Atlantic Council

EURASIA CENTER

More than a
Frozen Conflict:
Russian Foreign Policy
Toward Moldova
William H. Hill
More than a
Frozen Conflict:
Russian Foreign Policy
Toward Moldova

 William H. Hill

ISBN: ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-556-5:

Cover photo: May 9, 2017. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian
Armed Forces, and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev seen here prior to the military parade marking the 72nd
anniversary of Victory in the 1941-45 Great Patriotic War on Red Square, Moscow. Left: President of Moldova
Igor Dodon. Dmitry Astakhov/Sputnik via Agence-France Presse.

This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence.
The author is solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do
not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions.

August 2018
CONTENTS
Foreword 3

More than a Frozen Conflict:

Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova 4

Introduction 4

An Unclear Legacy 4

Russia and Independent Moldova: Main Directions 5

Military Presence 5
Mediation with Transdniestria 6
Personnel Support 6
Economic Assistance 6
Energy Issues 7
Trade, Migrants, and Exchanges 7
Politics, Information, and Culture 8
Gagauzia 9
Geopolitical Orientation 9
Fallout from the Donbas 10

Recent Run-Ins with Moscow 11

What Comes Next? 12

Policy Recommendations for the US Government 13

About the Author 14

 More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova
FOREWORD
R
oughly speaking, the countries that emerged
from the Soviet Union have faced two sets of
problems, domestic and external. Domestically,
most of these nations still struggle with the pow-
erful vestiges of the authoritarian society and command
economy that they inherited from the Soviet Union.
These vestiges include: the control of the state and ex-
ploitation of public resources by a small elite; related
corruption; the absence of independent institutions;
non-transparent governance; elite-controlled media;
and, in some countries, ethnic tensions.
Externally, these nations have faced a powerful neigh-
bor, Russia, that under President Putin has not hidden its
demand for a sphere of influence, which would circum-
scribe their security and even their foreign economic
policies. Moscow has exploited all of these vestiges
above to extend its influence in the “Near Abroad.”1 In
the countries where ethnic tensions loom, the Kremlin
has developed the policy of “frozen conflicts.” The
Kremlin has chosen to champion the ethnic minorities in
Nagorno-Karabakh, Ajaria, Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia
and Transnistria as a means to apply pressure on the
governments in Baku, Chisinau, and Tbilisi.
This policy has meant support for the minorities, includ-
ing advisers and weapons; and the provision of peace-
keepers to control the situation on the ground and to
prevent the central government from restoring their au-
thority in the contested areas. In the case of Georgia in
2008, it involved regular military provocations through-
out the 2000’s culminating in the war of 2008.
It is important to recognize that the “frozen conflict”
policy appeared in the first days of the post-Soviet pe-
riod, well before people began to talk about possible
NATO enlargement. In other words, it was not fear of
1 “Near Abroad” is usually used to describe Russia’s neighboring states that were republics in the Soviet Union.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
an “encroaching” NATO that led the Kremlin to pursue
an explicitly imperial course.
The status of the lands between NATO/EU and Russia
is a serious source of instability in Europe and beyond.
This area has been described as a grey zone. Moscow
claims a sphere of influence in the region and has twice
resorted to war to assert its primacy there: Georgia in
2008 and Ukraine since 2014. In the process, Moscow
has set out its objective upending the post-Cold War se-
curity system established in Europe. It is consistent with
US values and interests to block this Kremlin effort and to
support the right of the countries in this area to choose
their own domestic institutions and foreign policy.
With this in mind, the Eurasia Center has moved beyond
its extensive work on Ukraine to explore the broader
problem of the “Grey Zone.” We published a paper on
Georgia in the spring—Georgia’s Path Westward by
Ambassadors (Ret) William Courtney, Daniel Fried,
Kenneth Yalowitz—and now two papers on Moldova.
Here we present the first of the two papers, More than a
Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova
by Ambassador (Ret) William Hill. Ambassador Hill,
who at one point ran the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Moldova,
is one of the West’s foremost experts on Moldova. He
presents here a nuanced analysis of the circumstances
and challenges of Chisinau’s national security policy.
No work can be done without resources. We would like
to thank Trans-Oil International for its generous fund-
ing of our Moldova programming.
Ambassador (Ret) John E. Herbst
Director of the Eurasia Center
3
More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova

MORE THAN A FROZEN CONFLICT:

Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova
INTRODUCTION
Moldova is one of the smallest and poorest countries in
Europe. Nonetheless, as part of the post-Soviet space,
or “Near Abroad,” it is a top regional foreign policy
priority for Russia.2 Moldova sits on the dividing line
between the Mediterranean and the Slavic worlds, and
thus has both geopolitical and cultural importance for
Russian policy makers and the Russian public. Present-
day Moldova has historically been part of the Ottoman
Empire, the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Romania,
and the Soviet Union, before it finally achieved inde-
pendence in 1991. Since then, Moldova’s unresolved
conflict with the breakaway region of Transdniestria
has divided the country.3
Today, Moldova is the site of a competition between
two groups, vying for the country’s domestic and geo-
political orientation; Russia on the one hand and the
United States and European Union on the other. Recent
Russian policy documents, such as the Foreign Policy
Concept released in 2016, all identify the post-Soviet
space as one of Moscow’s top priorities.4 Moldova does
not top of the list in this region, but it is far more sig-
nificant for Russian policy makers than most Western
interlocutors realize.
Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. At one time or an-
other, Turkey, Russia, and Romania have each ruled
substantial portions of present-day Moldova.5
In the modern era, after retaking Bessarabia—the ter-
ritory between the Prut and Dniestr rivers, the bulk of
present-day Moldova—in 1944, Soviet policy sought
to deny or repress any connection of the region’s
Romanophone population with Romania. As political
restraints eased under perestroika, a Moldovan na-
tional movement emerged in the Moldovan SSR, on the
right, or western, bank, pushing for separation from the
USSR, either through independence or unification with
Romania. The Slavic, Russian-speaking population—
in particular, economic elites on the left, or eastern,
bank of the Nistru/Dniestr River (Transdniestria)—re-
sisted, pushing to remain in the USSR or with Russia.
Gorbachev’s Soviet opponents and Russian nationalists
supported the Transdniestrian separatists.
Due to internal Soviet practices, many of the Soviet
troops stationed in the Moldovan SSR were ethnic
Russians, and many of them sided with the separatists.
With the support of units from the 14th Army, Tiraspol
won its brief war with Chisinau in 1992, consolidated its
foothold on the left bank of the river, and has enjoyed
de facto independence ever since.6

AN UNCLEAR LEGACY A small detachment of Russian troops remains in

Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991,
Moldova last existed as an independent state in the
early sixteenth century. What was the Kingdom of
Moldova at that time includes territory in present-day
Moldova, over the unremitting objections of that
country’s population and its successive governments.
However, the troops do not pose a threat to either
Ukraine or Romania, Moldova’s neighbors.

2 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of
the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), accessed at http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/
asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248.
3 The Romanian language name for the eastern region in Moldova, on the left bank of the Nistru River, is Transnistria (literally “across
the Nistru”); the Russian language name for the region is Pridnestrov’e (literally “by the Dniestr River”). Since the deployment of the
Mission to Moldova in 1993, the OSCE has used a compromise version – Transdniestria – which I have chosen to use throughout this
paper.
4 For example, see Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016.
5 For background on Moldova’s history from the earliest times and foreign relations, see Charles King, The Moldovans (Stanford,
Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2000) and Rebecca Haynes, “Historical Introduction” in Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies, No.
3: Moldova, Bessarabia, Transnistria, edited by Rebecca Haynes (London: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University
College London, 2003), 1-141.
6 For the background to and history of the Transdniestrian conflict, see King, The Moldovans; also, Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The
Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 129-163; also see my own work, William H. Hill, Russia, the
Near Abroad, and the West: Lessons from the Moldova-Transdniestria Conflict (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012),
especially chapter 4.

4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova
Moldovan President Igor Dodon (pictured), and leader of the
pro-Russian Moldovan Socialist Party, has supported closer
ties between Moldova and Russia, obtaining observer status of
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) for Moldova shortly after
entering office. Photo Credit: ziarul de garda
The real threat is to the rule of law and enforcement
of international norms and regimes that comes from
the ongoing division of the country and the central
government’s lack of control over all of its recognized
territory. Leaders and elites in many countries of the re-
gion—particularly Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, Turkey,
and Russia—have benefitted from the opportunity af-
forded by the so-called “black hole” of Transdniestria to
conduct illicit or tax-free trade. Moscow has generally
used its military presence and role as a mediator in the
Transdniestrian conflict settlement process to maintain
its political influence in Moldova and the region.
Although the Moldova-Transdniestria standoff is gener-
ally presented as one of the “frozen conflicts” on the
post-Soviet periphery, the Transdniestrian question has
evolved continuously since the conflict began in 1990.
However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intrusion
into the Donbas in 2014 dramatically changed the re-
gional security and political environment, and Chisinau
and Tiraspol are still adjusting to that change.
Since 2014, Moscow has continued to seek predominant
influence in Moldova, particularly through its support of
President Igor Dodon and his Socialist Party (PSRM). At
the same time, while continuing its political support for
the Transdniestrian government, Moscow has reduced its
financial subsidies. In international bodies, Russia contin-
ues to recognize Transdniestria as a part of Moldova and
has remained within the international consensus in the
OSCE-managed political settlement process.
7 Both King, Moldovans, and Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, offer accounts on this subject based on interviews with participants from all
sides; see also Edward Ozheganov, “The Republic of Moldova: Transdniester and the 14th Army” in Arbatov, Chayes, Chayes, and
Olson, eds., Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), 164-183. For a dated, but representative
example of the Moldovan position on this subject, see Mihai Gribincea, Trupele Ruse in Republica Moldova: Factor stabilzator sau sursa
de pericol (Chisinau, 1998).
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Some of the recent noisy run-ins between Moscow
and Chisinau can be explained as political positioning
and preparation for elections, elections, which are now
scheduled for February 2019.. Russia also clearly hopes
for a favorable government in Chisinau that might
maintain Moldova as a barrier to the further expansion
of Western geopolitical influence and institutions such
as NATO and the EU.
RUSSIA AND INDEPENDENT
MOLDOVA: MAIN DIRECTIONS
The main elements of Russian policy toward Moldova
have remained remarkably consistent since 1992, al-
though tactics and emphases have changed with events
and the regional and international contexts. Moscow has
provided sufficient material, financial, and political sup-
port to enable the Transdniestrian entity to survive.
At the same time, Moscow has consistently refused to
recognize Transdniestrian independence, adhering to the
international consensus that Transdniestria is an integral
part of Moldova, but should have a special political sta-
tus in the reunited country. As a mediator in the political
settlement negotiations, and through financial, energy,
and trade ties, Russia has sought to achieve predominant
or exclusive influence over all of Moldova, not just the
breakaway left bank.
Military Presence
Russia’s military presence in Moldova is part of its effort
to achieve predominant political influence in the country.
According to Soviet military officers at the time, Moscow
assumed responsibility for the 14th Army in April 1992 to
ensure control of the large stocks of weapons and equip-
ment in the country, lest the separatists sell or dispose of
them to others, such as Chechens. About eight hundred
troops remain in the present-day Operational Group of
Russian Forces (OGRF), the descendant of the 14th Army
in Moldova. A majority of the 14th Army troops went over
to the Transdniestrian army; although Russia still provides
some officers, these units are not reliably under Russian
command. Under the 1992 ceasefire agreement, Russia
deployed several thousand peacekeepers from the Volga
Military District to Moldova; today, only about eight hun-
dred Russian peacekeepers remain.7
5
More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova
Peacekeeping forces have been in Transdniestria since the 1992
ceasefire and will remain until a political settlement is reached.
Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons
Moldova has consistently demanded that Russia with-
draw its troops, and Moscow has ostensibly agreed.
Russia and Moldova signed a treaty on Russian with-
drawal in October 1994, in which Moscow agreed to
remove all Russian troops from the country “in syn-
chronization with achievement of a political settle-
ment.” Moldova ratified the treaty; but after the 1995
Duma elections, Moscow shelved the pact as unlikely
to be ratified. While the treaty never entered into force,
Moscow maintains that peacekeepers must remain until
a political settlement is reached.
As part of the overall deal in the Adapted Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty signed at the
1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit, Russia agreed to remove
all its arms, ammunition, and troops from Moldova in
two stages. Moscow met the first deadline, in 2001, for
CFE treaty limited equipment, and made great progress
in removing its vast stores of ammunition in 2002-2003.
Despite this progress, ammunition withdrawals stopped
after the prospective settlement under the Kozak
Memorandum fell apart in November 2003. Moscow
insists that its small contingent of troops must stay to
guard the remaining ammunition, while the peacekeep-
ers must remain in place until a settlement is reached.
The collapse of the CFE regime after 2007 has essen-
tially removed the main source of international leverage
on Moscow to complete its withdrawal from Moldova.8
8 For more detail on the history, see my own, William H. Hill, Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West; see also the website of the OSCE
Mission to Moldova, accessed at https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova.
9 Moldovan, Russian, Transdniestrian, and OSCE officials to the author, various dates.
6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mediation with Transdniestria
The Russian troops remaining in Moldova are now a bar-
gaining chip at Moscow’s disposal in its role as media-
tor in the Transdniestrian political settlement process.
Moscow has generally used this role and its status not
only to seek or facilitate a political settlement, although
it has done this on occasion, but also to maximize its
influence throughout Moldova and to include and retain
Moldova within its sphere of influence. Moscow has done
this by offering continuing support for Transdniestria
while simultaneously offering incentives and exerting
pressure through its bilateral relationship with Moldova.
Personnel Support
Russia provides continuous consultation and guidance
to Transdniestria through a special Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) section in the foreign
ministry. Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and
Ministry of Defense have routinely assigned personnel
for varying lengths of time to posts in Transdniestrian
security and military units. In addition, since the re-
tirement of Igor Smirnov, the longtime original leader
of the Transdniestrian separatist enterprise, Moscow
has supplied a “prime minister” for the government in
Tiraspol.9 It is not clear to what extent these factors
determine Transdniestrian behavior, but any analysis
certainly needs to consider them.
Economic Assistance
For the first fifteen years of its existence, the de facto
independent Transdniestrian government did not re-
ceive overt financial or economic assistance from
Russia. There was some Russian investment in the
Transdniestrian region, but earnings from the trade of
a number of large left bank enterprises with Western
Europe and North America provided sufficient funds
to keep the region and its government afloat. After the
crisis of 2006-2007, during which Moldova and Ukraine
attempted to assert control of the border, Moscow has
provided direct and indirect payments to the regime in
Tiraspol, particularly to cover increasing social welfare
expenses for an aging population.
However, for reasons that are not entirely clear,
Moscow has recently curtailed such cash outlays to
 More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova

is now $6 billion. From time to time, Moscow has used

gas cutoffs to pressure Moldova; but since the major
gas pipeline to customers in the Balkans runs through
Moldova, Moscow has generally been reluctant to resort
to this measure.

For much of the post-Soviet era, right bank, Moldova

Russia has provided free energy to Transdniestria for years, but
Moldova is billed for its natural gas consumption and purchases
its electrical energy from plants in Transdniestrian-controlled
territory, such as from the Moldova GRES, pictured here. Photo
Credit: Wikimedia Commons
has purchased much of its electric power from the
Moldova GRES, the massive gas-fired generating plant
in Transdniestrian-controlled territory on the border
with Ukraine. Like other enterprises in Transdniestria,
the GRES does not pay Gazprom for gas deliveries, and
so remains highly competitive in local energy markets.
Currently under Russian ownership, the GRES has been
a continuing source of revenue for interests in Ukraine
and Moldova, as well as in Transdniestria. An attempt to
shift Moldova’s electric power contract to a Ukrainian
firm in spring 2017 was ultimately reversed, and after a
number of non-transparent actions, the Moldova GRES
resumed its role as chief supplier to the right bank.12

Trade, Migrants, and Exchanges

Transdniestria. There has been speculation that the cut-
off is due to local corruption, or to the increasing costs
to Moscow of the war in the Donbas.10 In 2016, Deputy
Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin hinted that Moscow de-
sired to foster local development and self-sufficiency.11
Whatever the cause, it has resulted in increased bud-
getary hardship for Tiraspol.
Energy Issues
Free energy is the major Russian economic support to
Transdniestria. Gazprom has delivered natural gas to left
bank residential and industrial customers but has never
credibly demanded payment from Tiraspol. Indeed,
Transdniestrian authorities for years have collected util-
ity payments from residential customers but have used
those funds for the Transdniestrian budget. However,
since the turn of the century, Gazprom, and therefore
Moscow, has billed Moldova for natural gas consumed
on the left bank; the bill, including penalties and interest,
Historically, and somewhat counterintuitively, Moldova’s
right bank has been more dependent upon trade
with Russia than the Russia-friendly left bank of
Transdniestria. Moldova’s agricultural products have
gradually found markets outside Russia, but for a long
time, Russian embargoes, “sanitary inspections,” and the
like, make Moldovan wines, fruits, vegetables, and meat
exports vulnerable. Meanwhile, Transdniestria retained
many of the large Soviet-era manufacturing enterprises,
namely steel, tools, and textiles, which successfully pen-
etrated Western European markets. For a long time,
over half of the left bank’s exports went to the West;
even now, that figure is close to fifty percent.
Moscow has resorted more often to trade embar-
goes than to energy cutoffs as a means of exerting
economic and political pressure on Chisinau. In 2006,
Russia responded with an overall wine and produce
embargo following a joint Moldovan-Ukrainian effort
to close the border with Transdniestria. Since 2012,

10 Moldovan officials to author, October 2017.

11 “РОГОЗИН: «МЫ НЕ ДАЕМ РЫБУ, МЫ ДАЕМ УДОЧКУ»,” Novosti PMR, July 6, 2016,
https://novostipmr.com/ru/nwews/16-07-06/rogozin-my-ne-daem-rybu-my-daem-udochku.
12 Much of this segment is based on extensive conversations with Moldovan, Russian, and Transdniestrian officials over the years. For
recent commentary on energy issues in Moldova, see Sergiu Tofilat, “Schema Energokapital explicate pe intelesul tuturor,” Aug. 3, 2016,
available at https://sergiutofilat.wordpress.com/2016/08/03/schema-energokapital-explicata-pe-intelesultuturor/; Michael Bird, Andrei
Cotrut, “Moldovan Energy Intermediary Company Linked to ‘Billion Dollar Bank Theft’ Scandal,” March 14, 2016, available at http://www.
theblacksea.eu/index.php?idT=88&idC=88&idRec=1228&recType=story; Victor Parlicov, Tudor Soitu, and Sergiu Tofilat, “Energy and
Politics: The Price for Impunity in Moldova,” IDIS Viitorul, April 2017, available at http://viitorul.org/files/library/Policy%20Paper%20
2017%20-%20Impunitate%20si%20%20%20intelelegeri%20rentiere%20sectorul%20energetic%20-%20Disclaimer%20Nou.pdf..

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 7
More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova

was part of Imperial and Soviet Russia, and many his-

torical traces remain. The Russian-speaking portion of
the population is significantly larger than the figures
for Russian, Ukrainian, and Gagauz minorities in the
country would suggest; for a number of reasons, a sub-
stantial number of families with Romanian or Moldovan
surnames speak Russian at home as a primary or sec-
ondary language. Russian-language films, shows, and
concerts still have a ready audience in Moldova.

Russian media and information sources remain ex-

Russia has resorted to trade embargoes and “sanitary
inspections” of Moldovan exports, such as wine, as a means
of exerting economic and political pressure. Photo Credit:
Wikimedia Commons
Moscow has resorted several times to selected, often
extended embargoes or slowdowns on Moldovan wine
and produce exports to Russia. The selective use of
sanitary standards has become an apparently favored
supplement or alternative to outright embargoes.13
The large number of Moldovans working in Russia is also
a potential source of leverage and influence for Moscow.
Currently, almost 500,000 Moldovans work in Russia,
temporarily or permanently. According to the most re-
cent data, almost 30 percent of Moldova’s GDP can be
attributed to remittances; one of the largest sources of
these financial flows is Moldovans working in Russia.
Periodically, Russian authorities have reminded Moldova
of this situation, and have hinted at more vigorous en-
forcement of Russian immigration and labor laws.14
Politics, Information, and Culture
tremely important in Moldova, due as much to the
weakness of indigenous Moldovan media as to any
special efforts from Moscow. Large segments of
Moldova’s population still receive a substantial portion
of their news, sports, and entertainment from Russian
language channels, through cable, direct broadcasts,
or rebroadcasts. Given these circumstances, it is diffi-
cult to discern whether specific information or disin-
formation efforts from Moscow are a primary means of
seeking influence, or simply icing on the cake.
Moscow has also long sought direct political influence
or involvement in Moldovan politics. When former
President Vladimir Voronin campaigned for his second
term, after explicitly turning away from Russia and to-
ward the European Union (EU), Moldovan authorities ar-
rested, deported, and blocked “political technologists”
sent from Moscow to organize and finance opposition
to Voronin. Russian presidential administration officials
such as Vladislav Surkov and Modest Kolerov sponsored
pro-Russian youth groups in Transdniestria and right-
bank Moldova.15 In 2014, Chisinau authorities blocked the
recently-founded, extremely popular, pro-Russian group
“Our Party,” Partidul Noastru. The party leader, Renato
Usatii, was later elected mayor in the Russophone strong-
hold of Balti. Usatii was connected to, and allegedly fi-
nanced by, Russian Railways Chief Vladimir Yakunin;
many believed the party to be a Kremlin project.16

Russia starts with a substantial advantage in exercising Overtly, the Kremlin, and President Vladimir Putin spe-
“soft power” in Moldova. For long periods, the country cifically, cast its support for Igor Dodon, back when he

13 For a good, brief summary of the bases of Transdniestria’s economy and the 2006 crisis, see International Crisis Group, Moldova’s
Uncertain Future, Crisis Group Europe Report No.175, August 17, 2006, available at https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/moldova-s-
uncertain-future.pdf. On more recent Russian embargoes, see for example “Why Has Russia Banned Moldovan wine? To punish Moldova
for its interest in joining the EU,” Economist, Nov 25, 2013, available at https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/11/
economist-explains-18; see also Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Winemakers in Moldova Eye Thirsty Russian market: Moscow is easing its
embargo on Moldovan wines, and wineries in Europe’s poorest country hope to cash in,” Politico, May 4, 2017, available at https://www.
politico.eu/article/winemakers-in-moldova-eye-thirsty-russian-market/.
14 For recent statistics on Moldovan migrants in Russia and remittances, see for example Dorin Lozovanu and Igor Rosca,“Răspândirea
moldovenilor în lume,” GeoInformStory, Aug. 7, 2017, https://geoinformstory.blogspot.md/2017/08/raspandirea-moldovenilor-in-lume.
html; “Topul ţărilor de unde vine cel mai mare volum de transferuri băneşti în Moldova,” Diez.md, Aug. 7, 2017.
15 Moldovan officials to the author, January-February 2005.
16 There was extensive press coverage in the West of the Moldovan elections, and specifically Usatii’s disqualification. For a good
example of the coverage of Usatii, See Vladimir Socor, “Net Setback for Moldova and Its Reforms in the Latest Elections (Part Three)”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 12 Issue: 124, July 2, 2015, available at https://jamestown.org/program/net-setback-for-moldova-and-its-
reforms-in-the-latest-elections-part-three/.

8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova

Russian-speaking ethnic Turkic population. Gagauzia

had resisted Moldova’s separation from the Soviet
Union in 1990-1991 and remains highly sympathetic to
Russia and wary of possible closer association between
Moldova and Romania. There have been problems in
the interpretation and implementation of this auton-
omy agreement from the very beginning, and from
time to time, Moscow has attempted to use Gagauz
discontent to exert political pressure on Chisinau.

The most notable recent case was a controversial

2014 referendum in Gagauzia on joining the EU or
CIS Customs Union, and leaving Moldova if it joined
Romania, timed to coincide with Moldova’s adoption
and implementation of the EU Association Agreement.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe has made considerable progress in helping to
improve relations between authorities in Gagauzia and
Chisinau, but the autonomous area still contains a large
concentration of pro-Russian voters.18

Several Russian politicians and oligarchs have supported or
financed pro-Russian politicians and organizations in Moldova,
including Russian Railways Chief Vladimir Yakunin. Photo Credit:
Wikimedia Commons
was the leader of the Moldovan Socialist Party; Dodon
met Putin personally and used photos of himself and
colleagues with Putin in the 2014 parliamentary elec-
tion and 2016 presidential election campaigns. In the
2014 vote, the PSRM achieved the single largest num-
ber of seats at that time. Since assuming the presi-
dency, Dodon has met with Putin several times, and
remains favorably inclined to Moscow, although not
necessarily in lockstep.17
Gagauzia
In 1994, Moldova reached an agreement granting
limited autonomy to its Gagauz region in south-
ern Bessarabia, with a primarily Orthodox, largely
Geopolitical Orientation
From the very beginning, Moldova has remained a
part, albeit unenthusiastic, of Russia’s orbit. Moldova
joined the CIS at its inception; despite grumbling and
some public discussion, it has never pulled out. Yet,
even Voronin in his most pro-Russia period resisted
Moscow’s attempts to include Moldova in the Customs
Union and Eurasian economic integration project. At
the end of Voronin’s first term, Moldova became ex-
plicitly pro-European, a shift that was captured in the
2005 Moldova-EU Action Plan. Since the installation
of a pro-European coalition in 2009, Moldova has re-
mained oriented toward European integration, much to
Moscow’s dismay and disapproval.
Russian has unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade
Moldova from signing the Association Agreement with
the EU and instead to join the Eurasian Economic Union
(EAEU). Despite this, Dodon sought and received ob-
server status for Moldova in the EAEU soon after as-
suming office. Recent polls suggest that the Moldovan
population is almost evenly split between advocates
of the EU and of the EAEU. Given this divide, Russia
will likely maintain its policy of disapproval toward

17 Again, the Moldovan and western press contained many examples of Dodon’s use of Putin’s support in the 2014 and 2016 elections.
For one example, see Petru Clej, “Will Moldova Elect Putin Fan Igor Dodon As President?,” Chisinau, Moldova, BBC News, November 12,
2016, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37948154.
18 On the Gagauzia referendum, see for example “Gagauzia Voters Reject Closer EU Ties For Moldova” RFE/RL, February 3, 2014,
accessed at https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-gagauz-referendum-counting/25251251.html. For basic background on Gagauzia, see
Kamil Calus, “Gagauzia: Growing Separatism in Moldova?” OSW Commentary, March 10, 2014, accessed at https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-10/gagauzia-growing-separatism-moldova.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 9
More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova

Moldova’s growing association with the EU and hope

for reorientation toward the EAEU.19

Moscow remains far more opposed to Moldova’s

closer association with NATO. Moldova is explicitly
neutral, a provision of its 1994 constitution. For some
time, a small, but vocal minority, in Chisinau has called
for NATO membership, but all polls show a large ma-
jority opposed to such a step. Nonetheless, Moldova
is an enthusiastic Partnership for Peace member, and
has fashioned a relatively close military-to-military
relationship with the US, much to Russia’s vocal dis-
comfort. Romania actively advocates for NATO in the
region, a fact often used by Moscow in information
campaigns designed stir up anti-NATO advocates in
Moldova.20 In mid-2017, Moldova and Ukraine jointly deployed border posts
along their borders with Transdniestria to enforce Moldovan
customs regulations. Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons
Fallout from the Donbas
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, particularly the
war in the Donbas, has had less effect on Moldova than harder for Russia to maintain the units stationed in
might have been expected. Most importantly, the conflict Transdniestria, its military presence has remained.21
has ended Russia’s overland access to Transdniestria.
With the outbreak of war, Ukraine immediately cut off Russia’s other issue of concern is joint Moldovan-
Russian and Transdniestrian use of Odesa Airport for Ukrainian control of the Transdniestrian segment of
Moscow-Tiraspol traffic, while Moldova quickly stepped the border with Ukraine. Earlier attempts by Moldova
up its control of traffic from Russia through Chisinau to enlist Ukrainian cooperation to control or close this
Airport, especially given fears that Moscow might send border, particularly in 2006, led to vehement protest
special forces through Transdniestria to fight in south- and swift action from Moscow. Following the outbreak
western Ukraine. of war in Donbas, it took until mid-2017, an unexpect-
edly long time for Chisinau, for Moldova and Ukraine
In 2015, Kyiv abrogated its agreement with Moscow that to begin deploying joint border posts and enforcing
allowed Russian military equipment and troops to tran- Moldovan customs regulations and control along the
sit Ukraine for resupply in Transdniestria. Meanwhile, Transdniestrian segment. So far, Moscow has been
Moldova has steadily refused to allow Russia to use quiet; Transdniestria has actually cooperated.
Tiraspol Airport for military resupply flights, and at
times has even closed Chisinau Airport for transit of During close informal work with the EU, Tiraspol has
Russian military personnel heading to Tiraspol. Despite adjusted its legislation and practices to European
Moscow’s complaints that these actions have made it norms, and Transdniestrian enterprises have continued

19 The EU/Moldova Action Plan is available at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf; Moldova’s

Association Agreement with the EU can be found at http://dcfta.md/eng/association-agreement-between-the-republic-of-moldova-
and-european-union. On Dodon and the EAEU, see for example “EU Warns Moldova To Honor Trade Pact As President Looks To
Russia,” RFE/RL April 19, 2017, accessed at https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-eu-warning-trade-pact-eurasion-union/28439766.html.
On Moldovan polls, see Barometrul de opinie publice. Republica Moldova, Noiembrie 2017, Institute for Public Policy, Chisinau, accessed
at http://ipp.md/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Rezultate-sondaj.-Partea-I.pdf.
20 This paragraph on NATO draws on extensive conversations with Moldovan, Russian, and NATO officials over many years. For another
good summary of Moldova’s relationship with NATO, see Eugene Rumer, “Moldova Between Russia and the West: A Delicate Balance”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 27, 2017, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/23/moldova-between-
russia-and-west-delicate-balance-pub-70056; on Dodon’s attitude toward NATO, see a joint press point with Deputy SG Gottemoeller
during a visit to NATO headquarters, February 2, 2017, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_140774.htm.
21 Moldova and Ukrainian officials to author, various dates, 2015-2017.

10 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova

to register in Moldova, all to maintain the substantial

flow of exports from the left bank to EU countries. This
process continues, quietly but steadily, in 2018.22

RECENT RUN-INS WITH MOSCOW

Very few of the current issues and disputes between
Moldova and Russia are new. Moscow’s desire to in-
clude Moldova in its “Near Abroad” sphere of influence,
and Chisinau’s desire for independence from Russia,
have been evident since 1991; they have always been
hard to reconcile, and sometimes have been cause for
open conflict. However, trade ties, labor migration,
and cultural affinity have limited the options of even
Moldovan governments highly suspicious of Moscow,
such as that of Prime Minister Iurie Leanca in 2013-15.
Given these circumstances, it is not always evident
whether Moscow’s periodic spats with Chisinau reflect
new developments or just continued jockeying for ad-
vantage in international positions or domestic Russian
or Moldovan politics.

In this light, the causes of a considerable sharpening

of relations between Moscow and Chisinau since 2017
are not entirely clear. The Russian press and individual
officials joined Dodon in complaining about Moldovan
troop participation in NATO-sponsored exercises in
the region, and the participation of US troops in a
bilateral military exercise in Moldova in the spring of
2017. Moldova complained about the mistreatment
of Moldovan officials and citizens traveling to Russia
by Russian authorities. In May, Moldova expelled five
Russian embassy officers for alleged spying and re-
cruitment of Moldovan citizens, often specified as
Gagauz, to fight in the Donbas. Moscow responded by
announcing a reciprocal action against Moldovan em-
bassy personnel.23
In July, Moldova escalated the dispute by refusing entry
to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin,
Moscow’s leading official in charge of relations with
Moldova, to participate in a ceremony celebrating the
Moldova declared Dmitry Rogozin, Russian Deputy Prime
Minister (pictured), persona non grata due to escalating
political tensions regarding the Russian peacekeeping forces in
Transdniestria. Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Russian-led peacekeep-
ing operation in Transdniestria. After refusing entry to a
Russian military aircraft, Chisinau barred Rogozin from
arriving on commercial flights. In early August, Moldova
formally declared Rogozin persona non grata, barring
him even from flights through Moldovan airspace.24
In early August, Russian troops from the OGRF, a
distinct unit from Russia’s peacekeeping detach-
ment, participated in an exercise with Transdniestrian
troops, drawing criticism from Chisinau as an escala-
tion of Russian military activities in the region. Moldova

22 On Transdniestrian cooperation with the EU, see for example Stanislav Secrieru, “Transnistria Zig-zagging towards a DCFTA,” PISM
Policy Paper, January 2016, available at https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=21295; see also Andrey Devyatkov, “Enhancing compliance:
Transnistria’s advance in fulfilling DCFTA provisions,” Laboratorul Pentru Analiza Conflictului Transnistrean, June 3, 2017, available
at http://www.lact.ro/2017/06/03/andrey-devyatkov-enhancing-compliance-transnistrias-advancein-fulfilling-dcfta-provisions/. On
Moldovan-Ukrainian joint border posts, see for example “Ukraine, Moldova to open new border checkpoints on Transdniestrian section,”
Kyiv Post, November 29, 2017, available at https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ukraine-moldova-open-new-border-checkpoints-
transdniestrian-section.html; see also coverage from Russia: “Moldova, Ukraine open 1st joint checkpoint at Transdniestrian border
sector,” Interfax, July 31, 2017, available at http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/425348.html.
23 On the expulsion of Russian diplomatic personnel, see Alexander Tanas, “Moldova Government Expels Five Russian diplomats,
President Furious,” Reuters, May 29, 2017, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moldova-russia/moldova-government-expels-
five-russian-diplomats-president-furious-idUSKBN18P1QP.
24 On the Rogozin saga, see for example “Moldova Declares Russian Deputy PM Rogozin Persona Non Grata,” Reuters, August 2, 2017,
available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moldova-rogozin/moldova-declares-russian-deputy-pm-rogozin-persona-non-grata-
idUSKBN1AI1MZ?il%3D0.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 11
More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova

In January 2018, Moldova’s parliament adopted a highly

publicized and controversial law requiring all news
and public affairs programs rebroadcast on Moldovan
media to come from countries that are party to the
European Convention on Transfrontier Television. The
bill obviously targeted Russian programming, the only
broadcasts in Moldova affected by the legislation.
Moldova’s Constitutional Court approved parliament’s
temporary suspension of Dodon, who refused to sign
the law, so that Candu could promulgate the measure.26

The Russian reaction to most of these disputes and

actions has been a mixture of official protest and un-
official commentary couched “more in sorrow than in
anger,” expressions of continued support for Dodon,
and attribution of the actions to Dodon’s political op-
ponents for electoral purposes. Moscow has responded
remarkably mildly in comparison with the past, with
one notable exception: Russia attempted to file an
Interpol warrant for the arrest of Vladimir Plahotniuc,
head of the Moldova Democratic Party (PDM), for his
alleged ordering of the murder of a Russian business-
man in London in 2012. Plahotniuc has so far blocked
Moscow’s efforts with Interpol.27

Vladimir Plahotniuc, leader of the Democratic Party of Moldova,

has advocated for greater integration between Moldova and
the European Union, resulting in Moscow’s support for his
political rivals. Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons
subsequently announced its intention to raise the issue
of Russian troop presence at the UN General Assembly
that fall, an elevation on Chisinau’s part of its usual
manner and forum of protest. Following further com-
plaints of Russian military activities in Transdniestria,
Andrian Candu, Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament,
publicly speculated about presenting a bill to the
Russian Federation for costs and damages incurred by
twenty-five years of “Russian occupation.”25
WHAT COMES NEXT?
To date, Russia has remained within the international
consensus at the OSCE as Chisinau and Tiraspol
signed, and implemented, a string of unprecedented
agreements in their political settlement negotiations
in late 2017 and early 2018. For the second year in
a row, Moscow joined its OSCE partners in Vienna
in December 2017 to make a ministerial statement
on Moldova/Transdniestria reaffirming the long-
time OSCE position that Transdniestria should re-
main a part of a unified Moldova, but with a special
political status.28 In comparison with its positions on
Ukraine, Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the
Donbas, Moscow’s recent positions and actions on the

25 On Russian troop exercises in Transdniestria, Moldovan complaints, and demands for compensation see inter alia Madalin Necsutu,
“Russia Dismisses Compensating Moldova for ‘Occupying’ Transnistria,” Balkan Insight, January 24, 2018, accessed at http://www.
balkaninsight.com/en/article/russia-slams-moldova-s-demand-for-compensations-in-transnistria-01-24-2018.
26 On the Moldovan media law, see for example “Moldovan Parliament Speaker Passes Law Against Russian Propaganda,” RFE/RL,
January 11, 2018, available at https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-parliament-speaker-approves-russia-media-law/28966975.html.
27 For examples of Russian reactions, see among others remarks by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mariia Zakharova on the first
anniversary of Moldovan President Igor Dodon’s election, November 9, 2017, available at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_
policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2943560#12; also “State Secretary and Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory
Karasin’s Interview With the Interfax News Agency,” December 25, 2017, available at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/
news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3009606. For the Interpol warrant on Plahotniuc, see for example “Interpol
Rejects Russian Request to List Moldova Leader,” Balkan Insight, December 27, 2017, available at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/
article/interpol-rejects-russian-request-to-list-moldova-leader-12-27-2017.
28 For the 2017 OSCE ministerial statement on Moldova/Transdniestria, see Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
“MINISTERIAL STATEMENT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TRANSDNIESTRIAN SETTLEMENT PROCESS IN THE “5+2” FORMAT,”
Ministerial Council, Vienna, December 8, 2017, accessed at https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/361586?download=true. For accounts of
recent progress in the political settlement process, see the OSCE Mission to Moldova, https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova.

12 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova
Transdniestrian question have been relatively moderate
and accommodating.
Meanwhile, parliamentary elections will be occurring in
Moldova at the start of next year, most likely in February
2019, and Russia remains outspoken in its support for
Dodon and his PSRM. Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party
has the lead in the current pro-European parliamentary
coalition and government. However, as of mid-2018 the
PD’s poll numbers are dramatically lower than those of
the largest non-parliamentary pro-European party, and
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE US GOVERNMENT
„„ Stay actively interested and engaged in Moldovan
security, foreign policy, and democratic gover-
nance issues. An ongoing, active US presence con-
tinues to be vital for Moldova’s geopolitical stability
and domestic development.
„„ Provide continuing economic and technical assis-
tance for Moldova’s economic, social, and political
development, but with appropriate conditions to
ensure that the assistance is used properly and not
misappropriated. Make clear that US support will
require more than simple lip service to US princi-
ples and ideals.
„„ Focus special attention on the development of
Moldova’s free and independent media, with atten-
tion to both the growth and sustainability of outlets
of all kinds and their capacity to provide content in
The opinions and judgments expressed in this paper are the personal views of the author.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Plahotniuc is eager to burnish his European integration
credentials.
Due to domestic Moldovan electoral politics this year,
and the fact that Moscow clearly has a preferred victor,
it is likely that the general subject of Russia’s relations
with Moldova will become increasingly politicized. At
the time of writing, the choices in the race are quite
distinct, the stakes for Moldova’s future very high, and
the likely result absolutely unclear.
all of Moldova’s major languages. This will bolster
Moldova’s ability to withstand disinformation and
destabilization.
„„ Continue active involvement and cooperation,
when possible, with all participants in the OSCE-
managed Moldova-Transdniestria political settle-
ment process. Seek to build on recent successes of
the “results-based approach” to encourage further
reconciliation and cooperation between Chisinau
and Tiraspol and in the region.
„„ Re-affirm the principles of the Helsinki Final Act
and the Charter of Paris and with it the right of
Moldova to choose its own political and economic
institutions, foreign economic relations and for-
eign policy.
13
More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

William H. Hill is a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars. A retired Foreign Service officer, Dr. Hill is an
expert on Russia and the former Soviet Union, east-west relations,
and European multilateral diplomacy. He served two terms – January
2003-July 2006 and June 1999-November 2001 – as Head of the
OSCE Mission to Moldova, where he was charged with negotiation of
a political settlement to the Transdniestrian conflict and facilitation of
the withdrawal of Russian forces, arms, and ammunition from Moldova.

14 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
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