ENGINEERING GEOLOGY

ASSIGNMENT 1

COLLATED BY:

BILY KRISTIAN 1701361573

DENNY BUDIMAN 1701369626
SRI KANTI WIDJAJANTI 1701358231
STEVEN TAN 1701356150

ENGINEERING FACULTY
CIVIL ENGINEERING
BINUS UNIVERSITY
JAKARTA
2016
Due date: 7 October 2016 at 5PM
Group assignment (3-4 people)

Task 1
Find and read a journal article titled “History of the 1963 Vaiont Slide: The
Importance of Geological Factor” written by E. Semenza and M. Ghirotti as
published by Bull Eng Geol Env (2000) 59: 87-97 and answer the question below:
1. After reading several academic resources, write a short summary (300 – 500
words) of what happened in the vaiont reservoir disaster.
2. What were the causes of slide occurred on October 9, 1963?
3. Reflecting on the history, do you think that the dam itself of sound design and
a product quality construction? Why?
4. Was the occurrence of the slide a complete surprise or was there some
forewarning? If it was not a surprise, list the times and types of forewarning
that were available.
5. List 10 geological terms that you have found related to the “Vaiont Reservoir
Disaster”

Task 2
Find a case study on a failure in infrastructure due to geological issues and write a
report summarizing on:
-What happened? -Who was the engineer or the
-When did it happen? company who built or designed the
-Where did it occur? infrastructure?
-Why it was happened? -Lesson learned from the case study.
Task 1
1.
The Vaiont dam was constructed from 1956 until 1959 in Italy. The dam was
built at the deep valley between Mt. Toc (south) and Mt. Salta (north). At that time,
Leopold Muller was entrusted to analyse the stability of Vaiont reservoir. In the
vicinity of where the dam was built, there were several ancient landslides, but only
one of them was considered dangerous, occurred in the area of Pian del Toc and Pian
della Pozza (Mt. Toc side). These ancient landslides proved that the mass was
unstable and could move during the reservoir filling, hence further countermeasures
needed to be conducted.
Some insignificant signs of instability occurred since March 1960, such as
small detachment and movement. Some efforts were conducted, such as bore holes in
order to locate the failure location and also surveys.
In November 1960, the water level of the reservoir was raised up to 650
above sea level (asl), thus causing not only huge material detachment into the lake,
but also small movement of the slope. At this point, further inspection was ensued
and showed that the rock mass was severely fractured. Ideas of how to stabilize the
slope were stated, such as reducing the infiltration to the mass by using drainage,
removing millions cubic meters of mass, cementing the mass, and building a buttress
at the foot of the slide. The ideas were later declined because they were impractical
and very dangerous to be conducted.
Realizing that it was impossible to completely stop the movement of the
slide, Muller then decided to lower down the velocity of the slope by lowering the
water level of the lake carefully. After they lowered down the water level to 600 m
asl, they construct a bypass tunnel on the south side of the valley in order to keep the
water level lower than the nearby village (Erto). They also built a hydraulic model in
order to get better understanding about the slope.
In October 1961, the water level of the lake was gradually raised again after
the construction of the bypass tunnel finished. The water level reached 710 m asl in
September 1963 with velocity of the slope as high as 20 mm/day. Attempts to lower
the water level were done, but the velocity of the slope did not decrease, but instead
rapidly increased in until October 1963.
 On 9 October 1963, the velocity of the slope reached 200 mm/day and then
finally failed, releasing over 260 million cubic meters of mass into the reservoir,
creating a 140 meters wave above the top of the dam, killing almost 2000 lives.
There are many opinions about this phenomenon, but it is agreed now that failure
occurred along bands of clay within the limestone mass (Genevois & Ghirotti,2005).
Some researchers believed that the landslides were caused by the reactivation of a
relict landslide, the decrease in clay shear strength, or else to self-accelerating rocks
producing an immense drop in resisting force.

2.
There are several factors that cause the 9 October 1963 landslide. One of the
factors was because detailed investigation could not be carried out during that time.
Because of that, the engineers could not figure out that the soil characteristic in the
area where dam built was not suitable for the construction. Other than that, what
triggered the slide on 9 October 1963 was the filling of the reservoir. After filling the
reservoir, they also gradually increased the water level of the reservoir which
resulted in increasing velocity of the slope then fail.
There are several opinions about the cause of this landslide. According to the
existing literature, the main factor was the geological structure of the northern slope
of Mt. Toc and the existence of ancient slide mass. Some researchers believed that it
was due to reactivation of relict landslide (Hendron & Patton, 1985), or because of
the decrease of clay shear strength with increasing strain rate (Tika & Hutchinson,
1999). This correlates to the results of Hendron’s and Patton’s study which showed
that there was a layer of montmorillonitic clay along the failure surface and also
outside of the slide zone whose residual friction angle was reduced to just 8˚ - 10˚.
This low friction angle could lead to instability of the slope by reducing the resisting
force of the slope, thus causing the slope to slide.
3.
Judging from the after-disaster, it could be concluded that the dam structure is
strong and stable because it could withstand the huge wave of water and landslide
during the October 1963. The reason behind this catastrophe was the geological
failure. The area where the dam built was not stable, thus resulting in landslide.
Because detailed soil and geological survey investigations were not carried
out, the engineers did not know that the soil was not compatible for dam
construction, resulting in slope failures, causing more than 2000 lives were lost.

4.
The occurrence was not a surprise because there are several signs of
instability, including ancient landslides, material detachments, and slope movements.
The first forewarning that occurs is during the filling of the reservoir in March 1960.
Parts of the northern wall became unstable and fell into the reservoir.
June 1960, small movement of the slope was noted.
October 1960, a continuous fissure about 1 m wide and 2,5 km long
appeared, followed by slope movement with velocity more than 30 mm/day.
November 1960, 700.000 m3 of mass slid into the reservoir, and the water
level was decreased to stabilize the slope. Surveys were then conducted and showed
that the mass was severely fractured.
December 1962, the water level of the reservoir was raised to 700 m asl and
the velocity of the slope reached 15 mm/day.
September 1963, the water level of the reservoir reached 710 m asl and the
velocity of the slope reached 20 mm/day.

5.
- Flysch Formation - Dipping
- Cretaceous limestones - Pheriperal crack
- Jurassic limestones - Stratified alluvial gravels
- Mylonite - Montmorillonitic clay
- Cementing of rock - Aquifers
- Fracture - Bedding planes
- Fold
Task 2

SLOPE FAILURE OF AN EMBANKMENT ON CLAY SHALE AT KM

97+500 OF THE CIPULARANG TOLL ROAD AND THE SELECTED
SOLUTION

The Cipularang Toll Road, located in West Java, Indonesia, is one of the
most vital highways in Indonesia that supports transportation link between Jakarta
and Bandung also the surrounding area. The toll road was constructed in 2004 to
2005 and was opened for public transportation in March 2005. The main contractor
of the Cipularang Toll Road is PT Jasa Marga. Due to topographical and geological
conditions, the highway had to pass hills and valleys on clay shale. Many cuts and
fills needed to be done because the toll road passes through many valleys and hills.
In early February 2006, after 11 months of operation, a road bed embankment
at KM 97+500 failed. Records of slope monitoring indicated that failure plane was
from toe of embankment to the top of embankment at the median of the highway.
After the soil investigation was conducted the result showed that a layer of original
clay shale was found directly below fill embankment, especially below the toe of the
slope.
Shale is a fine grained sedimentary rock formed from clays compacted
together by pressure, and generally characterized by thin laminae breaking with an
irregular curve fracture. The main engineering behaviors of shale is that it is very
hard, however, once it is exposed to sunrays, air, and water within a relatively short
time it will become soft clays (mud).
Back calculation by slope stability analysis verified that the slope failure
occurred on the soft clay shale. Due to the soil stripping/excavation and weathering,
shale loses its shear strength. Slope failure is caused because the safety factor of the
slope was 1.0 during construction.
 The most suitable solution to overcome the slope failure due to time and
space constrains and topographic condition at the site while the cost was still
considered effective by the installation group of bored piles. The group of bored piles
consisted of 2 layers of 18 m length of bored piles with a diameter of 1.0 m and pile
spacing (center to center) of 2.0 m, arranged in a zigzag pattern. The analysis result
also shows that bored pile has increased the factor of safety to a value of more than
1.3 and the capacity of bending moment of group of bored piles is more than
required.
Detailed soil investigation was not carried out, therefore the exact depth of
clay shale cannot be determined. The initial assumption of clay shale’s thickness was
0.3 – 2 m. This assumption is very inaccurate, because the original layer of soft clay
shale was found directly below fill embankment, which was found after the second
soil investigation after the slope failure occurred. Other than that, the safety factor of
the slope was one to begin with, which means that there was no space for
miscalculation. Learning from this case, we should always do detailed and careful
soil investigation to minimize the probability of failure and also we should always
realize that there is a chance of miscalculation, hence bigger safety factor is needed.

Figure 1 Soil Profile

Figure 2 The cross section of slope reinforcement and bored pile arrangement
References
Ghirotti, M., & Genevois, R. (2005). Giornale di Geologia Applicata 1 [Abstract].
The 1963 Vaiont Landslide, 41-52.
Irsyam, M., Susila, E., & Himawan, A. (n.d.). Slope Failure Of An Embankment On
Clay Shale At Km 97+500 Of The Cipularang Toll Road And The Selected Solution.
International Symposium on Geotechnical Engineering, Ground Improvement and
Geosynthetics for Human Security and Environmental Preservation, Bangkok,
Thailand, 531-540.