Interpretation

A JOURNAL loF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Spring 2002 Volume 29 Number 3

241 Quentin P. Taylor Public Deliberation and Popular

Government in Aristotle's Politics

261 Susan D. Collins The Problem of Law in

Aristotle's Politics: A Response
to Quentin Taylor

265 Jules Gleicher On Plutarch's Life of Caesar

"Mathematici"

281 Laurie M. Johnson Bagby v. "Dogmatici":

Understanding the Realist Project

Through Hobbes

Book Reviews

299 Kalev Pehme L'atheisme, by Alexandre Kojeve

311 Mark Lewis and Prophets, Lawyers, Philosophers

Harrison Sheppard and Civilians: Storm over the

Constitution, by Harry V. Jaffa

331 Harry V. Jaffa Response to Lewis and Sheppard

Interpretation
A JOURNAL XOF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Sprhifi 2002 Volume 29 Number 3

Quentin P. Taylor Public Deliberation and Popular 241

Government in Aristotle's Politics

Susan D. Collins The Problem of Law in Aristotle's Politics: 261

A Response to Quentin Taylor

Jules Gleicher On Plutarch's Life of Caesar 265

"Mathematici"

Laurie M. Johnson v. "Dogmatici": 281

Bagby Understanding the Realist Project Through

Hobbes

Book Reviews

Kalev Pehme L'atheisme, by Alexandre Kojeve 299

Mark Lewis and Prophets, Lawyers, Philosophers and 311

Harrison Sheppard Civilians: Storm over the Constitution, by

Harry V. Jaffa

Harry V. Jaffa Response to Lewis and Sheppard 331

Copyright 2002 by interpretation, Inc. All rights reserved.

No part of the contents may be reproduced in any form

without written permission of the publisher.

ISSN 0020-9635
Public Deliberation and Popular Government in
Aristotle's Politics

Quentin P. Taylor
Rogers State University

Aristotle is not known for his appreciation of the common man. On the

contrary, it is generally held that the Greek philosopher was a confirmed elitist,
and insofar as he gave serious thought to the masses at all, it was but to express
"many"
his low opinion of them. For Aristotle, the simply incapable of
are

attaining true knowledge, genuine virtue, or the higher forms of friendship. The
main political implication of this view is reflected in his marked preference for
best." "bias,"

aristocracy or "the rule of the This in conjunction with his other

"illiberal"

doctrines, has led some readers to characterize Aristotle's political

"dogmatic," "reactionary," "hierarchical," "authoritarian"

thought as and (Have-

lock, pp. 339, 313, 297, 20). Havelock's chapters on Aristotle's Ethics and

Politics remain the most sustained attack on the Greek philosopher's moral and

political thought. In fine, he reads Aristotle in much the same spirit that Karl

Popper read Plato in The Open Society and Its Enemies, namely, as an "authori
tarian" society"

proponent of the "closed (Popper, p. 12). A more recent, if less

polemical, critique of Aristotle appears in Ellen and Neal Wood, where the
conservatis

Stagirite is taken to task for his "aristocratic and "anti-democratic

outlook"

(pp. 222, 209). For a more balanced view see Thomas Lindsay (1992b).
While there is some truth to this charge, it represents but a partial, indeed, a

distorted view of Aristotle's actual teaching. In fact, fair reading of the Politics
a

indicates that Aristotle was far more progressive than his critics suggest. See Fred
tradition"

Miller, Jr., who identifies Aristotle as "an ancestor of the natural-rights

justice"
and "a forerunner of modern theorists of (1996, pp. 17, 22). Miller's
meticulous analysis has had a remarkable impact on the study of the Politics. Just

a year after its publication the Review of Metaphysics dedicated an entire issue to

its discussion. Yes, Aristotle was an elitist, and did occasionally lapse into an
illiberal dogmatism. Yet elitism and liberality may, and often do, coexist in a

single mind: John Stuart Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Jacob Burkhardt are

notable examples (see Kahan). Some contemporaries have even had the temerity
to defend elitism as a positive good (see Henry). Conversely, liberalism, no less

than elitism, may reflect a dogmatic mind set, and issue in authoritarian politics,
witness the democratic extremes of the French Revolution. In the case of Aris

totle, elitism is generally tempered with liberality, dogmatism with dialectic.

interpretation, Spring 2002, Vol. 29, No. 3

242 Interpretation

"natural"
Even his notorious defense of slavery, the most authoritarian feature of

his thinking, is so qualified that it can be read as a radical critique of slavery as

it actually existed (see Nichols, 1983, and Ambler).

With such considerations in mind, it remains the case that Aristotle's political

thought should not be confused with contemporary democratic liberalism. He

would women, laborers, mechanics, and those engaged in commerce full
deny
and the right to active participation in public not only in his
life,
citizenship
"ideal"

He does, however,
"better"

state, but even in the forms of democracy.

suggest that where the principle of rotation in office prevailed such individuals,
stipulation crucial
sans women, might participate when not plying their trades, a
On the hand, the Politics
to understanding Aristotle's theory of citizenship. other

is replete with passages that, when viewed as a whole, suggest a far more positive

attitude towards popular government and the political capacities of the average

citizen. Indeed, if one recalls Aristotle's (1) characterization of two of the three
"good" "uncorrupted"

or forms government as virtually unattainable, (2) favor

"polity"
able assessment of (a mixture of oligarchy anddemocracy), which he
attainable" "good"

maintains is the "most of the three forms, (3) criticisms of

"perverted"

oligarchy and condemnation of tyranny (the forms of aristocracy and

monarchy), (4) positive account of a regime dominated by the middle class, and
"better"

(5) appreciation for the forms democracy, it is possible to conclude

of

that Aristotle is best understood as a proponent (albeit a qualified one) of popular

government. Additional support for this view may be drawn from Aristotle's
reflections on liberty, equality, the rule of law, equity, citizenship, and justice. If
this conclusion is fair, if the Politics can be read as qualified defense of moderate

democracy, it is perhaps not altogether implausible to identify Aristotle as the

progenitor of the liberal-cum-republican tradition in political thought. There is

nothing particularly novel in making this connection, which in one form or

another a number of scholars have done. J. G. A. Pocock placed Aristotle at the
Tradition,"

fount of the "Atlantic Republican which took root in Renaissance

Florence and stretched from Machiavelli and Guicciardini to the seventeenth-

century English republicans and the American Founders. The link is also made,
if only implicitly, by writers who look to Aristotle in constructing arguments in
defense liberalism, communitarianism, and social democracy (see Rasmussen
of

and Uyl, Salkever, Swanson, Yack, and Nussbaum). While wholly different in
"neo-liberal"

approach from these studies, Miller's interpretation of Aristotle on

"applied"

rights and justice lends support to such efforts at Aristotelianism. It

should be noted, however, that liberal, communitarian social democratic, and
republican readings of Aristotle have not escaped serious criticism, (see Nadron,

1996; and Mulgan, 2000).

Establishing the claim that Aristotle bears an ancestral relationship to modern
democratic politics would require a lengthy and detailed analysis. It would also
be subject (as suggested above) to a number of important qualifications. Here I
simply wish to examine one aspect of his political thought which lends itself to
 Public Deliberation and Popular Government in Aristotle 243

such an interpretation. At the outset it was noted that Aristotle generally had a
poor opinion of the many in terms of their capacities for wisdom, virtue, and
friendship. The political implications of this view would hardly seem to bode
well for democracy, moderate or otherwise. Moreover, Aristotle considered the
best"
"rule of the or aristocracy (while not readily attainable) the ideal regime. In
"many"
light of these views, would not the suggestion that the ordinary citizens
better judges than the "few
good"

are ones have struck Aristotle as a political

heresy of the first order? Yet this is precisely what he says in book 3 of the
Politics. The oddity of this doctrine has not escaped the notice of contemporary

scholars, but the argument itself has rarely received close scrutiny. The principal

exception is Lindsay (1992a), with whom I concur in many of his arguments, but
"rhetorical"

whose approach, which rests on a reading, is different from my own.

"defense"

Moreover, he does not link Aristotle's of the many in Politics book 3,

chapter 13 with the related remarks in book 3, chapter 15, but looks to the later
'defense'

books to support his contention that "Aristotle's of democracy damns

praise"

with faint (p. 101). Jeremy Waldron also examines book 3, chapter 13 but
fails to address the real difficulties in Aristotle's argument. His suggestion that

Aristotle views the process of popular deliberation in "synthetic or even dialec

tical" "mechanical"

as opposed to terms, is an interesting hypothesis, but ignores

the important qualifications Aristotle places on the deliberative capacities of the

many. In fine, Waldron is more interested in application than analysis and carries
"summation"

his reading of the argument in several directions, including an

action."

Aristotelian defense of "affirmative Exploring, if not totally resolving,

this puzzle, and considering its implications for Aristotle's status as a proponent

of popular government constitutes the focus of what follows.

That Aristotle himself considered his finding on this point paradoxical is
evident in the Politics, for he concedes that it "would appear to be a strange

the basis of more

thing"

(bk 3, chap. 1 1. On occasion I have modified Jowett on

recent translations). But what explanation does he provide to resolve this riddle?

How is it possible "[t]hat inferior persons (tous phaulous) should have authority
"answer"

in greater matters than the good (ton epieikon)"! The first appears in
the context of a discussion of "what is to be the supreme power in the state": the

many? the wealthy? the good? the one best man? or the tyrant? Our concern is
with the first of these, "[fjhe principle that the multitude (to plethos) ought to be
In Aristotle the "mul
oligous)."

supreme rather then the few best (tous aristous

something of a technical term, although he uses a variety of words,

titude"

is a

e.g., ho pleistoi, hoi polloi, to plethos, hoi fauloi, ho demos, to describe the
"many"

majority of citizens, both as members of

"many."

Here the refers to the

the polis and members of a popular body. For an analysis of the meaning and
significance of these terms, see Jan Garrett. Aristotle first observes that this

principle, "though not free from difficulty, nevertheless seems to contain an

truth."

element of The claim that common notions are neither wholly true, nor
truth"

wholly false, but "contain an element of is a trademark of Aristotle, yet it

244 Interpretation

does not fully prepare the reader for the revelation which is to follow. In devel

oping this thought he notes that the "many (tons pollous), of whom each indi
vidual is but
ordinary person (on spoudaios aiwr). when they meet together
an

may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but
collectively."
'summation'

David Keyt calls this "the famous (p. 270).

but the relative lack of attention it has received suggests neglect rather than

notoriety. Here Aristotle inserts the analogy of a feast, which is better when many
contribute to its provision than only one. The connection? "For each individual

among the many has a share in virtue and prudence, and when they meet together,
they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, hands, and senses, and
disposition."
who is a figure of their mind and Delba Winthrop hints at an ironic

reading of this passage, for "Aristotle's reference to the many coming together
monstrous"

with many hands and feet suggests that he thinks the result will be (p.
1 59n.). Similarly, Michael Davis notes that "Aristotle has not described a man

here so much as an Aristophanic monster, which, any hierarchical or

lacking
all"

ruling principle, is not a whole at (p. 54). These statements need to be sorted
"many"

out. First, Aristotle is speaking of the in their deliberative capacity, either

"many"
as part of a council, assembly, or jury. Second, he is taking the in the
collective sense, that is, acting as a group. It is important to note that Aristotle

says the many may be better judges when operating in this capacity. This aside,
"ordinary"
how can a combination of many judgments issue in decisions which
"good"

are superior to those of the few ones? The analogy of the feast appears

ill suited to shedding light on the matter: it is to confuse quantity with quality.
Lindsay maintains that Aristotle ultimately rejects this argument and "denies the

quantitative-qualitative transformation on which the defense of the multitude is

made to depend (1992a, p. 105). As for the analogy itself, Winthrop observes that
"[n]o satisfactory proof is given that they [the many] either have good taste or

sound judgment about (p. 159). Moreover, as

Mary Nichols writes,
direction
planning"

"[a] potluck supper requires some overall and or the resulting

Aristophanes'

mixture of foods (as in Assembly of Women) may prove revolting

(1992, pp. 66, 195n.). Yet in the next passage, Aristotle suggests that the virtue
and prudence of the many, while less in the individual than in any one of the few,
combines, increases, and surpasses the collective virtue and prudence of the
truly
"good."
If Aristotle is simply pointing to the superiority of the many on the basis
of sheer numbers, there would be no confusion. But clearly this is not the case.

What he appears to be saying is that the virtue and prudence of discrete indi
is of a kind of synergistic aggregation,
viduals capable
something like a class
room of finger-painting six-year-olds producing a Renoir.
This analogy may appear as spurious as Aristotle's, but the example he uses

to illustrate the last quoted passage makes it somewhat less suspect. He asserts

that "the many (hoi polloi) are better judges than a single man of music and

In this assertion Aristotle directly contradicts Plato, who, in the Laws,

ardently denies the capacity of the many to evaluate works of art competently.
 Public Deliberation and Popular Government in Aristotle 245

Moreover, Plato directly links the prevalence of popular opinion in the arts to the
rise of extreme
democracy in Athens, blaming the poets for giving birth to "a sort
'theatrocracy,'"
of vicious which "proved to be the starting-point of everyone's

conviction that he was an authority on everything, and of a general disregard for

law."
the Andrew Lintott attributes Aristotle's departure from his teacher to "the
life"
spoken and unspoken assumptions of Athenian public regarding the delib
influenced"
erative capacities of the many, which are alleged to "have strongly
him (p. 1 17). This reading fails, however, to account for passages where Aristotle
contradicts himself on this very point. Later in the Politics, for example, he says

"[i]t is difficult, if not impossible, for those who do not perform to be good judges
others"

of the performances of (bk 7, chap. 6). In the Ethics he writes, "pit is only
the experts in a given art who can judge its products correctly and understand by
"
what means and methods perfection is achieved . . (bk 10, chap. 9). I see no

way to reconcile these passages, which points to the possibility that book 3,
chapter 11 was not written
by Aristotle, but represents an interpolation of a more
democratic disciple (see Lord). Naturally, the truth of this claim will depend on
theidentities of the many and the one, yet on face it would appear that more
frequently just the opposite holds true. But Aristotle attempts to explain: "some
understand one part, and some another, and among them they understand the
whole."

Richard Mulgan notes, "it does not follow from this [i.e., that each of the

many understand a portion] that as a group they understand and appreciate the
whole. Assuming that each of the individuals misunderstands at least a part of the

work it makes equally good sense to say that the group misunderstands the

More to the point, "[o]ne cannot establish that the collective judgment of

the group is superior without specifying some way in which the good qualities of

each individual coalesce into a collective judgment while the bad qualities are
do"
rejected. This Aristotle fails to (1977, p. 105). The example may be a poor
one, but the explanation does move the argument forward, for it suggests (as
applied to deliberation) a process of consultation, including the exchange of

information. Mulgan has anticipated this suggestion, observing that Aristotle

may be "understood to mean that the superior collective judgment emerges

through a process of public discussion, and to be foreshadowing the modern view

discussion."
that democracy is a process of government by On the other hand,
Aristotle "simply says that the people 'come together', a vague description which
aggregation"

would cover any sort of assembly or (p. 105). The implication for
public decision-making is obvious, and it may well be that the many are (col
lectively) possessed of more information and insight than the few on a given
man"

matter. Accordingly, the notion that the deliberating many become "one
disposition,"

who is a "figure of their mind and should not be read as an adum

bration of Rousseau's general will, that is, the reified expression of the common

good. (Moreover, Rousseau would prohibit members of the assembly from di

rectly conferring with one another.) Rather it serves as a metaphor to indicate

how the discrete judgments of the many are compounded and expressed in a
246 Interpretation

unified manner. As Mulgan notes, "[t]he addition is a metaphorical, not a literal,

sum . . (p. 104). Yet it is still fair to ask, as Lindsay does, "how does physical

accretion likewise improve 'character and (1992a. p. 104).

The preceding may be
explication a plausible account of how the many come

to exercise a deliberative judgment equal or superior to the notable few, but

Aristotle is not finished with the argument. At this point, however, it seems
"good"

appropriate to ask, will not the individual judgments of the few citizens

combine in a similar manner as those of the many? Aristotle does not provide a

direct answer, and what he does say is puzzling. He does recognize "a similar
combination of qualities in good men (hoi spoitdaioi). who differ from any

individual
pollon)"

of the many (ton but the combination in question is in the

individual man ("in whom the scattered elements are combined"), not among

individually good men. Still, there is a clear indication that Aristotle was aware

of the difficulties of the argument, for he leaves the issue of "[w]hether this
principle [of the superiority of the many] can apply to every democracy, and to
bodies
men"

all of in doubt. In fact, the entire basis of the argument is placed in

serious question, for if strictly applied it "would equally hold about brutes"; and

are not some men little better than beasts? On the other hand, "there may be some
true."

bodies of men about whom our statement is nevertheless The alleged

superiority of the many, then, would appear to turn on individual capacities for
virtue and prudence, and not on any inherent principle of collective wisdom. This
"many"

charitable reading of Aristotle's claim for the is developed by Ernest

Barker who writes, "[e]ach unit of the mass has its particle of virtue and moral

wisdom; and the meeting of the mass is not merely the union of many bodies in
one place, but also a confluence of many characters and intellects in a single

stream. Each intellect acts as complement to its fellow, ultimately there is

until

no defect. Every facet of a problem has some intelligence directed at it, until
finally the whole problem is surveyed by a whole intelligence, which may well
judge securely, because it judges every faculty, on every
point"

(p. 351). A
variant of this interpretation is made by Patrick Coby, who claims that for
Aristotle "[t]he multitude represent a great warehouse of human virtue needing
only some organization and assembly in order to become politically useful; they
are the audience who see everything in the play but who require a theater critic
observations"

to bring coherence to their (p. 909). The problem with this reading
is that it goes well beyond what Aristotle actually says, and overlooks what he
"many"

does say about the virtue of the on other occasions. Moreover, the
political equivalent of the theater critic does not appear in the Politics. It is not

implausible, however, that Aristotle assumed that the officials elected

by the
multitude would supply this function. Thus it may be argued, as Nichols does,
that "Aristotle's argument in favor of the many points to the need for states . . .

manship, that is, for some reflection that can see a whole that the parts can form,
some judgment to guide the individual contributions toward the common good"

(1992, p. 66). It may also be suggested that the institutional procedures

governing
 Public Deliberation and Popular Government in Aristotle 247

the political activities of the many would serve to regulate, and therefore mod

erate, its deliberations (see Stockton and Ober).

Aristotle does not explicitly make this argument, at least not here. Rather, he
simply suggests the foregoing analysis provides an answer to the original query
regarding the supremacy of the multitude, as well as the related question of "what
power should be assigned to the mass of freemen and citizens (tons clcutherous
merit."

kai to plenthston politon), who arc not rich and have no personal Aris
totle's discussion of the latter is an important part of his democratic theory, but
it is also relevant to the matter at hand. The many, Aristotle continues, may prove
superior in their collective (deliberative) capacity, but "[t]here is still a danger in
allowing them to share the great offices of state, for their folly will lead them into
crime."

error, and their dishonesty into This would seem consistent with the view

that the many, taken individually, possess but a small portion of practical virtue,
and are therefore unqualified to hold high office. Yet Aristotle's reference to the
"folly," "error," "dishonesty," "crime"

and of the many simply recapitulates the

paradox of their alleged superiority over the wise and virtuous few. While not

alluding directly to these terms as applied to the many, scholars have occasion

ally cited the inadequacy and paradoxical nature of Aristotle's argument on this

point. William Newman notes that "Aristotle forgets that bad qualities will be
thrown into the common stock no less than good ones (pp. 256-57). In a

similar vein, Lindsay asks, "on what basis can one expect the multitude's virtues,
fore?"

rather than its defects, to come to the (1992a, p. 104). More generally, as

Winthrop writes. "[t]he arguments made to establish the sufficiency of the taste

and judgment of the many, as distinguished from the few good are obviously
inadequate. The many are said to be able to judge the whole well, for we can

suppose that among them are individuals each of whom knows a part well. Not

only can we ask why the total result will be the sum of noble and correct rather

than base and ignorant judgments, but we can ask whether a whole is not more

than the sum of its parts (p. 159n.). Is this not the equivalent of maintaining
that order can arise out of chaos, virtue out of vice, truth out of error?
We have seen that Aristotle anticipates this objection, but he has yet to

provide asatisfactory reply. For the moment he is concerned with resolving the
dilemma that arises from excluding the many from the higher offices of state.

Undoubtedly it is dangerous to allow average citizens to occupy such offices, but

"there is a danger also in not letting them share, for a state in which many poor
enemies

men are excluded from necessarily be full of

office will The only

solution, Aristotle avers, is the one instituted by Solon and other legislators,
functions,"

namely, to "assign to them some deliberative and judicial such as "the

account.

power of electing to offices, and of calling magistrates to The many

should not, however, be eligible for offices held singly. In defending this doc

trine, Aristotle resorts to his earlier argument but with a twist. Because each of
judgment,"

the many, when "left to himself, forms an imperfect none is suffi

ciently qualified to hold office individually; but "[w]hen they meet together their
248 Interpretation

"
perceptions are quite good enough . . . . The addition comes in the next clause:

. and combined with the better class (tois beltiosi) they are useful to the
state." 'rehabilitated.'

Lindsay refers to this formulation as "the second, or ver

superiority,"

sion of collective and reads Aristotle's qualifications as constituting

form"
a
"radically diluted of his argument for the many. On the basis of this

modification, Lindsay contrasts modern participatory democracy, which rests on

the competence and inclusion of the many, with Aristotle's version of democ
racy, which "depends as much on exclusion as thus, "call[ing] into
participation,"

'certain'
question even the limited virtue granted the multitude by Aristotle
(1992a, pp. 107, 109). Winthrop opposes this view, concluding that "[t]he de
fense of participatory democracy originally intended by modern political theory
Aristotle's"
was no less qualified than (p. 171). Is Aristotle now saying that the
judgment of the many is valuable only insofar as it combines with the judgment
of the "few good"? The analogy used to illustrate this point, that a mixture of

impure food food is

wholesome"

and pure often "more than a small amount of

pure alone, could hardly be more unfortunate. Peter Simpson argues, contra

Lindsay, analogy "implies

that the that a mixture is only necessary and just
. .

when the few best are not good enough to have control all by themselves for if
they were good enough, there could be no need to mix in something impure as
well. Further, the example also shows that the sort of regime Aristotle has in
polity"

mind in this chapter is not democracy proper but the mixed regime of (p.
"polity" "democracy"
168). Observing the distinction between and in the Politics
is certainly relevant to understanding Aristotle's thoughts on the political role of

the many, a distinction Lindsay overlooks, yet it does not, in itself, account for
"summation"
the argument in book 3, chapter 11. Part of the difficulty resides in
Aristotle's use of analogies, which may indicate, as Nichols notes, an apprecia
"heterogeneity," "ambiguity"
tion for but are nonetheless plagued by (1992, pp.

66, 67-68, 70). The issue of the many and the few appears to have become more,
rather than less, opaque.

In characteristic fashion, Aristotle recognizes the inadequacy of this reasoning

its implications for "the form
government."

and negative popular of If governing

is a skill (techne) or science (episteme) like medicine, how can the unskilled

many sit in judgment of the skilled few? Is this not also true in the case of

elections? "For a right election can only be made by those who have knowledge
ergon),"

(ton eidoton and the many do not possess knowledge, but "true opinion
alethes)"

(doxa at best. Earlier in book 3 Aristotle writes, "[fjhe virtue of the

is certainly wisdom, but only true
opinion"

subject not (chap. 4. See also Davis,

p. 51). There is a similar difficulty in Aristotle's tendency to equate political
aptitude with virtue. As Barker notes, "[pjolitical capacity seems different from
virtue, though it is more than once mentioned
along with virtue
by
Aristotle"
(p.
348). And while there may be "some occupations and arts in which private

persons share in the abilities to choose, they certainly cannot choose better than
eidoton)."

those who know (ton On the basis of this reasoning, "neither the
 Public Deliberation and Popular Government in Aristotle 249

election of magistrates, nor the calling of them to account, should be entrusted to

plethos)."

the many (to

Such was the view of Plato, whom Aristotle may have had in mind, but does
not mentionby name. Plato, who viewed
statesmanship as a strict science,
insisted that the reviewing authority must be greater than the
authority reviewed.
Claiming in the Laws that "the office of Scrutineer is the single most crucial
disintegrates,"
factor determining whether a state survives or Plato lamented how
"desperately difficult [it is] to find someone of high moral standards to exercise
"

authority over the authorities ... Aristotle also considered the authority to
election, "the
all,"

audit officials, along with the power of greatest of but believed

it could be entrusted, at least under favorable circumstances, to the many. For
Plato statesmanship is a skill or science, analogous to other skills, only higher.
The capacity to correctly perform a skill is, accordingly, a function of knowledge,
and it is the presence of knowledge (phronesis) that determines whether one is
truly a doctor, a musician, a pilot, or a statesman. This analogy is prevalent in all
Plato's political dialogues, but nowhere more so than in the Statesman, which

"the uncompromising statement of the idea in the Platonic

corpus"

contains most

(Rowe, p. 18). The difference between Plato and Aristotle on this issue, and its
vital importance in their political thought, has been deftly summarized by Shel
don Wolin (pp. 57-63). Aristotle retains a portion of this teaching, but as in so

many other cases, modifies it in accordance with actual experience. First he

claims that the (Platonic) objections are largely answered by the earlier argu

ments, namely, "that if the people (to plethos) are not utterly degraded, although

individually they may be worse judges than those who have special knowledge
better."
(ton eidoton) as a body they are as good or Here Aristotle makes

explicit what he had only intimated before: the deliberative superiority (or equal
ity) of the many assumes a relative soundness in their (moral-cognitive) consti

tution. Second, he rejects a strict application of the techne argument to the realm

of politics, for "there are some arts whose products are not judged of solely, or
themselves,"

best, by the artists or even by other artists. Will not the homeowner
judge better of the house than the builder? the pilot better of the rudder than the

carpenter? and the guest better of the food than the cook? Aristotle's examples

areless than compelling, but they do speak to the ability of average citizens to
"products"
comprehend (if only partially) the of politics. He would have been on

more solid ground, however, had he linked this ability to the concepts of right

and interest, the original and perennial sources of political judgment. Mulgan,
who finds in Aristotle's notion that the art of politics is not exempt from lay
argument"

control "a much better than the doctrine of collective superiority, hints
at a similar solution. On the one hand, "it is difficult to argue that the population

as a whole is likely to have opinions superior to those of the expert few. On the
other hand, if political decisions are seen as decisions which affect the population

and if the individual is assumed to be the best judge of how he ought to be

affected, then the case for democratic rather than expert government is much
250 Interpretation
"products"

stronger (1977, p. 106). The which issue from the science of politics

may fall within the ken of the many, but it is the relation of these to their rights

and interests that constitutes the foundations of popular judgment.

the Platonic objections, Aristotle to
answered"

Having "sufficiently returns

the original paradox as expressed in the many's election and scrutiny of magis
thing"

trates. Since these functions are "the

all,"

greatest of is it not "a strange

matters"

that the multitude should have more authority in "greater than the few?
Yet as Aristotle observes, some existing states assign these duties to the people

as constituted in a popular assembly, which is supreme in such matters. Typically

these states place a low property qualification for membership in the assembly,

while a high qualification is attached to the great offices of state, thereby re

solving the problem of the many and the few. In such cases, the many exercise

authority over the most important general matters (which they are most qualified
to judge), and the few are entrusted with the high executive offices (which they

are most qualified to hold). However, the "reason the many (to plethos) may
few"
claim to have a higher authority than the is not owing to their superior
judgment when assembled, but to the superiority of their collective wealth and
numbers. While collective wealth and numbers may have constituted the foun
dation for the many's claim to govern, it was not the only basis. Isocrates, the
great rhetorician, appears to have sided with the many who rely on opinion

against the few self-proclaimed experts. Similarly, Demosthenes, the finest orator

of his time, observed that he was more likely to be mistaken than his audience,
and emphasized the value of experience in judgment. Athenagoras, a popular
"intelligence"

leader in Syracuse, defended the of the demos against the preten

sions of the rich, maintaining in Thucydides, that "it is the many who are best at
them."

listening to different arguments and judging betweenOber, in citing these

examples, avers that the "Athenian faith in group decision making was

grounded in the assumption that the collective wisdom of a large

group was
parts"

inherently greater than the wisdom of its many (p. 163).

Here the discussion of the many and the few breaks off, and Aristotle proceeds

to consider generally the other claims to political authority. His discussion of

these claims is aperotic and informed by the belief "that none of the principles on
which men claim to rule and to hold all other men in subjection to them are
right"

strictly (bk 3, chap. 13). While his remarks in this chapter center on the
issue of the right to rule, he does make a passing reference to the "many"

considered collectively. In response to the claim that virtue or wealth should be

the basis of authority, he notes that "the many (to plethos) might
fairly answer

that they themselves are often better few (to oligon) I do not
and richer than the
collectively."

say individually, but This reference sheds no additional light on the

summation argument but does indicate that Aristotle has not abandoned it. It also

reinforces, if only obliquely, the notion that the judgments of the

many are best
when mixed with those of the few. Support for this supposition appears earlier in
book 3. chapter 13 in the form of a question: "Suppose the virtuous (hoi ten
 Public Deliberation and Popular Government in Aristotle 251

areten echontes) to be very few in number: may we consider their numbers in

relation to their duties, and ask whether they are enough to administer the state,
state?"

or so many as will make up a Again, Aristotle does not provide a direct

answer, but it may be reasonably inferred that in such a case it will be necessary
to include the many, who collectively "are often better and richer than the few
oligon)."

(ton
This would appear Aristotle's final word on the matter, but the issue reappears

in his discussion of royal government, and particularly in response to the ques

tion, "when the law cannot determine a point at all, or not well, should the one
decide?"
best man or should all (bk 3, chap. 15). Surprisingly, very few com
mentators have attempted to integrate the discussion which follows with Aris

totle's earlier remarks. The argument begins as a mere recapitulation, complete

with the analogy of the feast, but Aristotle does provide some additional reasons
individual."

why "a multitude (ochlos) is a better judge of many things than any
oligon

First, the many (to plethos) are more incorruptible than the few (ton for
the same reason "a greater quantity of water is less easily corrupted than a
. .

little."

Second, while "[t]he individual is liable to be overcome by anger or some

other passion, and then his judgment is necessarily perverted; it is hardly to

be supposed that a great number of persons would all get into a passion and go
moment."

wrong at the same

On its face there is little to object to in the first claim. By virtue of their

superior numbers, it stands to reason that the many are less likely than the few
"few" "good" "wise"
to be corrupted all at once. But if the are also the and (as
Aristotle indicates), are they not largely immunized from corruption? Further
"folly," "error," "dishonesty," "crime,"

more, if the many are prone to and is it

not likely that their susceptibility to corruption is actually greater? To avoid this
conclusion Aristotle "assume[s] that they are freemen (hoi eleutheroi), and that

they never act in violation of the law, but fill up the gaps which the law is obliged
leave."
to But is this not to conflate the many with the few? It would appear so,

for Aristotle concedes that "such virtue is scarcely attainable by the multitude
(pollois)."

Accordingly, "we need only suppose that the majority are good men
politai)."

(agathoi andres) and good citizens (agathoi In such a case, "which will
good?"

be more incorruptible, the one good ruler or the many who are all

The second argument, like the first, appears reasonable on the surface, but
psych

fails to contemplate the group dynamic popularly known as "mob

a phenomenon not foreign to ancient Greek politics. On the other hand, if Ar

istotle assumes the presence of a check on the rule of the many, the bane of
irrationality"

"collective may be duly countered. As Miller notes, "[i]t might be

objected against Aristotle's summation argument that it fails to take into account
problems of collective irrationality, but it can be replied that the mixed consti

tution provides a check on the rule of the many which prevents the sort of
"

irrational excesses perpetrated under extreme democracy (1995, p. 262).

In considering these arguments it should be recalled that in book 3, chapter 15
252 Interpretation

Aristotle is not primarily interested in the deliberative abilities of the many and
the few per se. The original query was: who is better qualified to determine a
matter which the law fails to resolve, the many or the one? In the process of

answering, however, Aristotle repeats his assertion in book 3, chapter 1 1 regard

ing the collective superiority of the multitude over the few. He then turns to the

issue of corruption as the key factor in determining the matter. What is curious

is the perceived need to elevate the quality of the many in order to establish their

superiority to a single good man. The reason for this becomes clear in the

concluding passage. Here we learn that Aristotle's one good man, the royal ruler,
"true"

is good in an absolute sense. For the multitude to judge as

correctly as the

monarch requires a similar goodness in the many, least a majority of them.

or at

This is evident from Aristotle's response to the objection that "there may be
parties among them [the many], whereas the one man is not divided against
himself." his,"
His answer, that "their character is as good as suggests that the

many in question constitute an aristocracy, for this is the term Aristotle applies

to a regime in which the many citizens are truly good. The suspicion is confirmed

in the final sentence, where aristocracy is defined as "the rule of many men, who
(agathon)"
are all of them good And in keeping with his notion that two good
heads are better than one, Aristotle concludes that "aristocracy will be better for
states than royalty provided only that a number of men equal in virtue can be
found."

In light of the context of these remarks, is it fair to say that Aristotle has
"summation"

abandoned the argument in book 3, chapter 1 1 ? Or does the argu

ment in book 3, chapter 15 simply represent a variation? The one observer who

has attempted to integrate the two accounts claims that in the former "[collective
judgment is defended
aristocratically,"

. while in the latter Aristotle "provides

democratic
aristocracy"

a argument to defend (Coby, p. 909). This solution

would seem to run counter to Aristotle's clearly stated claim that democracy and
aristocracy are antipodal regimes and the most difficult to fuse. Yet, as Coby

notes, Aristotle holds out the

possibility of merging the two on the condition that
magistrates may in no way profit from office,
thereby insuring the rule of the well
off and relieving the poor from service, while
guaranteeing the integrity of the
public coffers (book 5, chap. 8). This clever construction does not fully resolve

the difficulties in Aristotle's doctrine, but it would appear to exonerate him from
the charge of inconsistency.
Having examined Aristotle's reasoning in detail, we may now summarize his
doctrine of summation. As is often the case in Aristotle, what begins as a rather
dubious assertion emerges as a far more coherent and plausible claim. The weak

points in his argument have been duly noted. Far more interesting are Aristotle's
additions, which render his case for the deliberative superiority of the many less
"mitigating"
paradoxical than it appears in its initial formulation. These additions
include his (1) understanding of politics as a soft science, which requires knowl
edge and skill, but is not wholly beyond the comprehension (at least in terms of
 Public Deliberation and Popular Government in Aristotle 253

its products) of the average citizen; (2) assumption that the many are not col

lectively corrupt or incontinent; (3) suggestion that the collective judgment of the

many is best when blended with that of the individually wiser few; (4) exclusion

of members of the many from the higher offices of state on the basis of their
limited capacity, qua individuals, for virtue and prudence, and (5) claim that the
right of the many to rule is but a partial right, limited by the right (or interests)
of other claimants to authority, and more generally, by the demands of justice.
With these qualifications in mind, Aristotle's doctrine of collective superiority
takes on a far more judicious cast and places him in the mainstream of modern

republican theory.
A democratic reading of Aristotle's doctrine of political deliberation speaks to

the second concern raised at the outset of this essay: the implications of this

doctrine for his status as a proponent of popular government. In fine, is his

teaching consistent with modern conceptions of democratic rule or representative

democracy? A complete answer would require a detailed analysis of Aristotle's

remarks on the forms of government, a task well beyond the present scope.

Another way of pursuing this question is to compare Aristotle's view of popular

deliberation with that of the moderns, particularly those who made an important
contribution to the liberal republican tradition. A review of such thinkers as

Machiavelli, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Rousseau, Madison, and Burke would

show that Aristotle was no less, and often more, trusting of the many than most
"liberal"
of his more successors, (See Machiavelli, Discourses, bk 1, chaps 47,
58; Locke, Second Treatise of Government, sees. 140, 149; Montesquieu, Spirit
Science,"

of the Laws, bk 1, chap. 6; Hume, "That Politics May Be Reduced to a

and "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth"; Rousseau, Social Contract, bk 2, chaps.
6, 7; Madison, Federalist, nos. 10, 51, 55, 63; and Burke, Reflections on the
Revolution in France, Pocock, 1987, pp. 36^-0.) Fortunately, Aristotle provides
a concise discussion of public deliberation as it relates to these forms in book 4,
element"

chapter 14. Here he defines the "deliberative as that part of the con

stitution which"has authority in matters of war and peace, in making and un

making alliances; it passes laws, inflicts death, exile, confiscation, elects mag
accounts."

istrates and audits their It is clear that Aristotle is now using

"deliberation"
in the broader sense to include all who have authority to make

decisions affecting the commonweal. The decisive issue, however, is the manner

in which these powers are distributed: all to all? all to some? some to all, others

to some? The first arrangement is characteristic of democracy, the second oli

"pure"

garchy, and the third polity, a fusion of the two. In a democracy, the

popular assembly determines all public matters, with no interference from elected
democracy."

magistrates, an arrangement found in the "worst form of Con

versely, when only a selected few determine these matters, althoughaccording to
regime. Aristotle
oligarchy,"

law, "the government is a pure a similarly perverted

does approve of moderate democracy and moderate oligarchy, in which some

deliberative powers are given to the many and others to the few, some elected by
254 Interpretation

vote others by lot. And while there are various ways of assigning these powers,
in each case the general citizenry, individually and collectively, directly and

indirectly, will have a hand in decision-making.

For Aristotle, the key is not so much the particular arrangements whereby
citizens dispose of public matters (except in cases such as war, which require

"special knowledge") as the principles of balance and inclusion. Just as he argued

that the judgment of the many is most useful when combined with that of the

"better he now calls on democracies to adopt measures for insuring the

attendance of both the poor and the rich at public assemblies; for citizens "will
advise better if they all deliberate together the people (demos) with the notables
(plethous)"

(gnorimon) and the notables with the people (bk 4, chap. 14). Simi
larly, where decision-making is entrusted to a council or smaller body, "[i]t is a

good plan that . . . [its members] be elected by vote or by lot in equal numbers
classes."

out of the different The need for balance and inclusion is even more

vital to the stability of oligarchies, which are inherently prone to faction and
injustice. In order to avert this tendency, "either certain persons should be co-

opted from the mass, or a class of officers should be appointed . . . who are

termed probuli and guardians of the law; and the citizens should occupy them
deliberated."
selves exclusively with matters on which these have previously In
this way, "the people (ho demos) will have a share in the deliberations of the

state, but will not be able to disturb the

constitution."

principles of the Here we

people"

find a corollary to Aristotle's belief that "the should exercise "some

functions,"

deliberative and judicial namely, electing and auditing magistrates,

but as individuals are unqualified to hold high office.
This brief look at Aristotle's views on the distribution of power and arrange

ments for decision-making strongly supports a democratic (or perhaps more

precisely, a republican) reading of his political thought. The confusion surround

"democracy" "republic"

ing the use of and has never been fully resolved. Madi
son's famous attempt to distinguish the two in Federalist 10 and 39 remains the
"democracy,"
locus classicus, but the marked preference for using both in the
United States and elsewhere, to define governments based on the principle of

representation inverts Madison's usage. Aristotle was faced with a similar dif
ficulty, and like Madison redefined a term (politeia) to distinguish a government

based on the direct many ("democracy") from one combining the

rule of the
"polity"

many and the few ("polity"). And while a is more democratic than a
"republic,"
as defined by Madison, both may be said to combine democratic
principles with republican methods. The similarity is even closer when one
considers the use of initiative, referendum, and ballot measures at the state and

local level in American may be found in his remarks

politics. Additional support

on polity (or constitutional government) and middle-class democracy made ear

"polity,"
lier in book 4. The term as a distinct form of government, is first defined

as a regime in which "the citizens (plethos) at large administer the state for the
common interest (koinon (bk 3, chap. 7). Polity, then, is at once a
 Public Deliberation and Popular Government in Aristotle 255

descriptive and normative term in Aristotle's vocabulary: it is not merely popular

government, but one that governs in the interest of the whole. Later, polity is
democracy,"
described "as a fusion (mi.xus) of
oligarchy and adding that "the
term is usually applied to those forms of government which incline towards
democracy"
(bk 4, chap. 8). On the basis of this definition, one is tempted to
equate polity with moderate democracy, but this would be a mistake. For Aris
totle polity is not a variety of democracy, but a distinct type, a hybrid as it were.
Even the moderate forms of democracy (and oligarchy) are governments rooted
in class interest, whereas institutional governments "unite the freedom of the
rich."

poor and the wealth of the Again, polity is not a mere patchwork of
"admixture"
incongruent elements, but a coherent of democratic and oligarchic
indenture"

principles which fit together "like the parts of an (bk 4, chap. 9).
each,"

Hence, in "a constitutional state, one element will be taken from and as

applied to the contentious issue of qualifications for public office, requires taking
"from oligarchy the principle of electing to offices [as opposed to lot or rotation],
office]."

and from democracy the disregard of qualification [for holding By such

union"

means a "true of the two principles is affected; a union marked by the

"democracy" "oligarchy"

interchangeable use of and to describe a state in which

("Polity"
is simply the generic name for "constitution.")
complete."

"the fusion is

Indeed, so complete a fusion that the parts form an integrated and seamless
whole; for "[i]n a well-tempered polity (te politeia te memigmere kalos) there
neither."

should appear to be both elements and yet

Since most Greek states are (on Aristotle's admission) comprised of rich and

poor, it would seem obvious that polity is the form of government best suited to

most states. He does not explicitly say this, but the inference is justified, indeed,
required by logic. Moreover, constitutional government represents a mean, which

for Aristotle is the categorical imperative both in ethics and politics. Confusion
arises, however, when he distinguishes middle-class rule from democracy and
states"

oligarchy and identifies it as "the best constitution for most (bk 4, chap.
politei

11). Does this mean that polity and the "middle constitution (mese are

essentially synonymous for Aristotle? But how can this be if polity is a fusion of

the rich and poor? And how can the middle-class regime be best for most states

when most states are divided between rich and poor? Unfortunately, Aristotle
does not discuss the relation between the two constitutions, but there is no real

inconsistency in his classification. Curtis Johnson finds Aristotle "guilty of ob

discovers fundamental
polity,"

scurity in the extreme when it comes to but also a

theory (pp. 203, 189).

"coherence"
when viewed against his overall constitutional

In contrast identify polity

to those who would with the middle constitution, or

simply accuse inconsistency and confusion, Johnson demonstrates

Aristotle of

that polity is a mixed regime (combining the rich and poor), whereas the middle

constitution is a popular regime dominated by the middle class. (See also Yack,

pp. 231-39.) The solution to the apparent confusion is found in Aristotle's

definition of political science, which aims to identify (1) the best state in the
256 Interpretation

"abstract" "absolute"

or sense; (2) "that which is best relative to ';

and (3) that "which is best-suited to states in
general"

(bk 4, chap. 1 ). Polity, then,

is best relative to circumstances in Greece, whereas the mese politeia is best in
general. Both are distinguished from oligarchy and democracy, but constitutional
go\ eminent is a fusion, a fusion deemed unnecessary in a state dominated by the
middle class. The institutional arrangements will be quite similar in both states

(bk 5, chap. 6): the key difference lies in the social composition of political

classes.

Aristotle provides a number of reasons

why a state "composed of middle-class
best,"
citizens is necessarily essentially the same reasons given today: equality,

moderation, stability, and justice (bk 4, chap. 11). This teaching, as well his
views on decision-making and polity, are not only consistent with his remarks on

the deliberative superiority of the many, but strongly support the view that

Aristotle endorsed a theory of government not so different from our own. Anyone
familiar with the principles contained in the Declaration of Independence and the

government embodied in the Constitution cannot read the Politics without noting
a marked kinship between the principles and prescriptions of Aristotle and those

of the American Founders. The philosopher's unequivocal commitment to the

rule of law and not men (bk 2, chap. 2; bk 3, chap. 1 1 ; bk 5. chap. 7), his repeated

equation of justice with the common good (bk 3, chaps 6, 7, 12, 13), his defi
equals"

nition of constitutional rule as "a government of freeman and (bk 1 ,

chaps 7, 12; bk 3, chap. 4), and his implicit doctrine of popular sovereignty (bk
3, chaps 1, 7) top the list of shared ideals. Insofar as Aristotle identifies eudai-

monia as the end of human life, he is also committed to "the pursuit of happi
ness.") Similarly, Aristotle advocates (bk 2, chap.
a mixed form of government

6; bk 4, chaps. 8, 9) bottomed on the 11), marked by

middle class (bk 4, chap.

a wide distribution of power and property (bk 2, chaps. 6, 7, 1 1; bk 4, chap. 1 1 ).

and designed to balance various interests (bk 4, chaps. 8, 9, 11), a position

embraced by the Framers. As for Aristotle's specific prescriptions, we have

already noted his strong preference for blending democratic and oligarchic prin

ciples in matters of elections, office-holding, and decision-making. Like the

Founders, he was animated by the desire to accommodate the legitimate, but
often competing, claims of liberty, property, equality, and order. Aristotle even

anticipates the American motto e pluribus uiuiin, for "[t]he state . . is a plurality
united"

which should be (bk 2. chap. 5). Finally, his belief that no constitution,
however well constructed, can survive without the support of all classes of

citizens (bk 4, chap. 9) was also shared by the Revolutionary generation. To take
barriers"
but one example, Publius recognized that the "parchment created by the
Constitution only as good as the people's willingness to support them. For
were

instance, Hamilton observes that "whatever fine declarations may be inserted in

any constitution respecting it [liberty of the press], must altogether depend on
opinion"

public (Federalist 84), whereas Madison acknowledged that

"
ultimately
"all governments rest on opinion . (Federalist 49).
 Public Deliberation and Popular Government in Aristotle 257

There are a number of

interesting parallels between Aristotle and the Ameri
can Founders, but these are the most striking. Indeed, given this fact it is re

markable how little attention they have received. While often noted in passing,
Aristotle's influence on the American Founders, and the republican tradition

upon which they drew, has largely escaped investigation. Miller (1997) has
Republicanism,"
written on "Aristotle and American Classical examining John
Adams'

critique of Aristotle, andnoting his qualified acceptance of the philoso

pher's teaching on popular government. Miller also observes (1) that Madison

placed the Politics at the top of a (nonalphabetical) list of books he recommended

for congressional use in 1783, (2) that Adams included Aristotle along with

Sidney, Locke, and others

among the authors upon which the
"principles"
of the

American Revolution rested, and (3) that Jefferson placed Aristotle in this same
sentiments"

with regard to the

company "harmonizing which gave rise to the
Declaration of Independence. Far more substantial is Paul Eidelberg, who pro
Founders'
vides a sustained investigation of the political science in terms of

Aristotelian regime analysis. Less interested in direct influence (which was ad

mittedly marginal and derivative) than in a shared approach to political inquiry,

Eidelberg provides a detailed and persuasive argument that "when properly un

derstood and properly applied to the American Constitution, [the Politics] can
profoundly enrich our
understanding of that Constitution, hence the statesman
founders"

ship of the (p. 5). More recently, contributors to a collection of essays

honoring Harvard professor Harvey Mansfield refer to the notable similarities

between Aristotle's mixed government and the American regime (Blitz and

Kristol, 2000). What is lacking, however, is a systematic comparison of Aristo

tle's political teaching with that of the American Founders; a comparison that

would, I believe, reveal the remarkable degree to which Aristotle anticipated the

principles and prescriptions of the Founding Fathers. Recent efforts by commu

nitarians, liberals, and social democrats to enlist the Stagirite have certainly
revived interest in the Politics, and for this we should be thankful. In his review

of Miller (1995), Saunders declares that "Aristotle's Politics is 'hot': it has never
now"

attracted greater attention than (p. 216). Yet we still have no account that

adequately captures the political thinker who is all of these and yet none. Dif
"agenda"
ferent scholars have different agendas. The here has been to examine

a salient aspect of Aristotle's political thought and consider its implications for
his status as a proponent of popular government. Viewed against the balance of
supremacy"

the Politics, the doctrine of "collective is neither an aberration nor

an anomaly. Rather it is fully consistent with his leading ideas on the structure,

composition, and ends of government, ideas which mark Aristotle as the pro

genitor of the liberal-democratic-republican tradition. Again, one should not

ignore the illiberal teachings and authoritarian tendencies contained in the Poli
tics or confuse Aristotle with Locke or Jefferson. This said, it can hardly be
denied that a plain reading of the Politics supports a progressive reading of its
258 Interpretation

author s political theory, and one directly relevant to Americans and others

interested in their civicheritage. The ambiguities and omissions which mark the
"final"

Politics will always permit a

variety of interpretations of his teachings.

But this is what makes Aristotle so intriguing to the student of politics which

is no strange thing at all.

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