LEGITIME CASES

[G.R. No. 82233. March 22, 1990.]

JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents.
Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.

The facts are as follows:

In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario along the
national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB
Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner Jose
Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died, 4 and the tricycle was
damaged. 5 No criminal case arising from the incident was ever instituted. 6
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter
negotiated by the petitioners and the bus' insurer — Philippine First Insurance Company,
Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) — Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario,
received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980
a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them
from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's
death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed
an affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case,
either civil or criminal, against the petitioners. 7
On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on
November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a
complaint for damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.
8 In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the
petitioners through their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-
judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses
incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage to the tricycle the purchase price of which they (the
private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise
and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son.
The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in
the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged
tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and
for moral damages. 9
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the defendants
(herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-
interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private
respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants (petitioners). 10
The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial court. The
appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did not discharge
the liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by the private respondents in their own
capacity and not as "heirs, representatives, successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not
have validly waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not
the one who suffered these damages arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the appellate
court said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants (private respondents)
that they were the ones who bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had
the burden of proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony . . . ." 11 Anent
the funeral expenses," (T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by the appellants
(the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment
(for these) were made by the appellants, therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor."
12
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the private respondents
P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral services, P450.00 for
cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. 13 The petitioners moved
for a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision 14 but their motion was denied. 15 Hence, this
petition. cdll
The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that the petitioners
are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount of P20,505.00 despite the
agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs.
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment. Article 1231 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
(Emphasis ours.)
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation arising from the accident that
occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is whether or not Alicia, the surviving spouse
and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it. LLpr
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom payment to
extinguish an obligation should be made.
Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been
constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in
interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the forgoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do
they exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents and
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives.(Emphasis ours.) Cdpr
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a
legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it
has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private
respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The
petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido
and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from
Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as
an heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and
compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to
Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral,
the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their deceased son.
16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been
released by the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda.
de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As
a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private
respondents. prLL
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C.
BOBILES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on February 20, 1990 1
which affirmed in toto the decision of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City 2 granting
the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the
reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6)
years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 1386. 3
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order dated
February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. 4 The order was duly
published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor General; Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social worker assigned to the
court. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it
had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. 5
Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing, the testimonies
of herein private respondent, together with that of her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz
Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted in the
proceedings.
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from
all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and
be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and
the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, Regional Office, Region V, Legaspi City, and the Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi,
Albay, with copies of this decision. 6
Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated, affirmed the aforesaid
decision of the court below. Hence, this present petition with the following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be applied
retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles; and
2 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted
the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C.
Bobiles. 7
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988,
when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under
said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However,
after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said
new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be
dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in
violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues
that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter
did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption.
We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as
a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score. It
could not be taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner must be aware that
non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. We further
apprehend that this objection has been raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court.
Nonetheless, we shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment of
errors.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions
thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to
the will of the holder. 9 The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right
reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual
rights, cannot deny. 10 Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. 11
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for
adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she
was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right
to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the
law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment
of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of
substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 12 We do not find in the present case such
facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and foreign jurisprudence.
For that purpose, we start with the premise that Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature.
Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that they may
be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions. However, they will not be
so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed before their enactment. 13
Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and procedural statutes are
generally retroactive in that they apply to pending proceedings and are not confined to those begun
after their enactment although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only
procedural steps taken after their enactment. 14
The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions and proceedings,
unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so extensive that it may be
used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be
governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises. 15
The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is substantive in
nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to
comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for
adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time
it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. 16 To
repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it
attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. 17
On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not apply
retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by granting the
adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner.
We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed
by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an
integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The
pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire to adopt as our child, a
boy named JASON CONDAT, still a minor being six (6) years old, likewise residing at 18 C.
Imperial Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also in the Philippines;
3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said minor child, JASON
CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations court, now the Regional Trial Court in
Legaspi City, Albay in the Philippines;
4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am giving my lawful consent to this
adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT;
5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I have continuously reared and
cared for this minor child, JASON CONDAT since birth;
6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind of maternal and paternal love
for the boy as our very own, exercising therein the care, concern and diligence of a good
father toward him;
7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT for whatever it is worth in
the premises as to the matter of adoption of this minor child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife
ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and by me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in any court of justice;
(Emphasis supplied.) 18
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient
to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign
residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to
make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in
language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher
considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by
arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this case and, for
that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of
procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as
a result of the adoption. 19 The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not be more
than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding;
to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat
its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where every material requirement of
the statute was complied with.
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the judicial microscope to
bear upon the case in order that every slight defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason
may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to approach the
case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that there was a substantial compliance
with the statute. 20 The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption
proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts relating to the
child and its parents, which may give information to those interested, than that it should be formally
correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it
substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court
jurisdiction. 21
In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of the
child are of primary and paramount consideration. 22 The welfare of a child is of paramount
consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another, and
the courts to which the application for adoption is made is charged with the duty of protecting the
child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to
accomplish that end. 23 Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the
court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the best interests of the child, as long
as the natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of
grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed. 24
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the
best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. 25 The
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended
the approval of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for
several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents
since infancy. 27 Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the
adopters.
The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we find
no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and
circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, 28 We are of the
opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way
towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and
happy life." 29
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 30
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs. ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving
properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence
at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the
left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and
Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left
margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will
was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full
use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the
beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously
executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she
could freely dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico,
married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the
usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal
parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also
instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First
Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication
and service to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same
testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following
grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and
mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed
under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal
personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as
an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition
by alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico
because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November
10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene
Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the
testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for
reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by
the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor
filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of
the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for
reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his
favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor
appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr.
Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs,
and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner
and oppositor assign several errors which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the
following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the
will in question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing
on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion
to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by
it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091,
September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by
the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On the
other hand, in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an "interested person." An interested party has been defined in this
 connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171).
And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the
interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct,
and not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3370, August 22,
1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and,
in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the
estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property
affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir,
legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as
administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she
is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in
Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.1äwphï1.ñët
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any
portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of
the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an
adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give
her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of
the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an
illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural
father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; ... ." And the philosophy
behind this provision is well expressed in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and
they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it.
On this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumption will of the
interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of
a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the
adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is
an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and
does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted
child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting
parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that
the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the
children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is
exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of
either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other
members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the
adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and
Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol
1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in
this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate.
Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only because it was not properly
attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her
signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In this
respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will
for she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above
the attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of
the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked
her and the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later
she gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix herself
who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the
will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of
the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the
will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he signed the document, and all the
witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and
the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly
executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the
evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is
no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue
influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her
witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the
vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the
will on May 17, 1951. Although those fact may have some weight to support the theory of the
oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing could have prevented
the testatrix, had she really wanted to from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in
fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor
and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila,
walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to
talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing
observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the
opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years
prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she
was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove
what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full
consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of
improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a
kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and
make her express the will of another rather than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is
on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a
matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is insufficient but was
disproved by the testimony of the instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions
of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may be
cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in
Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed
in accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of
the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for
the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be
raised even after the will has been authenticated. ...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained,
it does not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which
the law recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a
 fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties,
and must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public
morals. (Montañano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make
a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will.
(Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In
them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It
can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castañeda
v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid
the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in
excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the
legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to
intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of
the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in
question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is
hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed
SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent Felisa Pamuti Jardin.
RESOLUTION
PARAS, J.:
The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be
the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, and its
Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are being
challenged in this Second Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had filed
their respective pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved to grant the
request of the petitioners for oral argument before the court en banc, and the case was set for
hearing on November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the term "relatives" in Article 992 of
the New Civil Code which reads:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children or relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited to discuss
as amici curiae during the hearing were the following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice Minister
Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane.
The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who
together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe
Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were
born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero
was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6)
that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his
six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children
with Felixberta Pacursa.
(pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)
Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this — who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo
Santero)?
The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
In connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew whether petitioners as illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of
Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a
substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional
rights. We do not dispute the fact that the New Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional
rights, which rights were never before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during
that time merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory primary heirs
under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate succession). Again, We do not
deny that fact. These are only some of the many rights granted by the new Code to illegitimate
children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902,
982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to
represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact
reveal that such right to this time does not exist.
Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.
Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation and if
any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be
divided among the latter in equal portions. (933)
Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of another
illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by right
of representation. (940a)
Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children
shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of
representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a) Emphasis supplied).
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights
are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate
children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In
whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are
themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of
a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant
of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides
that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a
conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate
parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992.
Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the
exception.
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed
by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice
Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12)
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child
is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product
of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth,
by avoiding further ground of resentment." (7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG (First S) No.
3, p. 196).
According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on Articles 939
to 944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil Code and to the case at
bar. Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine adopted by this Court in the cases of
Llorente vs. Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil., 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao vs. Oyao, 94
Phil. 204, cited by former Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof. Balane, which
identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate father or
mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself is already abrogated by the amendments
made by the Now Civil Code and thus cannot be made to apply to the instant case.
Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial changes in
our law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the provision of Article 992
of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change, Article 992, which was a reproduction f
Article 943 of the Civil Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the
matters which are now the subject of the present controversy. While the New Civil Code may have
granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with
Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the person to be
represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child,
then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person
to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law
provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of
the barrier imposed Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue,
even though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much applicable to the New Civil Code
because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of giving illegitimate children the right
to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession of their grandparents
(legitimate). It is with the same line of reasoning that the three aforecited cases may be said to be
still applicable to the instant case.
Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also find
support from other civilists. We quote:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the
legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child
can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother.
The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article
943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles
(990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his
own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the
grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a
choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article
and modify Articles 992 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened
attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of hereditary Succession,
JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quartet 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp.
40-41). (p. 7, Decision; p. 196, Rollo)
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is
broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing
p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from
the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to
be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus
curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance
therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general
and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter
 intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. Esrinche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia defines parientes as "los que estan relacionados por los vinculos de la sangre, ya
sea por proceder unos de otros, como los descendientes y ascendientes, ya sea por proceder
de una misma raiz o tronco, como los colaterales. (cited in Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457). (p. 377,
Rollo)
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense
than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states
that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the
word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that
it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in
the case at bar.
To recapitulate, We quote this:
The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which goes back very far in
legal history, have been softened but not erased by present law. Our legislation has not gone so
far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family
Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation between legitimate and illegitimate
children (although it has done away with the sub-classification of illegitimates into natural and
'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children have only those rights
which are expressly or clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1973 ed., vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).
In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended to
clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We
hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to
the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea
and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and a well-known
author of many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae — former Justice Jose B.L. Reyes,
former Justice Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and
Professor Ruben Balane — together with the ponente read like a veritable Who's Who in Civil Law in
the Philippines.
It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue before the Court.
But it is perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law tradition and in the usually tidy
and methodical neatness characterizing its ancient precepts that I discern a change effected by our
own version of the Civil Code. The orthodox rules which earlier inflexibly separated the legitimate
from the illegitimate families have been relaxed a little. The oppobrium cast on illegitimate children
and the disadvantages they suffer in law are no longer as overwhelming as before. The wall is no
longer as rigid as it used to be. The efforts of the Code Commission and the Congress to make our
civil law conform "With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the Filipino people and with
modern trends in legislation and the progressive principles of law" have resulted in deviations from
the strict and narrow path followed by Manresa and other early glossators. I, therefore, do not feel
bound to follow the ancient interpretations in the presence of absurd and unjust results brought
about by amendments in the new Civil Code.
We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant, their own
grandmother, simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed to marry their mother.
There are no other direct heirs. Hence, the properties of their grandmother goes to a collateral
relative — her niece. If the niece is no longer alive, an even more distant group of grandnieces and
grandnephews will inherit as against the grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.
As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disregards the
order of intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and the right of representation in
Art. 970 of descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate as provided by Arts. 902, 993, and 995.
I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as illegitimate
children and legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings and their legitimate half-
brothers or half-sisters are to inherit from one another. But I must stress that the barrier is between
the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see no reason why we should include a grandmother or
grandfather among those where a firm wall of separation should be maintained. She cannot be a
separate "family" from her own grandchildren.
The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the Code which
provides:
The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)
The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the circumstances
given in preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right was reserved to the illegitimate
child's legitimate off-spring.
I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their grandparents
Simona and Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino, while supporting the majority
view of this Court states:
xxx xxx xxx
In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by giving an illegitimate child
the right of representation, which he did not have under the old Code. But in retaining without
change provisions of the old Code in Article 992, it created an absurdity and committed an
injustice, because while the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child
should succeed by operation of law only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy has
thus been preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate descendants of legitimate children.
Dura lex, sed lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. III, 1987 ed., p. 330.)
The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law, does not
impress me as correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for reinterpretation because
the Code has been amended. The meaning of relatives must follow the changes in various provisions
upon which the word's effectivity is dependent.
My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based on
considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what appears right and just.
Unless the opposite is proved, I will always presume that a grandmother loves her grandchildren —
legitimate or illegitimate — more than the second cousins of said grandchildren or the parents of said
cousins. The grandmother may be angry at the indiscretions of her son but why should the law
include the innocent grandchildren as objects of that anger. "Relatives" can only refer to collateral
relatives, to members of a separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.
I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and a well-known
author of many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae — former Justice Jose B.L. Reyes,
former Justice Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and
Professor Ruben Balane — together with the ponente read like a veritable Who's Who in Civil Law in
the Philippines.
It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue before the Court.
But it is perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law tradition and in the usually tidy
and methodical neatness characterizing its ancient precepts that I discern a change effected by our
own version of the Civil Code. The orthodox rules which earlier inflexibly separated the legitimate
from the illegitimate families have been relaxed a little. The oppobrium cast on illegitimate children
and the disadvantages they suffer in law are no longer as overwhelming as before. The wall is no
longer as rigid as it used to be. The efforts of the Code Commission and the Congress to make our
civil law conform "With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the Filipino people and with
modern trends in legislation and the progressive principles of law" have resulted in deviations from
the strict and narrow path followed by Manresa and other early glossators. I, therefore, do not feel
bound to follow the ancient interpretations in the presence of absurd and unjust results brought
about by amendments in the new Civil Code.
We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant, their own
grandmother, simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed to marry their mother.
There are no other direct heirs. Hence, the properties of their grandmother goes to a collateral
relative — her niece. If the niece is no longer alive, an even more distant group of grandnieces and
grandnephews will inherit as against the grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.
As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disregards the
order of intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and the right of representation in
Art. 970 of descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate as provided by Arts. 902, 993, and 995.
I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as illegitimate
children and legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings and their legitimate half-
brothers or half-sisters are to inherit from one another. But I must stress that the barrier is between
the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see no reason why we should include a grandmother or
grandfather among those where a firm wall of separation should be maintained. She cannot be a
separate "family" from her own grandchildren.
The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the Code which
provides:
The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)
The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the circumstances
given in preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right was reserved to the illegitimate
child's legitimate off-spring.
I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their grandparents
Simona and Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino, while supporting the majority
view of this Court states:
xxx xxx xxx
In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by giving an illegitimate child the
right of representation, which he did not have under the old Code. But in retaining without
change provisions of the old Code in Article 992, it created an absurdity and committed an
injustice, because while the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child
should succeed by operation of law only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy has thus
been preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate descendants of legitimate children. Dura lex,
sed lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III,
1987 ed., p. 330.)
The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law, does not
impress me as correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for reinterpretation because
the Code has been amended. The meaning of relatives must follow the changes in various provisions
upon which the word's effectivity is dependent.
My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based on
considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what appears right and just.
Unless the opposite is proved, I will always presume that a grandmother loves her grandchildren —
legitimate or illegitimate — more than the second cousins of said grandchildren or the parents of said
cousins. The grandmother may be angry at the indiscretions of her son but why should the law
include the innocent grandchildren as objects of that anger. "Relatives" can only refer to collateral
relatives, to members of a separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.
I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995

BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA
MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and
NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners,
vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.

VITUG, J.:
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate
child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit.
During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From
this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife
Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February
1981 and 04 November 1976.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the
marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters,
covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by
Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of
Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not
blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private
respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter".
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de
Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT
No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February
1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and
TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of
adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles
(OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new
titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were issued in the name of Modesta
Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa
Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land
(now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of
Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a
complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a quo for
summary judgment.
The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed the complaint holding that
petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real
parties-in-interest to institute the suit. Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally
(solidarily) pay
(a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for
exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for litigation expenses and (b)
Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and
P500.00 for attorney's fees.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
The petition before us raises the following contentions: That —
1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 994 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED
FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF THE SAME CODE.
2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING ALL DOCUMENTS
EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE
RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED
SAID RESPONDENT THE STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND
PUBLIC POLICY.
3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL WRONG. 1
Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other
half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994
of the Civil Code, providing thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or
her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or
he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession
as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family."
The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the
one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such
succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has
no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained
by a noted civilist. 2 His thesis:
What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or
intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a
barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is
clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the
illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well
as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early case of Grey v.
Fabie 3 and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4 and De la
Puerta v. Court of Appeals. 5 In Diaz, we have said:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated
by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing
but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has
ruled that where the illegitimate child had
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; 6 that the
legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a
natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate
grandparent; 8 that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a
legitimate brother of her natural father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. 10 Indeed, the law on succession is
animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative 11 by, but
must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. 12
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence
in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:
Order of Preference Order of Concurrence
(a) Legitimate Children and (a) Legitimate Children and
Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b) Legitimate Parents and (b) Legitimate Parents and
Ascendants Ascendants Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children and
Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Surviving
of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse
Illegitimate Parents)
(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and
Illegitimate Parents
(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/
Nephews and Nephews and Nieces
 Nieces and Surviving Spouse
(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone
(within the fifth civil degree)
(g) State (g) Alone
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate
heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial)
adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13
We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the
Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by
the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither the
standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law
does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of
damages against the actor. 15
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is
AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby
DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-22469. October 23, 1978.]

TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate
of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L.
CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO,
defendants-appellees.
DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will dated
August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No.
54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73
Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother,
Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio, (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A.
V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana
(Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at
Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas
Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas
Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was
submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was
opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be
declared because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman
A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was
already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel. cdphil
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partition was not in conformity with the will
because the testator intended that the estate should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned.
Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios y
que ha lugar a sucession intestado con respecio a los mismos, y que señale un dia en esta causa
para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o
abintestato del difunto".
The probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It held that in
certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense of
disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of preventing that "tales bienes fuesen
malgastados o desfilpar rados por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a perpetual
prohibition against alienation, that condition would be regarded "como no puesta o no existente". It
concluded that "no hay motivos legales o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco
sea declarada intestada." (See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the
Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734,
March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.)
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis
R. Yangco appealed to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in this Court's resolutions
of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise
agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro
Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein
appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The
estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise agreement. As the resolutions dismissing
the appeals became final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment
were made on those dates.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947
wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos
(P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with
Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17).
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical
partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945
project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controversy over the Yangco
estate.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco' intestate estate, He alleged ill his
complaint that the dispositions in Yangco's will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation
rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and,
therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy. LLphil
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and
laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December
26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's estate.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964 in CA-
G.R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at more
than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17[5], Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No.
2613).
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R.
Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized, and (3) that plaintiff's action is
barred by res judicata and laches.
In the disposition of this appeal, it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had been duly
legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The appeal
may be resolved by determining whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of appellant Tomas Corpus, was
a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed
intestate share in Yangco's estate?
To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation. The trial court found that
Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales
reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's conclusion that
Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement
in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other
children were his acknowledged natural children. His exact words are:
"Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, llamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis,
los cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos." (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco).
That will was attested by Rafael del Pan, Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio Gonzales
Diez.
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, identified as Exhibit 1
herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on appeal in Special
Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy
found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in
his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with
Victoria Obin, implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of
Teodoro.
These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in
Exhibit 1 herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R.
Yangco's will, in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record.
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be
legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumed "That a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child born
in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life"
(Sec. 5[z], [bb] and [cc], Rule 131, Rules of Court). llcd
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita
Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant
Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his
mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of
Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.
Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a
suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que lo haya reconocido, ni
ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" (6 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola, Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 465-6) . . .
Appellant Corpus concedes that if Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus) would
have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the
legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does
not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo
Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185-6).
Under articles 944 and 945 of the spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated
child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who
acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive,
they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and
legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the
rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on
the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of
intestacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the
mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693.
See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).
Where the testatrix, Rosario Fabie, was the legitimate daughter of Jose Fabie, the two acknowledged
natural children of her uncle, Ramon Fabie, her father's brother, were held not to be her legal heirs
(Grey vs. Fabie, 88 Phil. 128).
By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to
the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno,
52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909). The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of
her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil.
29). LLpr
WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19996 April 30, 1965

WENCESLA CACHO, petitioner-appellee, vs. JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO G. UDAN, oppositors-
appellants. Gregorio Dolojan for petitioner-appellee.
Benjamin A. G. Vega and Abad Santos and Pablo for oppositors-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on questions of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zambales (Hon.
Lucas Lacson presiding), issued on 20 February 1962, in its Special Proceeding No. 2230, wherein the
court disallowed the opposition of John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan to the probate of the alleged will
of their sister Silvina Udan.
From the records it can be gleaned that on 13 December 1959 one Silvina G. Udan, single, and a
resident of San Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a purported will naming her son, Francisco G.
Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike. Wencesla Cacho, filed a
petition to probate said Will in the Court of First Instance of Zambales on 14 January 1960 (RA. pp. 1-
16). On 15 February 1960 Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brother of the testatrix, filed an opposition to
the probate (RA. pp. 16-18). On 16 February 1960 Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., filed his Appearance and
Urgent Motion for Postponement for and in behalf of his client Francisco G. Udan, the appointed heir
in the Will (RA. pp. 18-22). On 9 June 1960 Francisco G. Udan, through counsel, filed his opposition to
the probate of this will (RA. pp. 33-35). On 15 September 1960 oppositor Rustico G. Udan, through
counsel, verbally moved to withdraw his opposition, dated 13 February 1960, due to the appearance
of Francisco G. Udan, the named heir in the will and said opposition was ordered withdrawn (RA. pp.
55-56). After one witness, the Notary Public who made and notarize the will, had testified in court,
oppositor Francisco G. Udan died on June 1961 in San Marcelino, Zambales, Philippines (RA. pp. 63-
66).
After the death of Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, both legitimate brothers of
the testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the will was not
attested and executed as required by law, that the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that
it was procured by fraud or undue influence (RA. pp. 63-66; 67-71). On 20 January 1962 proponent-
appellee, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss Oppositions filed by the Oppositors (RA. pp. 73-
80), and on 20 February 1962 the Honorable Court of First Instance of Zambales issued an Order
disallowing these two oppositions for lack of interest in the estate and directing the Fiscal to study
the advisability of filing escheat proceedings (RA. pp. 97-99). On 26 and 30 March 1962 both
oppositors filed their Motions for Reconsideration, through their respective counsels, and these
motions were both denied by the lower court on 25 April 1962 (RA. pp. 99-122; pp. 131-132). On 7
May 1962 oppositors filed their joint Notice of Appeal (RA. pp. 132-135).
The first issue tendered by appellants is whether the oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan, may
claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the late Silvina Udan. We find that the court
below correctly held that they were not, for at the time of her death Silvina's illegitimate son,
Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. This is clear from Articles
988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines, in force at the time of the death of the
testatrix:
ART. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.
These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the
absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can
concur with the widow or widower under Article 1101, they do, not concur, but are excluded by the
surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003).
That Francisco Udan was the illegitimate son of the late Silvina is not denied by the oppositor; and he
is so acknowledged to be in the testament, where said Francisco is termed "son" by the testatrix. As
the latter was admittedly single, the son must be necessarily illegitimate (presumptively natural
under Article 277).
The trial court, therefore, committed no error in holding that John and Rustico Udan had no standing
to oppose the probate of the will. For if the will is ultimately probated John and Rustico are excluded
by its terms from participation in the estate; and if probate be denied, both oppositors-appellants will
be excluded by the illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, as sole intestate heir, by operation of law.
The death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not improve the situation of
appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at
law not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, as correctly
decided by the court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate
child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code.
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
For the oppositors-appellants it is argued that while Francisco Udan did survive his mother, and
acquired the rights to the succession from the moment of her death (Art. 777, Civ. Code), still he did
not acquire the inheritance until he accepted it. This argument fails to take into account that the
Code presumes acceptance of an inheritance if the latter is not repudiated in due time (Civ. Code,
Art. 1057, par. 2), and that repudiation, to be valid, must appear in a public or authentic instrument,
or petition to the court. There is no document or pleading in the records showing repudiation of the
inheritance by Francisco Udan. The latter's own opposition (RA. p. 61) to the probate of the alleged
will is perfectly compatible with the intention to exclude the proponent Cacho as testamentary
coheir, and to claim the entire inheritance as heir ab intestato.
Finally, it is urged that as probate is only concerned with the due execution of a testament, any
ruling on the successional rights of oppositors-appellants is at present premature. Inquiry into the
hereditary rights of the appellants is not premature, if the purpose is to determine whether their
opposition should be excluded in order to simplify and accelerate the proceedings. If, as already
shown, appellants cannot gain any hereditary interest in the estate whether the will is probated or
not, their intervention would merely result in unnecessary complication.
It may not be amiss to note, however, that the hearing on the probate must still proceed to ascertain
the rights of the proponent Cacho as testamentary heir.
It is urged for the applicant that no opposition has been registered against his petition on the issues
above-discussed. Absence of opposition, however, does not preclude the scanning of the whole
record by the appellate court, with a view to preventing the conferment of citizenship to persons not
fully qualified therefor (Lee Ng Len vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20151, March 31, 1965). The applicant's
complaint of unfairness could have some weight if the objections on appeal had been on points not
previously passed upon. But the deficiencies here in question are not new but well-known, having
been ruled upon repeatedly by this Court, and we see no excuse for failing to take them into
account.
WHEREFORE, the order under appeal is affirmed, without prejudice to further proceedings in the
case, conformably to this opinion. Costs against appellants John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 17768 September 1, 1922

VICENTE SOTTO, Petitioner, vs. FILEMON SOTTO, Respondent.
OSTRAND, J.: chanroble

This is a petition under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure to reopen the land registration
proceedings in regard to lot No. 7510 of the Cadaster of Cebu.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The petitioner alleges that he is the owner of said lot No. 7510; that in or about the year 1907 he
absented himself from the city of Cebu, leaving the respondent in charge of the lot; that on or about
the 16th of April, 1921, the petitioner, upon visiting the office of the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, discovered that the respondent had fraudulently obtained the registration of said
lot in his own name and that a certificate of title for said lot had been issued to said respondent on
January 24, 1920; that the petitioner, due to his long absence from Cebu, was unable to appear in
court in the land registration proceedings and to defend his rights; and that this action is his only
remedy to recover the property in question. He therefore asks that the decision of the Court of First
Instance in regard to said lot No. 7510 be annulled and that a new trial be had. The case is now
before us upon demurrer by the respondent to the petition on the ground that it does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.virtual law library

The respondent maintains that section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to
decisions in land registration proceedings which are covered by a final decree and this is the only
question of importance raised by the demurrer.es virtual law library

A brief statement of the history of the legislation relating to the question at issue may be by some
aid in its determination. The original Land Registration Act (No. 496) which established the Torrens
system of registration in these Islands, went into effect on January 1, 1903, It created a court of land
registration and its section 14 provided for an appeal from that court to the Court o First Instance.
Section 38 of the Act reads:

If the court after hearing finds that the applicant has title as stated in his application, and
proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree
of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated
in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
 Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice, or citation, or included, in the general description "To all whom it may concern.' Such
decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgment or decrees;
subject, however to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein
by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for
review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be
opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal
hereinbefore provided. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his
remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring
the decree. Whenever the phrase 'innocent purchaser for value' or an equivalent phrase occurs
in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrances
for value.

On April 15, 1904, Act No. 1108 was enacted which, by its section 4, amended section 14 of the
original Act so as to read as follows:

SEC. 14. Every order, decision, and decree of the Court of Land Registration may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court in the same manner as an order decision, decree or judgment of a Court of
First Instance might be reviewed, and for that purpose sections one hundred and forty-one one
hundred and forty-two, one hundred and forty-three, four hundred and ninety-six, four hundred
ninety-seven (except that portion thereof relating to assessors), four hundred and ninety-nine,
five hundred, five hundred and one, five hundred and two, five hundred and three, five hundred
and four, five hundred and five, five hundred and six, five hundred and seven, five hundred and
eight, five hundred and nine, five hundred and eleven, five hundred and twelve, five hundred and
thirteen, five hundred and fourteen, five hundred and fifteen, five hundred and sixteen, and five
hundred and seventeen of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a
Code of Procedure in civil actions and special proceedings in the Philippine islands," are made
applicable to all the proceedings of the Court of Land Registration and to a review thereof by the
Supreme Court, except as otherwise provided in this section: Provided, however, That no
certificates of title shall be issued by the Court of Land Registration until after the expiration of
the period for perfecting a bill of exceptions for filing: And provided further, That the Court of
Land Registration may grant a new trial in any case that has not passed to the Supreme Court, in
the manner and under the circumstances provided in sections one hundred and forty-five, one
hundred and forty-six, and one hundred forty-seven of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety:
And provided also, That the certificates of judgment to be issued by the Supreme Court, in cases
passing to it from the Court of Land Registration, shall be certified to the clerk of the last-named
court as well as the copies of the opinion of the Supreme Court: And provided also, That in the bill
of exceptions to be printed no testimony or exhibits shall be printed except such limited portions
thereof as are necessary to enable the Supreme Court to understand the points of law reversed.
The original testimony and exhibits shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. . . .

Section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure to which reference is made in the foregoing section, reads:

When a judgment is rendered by a Court of a First Instance upon default, and a party thereto
is unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and the
Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no
adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so deprived of hearing may present his
petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such
judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have such judgment set
aside. The court shall summarily on notice to both parties hear such petition, upon oral
written testimony as it shall direct, and the judgment shall be set aside and the trial upon the
merits granted, upon such terms as may be just, if the facts set forth in the complaint are
found to be true, otherwise the complaint shall be dismissed with costs.

If a trial on the merits is granted, the order shall forthwith be certified to the Court of First
Instance. Pending such petition, any judge of the Supreme Court for cause shown, may order
a suspension of further proceedings to enforce the judgment complained of, upon taking
 sufficient security from the petitioner for all costs and damages that may be awarded against
him in case the petition is dismissed.

From the time of passage of Act No. 1108 until the filing of the petition in the recent case of Caballes
vs. Director of Lands (41 Phil., 357) the final decrees in land registration cases were always regarded
as indefeasible and it apparently did not occur to the members of the legal profession that the
provision of section 513, supra, could be applied to such decrees or to the orders or decisions upon
which they were based. Aside from the dictum in the Caballes case, this court has consistently held
that final decrees in land registration cases could not be reopened except under the circumstances,
and in the manner, mentioned in section 38 of the Land Registration Act. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz,
17 Phil., 49; City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil., 324; Cuyugan and Lim Tuico vs. Sy Quia, 24 Phil., 567;
Broce vs. Apurado, 26 Phil., 581; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29, Phil., 31; De Jesus vs. City of Manila, 29
Phil., 73; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rodriguez, 29 Phil., 336; Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil.,
590; Mariano Velasco and Co. vs. Gochico and Co., 33 Phil., 363; Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila vs. Sunico and Catli, 36 Phil., 279; Blas vs. De la Cruz and Melendres, 37 Phil., 1, and
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abural, 39 Phil., 996.) chanrobles virtual law library

The dominant principle of the Torrens system of land registration is that the titles registered
thereunder are indefeasible or as nearly so as it is possible to make them. (Niblack's Analysis of the
Torrens System, paragraphs 5, 161, and 166; Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 40 and 41; Dumas'
Registering Title to Land, p. 31; Hogg on the Australian Torrens System, pp. 775 et seq.) This
principle is recognized to the fullest extent in our Land Registration Act and gives the Act its principle
value. (See land Registration Act, section 38 and 39.) chanrobles virtual law library

An examination of Act No. 1108 shows that it merely provides for the amendment of section 6, 12,
13, 14, 17, 19, 24, 36, and 114 of the original Land Registration Act. Sections 14 and 19 relate to
matters of procedure; all the other section mentioned deal with administrative matters. Nowhere in
Act. No 1108 is there any direct indication of any intention or to impair the strength of the registered
titles.

The purpose of the amendment of section 14 of land Registration Act was clearly to make the Court
of Land Registration coordinate with the Court of First Instance and to make its judgments
appealable to the Supreme Court instead of to the Courts of First instance. In carrying out this
purpose the Legislature by reference to certain sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, incorporated
into the Land Registration Act the then existing provisions for bills of exceptions and appeals from
the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court and made certain original actions in the Supreme
Court applicable to land registration matters. This was all that was done and very evidently all it was
intended to do.

As Act No. 1108 only amended certain section of the Land Registration Act and did not purport to
amend the Act as whole, or to introduce any new principle therein, the amended section should be
read in connection with the other sections of the Act as if all had been enacted in the same statute,
and, as far as possible, effect should be given to them all in furtherance of the general design of the
Act. Sutherland on Statutory Construction 2d ed., says in paragraph 368:

The practical inquiry is usually what a particular provision, clause, or word means. To answer it
one must proceed as he would with any other composition - construe it with reference to the
leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument. A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts
of section and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently each part or section
should be construed in connection with every other part or section and so as to produce a
harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine the attention to the one section to be construed. "It
is always an unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divided it by a process of
etymological dissection, into separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated from its
context, some particular definition given by lexicographers, and then reconstruct the instrument
upon the basis of these definitions. An instrument must always be construed as a whole, and the
particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is usually to be ascertained from the
context, the nature of the subject treated of and the purpose or intention of the parties who
executed the contract, or of the body which enacted or framed the statute or constitution."
(International Trust Co. vs. Am. L. and I. Co., 62 Minn., 501.) Another court says: "Statutes must
receive a reasonable construction, reference being had to their controlling purpose, to all their
 provisions, force and effect being given not narrowly to isolated and disjointed clauses, but to
their plain spirit, broadly taking all their provisions together in one rational view. Neither
grammatical construction nor the letter of the statute nor its rhetorical framework should be
permitted to defeat its clear and definite purpose to be gathered from the whole act, comparing
part with part. . . . A statute must receive such reasonable construction as will, if possible, make
all its parts harmonize with each other, and render them consistent with its scope and object."
(Adams vs. Yazoo and Miss Val. R.R. Co., 75 Miss., 275.)

Applying the principles stated, we do not think it impossible to so harmonize the various section of
the Land Registration Act as to carry out its general intent.

It must be conceded that section 14, as amended, is repugnant to several other sections of the Land
Registration Act, if we hold that the final "decree of confirmation and registration" provided for in
section 38 of the Act is a "judgment" within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. But we do not think it necessary to so hold. The Land Registration Act itself distinguishes
between a judgment and the final decree. In section 36 of the Act the decision rendered by the court
is styled "a judgment." The final "decree of confirmation and registration" cannot be entered until at
least thirty days after such judgment has been rendered. The contents of this final decree is thus
prescribed by section 40 of the Act:

Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and
shall be signed by the clerk. It shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if
married, the name of husband or wife. If the owner is under disability, and if a minor, shall
state his age. It shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by the court, and
shall set forth the estate of the owner, and also, in such manner as to show their relative
priority, all particular estates, mortgages, easements, liens, attachments, and other
incumbrances, including rights of husband and wife, if any, to which the land or owner's
estate is subject, and may contain any other matter properly to be determined in pursuance
of this Act. The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the
certificates of title hereinafter mentioned.

As provided in the last sentence of the section quoted, the decree is transcribed literally upon the
certificates of title. Section 38 of the Act provides that it "shall not be opened by reason of the
absence infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any
court for reversing judgment or decrees." chanrobles virtual law library

It can readily be seen that such a decree possesses very special characteristics and that it differs not
only in form but also in character from the ordinary judgment.

Its features of finality and indefeasibility constitute the cornerstone of the Land Registration Act; if
we eliminate them we may still have a land registration system but it will not be a Torrens system.
To hold that the Legislature by a mere reference in Act No. 1108 to section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure intended to include such final decrees in term "judgment" as employed in that section
would therefore equivalent to holding that it proposed in this casual manner to abolish the Torrens
system in these Islands, a system which had given general satisfaction, and to substitute therefor a
mongrel system with all disadvantages of Torrens registration but without its principal advantages.

Such an interpretation of the law would be in conflict with the view of the effect of final decree
expressed in all decisions of this court upon the subject from the time of the enactment of Act No.
1108 until the present time, with the sole exception of the aforementioned dictum in the case of
Caballes vs. Director of Lands, supra. It would lay a final land registration decree open to successive
attacks by persons claiming to have been deprived of their interest in the decreed land by default
and would throw the title back into the realm of oral evidence, which, in land disputes in this country,
has always been found notoriously unreliable chanrobles virtual law library

Moreover, an examination of the Land Registration Act shows clearly that its prime object is to give
the greatest possible protection to the bona fide holders of the certificates of title provided for in the
Act. If a final decree of confirmation and registration should be reopened and cancelled, it is, of
course, obvious that all certificates of title issued under the decree would fail whether the holders
were guilty of bad faith or not; as far as the validity of his title might be concerned, the bona fide
holder of a transfer certificate - an innocent third party - would be exactly in the same position as the
holder in bad faith of the first certificate issued under a decree, i. e, neither would have any legal
title whatever.

A bona fide holder of title recorded in the old, or Mortgage Law, register would then be in a much
better position inasmuch as he would enjoy the very important benefits of article 34 of the Mortgage
Law. In other words, the old register would offer greater advantages and afford much better
protection to bona fide third parties than would the Torres register if we were to accept the
interpretation placed upon the law by the petitioner. It requires no argument to show that such an
interpretation would defeat the principal object of the Land Registration Act and render the
certificate of title an instrument of very slight value. It is hardly conceivable that the legislators
intended to create such a state of affairs.

Another circumstances also plainly indicates that in enactment of Act No. 1108 it was not the
purpose to make such drastic changes in the law. The theory of American adaptation of the Torrens
system is that every transfer of title and every memorandum upon the certificate of title is a judicial
act and that the register of deeds merely acts in a ministerial capacity as an officer of the court.

A transfer certificate of title is both in form and in substance merely a variation of the final decree in
the case; it runs in the name of the judge of the court, contains the same data as the final decree
and transfer and confirms the title just as effectively. If, therefore, we regard the final decree as a
judgment within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we must also so regard a
transfer of certificate of title. Now, if this is so, what can then be the purpose of maintaining the
assurance fund? If both final decrees and transfer certificates of title can be regarded as judgments
and reopened or cancelled by a proceeding under section 513, how can there ever be any demand
upon the assurance fund? Indeed, the fact that in passing Act No. 1108 the Legislature left the
provisions for the assurance fund intact and did not reduce the amount of the premium to be paid
into said fund by an applicant for registration, shows sufficiently that if did not intend to introduce a
new proceeding in substitution of the action against the assurance fund. We cannot assume or
believe that the collection of the assurance premium or fee is only a scheme on the part o of the
Government to obtain money under false pretenses.

If we, on the other hand, hold that in land registration matters section 513 of the Code of the Civil
Procedure applies only to those judgment which are not covered by final decrees of confirmation (of
which the Caballes case offers a good example) all difficulties in reconciling the amended section 14
of the Land Registration Act within its other section disappear and the registration system
established by the Act will remain intact. In view of the fact that it obviously was not the intention of
the Legislature to introduce any radical changes in the system itself, this seems to be the only
rational construction which can be placed upon the law.

Such an interpretation can in reality impose no material hardship upon the aggrieved party; he still
has his right of action for damages against the person who has unjustly deprived him of his land and
if the title has not been transferred to a third party, an attachment may be levied upon the land.
Recourse may also be had to be assurance fund in proper cases. Furthermore, we have already held
in the case of Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds of Laguna and Obiñana (40 Phil., 620) that in certain
cases a suit in equity may be maintained to compel the conveyance of registered land to the true
owner.

A person who, through no fault of his own, has been deprived of his land through registration
proceedings is thus offered all the remedies which he, in justice and equity, ought to have; to go
father and allow his claims to prevail against the rights of a bona fide purchaser for value from the
holder of a registered title is neither justice nor common sense and is, as we have seen, subversive
of the object of the Land Registration Act. This, as far as we can see, would be the inevitable and
logical consequence of adopting the doctrine that final land registration decrees may be reopened; it
is inconceivable that a certificate of title can stand when the decree upon which it is based fails.

It has been suggested by some of the opponents of the views set forth that as under the final decree
in land registration case the petitioner acquires a legal title a purchaser from him in good faith also
acquires a good title and cannot be disturbed through proceedings under section 513, and that such
proceedings can, therefore, only reach the original holder of the title and his mala fides transferees.
This view is in itself a recognition of the fact that the sweeping language of the section in question is
not, to its full extent, applicable to land registration cases; the only difference between this theory
and ours is that the line of the inapplicability of the section is drawn at a different point. Instead of
being placed at the issuance of the final decree, thus making the section applicable to judgments not
covered by such decrees, the line of demarcation is drawn at the point of where the land passes into
the hands of an innocent purchaser of value.brary

While this interpretation of the law has an appearance of reasonableness, at first sight, may seem
harmless, its adoption would in reality be only slightly less disastrous than the holding that section
513 is applicable to all land registration matters. The fact that the question of good or bad faith on
the part of a purchaser would often have to be determined by oral evidence, would introduce an
element of uncertainty which would impair the value of Torens titles out of all proportion to the
benefits to be derived from the application of the remedy prescribed by section 513 in the manner
suggested. There might be few successful attacks on such titles, but from a practical point of view
the possibility of attacks and of litigation in regard to which the Statute of Limitation does not apply,
would necessarily have a deterrent effect on possible investors in lands covered by such titles. And,
as we have seen, there is not now, and never has been, any real necessity for such an application of
the remedy in land registration cases; the field is sufficiently covered by other remedies, equally
effective and much less harmful to the public interest. It is, therefore, not at all a question of
sanctioning or encouraging fraud by curtailing the remedies against it.

For the reasons stated, we hold that so called "decree of confirmation and registration" provided for
in the Land Registration Act is not a judgment within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and that such a decree cannot be reopened except for the reasons and in the manner
stated in section 38 of the Land Registration Act.

The demurrer must, accordingly, be sustained and it being evident that the petition suffers from
defects not curable by an amendment, an order absolute will be entered dismissing the same with
costs. So ordered.

Separate Opinions chanrobles virtual law library

ARAULLO, C.J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library

I concur in the foregoing decision, and have to state, in addition, that as the declaration made by this
court in the case of Caballes vs. Director of Lands (41 Phil., 357) with regard to the application of
section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure to cadastral land or registration proceedings has reference
only to the case where final judgment by default has been rendered, and not to that where the final
decree has been entered and the respective certificate of title issued, as in the instant case, such a
declaration cannot serve as ground to support the pretension of the petitioner, nor is it in conflict
with the finding and ruling contained in this decision.

STREET, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library

The complaint in this case, considered as a petition for relief under section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, is apparently defective in more than one respect; and if the court had been content to
sustain the demurrer because of the insufficiency of the complaint to make out a cause for relief, the
undersigned would not have been called upon to record this dissent. Instead of pursuing this course,
the court holds that said section 513 is not applicable in land registration proceedings. In so holding,
the court flatly refuses to give effect to so much of section 4 of Act No. 1108 of the Philippine
Commission as makes section 513 of our Code of Civil Procedure applicable in land registration
cases. The reason suggested for this in substance is that said section opposed to the spirit and
purpose of the Land Registration Act. Our reply to this is that the same legislative body that
introduced the Torrens system in these Islands was not lacking power to modify the system so
introduced; and it is an unusual and in our opinion unjustified exercise of judicial power to override
the legislative will as expressed in the amendatory Act.

It is idle to invoke in such a case as this the familiar rules of interpretation and construction. These
rules were devised for the purpose of enabling the courts to discover the legislative intent when such
intent is not readily discernible, and above all rules of statutory interpretation stands the
fundamental principle that where the intention of the legislative body is clearly revealed no
interpretation or construction is admissible which contradicts that intention.

In dealing with a decision believed to be so entirely untenable as this, the temptation to multiply
words is great but we content ourselves with a few observations on a single aspect of the case,
which has reference to the manner in which section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure would operate
in land registration case if allowed to have effect.

In the first place it will be noted that section 513 contemplates and assumes the existence of valid
judgment, which means - in relation to land registration proceedings - that there has been a
conclusive adjudication of title and that the decree has become final in the sense that the Court of
First Instance has lost he power to change the same and that the time for appeal to the Supreme
Court has passed, with the result that, but for the remedy now given in section 513 all right of party
adversely affected by the decree has been totally destroyed. In other words the person in whose
name the property has been registered has acquired an indefeasible legal title, subject only to be
divested in a subsequent proceeding under section 513.

This being true, it must follow that any bona fide purchaser of the property who acquires the same
from the person in whose name the same is registered, before any proceeding is instituted under
section 513, acquired a good title and cannot be disturbed, regardless of what the situation may be
as between the petitioner, supposedly the original true owner, and the person who procured the
property to be registered in his own name. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, which permits the
decree to be opened within one year in the Court of Land Registration upon the petition of one who
have been deprived of an interest in the land by fraud, expressly saves the interest of any innocent
purchaser for value; and in obedience to recognized principles of jurisprudence the same reservation
of the rights of the innocent purchaser must be understood to exist in connection with the remedy
given by section 513. It is rudimentary in English and American jurisprudence that a person who has
acquired the legal title to property by transfer for value and without notice of any defect in the title
will not be deprived thereof at the instance of any person having equitable right only, even though it
be prior to in point of time. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the remedy granted in
section 513 involves the exercise of the equity power of the court; and the equitable right of a
person against whom a default judgment has been taken in land registration proceeding, under the
conditions mentioned in that section, to have the decree set aside does not rest upon as high a plane
as does the rest upon as high a plane as does the right of an innocent purchaser from the person in
whose name the title has been registered.

It should be observed that section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure was originally conceived and
reduced to forms with especial reference to ordinary litigation, such as chiefly dealt with in the Code
of Civil Procedure; and some rational adjustment is necessary when we come to apply that section in
land registration case. It results that the "new trial upon the merits" which may be granted in a
proper case under section 513 must of necessity fail of effect against any innocent purchaser for
value claiming by transfer of the Torrens title under the person to whom the certificate was issued.
But as between an owner who has lost he legal title under the conditions defined in section 513 and
the individual who has been unjustly enriched by the decree of the Land Registration Court in his
favor, there is really no reason why the remedy conferred in said section should not be allowed to
operate with full effect. In the end, supposing the petition to sustained and that the property still
remains in the name of the respondent, he should be compelled to transfer it to the petitioner.

The decision of the court lays great emphasis upon the hardships which might be expected to result
to innocent purchasers of registered land, if section 513 should be given effect in land registration
proceedings, but what has been said shows that this fear is not well founded. It is needless to say
that in the case before us the land in question appears to be still in the possession of the person who
procured registration and against whom the petition is brought.

The view of the land registration system, entertained by the majority seems entirely to ignore section
70 of the Land Registration Act, and especially the concluding portion which declares that nothing in
said Act shall in any way be construed to change or affect any rights or liabilities created by law and
applicable to registered land, except as otherwise expressly provided in said Act or in the
amendments thereof. This is really a basal idea in the system and when an amendatory statute has
expressly created a liability with reference to registered land, as was inferentially done when the
remedy expressed in section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure was made applicable to land
registration cases, said liability should undoubtedly be respected by all the courts called upon to
maintain the law. It is to be regretted that our land registration system should have become an
object of superstitious reverence to such a degree as to the statutory law. No system worth
preserving was ever destroyed, or even impaired, by the creation of a remedy against fraud or for
the relief of those who have lost their property without fault.

[G.R. No. 4275. March 23, 1909.]

PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMAN ABAYA, defendant-appellant.
C. Oben, for appellant.
L. Joaquin, for appellee.
DECISION
ARELLANO, C.J p:
From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special proceedings brought in the
Court of First Instance of La Laguna for the settlement of the intestate estate and the distribution of
the property of Casiano Abaya it appears:

I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina
Labadia, died on the 6th of April 1899; that Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose
and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya, on the 6th of November, 1905,
moved the settlement of the said intestate succession; that an administrator having been appointed
for the said estate on the 25th of November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said Romualdo Abaya
and Sabina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came forward and opposed said
appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased; that this was
granted by the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that on the 17th of November, 1906, Roman
Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano
Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled to
take possession of all the property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him; and that on
November 22, 1906, the court ordered the publication of notices for the declaration of heirs and
distribution of the property of the estate.

II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in reply to the foregoing motion of Roman
Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman
Abaya, but that she considered that her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing of the
matter, and, in consequence of the evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be
declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be
adjudicated to her together with the corresponding products thereof.

III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral evidence, and the court
below entered the following judgment:

"That the administrator of the estate of Casiana Abaya should recognize Teopista and Jose Conde as
being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the
hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father
Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby declared that she is the only heir to the property of the
said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman Abaya."

IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this court, and
presented the following statement of errors:

1. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of natural
children under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code, might be brought in special probate
proceedings.

2. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged natural child,
the mother of such presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, may bring an action to enforce the
acknowledgment of her deceased child in accordance with articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code.
3. The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuous possession of the deceased children
of Paula Conde of the status of natural children of the late Casiano Abaya, has been fully proven in
these proceedings; and

4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this intestate estate to
Paula Conde, as improperly found by the court below, the court erred in not having declared that
said property should be reserved in favor of relatives of Casiano Abaya to the third degree, and in
not having previously demanded securities from Paula Conde to guarantee the transmission of the
property to those who might fall within the reservation.

As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special proceedings for the
administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an action might be brought to enforce the
acknowledgment of the natural child of the person from whom the inheritance is derived, that is to
say, whether one might appear as heir on the ground that he is a recognized natural child of the
deceased, not having been so recognized by the deceased either voluntarily or compulsory by
reason of a preexisting judicial decision, but asking at the same time that, in the special proceeding
itself, he be recognized by the presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim to be entitled to
the succession opened in the special proceeding.

According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure —

"If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the lawful heirs of the
deceased person are, or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law,
the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing by the judge, under oath and signed
by witness. Any party in interest whose distributive share is affected by the determination of such
controversy, may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance determining such
controversy to the Supreme Court, within the time and in the manner provided in the last preceding
section."

This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case of Juana Pimental vs.
Engracio Palanca (5 Phil. Rep. 436.)

The main question with regard to the second error assigned, is whether or not the mother of a
natural child now deceased, but who survived the person who, it is claimed, was his natural father,
also deceased, may bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such
child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to
be his natural father.

In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the following as the only
foundation:

"In resolving a similar question Manresa says: 'An acknowledgment can only be demanded by the
natural child and his descendants whom it shall benefit, and should they be minors or otherwise
incapacitated, such person as legally represents them; the mother may ask it in behalf of her child so
long as he is under her authority.' On this point no positive declaration has been made, undoubtedly
because it was not considered necessary. A private action is in question and the general rule must be
followed. Elsewhere the same author adds: 'It may so happen that the child dies before four years
have expired after attaining majority, or that the document supporting his petition for
acknowledgment is discovered after his death, such death perhaps occurring after his parents had
died, as is supposed by article 137, or during their lifetime. In any case such right of action shall
pertain to the descendants of the child whom the acknowledgment may interest.' (See
Commentaries to arts. 135 and 137, Civil Code. Vol. I.)'

The above doctrine, advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of the Civil Code, lacks
legal and doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the right of such action by the natural child to
his descendants can not be sustained under the law, and still less to his mother.

It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most positive, limiting in
form, when establishing the exception for the exercise of such right of action after the death of the
presumed parents, as is shown hereafter. It is not supported by any doctrine, because up to the
present time no argument has been presented, upon which even an approximate conclusion could be
based.

Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized natural children, granting
them rights and actions that they did not possess under the former laws, they were not, however,
placed upon the same plane as legitimate ones. The difference that separates these two classes of
children is still great, as proven by so many articles dealing with the rights of the family and with
succession in relation to the members thereof. It may be laid down as a legal maxim, that whatever
the code does not grant to the legitimate children, or in connection with their rights, must still less be
understood as granted to recognized natural children or in connection with their rights. There is not a
single exception in its provisions.

If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family rights of the child, the
acknowledgment of the natural child is, among illegitimate ones, that which unites him to the family
of the father or the mother who recognizes him, and affords him a participation in the rights of the
family, relatively advantageous according to whether they are alone or whether they concur with
other individuals of the family of his purely natural father or mother.

Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code nothing is more logical than to establish a
comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to enforce acknowledgment.

"Art. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any time of its
lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs, should it die during minority or in a state of insanity. In
such cases the heirs shall be allowed a period of five years in which to institute the action.

"The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it has not lapsed
before then.

"Art. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be instituted only during
the life of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

"1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its majority.

"2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown, should be
discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged.

"In this case the action must be instituted within the six months following the discovery of such
instrument."

On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and the other consists in that
the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole lifetime of the child, that is, it can always be
brought against the presumed parents or their heirs by the child itself, while the right of action for
the acknowledgment of a natural child does not last his whole lifetime, and, as a general rule, it can
not be instituted against the heirs of the presumed parents, inasmuch as it can be exercised only
during the life of the presumed parents.

With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of the presumed parents of
the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to recognize the natural filiation, there exists the
most radical difference in that the former continues during the life of the child who claims to be
legitimate, and he may demand it either directly and primarily from the said presumed parents, or
indirectly and secondarily from the heirs of the latter; while the second does not endure for life; as a
general rule, it only lasts during the life of the presumed parents. Hence the other difference, derived
as a consequence, that an action for legitimacy is always brought against the heirs of the presumed
parents in case of the death of the latter, while the action for acknowledgment is not brought against
the heirs of such parents, with the exception of the two cases prescribed by article 137 transcribed
above.
So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to
acknowledge the natural filiation.

As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latter's action to claim his legitimacy, or to
obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is seen that the code grants it in the first case,
but not the second. It contains provisions for the transmission of the right of action which, for the
purpose of claiming his legitimacy inheres in the child, but it does not say a word with regard to the
transmission of the right to obtain the acknowledgment of the natural filiation.

Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is: (1) That the right of
action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article 118, may be transmitted to
his heirs in certain cases designated in the said article; (2) That the right of action for the
acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137 refers, can never be transmitted, for the
reason that the code makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception.

It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation, that the right of action to
secure acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed to be transmitted, independently,
as a rule, to his heirs, while the right of action to claim legitimacy from his predecessor is not
expressly, independently, or, as a general rule, conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child, but only
relatively and as an exception. Consequently, the pretension that the right of action on the part of
the child to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is
altogether unfounded. No legal provision exists to sustain such pretension, nor can an argument of
presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no basis for the greater one, and when it is
only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is placing the heirs of the natural child on a better
footing than the heirs of the legitimate one, when, as a matter of fact, the position of a natural child
is no better than, nor even equal to, that of a legitimate child.

From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are derived:

The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life,
while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his
presumed parents.

Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole
life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs; while the right of action to
secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does not last during his whole life, but
depends on that of the presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised against the latter.

Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and
pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As an
exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died
during his minority, or while insane, or after action had been already instituted.

An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the
heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during the
minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express
acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown
during the life of the latter.

But as such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It can not
be transmitted to his descendants, or to his ascendants.

In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited:

Sanchez Roman, in his Treatise on Civil Law, propounds the question as to whether said action
should be considered transmissive to the heirs or descendants of the natural child, whether he had
or had not exercised it up to the time of his death, and decides it as follows;
"There is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be deemed admissible as a
solution, that the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child is transmitted by
analogy to his heirs on the same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to the descendants of a
legitimate child, to claim his legitimacy, under article 118, but nothing more; because on this point
nothing warrants placing the heirs of a natural child on a better footing than those of the legitimate
child, and even to compare them would not fail to be a strained and questionable matter, and one of
great difficulty for decision by the courts, for the simple reason that for the heirs of the legitimate
child, the said article 118 exists, while for those of the natural child, as we have said, there is no
provision in the code authorizing the same, although on the other hand there is none that prohibits
it." (Vol. V.)

Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on "The Civil Code as construed by the supreme court
of Spain," commenting upon article 137, say:

"Article 118, taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of children, grants them the
right to claim said legitimacy during their lifetime, and even authorizes the transmission of said right
for the space of five years to the heirs thereof, if the child die during his minority or in a state of
insanity. But as article 137 is based on the consideration that in the case of a natural child, ties are
less strong and sacred in the eyes of the law, it does not fix such a long and indefinite period for the
exercise of the action; it limits it to the life of the parents, excepting in the two cases mentioned in
said article; and it does not allow, as does article 118, the action to pass on to the heirs, inasmuch
as, although it does not prohibit it, and for that reason it might be deemed on general principles of
law to consent to it, such a supposition is inadmissible for the reason that a comparison of both
articles shows that the silence of the law in the latter case is not, nor can it be, an omission, but a
deliberate intent to establish a wide difference between the advantages granted to a legitimate child
and to a natural one."

(Ibid., Vol. II, 171.)

Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Codigo Civil) raises the question: "Can the heirs of a natural child
claim the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the father or mother are under obligation to
acknowledge"? And says:

"Opinions are widely divergent. The court of Rennes held (on April 13, 1844) that the right of
investigation forms a part of the estate of the child, and along with his patrimony is transmitted to
his heirs. The affirmation is altogether too categorical to be admissible. If it were correct the same
thing would happen as when the legitimacy of a child is claimed, and as already seen, the right of
action to demand the legitimacy is not transmitted to the heirs in every case and as an absolute
right, but under certain limitations and circumstances. Now, were we to admit the doctrine of the
court of Rennes, the result would be that the claim for natural filiation would be more favored than
one for legitimate filiation. This would be absurd, because it can not be conceived that the legislator
should have granted a right of action to the heirs of the natural child, which is only granted under
great limitations and in very few cases to those of a legitimate one. Some persons insist that the
same rules that govern legitimate filiation apply by analogy to natural filiation, and that in this
conception the heirs of the natural child are entitled to claim it in the cases prescribed by article 118.
The majority, however, are inclined to consider the right to claim acknowledgment as a personal
right, and consequently, not transmissive to the heirs. Really there are not legal grounds to warrant
the transmission." (Vol. 2, 229.)

In a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the argument of analogy for the
purpose of considering that the heirs of the natural child are entitled to the right of action which
article 118 concedes to the heirs of the legitimate child. The existence of a provision for the one case
and the absence thereof for the other is a conclusive argument that inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, and it can not be understood that the provision of law should be the same when the same
reason does not hold in the one case as in the other.

The theory of the law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case. This theory, which in
the Roman Law expressed the general rule that an heir who did not accept an inheritance during his
lifetime was incapacitated from transmitting it to his own heirs, included at the same time the idea
that if the inheritance was not transmitted because the heir did not possess it, there were, however,
certain things which the heir held and could transmit. Such was the law and the right to accept the
inheritance, for the existing reason that all rights, both real and personal, shall pass to the heir; quia
haeres representat defunctum in omnibus et per omnia. According to article 659 of the Civil Code,
"the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations of a person, which are not
extinguished by his death." If the mother is the heir of her natural child, and the latter, among other
rights during his lifetime was entitled to exercise an action for his acknowledgment against his
father, during the life of the latter, or after his death in some of the excepting cases of article 137,
such right, which is a portion of his inheritance, is transmitted to his mother as being his heir, and it
was so understood by the court of Rennes when it considered the right in question, not as a personal
and exclusive right of the child which is extinguished by his death, but as any other right which might
be transmitted after his death. This right of supposed transmission is even less tenable than that
sought to be sustained by the argument of analogy.

The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects superior to that of
the child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is evident that the right of action to
claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance
to his heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it were so, there would
have been no necessity to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and
conditions of article 118 of the code. So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of the child's
inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in article 118 shall be
present, since without them, the right that the child held during his lifetime, being personal and
exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not susceptible of transmission, would and
should have been extinguished by his death. Therefore, where no express provision like that of
article 118 exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and
without exception, extinguished by his death, and can not be transmitted as a portion of the
inheritance of the deceased child.

On the other hand, it said right of action formed a part of the child's inheritance, it would be
necessary to establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an acknowledgment from the
presumed natural father and from his heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of the child, not limited
by certain circumstances as in the case of the heirs of a legitimate child; and if it is unreasonable to
compare a natural child with a legitimate one to place the heirs of a natural child and his inheritance
on a better footing than those of a legitimate child would not only be unreasonable, but, as stated in
one of the above citations, most absurd and illegal in the present state of the law and in accordance
with the general principles thereof.

For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from in all its parts,
without any special ruling as to the costs of this instance.

Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Willard, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The questions arising from the facts and points of law discussed in this litigation between the parties
thereto, decided in the judgment appealed from, and set up and discussed in this instance by the
said parties in their respective briefs, are subordinate in the first place to the main point, submitted
among others to the decision of this court, that is, whether the right of action brought to demand
from the natural father, or from his heirs, the acknowledgment of the natural child which the former
left at his death was, by operation of the law, transmitted to the natural mother by reason of the
death of the said child acknowledged by her.

The second error assigned by the appellant in his brief refers exclusively to this important point of
law.

Article 846 of the Civil Code prescribes:

"The right of succession which the law grants natural children extends reciprocally in similar cases to
the natural father or mother."

Article 944 reads:

"If the acknowledged natural or legitimized child should die without issue, either legitimate or
acknowledged by it, the father or mother who acknowledged it shall succeed to its entire estate, and
if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike."

It can not be inferred from the above legal provisions that from the right of succession which the law
grants the natural father or mother upon the death of their natural child, the right of the heirs of any
of the said parents to claim the acknowledgment of the natural child is excluded. No article is to be
found in the Civil Code that expressly provides for such exclusion or elimination of the right of the
heirs of the deceased child to claim his acknowledgment.

If under article 659 of said code, the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations of a
person, which are not extinguished by his death, it is unquestionable that among such rights stands
that which the natural child had, while alive, to claim his acknowledgment as such from his natural
father, or from the heirs of the latter. There is no reason or legal provision whatever to prevent the
consideration that the right to claim acknowledgment of the filiation of a deceased child from his
natural father, or from the heirs of the latter, is included in the hereditary succession of the deceased
child in favor of his natural mother.

It is to be regretted that such an eminent writer as Manresa is silent on this special point; or that he
is not very explicit in his comments on article 137 of the Civil Code. Among the various noted writers
on law, Professor Sanchez Roman is the only one who has given his opinion in a categorical manner
as to whether or not the right of action for the acknowledgment of a deceased natural child shall be
considered transmissive to his heirs, as may be seen from the following:

"In order to complete the explanation of this article 137 of the Civil Code, three points must be
decided: (1) Against whom shall an action for acknowledgment be brought under the cases and
terms to which the two exceptions indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 137 refer? (2) Who is to
represent the miner in bringing this action when neither the father nor the mother has acknowledged
him? (3) Should this right of action be considered as transmitted to the heirs or descendants of the
natural child whether or not it was exercised at the time of his death?

"With respect to the third, there is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be
deemed admissible as a solution, that the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a natural
child is transmitted by analogy to his heirs on the same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to
the descendants of the legitimate child, to claim his legitimacy, under article 118, but no more;
because on this point nothing warrants placing the heirs of a natural child on a better footing than
those of the legitimate child, and even to compare them would not fail to be a strained and
questionable matter, and one of great difficulty for decision by the courts, for the simple reason that
for the heirs of the legitimate child the said article 118 exists, while for those of the natural child, as
we have said, there is no provision in the code authorizing the same, although on the other hand
there is none that prohibits it."

Certainly there is no article in the Civil Code, or any special law that bars the transmission to the
heirs of a natural child, particularly to his natural mother, of the right of action to claim the
acknowledgment of said natural child from the heirs of his deceased natural father.

According to the above-cited article 944 of the Civil Code, the only persons designated to succeed to
the intestate estate of a natural child who died during minority or without issue are its natural father
or mother who acknowledged it; consequently if by operation of the law his parents are his legal
successors or heirs, it is unquestionable that by reason of the child's death the property, rights, and
obligations of the deceased minor were, as a matter of fact, transmitted to them, among which was
the right to demand the acknowledgment of the said deceased natural child from the heirs of the
deceased natural father or mother, respectively, on account of having enjoyed uninterruptedly the
status of natural child of the said deceased parents. (Arts. 135 and 136, Civil Code.)
At the death of the children, Teopista in 1902, and Jose in 1903, during their minority, and after the
death of their natural father which took place in 1899, the natural mother of the said minors, Paula
Conde, succeeded them in all of their property and rights, among which must necessarily appear and
be included the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of said two children from the heirs of
Icasiano Abaya, their deceased natural father. There is no legal provision or precept whatever
excluding such right from those which, by operation of the law, were transmitted to the mother,
Paula Conde, or expressly declaring that the said right to claim such acknowledgment is extinguished
by the death of the natural children.

It is true that, as a general rule, an action for acknowledgment can not be brought by a surviving
natural child after the death of his parents, except in the event that he was a minor at the time of
the death of either of his parents, as was the case with the minors Teopista and Jose Conde, who, if
living, would unquestionably be entitled to institute an action for acknowledgment against the
presumed heirs of their natural father; and as there is no law that provides that said right is
extinguished by the death of the same, and that the mother did not inherit it from the said minors, it
is also unquestionable that Paula Conde, the natural mother and successor to the rights of said
minors, is entitled to exercise the corresponding action for acknowledgment.

If the natural mother had no right of action against the heirs of the natural father, for the
acknowledgment of her natural child, the unlimited and unconditional reciprocity established by
article 846 of the code would neither be true nor correct. It should be noticed that the relation of
paternity and that of filiation between the above-mentioned father and children are both natural in
character; therefore, the intestate succession of the said children of Paula Conde is governed
exclusively by articles 944 and 945 of the said code.

It is true that nothing is provided by article 137 with reference to the transmission to the natural
mother of the right to claim the acknowledgment of her natural children, but, as Sanchez Roman
says, it does not expressly prohibit it; and as opposed to the silence of the said article, we find the
provisions of articles 846 and 944 of the Civil code, which expressly recognized the right of the
natural mother to succeed her natural child, a right which is transmitted to her by operation of law
from the moment that the child ceases to exist.

The question herein does not bear upon the right of a child to claim his legitimacy, as provided in
article 118 of the code, nor is it claimed that the rights of natural children and of their mother are
equal to those of legitimate ones, even by analogy.

The foundations of this opinion are based solely on the provisions of the above-mentioned articles of
the code, and I consider that they are sustainable so long as it is not positively proven that the so
often-mentioned right of action for acknowledgment is extinguished by the death of the minor
natural child, and is not transmitted to the natural mother by express declaration or prohibition of
the law, together with the property and other rights in the intestate succession.

In view of the considerations above set forth it is my opinion that it should be held: That Paula
Conde, as the natural mother and sole heir of her children Teopista and Jose, was and is entitled to
the right to institute proceedings to obtain the acknowledgment of the latter as natural children of
the late Icasiano Abaya, from Roman Abaya, as heir and administrator of the estate of the said
Icasiano Abaya; and that the said Teopista and Jose who died during their minority, three years after
the death of their father, should be considered and acknowledged as such natural children of the
latter, for the reason that while living they uninterruptedly enjoyed the status of his natural children.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed without any special ruling as to costs.

With regard to the declaration that the property of the late Icasiano, which Paula Conde might take,
are of a reservable character, together with the other matter contained in the third error assigned by
the appellant to the said judgment, the writer withholds his opinion until such time as the question
may be raised between the parties in proper form.

RESERVA TRONCAL CASES

 [G.R. No. 6878. September 13, 1913.]
MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant, vs. PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-
appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
DECISION
ARELLANO, C.J p:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law
to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land
situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63
centares, and the other of 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for
each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this
marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's
death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue,
and by his decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina
Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan —
appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the
registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be
recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the applicant appealed through a bill of
exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of
the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only
be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and
denies that the lands which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be
reserved — a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2)
Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3)
Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan
and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property
had between him and his brothers. There are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusion of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
[gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is
that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.
"The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to
reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree
and belong to the line whence the property proceeded." (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which had
acquired without a valuable consideration — that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them intact
for the claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that
they partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with
the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been
acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration,
which is by operation of law, is required by law to be reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only
herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property
in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right
required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of
action; and, finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had
it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superfluous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant
inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The
trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17,
20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her
son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
"In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall inherit
from him, to the exclusion of collaterals."
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had
passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary
provision that demonstrates any transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of
law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was
ab intestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act.
No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully
complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left
at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her
as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
"The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary estate of
the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the
exception of what is established in article 836." (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved,
because it is what by operation of law would fall to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other
half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the
application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that
either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
Proof of testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that
a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides
that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of law — that is, by intestate
succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party,
that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignment of error admissible — that the trial court failed to sustain the renunciation
of the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such
renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact that the appellees
did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:
"The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan died and was buried, his brother came to my house
and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of
them" (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio Sablan
said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that
he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of
article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignment of error sets up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The
appellant alleges prescription of the opponents' right of action for requiring fulfillment of the
obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right required by law to be
reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created
by law, it prescribes in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of
the right alleged to be reserved by force by law has not been invoked." (Eighth allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she
do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not
refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the
prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking
that guaranty, for to those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for
recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the
registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that
it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not
prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is
required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record.)
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to
constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the
right required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has prescribed, that property
has not been divested of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such
character by virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippines in
December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country
by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of
the Civil Code acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such
independently of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the
country; that although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has
in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same
merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by
operation of law to require of the person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage
to answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the
guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the
mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal.
(Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being
indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a
guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined in this
appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can
and ought to be registered, not in the property registry established by the Mortgage Law, but in the
registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as there have slipped into the allegations quoted some
rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required to be
reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief digression on the most essential points may not be out of
place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the
colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of
said amended Mortgage Law States:
"The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications
necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on December 1,
1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the law on real property, and
consequently of agrarian credit."
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth
in article 968 thereof, where it says:
"Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a second
marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the
ownership of all the property he or she may have acquired from the deceased spouse by will, by
intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1,
1889, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions
intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage
when their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme
court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been
reiterated:
"That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the right
required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract second or later
marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the right established in article 811,
because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such must be the construction
from the important and conclusive circumstance that said provisions are set forth in the chapter that
deals with inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and because article 968, which heads
the section that deals in general with property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to
the provisions in article 811; and it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law
and of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right."
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court
has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in articles 977 and 978 for the rights
required by law to be reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt
with in article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of the
provisions of the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case
had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right
would have been able to institute, against the ascendants who must make the reservation,
proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that articles 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first
marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance,
under article 977, are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the
property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property;
and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value
of what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this
is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right
reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in
article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain,
to wit, article 199, which read thus:
"The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only
be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if
minors, it will be required by the persons who should legally represent them. In either case the right
of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured by the same requisites
as set forth in the preceding articles (relative to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code),
applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted,
so that said article 168 reads thus:
"Legal mortgage is established:
"1. ...
"2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property required
to be reserved, upon the property of the person obligated to reserve it."
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety
days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the
effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down
a principle in this matter. Now it should be noted that such action has not prescribed, because the
period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the
persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must
make the reservation.
Article 191 of the law reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the
proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment,
etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199
of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days
succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to
reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution
of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the
period for the exercise of this right of action by the persons in whose favor the right must be
reserved, but really the commencement thereof, and enables them to exercise it at any time, since
no limit is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two
parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons
entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against the
exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring
that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no
necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action
does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496
of the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present
case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for
recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this
finding set forth in its decision:
"Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two uncles of
the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in
common." (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and
recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of
the thing; otherwise, the person who has the rights to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the
person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or
contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights of using and enjoying, and then he is
said not to have the fee simple — that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to
another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
"What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article
811 of the Civil Code?"
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to
the persons in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property
could not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the
former's consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported
by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil
Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points — the usufruct and the fee simple;
the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscured in the presence
of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holding the property
will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other person." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained — that is,
that the surviving spouse (the person obligated by article 968 to make the reservation) can be
regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has no
serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendant, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law,
acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the
attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and
recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least,
if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die
before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should
be relatives within the third decree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a
limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be
determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The
opinion which makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition of a mere
usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support
in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion that has been expressed in speaking of the
rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the case
where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner
of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968.
In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the
hereditary owner and only he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way
perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of
usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery
thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he
totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendant who holds the property required by article 811 to be
reserved, and the father or mother required by article 968 to reserve the right, can dispose of the
property they inherit itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his or her child in first
marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor
the rights is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal of
recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 968 to reserve the right may
dispose of the property itself:
"Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the surviving
spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death no legitimate
children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Mortgage Law."
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition
subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage
survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof
would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he
could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to subsist is to continue to
exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
"The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may mortgage or
alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in said conditions by
expressly reserving that right in the registration."

In such case, the child or legitimate descendant of the first marriage in whose favor the right is
reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending,
that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily
happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the persons in whose favor the
right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive
him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would
disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in every way absolutely effective.
Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is
respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not
become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what
the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly
directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or
descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendant
must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the hearing, "Rights and
obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:
"During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be
reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their
turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not
even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
"The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to
their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the articles of the Code
referring to use and usufruct.
"But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee
simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in articles 974 and 976 of the
same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion
of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer
to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this
subject, and the relatives within the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right
reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason
that the right required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject
to those conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such
alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
"The ascendant acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exist
at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendant from whom they inherit in
the line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property
at the death of the ascendant. If they do not exist, the ascendant can freely dispose thereof. If this is
true, since the possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it,
the ascendant may alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he
has and nothing more because no one can give does not belong to him, and the acquirer will
therefore receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn
have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who is
required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty
required by law to be reserved and they will acquire it and all the rest that has the same character in
complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufructuary." (Morell, Estudios
sobre bienes reservables, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt
at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the
law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it
and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion,
even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be
reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their
possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of fee simple which they can
transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should
die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their
place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that is
to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a
possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their
right has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of
the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the
decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain
therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of
the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as it may even become absolute
should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the
person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved,
because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal
title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in
order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to
us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third
degree of the descendant from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him,
because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein."
( Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of
a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that
may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that
which the applicant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the
conditional alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and,
practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that the person
who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the
thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she
transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual and positive, as is the
case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish
of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership,
he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in
law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to
the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to be reserved, merely because a condition
subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property
he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made agree thereto,
provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
"The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions." (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once
acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent
annexed — that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should
exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:
"Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover
the thing sold with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been
agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and
other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that
the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged — that is to
say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may
alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows very well from the title entered in the registry
that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected
than the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit
some day what another has inherited. The purposes of the law would be defeated in not applying to
the person who must make the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto
de retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more powerful and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio,
eadem legis dispositio.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the
applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter
of the application, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to
either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without
special finding as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. L-43155. August 14, 1987.]

LUISA Y. ORTEGA, NIEVES Y. ORTEGA, MARIA MARIZAL POLANCOS, represented by her
father and natural guardian MAMERTO POLANCOS, JOAQUIN ORTEGA, JR., represented by
his cousin, MARIA LUISA O. SEVILLE, as guardian ad litem, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE NUMERIANO ESTENZO, CALIXTA YAP,
ADELAIDA ORTEGA, CONCHITA ORTEGA, MAXIMO JOSE ORTEGA, JESUS ORTEGA, CARMEN
ORTEGA LIM, AMPARO ORTEGA LONGALONG, and MERCEDES ORTEGA BACALSO,
respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
The sole issue in this petition for certiorari is whether the respondent Judge Numeriano Estenzo of
the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V, acted in excess of jurisdiction when he converted
Civil Case No. 1184-0, an action for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of sale, and annulment of
tax declaration of a parcel of land, into an action for the declaration of who is the legal wife, who are
the legitimate children, if any, and who are the compulsory heirs of the deceased Joaquin Ortega.
The Court of Appeals * dismissed the petition assailing the decision of the trial court.
As factual background, it should be stated that on May 22, 1948, Joaquin Ortega died intestate. On
January 3, 1949, Emilia Ybañez, the surviving spouse of Joaquin Ortega, initiated intestate
proceedings (Docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 441-R) in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu City,
Branch II, for the settlement of the estate of her deceased husband. In that proceedings, Emilia
Ybañez was appointed administratrix of the estate, with letters of administration issued to her on
February 22, 1949. Joaquin Ortega was also survived by his daughters by Emilia Ybañez, namely,
Luisa Y. Ortega de Sevilla, Elena Y. Ortega, Nieves Y. Ortega, Eufemia Y. Ortega and Agueda Y.
Ortega, all petitioners in this case.
On March 17, 1949, Calixta Yap, who claimed to be the common-law wife of Joaquin Ortega, filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order appointing Emilia Ybañez as administratrix of Joaquin
Ortega's estate on the ground that her own acknowledged natural children by Joaquin Ortega were
the only surviving forced heirs of the decedent. She also claimed that Emilia Ybañez and Joaquin
Ortega were never married; hence, their children (petitioners herein) could not be considered
legitimate, the motion was denied.
On May 19, 1949, Emilia Ybañez presented a verified inventory and appraisal of the estate of the
deceased. It was approved by the probate court. On June 30, 1954, Aqueda Concordia Y. Ortega, a
daughter of Joaquin Ortega, by then the duly appointed administratrix of the estate, filed another
inventory which the court also approved. cdrep
On April 17, 1959, the children of Calixta Yap, herein private respondents, filed in the probate court a
motion for intervention in the intestate proceedings, alleging that they were the acknowledged
natural children. They prayed to be declared the heirs of Joaquin Ortega.
On June 25, 1959, another inventory was filed in court by Eufemia Y. Ortega, another daughter of
Emilia Ybañez by Joaquin Ortega, at that time the appointed administratrix of the estate. The
inventory was approved by the probate court.
On November 14, 1962, the children of Calixta Yap filed a motion for the dismissal of their motion for
declaration of heirs, which the court granted in an order dated November 16, 1962.
On November 24, 1962, Judge Amador E. Gomez, Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, Branch II,
issued an order in Sp. Proc. No. 441-R declaring Emilia Ybañez and her daughters by Joaquin Ortega
the legal heirs of the said Joaquin Ortega, to whom all the assets of the estate were adjudicated in
undivided equal shares, and, there having been no money claims filed against the estate, the court,
in the same order, declared the proceedings closed and terminated.
On December 6, 1972, Calixta Yap and her children herein private respondents, filed against
petitioners a complaint for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of sale, annulment of tax
declaration, damages and other reliefs, in the CFI of Leyte, Branch V, presided over by Judge
Numeriano Estenzo. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 1184-0, made the following
substantial allegations: that Calixta Yap was the absolute owner of a parcel of land situated in Sta.
Cruz, Isabel, Leyte, with an area of 174,496 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 4251; that on October 20, 1927, while Calixta Yap was living together with her
common-law husband, Joaquin Ortega, she and her grandfather, Froilan Maurillo, executed a
simulated deed of sale transferring and conveying the land mentioned above to Joaquin Ortega; that
Calixta Yap had always been in possession of said land until the death of Joaquin Ortega in 1948; that
Calixta Yap and Joaquin Ortega had eight children, her co-plaintiffs.
On February 12, 1973, the complaint in Civil Case No. 1184-0 was amended, showing these changes:
that Calixta Yap was married to Joaquin Ortega in 1927 before Justice of the Peace Silverio Zamora of
Merida, Leyte, which marriage was kept a secret to avoid a misunderstanding with the family of
Emilia Ybañez; that Calixta Yap's children by Joaquin Ortega were legitimate or were legitimated; that
Emilia Ybañez's children by Joaquin Ortega were illegitimate; that the approval by the probate court
of the inventories submitted in the intestate proceedings had no basis in law and in fact; and that the
declaration by the proprobate court in Sp. Proc. No. 441-R of Emilia Ybañez and her children as heirs
of Joaquin Ortega was an error.
On February 19, 1973, the complaint in Civil Case No. 1184-0 was amended a second time, with the
following additions to the subject matter of the action: a) the four other lots adjacent to the one
covered by Tax Declaration No. 4251; and b) the six other lots in Cangag, Isabel, Leyte. The original
subject matter of the complaint (the 174,496 square meters of land in Sta. Cruz, Isabel, Leyte) plus
the aforementioned additions comprise the entire estate of Joaquin Ortega, which were already
adjudicated in Sp. Proc. No. 441-R to Emilia Ybañez and her children on November 24, 1962. Cdpr
Despite the vehement objections of the petitioners (then the defendants below) that the amendment
had altered the nature of the case, respondent Judge Numeriano Estenzo nevertheless allowed the
amendments.
The amended complaint in essence prayed —
1) That Calixta Yap be declared the absolute owner of the parcel of land at Bo. Sta. Cruz. Isabel,
Leyte in her own right;
2) That her children by Joaquin Ortega be declared the only legitimate children, or in the
alternative, the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Joaquin Ortega, and, as heirs,
entitled to the residuary estate of the decedent;
3) That the deed of sale earlier executed by her in favor of Joaquin Ortega be declared inexistent
and void.
Petitioners filed their answer to the amended complaint, raising the following allegations: that
Joaquin Ortega, then Justice of the Peace of Hilongos, Leyte, was legally married to Emilia Ybañez,
that their children and heirs are Luisa Elena Ortega, Eufemia Ortega, Nieves Ortega, Agueda Ortega,
and Maria Elena Ortega; that, on the other hand, Calixta Yap was only a concubine of Joaquin Ortega,
and that her children were spurious children, begotten during the existence of the marriage of Emilia
Ybañez and Joaquin Ortega; that since 1927, Joaquin Ortega and Emilia Ybañez, their children and
grandchildren, have been continuously, openly, peacefully and adversely in possession and
occupation of the land in litigation, and that plaintiffs' cause of action, if any, had already prescribed;
that the estate of Joaquin Ortega (a part of which is in litigation) was the subject of the intestate
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 441-R in the CFI of Cebu, and that in said proceedings, the plaintiffs
were not among those declared the heirs of Joaquin Ortega.
On February 24, 1975, respondent Judge Numeriano Estenzo rendered a decision which reads in part
—
"This is a case of first impression where the issue to be resolved by this Court has been to determine
who is the legitimate wife of the deceased Joaquin Ortega, as between plaintiff Calixta Yap Ortega
who claims she was married to Joquin Ortega on May 2, 1927 before the Justice of the Peace Silverio
Zamora of Merida, Leyte, on one hand, and Emilia Ybañez or Emilia Aburdo, mother of the alternative
defendants who claim their aforesaid mother married Joaquin Ortega sometime in May 1915, which
marriage claims have no entries in the respective Local Civil Registrar considering the loss of the
records, as well as the corresponding marriage contracts due to the last war.
xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the alternative
defendants, declaring Calixta Yap Ortega as the surviving spouse of Joaquin Ortega, of Isabel, Leyte
as described in the deed of sale in favor of Joaquin Ortega dated October 21, 1927, with right to the
1/2 share of all other parcels of land which are found by this Court as above indicated to be the
conjugal partnership properties of Calixta Yap and Joaquin Ortega, hereby adjudicating the other half
to all other plaintiffs in equal proportion.
"Alternative defendants are ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the sum at the rate
of P2,400.00 a year from 1949 until April 7, 1973, plus another amount of P10,000.00 for and as
litigation express, plus another sum of P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, plus P10,000.00 for and
as moral damage all of which amounts shall bear legal rate of interest, from the filing of this case
until paid, with no costs against the said alternative defendants.
"Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II in connection
with Sp. Proc. No. 441-R entitled Estate of Joaquin Ortega for its ready reference.
"The defendant administrator Jesus Laurente of the Estate of Joaquin Ortega is ordered to deliver the
land as above indicated to the plaintiffs, upon termination of the aforesaid proceedings now pending
in Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Cebu after the submission and approval of the project of
partition and the payment of the estate and inheritance taxes." (pp. 182-183, rollo)
On August 11, 1975, after several motions for execution of judgment had been filed by the private
respondents, petitioners filed their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
No. SP-04494-R, assailing the proceedings and the judgment in Civil Case No. 1184-0 on the ground
that respondent Judge Estenzo converted private respondents' action for quieting of title, declaration
of nullity of sale, and annulment of tax declaration of a parcel of land into an action for declaration of
the legal wife, legitimate children, and legal heirs of the deceased Joaquin Ortega. It is likewise the
contention of petitioners that the assailed decision nullified, modified, and revoked the order of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, dated November 24, 1962, in Sp. Proc. No. 441-R, which
declared Emilia Ybañez and her children by Joaquin Ortega the heirs of the said Joaquin Ortega. prcd
In a decision promulgated on February 14, 1976, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence,
this present recourse.
The declaration of heirs made by Judge Estenzo is void, said matter having been already resolved
with finality by the probate court, whose order of November 24, 1962 has not been appealed and is
therefore final insofar as said declaration is concerned. But of course the ownership of the disputed
parcel cannot be said to be res judicata, for a probate court has no right to determine with finality
the ownership thereof.
Civil Case No. 1184-0 was instituted for the purpose of having Calixta Yap declared owner of a parcel
of land in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Isabel, Leyte, asserting her title as against the decedent Joaquin Ortega
himself. The subject matter being beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
sitting as a probate court, it was proper that the issue of ownership of a specific property was raised
in a separate ordinary action.
This Court has ruled:
"It is well-settled that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."
(Mallari vs. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial vs. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501; Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Court of
Appeals, 91 SCRA 540).
Thus, it is fitting and proper that the issue of ownership of the parcel of land be resolved in the
already instituted Civil Case No. 1184-0, in the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V.
This is as far as We can go. For now, the issue of ownership cannot be determined by Us with finality.
The resolution of the issue is better left to the trial court where Civil Case No. 11843-0 is now
instituted. The resolution of this issue will need a full-dress hearing where the parties will exchange
various pleadings between themselves. This Court not being a trier of facts, it is clear that We cannot
order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of
Joaquin Ortega.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the trial court for a
full hearing only on the question of ownership of the 174,496 square meters of land in Sta. Cruz,
Leyte as covered by the original complaint.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., on leave.

[G.R. No. L-10701. January 16, 1959.]

MARIA CANO, applicant-appellee, vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET
AL., oppositors-appellants. JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Ramon C. Fernandez for appellants.
Jose B. Dealca for appellee.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case No. 12, G. L. O. Rec.
No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of Lots. Nos. 1798 and
1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the following terms and conditions:
"In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly published and posted as
required by law, and that the title of the applicant to the above-mentioned two parcels of land is
registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and decreed, and with reaffirmation of the order of general
default, that the two parcels of land described in plan SWO-24152, known as Lots Nos. 1798 and
1799 of the Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their improvements, be registered in the name of Maria
Cano, Filipina 71 years of age, widow and resident of Juban, province of Sorsogon, with the
understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia
Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of Civil Code. After this decision shall have become final for lack of
appeal therefrom within the 30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding decree issue.
So ordered." (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)
The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20) were issued in the
name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero. In October 1955,
counsel for the reservee (reservatario) Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court, alleging the
death of the original registered owner and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and
praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new one issued in favor of
movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered to place her in possession of the
property. The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of the reservista Maria
Cano, who contended that the application and operation of the reserva troncal should be ventilated
in an ordinary contentious proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to
grant the motion.
In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in the final decree of
registration, the lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a new certificate, for the reason
that the death of reservista vested the ownership of the property in the petitioner as the sole
reservatario troncal.
The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting that the
ownership of the reservatario can not be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496,
but requires a judicial administration proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as the reservatario
entitled to the reservable property, are to be declared. In this connection, appellants argue that the
reversion in favor of the reservatario requires the declaration of the existence of the following facts:
"(1) The property was received by a ascendant by gratuitous titled from an ascendant or from a
brother or sister;
(2) Said descendant dies without issue;
(3) The property ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
property came." (Appellants' Brief, p. 8)
We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been declared
to exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the appellee as reservatario troncal were
expressly recognized:
"From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799 was acquired by
the applicant Maria Cano by inheritance from her deceased daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who, in turn,
inherited the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence falls squarely under the provisions
of Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of the private oppositors are within the
third degree of consanguinity of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, and who belonging to the same line
from which the property came.
It appears, however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with exception of Eustaquia Guerrero,
who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his former marriage, all the
other oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by his former marriages. Eustaquia
Guerrero, being the nearest of kin, excludes all the other private oppositors, whose degree of
relationship to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil Code; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 62 Phil.,
279)." (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)
This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are barred thereby from contesting
the existence of the constituent elements of the reserva. The only requisites for the passing of the
titled from the reservista to the appellee are: (1) the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact that the
reservatario has survived the reservista. Both facts are admitted, and their existence in nowhere
questioned.
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that the
reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not true.
The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of
the reservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and
accidentally strayed during the reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed
to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest
to the prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the
owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the
reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by the
reservatario may be entered in the property records without necessity of estate proceedings, since
the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that the reservable property
can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa, (like appellants
herein) so long as a reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and belonging to the
line whence the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.
Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the property,
without determining the identity of the reservatario (as in the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63
Phil., 279) or where several reservatarios dispute the property among themselves, further
proceedings would be unavoidable. But this is not the case. The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia
Guerrero have been expressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there are other
reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that the heirs of the reservista are merely
endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of the reservable property to the detriment of the party
lawfully entitled thereto.
We find no error in the order appealed from therefore, the same is affirmed with costs against
appellants in both instances. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.

[G.R. No. L-34395. May 19, 1981.]

BEATRIZ L. GONZALEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V),
BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDES, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE
LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DOÑA FILOMENA
ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.
Eligio G. Lagman and Roberto A. Gianzon for petitioner.
Teves, Campos, Mendoza and Hernandez Baizas, Alberto and Association, Macias and
Achos for private-respondents.
DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not
subject to reserva troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Roces inherited in 1943 from
Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died in Manila on June 17, 1933. He
was survived by his widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz,
Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De
la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was
her mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties
consist of the following:
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain
shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life
Assurance Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261
and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206,
48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City;
1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of
deeds;
1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael described in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the
Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
1/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets and Estero);
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of the registry of deeds of Tayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena
Roces succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held
proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two hand-written identical documents wherein she disposed
of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito,
Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads:
"A mis hijos:
"Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos, hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he
heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Distileria 'La Rosario'
recientemente comprada a los hermanos Valdes Legarda.
"De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un lote de terreno que yo he donada a las Hijas de
Jesus, en Guipit.
"La casa No. 181 San Rafael, la cedo a mi hijo Mandu, solo la casa; porque ella esta construida sobre
terreno de los hermanos Legarda Roces.
"(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
"6 Marzo 1953"
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children
partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason
which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in
the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No.
70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzalez, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30, 1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20,
1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable
properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not
by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the
administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil
action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of
securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could
not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and
her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzalez. In this appeal under
Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not
regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the
lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena
Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito
Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzalez waived her right to the reservable
properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzalez'
petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied
respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts.
Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the
properties in question are subject to reserva troncal, that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this
appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters,
cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling
which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the
Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them
in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter
Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second degree
or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six children of
Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. It was resolved
in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the
doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse
on the nature of reserva troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the
nature of reserva troncal, which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished
by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the
uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of
the reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for
generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy and is incompatible with the
socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian
unrest. Moreover, the reservas, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust
and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored the reserva
troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobeñas, has provoked questions
and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads:
"ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que ste hubiese adquirido por
titulo lucrativo de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado reservar los que hubiere
adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que esten dentro del tercer grado y
pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden."
"ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within
the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. "
In reserva troncal, (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should
reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant ( prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (1) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or
donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior
transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant
(causante de la reserva) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two
transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmission of the same property (in
consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives
within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant,
brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobeñas, Derecho Civil, Part I, 1960, 6th Ed.,
pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserva. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and
her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should
be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not
reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, 111 Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or
prepositus ( propositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista), the other ascendant
who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law and (4) the reservee
(reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the line (linea o
tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the
reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs.
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree
relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserva troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una
familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras", or "impedir que, por un azar de la vida, personas extrañas a una familia puedan
adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella" (6 Castan Tobeñas, Derecho Civil, Part 1, 6th
Ed., 1960, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserva troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. In that case, Pedro
Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victoriano. Pedro died in 1902, single and
without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could
register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was reservable
property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of
conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920,
said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Mañalac who owned the other one-half
portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. It was held that
the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his
death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and maternal aunts
of Juliana Mañalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs.
Mañalac, 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and
Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita, 46 Phil. 551;
Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737;
Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of
the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is
called the prepositus (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When
Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. In his hands, the property was
reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa
Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even
represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of
representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura
vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. Illegitimate relationship and relationship by
affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in
return such as donation and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186-189-190, citing 6
Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to
reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which the property came (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee
gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked
upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Director
of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacto de retro sale or to a
fideicomiso condicional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that
if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should
deliver it to the reservees. If there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the
transferee's title would become absolute (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118
Phil. 944; Nono vs. Nequia, 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reservee has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant
right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. It would become absolute should the reservor
predecease the reservee.
The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the
reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737;
Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for
being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of
conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reservee survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
"The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant ( prepositus), said
property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed
during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that
survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the
reservable property." (J. J.B.L. Reyes in Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)
"Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the
property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might
frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right
in the registry of property even while the reservista is alive" (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168,
199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the
reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista
who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs.
Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
"The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant prepositus, of
whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive
the reservista." (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed.,
pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cano vs. Director of
Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of
Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time
of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda
were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren)
to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons.
As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees
survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties
from the prepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and
deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in
favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480, a similar case, where it was ruled:
"Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista)
together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of
the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to
be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict
obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest
( prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at
the same time the right of a reservatario" (reservee).
In the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de Leon
begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon
Apolonio III's death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908.
In her will she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those
coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the
descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the
recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from
Apolonio III, which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her
daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in
Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's
estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reservee, to one-seventh of the
properties. The other six-sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine
of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon
his death there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus, regardless of whether those
reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property
came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees.
The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reservee to whom the reservable property
should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives within
the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who
would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in the
Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties
because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when
Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives
of Filomena Legarda who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been
satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained therein."
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable
properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors,
the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor
to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be
given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reservee it
did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the
reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the
other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the
properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of
whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the
reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-
existence of third degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs.
Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the
Legarda and Roces lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of
reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still
are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their
reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with
article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will.
The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate (Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1,
4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. It is hereby adjudged that the
properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with
all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of
Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to
their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur .
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.

[G.R. No. 14856. November 15, 1919.]

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MERCEDES FLORENTINO ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense & Vera for appellants.
Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for appellees.
DECISION
TORRES, J p:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon Serrano), Gabriel,
Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and Antonio of the surname Florentino; for Miguel Florentino,
guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario Florentino; for Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad
litem of Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y Florentino; and for
Eugenio Singson, guardian of the minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her husband, alleging as follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that during the
marriage he begot nine children called Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro,
and Magdalena of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a widower he married the
second time Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of the
surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he
was survived by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first above mentioned;
that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the following 4th of March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan, Maria and Isabel died
single, without leaving any ascendants or descendants; that Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and
Rosario are the legitimate children of the deceased Jose Florentino who was one of the children of
the deceased Apolonio Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate
children of Espirita Florentino, now deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose and
Asuncion are the children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will before the
notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned ten children, the
posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the
paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there as given to Apolonio Florentino III, his
posthumos son the property marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold
rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some personal property and
other objects mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in 1891; that his
mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property described in the complaint; that the
widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal
heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took
possession of all the property left at the death of her mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that among
same is included the property, described in the complaint, which the said Severina Faz de Leon
inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as a
reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone the
fruits of lands described in the complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in said
complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property described therein, either
by direct participation or by representation, in the manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the
complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the defendants to deliver their
corresponding part of the reservable property; that without any justifiable motive the defendants
have refused and do refuse to deliver said property or to pay for its value; that for nine years
Mercedes Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at
fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs
have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fifty-
eight centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the value of
the fruits not gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the
aforementioned reservable property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be
declared that all the foregoing property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs had and do have a
right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in the aforementioned paragraph 9 of
the complaint; that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her husband be ordered to deliver to the
plaintiffs their share of the property in question, of the palay and of the corn above mentioned, or
their value; and that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) together with the costs of this instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the cause of action is
based on the obligation of the widow Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the property she inherited
from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon v. Ho, in turn, inherited same from his
father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that, there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be
presumed that the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry after the death of this husband nor
have any natural child; that the right claimed by the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968
and the following articles, but that established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that the object of the
provisions of the aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of said reservable property to those
extraneous to the family of the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the widow Severina
Faz de Leon from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property which originated
from his father and her husband) has all passed into the hands of the defendant, Mercedes Florentino
y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino with the deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property left at the death of
the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass after the death of his mother
Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said property having
been inherited by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article 811 of the
Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case because, when the defendant Mercedes, by
operation of law, entered into and succeeded to, the possession, of the property lawfully inherited
from her mother Severina Faz de Leon, said property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost
the character of reservable property — there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de Leon
with the right to succeed her in all her rights, property and actions; that the restraints of the law
whereby said property may not passed into the possession of strangers are void, inasmuch as the
said widow had no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes Florentino is a forced heiress of her
mother Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the present case, there ii no property reserved for the plaintiffs
since there is a forced heiress, entitled to the property left by the death of the widow Severina Faz de
Leon who never remarried; that the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty of respecting the
legitime; that in the instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in duty bound to respect the
legitime of her daughter Mercedes, the defendant; that her obligation to reserve the property could
not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the legitime which belongs to her forced heiress, citing in support
of these statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain of January 4, 1911; that, finally, the
application of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion of
the defendant from her right to succeed exclusively to all the property, rights and actions left by her
legitimate mother, altho the said defendant has a better right than the plaintiffs; and that there
would be injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs, as well as a violation of
section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving any person of an equal protection.
Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the defendants from the
complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant them a new trial;
said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs excepted thereto and filed the corresponding bill of
exceptions which was allowed, certified and forwarded to the clerk of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint of the plaintiffs,
but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their complaint within the period prescribed by the rules
— undoubtedly believing that the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the facts constituting the
cause of action, and that, as both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as well
as in the demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of the law, already submitted to the decision
of the court — the said judge, disregarding the ordinary procedure established by law, decided the
case by absolving the defendants from the complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the
costs of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of answering the complaint of
the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a demurrer based on the ground that the facts alleged in
the complaint do not constitute a cause of action. However, the judge preferred to absolve the
defendants, thereby making an end to the cause, instead of dismissing the same, because
undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy between the parties, that the arguments
adduced to support the demurrer would be the same which the defendants would allege in their
answer — those dealing with a mere question of law which the courts would have to decide — and
that, the demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs should insist — they could do no less —
upon alleging the same facts as those set out in their complaint and if another demurrer were
afterwards set up, he would be obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs against the plaintiffs — in
spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that the plaintiffs absolutely lack the right
to bring the action stated in their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary — as in this case
what has been done does not prejudice the parties — the appellate court will now proceed to decide
the suit according to its merits, as found in the record and to the legal provisions applicable to the
question of law in controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided,
inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be followed, the suit would be subsequently
decided in the manner and terms that it is now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and
conscientiously formed for its determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their favor, the provisions
of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the same article is applicable to the question of law
presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5
of the complaint is of the nature of reservable property; and, if so, whether in accordance with the
provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina Faz de Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino) who inherited said property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born after the
death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve and reserve same for the
relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioned deceased son Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:
"Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously
from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as
he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came."
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon two children were
born, namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of
his father). At the death of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino under a will, his eleven children succeeded to
the inheritance he left, one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as his share, the
aforementioned property enumerated in the complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos son Apolonio
Florentino III died and was succeeded by his legitimate mother Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited
the property he left and who on dying, November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole heiress her
surviving daughter, Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein, who took possession of all property
left by her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included in said inheritance is the property,
specified in paragraph 5 of the complaint, which had been inherited by the posthumos son Apolonio
Florentino III from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the death of the said
posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina left
in her will said property, together with her own, to her only daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes
Florentino, nevertheless this property had not lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated
from the common ancestor of the litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III;
was transmitted by same (by operation of law) to his legimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz
de Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed by his brothers, by a
lucrative title or by inheritance from his aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II. Although said property was inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
nevertheless, she was in duty bound, according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the
property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within the third degree, of the line from which
such property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its
enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said law imposes the obligation to reserve and
preserve same for certain designated persons who, on the death of the said ascendants-reservists,
(taking into consideration the nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the
ownership of said property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs
(because they are also so such) — said property reverts to said line as long as the aforementioned
persons who, from the death of the ascendant reservists, acquire in fact the right of reservatarios
(persons for whom property is reserved), and are relatives, within the third degree, of the
descendant from whom the reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are living, within the third
degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable
property received. He is, however, the legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable
property and which constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if,
afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant (from whom came the
reservable property) die or disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of law,
and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to
his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of reservable
property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within
the third degree to the line from which such property came.
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the
Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated
persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be
considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his
right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of
representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in
the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. These
reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the
brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the third degree in accordance with article
811 of the Civil Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs Encarnacion, Gabriel and
Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II, and children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same have the right
to represent their aforementioned father, Jose Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and
Dolores are the legitimate children of the deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of the
deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the right of their aforementioned mother; and
that the other plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to represent their legitimate father
Pedro Florentino, one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact,
admitted by both parties, that the other children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that this decision does not deal with them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of
Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of
his first marriage — Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who
are represented by their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by
a second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio
Florentino III, within the third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and the remaining twelve
being his nephews as they are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first four are his
relatives within the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by representation,
all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which came from the common
ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by
inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the aforementioned Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial judge refused to accept
the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the defendants, absolved the latter from the
complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as
the defendant Mercedes Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable
property came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II; that the defendant Mercedes, being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is
likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the property left at the death of her mother,
together with that which came from her deceased brother Apolonio III, the fundamental object of
article 811 of the Code was thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger that the property coming
from the same line might fall into the hands of strangers had been avoided; and that the hope or
expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the property of the deceased Apolonio
III never did come into existence because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the Civil Code does not
destroy the system of legitimate succession and that the pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said
article in the instant case would be permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair the forced
legitime which exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the precept
of article 813 of the same Code which provides that the testator cannot deprive his heirs of their
legitime, except in the cases expressly determined by law. Neither can he impose upon it any
burden, condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the
usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4,
1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in determining whether the
property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not
invested with the character of reservable property when it was received by his mother, Severina Faz
de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint came, without any doubt
whatsoever from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III
without issue, the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina
Faz de Leon, it became reservable property, in accordance with the provision of article 811 of the
Code, with the object that the same should not fall into the possession of persons other than those
comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source
of said property. If this property was in fact clothed with the character and condition of reservable
property when Severina Faz de Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby
acquire the dominion or right of ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the
necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property to her
deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant who
inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property
nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case that all the
relatives of his descendant shall have died (reservista), in which case said reservable property losses
such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own property in favor of
her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision there is in
her will concerning the reservable property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever
provision will reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her
daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has
only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same to the
reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that by operation of law
all of the reservable property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from her son,
Apolonio III, constitutes or forms part of the legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said
property did not come to be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only
legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law and
in accordance with the order of legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the deceased
Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes Florentino, coming
from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and the
application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the
defendant Mercedes Florentino, inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable property,
there being no lawfull or just reason which serves as real foundation to disregard the right to
Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third degree, to participate in the reservable property in
question. As these relatives are at present living, claiming for it with an indisputable right, we cannot
find any reasonable and lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and why they should not
be granted equal participation with the defendant in the litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter Mercedes, the
property received from the deceased son Apolonio III lost the character, previously held, of
reservable property; and that the mother, the said Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to
reserve same for the relatives within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently
erroneous for the reason that as has been already stated, the reservable property, left in a will by the
aforementioned Severina to her only daughter Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left
by her death nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a forced heiress,
with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve Severina of her obligation to reserve the property
which she received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable property
held before the reservatarios received same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina, took possession of
the property in question, same did not pass into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise true that
the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And there is no reason founded upon law and upon
the principle of justice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives within
the third degree in accordance with the precept of article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of
portions of the property which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of Spain on
January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles 811, 968 and consequently of the Civil Code is not
applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the legitime of the
forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights, it has not been
shown, upon any legal foundation, that the reservable property belonged to, and was under the
absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being relatives within the third degree of the person from
whom same came; that said property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the
deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former; and that the said forced heiress, in
addition to being a reservataria, had an exclusive right to receive all of said property and to deprive
the other reservatarios, her relatives within the third degree, of certain portions thereof.
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and the delivery of the
fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first for there is no evidence of any damage which can
give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As to the second, the delivery of the fruits produced by
the land forming the principal part of the reservable property, the defendants are undoubtedly in
duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits or rents of the portions of land
claimed in the complaint, in the quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same, from January 17,
1918, the date the complaint was filed; and the remaining seventh part should go to the defendant
Mercedes.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of decision appealed from we
should declare, as we hereby do, that the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased
Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property; that the plaintiffs,
being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of
said reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part
thereof; that the latter, together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the plaintiffs,
jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said portion of the land and of the quantity
claimed, from January 17, 1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one thousand pesos
(P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special findings as to the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. L-22601. October 28, 1966.]

 PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FRANCISCA SALAK DE
PAZ and ERNESTO BAUTISTA, defendants-appellees.
Filemon Cajator for plaintiffs and appellants.
Tomas Besa for defendants and appellees.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.P., J p:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing a suit to recover
ownership and possession of 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac.
Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 41543, with an area of 1,334 square meters. Petra Garcia
died on September 21, 1941. On August 16, 1943, Severino Salak sold to Honoria Salak for P812.00
his 1/2 portion of said lot. A year later, on December 5, 1944, Severino Salak died.
Sometime in January 1945, Honoria Salak and other members of her family died — massacred by the
Japanese.
As a result, two settlement proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac: (1)
Special Proceeding No. 3, to settle the estates of Severino Salak and Petra Garcia and (2) Special
Proceeding No. 23, to settle the estates of the Salak family (parents Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo;
and children Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya).
On September 4, 1946, a Project of Partition was submitted in Special Proceeding No. 3, which the
court approved on November 19, 1946. Said project adjudicated inter alia Lot No. 221, which was
given thereunder to Francisca Salak de Paz (1/4, of it in her capacity as heir, and the other 3/4 by
purchase and/or exchange with her co-heirs, Rita Sahagun, Aurea Sahagun and Ernesto Bautista).
From 1946 up to the present Francisca Salak has possessed all of Lot No. 221.
On the other hand, in Special Proceeding No. 23, on February 26, 1948, the court a quo held that the
heirs entitled to the estates of the Salak family were Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo (3/4 share)
and Ernesto Bautista (1/4, share), applying the survivorship presumption [Rule 123, Sec. 69(ii), now
Rule 131, Sec. 5(jj) of the Rules of Court], thus: (1) Simeon Salak died first — his properties went to
the children Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya (1/4, each); (2) Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya died
next — Honoria's and Consuelo's properties went to their mother, Isabel; those of Ligaya went to her
son, Ernesto Bautista; 1 (3) Isabel died next — her properties went to her son Adolfo; and (4) Adolfo
died last — his properties went to his maternal grandmother, Agustina. Agustina thereby succeeded
to the properties that came by intestate succession from Honoria Salak and Isabel Carrillo, including
1/2 of Lot No. 221.
On November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac (docketed therein as Case No. 351) against the heirs in Special Proceeding No. 3 to
recover 1/2 of Lot No. 221 which as aforementioned has been possessed by Francisca Salak de Paz.
On April 24, 1950, Agustina died.
On June 8, 1950 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in
Special Proceeding No. 23, and further decreed that the properties inherited by Agustina de Guzman
Vda. de Carrillo were subject to reserva troncal.
On November 6, 1950, Ernesto Bautista filed petition in Special Proceeding No. 23 for the execution
of the judgment therein. Said petition was heard on November 10, 1959, after a copy was served on
the lawyer of Prima Carrillo, the latter being a party thereto as administratrix of the estate of her
deceased mother Agustina. Acting on said petition, the lower court issued its order of November 14,
1950, which reads in part:
". . . the Court, in view of the death of the reservista, Doña Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo,
declares all the interest of the said reservista Doña Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo as well as
that of her heirs in the three-fourths share adjudged to the reservista definitely terminated, and that
the reservee, the minor Ernesto Bautista, is entitled to the immediate delivery to him of the said
three-fourths share declared reserved to him in the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 8,
1950 . . ." (Record on Appeal, pp. 213- 214)
On December 20, 1960, the lower court dismissed Civil Case No. 351. The order of dismissal reads in
part:
"By virtue of the existence of third-degree relatives of Adolfo Salak, the portion of Lot No. 221,
inherited by Agustina de Guzman was never released from the reserva, so as to convert the
ownership of Agustina de Guzman into an absolute one. Upon her death on April 24, 1950, therefore,
the property did not pass by inheritance to her legal heirs, but rather reverted to the family trunk of
the Isabel-Adolfo line. Such being the case, the estate of Agustina de Guzman, the present plaintiff in
this case, has no cause of action against the defendants.
"In resume the adjudication in Special Proceeding No. 23, Intestate Estate of the late Simeon Salak
and Isabel Camillo, which included Lot No. 221, has become res judicata which cannot be disturbed
in this case." (Record on Appeal p. 209)
On April 22, 1963, Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup filed the present suit for recovery of 2/3 of 1/2 Lot
No. 221 against Francisca Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautista. 2
On June 20, 1963, defendants Francisca Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautista filed a motion to dismiss
upon the grounds that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment and by the statute of
limitations.
On November 19, 1963, the court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata,
finding the suit barred by the order of delivery dated November 14, 1950 in Special Proceeding No.
23.
Plaintiffs Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup thereupon appealed to Us upon questions of law.
Several grounds were advanced to support the motion to dismiss: that the cause of action is barred
by prior judgment and by the statute of limitations. Although the action was dismissed by the lower
court expressly upon the ground of res judicata, it did not totally disregard the defense of
prescription. Thus, said court pointed out that:
"Prima Carillo being then the administratrix of the estate of her mother, she is also deemed to have
been notified of the petition for execution of judgment in Special Proceeding No. 23, and of the order
of November 14, 1950. As of then, therefore, Prima Carillo (even though as administratrix) personally
knew that Ernesto Bautista claimed to be the sole reservee of all the properties inherited by Da.
Agustina from the Salak Family, among which was Lot No. 221 in question, but she did not file any
opposition thereto. It was her opportunity to assert her right as reservee by opposing the petition or,
failing in this, to contest or to ask to be relieved from the order of November 14, 1950. Instead, she
allowed about thirteen (13) years before she commenced the present action." (Decision, Record on
Appeal, pp. 214-215; emphasis supplied)
At any rate, this Court can resolve this appeal on the issue of prescription. As ruled in the cases of
Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana Tuazon, 40 Phil. 943, and Relativo vs. Castro, 76 Phil. 563, when the trial
judge decides a case in favor of a party on a certain ground, the appellate court may uphold the
decision below upon some other point which was ignored or erroneously decided in favor of the
appellant by the trial court.
Reserva troncal in this jurisdiction is treated in Article 891 of the new Civil Code and Article 811 of
the old Civil Code, which state:
"The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired
by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property
as he may have acquitted by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property came."
The reserva troncal arose — as had been finally decided by the Court of Appeals in Special
Proceeding No. 23 — when Agustina acquired by operation of law all the properties of her
descendant Adolfo (grandson), who acquired them by gratuitous title from another ascendant, Isabel
(Adolfo's mother).
According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservista, as it then
becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a revindicatory suit
therefor. Nonetheless, this right, if not exercised within the time for recovering real properties, can
be lost by prescription:
"Pero extinguida la reserva por la muerte del reservista, cambian nor completo las relaciones y
condiciones juridicas de las personas y de las cosas, como ya se ha indicado. La obligacion de
reservar se convierte en la de entregar los bienes a quien correspondan, obligacion que pasa a la
herencia del reservista fallecido y deben complir sus herederos. Y el derecho a la reserva se
convierte en el derecho al dominio pleno de esos bienes. Si a la muerte del reservista se comple la
condicion resolutoria de existir parientes dentro del tercer grado que pertenezcan a la linea de donde
los bienes proceden, a estos parientes pasa desde aquel momento por ministerio de la ley el dominio
absoluto de aquellos bienes, y, por consiguiente, el derecho para reclamarlos, pudiendo disponer
libremente de aquellos o de este, y transmitirlos a sus herederos, puesto que la ley no lo prohibe. Y
si no sobrevive al reservista ninguno de dichos parientes, queda extinguida la obligacion de reservar,
por no haberse complido aquella condicion resolutoria impuesta por la ley, y en su virtud vuelven los
bienes al pleno domiuo del ascendiente, y pertenecen a su herencia conforme al art. 651. Y como
nada ordena la ley en sentido contrario, tenemos por indudable que no tienb el caracter de
personalismo ninguno de esos derechos, que nacen con la extincion de la reserva, pertenecen a la
herencia y se transmiten a los herederos, aunque el causante no los hubiere ejercitado por si mismo,
salva los casos de renuncia, incapacidad o prescripcion."
xxx xxx xxx
"C) Extincion de la reserva. — Las mismas condiciones exigas para el nacimiento de la raserva
son necesarias para su exitsencia. Al faltar una de ellas, la reserva muere. Tres son, por tanto las
principales causas da extincion:
"1.a Muerte del ascendiente. — Sea el que quiera el destino definitivo de los bienes, en virtud de
la naturaleza condicional de los derechos que crea el art. 811, es lo cierto que la reserva, como tal,
una vez nacida, acompaña al ascendiente obligado a ella hasta su muerte. Muerto el ascendiente,
casa toda obligacion da reservar; falta el sujecto pasivo ds la reserva.
xxx xxx xxx
"Ademas de las tres causas expresadas, pueden señalarse otras que expondremos a continuacion.
xxx xxx xxx
"Y 5.a La prescripcion, si se disfrutan como libres los bienes por los herederos del ascendiente
durante el tiempo y con las condiciones marcadas por la ley." (Manresa, Comentarios Al Codigo Civil
Español, Vol. 6, 1911 Ed., pp. 288-289, 316-318).
Scaevola also states the view that prescription can apply against the reservatarios to cut off their
right to the reservable property:
"f) Prescription. — Este modo extintivo de los derechos tiene solo aplicacion a los parientes del
tercer grado del descendiente porque no habiendo reserva si no acepta el ascendiente, no hay que
hablar de prescripcion extintiva respecto de el.
"Trocante a los parientes con derecho a la reserva, es aplicable la doctrina, porque pueden no
ejercer su derecho por ignorar la muertb del descendiente o por otra causa.
"Dada esta posibilidad, entendemos que, tratandose de un derecho real sobre bienes inmuebles,
prescribira a los treinta años (art. 1693) (1), contados desde la aceptacion de la herencia por el
ascendiente, momento determinante del derecho al ejercicio de la reserva (art. 1.969); transcurridos,
pues, treinta años desde la aceptacion sin que los parientes favorecidos por la ley hayan solicitado la
constitucion da la reserva, se extinguira esta, y el ascendiente o sus derecho-habientes adquiriran el
plano diminio de los bienes reservebles por su naturaleza, pero que no fueron objeto de reserva."
(Scaevola, Codigo Civil Comentado, Vol. 14, 1944 Ed., p. 360).
Plaintiffs-appellants herein, as reservatarios, had the right to claim the property — 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot
No. 221 - from Francisca Salak de Paz, who has been possessing it in the concept of an owner, from
April 24, 1950 when Agustina died. And the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the existence of
reserva troncal, promulgated on June 8, 1950, rendered it all the more doubtless that such right had
accrued in their favor from the time Agustina died. It is clear, therefore, that the right or cause of
action accrued in favor of the plaintiffs-reservatarios herein on April 24, 1950.
Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes 10 years as the period of prescription for actions to
recover real property, counted from the time the cause of action accrued. This is the applicable law
because Article 1116 of the new Civil Code provides that "prescription already running before the
effectivity of this Code [August 30, 1950] shall be governed by laws previously in force."
Plaintiffs-appellants' suit herein, having been filed only on April 22, 1963, or more than 10 years from
April 24, 1950, has prescribed.
And having reached such conclusion, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the question of whether
the suit is also barred on the ground of res judicata.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed on the ground of prescription,
with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., is on leave.

[G.R. No. 39537. March 19, 1985.]

IRENE REYES (alias IRENE RAMERO, alias IRENE DELGADO), MOISES VILLANUEVA and
GENOVEVA RAMERO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PLACIDA DELGADO, DOMINGO
DELGADO, PAULA. DELGADO and MAXIMINA DELGADO, respondents.
Ruben M. Orteza for petitioner.
Leovigildo L. Cerilla for private respondents.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals Special Division of Five
dated October 7, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. L-44964-R, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Batangas, Branch I, dated December 26, 1969, in Civil Case No. 1144 dismissing the action for
reconveyance. cdrep
On January 29, 1967, private respondents as plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of first Instance
of Batangas praying that the defendant Irene Reyes, alias Irene Romero or Irene Delgado, be ordered
to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado, and
Paula Delgado over four parcels of land located in Tayabas, Quezon, and one parcel of land located in
Pagbilao, Quezon, and another deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiff Maximina Delgado over
three parcels of land located in Alitagtag, Batangas.
It was alleged in the complaint that the defendants thru abuse of confidence, fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and other falsifications succeeded in registering in the offices of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon and Batangas a document of self-adjudication (Exhibit "24"), wherein defendant
Irene Delgado alleged that she was the sole child of the deceased Francisco Delgado and entitled to
inherit the parcels of lands described in the complaint; that as a result thereof Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 were cancelled and new Transfer Certificates of
Title were issued in the name of Irene Delgado; that defendant Irene Delgado is not the illegitimate
daughter of Francisco Delgado, who died without issue, but is the legitimate daughter of Genoveva
Romero and Justino Reyes; that plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado and Paula Delgado,
sisters and brother of the deceased Francisco Delgado are the heirs entitled to inherit from Francisco
Delgado; and that Paula, Placido and Domingo Delgado defrayed the expenses of the last illness and
the funeral expenses of Francisco Delgado and for the purpose they borrowed the sum of P7,000.00
from their niece, plaintiff Maximina Delgado, and to pay Maximina Delgado they conveyed to her the
three parcels of land described in subparagraphs (f) to (g) of paragraph 9 of the complaint. They also
alleged that the defendant spouses Irene and Moises Villanueva borrowed from plaintiffs common
fund the sum of P23,000.00 which they used in the purchase of a parcel of land (pp. 1-14, Record on
Appeal; p. 63, rec.). cdll
On or about March 2, 1967, defendant Irene Delgado, one of the petitioners herein, filed an answer
to the complaint and set up the affirmative defense that she is the illegitimate daughter of the
defendant Genoveva Romero and the deceased Francisco Delgado; that for several years preceding
the birth of Irene Delgado, her mother Genoveva Ramero had separated from her lawful husband
Justino Reyes and never reconciled since then; and that Irene was born during the cohabitation of
Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero as common-law husband and wife, and since her birth,
lived with Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero, who reared and treated her as their child,
maintaining her and sending her through college. Defendants also denied having contracted a debt
of P23,000.00 from plaintiffs, or that plaintiffs spent for the last illness and funeral of Francisco
Delgado. Irene Delgado likewise set up a counterclaim, alleging that, as the illegitimate daughter of
Francisco Delgado, she has the right to represent her father to the inheritance left by her
grandmother (pp. 15-43, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On March 16, 1967, the plaintiffs thru counsel filed an answer to the counterclaim denying that the
defendant Irene Delgado was the illegitimate child of Francisco Delgado, and hence has no right to
claim from the estate of Francisco's mother, Benigna Castillo, and that the properties claimed by the
defendant Irene Delgado no longer formed part of the estate of Benigna Castillo as she had
previously disposed of them during her lifetime (pp. 43-46, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On August 15, 1967, a pre-trial in Civil Case No. 1144 was conducted.
On March 25, 1969, the plaintiffs filed a motion to admit an amended answer to the counterclaim
posed by defendant, wherein the plaintiffs alleged that the counterclaim of the defendant, in so far
as it would have the effect of being an indirect action for acknowledgment, has already prescribed
(pp. 50-55, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On April 14, 1969, the lower court admitted the amended answer to the counterclaim over the
objections of the defendant (pp. 56-61, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.). LibLex
After trial on the merits, the Court rendered its decision on December 26, 1969 dismissing the action
for reconveyance and declaring defendant Irene Delgado the lawful owner of the eight parcels of
land. The counterclaim of Irene Delgado was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (now IAC), the plaintiffs with respect to their complaint
and the defendants with respect to their counterclaim.
The then Court of Appeals sitting as a Special Division of Five rendered its decision on October 7,
1974, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"Wherefore, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed The deed of self-adjudication
executed by Irene Delgado is hereby declared null and void and set aside. The transfer certificates of
title issued in the name of Irene Delgado in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348,
14937, T-11747 and 13489 are hereby canceled, and T.C.T. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489
are reinstated in the name of Francisco Delgado. Likewise, the extrajudicial declaration executed by
Irene Delgado adjudicating to herself the 3 parcels of land located in Alitagtag, Batangas, with Tax
Declaration Nos. 8625, 8626 and 8627 are declared null and void. No costs" (pp. 52-53, rec.).
The then Court of Appeals in arriving at this decision found that, although Irene Delgado was the
spurious daughter of Francisco Delgado, she nevertheless cannot merit from the estate of the
deceased Francisco Delgado because she was not recognized either voluntarily or by court action
(pp. 52-53, rec.).
The titles to the questioned lot however cannot be executed in favor of the plaintiffs; because in so
doing it will be in effect a recognition by the court that the plaintiffs are the only heirs of Francisco
Delgado to the prejudice of other possible heirs or creditors of the deceased.
As to alleged loan contracted by Irene from the plaintiffs, the then Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision that it was without merit, because if it were true, the plaintiffs could have
demanded a receipt for such a big amount.
The counterclaim of Irene that she has the share to the inheritance of Benigna Castillo, Francisco
Delgado's mother, and her alleged share in the expenses for the sickness and funeral of Francisco
Delgado which was advanced by the plaintiffs, need not be ruled upon because of the findings that
Irene is not an heir of Francisco Delgado (pp. 57-58, rec.). prLL
On December 2, 1974, defendants, petitioners herein, filed a petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals (pp. 22-37, rec.).
On January 2, 1975, the plaintiffs, respondents herein, submitted their comment on the petition for
review filed by the petitioner (pp. 67-71, rec.).
On January 15, 1975, the petition for review filed by petitioners was denied in a resolution by the
First Division of the Supreme Court for lack of merit (p. 75, rec.).
On February 18, 1975, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 86-113, rec.).
On April 5, 1975, respondents filed their comments on the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners (pp. 130-134, rec.).
On April 23, 1975, petitioners filed their reply to respondents' comment (pp. 118-125, rec.).
On May 23, 1975, the Supreme Court reconsidered its resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration (p. 142, rec.).
In their petition, petitioners sought to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals raising the
following arguments:
1. "There are strong and cogent reasons why this Honorable Court must return to and even
enhance the doctrine in Zuzuarregui vs. Zuzuarregui, considering serious flaws in the reasoning of
the currently prevailing doctrine, so that assuming arguendo and pro hac vice that Irene was not duly
recognized or acknowledged as illegitimate child, she is nevertheless entitled to successional rights
as sole heir of the late Francisco Delgado, considering that her filiation as illegitimate daughter of
Francisco Delgado is undisputed and beyond question" (p. 12, Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.).
2. "Upon the other hand, this time assuming arguendo and pro hac vice that under the Civil
Code recognition of an 'other illegitimate' is a pre-requisite to enjoyment of rights, Irene Delgado was
legally acknowledged by her father Francisco Delgado, specially by his consent or advice to her
marriage with Moises Villanueva contrary to the erroneous conclusions of the Court of Appeals" (p.
39, Petitioner's Brief, p. 164, rec.).
The petition is without merit.
The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit must be first recognized
voluntarily or by court action is well settled in Our jurisprudence. (Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53
[1984]; Divinagracia vs. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307 [1976]; Clemeña vs. Clemeña, 24 SCRA 720 [1968];
Noble vs. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104 [1966]; Republic vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA
272 [1969]; Paulino vs. Paulino, 3 SCRA 730 [1961]; Barles vs. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil. 522 [1960]).
Cdpr
There is no reason to overturn this doctrine and revert to what was enunciated in the case of
Zuzuarregui vs. Zuzuarregui (103 Phil. 346 [1958]); as suggested by herein petitioners in their first
assignment of errors.
It is the contention of the petitioners that the silence of the Civil Code as to the recognition of
illegitimate children other than natural, in contrast to natural children who are expressly required to
be recognized in order to inherit, only meant that illegitimate children need not be recognized in
order to inherit from his or her alleged parent (p. 13, Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.). Petitioners also
raised the argument that under Article 287 of the New Civil Code which reads: "Illegitimate children
other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are
entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in this code." The term "other
illegitimate children" refers not only to those who are not natural or merely adulterous or incestuous
but also includes natural children who were not acknowledged or recognized (p. 18, Petitioner's Brief;
p. 164, rec.). In other words, unrecognized natural children can inherit not the share of a natural child
but the share of a spurious child so long as his filiation shall be duly proved. So, in effect, illegitimate
children need only to prove his filiation to inherit and such does not place him in a more
advantageous position than natural children, as they are placed in the same situation.
WE do not find these arguments persuasive.
Though the Civil Code is silent with respect to spurious children as to their recognition, this Court, in
applying the rules of recognition, applicable to natural children, to said spurious children, declared in
Clemeña vs. Clemeña, supra that:
"The considerations of fairness and justice that underlie the time limit fixed in Article 285 of the Civil
Code for actions seeking compulsory acknowledgment of natural children are fully applicable, if not
more, to actions to investigate and declare the paternity of illegitimate children that are not natural.
The motive that led the codifiers to restrict the period for bringing action for compulsory recognition
of natural children were stated by this Court in Serrano vs. Aragon, 22 Phil. 18, to be as follows:
'. . . the writers of the code no doubt had in mind that there would arise instances where certain
illegitimate children, on account of the strong temptation due to the large estates left by deceased
persons, would attempt to establish that they were natural children of such persons in order to get
part of the property, and furthermore, they considered that it is nothing but just and right that
alleged parents should have a personal opportunity to be heard. It was for these reasons and others
equally as well founded that Article 137 was enacted'" (p. 724).
There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born
out of wedlock. They may be either natural (actually or by fiction) or spurious (the incestuous,
adulterous or illicit). Natural children are defined as those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at
the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other
(Article 269, New Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious children are those born of parents, who at
the time of their conception, are disqualified to marry each other on account of certain impediment.
Because of this basic distinction between these children, it is not legally possible to classify
unrecognized natural children under the class of spurious children. Besides, commentators construe
the phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as excluding from the grants of rights under
Article 287 of the New Civil Code those children who are natural child proper by birth and who have
not secured voluntary or compulsory recognition (p. 276, An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and
R.C. Puno, Vol. 1). They fall within the scope of the definition of natural children enumerated in
Article 269, New Civil Code (p. 142, Civil Law Reviewer, D. Jurado, 1982 ed.). Lastly, to follow
petitioners' contention will not be in accordance with the consistent pronouncements of this Court. It
is an elementary and basic principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural
child has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His rights spring not from the filiation
itself, but from the child's acknowledgment by the natural parent (Alabat vs. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479
[1967]; Mise vs. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954]; Magallanes vs. CA, 95 Phil. 797 [1954]; Canales vs.
Ugarte, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda vs. Malonda, 81 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil.
1 [1905]).
As to the second assignment of error raised by petitioners, We find that there was no sufficient legal
recognition of petitioner Irene Delgado by Francisco Delgado.
It can be seen from the record of birth (Exhibit "L-2") that the name of the petitioner was Irene
Ramero, and signed by Genoveva Ramero and of an unknown father. This was certified to by the
treasurer of the municipality of Alitagtag, Batangas (Exhibits "L" and "L-1"). Another certified copy of
another birth certificate issued by the municipal treasurer and local civil registrar of the municipality
of Alitagtag (Exhibit "20") stated therein that the name of the child is Irene Ramero, and the name of
the father is "Francisco" and the mother "Genoveva Ramero." Any of these records of birth cannot be
sufficient recognition under the law. The birth certificate, to be sufficient recognition, must be signed
by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise she may be
penalized (Sec. 5, Act 3753; Madredejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]); and if the alleged father did
not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or registrar, is
incompetent evidence of paternity of said child (Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Roces vs.
Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil. 1050 [1958]). Since any of the certificates of birth presented
were not signed by Francisco Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to prove recognition of
Irene Delgado; nor can this birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument (Pareja
vs. Pareja, 95 Phil. 167 [1954l).
Irene's certificate of baptism (Exhibit "1") cannot be taken as proof of recognition (Bercilles vs. GSIS,
supra, People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [19681;
Vudaurrazaga vs. CA, 91 Phil. 492 [1952]; Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907]). In the case of
Macadangdang vs. CA [100 SCRA 73 [1980]), this Court said that while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments
on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein
with respect to his kinsfolk. LLpr
Irene's secondary student permanent record (Exhibits "12", "13", "15" and "16") nor the written
consent given by Irene to the operation of her alleged father (Exhibit "4") cannot be taken as an
authentic writing. An authentic writing does not have to be a public instrument; it is sufficient that it
is genuine and not a forgery. It must generally be signed by the alleged parent (Madredejo vs. De
Leon, supra) unless the whole instrument is in the handwriting of the alleged parent and the facts
mentioned therein correspond to actual and real facts (Varela vs. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248 [1954]).
Thus, Irene's secondary student permanent record and her written consent to the operation of her
father, not being signed nor written in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado, cannot be taken as an
authentic writing to prove her recognition by her alleged father.
The marriage contract (Exhibit "17") of Irene Delgado and Moises Villanueva, wherein it was stated
that Francisco Delgado gave his consent or advice for Irene Delgado to marry, and that he was her
father cannot be also taken as recognition in an authentic document because it was not signed nor in
the handwriting of Francisco Delgado. It cannot also be taken as recognition in a public instrument as
held in the case of Lim vs. CA, (65 SCRA 161, 164 [1975]) wherein the Court said:
"According to Article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, public documents are those authenticated by a
notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required by law.' Thus, 'there are two
classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office.' "The public
document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs
to the first class.'
"The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity
prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a written act with the
intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary and certified by
him. The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as
husband and wife, signed by signature or mark by said contracting parties and the said witnesses,
and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. The marriage contract does not possess the
requisites of a public document of recognition . . ."
The family pictures (Exhibits "11" to "11-E") presented by Irene, showing Irene posing with Francisco
Delgado, cannot be a sufficient proof of recognition. In the case of Bercilles vs. (GSIS, supra, it was
held that pictures do not constitute proof of filiation.
What Irene may have proved is that she had been in continuous possession of a status of an
illegitimate child who is not natural. But such fact alone without a valid recognition in a record of
birth, will, statement before a court of record, or authentic writing does not make Irene a recognized
illegitimate child who is not natural. She nevertheless possesses the right to compel judicial
recognition and the action for this must be brought within the proper prescriptive period (Clemeña
vs. Clemeña, supra). Article 285 of the New Civil Code provides "that the action for the recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except when the
father or mother dies during the minority of the child, the action shall be brought within four years
from the age of majority, or if after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child, the
action shall be brought within four years from the finding of the document." Since Irene was already
of age (35 years old) when her alleged father died, and she had not presented any discovered
document wherein her presumed father recognized her, the action to compel recognition is already
barred (Canales vs. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]).
WE affirm the findings of the then Court of Appeals that Irene Reyes has Irene Delgado is not an heir
of the late Francisco Delgado. LLphil
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE THEN COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN TOTO, WITH
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The spouses Justino Reyes and Genoveva Ramero, natives of Tayabas town, were married
there in 1903. They had seven children. An eighth child, named Irene, was born to Genoveva, either
on May 5, 1930 in Tayabas town, or on September 1, 1931 in Barrio Dalipit, Alitagtag, Batangas. Of
course, the presumption under article 255 of the Civil Code is that Irene was Justino's child. Was that
presumption rebutted?
Joaquin Reyes, Irene's elder brother, testified that his parents, the Reyes spouses, separated in 1928
when his father surprised Francisco Delgado in his house. On that occasion, there was a commotion
in the house which was investigated by the police. Justino eventually decided to allow Genoveva to
go with Francisco. That testimony is sufficient to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. It shows that
Irene was not Justino's child. Was Delgado her father?
Her birth certificate shows that she was horn on September 1, 1931 as the child of Genoveva at
Barrio Dalipit, Alitagtag, Batangas with an unknown (desconocido) father (Exh. L-2 or 22). prcd
Since 1928, Genoveva lived with Francisco Delgado and was never reconciled to Justino who died in
1935. Irene was educated at their expense.
Justino was not mentioned as the father of Irene in her record of birth. Among the eight children of
Genoveva, Irene's birth was the only one registered in Alitagtag, Francisco's native town. Irene had
always lived with Genoveva and Francisco up to 1951, when she was 19 and she got married.
She was baptized in 1949, when she was 18. Francisco and Genoveva were listed as her parents in
the baptismal certificate, Exhibit 1. In the certificate of marriage of Irene and Moises Villanueva,
Francisco Delgado was mentioned as her father and as the one who gave consent to the marriage
(Exh. 17).
Irene consented to the operation of Francisco when he was submitted to an operation at the Family
Clinic in 1966 (Exh. 2). The paid his hospital bills (Exh. 4). She used the surname "Delgado" in her
school records and Francisco Delgado was indicated therein as her guardian (Exh. 12 to 16).
Francisco died intestate on October 28, 1966. On November 25, 1966 Irene adjudicated to herself the
lands left by Francisco (Exh. H or 9). On January 30, 1967, the brother, two sisters and a niece of
Francisco Delgado sued her for the annulment of said adjudication. They sought a declaration that
they are the nearest legal heirs of Francisco.
Judge Lorenzo Relova ruled that Irene's filiation was duly proven. The Appellate Court disagreed
because she was not duly acknowledged within the meaning of articles 278 and 283 of the Civil
Code. It held that the evidence submitted by her does not amount to voluntary and compulsory
recognition required of natural children.
In my opinion the rule requiring voluntary or compulsory recognition for the so-called spurious
children or bastards is not mandatory. Article 289 of the Civil Code does not make such recognition
mandatory.
Irene's status as an heir is governed by the Civil Code pursuant to its article 2264. To enjoy
successional rights, she has to prove her filiation as required in article 887 of the Civil Code. To prove
filiation, the rules on acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children. But
there may be cases, where the filiation of an illegitimate child, other than natural, has been duly
proven and such proof does not satisfy the requirements of recognition under articles 278 and 283.
In such exceptional cages, article 278 and 283 should not be applied. If sufficient proof to satisfy the
judicial mind has been adduced to prove the spurious child's filiation, he or she should be entitled to
successional rights. This is justified by the liberal policy of the Civil Code towards illegitimate
children. LibLex
The natural child needs acknowledgment because he may become a legitimated child. The spurious
child will never attain the status of a legitimated child.
I agree with Judge Lorenzo Relova that Irene's filiation as Francisco Delgado's child was duly proven
within the meaning of article 887. She is the nearest compulsory and legal heir of Francisco. She
excludes the brother, two sisters and niece of Francisco (Art. 988, Civil Code).
I vote to reverse the decision of the Appellate Court and affirm the decision of Judge Relova.

DISINHERITANCE CASES

[G.R. No. 7890. September 29, 1914.]

FILOMENA PECSON, as administratrix of the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson et
al., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO, defendant-appellee.
S. E. Imperial, for appellants.
Tomas Lorayes, for appellee.
DECISION
JOHNSON, J p:
It appears from the record that some time prior to the 17th day of September, 1910, the last will and
testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay
for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legalization of the will on the ground
that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased, in accordance with the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure. After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge,
found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law, and
denied the opposition on the 17th day of September, 1910.
On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and
Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion in the words following:
"1. That Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of the deceased
Teresa Pecson, who also was a daughter of the testator, Florencio Pecson, and therefore the first
mentioned is and the second was a grandchild of the latter.
"2. That the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her
grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to
show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him.
"3 That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due to the
derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from which she now suffers
in periodical attacks.
"By reason of all the foregoing and because the disinheriting clause 3 of the will is unfounded, the
undersigned prays the court to annul the said clause and to make the testator's grandchildren,
Rosario and Joaquin Mediavillo (the latter died without succession, but is represented now by his
father, Basiliso Mediavillo), participants in the estate left by their grandfather; and, finally, that the
court grant such other relief as it may deem just and equitable."
After a consideration of the question presented by said motion, the lower court, on the 22d day of
September, 1911 rendered the following decision:
"This case has come up today for a hearing on the declaration of heirs of the deceased Florencio
Pecson, who died in Daraga, about the year 1910.
"From the evidence it appears that the deceased had eight children by his wife Nicolasa Manjares,
likewise deceased which children are those named Emerenciano, Teresa, Filomena, Asuncion, Rufino,
Zoila, Emiliano, and Perfecto, all surnamed Pecson. It also appears that Rufino Pecson absented
himself from these Islands twenty-five years ago, going to Australia, and that nothing has been heard
of him for the past twenty years. The said Rufino Pecson left no children in the Philippines and was
unmarried when he emigrated. As nothing has been heard of him for twenty years, it is presumed
that he died and it is held that the part of this estate to which he was entitled must be divided
among the other heirs.
"It also appears from the evidence that Teresa Pecson married Basiliso Mediavillo, by whom she had
two children, Joaquin and Rosario Mediavillo. Teresa also died, leaving these two children and her
husband, Basiliso Mediavillo. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and childless, before the death of the
testator, Florencio Pecson. Rosario is the only living daughter of Teresa and the latter's husband,
Basiliso Mediavillo, is also living. The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895,
when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to
this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator
states in the third paragraph of his will, he disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario,
who was then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible for
her acts and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather.
"The court therefore decrees that this part of the will is contrary to law and sets it aside as being of
no force or value whatever. The court further holds that Rosario Mediavillo, the daughter of Teresa
Pecson, is the heiress of the one-half of the share of this estate pertaining to the said Teresa, and
that her father, as the heir of his son Joaquin, also Teresa's son, is the heir of the other one-half of
the said share pertaining to Teresa — that is, of the one-seventh of this estate that pertains to the
latter. Moreover, the court decrees that, besides the two heirs just above mentioned, Emerciano,
Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila, Emiliano, and Perfecto, surnamed Pecson, and the children of Teresa, are
also heirs of the estate of Florencio Pecson."
From that decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following assignments of error:
"FIRST ERROR.
"The lower court erred in finding that the part of the will which disinherits Rosario Mediavillo is
contrary to law, and in setting it aside as being of no force or value whatever.
"SECOND ERROR.
"The lower court erred by decreeing that Basiliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin Mediavillo, is the
heir by representation of the one-half of the one-seventh of this estate pertaining to Joaquin
Mediavillo."
With reference to the first assignment of error it may be said that from the record it appears that
during the lifetime of Florencio Pecson he had been married to Nicolasa Manjares, with whom he had
eight children, named Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila, Emerenciano, Emiliano, Perfecto, Rufino and Teresa
Pecson; that before the death of Florencio Pecson he executed and delivered the will in question. The
will made no provision for the said Rufino Pecson, neither was there any provision in the will for the
said Teresa. All of the other children were named as heirs in said will. It appears that Teresa had
been married with one Basiliso Mediavillo, and that some time before the making of the will in
question she died, leaving her husband and two children, Joaquin Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo,
as her heirs. It also appears from the record that Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs, leaving as the
only heirs of the said Teresa Pecson, her husband, Basiliso Mediavillo and the said Rosario Mediavillo.
The said Joaquin Mediavillo died before his grandfather, Florencio Pecson, and probably before the
will in question was made.
Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo in the following language:
"I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate daughter named
Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter, the said Rosario Mediavillo,
because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not
remember, she raised her hand against me. There- fore, it is my will that the said Rosario Mediavillo
shall have no share in my property."
The defendant, Rosario Mediavillo, in the motion which she presented and which is copied above,
alleges that she was disinherited without cause. Upon a consideration of that question, the lower
court found that she had been disinherited without cause and annulled said paragraph 3 of the will.
That order of the lower court constitutes the error complained of by the appellant in her first
assignment of error.
By reference to said paragraph 3 above quoted, it will be seen that Florencio Pecson disinherited the
said Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion,
when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will that she, the
said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property."
The lower court admitted proof upon the question of the responsibility of the said Rosario Mediavillo
at the time she offered the offense to her grandfather, Florencio Pecson. After hearing the proof, the
lower court reached the following conclusion:
"The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva Caceres
to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her
grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator states in the third paragraph of his
will, he disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and
who shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible for her acts and should not have been
disinherited by her grandfather."
The first assignment of error presents the question whether or not the courts, when a parent
disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide that there was or
was not ground for such disinheritance. The Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall
only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions of that
article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853 provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in
other words, the cases or causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs. Article 849
of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which
shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be
disinherited only by will, and for causes mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seem to follow that the
courts might properly inquire whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes
provided for by law. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was
sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the
Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance
shall be established by the heirs of the testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would
appear then that if the person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the cause of
disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to
inquire whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the provisions
of article 851, which in part provides that:
"Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it
prejudices the person disinherited."
It seems clear from the abovequoted provisions, that the courts may inquire into the justice of a
disinheritance such as was attempted in the present case, and if they find that the disinheritance
was without cause, that part of the testament or will may be pronounced null and void. It remains,
however, to be seen whether the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause was
sufficient to show that the disinheritance made in paragraph 3 of the will was made for just cause. It
appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had received
some attentions from a young man — that she had received a letter from him — and that her
grandfather, Florencio Pecson, took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the
said young man; that it was upon that occasion when, it is alleged, the disobedience and disrespect
were shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather.
The record shows that very soon after said event she lost the use of her mental powers and that she
has never regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the present time. The lower court,
taking into consideration her tender years, and the fact that she very soon thereafter lost the use of
her mental faculties, reached the conclusion that she was probably not responsible for the disrespect
and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.
After a careful consideration of the record, we are inclined to believe that the same supports the
conclusions of the lower court and that he did not commit the error complained of in the first
assignment of error.
With reference to the second assignment of error, it will be remembered that Teresa Pecson, the
mother of Rosario Mediavillo, at the time of her death left two children, Rosario and Joaquin, and her
husband Basiliso Mediavillo, and that the said Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs. The lower court
gave one-half of the inheritance of the said Teresa Pecson to Rosario Mediavillo and the share that
would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, to his father Basiliso Mediavillo. In that conclusion of the
lower court we think error was committed. The appellant relies upon the provisions of article 925 of
the Civil Code, in his contention that the lower court committed an error. Article 925 provides that:
"The right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending In collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters,
whether they be of the whole or half blood."
The appellee, in support of the conclusions of the lower court, cites articles 935 and 936 of the Civil
Code. Article 935 provides that:
"In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall inherit
from him, to the exclusion of collaterals."
Article 936 provides that:
"The father and mother, if living, shall inherit share and share alike. If one of them only survive, he or
she shall succeed to the son's entire estate."
It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference to the first
assignment of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court evidently
believed that there were no "legitimate children, descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that
therefore the father or mother of said legitimate children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch,
however, as there was a descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not ascend,
and for that reason the lower court committed an error in declaring that Basiliso Mediavillo was
entitled to inherit that share of the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he
been living. Therefore, and for all of the foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower court
nullifying and setting aside paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed, and that part of said judgment
which decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio Pecson; belonging to Teresa
Pecson and which would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby
revoked. And without any finding as to costs, it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to the
lower court, with direction that judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and that such further
proceedings be had as the interested parties may deem necessary, for the purpose of disposing of
that part of the inheritance of Teresa Pecson which would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had
he been surviving.
Torres, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. L-4888. May 25, 1953.]

JOSE MERZA, petitioner, vs. PEDRO LOPEZ PORRAS, respondent.
Primicias, Abad, Mencies & Castillo for petitioner.
Moises Ma. Buhain for respondent.
DECISION
TUASON, J p:
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals which affirmed an order of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales denying the probate of the last will and testament and a so-called codicil, identified as
Exhibits A and B, of Pilar Montealegre, deceased. The testatrix was survived by her husband and
collateral relatives, some of whom, along with the husband, were disinherited in Exhibit B for the
reasons set forth therein.
The opposition to Exhibit A was predicated on alleged defects of the attestation clause. Written in the
local dialect known to the testatrix, the attestation clause, as translated into English in the record on
appeal reads:
"The foregoing instrument consisting of three pages, on the date above-mentioned, was executed,
signed and published by testatrix Pilar Montealegre and she declared that the said instrument is her
last will and testament; that in our presence and also in the very presence of the said testatrix as
likewise in the presence of two witnesses and the testatrix each of us three witnesses signed this
testament."
The opponent objected that this clause did not state that the testatrix and the witnesses had signed
each and every page of the will or that she had signed the instrument in the presence of the
witnesses. The Appellate Court dismissed the first objection, finding that "failure to state in the
attestation clause in question that the testatrix and/or the witnesses had signed each and every
page of Exhibit A were cured by the fact that each one of the pages of the instrument appears to be
signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses (Nayve vs. Mojal, 47 Phil., 152, (1924);
Ticson vs. Gorostiza, 57 Phil., 437, (1932); Leynes vs. Leynes, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Suppl. (October 18,
1939), 510, 528; Rallos vs. Rallos, 44 Off. Gaz., 4938, 4940)." But granting the correctness of the
premise, the court held the second objection well taken and thus concluded: "The question whether
the testatrix had signed in the presence of said witnesses can not be verified upon physical
examination of the instrument. Hence, the absence of the required statement in said clause may not,
pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Court, be offset by proof aliunde even if admitted without
objection."
The premise of this conclusion is, in our opinion, incorrect.
It must be admitted that the attestation clause was very poorly drawn, its language exceedingly
ungrammatical to the point of being difficult to understand; but from a close examination of the
whole context in relation to its purpose the implication seems clear that the testatrix signed in the
presence of the witnesses. Considering that the witnesses' only business at hand was to sign and
attest to the testatrix's signing of the document, and that the only actors in the proceeding were the
maker and the witnesses acting and speaking collectively and in the first person, the phrase "in our
presence," used as it was in connection with the process of signing, can not imply anything but that
the testatrix signed before them. No other inference is possible. The prepositional phrase "in our
presence" denotes an active verb and the verb a subject. The verb could be no other than signed and
the subject no other than the testatrix.
The use of the word "also" is no less enlightening. It denotes that, as each of the witnesses signed in
the presence of the testatrix and of one another, so the testatrix signed in similar or like manner —
in their presence.
In consonance with the principle of liberal interpretation, adhered to in numerous later decisions of
this Court and affirmed and translated into enactment in the new Civil Code (Article 827), we are
constrained to hold the attestation clause under consideration sufficient and valid.
"Precision of language in the drafting of the attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not
imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the
language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it." (Ticson vs. Gorostiza, supra.)
"It could not have been the intention of the legislature in providing for the essential safeguards in the
execution of a will to shackle the very right of testamentary disposition which the law recognizes and
holds sacred." (Leynes vs. Leynes, supra.)
With reference to Exhibit B the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the document having
been executed one day before Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as
the word implies, is only an addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that
"the contents of Exhibit B are couched in the language ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as
such, may not have the legal effect and force of a testamentary disposition." Furthermore, the Court
of Appeals observed, disinheritance "may not be made in any instrument other than the will Exhibit
A, as expressly provided for in article 849 of the Civil Code," and, "there being no disposition as to
the disinheritance of the oppositor, Pedro Lopez Porras (the surviving spouse), in the said Exhibit A, it
is quite clear that he can not be disinherited in any other instrument including Exhibit B, which is, as
above stated, a simple affidavit."
Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the Civil Code of Spain
as "the act by which a person disposes of all his property or a portion of it," and in article 783 of the
new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death." Exhibit B
comes within this definition.
Being of testamentary character and having been made with all the formalities of law, Exhibit B is
entitled to probate as an independent testamentary disposition. In the absence of any legal provision
to the contrary - and there is none in this jurisdiction — it is the general, well-established rule that
two separate and distinct wills may be probated if one does not revoke the other (68 C. J., 885) and
provided that the statutory requirements relative to the execution of wills have been complied with
(Id. 881). As seen, Exhibit B embodies all the requisites of will, even free of such formal or literary
imperfections as are found in Exhibit A.
It also follows that Exhibit B is a legal and effective vehicle for excluding lawful heirs from testate or
intestate succession. Article 849 of the Civil Code of Spain does not, as the appealed decision seems
to insinuate, require that the disinheritance should be accomplished in the same instrument by which
the maker provides for the disposition of his or her property after his or her death. This article merely
provides that "disinheritance can be effected only by a will (any will) in which the legal cause upon
which it is based is expressly stated."
It is our judgment therefore that the instruments Exhibits A and B should be admitted to probate,
subject of course to the right of the disinherited person under article 850 to contest the
disinheritance, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellee.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.