawn. If the transmittal of the requested check to Sorsogon
took 1 day – private respondents could therefore still wait for 6 days before the same may
be withdrawn. Requesting a check that would take 6 days before it could be withdrawn
therefore contradicts plaintiff’s claim of urgency or need.28
At any rate, any sense of urgency of the situation was met when Grace Verchez was able
to communicate to Manila via a letter that she sent to the same addressee in Manila thru
JRS.29
xxxx
As far as the respondent court’s award for moral damages is concerned, the same has no
basis whatsoever since private respondent Alfonso Verchez did not accompany his late
wife when the latter went to Manila by bus. He stayed behind in Sorsogon for almost 1
week before he proceeded to Manila. 30
When pressed on cross-examination, private respondent Alfonso Verchez could not give
any plausible reason as to the reason why he did not accompany his ailing wife to
Manila.31
xxxx
It is also important to consider in resolving private respondents’ claim for moral damages
that private respondent Grace Verchez did not accompany her ailing mother to Manila.32
xxxx
It is the common reaction of a husband to be at his ailing wife’s side as much as
possible. The fact that private respondent Alfonso Verchez stayed behind in Sorsogon for
almost 1 week convincingly demonstrates that he himself knew that his wife was not in
critical condition.33
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RCPI’s arguments fail. For it is its breach of contract upon which its liability is, it bears
repeating, anchored. Since RCPI breached its contract, the presumption is that it was at
fault or negligent. It, however, failed to rebut this presumption.
For breach of contract then, RCPI is liable to Grace for damages.
And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace’s co-respondents following Article 2176 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
RCPI’s liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it could prove that it observed
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
so provides:
20
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(Underscoring supplied)
RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
Respecting the assailed award of moral damages, a determination of the presence of the
following requisites to justify the award is in order:
x x x firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological
suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually
established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is
predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article
2220 of the Civil Code.34
Respecting the first requisite, evidence of suffering by the plaintiffs-herein respondents
was correctly appreciated by the CA in this wise:
The failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram containing the message of appellees on time,
disturbed their filial tranquillity. Family members blamed each other for failing to respond
swiftly to an emergency that involved the life of the late Mrs. Verchez, who suffered from
diabetes.35
As reflected in the foregoing discussions, the second and third requisites are present.
On the fourth requisite, Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides:
Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
After RCPI’s first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it did not inform Grace of the non-
delivery thereof and waited for 12 days before trying to deliver it again, knowing – as it
should know – that time is of the essence in the delivery of telegrams. When its second
long-delayed attempt to deliver the telegram again failed, it, again, waited for another 12
days before making a third attempt. Such nonchalance in performing its urgent obligation
indicates gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The fourth requisite is thus also
present.
In applying the above-quoted Article 2220, this Court has awarded moral damages in
cases of breach of contract where the defendant was guilty of gross negligence amounting
to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation. 36
As for RCPI’s tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention,
and other relief:
xxxx
21
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another. (Emphasis
supplied)
RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the
peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the
appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them as they blamed each
other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions
complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of
the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may award
moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is in order, as is
the award of attorney’s fees, respondents having been compelled to litigate to protect
their rights.
While a contract of adhesion is not necessarily void and unenforceable, since it is
construed strictly against the party who drafted it or gave rise to any ambiguity therein, it
is stricken down as void and unenforceable or subversive of public policy when the
weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is
reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the
opportunity to bargain on equal footing.39
This Court holds that the Court of Appeals’ finding that the parties’ contract is one of
adhesion which is void is, given the facts and circumstances of the case, thus well-taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

Clutching at straws, RCPI insists that the limited liability clause in the "Telegram SO ORDERED.
Transmission Form" is not a contract of adhesion. Thus it argues:

Neither can the Telegram Transmission Form be considered a contract of adhesion as held
by the respondent court. The said stipulations were all written in bold letters right in front
of the Telegram Transmission Form. As a matter of fact they were beside the space where
the telegram senders write their telegraphic messages. It would have been different if the
stipulations were written at the back for surely there is no way the sender will easily
notice them. The fact that the stipulations were located in a particular space where they
can easily be seen, is sufficient notice to any sender (like Grace Verchez-Infante) where
she could manifest her disapproval, leave the RCPI station and avail of the services of the
other telegram operators.37 (Underscoring supplied)

RCPI misunderstands the nature of a contract of adhesion. Neither the readability of the
stipulations nor their physical location in the contract determines whether it is one of
adhesion.

A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties imposes a ready-
made form of contract, which the other party may accept or reject, but which the latter
cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in the contract, while the other party
merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto, giving no room for negotiation and
depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.38 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

22
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD dIVISION
G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988
JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private
respondents), respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which
afirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner, who
was then the President of the West Visayas College liable for damages under Article 27 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines for failure to graduate a student with honors.
The facts are not disputed.
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the
West Visayas College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that
capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the
school. "the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans was against school rules
and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo
informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she
would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo,
thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.
The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13, 1966 which provided:
Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal officers of this
Office disclosed the following: That Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of the Student
Leadership Club, an exclusive student organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of
the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it passed Resolution No. 2, authorizing the
treasurer to disburse funds of the Club to student for financial aid and other humanitarian
purposes; that in compliance with said resolution and as treasurer of the Club, Violeta
Delmo extended loans to some officers and members of the Club upon proper application
duly approved by the majority of the members of the Executive Board; and that upon
receiving the report from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the Club, that Office
conducted an investigation on the matter and having been convinced of the guilt of
Violets Delmo and the other officers and members of the Club, that Office rendered the
order or decision in question. In justifying that Office's order or decision, it is contended
that approval by that Office of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club is necessary for
its effectivity and validity and since it was never submitted to that Office, the Club had no
valid constitution and By-Laws and that as a consequence, Resolution No. 2 which was
passed based on the Constitution and By-Laws- is without any force and effect and the
treasurer, Violeta Delmo, who extended loans to some officers and members of the Club
pursuant thereto are illegal (sic), hence, she and the other students involved are deemed
guilty of misappropriating the funds of the Club. On the other hand, Raclito Castaneda,
Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo, President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Club,
respectively, testified that the Club had adopted its Constitution and By-Laws in a meeting
held last October 3, 1965, and that pursuant to Article I of said Constitution and By-Laws,
the majority of the members of the Executive Board passed Resolution No. 2, which
resolution became the basis for the extension on of loans to some officers and members
of the Club, that the Club honestly believed that its Constitution and By-Laws has been
approved by the superintendent because the adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon,
assured the President of the Club that he will cause the approval of the Constitution and
By-Laws by the Superintendent; the officers of the Club have been inducted to office on
October 9,1965 by the Superintendent and that the Club had been likewise allowed to
cosponsor the Education Week Celebration.
After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action taken by the
Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the officers and members
thereof by dropping them from membership therein. However, this Office is convinced
that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in her capacity as Club Treasurer, in
extending loans to the officers and members of the Student partnership Club. Resolution
No. 2 authorizing the Club treasurer to discharge finds to students in need of financial
23
assistance and other humanitarian purposes had been approved by the Club adviser, Mr.
Jesse Dagoon, with the notation that approval was given in his capacity as adviser of the
Club and extension of the Superintendent's personality. Aside from misleading the officers
and members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to
give the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to the Superintendent for approval despite
his assurance to the Club president that he would do so. With this finding of negligence on
the part of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity in the performance of his duties as
such, this Office considers as too severe and unwarranted that portion of the questioned
order stating that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any award or citation from
this school or any organization in this school." Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a
consistent full scholar of the school and she alone has maintained her scholarship. The
decision in question would, therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her
dreams of graduating with honors in this year's commencement exercises.
In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and hereby directs that
appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club members or officers
involved in this case, be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if
they are otherwise entitled thereto. (Rollo, pp. 28-30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and all the
records of the case. On the same day, petitioner received a telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly mistook
the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back. On the same day, he
returned by mail all the records plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public
Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him to
furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the
Director informing the latter that he had sent the decision back and that he had not
retained a copy thereof..
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another telegram from
the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was
impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the program as one of the honor
students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain student instead of being awarded the
Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director for a
reconsideration of the latters" decision because he believed that Delmo should not be
allowed to graduate with honors. The Director denied the petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school to enter into
the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for
damages against the petitioner. During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo
passed away, and thus, an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed by her
parents as her sole and only heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor of the
spouses Delmo. The court said:
Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners) bad faith. Per
investigation of Violeta Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano Bernardino of the Bureau of
Public Schools (Exhibit L it was the defendant who inducted the officers of the Student
Leadership Club on October 9, 1965. In fact the Club was allowed to cosponsor the
Education Week Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If the defendant he not approve of the
constitution and by-laws of the Club, why did he induct the officers into office and allow
the Club to sponsor the Education Week Celebration"? It was through his own act that the
students were misled to do as they did. Coupled with the defendants tacit recognition of
the Club was the assurance of Mr. Jemm Dagoon, Club Adviser, who made the students
believe that he was acting as an extension of Mr. Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").
Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that, although, he kaew as
early as April 27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he was directed to give
honors to Miss Delmo, he kept Id information to . He told the Court that he knew that the
letter of Director Bernardino directed him not to deprive Miss Delmo the honors due her,
but she (sic) says that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exhibit "L," of
Director Bernardino 0, him to give honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974, testimony of
Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-35). It could not be true that he has not finished reading the letter-
decision, Exh. "L," because said letter consisted of only three pages, and the portion which
directed that Miss Delmo "be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the
24
school, if otherwise entitled thereto is found at the last paragraph of the same. How did
he know the last paragraph if he did not read the letter.
Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of bias and prejudice.
When his action would favor him, he was deliberate and aspect to the utter prejudice and
detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus, although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the
exoneration of Miss Delino by Director Bernardino, he withheld the information from Miss
Delmo. This is eloquently dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966,
Director Bernardino cabled him to furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision, Exh. "L,"
but instead of informing Miss Delmo about the decision, since he said he mailed back the
decision on April 28,1966, he sent a night letter on April 29,1966, to Director Bernardino,
informing the latter that he had returned the decision (Exh. "l3"), together with the
record. Why a night letter when the matter was of utmost urgency to the parties in the
case, because graduation day was only four days ahead? An examination of the telegrams
sent by the defendant shows that he had been sending ordinary telegram and not night
letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit "7"). At least, if the defendant could not furnish a copy of the
decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, he should have told her about it or that Miss Delmo's
honors and citation in the commencement be announced or indicated. But Mr. Ledesma is
one who cannot admit a mistake. Very ungentlemanly this is home out by his own
testimony despite his knowledge that his decision to deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to
her was overturned by Director Bernardino, he on his wrong belief. To quote the
defendant,1 believed that she did not deserve those honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p.
43,Empasized supplied). Despite the telegram of Director Bernardino which the defendant
received hours before the commencement executory on May 3-4,1966, he did not obey
Director Bernardino because he said in his testimony that he would be embarrassment .
Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46). Evidently, he knew only his embarrassment and not that of r
Bernardino whose order was being flagrantly and wantonly disregarded by bim And
certainly, not the least of Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts speak eloquently of ho
bad faith and unjust of mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for having been challenged
by Miss Delmo, a mere student.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks of contemptuous
arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. Come to think of it. He refused to obey the
directive of Be o and instead, chose to feign ignorance of it." (Reward on Appeal, p. 72-
76).
The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her
parents for moral damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary
damages of P10,000.00 and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of whether or not
the respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner
is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It
cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought
about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but
proper. As we have affirmed in the case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,
Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongly act or
omission." (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss
Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the
Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to
enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering that he received the
decision on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it back with the records of the case,
he undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the
petitioner should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and
inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner likewise failed to
do, and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed
out in its decision, to wit:
Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of the decision, he
could have used his discretion and plain common sense by informing her about it or he
could have directed the inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the printed commencement
program or announced it during the commencement exercises.
25
Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director Benardino hours before the
commencement exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed his superior by refusing to give
the honors due Miss Delmo with a lame excuse that he would be embarrassed if he did so,
to the prejudice of and in complete disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.
Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico Delmo, father
of Miss Delmo, who tried several times to see defendant in his office thus Mr. Delmo
suffered extreme disappointment and humiliation.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and due regard
to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by
defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is
liable for damages in his personal capacity. . . . (Rollo, pp- 57-58)
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the same case
of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide
an example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World
Airways, 16 SCRA 431).
However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo damages in the
amount of P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately from and in addition to what
they are already entitled to as sole heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the
decision is modified insofar as moral damages are awarded to the spouses in their own
behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in the preceding paragraph.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA
FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN
LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO,
JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN
SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO
B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ.
RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO
RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.
YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court.
It poses the question whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and
other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action
for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the
military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the
rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses
in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,"
Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM
raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants;
that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of
26
purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper
warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights
to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats,
tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information
or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional
rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said
plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages
in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary
damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and
attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General
Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can
entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action
against the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco
Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando
Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan
Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa,
Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21,
1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95,
Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I
sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs may not
cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage
suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that
assuming that the court can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from
liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint
states no cause of action against defendants, since there is no allegation that the
defendants named in the complaint confiscated plaintiffs' purely personal properties in
violation of their constitutional rights, and with the possible exception of Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo committed acts of torture and maltreatment,
or that the defendants had the duty to exercise direct supervision and control of their
subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as employers under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful study of defendants' arguments, the
court finds the same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be granted. On the other
hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24,
1983, respectively. On December 9, 1983, the defendants filed a comment on the
aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of all the
plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren
Mercado, Auguso Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V. Sanidad,
Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from
further proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the
order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun)
cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or
jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an
amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino
and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984, the defendants filed a comment on
said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without
acting on the motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:
It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca, Danilo
de la Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno, Alan Jasminez
represented by counsel, Atty. Augusta Sanchez, Spouses Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth
Protacio-Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos
represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando Salutin, represented by
counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of November
8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom within the
27
reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now final against said
plaintiffs.
Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration
on May 28,1984, alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo
Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of November 8,
1983 dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the
motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for
reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the
lawyers.
In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1)
to reconsider its order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs,
the resolution of November 8, 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its
resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. In the
dispositive portion of the order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the
Resolution of dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente,
Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos
and Rolando Salutin is deed for lack of merit;
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:
1. Gen Fabian Ver
2. Col. Fidel Singson
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.
5. Col. Galileo Montanar
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson
7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro
8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango
9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo
10. Lt. Raul Bacalso
the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present action or
complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied but in so far as it affects and refers to
defendants, to wit:
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and
2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated November 3,
1983 is granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered and
modified.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to
annul and set aside the respondent court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of
May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Respondents were required
to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9, 1985. A reply was filed by
petitioners on August 26, 1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
28
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary
to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress
of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to
make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to commence
an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted),
and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the
deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear;
no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval
or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing the
words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather than the force of
law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are
immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the
ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to
democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces
law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community.
"Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is
respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies
a maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we
discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived
from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view
that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts
done in the performance of official duties or function In support of said contention,
respondents maintain that —
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary duty is to
safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that the President
may call them "to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion,
or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII, Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law but
providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
view of the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The proclamation also
provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress
29
lawless violence, insuitection rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and
effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from respondent
General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive strikes against
communist terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this
order and its subsequent implementation by elements of the task force resulted in the
violation of their constitutional rights against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights
to counsel and to silence, and the right to property and that, therefore, respondents Ver
and the named members of the task force should be held liable for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent members
of the armed forces merely performed their official and constitutional duties. To allow
petitioners to recover from respondents by way of damages for acts performed in the
exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy considerations to shield respondents as
public officers from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling
threats of hability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil.
634), and upon the necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and public
functions from being harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan
v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their duties
is now a settled jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil.
944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v.
Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232;
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d
755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and his
call for the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such immunity from
Suit.3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally
misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the
performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs.
Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal
manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General
had authority, under the law to deport or expel the defendants, and circumstances
justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then he
cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts
are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of controlling or
interferring with the exercise of the political powers vested in the chief executive
authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts cannot intervene for the
purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exeercise of this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were
merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of
President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance
of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist
underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving
commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon
the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the
Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials,
high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private
individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another,
as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges
are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not
constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task
or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the
Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without,
seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence.
What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission,
constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our
faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind
is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in
the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be
abandoned.
30
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred
by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that
"Petitioners cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to
a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their
detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is indemnification for
alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the same
claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus
case as grounds for release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit,
the judicial inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place.
The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered by
the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of altering the title of
their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are
explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by
adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict)
arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the
exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention
and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for
illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of
action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private
belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other
cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On
March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking
Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the
notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his
subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case.
We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its
application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee)
relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and
their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of
Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly"
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is
not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages
under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or
injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the
Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a
superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates,
secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed
by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part
of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held
perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible
for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect
that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage
suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil
Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
transgression joint tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel
Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo
Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo
31
Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master
Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been
specifically mentioned and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of
some of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong
that gave rise to a cause of action. But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is
it in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of
alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as
actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the
constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced
to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make a
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details,
how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code
were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others,
searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially
defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and
personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not
subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of
plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances;
detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept
incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman,
degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements.
The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs
violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly"
should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its
provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the
complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears
on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only
the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this
purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in
the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause
of action the complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and
Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the
defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or
causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with
respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex
Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the
basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration of the
court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed
by 'plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo,
counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and
Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos
Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel
for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of
all the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel
himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not
just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys.
Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio
Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag,
Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
32
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys
did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The
authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless
questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never
done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon
himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the
complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly
intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent
judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the
complaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers
did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity
cannot be sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the
respondent court, dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its
resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be remanded to the respondent court
for further proceedings. With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public officers or
employees, or members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly
or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional
rights and civil liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued in court for
damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the
court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel
and other violations of their constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects
the automatic application of the principle of respondeat superior or command
responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally accountable for
damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such
transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not
abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held
responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil
Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor.
The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in wise: "In a
government of laws, existence of the government be imperilled following it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent omnipresent teacher. For
good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is contagious. If the
government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, it invites every
man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible
retribution." 1
As the writer stress in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 Which Was an action to enjoin the operations of
the dreaded secret marshals during the past regime, 'In a democratic state, you don't
stoop to the level of criminals. If we stoop to what they do, then we're no better than
they ... there would be no difference. ... The Supreme Court stands as the guarantor of the
Constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and cannot abdicate
its basic role under the Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The
spirit and letter of the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human
rights and freedom that a person's life be snuffed out without due process in a split
second even if he is caught in flagrante delicto — unless it was caned for as an act of self-
defense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased.
33
Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads of the NPA
which have infutrated the cities and suburbs and performed their despicable killings of
innocent civilians and military and police officers constitute an equally perverse violation
of the sanctity of human life and must be severely condemned by all who adhere tothe
Rule of the Law.
It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present government under
President Corazon C. Aquino after her assumption of office in February, 1986 was to file
our government's ratification and access to all human rights instruments adopted under
the auspices of the United Nations, declaring thereby the government's commitment to
observe the precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution which the people decisively
ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent office of the Commission on Human Rights
hats been created and organized with ample powers to investigate human rights
violations and take remedial measures against all such violations by the military as well as
by the civilian groups.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public officers or
employees, or members of the military or police force or private individuals who directly
or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional
rights and civil liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued in court for
damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the
court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel
and other violations of their constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects
the automatic application of the principle of respondeat superior or command
responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally accountable for
damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such
transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not
abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held
responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited provision of the Civil
Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor.
The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in wise: "In a
government of laws, existence of the government be imperilled following it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent omnipresent teacher. For
good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is contagious. If the
government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, it invites every
man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible
retribution." 1
As the writer stress in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 Which Was an action to enjoin the operations of
the dreaded secret marshals during the past regime, 'In a democratic state, you don't
stoop to the level of criminals. If we stoop to what they do, then we're no better than
they ... there would be no difference. ... The Supreme Court stands as the guarantor of the
Constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and cannot abdicate
its basic role under the Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The
spirit and letter of the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human
rights and freedom that a person's life be snuffed out without due process in a split
second even if he is caught in flagrante delicto — unless it was caned for as an act of self-
defense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased.
Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads of the NPA
which have infutrated the cities and suburbs and performed their despicable killings of
innocent civilians and military and police officers constitute an equally perverse violation
of the sanctity of human life and must be severely condemned by all who adhere tothe
Rule of the Law.
It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present government under
President Corazon C. Aquino after her assumption of office in February, 1986 was to file
our government's ratification and access to all human rights instruments adopted under
the auspices of the United Nations, declaring thereby the government's commitment to
observe the precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution which the people decisively
ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent office of the Commission on Human Rights
hats been created and organized with ample powers to investigate human rights
violations and take remedial measures against all such violations by the military as well as
by the civilian groups.
34
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 184315 November 28, 2011
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION, NOEL CABRERA, GERRY
ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO, THELMA SAN JUAN
and ROBERT COYIUTO, JR.,Respondents.
R E S O L U T I ON
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration1 dated January 15, 2010, filed by the
respondents, and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration2 of respondent Robert
Coyiuto, Jr., dated March 17, 2010, from the Decision rendered in favor of petitioner
Alfonso T. Yuchengco, dated November 25, 2009.
At the outset, a brief narration of the factual and procedural antecedents that transpired
and led to the filing of the motions is in order.
The present controversy arose when in the last quarter of 1993, several allegedly
defamatory articles against petitioner were published in The Manila Chronicle by
Chronicle Publishing Corporation. Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint against
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 136, docketed as
Civil Case No. 94-1114, under three separate causes of action, namely: (1) for damages
due to libelous publication against Neal H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma
San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, all members of
the editorial staff and writers of The Manila Chronicle, and Chronicle Publishing; (2) for
damages due to abuse of right against Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing; and
(3) for attorney’s fees and costs against all the respondents.
On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision3 in favor of petitioner.
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse before the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 18,
2008, the CA rendered a Decision4 affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration 5 praying that the CA reconsider its
earlier decision and reverse the decision of the trial court. On August 28, 2008, the CA
rendered an Amended Decision6 reversing the earlier Decision.
Subsequently, petitioner filed the present recourse before this Court which puts forth the
following assignment of errors:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING THAT THE CASE OF ARTURO BORJAL, ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., CITED
BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WARRANTED THE
REVERSAL OF THE CA DECISION DATED MARCH 18, 2008.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLES IN THE COMPLAINT FALL WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR PUBLIC FIGURE. 7
On November 25, 2009, this Court rendered a Decision partially granting the petition.
Respondents later filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 15, 2010, which the
Court denied in the Resolution8 dated March 3, 2010.
Meanwhile, respondent Coyiuto, Jr. also filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration with Attached Supplemental Motion, both dated March 17,
2010.
On April 21, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution9 resolving to recall the Resolution dated
March 3, 2010; grant Coyiuto, Jr.’s motion for leave to file supplemental motion for
reconsideration; note the supplemental motion for reconsideration; and require
petitioner to comment on the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration.
35
On June 22, 2010, petitioner filed his Comment on the Motion for
Reconsideration10 dated January 15, 2010 and Comment on respondent Coyiuto, Jr.’s
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration11 dated 17 March 2010.
In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents moved for a reconsideration of the earlier
decision on the following grounds:
1. MALICE-IN-FACT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN.
2. PETITIONER IS A "PUBLIC FIGURE."
3. THE SUBJECT OF THE PUBLICATIONS CONSTITUTES FAIR COMMENTS, ON PUBLIC
ISSUES, ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST AND NATIONAL CONCERN.
4. RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT IN A RECKLESS MANNER OR IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF
THE TRUTH OF THE MATTERS COVERED BY THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.
5. THE PROTECTIVE MANTLE OF QUALIFIED PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTS
THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.
6. THERE IS NO LEGAL OR EVIDENTIARY BASIS TO HOLD DONNA GATDULA, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, LIABLE FOR THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE EDITORS AND
STAFF OF THE NEWSPAPER.
7. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO HOLD THELMA SAN JUAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUBJECT
PUBLICATIONS.
8. THE "QUICK NOTES" COLUMN OF MR. RAUL VALINO ARE BASED ON FACTS; THUS, NOT
LIBELOUS.
9. ROBERT COYIUTO, JR. IS NOT IMPLEADED WITH THE EDITORS AND STAFF MEMBERS OF
THE MANILA CHRONICLE, BUT IS SUED IN "HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY" FOR AN "ABUSE OF
RIGHT" AND NO EVIDENCE LINKS HIM TO THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.
10. THE AWARDED DAMAGES ARE EXCESSIVE, EQUITABLE AND UNJUSTIFIED. 12
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Coyiuto, Jr. raises the following
arguments:
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE COURT OBVIOUSLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT
THAT IN PETITIONER’S AMENDED COMPLAINT (DATED OCTOBER 17, 1994), RESPONDENT
ROBERT COYIUTO, JR. WAS NOT SUED FOR DAMAGES ALLEGEDLY DUE TO "LIBELOUS
PUBLICATIONS" (FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION). HE WAS SUED, HOWEVER, IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY FOR "ABUSE OF RIGHT" (SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION) ALLEGEDLY, AS
"CHAIRMAN" OF THE BOARD, "OFFICER," "PRINCIPAL OWNER," OF THE MANILA
CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION UNDER ARTICLES 19 AND 20 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
AS SUCH, THE IMPOSITION OF MORAL (₱25 MILLION PESOS) AND EXEMPLARY (₱10
MILLION PESOS) DAMAGES AGAINST RESPONDENT COYIUTO, JR. HAS NO BASIS IN LAW
AND CONTRARY TO THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 2219 AND 2229, IN RELATION
TO ARTICLE 2233, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE CIVIL CODE AS WILL BE ELUCIDATED
HEREUNDER.
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, APART FROM THE SELF-SERVING/UNILATERAL ALLEGATION IN
PARAGRAPH 3.11 OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT (ANNEX "C" OF PETITION FOR REVIEW),
NO IOTA OF EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED ON TRIAL IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLEGATION THAT
RESPONDENT COYIUTO, JR. WAS "CHAIRMAN", "PRINCIPAL OWNER" AND "OFFICER" OF
RESPONDENT MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION. SEC DOCUMENTS SHOW
THE CONTRARY, AS WILL BE DISCUSSED HEREUNDER. SO HOW COULD RESPONDENT
COYIUTO, JR. BE IMPLEADED TO HAVE "ABUSED HIS RIGHT AS A NON-CHAIRMAN, NON-
STOCKHOLDER, NON-OFFICER OF RESPONDENT MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING
CORPORATION? IT IS FUNDAMENTAL THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF RESTS ON THE PARTY
ASSERTING A FACT OR ESTABLISHING A CLAIM (RULE 131, REVISED RULES OF COURT).13
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the motion for reconsideration generally restates
and reiterates the arguments, which were previously advanced by respondents and does
not present any substantial reasons, which were not formerly invoked and passed upon
by the Court.
However, from the supplemental motion for reconsideration, it is apparent that Coyiuto,
Jr. raises a new matter which has not been raised in the proceedings below. This
notwithstanding, basic equity dictates that Coyiuto, Jr. should be given all the opportunity
to ventilate his arguments in the present action, but more importantly, in order to write
finis to the present controversy. It should be noted that the Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration was later recalled by this Court in the Resolution dated March
3, 2010, and therein, petitioner was given the opportunity to refute Coyiuto, Jr.’s
36
arguments by filing his comment on the motion for reconsideration and the supplemental
motion for reconsideration, which petitioner complied with.
From these Comments and contrary to Coyiuto, Jr.’s contention, it was substantially
established that he was the Chairman of Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation when
the subject articles were published. Coyiuto, Jr. even admitted this fact in his Reply and
Comment on Request for Admission,14 to wit:
4. Defendant Robert Coyiuto Jr. ADMITS that he was the Chairman of the Board but not
President of the Manila Chronicle during the period Novemeber (sic) to December 1993.
5. Defendant Robert Coyiuto Jr. DENIES paragraph 11. He has already conveyed such
denial to plaintiff in the course of the pre-trial. It was The Manila Chronicle, a newspaper
of general circulation, of which he is, admittedly Chairman of the Board, that published
the items marked as plaintiff’s Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, and G.
xxxx
12. This case, based on plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, is limited to the publications in The
Manila Chronicle marked plaintiff’s Exhibits "A" to "G", consecutively, published by
defendant Manila Chronicle. Thus, only the question of whether Mr. Robert Coyiuto, Jr.
was Chairman and President of defendant Manila Chronicle, during these publications and
whether he caused these publications, among all of plaintiffs’ queries, are relevant and
material to this case. And defendant Robert Coyiuto, Jr. has answered that: "Yes", he was
Chairman of the Board. "No", he was never President of The Manila Chronicle. "No", he
did not cause the publications in The Manila Chronicle: it was the Manila Chronicle that
published the news items adverted to.15
Both the trial court and the CA affirmed this fact. We reiterate that factual findings of the
trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this
Court and will generally not be reviewed on appeal. While this Court has recognized
several exceptions16 to this rule, none of these exceptions exists in the present case.
Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of fact of the trial court
and the CA.
More importantly and contrary again to Coyiuto, Jr.’s contention, the cause of action of
petitioner based on "abuse of rights," or Article 19, in relation to Article 20 of the Civil
Code, warrants the award of damages.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights
as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his
due; and observe honesty and good faith.17
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals,18 it was elucidated that
while Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and
for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper."
The Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some
basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON
THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking
to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but
failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were
"designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience"
and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as
golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal,
which is the sway and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that
pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
37
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays
down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance
of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.19
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks
of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for
its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. 20 Thus, if the provision
does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20
or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting
in damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. In the present case, it was found that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed
abused his rights as Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, which led to the publication of the
libelous articles in the said newspaper, thus, entitling petitioner to damages under Article
19, in relation to Article 20.
Consequently, the trial court and the CA correctly awarded moral damages to petitioner.
Such damages may be awarded when the transgression is the cause of petitioner’s
anguish.21 Further, converse to Coyiuto, Jr.’s argument, although petitioner is claiming
damages for violation of Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, still such violations directly
resulted in the publication of the libelous articles in the newspaper, which, by analogy, is
one of the ground for the recovery of moral damages under (7) of Article 2219. 22
However, despite the foregoing, the damages awarded to petitioner appear to be too
excessive and warrants a second hard look by the Court.
While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable
amount of moral damages, the same should not be palpably and scandalously excessive.
Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich
the claimant at the expense of the defendant.23
Even petitioner, in his Comment24 dated June 21, 2010, agree that moral damages "are
not awarded in order to punish the respondents or to make the petitioner any richer than
he already is, but to enable the latter to find some cure for the moral anguish and distress
he has undergone by reason of the defamatory and damaging articles which the
respondents wrote and published."25 Further, petitioner cites as sufficient basis for the
award of damages the plain reason that he had to "go through the ordeal of defending
himself everytime someone approached him to ask whether or not the statements in the
defamatory article are true."
In Philippine Journalists, Inc. (People’s Journal) v. Thoenen, 26 citing Guevarra v.
Almario,27 We noted that the damages in a libel case must depend upon the facts of the
particular case and the sound discretion of the court, although appellate courts were
"more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them." So it must be in this case.
Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant’s grief and
suffering. Moral damages should be reasonably approximate to the extent of the hurt
caused and the gravity of the wrong done.28 The Court, therefore, finds the award of
moral damages in the first and second cause of action in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00
and ₱25,000,000.00, respectively, to be too excessive and holds that an award of
₱1,000,000.00 and ₱10,000,000.00, respectively, as moral damages are more reasonable.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. 29 On this
basis, the award of exemplary damages in the first and second cause of action in the
amount of ₱500,000.00 and ₱10,000,000.00, respectively, is reduced to ₱200,000.00 and
₱1,000,000.00, respectively.
On the matter of attorney’s fees and costs of suit, Article 2208 of the same Code provides,
among others, that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered in cases
when exemplary damages are awarded and where the court deems it just and equitable
that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In any event,
however, such award must be reasonable, just and equitable.30 Thus, the award of
attorney’s fees and costs is reduced from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱200,000.00.
One final note, the case against respondent was one for damages based on the
publication of libelous articles against petitioner; hence, only civil in nature. The rule is
38
that a party who has the burden of proof in a civil case must establish his cause of action 2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle
by a preponderance of evidence. Thus, respondents’ liability was proven only on the basis Publishing to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
of preponderance of evidence, which is quite different from a criminal case for libel where
proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established. a. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) as moral damages; and

Corollarilly, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the person who "caused the b. the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;
publication" of a defamatory article shall be responsible for the same. Hence, Coyiuto, Jr.
3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly
should have been held jointly and solidarily liable with the other respondents in the first
and severally, the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) as attorney’s
cause of action under this article and not on the basis of violation of the principle of abuse
fee and legal costs.
of rights founded on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Because of the exclusion of
Coyiuto, Jr. in the first cause of action for libel, he cannot be held solidarily liable with the Costs against respondents.
other respondents in the first cause of action. Nonetheless, since damage to petitioner
was in fact established warranting the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same SO ORDERED.
could only be awarded based on petitioner’s second cause of action impleading Coyiuto,
Jr. for violation of the principle of abuse of right.

It did not escape the attention of the Court that in filing two different causes of action
based on the same published articles, petitioner intended the liability of Coyiuto, Jr. to be
different from the other respondents. It can be inferred that if Coyiuto, Jr. was impleaded
in the first cause of action for recovery of the civil liability in libel, petitioner could not
have prayed for higher damages, considering that the other respondents, who are jointly
and severally liable with one another, are not in the same financial standing as Coyiuto, Jr.
Petitioner, in effect, had spared the other respondents from paying such steep amount of
damages, while at the same time prayed that Coyiuto, Jr. pay millions of pesos by way of
moral and exemplary damages in the second cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration are PARTIALLY GRANTED.1âwphi1 The Decision of this Court, dated
November 25, 2009, is MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz,
Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul
Valino and Rodney Diola, to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:

a. the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and

b. the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) as exemplary damages;

39
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N.
Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of
said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the
provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in
Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who
is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo
Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time
adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred
Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any
interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at
my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her
lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account
and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia
and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child,
she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of
the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two
acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of
the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the
deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law
thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines
and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code,
which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It
was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged
40
natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of
her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic
validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in
accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he
desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable
(In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal.
286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE
INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the
time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts
admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1,
1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for
the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching
school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in
1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own
country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces
in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the
United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective
Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM",
"MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
41
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City
of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided
there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to
California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that
he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which
would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the
State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote
something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California
when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay
in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946
and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact
that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so
that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by
Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a
place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical
meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may
reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he
divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business
which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said
to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however,
that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand,
not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a
domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the
merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that
any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning
of the term "national law"is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens
only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the
Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-
appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by
will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl.
2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code
of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We
have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand,
relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of
Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that
42
given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that
Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine
of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should
be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum
refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal
rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict
of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi,
that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to
Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule
looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has
so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked
merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet
there seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the
internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids
going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying
internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look
always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that
greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more
strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is
if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as
to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the
result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had
the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if
the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi,
judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts
would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted
the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the
Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce
case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law.
Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court;
and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable
property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the
conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of
the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural
thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution
accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court
were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the
distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute
of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it
alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession,
or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of
distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts
the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter
back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term
for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
43
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the
operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in
returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16
C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it,
must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to
conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other
jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application
in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27,
1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign
laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as
regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined
by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question
occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of
them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question
to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile,
he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon
death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would
make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law
— he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the
rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the
conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the
State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California
but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights
which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will
directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was
domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the
will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of
land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate
in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the
domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the
domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property,
and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general
convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general
principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is
valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international
comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business
intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary
44
lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of
California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and
another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should
enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce
the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of
California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code,
then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its
conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California,
is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile,
pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the
place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the
Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should
govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited
above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of
laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return
of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California,
Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the
domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed
back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as
directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime
for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and
Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not
possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case

45