Somewhere I have spoken about the nature of reality being prone to science is what

makes it possible for us to know anything, need to insert a passage from an essay by Read
Bain in Journal of Social Philosophy April 1939, page 224.

I inserted this where I left a message ‘insert Bain’, but it is not where I talk about science,
so I am lost, for now.

_____

Page 31 of Pure Sociology by Ward, institutions do not die = universities must still exist
to serve the theocracy

______

07/05/08

Today the main item in the news was the government decision to reclassify
cannabis back from class C, to B, from where it had been downgraded in 2004.
The main thrust of the item was that the politicians were going against the advice
of their own scientific experts, who had decided that on the basis of harm alone, cannabis
belonged with drugs like antidepressants, rather than with amphetamine and cocaine.
The decision is deemed to be a political game appealing to the middle classes who
have a horror of recreational drugs. This is of interest to us because it shows how
politicians have no qualms in a democracy, imposing their political savvy upon scientific
facts. This is relevant in relation to racism, which, although a natural and functional
attribute of human nature, essential to the formation of society, its antagonism to the
Jewish slave identities, which have replaced primarily racial identities with primarily
cultural identities, have meant that politicians have forced scientists to prove that racism
is not natural. Saying otherwise is racist, and as such, taboo.

The
 Human

Superorganism

an

Alternative Sociology

Congleton

January 30th 2008

 CONTENTS

Page

Preface
4

Chapter

1 Knowledge Warfare 7

2 Superorganics 21

3 The Problem with Individualism 28

4 Knowledge as Territory 49

5 Unreal Reality 76

6 Saint-Simon 84

7 After the War 112

8 Excursion into Spencerism 127

9 Inge 149

10 Modern Evaluations of Organicism 152

11 Good for What ? 189

12 Durkheim 221

13 Social Philosophy 251

14 Worms 252

15 Daddy, Is there a God ? 272

16 Why do we Live ? 275

17 Boodin 323

18 Pareto 329

19 Retrospective 350

Conclusion 355
 Evolution throughout its series of levels is a whole-making process—from
the atom to human society. An atom is a whole, a gestalt. It has characteristics of
its own which are not those of its constituent elements. Just as an atom is a whole
and not a mere collection of electrons, and as a molecule is a whole and not a
mere collection of atoms, and as a cell is a whole and not a mere collection of
chemical elements, and as a multicellular organism is a whole and not a mere
collection of cells, so the psychological group is a whole and not a mere
collection of individuals. But it must not be forgotten that they are different types
of wholes. There is no sense in trying to reduce one type of whole to another—
the molecular gestalt to the constituent atoms, the cellular gestalt to its chemical
elements, the multicellular gestalt to its constituent cells, the group gestalt to the
individual members. Within each type of gestalt there is indeed the individual
character and movement of the constituent parts—the electrons in the atom, the
atoms in the molecules, the molecules in the cell, the cells in the multicellular
organism, the individuals in the psychological group ; but there is also the
character and movement of the whole without which we cannot understand the
behavior of the parts. The parts are different because they figure in the particular
gestalt.
Society is as truly a pattern of life organization as is a multicellular
organism, but it is a different type of pattern. Just as at the level of the
multicellular organism a single cell cannot realize its life destiny by itself but
must realize it in its organic group, so at the level of human society a single
individual cannot realize his life destiny, except in a social group. The biological
approach shows the absurdity of attempting to study human society as a collection
of individuals. The human individuals are evolved through a long process of
creative adaptation and selection for a common life as truly as the cell in the
multicellular organism. They are destined by their evolution to work in symbiosis
in order to realize their life genius, however great their degrees of freedom in so
doing. Man doth not live to himself or die to himself. He is part of a community
of life which stretches backward and forward into the gestalt of life history as a
whole.

(The Biological Basis of Society, Boodin, in Journal of Social Philosophy,

Volume 1, No. 4, July, 1936, pages 303 – 304)
 Preface

Sociology, who needs it ! What is sociology anyway ?

Answer : We all need sociology more than we know, and that is because, of all
the ways in which modern academics pretend to interrogate mother nature, it is the field
of sociology which should mean more to us than any other, because this is the study of
human society, and humanity, is society.

Reality, as indicated by this opening, is not what it should be. Sociology is the
most limp science of all the major scientific disciplines, so limp indeed that it is a
perennial, and on going question, as to whether or not sociology is a science at all, or
whether it can ever be.
Why is sociology so useless, in scientific terms, so incapable of answering the
most basic questions about what human society is ? We do not have to rack our brains to
figure out a general answer to this question. Imagine if scientific methods were applied
to humans with the same exacting ruthlessness that is used in all other fields of enquiry.
By definition science would thereby exclude all other ways of knowing ourselves, and
most crucially, this would set science in complete opposition to religion. The weakness
of sociology is therefore entirely due to the study of humanity, in an unbiased scientific
manner, being the inevitable victim of the age old warfare between science and religion.
It cannot be news to anyone that the war between science and religion is alive
today, but the management of this war is so extensive and sophisticated, that it ought to
be news to everyone to hear it said that science as practiced in universities throughout the
world is utterly constrained by the religious oppression of social authority that is imbued
into the fabric of academia. This is however the case, and it is due to this fact, that in
presenting a true scientific model of human society, we can only adopt the position that a
wholly alternative sociology is implicit in any real science of humanity.
In these circumstances we find our subject, an alternative sociology, divided into
the description of the warfare between science and religion as it has come down to the
present day, revealing how this interminable warfare over knowledge has impacted upon
the development of sociology in particular, and in the course of this work we must at the
same time reveal the alternative knowledge, that social powers have found it so important
to stifle. These two aspects of this work are stated in the title, which carries a genuinely
scientific name, The Human Superorganism, and a subtitle, Alternative Sociology,
making it implicit that the science of humanity as we have it today is an imposition, by
social authority, upon society.
This said, if it is our contention that humans are a superorganic species of
mammal, which evolved to form social structure—and it most certainly is our intention to
assert this fact—then whatever form society takes must be dictated purely by natural
factors, over which humans can have no influence whatsoever. Therefore, while it is
clear enough that social authority has dictated the suppression of science, and the
substitution of a pseudo scientific academic infrastructure, this outcome must ultimately
be seen as organic, and not political, or conspiratorial.

I am a lay philosopher, that is, a true philosopher. An ordinary person seeking

knowledge ; as opposed to a professional philosopher who serves a patron, namely the
state, an organization that exists to serve the ultimate social authority which we may call,
for simplicity, the church. I am first, and foremost, an atheist philosopher, the war
between religion and knowledge is the pivotal, and eternal load stone of my thinking, and
as a consequence I call my philosophy Atheist Science.

______

I need to add something to this preface not a few months have passed since I
began this work, today being Monday, 24 March 2008. I had been writing a book that I
was rather keen on, How Religion Survived the Coming of the Scientific Age, I see I have
dated it September last year, and it has 183 pages, this work is already registering 278
pages. I like the title of that book, it surely is the meat and grizzle of what I think about,
and it has a very ordinary title, the sort of title that could attract the attention of any
interested reader. I have developed a method of producing work to an adequate quality
that relies entirely upon my editorship, which can never be satisfactory, this previous
work has reached the end of the second stage, as I recall. It had been knocked up, and
then read once on the machine. The next job is to print off a hard copy, which is then
edited and developed as I see fit. All this is a time consuming process and I ran out of
time, I reached the point where I had to return to the punishment centre for the criminally
unemployed, to receive more intensive abuse for refusing to take up my place in the great
slave camp that is forever England.
It is impossible to even think of doing any work while attending such a place,
although I should of at least used their facilities to print off my document, that I did not
just goes to show how demoralising it is to attend these slave punishment centres. And
now I have come away with the most horrendous sores on my legs due to the stress of the
experience, what kind of brain does this to a body ! Pathetic, it is not much good being a
rebel if you can’t even cope with being got at. Anyway, I did nothing for four months,
and when I got my freedom back I could not think about the work I had been doing.
Meanwhile I had spent every penny I could lay my hands on buying a fair number of
books that I had barely glanced at, they were piled on the floor awaiting my attention ;
such a waste of time. And all these miserable insects want, is for me to take a job in
factory. The women I saw the other day, handed me a warehouse job to apply for, when I
dismissed it as rubbish, she said she thought it might be nice, “What, packing pet bedding
into boxes.” I replied, to which she said that it was not only that, you got out in a van or
something as well. I gave her my usual response to the effect that the idea that it was
possible to enjoy work had not reached me yet. Life in our Jewish slave society is hell if
the slave implant has not taken properly.
The upshot of all this is that I had to get myself into writing something new, and I
sat down and dragged an idea out of myself, which seems to of become an exercise in
active sociology, practiced according to my own philosophical method, whereby I
examine works seeking any relevance to the idea of society as a natural entity, based on
the insight that humans are a superorganic mammal, with the same nature as other
superorganic organisms that evolved to form complex societies, creatures like ants and
termites. At the same time I look for works that were transitional in the move away from
a true science of society, toward the pseudo intellectual wash we are exposed to now.
I felt it necessary to add this update to the preface in order to flesh out the nature
of this work, now its form had developed to the point where I felt its nature had become
clear to me. I think the original idea is still valid, it is about offering an alternative
sociology, and the product is quite nice in the end, because it shows how I actively seek
out books and then dive into them, extracting pieces that I can review in terms of the
quest to understand the general consequences of the idea that religion has survived the
coming of science, and how we might understand the consequences of the whole process
of ignorance surviving the onset of expanding knowledge, including the knowledge that
continues to be developed today, where we can find any modern books impinging upon
our intellectual territory.

It is now June 2008 and I have been writing this work for the whole of the year,
since ending my term of attendance at the long term unemployed detention centre,
enforced under the New Deal programme, I am still suffering, slightly, as a result, and
may carry the scars for the rest of my life ; but anything is better than working in this
slave society.
I did not know what this work was when I began it, I just needed to begin
something and I could not get back into my piece on How Religion Survived the Coming
of the Scientific Age that I had been working on prior to my enforced attendance for
refusing to take up my place in society as a productive slave. I have long admired
Benjamin Kidd and in the period while working on this item I have finally got around to
buying his other three works written after Social Evolution in 1894. I am currently
reading The Principles of Western Civilisation, 1902, and it has been an inspiration. I
feel as though the work has peaked, and he is now going to run away with his erroneous
notions of what social evolution is all about, and die in the sands of a worthless
conclusion. But in the meantime, because he is focused on the idea that society is the
product of a biological process of evolution, he has fed me some inspired ideas and I
have been working his work into my own, and as a result declaring our work here
complete, we now know all there is to know about the true nature of human nature, and
how that nature has come to produce the modern world as we know it.
I return to this preface now in order to insert a note, this work has reached 497
pages, and the philosophy-as-you-go style of incorporating whatever I happen to be
reading while writing a work is bound to result in a piece difficult to make sense of, I
suspect. Hence I have cut across the point where I think we cut to the chase and discuss
the ultimate questions of human nature, by inserting a chapter entitled The Holy Grail of
Scientific Sociology, currently set at page 105, so that is all I wanted to say, now I will get
back to my work, a real labour of love, the work of a free human being, and not a damned
slave.
 Chapter One

Knowledge Warfare

The war of religion against free access to knowledge is notorious, but if we want
to examine this subject through historical works presenting it in a concise manner, there
is only one small window of opportunity through which we may do this, and its vista
opens upon the second half of the nineteenth century. Why, we ought to ask, did this all
important question of the ‘war over knowledge’ come to fruition, for a brief moment, at
this time ?
No one would pretend that any societies had ever been open and free prior to the
foundation of modern European society, which is actually founded on the principle of
freedom, central to which has always been the question of free access to knowledge, as
opposed to the absolute power of a church to determine what passes for reality.
Accordingly, we cannot be surprised to find that a period of emergence from intellectual
oppression, to the supposed freedom of the modern world, must of gone through a
transitional phase at some time approximately related to the period when modern
European society was taking shape. Almost one century before Darwin unleashed his
contrived theory of evolution upon the world, we find such magnificent works as The
System of Nature or Laws of the Moral and Physical World, 1770, by Baron D’Holbach,
making a splash. I say magnificent because it is a notoriously atheistic treatise, written
by a notable Frenchman, but for my part I know of no works of an atheistic kind by any
author, none that would obtain my affirmation as truly atheistic works. To receive my
blessing as a real work of atheist science or philosophy, a work ought to make religion
impossible, and no work ever published has achieved so much. I have only recently
obtained D’Holbach’s book from the internet, for free, and while tidying up the electronic
copy on my computer I read the opening passage, thus :

Author’s Preface
The source of man’s unhappiness is his ignorance of Nature. The
pertinacity with which he clings to blind opinions imbibed in his infancy, which
interweave themselves with his existence, the consequent prejudice that warps his
mind, that prevents its expansion, that renders him the slave of fiction, appears to
doom him to continual error. He resembles a child destitute of experience, full of
idle notions : a dangerous leaven mixes itself with all his knowledge : it is of
necessity obscure, it is vacillating and false : — He takes the tone of his ideas on
the authority of others, who are themselves in error, or else have an interest in
deceiving him. To remove this Cimmerian darkness, these barriers to the
improvement of his condition ; to disentangle him from the clouds of error that
 envelop him, that obscure the path he ought to tread ; to guide him out of this
Cretan labyrinth, requires the clue of Ariadne, with all the love she could bestow
on Theseus. It exacts more than common exertion ; it needs a most determined, a
most undaunted courage — it is never effected but by a persevering resolution to
act, to think for himself ; to examine with rigour and impartiality the opinions he
has adopted. He will find that the most noxious weeds have sprung up beside
beautiful flowers ; entwined themselves around their stems, overshadowed them
with an exuberance of foliage, choked the ground, enfeebled their growth,
diminished their petals, dimmed the brilliancy of their colours ; that deceived by
the apparent freshness of their verdure, by the rapidity of their exfoliation, he has
given them cultivation, watered them, nurtured them, when he ought to have
plucked out their very roots.

Marvellous. While I would not want to use such flowery and extravagant
language, and the references to ancient mythology are lost on me, I can think of no better
sentiment than that expressed in the above passage to open a work such as the one I
present here, written by a would be seeker after truth, in this England of ours in the year
2008, that is 238 years after these words were published in pre-revolutionary France.
Believe me, nothing has changed, except the supreme skill with which those who feed us
our ideas develop the lies they have to sow in our enslaved minds, plus the total absence
of people like D’Holbach in the upper echelons of society to try and save us from the
imposition of ignorance. For even those who carry such an image of themselves, people
like Richard Dawkins perhaps, are nothing more than carefully managed dupes feeding
us atheism and false knowledge in the name of an absolute theocracy. Social authority
must always control both ends of the game, no matter what the game is, that is what
makes it a social authority. So much has happened since the 1770’s, we eat burgers, we
drive cars, watch television, travel to the moon, and talk about continental drift, but so
what ! all we are saying is that we eat, we travel and we communicate. Did people not do
these things in eighteenth century France ? Of course they did, and, what is more to the
point, they worshipped God, just as they do to this day, something that we could not
possibly continue to do if the objectives announced by D’Holbach in writing the above
work had achieved anything at all by way introducing enlightenment.
All D’Holbach does in the above passage, is describe our condition. Many a
devoted theologian would speak in exactly the same exaggerated terms before proceeding
to foist the ignorant deceptions they are affiliated to upon us, and calling while calling
their deceptions the supreme truth. Talk is cheap. It is the possession of a public voice
that is expensive, and the church can always afford the price, because the church and the
state are always one and the same thing.
The question then has to be why do we behave so, why are we permanently
deceived ? Answering this question does not require that we put an end to an endemic
quality of human existence, by overcoming our innate gullibility, all we need know is
why we are so made as to be doomed to endure this eternal state of informed ignorance.
 The end of believing is the beginning of knowing

If humans have evolved along a tangent that means they have an ability to possess
knowledge, then why is the truth of that knowledge so irrelevant ?

How does religion survive no matter what changes in knowledge arise ? This is a
question of the utmost importance, although not a question that anyone I can think of,
discusses at length. I feel sure I have books in which the question is raised, but I cannot
put my hand on any right now because none make a primary topic of this inquiry. Given
that religion has shown itself to have sufficient resilience to meet the challenge, even of
the modern world, why have the structures of religious power devoted so much effort to
resisting the advance of knowledge throughout the ages, right down to modern times ?
The answer is exactly that, right down to modern times the war against knowledge,
conducted by the establishment, is going on, full speed ahead. It is this war against
knowledge that shapes our social structure and gives religion its resilience as the supreme
focus of social power and integrity. Without the war against knowledge there would be
no religion, as we know it, at the level of official sanction. But the critical period of
uncertainty, when religion was facing a direct interrogation, is now firmly behind us.
Last night, 02/04/08, on BBC 2’s Newsnight Jeremy Paxman asked “When is it ever
alright to poke fun at religion ?”. Religion is an utter obscenity, an offence against
humanity, in that sense making fun about something so abhorrent as religion is like
making fun about acts of terrorism, but somehow I do not think that is what this great
defender of intellectual freedom had in mind. We have settled into a period of stable
ignorance, where all the blocks have been put in place to ensure that there can be no
danger of anyone advancing scientific ideas capable of undermining religious authority,
for the foreseeable millennia ahead. Certainly it is our object to perform this impossible
task, but we will not succeed, success is impossible, we will merely enjoy the effort for
its own sake, as an intellectual exercise.
And so, the point is, that hundreds of years before Holbach, ideas about the nature
of the planet and the place of humans in nature were breaking through the force field of
ignorance imposed by the church, hence a man like Holbach eventually gave some
restrained expression to the sentiments of resistance that such a movement had to
generate. If modern religion, meaning Jewish religion, involves the control of
knowledge, then this implies the persistence of a suppressed urge to possess real
knowledge, and we must expect periodic up welling of this urge. Between the
publication of System of Nature and Origin of Species a lot changed, this was a period
when the emergence of the need to reformulate the suppression of knowledge was at its
most intense. It would seem most natural to talk about the ‘urge to form knowledge’ as
being at its most intense, whereby religion was obliged to make adjustments to its own
formula. But this would misrepresent the real nature of what was happening in respect to
knowledge. The search for knowledge is never really a search for knowledge, it is
always a search for an adjustment in the mode of knowledge control. The most important
product of this search, in terms of the war over knowledge, was Darwinism, which was
therefore not really a culmination of the search for knowledge, Darwinism was a
culmination of an effort to control the emergence of knowledge. Science struggled on,
atheism was a crime, and writing scientific works that suggested humans were a part of
nature, like any other living thing, was taboo. This is what made Darwin’s work so
stunning, and this is what makes Darwin the supreme hero of the modern atheist.
Unfortunately all is not what it seems, which is obvious when you think about it, for it is
clear that if science was free to study humans without restraint then there could be no
stopping the total resolution of what humans are as a natural phenomenon, and religion
would be dead and gone ; neither of which inevitable consequences of a free academic
world have come to pass. But it is all very well to say this with the benefit of hindsight,
once the correct solution to the question, What is human nature ? is known to us. As it is,
we are so overwhelmed by the ceaseless barrage of information coming at us, which
pretends to be science, that we simply cannot believe that the whole presentation is an
unbelievably complex charade generated as a feature of the social fabric, no more real in
a detached sense than the civil law with all its associated plethora of ‘knowledge’ and
institutions, but that is what academic knowledge is too, it is one stupendous, all
embracing, deception. In actual fact, to relate this idea of world wide deception to a
famous theme in the work of the renowned ancient philosopher Plato : Knowledge is the
Noble Lie. A statement worthy of some expansion, we can have an appendix dealing
with this question separately, by way of an essay aimed specifically at this topic.

Holbach refers to the dependence of the people on individuals who are, for
various reasons, ignorant themselves, or motivated to deceive, and nothing has changed
there. But in saying this we have to be aware of the staggering extent of the deception
perpetrated against any possibility of possessing real knowledge, and we must understand
that this deception, as stated above, is not, strictly speaking, a political conspiracy, for all
that it is fronted by an overt conspiratorial machinery, this deception could not exist
unless it was the product of a natural force that is responsible for creating human society.
Humans have the capacity to know anything, and everything, all that prevents them from
knowing more than they do is the cap placed on our knowledge by the physiological
function of knowledge, in relation to the formation of superorganic physiology.
So it is not the case that we struggle along a frontier of the unknown, seeking to
know more, it is the case that we are contained within a physiological space that ensures
we can see nothing beyond that which serves a physiological purpose, determined from
the perspective of the human superorganism that we are all part of, and which is the
product of both the knowledge we do possess, and, a consequence of the suppression of
the knowledge we could possess, but do not possess. If knowledge creates form then it
follows logically that : knowledge must be positively constrained in order to create a
distinct form. Because forms do not only have structure, they also have boundaries.
Knowledge cannot be allowed to find its own limit, otherwise knowledge has no other
function than to match the reality that exists. And this makes no sense, because the
power of knowing is a biological attribute, and life would not—could not—evolve an
animal that exists simply to know, for the sheer hell of knowing. If knowledge creates
the physiology of the superorganism, then it stands to reason that both what is known,
and the suppression of what can be known, are both essential to forming the inner
structure, and setting the boundary of the living form that gives the superorganism its
outer structure, its appearance. In the same way that building an integral structure such
as a ship requires knowledge of its whole structure, and a knowledge of where to set the
limits on the structure to give the vessel its necessary shape in the water. According to
this example of a physical form determined by nature, we can say that the purpose of
enforced ignorance is to set a limit on the social form of the human organism. Hence
religion, which gives us our identity and creates the outer form of the superorganism, the
form that we are all conscious of, is the sum of enforced ignorance. Which explains why
the formation of religion is synonymous with the war against knowledge, so that when
this war produces Darwinism, what it is really doing is developing religion, not science,
and certainly not knowledge ; on the contrary, Darwinism is the supreme example of
capping knowledge, of preserving the outer form of the superorganism, the religious
form.
The idea that society has its roots in nature is ancient, and if we try to examine the
history of the idea that society is an organic entity, a biological phenomenon created by
nature, then, although the idea is practically unknown today, outside academic circles,
we would eventually gather a considerable body of work together for consideration.
Indeed so much so that it is quite a challenge to know how to develop such a historical
resource, for the purposes of developing the argument to be presented here. But as it
happens that I have just come across a remark in an early essay on this subject, I will
quote from it, because it so nicely reiterates the point I have just made according to my
own mode of thinking and expression. The discussion concerned the idea of a social
contract, as set out by Thomas Hobbes in 1651, in his famous Leviathan, where,
according to the author of our essay, he basically asserts that society is the product of a
legal contract, prior to the existence of which men were lawless ; which sounds like
Rousseau, who came after Hobbes, but anyway, we have this :

“Thus Locke, recognising a contradiction in Hobbes’ theory, in the

original individualism and warfare, and in the subsequent social unity and peace,
secured only through surrender of inalienable rights, refused to think of the
contract as actually creating society. For him, indeed, society is original and
natural, its component individuals being rational, and so subject to an organizing
law that is superior to any enacted contract.”

(The Organic Theory of Society, Lloyd, A. H., The American Journal of

Sociology, March 1901. Page 580.)

At least when introducing these ideas somewhat out of the blue, as we have just
done, we get to introduce the most famous modern English philosopher to of represented
society as an organically constituted whole, of a sort, Hobbes ; and another famous
English philosopher who evidently had a yet more natural conception of society as an
organic form, Locke. Our whole argument is based on the realisation that humans are a
superorganic species of mammal, a mammalian equivalent of insects like ants, bees and
termites, that also form large complex social bodies. Accordingly, we assert that there is
such a thing as human nature in a biological sense, and that human nature is most
fittingly called corporate, by which we mean human nature is body forming, where the
physiology of individual humans has evolved to give rise to a complex living structure at
the level of social organization. What is so beautiful in the last quotation, for our
purposes, is the statement telling us that for Locke, human society is implicit in the
human biological form, society is natural, and government is only an elaboration on this
theme. Furthermore, this suggests a law of nature making humans social, and thus tallies
with the idea we will favour that says humans, and all details of human society, are
dictated by a natural force. The only required caveat to this tone of approval would seem
to be that Locke was trying to define the human individual as the embodiment of the
motive force, shown in the idea that ‘component individuals are rational’, thus promoting
individualism, which is anathema to our ideas ; but you cannot have it all. At least these
early attempts to formulate an idea of society imply a notion of ‘human nature’ that has to
be taken into account, giving an indication of the central problem, which persists
unresolved to this day, namely, between an urge to preserve the idea of human
individuality, and the central problem of accounting for a huge complex social
organization transcending any possible notion of dependence upon individual will.

We wondered about the brief period in the late nineteenth century when the
warfare between science and religion became an open question of debate, and why this
exceptional moment occurred as and when it did. We have seen that knowledge was
expanding, irresistibly, and the church resisted all change in human understanding, just as
it continues to do to this day. Only last week, today being ¾/08, there was a big fuss over
a forthcoming bill dealing with the regulation of embryo research and fertility treatment.
The Catholic priesthood ordered the phalange it has placed within parliament to vote
against the bill, and prime minister Gordon Brown bowed to his masters, and granted the
political face of the priesthood a free vote on these matters. But overt resistance of this
blatant kind was futile in the past, as it will be now, trying to hold back knowledge of
reality is like Chanute commanding the tide to turn ; another solution was required in the
nineteenth century. Although the social authorities are ultimately religious, they are not
God himself, and much of the political tussle is about working out how to preserve
traditional authority while permitting material development upon which the power of the
social structure is based. The basic framework of the nineteenth century solution was
well established long before the crisis of emerging knowledge brought pressure to bear
on the church. The academic world was a religious world, but this part of the theocratic
buttress could not hold back the swell of new ideas by a force of resistance alone, and in
fact universities had always been based upon an opposite principle to that of stalwart
resistance, universities existed to attack the problem of real knowledge by a process of
controlling knowledge. If knowledge be likened to a flow of water, then a university is
like a damn with integral sluice gates, not simply blocking what could be known, but
controlling what could be known. In circumstances where the pressure of new
knowledge is overwhelming there can only be one solution : the subversion of
knowledge. What passes through the sluice gate must be refined knowledge only,
knowledge which has had the raw force of pure information moderated by priestly
expertise. To sit here today and talk about this subject in such blunt, matter of fact ways,
is liable to create a sense of awe at the suggestion, because it describes a superhuman
challenge in mundane terms. It suggests that people faced with the certain death of
religion needed to plan a total subversion of all knowledge throughout the world,
requiring the total control of all academic institutions on earth, for centuries to come !
Impossible, insane, and obviously this has not been the means by which religion has
survived the coming of science, Has it ? Well, if not, then how else has religion persisted
into the age of scientific knowledge that has stripped nature down to its barest particles of
matter ?
No, the outcome, the total subjection of all knowledge to the rule of the church,
has been perfected, but not through the guile of individuals, but through the action of a
natural law, a natural force, that directs people in their creation of social fabric, of which
the living human superorganism is composed, producing a superorganism which includes
within its physiology the living bodies of the individuals who create its extended fabric,
which, to those individuals who create the extended fabric, ought to be known as an
exoskeleton, because in scientific terms that is what it must be. The essay quoted from
above opens with this line :

“The organic theory of society is entertained by nearly every serious

thinker of the present time.”

This in 1901. As a student of the ‘organic theory’ I can confirm that the idea was
rife, and had been developing nicely for some time, but it was a bubble about to burst,
and hence to vanish into oblivion, in the twinkling of an eye, as if it had never been.
Today, with the modern techniques of science to help us, the traces of events long gone
can be discovered in the most seemingly miraculous ways. DNA captures killers from
decades ago, magnetized particles fixed in igneous rocks capture the alignment of the
earth’s crust from ages past, tree rings in preserved wood capture the story of seasons
before recorded history, pollen grains tell a tale of long past floras, radioactive traces
capture a fleeting moment in time, from millions of years ago, when a rock smacked the
planet. And so we ought to be able to find traces of debris splattered through the residue
of academic work, revealing the fleeting, but distinct moment, when the search for
knowledge was liberated, unleashed by the sudden expansion of our societies dominion.
A searing flash of free thought did occur, and the pressure of knowledge swelled behind
the dam of academia, which soon filled up, collecting all ideas to itself, drowning all
possibility of free thought henceforth, from whence only the purified knowledge
sanctioned by priests was allowed to flow once again, into the farthest reaches of society.
But you see, in the preceding description, we do not talk about Fred, Bob and
Sally, who organized a fight back against science because they saw that truth was
emerging, that would annihilate the religion that they depended upon for their exalted
positions in society. We describe a process which is contained by huge, complex and
long lived social structures, that are in a permanent state of operation, structures that are
simply required to respond to a period of increased pressure, as and when needed.
Wherein the individuals, who can indeed be discovered and named according to a
historical fashion, do what is required of them in obedience to the cultural programmes
that are related to the social structures of knowledge control. So that the individual, even
be they a Darwin or a Wallace, need know no more about what they are doing to thwart
science and save religion, than a clerk in a public office need know what deeper reasons
lie behind the policy they manage at the interface between the government and the
populace. At the public interface things are always done for the purest of reasons, but in
the deepest recesses of government the meat and grizzle of running a society are faced
head on, between the realism and the realisation, harsh decisions are softened into
blessings.
To my knowledge, properly speaking, only one history of the doomed science of
society has ever been written, The Social Organism, by George R, Maclay, 1990, and I
want to quote from the closing pages of this work now, in order to illustrate the current
state of affairs through the words of a contemporary student of this subject, the only
contemporary student of this subject I know of, apart from myself.

The idea that a human society might be viewed as an organism suddenly

went out of fashion .......

Several factors have probably contributed to the twentieth century’s

disenchantment with the society-as-organism idea. It does not fit well with the
ideals and methods of experimental science. .......

Throughout this century sociologists have had to defend themselves

against the charge that their science is not quite a science. ......... Sociologists
have been pressed by this criticism to concentrate their attention on those areas
within their large field of study where the subject matter is most measurable and
open to conventional scientific proof.

Something else has been at work too. The events of the twentieth century
have led many people to see organismic theories of the state as being too easily
misemployed as a justification for authoritarian government.

(Pages 340-1)

So here we have a recent, self professed devotee of the idea that society is an
organic phenomenon, straining himself to explain the sudden disappearance of the only
possible truly scientific sociological idea, to be replaced by utter nonsense, and in his
explanation he includes the effort to be more rigorously scientific ! Then he extends his
excuses to peripheral social conditions, taking note of the fascism which most certainly
did so conveniently come along at precisely the right moment to cast true science into
purgatory, while advancing an old dead religion, Judaism, to the forefront of human
global politics, not to mention propelling Islam across a Europe which until then had
been a bastion of Christian Judaism ; albeit this continental zone, under the influence of
science, was losing its Christian slave identity, and making Judaism redundant. Funny,
though, despite all this astute and well informed observation, our great friend of
organicism fails to think of the war between science and religion as a factor in the death
of organicism, and the impact of the idea of the social organism on a naturalistic
understanding of religion, and how this idea of the social organism meant certain death
for Judaism, and its slave forms, Christianity and Islam.
By pointing out this failure to be genuinely critical of the demise of this idea, we
indicate the subtle manner in which the effort to subvert knowledge shifts through every
minute particle of the flux of knowledge available to us, to all of us who are dependant
upon people who are either fooled themselves, or consciously committed to fooling us.
The copy I have of Maclay’s work is quite likely to be the only copy in Europe, it was
never intended to spread knowledge of its subject, it was always intended to thwart
knowledge that had been stirred up by events in America, during the years just prior to
the book’s publication. It was, I presume, purposefully not written by a professional
academic, it is an amateur work. If the response from my local library to my request to
borrow a copy of this book is correct then even the British Library has no copy of
Maclay. This discussion of Maclay’s work does smack of conspiracy, but the point to
understand here is that any conspiracy of this kind is not the product of individual
determination, but the result of action dictated by the institutional framework which has
the power to direct such activity built into its structure, and to bring a result to fruition
that simulates a true conspiracy, by acting toward a purposeful goal, namely the control
of knowledge, to serve the needs of a ruling theocracy. Individuals are forever present, as
professionals, awaiting tasks dictated by the establishment. Conversely, try doing
something like this, producing an amateur work that runs counter to the thrust of the
establishment, it is nigh on impossible to bring such a project to completion.
What this means is that knowledge exists in society as lines of social force, that
shape the social landscape, just as water exists as lines of geological force that shape the
planet’s landscape. A valley is a line of water force ; a university is a line of knowledge
force, or, as I would rather have it, a line of linguistic force. So, just as all water falling
within a geographical catchment must eventually run toward the line of force in its
location, toward the main water course that is, and augment it, or seep into the aquifer, so
in society, all ideas must run toward the main line of force in its locality, which is defined
by the institutions that control knowledge, and in doing so all ideas, of whatever kind,
ultimately augment the one idea, the religious idea that cuts the social landscape in which
humans live.
Wars are as routine in human life as egg laying in birds, anti-Semitism is as much
a part of routine occurrences in societies where Jews exist as death is part of the process
of life. Therefore why not try and discover a scientific explanation that accounts for
Nazism as a natural and normal part of social processes. Indeed, but such a project would
be unimaginable coming from any academic forum on earth. We hear the Iranians
denying the holocaust and attacking the existence of Israel, but as a Muslim state we must
regard Iran as a rigidly enslaved Jewish territory, the Iranians could never offer any
scientific account of these issues, such as we provide here, because that would involve
denying Islam just as much as Judaism, and this is because Judaism and Islam are one
and the same identity. Thus we see that one line of linguistic force exists everywhere,
and all ideas flow into the same catchment area, and are thereby reduced to a common
form, even when it appears that these various knowledge formulas are diametrically
opposed to one another.
As the analogy we have used is not an intuitively precise match, in that water cuts
an inert substance, while language accretes a highly complex inert substance in the shape
of the artificial world of humans, we might just say that our analogy is intended to be
suggestive, but we would expect its basic suggestion of a creative relationship between
what we have called ‘forces’, will be the same in both cases. We are dealing with
different types of creative system, so that water cuts a landscape, whereas language
deposits a structure. In order to justify the idea of language acting like a river, carrying
material, that is deposited to form a structure, we need to indicate how language can be
deemed to act in such a way, as a carrier of social substance. Language is an attribute of
human physiology, as such language causes human behaviour, the nature of this
behaviour is specifically social. Social behaviour is itself a structural entity. No social
behaviour can ever exist that is not structural in its nature, and this includes all forms of
social action, be it what we would deem good, or what we would call evil and
destructive. Destructive action is still structural, in that it has a structural impact.
Vandalism could be regarded as a manifestation of the process of decay for example,
even though we would inevitably regard is as wanton damage inflicted by mindless
youth, it could be seen as the urge of youth to force degeneration or stagnation to give
way to youth’s rising social influence. Two people walking together constitute a
structure, and if they choose to carry items for a picnic then the form of this activity is an
extension of the social structure their togetherness constitutes, and the actual picnic is a
temporary material deposit within the environment. But the whole manifestation of their
human activity is induced by, and hence deposited by, the force of language inherent in
their physiology, that alone makes the social behaviour happen. Thus language deposits
a picnic, and language also deposits any other sum of human activity that takes place
through the agency of human social action.

What we are saying is that we do not live in a free society, but the way in which
our urge towards freedom is contained is through subversion. We are saying that all
academics in the world are drawn unwittingly into this deception, all ideas flow toward a
common point imposed upon collective knowledge by the social structure which is
created by collective knowledge ; so we have a knowledge catchment, just as we have
seen there is a water catchment similarly formed by a force related to a structure via
feedback process, so that force and structure reinforce each other. There is no other way
to account for the situation in which we find sociology today. It is peculiar to find a
complete lack of any appreciation of what scientific sociology is, in a book dealing with
the only tenable scientifically valid sociological idea, a book which uses the accusation
that sociology has failed to adopt a scientific method as an excuse for sociology failing to
pursue the one true scientific idea of human nature ; which Maclay says is partly because
sociologists were accused of being non-scientific ! Incredible, this contorted dishonesty
reminds me of the excruciating arguments I would have with my big sister when I was a
little boy, when I accused her of lying she would say, “Very well, if you are going to
accuse me of lying then I will lie.” There was no way to get the better of my sister, and,
as we can see, the total control that the powers of theocratic authority have over all means
of developing and disseminating knowledge, means that there is no way to get the better
of academia either. Accuse sociologists of being false to science and all that happens is
that they present apologists in the guise of their own enemies, who make those same
accusations work in the favour of the sociologists by saying that sociologists are only
failing to be scientific because they are being accused of failing to be scientific, so if this
accusation is going to be made then sociologists will see to it that it is true !
But the plain fact is, all of this duplicity, idiocy and deviousness, is simply the
manifestation of the war of knowledge rolling on down the ages. The war has taken this
amazingly convoluted and elaborate form because we live in a knowledge rich age where
reliance on overt resistance no longer works, and subversion is the only sure means of
control. The theocracy cannot stop what pervades society by meeting the challenge head
on, so the theocracy must ensure that it is the sole source of whatever enters the public
domain, and it must be such an overwhelming source that all unwanted information is
drowned out, overwhelmed by the force of pseudo knowledge generated by the
establishment.
Accordingly, as we have seen regarding the only person to write a history of the
idea that humans are a mammalian superorganic species, while presenting himself as a
friend of this idea, he actually bent over backwards to pay homage to the free world in
which we live, while making no mention of the ongoing war between religion and
science which ought to of been the central theme of his subject. Today no one discusses
the war between religion and science. The best examples we have of this war today are
to be found in the work of Richard Dawkins, but he is all the proof we could ever want
that there is no war between religion and science today, because while he does attack
religion without mercy, he simultaneously freely promotes the pseudo science created to
protect religion, without setting any limit to his support for establishment science, and
while expressly denying the validity of ideas tending toward the notion that humans
evolved to form a superorganism. Yes, that is right, Dawkins presents Darwinism as
science, and Darwinian science is the big fraud.

We have as yet not spelt out an answer to the question concerning the appearance
of works dealing directly with the ‘knowledge war’ at a brief moment in the late
nineteenth century. Three books were produced, by two American authors, that made
this war their subject. As I have said, no other books I know of make warfare between
science and religion their topic, but there must be many modern works that deal with the
subject in various ways. We could say that a book like the History of the Rise and
Influence of Rationalism in Europe, by William Lecky, was about this war, which is true,
but while it is the kind of book anyone interested in intellectual warfare as a social
phenomenon would want to consult, the war of knowledge, and its explanation, is not
such a book’s avowed remit. Lecky opens his introduction thus :

During the fierce theological controversies that accompanied and followed

the Reformation, while a judicial spirit was as yet unknown, while each party
imagined itself the representative of absolute and necessary truth in opposition to
absolute and fatal error, and while fluctuations of belief were usually attributed to
direct miraculous agency, it was natural that all the causes of theological changes
should have been sought exclusively within the circle of theology. Each
theologian imagined that the existence of the opinions he denounced was fully
accounted for by the existence of certain evil-minded men, who had triumphed by
means of sophisticated arguments, aided by a judicial blindness that had been cast
upon the deluded.

(Lecky, 1884, page v.)

 From what we have already said about how the war has been projected into the
modern era, the basic mechanism of knowledge control was well known in the past, as it
can also be known today. But Lecky is talking about religion as a valid way of knowing
about reality, but a way of knowing that has to keep up with the general state of
knowledge. So he is no atheist, he is no friend of science, indeed, he was a clergyman.
Where knowledge is concerned people are dependant upon a few voices of authority, as
Holbach said. The task of social rulers is to ensure that they are the point of origin for
that voice of authority in matters of knowledge impacting upon their political authority.
But just as we have no idea where the thoughts exist in our brains, that appear in the form
of words, so there is no way of knowing where the ideas which appear in books actually
arise in the body of society. All we can be sure of is that the science that pervades our
society is especially formulated to be safe for a world ruled by an absolute theocracy that
determines all that we may think or know.
I have in my possession a modern book that uses the idea of a war between
religion and knowledge, The Long War Against God : The History and Impact of the
Creation/Evolution Conflict, by Henry M. Morris, 1989, but this is a piece of
unashamedly religious propaganda, mimicking an academic style of presentation, it is a
piece of Creationist literature set up to act as the protagonist of the pseudo Darwinian
science of evolution, that was itself set up to protect religion from science by assuming
the provocative face of science, when really Darwinism is nothing of the sort ; which is
why a void exists in our knowledge that allows religious freaks like Morris to attack
science at will, in the obscene guise of Creationism. Thus we find that we have a virulent
pseudo science mercilessly attacking religion, only to be countered by an overtly
religious science attacking the pseudo science presented by the establishment as real
science. The net result of which is that the establishment’s ideas are the only game in
town, and all these ideas are sham. This sets up a closed loop between the covert and
unwitting enemies of science, people like Dawkins, and the overt enemies of science,
people like Morris, and this closed loop ensures that no void remains within which a true
science may exist. By contrasting a vigorous enemy of religion and friend of science like
Dawkins, with a rabid enemy of science and true friend of religion like Morris, while
indicating that the ideas of both actually flow in the same direction, we provide a nice
example of the situation we discussed above, when we said that all ideas are of a
common nature ; no water ever flows up hill, away from the river, and no knowledge ever
runs counter to the authority of the theocracy, and reveals the true nature of existence—
life remains forever an inscrutable mystery.
There is still more involved in the exclusion of true science from society, and
Maclay referred to what we have in mind when he spoke of how the idea that society was
a product of biology was made taboo by the likes of the Nazis. If there is an idea that is
anathema to religion then all that is required is to take that idea to its maximum degree of
misrepresentation, and hey presto, you have a taboo subject, that none dare touch, and if
some errant individuals do dare, woe betide them !
For an example of the kind of argument presented in overtly religious science, we
may turn to a passage from Morris :
 We can therefore conclude that this concept of the Great Chain of Being
was very significant as the medium for transmitting evolutionary concepts into the
era of modern science. The main arguments for evolution—comparative
morphology, the recapitulation theory of embryology, the order of the fossils, the
differences between the human “races”—were all based on it, as was the very idea
of evolutionary “progression” with time. None of these arguments is supported
by the actual data of science, but all were nevertheless effectively used in the
nineteenth century to convince practically the whole intellectual world that
evolution was valid.

(Page 193)

This sworn enemy of science, this Christian apologist, is presenting himself in the
guise of a scientist. We see this in his presentation of scientific history, and his
authoritative mode of dealing with science. This is Creationism, the pseudo science of
the religious establishment, which is designed to mimic the official science of the covert
theocracy that pretends to be unbiased and strictly secular. Professional scientists hate
this kind of thing, but they are powerless to stop it, and they struggle to understand why
this situation exists. The answer is that they have all been unwittingly duped, and it is
pleasing to see that our Creationist affirms the possibility of achieving this outcome, he
says that it is possible to hoodwink the whole academic world, and he is right. The root
of the problem is that the academic structure, where science is based, is open to religion !
The idea is staggeringly perverse, it is as if professional criminals were welcome to work
and study within the judicial system. Incredible, no wonder all academia is utterly
corrupt, and science can get nowhere. We see that Lecky affirms a similar principle
when he says that people believed the whole of humanity could be deceived by a few
well placed ‘evil-minded’ people. And we also saw the same idea expressed in the short
passage taken from Holbach, where he speaks of the masses being dependant upon a few,
for all that this few may know.
But what also emerges from this observation that in all walks of life, wherever
anyone descries the way in which knowledge is subverted, as Lecky says, everyone
bemoans the same misanthropy ; and we are doing likewise. How can we escape being
caught up in this vortex of deceit ? How can we show that we are the only ones speaking
the truth, and everyone else is either deceived, or lying ? This flaw, the impossibility of
making true words appear distinct from false words, lies in the nature of language as a
symbolic system of representation, and indeed, it is not really a flaw, it is a primary
mechanism, because language did not evolve to enable the predominance of true
knowledge, language evolved to enable a social authority to exist. Therefore it is not a
question of who is telling the truth, it is a question of who controls the power to speak.

We can see from the above discussion that our attention focuses upon the
nineteenth century when we think about the war between science and religion, and it is to
this period that we must turn to find works dealing specifically with this war. History of
the Conflict between Religion and Science by John Draper appeared in 1873, while at the
same time a similar theme was brewing in the work of another American academic. In A
History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, by Andrew White,
1896, we find a full description of how this author came to develop this subject, where he
tells us his first venture into this field, in book form, was The Warfare of Science,
published in 1876.
These are all the books ever written in English which take the theme of conflict
between religion and science as their subject. Can that possibly be correct ? I find it hard
to believe, but I know of no others specifically tackling this topic from anything
approximating to a sincere viewpoint, although White and Draper both seem heavily
biased in favour of religious authority, and their work certainly is nothing like what we
produce here, nothing like a genuine scientifically oriented analysis of the conflict.
Given that the war is careering along unabated to this day, this lack of books on the
question how religion survives today, seems odd ; or it would seem odd if it were not for
the fact that no one knows that the war is ongoing, everyone believing that we live in a
free society, the war between religion and science being over. Clearly this latter view is
self evidently absurd, since religion could not exist for any length of time in a world
where science was free to pursue knowledge without limit, or restraint of any kind.
But can we say that something is self evident, when no one knows about it ! Yes,
because it is not the lack of evidence that is the issue, it is the nature of the human person
which makes it impossible for people to see that which is ‘self evident’. The mind of a
person is composed of information imprinted upon it by the social authorities—not in a
direct act of indoctrination, in their capacity as emitters of social consciousness—so that
a veil of linguistically composed ideas constitutes the individuals consciousness and takes
precedence over any capacity for thought originating within the individual themselves. If
each person were an authority in their own right, wholly independent of each other, then
all would agree on what was self evident as a matter of course. The fact that this does not
happen is all the proof we could ever wish for, to show that individuals are not ends in
themselves.
Something of the veracity of this last observation may be garnered from the
following exert from an apposite essay :

ART. IV.—A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom.

By ANDREW DICKSON WHITE, LL.D. (Yale), L.H.D. (Columbia), Ph.Dr. (Jena), late
President and Professor of History at Cornell University. London : 1896.

NOTHING is more remarkable in the history of the last few centuries than the
additions which have been made to the knowledge of mankind. The intellect of
man is no greater than it was, perhaps is not so great as it was, in the days of
Athens. But the knowledge of man has increased, and is increasing, at a
constantly accelerating ratio. This addition to our knowledge affects us in every
department of life. It endows our inventors, our engineers, our mechanics with
new powers. It enables them to achieve successes which in past ages they could
not have even contemplated. But increased knowledge has not merely enabled
man to dominate nature ; it has furnished him with new materials for explaining
nature. The old theories which geologists, astronomers, and biologists universally
accepted a few centuries ago have been discarded for new theories, to which new
discoveries and new inventions have contributed ; and the whole idea of the world
in which we live and of the surrounding universe has been modified and enlarged.
Ready, however, as most of us are to admit that the area of human
knowledge has been extended during the preceding centuries, many of us forget
that only a comparatively small number of persons have the means, the leisure, or
the ability to satisfy themselves of the truth of the conclusions which scientific
men have established. The ordinary citizen accepts the facts that the world is
some 24,000 miles in circumference, and that the sun is rather more than
90,000,000 miles from the earth, just as he accepts the fact that a message handed
to a telegraphist in London can be transmitted within a second of time by
electricity to New York. But he could no more give an intelligent reason for his
faith in the one case than he could himself construct an electric battery in the
other. The victory which the electrician has won over the forces of nature is,
indeed, impressed on him by the circumstance that he can himself communicate
by electricity with a distant friend. But the victory which the astronomer has
concurrently won over nature is not brought home to the ordinary citizen in the
same way. He accepts the facts which scientific men have established because he
finds that other persons, whose integrity he trusts and whose abilities he respects,
have received them as proven. Beyond this he cannot go : he cannot hope to
measure for himself the circumference of our globe or its distance from the sun.
If these circumstances be clearly borne in mind it will not seem surprising
that new discoveries in physics should have only slowly filtered into the popular
understanding. They could only be accepted by the great mass of men and women
on the authority of those who taught them ; and authority necessarily rests with
those who maintain old traditions and not with those who propound new theories.
The reluctance of mankind, moreover, to accept the new discoveries which
scientific men have made has been increased by the fact that religion in all ages
has assumed the task of interpreting nature. Both in the ancient and in the modern
world the ideas about the earth in which we live and the surrounding universe
have been associated with religious belief ; and new theories, therefore, seemed
not only opposed to authority, but subversive in many cases of faith. This attitude
of religion affected the ancient heathen as well as the modern Christian world.
Plutarch tells us in his life of Nicias—if we remember rightly—that Anaxagoras
was thrown into prison for explaining the manner in which the moon was
illuminated. Perhaps, therefore, it is not wholly surprising that Galileo should
have been similarly imprisoned for explaining the movement of the earth.
Authority in each case was in favour of the old faith ; and authority, in the
interests of religion, thought it necessary to interfere with the promulgation of
what it supposed to be error.
This attitude of religion, both in ancient as well as in modern times, was
no doubt unfortunate. It was specially disastrous in modern Europe, because the
religion of modern Europe is based on revelation, and a little courage might have
taught its professors that revelation did not cease with the dispersion of the Jews.
The history of this people had shown a continuous evolution in religious thought.
The God of the Old Testament, who walked in the garden in the cool of the day,
became by an almost insensible change the God of the New Testament, whom no
 man hath seen nor can see ; and it was in reality irrational to suppose that this
evolution, which had continued through all time, should have been abruptly
terminated after the fall of Jerusalem.

(Spencer Walpole, Quarterly Review, October 1897, Pages 357 – 358)

I have just grabbed the first two pages of this twenty four page essay reviewing
the book by White, because it nicely reflects our preceding discussion. The undeniable
truth of the idea that reality is fixed, as opposed to chaotic, and as such is able to be
discerned, comes across well in this essay. While at the same time, the Achilles heel of
the search for absolute truth as regards reality, is also brought into strong relief by the
description of how prone the mass of people are to their reliance upon a tiny elite of
extremely privileged individuals ; in addition to which we have the dynamic of traditional
authority, in shape of religion, forever seeking to hold the advance of true knowledge in
check.
At the same time, in common with the several works investigating the war
between science and religion just named, this essay is not intended to be friendly to our
atheist objectives, for we see in the last section taken, that religious fascism is being
excused. How do you like this piece of undisguised insanity :

“the God of the New Testament, whom no man hath seen nor can see ; and
it was in reality irrational to suppose that this evolution, which had continued
through all time, should have been abruptly terminated after the fall of
Jerusalem.”

“It was in reality irrational” ....... are you kidding ! A person exudes a line
composed of an insane statement, and then, emphasising one element from within the
stream of absurdity, says of it, tut-tut, they should of seen that that made no sense !
Blurrrrrr ! Of course he means that this error is inconsistent with the broad idea of
Christian religion itself ; but the piece is still a nice example of the vile, sick, degenerate
garbage that these arrogant ponces come out with in defence of religion. The elite spew
forth any gush they like, without regard for any kind of decency based on reason as such :
religion is knowledge prostituted.

What these few volumes concerning the war between religion and science
represent, is a severance of the modern open society, from the past closed society, even
though there is in reality no break in the continuity of religious authority. The world did
go through a transformation in its presentation, the world took on a secularised outer skin,
while retaining its inner religious core. The tone of Walpole’s snivelling essay indicates
well how the priesthood managed the transformation of false knowledge, allowing them
to accommodate the radically new society which science brought into being, so that the
nature of society remained as primitive and servile as ever any society could be, while at
the same time massively empowering the social structure farmed by the elite who manage
the lies we all live by. These works on intellectual warfare appeared at precisely the time
when the act of severance was being made between the old lie and the new lie, and this
was the only moment in time when such works could possibly be written, as they dealt
with the past as a mistake from which we had learned. We see something of this logic in
the way Lecky talks about how religion had been, as compared to how it was in his time.
When Lecky talks about The Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe he
is not talking about the rise of rationalism as such, he is talking about the moderation of
the insanity of religion. People stopped burning witches, but they continued to believe in
God, life after death, heaven, and many other lunacies. So that really, he was describing
a process that continues to this day, as homosexuals are welcomed into the church,
abortion is accepted, and marriage rules relaxed. This is not rationalism at all, just as
experimental science is not science at all, these activities and developments are merely
examples of structural reorganization, and structural manipulation. After these acts of
severance between so-called modern, and outmoded times, were produced, it was no
longer possible for anyone ever again to write a book discussing the war between religion
and science, just as no one today can write a book about the war with Germany, because
there is no war with Germany, all anyone can do now is to write a history of past wars
with Germany. People might write about the war with religion in days gone by, but no
one writes such books with any purpose, because the war is over, although we do get
works on certain topics, such as the attack on Galileo, which now teach us that the church
was not really an enemy of knowledge, this idea was all a big misunderstanding. Tell
that to the poor sod that the Catholic fascists burnt to death !
The job of perverting knowledge is unending, and an infinite number of people
are always clamouring for the opportunity to devote their lives to this great work, this is
because it is so well rewarded by the establishment. Being a priest allows ordinary
people a means of escaping a menial life, it takes no intelligence or knowledge to spout a
doctrine with vehemence, only a desire for privilege and a fat ego. And in so far as well-
to-do people are ambitious to serve, they are trained by their privileged education to
specialise in deceit, under the guise of being leaders and such like. Look at the Tory
leader David Cameron right now, what is such a toff doing in such an elite position,
representing us, the people ! It makes no sense, what does he know about anything that
matters to us ? But he is trained for power, just as the monarch is, just as we are trained
to grovel in ignorance, and as such he is pre-selected by the system ; we have no say in
these matters, we can only choose what we are offered—modern society is a ‘brave new
world’, just as the ancient world was. My tone betrays my contempt, but really it is the
nature of our language which loads my description with malice, and makes me appear
cynical and nasty. In reality these social arrangements are ordained by human nature, and
the cynical description I provide is simply the inverse of the propagandist description
imposed by the establishment as the norm. If you are going to impose a programme of
life and call it ‘up’ and say ‘up’ is good, what can I do if I disagree but say ‘up’ is bad,
and ‘down’ is better ? The state calls out for leaders, I point out deceivers. But the
whole process is a natural one, none of us have any say over what life is, I am only at
odds with the main flow because I seek to describe society as a natural world, instead of
taking part in it.

To write a book about the war between science and religion today, a person must
become aware of the fact that the war is ongoing precisely because the war is over. How
can that be, how can a war be continuing because it has ended ? This curious
contradiction arises because of the nature of the war. Think of it like this : Holland is a
land captured from the sea, in part, so we can think of the Dutch as fighting a war with
the sea for the possession of the land. With dykes raised and land drained people have
settled, and the land is farmed. Is the war between the Dutch and the sea over ? Of
course not, let them lower their guard, and before they know it the sea will of risen up
and invaded the precious land once again. This kind of war is based upon raising a
defence against an ever present force of nature. And so it is with knowledge. Where a
social authority relies upon the imposition of false ideas in order to secure its place in
society, it goes without saying that there must be some source of power in the
development of a false body of knowledge, but irrespective of this fact, it is equally
obvious that if an organ of social power has to be raised, and defended in the face of
competition from alternative modes of reasoning, then such an organ must, once
established, must be defended, and, as with the dykes of the Netherlands, once erected,
the barricades must be maintained. And so, while religion has built up intellectual
barricades to keep knowledge at bay, it cannot let down its guard, for if it does then the
would be alternative modes of knowing will flood society, and wash religion as we know
it away.
If we look at these few pieces of work dealing directly with the war of knowledge,
we find they are highly respectful of religion, they speak of how religion can only benefit
from a free science ; which is the height of absurdity. You may as well say a window is
best cleaned by throwing a brick through it ! As such it is clear that these works are
written by devoted friends of religion. Both White and Draper make it perfectly clear
that they at any rate are such friends of religion. It would be impossible for virulent
enemies of religion to of published a book of an atheist character at this date, and it
would be equally impossible today, come to that. But it could never even occur to
anyone to do so today, because no one is aware that religion is the problem blocking our
understanding of ourselves. Today we are slaves indeed, bound hand and foot in a
gossamer of freedom.

Draper, 1874 :

P R E F A C E.
_____

WHOEVER has had an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the mental

condition of the intelligent classes in Europe and America, must have perceived
that there is a great and rapidly-increasing departure from the public religious
faith, and that, while among the more frank this divergence is not concealed, there
is a far more extensive and far more dangerous secession, private and
unacknowledged.
So wide-spread and so powerful is this secession, that it can neither be
treated with contempt nor with punishment. It cannot be extinguished by derision,
by vituperation, or by force. The time is rapidly approaching when it will give rise
to serious political results.
 Ecclesiastical spirit no longer inspires the policy of the world. Military
fervour in behalf of faith has disappeared. Its only souvenirs are the marble
effigies of crusading knights, reposing in the silent crypts of churches on their
tombs.
That a crisis is impending is shown by the attitude of the great powers
toward the papacy. The papacy represents the ideas and aspirations of two-thirds
of the population of Europe. It insists on a political supremacy in accordance with
its claims to a divine origin and mission, and a restoration of the mediæval order
of things, loudly declaring that it will accept no reconciliation with modern
civilization.
The antagonism we thus witness between Religion and Science is the
continuation of a struggle that commenced when Christianity began to attain
political power. A divine revelation must necessarily be intolerant of
contradiction ; it must repudiate all improvement in itself, and view with disdain
that arising from the progressive intellectual development of man. But our
opinions on every subject are continually liable to modification, from the
irresistible advance of human knowledge.
Can we exaggerate the importance of a contention in which every
thoughtful person must take part whether he will or not ? In a matter so solemn as
that of religion, all men, whose temporal interests are not involved in existing
institutions, earnestly desire to find the truth. They seek information as to the
subjects in dispute, and as to the conduct of the disputants.
The history of Science is not a mere record of isolated discoveries ; it is a
narrative of the conflict of two contending powers, the expansive force of the
human intellect on one side, and the compression arising from traditionary faith
and human interests on the other.
No one has hitherto treated the subject from this point of view. Yet from
this point it presents itself to us as a living issue—in fact, as the most important of
all living issues.
A few years ago, it was the politic and therefore the proper course to
abstain from all allusion to this controversy, and to keep it as far as possible in the
background. The tranquillity of society depends so much on the stability of its
religious convictions, that no one can be justified in wantonly disturbing them.
But faith is in its nature unchangeable, stationary ; Science is in its nature
progressive ; and eventually a divergence between them, impossible to conceal,
must take place. It then becomes the duty of those whose lives have made them
familiar with both modes of thought, to present modestly, but firmly, their views ;
to compare the antagonistic pretensions calmly, impartially, philosophically.
History shows that, if this be not done, social misfortunes, disastrous and
enduring, will ensue. When the old mythological religion of Europe broke down
under the weight of its own inconsistencies, neither the Roman emperors nor the
philosophers of those times did any thing adequate for the guidance of public
opinion. They left religious affairs to take their chance, and accordingly those
affairs fell into the hands of ignorant and infuriated ecclesiastics, parasites,
eunuchs, and slaves.
 The intellectual night which settled on Europe, in consequence of that
great neglect of duty, is passing away ; we live in the daybreak of better things.
Society is anxiously expecting light, to see in what direction it is drifting. It
plainly discerns that the track along which the voyage of civilization has thus far
been made, has been left ; and that a new departure, on an unknown sea, has been
taken. ...........

Though I have spared no pains in the composition of this book, I am very

sensible how unequal it is to the subject, to do justice to which a knowledge of
science, history, theology, politics, is required ; every page should be alive with
intelligence and glistening with facts. But then I have remembered that this is only
as it were the preface, or forerunner, of a body of literature, which the events and
wants of our times will call forth. We have come to the brink of a great
intellectual change. Much of the frivolous reading of the present will be
supplanted by a thoughtful and austere literature, vivified by endangered interests,
and made fervid by ecclesiastical passion.
What I have sought to do is, to present a clear and impartial statement of
the views and acts of the two contending parties. In one sense I have tried to
identify myself with each, so as to comprehend thoroughly their motives ; but in
another and higher sense I have endeavoured to stand aloof, and relate with
impartiality their actions.
I therefore trust that those, who may be disposed to criticise this book, will
bear in mind that its object is not to advocate the views and pretensions of either
party, but to explain clearly, and without shrinking, those of both.

(Third Ed. 1875, Pages v. – x)

This is an interesting observation, on the loss of interest in religious warfare,

because, thanks to our masters introducing Islam into our lands, in order to recover from
the disastrous failure of religion noted by Draper, we once again have the joy of religious
warfare resounding all around the world. 9/11 has been an inspiration to the West, we
have waged war with glee ever since ; Draper will be resting contentedly in his grave as
American soldiers die in a modern version of the age old Jewish religious war, now cast
in the effigy of terrorism.
It is clear that Draper is no friend of science, he is as devoted to religion as any
human could ever be. When he talks about treating both sides with impartiality he is
delivering science into the hands of religion, helping to promote the sterilisation of
science, to make knowledge safe for a world, as he says, ruled by religion. This author is
a perfect voice for all that has happened in the war between science and religion, that has
brought us to the terrible situation in which we exist today, where we are the most
miserably begotten slaves ever known on earth, zombified and pathetic, yet so
empowered that we are on the brink of wrecking our planet, as our masters continue to
make their will the sole cause of all things we do on earth.
There is something interesting about the only two authors of works dealing
directly with the war on religion being American. On the one hand this suggests a certain
freedom from old authoritarian modes of thought, an expression of a new notion of
freedom, such as the Americans are supposed to of brought to the world. But we know
the Americans mean nothing of the sort, quite the reverse, as the supreme power base on
earth America is the seat of the age old master race today. The other day, today being
28/04/08, Hilary Clinton was asked a question by a reporter, as the battle for prospective
president nears completion, and the exchange went something like this : “What if the
Iranians had nuclear weapons, and were preparing to attack Israel ?” “Make no mistake”
she said, “We have the power to deal with the Iranians.” What a horrific society America
is, the Nazis pale into insignificance by comparison. But why, why on earth should this
question about Israel be asked ? In no other society on earth could this question be
asked ? Who gives a shit about Israel, what is Israel anyway ? just an upstart nation that
was founded a couple of years before I was born, and at that founded on the basis of a
total lie, on the basis of a religion, on the basis of something which we should all be
striving to eradicate from the face of the earth. But no, this is America, the home of the
Jew, a slave nation for sure, if ever there was an enslaved people anywhere.
And this is what comes across most powerfully from the works produced by these
two authors of the war against freedom, as mounted by religion in the modern world.
What we really see by way of their efforts is just how the transference of European
culture to America, created a whole new seat of power for the master race, providing an
invigorated religious slave identity. This dynamic, appearing so prominent in American
history, explains why Jewish history shows a relentless mobility across territorial areas
occupied by alien peoples, eventually culminating in a total detachment from any fixed
locality, precisely as an actual Jewish slave identity came into being in the shape of
Christianity. And it is because of the continuing unfolding of this superorganic growth
process that America finds itself where it does today, immensely powerful, as the agent
of the master race, but mindlessly so, because its population is enslaved from within.
White’s later account of why he chose the theme of warfare between religion and science
reveals this situation particularly well, as he describes how he had to fight for the right to
create a university in which the teachers were not professional theologians.
I dropped on a fairly new book in a charity shop the other day, God Won’t Save
America : Psychosis of a Nation, by George Walden, 2006, written by an Englishman. I
do not expect to find any empathy from this author with my own scientific understanding
of the nature of the issues involved in such a topic, but the title on its own says something
of relevance to our discussion at this point. When I lay my hands on a book I taste it
first, seeking its bias, after viewing the contents, and perhaps a random dip or two into
the substance, I invariably head for the bibliography, where I always expect to be led to
something interesting that I have not heard of before. In this work there is one title in the
short bibliography that I think I might like to look at, Who Are We ? by Samuel
Huntington, 2004. Walden’s opening discussion is of some interest, as he thinks about
whether or not there is such a thing as a national character, and rightly notes that such
ideas are generally frowned upon today, which is because they hark back to the formative
years of German nationalism prior to the world wars. Needless to say Walden has no
means of understanding his own thought processes because he does not know what
human animals are, he thinks humans are people, he does not know humans are
superorganisms. But still it is always nice to see the blind feeling their way around the
edges of a door they cannot see, but cannot help sensing must be there somewhere, they
feel its draft pulling them toward it. Walden says “America is currently examining its
own identity as rarely before (notably in Samuel Huntington’s book Who are We ?),
asking itself what it stands for and where it is going.” (p. 9)
It is clear from what we have been arguing that the domination of alien
populations by the Jews, through a process of cultural infiltration—not through the
exercise of direct military or political power—requires striking a balance between a
stable slave identity, and a fixed alien identity. The Americans, being freshly formed are
powerfully attached to their Jewish slave identity—it is all they have—and this is the real
reason that the interests of Israel are paramount to Americans—Jewish interests are all
the interests the Americans have—Americans have no identity or purpose of their own,
they are not supposed to have, they have their slave identity. How can the Americans
have any purpose of their own, where would such an ambition come from ? But these
observations are not specific to Americans, in some way implying they are a weak or
flawed people, perhaps because they are newly enslaved, and freshly constituted on the
basis of a slave identity. Here we are describing mechanisms of superorganic physiology
as applied to a supermassive organism, created by means of implanted linguistic
identities. Accordingly, despite England’s great age and maturity as a European nation,
we English are also continually bombarded by questions seeking to undermine our sense
of identity. This demoralising attack upon our true cultural identity, conducted by our
alien masters, who farm our society in the name of Judaism, via the image of the
Christian slave identity, is essential to the rule of an alien identity. Our indigenous
identity must not get too compact, too clear cut, it must remain at least partially fluid.
The basis of the question What is Englishness ?, which is fired at us all the time these
days, is the massive rate of immigration that has been used by our masters to undermine
our culture, and thus to control us, to prevent us from breaking away from our Jewish
slave identity of Christianity. Consequently, as old as our society is, we find its fabric
being forced to mimic the fragmented, identity-less state of the newly formed European
territory of America. It is no accident that our territory is viewed as a primary target for
cultural programmes of American origin, originally developed to exploit a freshly made
slave biomass in the most efficient way possible, under modern conditions. Such as the
Mormon identity programme, which is coming over here, and its associated methods of
farming the population are also being introduced into the fabric of our society by our
masters, in the shape of Las Vegas style super casinos, destined to take the place of our
more homely traditional seaside resorts that, like supermarkets versus corner shops, do
not have the same potential of centralised farming practices, that enable more intensive
exploitation of social energy. In other words the developments in intensive human
farming, developed in the free ranges of the American extension of the European Jewish
territories, are now sufficiently developed to be exported, and our social fabric has been
sufficiently pulped to facilitate a gradual transformation of England into an American
style of intensive social farming. None of this is accidental, it is vital to the continuing
progress of Judaism as the expression of the linguistic force that has created the
superorganism we are all part of today.
So I find it hard to envisage Americans asking meaningful questions. That is
about as likely as a monkey banging away on a typewriter happening to knock off a copy
of one of Shakespeare’s masterpieces. That is what makes Huntington’s book of interest,
I want to see where he gets with that one. Will he realise that America is a slave state of
Israel ? Oh yes !!! That is even less likely than Hitler being brought out of hiding to be
made the next president of Israel.

The Nature of Jews

I have just been running freely at the mouth about the nature of the Jews,
prompted by turning our attention to the present state of the American nation. In order to
put this free flowing representation of the Jews as a master race, the most provocative
idea anyone can take up in world today, we can take a moment to think about the nature
of the Jews in the wider world.
I happened upon an old piece of Jewish propaganda in a charity shop toward the
back end of last year, 2007, a mid nineteenth century novel set in fifteenth century Spain,
telling the story of a Jewish noble women. The story looks at the abuse of the
Inquisition, and its attack on Jews. Dipping into it now, I have found a short passage that
evokes a very peculiar picture of Judaism as a cultural phenomenon. The novel is The
Vale of Cedars or The Martyr, by Grace Aguilar, 1887. My copy is the twenty-first
edition, so I can only guess the book’s date of publication, let’s say about 1870. From
notices of her works at the rear I suspect that Aguilar was herself a Jew, The Women of
Israel is a rather suggestive title. I assume she was English, but from her surname we
may suppose she had Spanish antecedents, from The Spanish Inquisition, by Henry
Kamen, 1997, we find an area of Spain named, “Aguilar de la Frontera, near Córdoba”
(p. 30), that evidently had a Jewish presence at the period in which Aguilar sets her
historical novel, even if Kamen only refers to “converso peasant farmers” (ibid.) in this
passage ; converso being Jews or Muslims that have converted to Catholicism, and all
their descendants thereafter. I have not read any of the novel in question but I think The
Vale of Cedars is actually the country retreat of a Jewish family, which would suit the
hint we find in Kamen’s work about the area where the name Aguilar might come from,
with its mention of Jews or Muslims working on the land. Jews being what they are, we
may well expect that if this authoress traced her name to this area, then. even three or
four centuries later, in a foreign land, she would be able to draw on family traditions to
tell her story in some detail. Which is quite an amazing thought, preserving family
traditions down the generations is no easy thing, my father was a mine of such
information on his side, but I can recall little of what he told me now I am middle aged,
and even then his reach would not cross a century from his own date of birth. The Jews
however are famous for their attachment to family, and this is undoubtedly an important
point concerning the nature of the Jews as a cultural phenomenon. Sharing family history
preserves the family, makes the family indeed ; which accords with the scientific idea that
linguistic force creates social structure ; although we generally speak of this principle in
relation to the sociological conception of society as a whole.

In spite of the miserable conditions of the people during the civil

struggles, the wealth of Spain had not decreased. It was protected and increased
by a class of people whose low and despised estate was, probably, their safeguard
—these were the Jews, who for many centuries had, both publicly and secretly,
resided in Spain. There were many classes of this people in the land, scattered
alike over Castile, Leon, Arragon, Navarre, and also in the Moorish territories ;
some there were confined to the mystic learning and profound studies of the
schools, whence they sent many deeply learned men to other countries, where
their worth and wisdom gained them yet greater regard than they received in
Spain ; others there were low and degraded in outward seeming, yet literally
holding and guiding the financial and commercial interests of the kingdom ;—
whose position was of the lowest—scorned and hated by the very people who yet
employed them, and exposed to insult from every class ; the third, and by far the
largest body of Spanish Jews, were those who, Israelites in secret, were so
completely Catholic in seeming, that the court, the camp, the council, even the
monasteries themselves, counted them amongst them. And this had been the case
for years—we should say for centuries—and yet so inviolable was the faith
pledged to each other, so awful the dangers around them were even suspicion
excited, that the fatal secret never transpired ; offices of state, as well as
distinctions of honour, were frequently conferred on men who, had their faith or
race been suspected, would have been regarded as the scum of the earth, and
sentenced to torture and death, for daring to pass for what they were not. At the
period of which we write, the fatal enemy to the secret Jews of more modern
times, known as the Holy Office, did not exist ; but a secret and terrible tribunal
there was, whose power and extent were unknown even to the sovereigns of the
land.
The Inquisition is generally supposed to have been founded by Ferdinand
and Isabella, about the year 1480 or 82 ; but a deeper research informs us that it
had been introduced into Spain several centuries earlier, and obtained great
influence in Arragon. Confiding in the protection of the Papal see, the inquisitors
set no bounds to their ferocity ; secret informations, imprisonments, tortures,
midnight assassinations marked their proceedings; but they overreached
themselves. All Spain, setting aside petty rivalships, rose up against them. All
who should give them encouragement or assistance were declared traitors to their
country ; the very lives of the inquisitors and their families were, in the first burst
of fury, endangered ; but after a time, imagining they had sunk into harmless
insignificance, their oppressors desisted in their efforts against them, and were
guilty of the unpardonable error of not exterminating them entirely. *

* Stockdale’s History of the Inquisition.

According to the popular belief, the dreaded tribunal slept, and so soundly,
they feared not, imagined not its awakening. They little knew that its subterranean
halls were established near almost all the principal cities, and that its engines were
often at work, even in the palaces of kings. Many a family wept the loss of a
beloved member, they knew not, guessed not how—for those who once entered
those fatal walls were never permitted to depart, so secret were their measures,
that even the existence of this fearful mockery of justice and religion was not
known, or at that time it would have been wholly eradicated. Superstition had not
then gained the ascendancy which in after years so tarnished the glory of Spain,
and opened the wide gates to the ruin and debasement under which she labours
now. The fierce wars and revolutions ravaging the land had given too many and
 too favourable opportunities for the exercise of this secret power ; but still, regard
for their own safety prevented the more public display of their office, as ambition
prompted. The vigorous proceedings of Ferdinand and Isabella rendered them yet
more wary ; and little did the sovereigns suspect that in their very courts this fatal
power held sway. The existence of this tribunal naturally increased the dangers
environing the Israelites who were daring enough to live amongst the Catholics as
one of the ; but of this particular danger they themselves were not generally
aware, and the extraordinary skill in the concealment of their faith (to every item
of which they yet adhered) baffled, except in a very few instances, even these
ministers of darkness.

(Pages 18 – 21)

This is a nice description of the nature of the Jews, as revealed in a particularly

testing set of social conditions, but conditions which seem to be more or less normal for
Jews, if not always so extreme. We can turn to a modern, highly proficient looking
history of the Spanish Inquisition, such as that provided by the scholarship of Kamen, but
it is nice to have the personal sense of connection that can be expressed freely in a novel,
expressing itself in a way that is precluded from an academic work that must be less
prosaic and more detached ; even though, in actual fact, the heavy bias toward taking the
Jews at face value, as a hard done by people, colours the pretence of professional
detachment and precludes any sense of the organic nature of the process creating the
social phenomena that results in the extraordinary history that academics pretend to
describe without bias.
Just look at the second sentence of the above passage, see how much it tells us, of
an extraordinary nature, about the nature of Jews as a cultural phenomenon.

1) Jews were a despised portion of the Spanish population.

2) Being despised was a protection.

3) Jews alone were the saviours of the entire county’s wealth.

4) Some Jews lived openly as part of Spanish society, but many lived as a
secret inclusion within the Spanish population

The second and third points are related to the exceptional conditions mentioned in
the preceding sentence, concerning a state of civil war in Spain, which made protection
by way of being despised a boon because, presumably, the Jews were ignored as being
beneath contempt. And somewhat related to this condition, we must suppose, the
exclusion of the Jews from the troubles, allowed them to keep the machinery of
commerce and wealth creation open.
Well, I am no academic, and I know no more than you, I am basing my
assessment on what I have just taken notice of. But this short passage accords so well
with much of the later problematic conditions that emerged in northern Europe, and
America, toward the end of the nineteenth century, when the Jewish Question came into
existence in its modern, or most recent form. The Jewish Question was basically a
question about what the nature of the Jew was. But the modern version of the question
was asked for specific reasons related to the differences between the Jews and everyone
else. Two features of the Jewish problem were the focus of attention, Jewish financial
and political power, and the hidden equivalent of the same, their secret, subversive
influence. These later concerns can be understood in relation to the fourth character
noted above, because here we see it stated that the Jews as a whole could be divided into
those who lived openly in society, that presumably managed financial and political
interests openly, and those who lived secretly, but whom still, we must suppose, also
managed financial and political interests, but not in the open, as Jews, but rather through
disguises of whatever kind.
The modern version of the Jewish Question therefore asked an old question, a
question as old as the Jews probably. And the more we try and appreciate the inherent
nature of the Jews as a people, the more we can see the structural reasons for the Jewish
Question forever forcing itself on the consciousness of anyone who examined societies in
which Jews live. Accordingly we cannot begin to think about the nature of America
today, or ask the question, Who are the Americans ?, without raising the Jewish Question.
This in turn shows why anti-Semitism is continually emerging. It also shows why the
culmination of anti-Semitism should act to cauterise the Jewish Question, allowing the
‘problem’ to subside for a century or three, or whatever.
But if we are going to speculate this much, then we must ask why the Jews have
the nature that they do, whereby they end up living lives so fraught with extraordinary
difficulties. And the answer is because this whole question is about the nature of the
human animal as a superorganism. By viewing human society as a living structure,
created by nature through the agency of individual physiology, a physiology that evolved
to bring a living being into existence at the level of social organization, we can make
sense of the social dynamics revealed in this discussion about the nature of the Jews.
Whereby Jews appear to have a special structural role in society, relative to other none
Jewish structural elements. These structural factors are indicated in Aguilar’s work, and
if we examine Kamen we will find her descriptive statement bolstered many times over,
by more fulsome academic research.
It follows from the foregoing that anti-Semitism is itself a specific natural
mechanism related to the physiological form of a master organ that is constituted
according to an array of social mechanisms expressed in Jewish culture. Some social
mechanisms are positive, they construct the Jewish identity and give Jewish culture its
form, integrity, and power, while anti-Semitism is induced in the alien population, the
gentiles, where it operates as a defence mechanism serving Jewish interests. A defence
mechanism may be regarded as negative in that it does not act as a constructive force,
but, as we have seen with the Nazi attack on the Jews, a defence mechanism is essential
to constructive development, in the same way that demolition is essential to building
when there are structures that need to be removed to allow development. We are obliged
to regard anti-Semitism as a defence mechanism because, over time, the nature of the
Jewish relationship to its host population is stable. Aguilar’s account of the Jews is
extremely weird compared to how most people live, but it is pretty much normal for the
Jews, these conditions find expression today in their own state of Israel’s relations with
its neighbours, who are defenceless against the awesome military power of the Jews. If
attacks against Jews were to be viewed as a quality of the host population, merely
suffered by the Jews, then Jews would be extinct, and we would not be having this
conversation.
This leads us to realise that anti-Semitism is, more specifically, a reactionary
attribute of tolerance. Although hated and despised, as Aguilar says, the Jews are
tolerated, and without this normal state of affairs anti-Semitism could not flare up, and
settle down. This week, today being 02/05/08, a report has been published reassuring us
that although a million immigrants have entered Britain in the last few years, half of them
have gone home. Meanwhile other news items are fed to us : half a million children in
primary school have English as a second language, in some schools half the pupils are
foreign. This picture describes a situation imposed on a stable, uniform population, by an
exploitative class seeking to enrich themselves, for, as the newsmongers say, without
these immigrants coming from third world conditions our menial jobs will not get done,
because our people are so degenerate they will not work ; they forget to mention that our
masters who own and farm our society will not pay the wages to make doing disgusting
work worthwhile, except for people who ship the money back to countries with a much
lower standard of living. However, putting aside the superficial political significance of
these details to ourselves, and looking at the social dynamics of these facts, we can see a
structural pattern applying to what we know is actually the physiological arrangement of
a living organism, a superorganism. Immigration on this scale reveals the basic dynamic
of a large complex superorganic physiology, managed by an all powerful elite. It brings
into sharp contrast the structural division between a resident biomass, and the controlling
organ which must have a distinct identity that is not loyal to the indigenous biomass,
because no population on earth would ever invite aliens into its body on a mass scale, all
peoples, without exception, throughout time, have hated such incursions, generally they
have only been possible by means of all out warfare.
The basic principle we are discussing is that of lord versus servant. The lords get
to make the law, spend the money, organize society, and tell us what we think of all these
arrangements. Accordingly they talk about our need to get menial jobs done. Without
quibbling about the general logic of this statement, the division between the dictators and
the serfs is always massive, and always abusive, but there is some truth in the fact that the
poor masses, as dependants, do need to live in a society that is well organized, or else you
get stuck with a tragic situation such as that with Mugabe in Africa right now, where the
nation he rules is a total mess. But our objective is to understand the role of
differentiated identities in enabling the organization of social structures, so that millions
of people are able to work willingly for a pittance. Ultimately this comes down to the
dynamics of social organization, and these dynamics must be understood as a natural
process, created through the evolution of a mammalian superorganism. So, anyway we
describe the situation, the political elite must be more or less detached from the powerless
masses, and such detachment can only be achieved through a degree difference
experienced in terms of identity. People like the recent leaders named above may share a
national identity with the people of the nation they rule, but they are distanced from those
people by their extreme attachment to the Christian identity, which is so rare in ordinary
people. But not so rare that this exclusiveness does not still preserve a vital bond with a
structural element of the national body. This is how these identity dynamics work out.
The upshot is that religion must be preserved at all cost, and the most stalwart example I
know of, that recognised this fact, is to be found in Hitler’s work, and the identity he was
committed to uphold, was Judaism, in the form of its Christian slave identity, and this is
how it has to be.
Today our conquerors live amongst us, as a stable part of our own population, and
accordingly, they develop philosophical positions that are meant to be part of our cultural
heritage, and as such we are, for example, famous for being a multicultural society. But
when certain physiological growth processes heat up, as they have been doing in the
aftermath of our defeat in the world wars, the defeat of the biomass to its masters, which
is what these wars were all about, controlling the biomass, then the tension imposed on
the whole biomass reveals the structural division between the master organ and the living
body that it commands.
Two important factors have been stated in the preceding paragraph, the permanent
place of an alien elite within our population, and the consequent development of ideas to
further the control effected by this kind of integration. These ideas are extremely radical,
and they warrant a good deal of thought and elaboration, but they are nonetheless very
much part of the whole of the wider discussion to be found in much of our work based on
the knowledge that humans are a superorganic species of mammal. For a start, it is not
possible for aliens to be part of the society they are integrated with, to the degree that our
masters are now. So, Blair, Brown, Thatcher, Cameron, or Bush, and his ilk, in the US of
A, are just as much part of our society as the rest of us. Making a nonsense of what I
have just said. So what on Earth can I mean ? The answer is quite simple, these elite are
made aliens through their heightened affiliation with Christianity. Being a devout
Christian is what makes the leaders aliens, because they derive their obedience to
behavioural principles associated with their allegiance to Christian faith. This makes
them welcome Muslims into our societies, and makes them support the presence of major
religious blocs in parliament, and the promotion of religious education throughout the
land, and the eternal existence of the Holy Land of Israel. It is normal for our masters to
be detached from us, and it is not the intention here to protest in a political manner
against this fact, it is our intention to understand the nature of this fact, and that is what
we do when we talk about the relationship of the Jews to the societies in which they exist,
always as aliens, to some degree, however integrated they may be. I am English, and
Jews born here are just as English as me. But I am not a Jew, and that makes Jews,
relative to me, aliens in my land, because there is a part of them that is not English, and
the same goes for Muslims too, because, like Jews, Muslims deliberately set out to
project their religious identity beyond that of the national land that gives them their
political identity. As we discuss these superorganic physiological relationships, we
should get a more intimate sense of the nature of the three so-called Abrahamic religions,
and the symbiotic interconnectedness between them.

The fourth floor housed the ‘Desks’ — each a separate office with direct
links to Mossad’s 22 overseas stations. A part of the floor was the home of the
Collections Department, responsible for collating all intelligence received. In
another corner of the floor was the Foreign Liaison Unit, which maintained
contact with other intelligence services that Mossad deemed to be friendly. These
 included the CIA and Britain’s MI6 and, in September 1991, South Africa’s
Bureau of State Security.
The fifth floor was occupied by the Directorate of Operations. The kidon
unit was controlled from here, as were the forty other katsas who formed
Mossad’s intelligence capability in the field. A number of katsas were
permanently stationed overseas. Those who worked out of the fifth floor were
known as ‘jumpers’ — case officers who could be sent to reinforce an ongoing
operation in some part of the world.
On the sixth floor were the analysts, psychologists and forward planners,
the men and women who tried to evaluate the data from the Collections
Department to see how it could affect future military and political moves by
Israel.
The seventh floor housed the Legal Department, the Library, Office of
Finance, Office of Logistics, Office of Personnel. Attached to these was a small
medical facility.
On the eighth floor were the suites of the director-general, the deputy
directors and their staffs.
All told, some twelve hundred persons worked on the floors, making
Mossad still one of the smallest global intelligence services. But in support was an
operation no other agency could match. It was known as sayanim, a derivative of
the Hebrew word lesayeah, to help.
Throughout the Diaspora there were tens of thousands of these ‘helpers’.
Each had been carefully recruited, sometimes by katsas, more often on the
recommendation of someone who had already been recruited.
Sayanim was another creation of Meir Amit, its success a striking example
of the cohesiveness of the worldwide Jewish community. For Amit, ‘it is proof
that no matter the allegiance a sayan has to his or her country, in the end there is a
more emotional and mystical one, an allegiance to Israel and need when called
upon to help to protect it from its enemies.’ Isser Harel, another former Mossad
director-general, has said that ‘the contribution sayanim have made is beyond
measure.’

(The Assassination of Robert Maxwell, Thomas and Dillon, 2002, p. 11)

I have pinched the above from the opening chapter of a book about the death of
Robert Maxwell, it is quite extraordinary, and deeply disturbing, the description of the
Jewish secret service makes the Nazis look like kindergarten children by comparison.
The second paragraph of the book, on page three, states that this service “worked in a
$60-billion global industry employing a million people.” Wow ! think of that. All
existing simply to allow the Jews to spy on, and control its slaves all around the world.
The passage quoted however becomes especially pertinent to our immediate discussion
because of the remarks concerning the Jews of the world, who are recognised to have a
deeper attachment to Israel then to their host nations, no matter how much they may be,
by virtue of birth and upbringing, part of the nations in which they live. But, secondarily,
having taken this snippet of scary material on the master race, we can see just how much
it portrays a true master race, not some freaks who pop-up in an emergency and play at
being cartoon cut-outs of a master race, then disappear again, once their job is done,
returning power to the supreme lords and masters of all earth, the Jews.
The Jews, while not being the elite themselves, they are not acknowledge as the
rulers of all humanity, are in effect a stable culture evolved to meet exactly the set of
crude circumstances we have sort to outline here, so they exist to serve the needs of an all
powerful, immensely wealthy elite, that is an endemic feature of all national states. Thus
the Jewish culture is an immigrant culture, seemingly doomed to be forever alien, made
viable by the special conditions that are open to an alien group in all large scale social
structures. Most importantly then, we see from this description that the Jews have
become a kind of professional immigrant culture, always mobile, equipped to offer
services that all ruling elites need, in varying degrees and forms, and it is the
incorporation of a special immigrant mechanism within Jewish culture that gives the Jews
their peculiar nature, and which carries with it a source of power that, over time, comes to
rule over all the rulers. And it is from this immigrant mechanism the sub-Jewish
identities, the slave identities of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, have been induced to
evolve, to exploit the latent potential energy of the Jewish identity embodied in the
mechanism of immigration, a latent energy that arises in a superorganism empowered by
the activity of a specially adapted immigrant organ of superorganic physiology. And
then, finally, we come back to the original point, as a safety valve, while maintaining a
tolerance for Jews as an essential part of the evolved physiology, anti-Semitism allows
friction in the structure to be released. And yet, not discounting what has just been stated
about the Jews as a shadow elite, the establishment of the state of Israel does look like the
beginning of the emergence of the Jews as the actual, formal hub, of all power on earth.
It may take a millennia to come to fruition, but what the hell, the Jews have been working
toward this object without a pause for over six millennia already, according to their own
accounts. Does it matter ? No, the question is meaningless, in some sense ; all we wish
to do is to comprehend.
We have dismissed Darwinism as a fraud, based on the idea of competing
individuals. We have said that a true idea of evolution would be based on the idea of
force, indicating adaptation toward latent sources of energy. Here we see how this
naturalistic logic accounts for the evolution of the Jewish superorganism. First the
Jewish master identity evolves in response to the latent potential energy of cultivated
society, that we call civilized, thereby causing all such societies to become a source of
relatively unexploited latent potential energy, relative to the Jewish identity, constituting
the human biomass surrounding the Jews, which is then turned into a Jewish form via the
evolution of sub-Judaic identities. On route to realising this state of total Judification,
there are intermediate stages, this explains the rise of the Romans, and the Etruscans, and
maybe other novel cultures of the period which just sprung from nowhere, and vanished
without a trace.
This means then, that part of the special role of the Jews as a master organ of
social organization, includes a package that defends the whole structure of society from
becoming detached from the Jewish identity that defines the master organ of the whole
superorganism. And this means that whenever any form of knowledge evolves to conflict
with Jewish identity there will be a tendency for this to culminate in a bout of anti-
Semitism, which is exactly what we have always argued links the rise of the Nazis to the
science of society based on the scientific principle that humans are a superorganic species
of mammal. And all of this reasoning together, makes the point that the whole
superorganism within which Jews exist must be viewed as being quite simply Jewish,
even though as individuals we are unable to see this because we are transfixed by our
own personal identity attachment. How different the world must look to an English Jew,
as compared to an Englishman or women. And the same applies to a Muslim ; and to
some extent to a Christian, except being a Christian is a normal condition of English
identity, and as such imparts not alien element to the national identity package. Identity
myopia is akin to the conceptual short-sightedness we experience in terms of our fixed
place on the surface of the planet, preventing us from actually experiencing directly the
motion of the planet that we know takes place continually on a higher plane of motion,
that we are shielded from by the limits of our own powers of sensation relative to the
scale of the phenomena we have learnt to know by virtue of intellectual power.
This leads us toward a special conception of the war between religion and science.
Thus far this war has always been discussed in terms of a war between Christian
authorities and the urge for knowledge of reality. But the whole reason why we cannot
avoid getting embroiled in the Jewish Question once we have a true scientific conception
of human nature is that we are forced to realise that the Christian identity, viewed
scientifically, must be seen as a sub-identity of Judaism, a slave identity. And this turns
our attention from the Christian arena to which we feel attached as members of a
Christian culture, to the Jews, we just cannot avoid this, much as we would like to,
because we are all too well aware of the special forces protecting the Jews from
interrogation by science. By the same token, if we cannot help examining the nature of
the Jews if we want to exterminate Christianity, then the Jews cannot help having a
powerful interest in sustaining Christianity as if it were a defence against a surge of real
knowledge. Thus in so far as the Jews are a functional master race, active in the farming
of Christian and Muslim societies, which we know they must be, then we would expect to
see signs of the Jews actively nurturing Christianity, and public knowledge in general.
Look how keen the Jews are to protect Israel, as portrayed in the book on Maxwell. Yet
the greatest threat to Israel is a free society, as we can see from all our work, and the only
way for the Jews to suppress this freedom is through covert agencies such as the Nazis,
they can hardly achieve this protection by standing up for themselves and protesting, this
is what the Christian church did, but in the end it had to resort to the duplicity of
producing a pseudo science, just as Judaism produces a pseudo master race.
Unfortunately, along with making the Jewish Question itself taboo, all questions
veering in this direction are also tainted with the same sense of abhorrence. It is not easy
to know who Jews are, in the days when anti-Semitism was rife Jew spotting was a public
exercise, as we can imagine from Aguilar’s description, people must generally of known
who Jews were, and this had taught the Jews to become experts in disguising themselves.
So it is a bugger of a job trying to discern any sensible knowledge of the Jewish role in
the organization of the slave programme that is imposed upon us by our masters,
operating through the medium of our own Christian organization. Even so, casual
observations show the Jews, as ever, to have a disproportionate influence in the media.
Of late there have major television documentaries fronted by Jewish intellectuals dealing
with British history, philosophy, human nature and cooking ! Not sure what the
significance of the cooking is, but there may be some hidden meaning in this, apparently
after the presenter mentioned using goose fat to cook the turkey last Christmas, 2007, the
sale of goose fat went from zilch to mega amounts in a twinkling. So this might just be
an experiment conducted by the master race to test the effectiveness of the strings they
attach to their puppets. Actually I like this Jewess, I once saw her declare that she could
not believe that people are stupid enough to believe in God ; yet still, she is a Jew.
To be completely serious though, the impact of the desire for a true science,
which we say must demand the eradicating of all religion, has to have a serious
repercussion for the Jews, and we see the eternal vigour with which the Jews are
determined to survive, come hell or high water. How can a women be an atheist and a
Jew ? It makes no sense, without religion Jews cannot exist, anymore than a person can
be a Christian and an atheist. We have said that religion could not survive in a world
where there was real science. What about Judaism, could Judaism continue to exist if the
ideas we are expressing here were public and accepted as a true scientific account of
human society ? The Jews have displayed a great capacity to curl up in their own shell
and do what is necessary to weather wider social conditions. But in the end, as much as it
grieves me to say it, because it is asking for trouble, it does seem that the Jews are the
ultimate problem for humanity ever having a true science. This is not because society
and the Jews would meet head-on, it is because of the extraordinary influence the Jews
are able to bring to bear in an unseen way on all societies on earth, influence that stems
from their own peculiar nature which we see encapsulated in the short passage taken from
Aguilar’s novel.

What are we trying to say, trying to grasp, and understand, by digging into these
details of Jewish history ? The object is to put the harsh and provocative observations
made on contemporary Jewry in America into a broader, historical context, that suits our
scientific conception of society as a product of human corporate nature, which has given
rise to a special cultural identity serving as a core of identity about which the global
superorganism has grown. As a consequence, we are looking for general themes in the
course of Jewish history that accord with our idea of the Jews as a ‘master race’. Our
sense of mastery is organic, not political. Organic mastery is symbiotic, symbiosis
involves the reduction of disparate organic identities drawn into one coalesced identity,
within which each separate identity sustains a transparent integrity, so that the
information of identity permeates the whole organism, meaning that each identity is
permeable to the same elements of identity, no matter how much the outer form may
impress upon our consciousness that it is unique. This is exactly the condition we find in
modern human society, so often remarked upon by sociologists, and often used as a proof
against humans being a superorganism, for it is said that human individuals can belong to
many different organs of society, unlike a cell within a body, and as such humans cannot
be likened to an organic body. But if we turn from Aguilar to a modern academic work
on the inquisition such Kamen’s, then we get a much fuller impression of a society
revolving around three primary identities, Jew, Christian and Muslim, in such a way that
while each preserves their own definite integrity, and fits into the overarching national
identity of Spain in their own specific way, it is clear that all are incorporated into one
symbiotic unity.
Yet, Spain at this time offers an example of the fracturing of this symbiotic unity,
whereby each major element is ejected, and follows a track of their own. This seems to
mirror the events of mainland Europe, especially Germany and Russia, in the early
twentieth century, to some extent, although the Muslims had no part in this process at that
time, but they obviously will have in a few centuries time if the same physiological
conditions arise, requiring a new fracturing of the superorganic structure. Hopefully we
moderate the searing description we have applied to America as a slave nation of the
Jews today, by talking about the way the Jews always form a structural element of a
distinct kind in Christian communities, and in relation to Islamic culture too. We could
extend the same discussion to the Roman empire, where the Romans dispersed the Jews
through Greek territories, and of course the Jews own history in the Old Testament is a
tale of dispersion amongst major civilizations that is really exactly the same kind of
dynamic as we find in America today. Obviously the usual portrayal of the Jews, as
victims, is that of a weak dependant culture, Kamen talks about another sorry chapter in
the long saga of an abused people.

Judaism continued to be an issue in Spain long after the last heretic had died at the
stake. On the other hand, there was a legacy of suspicion and fear based on
antisemitism — the willingness to blame the secret and concealed enemy for all
the evils of policy and history. On the other, there was a distinct atmosphere of
racialism which persisted into modern times. On both counts the Inquisition had
some part to play and some responsibility to bear in the tragedy of a hunted
people.

(Kamen, pages 303 – 304)

Yeah, weep, weep, weep. And we are also supposed to think that one of the
greatest scientists ever to of lived, Charles Darwin, was actually a scientist who wrote
science. But if we fall for such lame pretence then, more fool us. The funny thing about
the hatred of the Jews is that it is nye on impossible to find anything, anywhere, from any
period, that criticises the Jews in anyway whatever, all we ever see are apologists for
Judaism and grovelling apologies for antisemitism. I would give anything to be able to
read some horrendous attacks on the Jews, I want to know what people who sort the
extermination of the Jews accused the Jews of, but there are no such people, they never
existed, if the supply of books expressing their ideas is anything to go by. Yes there is
Hitler’s Mein Kampf, but that can hardly be a representative item. I have World
Revolution by Webster, which is great to be able to examine, but she is just a Christian
fanatic, like Hitler. Such works are rare, and what there is is of poor intellectual quality.
Meanwhile there is an endless amount about the Jews and antisemitism, all written by
Jews, or people the Jews would approve of.
Another little issue of some interest in terms of how Jews integrate into the social
fabric within which they preserve an alien identity, is the manner in which some Jews
take on the role of their antithesis, Nazis and Inquisitors. The significance of this
extreme degree of adaptation to alien masses by a supposedly minor incursion cannot be
over estimated, because it indicates the truly symbiotic nature of the Jewish identity, and
it belies any notion that Jews are independent people. Accordingly this reinforces the
fact that Christians are Jews, as Muslims are Jews, and it indicates how the Jews
spontaneously integrate into societies whose structures are based on their own identity.
The evolution of sub-Judaic identities was obviously induced by the Jewish master
identity’s effect on the mosaic of human superorganisms over a period of thousands of
years. And we see the result in the world today, where it is epitomised in the condition in
which America finds itself, attacked as an ally of Israel, and motivated to stand, to the
death, as an ally of Israel.

In a circular issued by Heydrich in September 1941 to SS units in the

occupied territories, he instructed his officials to collect the Jews in ghettos and
secure their aid in arranging their own annihilation. This circular is sometimes
referred to as Heydrich’s Schnellbrief, or express letter. The Jews were to be
assembled in the special area of Warsaw, Lodz, Lublin, and various other cities.
This was a mammoth task. To implement it with German personnel would
constitute a gigantic drain on manpower resources. Heydrich therefore conceived
the plan of mobilizing the Jews themselves in this endeavor, or, as one or two
commentators have cynically put it, of making the Jews honorary and temporary
members of the SS.
An organization was needed for this new branch of Jewish activity. It was
to be arranged under the auspices of what were to be called Judenräte, or Jewish
Councils. These would be composed of the leading members of the Jewish
community, those who had shown themselves, prior to the German occupation, as
being ready to undertake the representation of their co-religionists.
In fact, the apparatus of the Jewish council existed for many generations
prior to the German drive to the east. Within an organization called the kehillah,
the Jewish Elders of a community, elected by popular vote, would meet in
committee and debate such issues as Jewish social welfare, Jewish religious
practices, and various other matters relating to their group. Surrounded by an alien
society, it is not surprising that the kehillah should have been established and that
it should have produced spokesmen, over the years, to put the case of the Jews as
firmly as they could, before the various civic authorities in Poland. It was an
honor to be elected in this fashion and the candidates were usually members of the
liberal professions or successful businessmen.
When local SS and SD units approached the kehilloth (plural of kehillah)
in Poland and asked them to set up Jewish Councils, they met with a variety of
responses. Many members of the kehillah said that under no circumstances would
they cooperate with the German occupying forces, whatever the cost, because
they were only too aware of the bestial nature of German anti-Semitism. But there
were others who said that it was possible, that if they themselves did not do the
job of rounding up their fellow Jews and supplying the Germans with the
information requested, the work would be undertaken by the Germans, and this
might prove even more disastrous for the Jews.

(History of the SS, Graber, 1978, p. 213)

 Thinking in physiological terms, that is in terms of scientific sociology, that
recognises that humans are a superorganic species of mammal, the Jews represent a brain
within the superorganism. From accounts of how Jews are insinuated into all possible
types of alien populations, especially infiltrating any structures with any kind of social
power associated with them, we can see that the Jews invariably display a quality of
separateness centred on themselves, giving them the form of a brain, which is dispersed
through the matrix of the host biomass, so that Jews seem to be found especially within
concentrated populations, in towns that is, just as contemporary immigrants are in Britain
today, and their finely graded insinuation into positions of power at every single level of
the social structure suggests a network of nervous tissue emanating from neural centres,
so that the whole superorganism takes on the appearance of a uniform body, with a brain
like structure dispersed throughout it, interconnected by a fine network of connective
tissue that is of the same nature as the brain fabric itself. It is a difficult image to draw, in
reality it requires professional study, conducted over decades, but since we are not
allowed to ask the Jewish Question since Hitler blocked all such questions, then we are
left with a struggling would be philosopher of human nature like myself, to hint at what
might be known if we lived in a free society where sociology was permitted.

Saying that being despised is a protection, reveals the true physiological,

superorganic nature of anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism, in the minds of those who express
anti-Semitism, is a an expression of extreme contempt, that causes those who express this
idea to regard Jews as subhuman. The first thing to note about this observation is that the
strongest psychological trait of humans is to love the same, and hate the outsider. This is
not about hating people per se, it is about forming tightly bonded groups. So it is
possible to have people that define themselves as a group by saying they love everyone,
save only those who do not love everyone, these people, racists, multiculturalists they
hate. Hence whenever racist groups come out in public there are always fierce attacks
upon them by those whose inner group uphold multiculturalist principles. In ethical
terms it looks like the multiculturalists are fighting for the sake of goodness, but in
physiological terms they are still conforming to the natural impulse to love the same and
to hate the outsider, the difference is only a little more sophisticated than in less complex
circumstances. If humans did not have an overwhelming instinct to segregate themselves
then the evolution of races would be impossible, since we know that races merge when
interbreeding takes place. This argument explains what races are in naturalistic terms,
and is therefore not supported by the scientific community, because the politicians have
forbidden it ; but this topic has been discussed elsewhere, in relation to the work of Sir
Arthur Keith.%
Jews are radically different from all other people on earth, this is because Judaism
is a special cultural programme that evolved to enable those belonging to the Jewish
culture to exploit all complex forms of human society. Therefore Jews are of the nature
of an outside group. Human society is a living organism, which has fixed mechanisms of
existence that make it inevitable that organs of command, like Judaism, must evolve,
when conditions are right. Anti-Semitism is therefore an extension of the Jewish cultural
programme, part of what makes Jews unique, but anti-Semitism is an extension of the
Jewish identity programme implanted into the victims of Jews, to make them compliant to
the same directive force that Jews are made compliant to by their own cultural
programme. Anti-Semitism follows the same line of social force as Judaism, except anti-
Semitism is outside the cultural core. Thus anti-Semitism causes non-Jews to become
attached to Jewish culture in the manner of a negative social force forced to rotate about a
positive social force. This bonds the non-Jew to the Jew in a particularly intense manner.
Anti-Semitism causes the Jewish cultural organ to come under attack, but in such
a way that the integrity of Jewish culture is increased. This idea makes no sense in terms
of every day experience, but it is used in fictional settings, a movie called the Fifth
Element staring Bruce Willis uses the idea of a ball of evil coming toward the earth that,
when fired upon with nuclear weapons, becomes stronger instead of weaker, it absorbs
energy of a like kind, and this ball of fire is portrayed in the movie as energy of pure evil.
Jews are a focal point of social energy because of their special cultural programme,
therefore, causing social energy to be focused upon them is a sign of success, even when
the focus seeks to destroy them. Such intense focus shows that the Jews matter in the
society where they are hated. In the real world we can think of life systems that have
evolved to exploit destructive forces, such as the widespread adaptation to fire, whereby
some plants wait for periodic fires to induce the onset of their seeds germination, so that
the destructive fire acts as a means of increasing the very thing which it destroys. What
happens in an ecosystem subject to fire is that the burning event represents a sudden
change in the energy balance within the life system, causing life that has adapted to this
regular occurrence to spring back into the void of latent energy potential caused by fire
removing so much established living mass. We may try and imagine society as an
ecosystem which Jews have evolved to exploit, and where anti-Semitism exists as a
simmering feature of the social structure carrying a Jewish presence, whereby, when
critical conditions arise, where Jews have increased to a maximum degree, and society is
nearing a maximum in its cycle of growth, anti-Semitism can act as a release of social
energy clearing away the burden of social structure, but clearing it in such a way that
Jews are always preserved, and, as in the creation of the state of Israel after the Nazi
holocaust, are caused to bounce back into the freshly made void of latent social energy.
In reality we would not imagine that any social element could be empowered by being
attacked, but if we think about the strange nature of a superorganism, whose physiology
has become organised through the medium of individuals programmed by highly
sophisticated and subtly distinguished identity programmes, then we should not be
surprised to find that where a master identity has evolved it must have some special
means of retaining its integrity, and the anti-Semitic idea, within societies subject to
Judaism, is a perfect example of how information, as a carrier of social energy, can feed a
cultural organ by attacking it. Why should this be ? Because cultural structures are
products of social information, remember that language is a natural force that creates
social structure, therefore if an antagonistic package of information is directed at a
package of information it may feed the structure produced by the package under attack,
rather than destroy it, as intended. But this effect must be understood in terms of the
nature of the original cultural package coming under attack, relative to the total social
structure within which the cultural package in question is found. Anti-Semitism exists as
an idea within the minds of the exploited, it obscures the true master identity of the Jews
from those that the Jews own and farm by virtue of the Jews excluded, exclusive,
position. Anti-Semitism is therefore a deception imposed on their victims by the Jews,
by means of the Jews exceptional resistance to conformity to any cultural programme
beyond their own. The Jews wear parochial cultural identities as a sheaf, or body armour,
a disguise within which their true cultural identity exists. Thus anti-Semitism is a facet of
exclusion, where exclusion is an attribute of elite status, and Judaism is a deceptive
strategy of cultural behaviour, a strategy used by the Jews to manipulate their victims.
This is perfectly obvious from the aftermath of the last world war, which has outlawed
debating this kind of question from public debate, which is the only way the Jews could
continue to rule all humanity.

Herbert Spencer has a volume of his Principles of Sociology dealing with

Ecclesiastical Institutions, 1885, which has a chapter called The Rise of a Priesthood
which does not inspire me, it seems focused on the individual, but then chapters appear
on more modern priesthoods, of the kind associated with governments, but still I am not
sure I can derive much material from his work in this area. His thinking remains too
parochial, it is not scientific, not biological.

CHAPTER VIII.
ECCLESIASTICAL HIERARCHIES.

§ 616. THE component institutions of each society habitually exhibit

kindred traits of structure. Where the political organization is but little developed,
there is but little development of the ecclesiastical organization ; while along with
a centralized coercive civil rule there goes a religious rule no less centralized and
coercive. Qualifications of this statement required to meet changes caused in the
one case by revolutions and in the other case by substitutions of creeds, do not
seriously affect it. Along with the restoration of equilibrium the alliance begins
again to assert itself.
Before contemplating ecclesiastical hierarchies considered in themselves,
let us, then, note more specifically how these two organizations, originally
identical, preserve for a long time a unity of nature consequent on their common
origin.

(Spencer, p.749)

This passage however is quite nice placed in conjunction with what we have been
trying to say about the evolution of the Jewish identity as a master identity, for all we are
asserting is an extension of the basic process Spencer pays so much attention to, which
has given rise to the Jews as a generalised master culture, able to act as a priesthood in
any sophisticated culture possessing what Spencer observes, is a universal pattern of civil
government appearing at a certain stage of social development. Judaism is therefore an
abstract identity programme, an idealised version of the localised varieties, which
evolved to function in any civilised social setting. Over time, the success of the Jews as a
transferable, abstract elite identity, forming a specialised culture of priesthood, increased
because, as with a scientific piece of work, the abstraction of the essence of a process
leads to a degree of perfection in the practical methods applied. So Judification has now
taken place under the influence of the two slave identities of Judaism, Christianity and
Islam, as we have said. On this basis, Judaism is an intuitive expression of the scientific
logic, which has itself been abstracted to produce science as a pure exercise in the
gathering of knowledge and expertise. And this proposition suggests why science should
realise its perfection in a Jewish cultural setting, namely that of Christianity. This does
raise a question regarding the first flowering of scientific method, supposedly in Greece,
but this only goes to show the importance of science in general, as a logical method, and
what Judaism does specifically is to apply this scientific logic to the study of human
society, but subliminally. We could say, therefore, that Judaism is the fist true sociology,
but an applied sociology, intuitively applied in the same way people intuitively applied
genetic science to the domestication of animals and plants, which gave rise to the social
settings in which the Jewish identity evolved. So that Jews domesticated humans by
becoming Jews. Yes, I like that.

___

Taken from the net on Friday, May 09, 2008.

“Progressive” Jewish Thought and the New Anti-Semitism

What Is New in Today’s Anti-Semitism ?

What does all this anti-Jewish hostility tell us ? Despite the huge scandal
of the Holocaust, which most Jews probably thought would prevent public
manifestations of anti-Semitism from ever appearing again, the genie is once
more out of the bottle. Is there a new anti-Semitism today ? There is, and while
much of it resembles the anti-Semitism of the past, certain features of present-day
hostility to Jews and sometimes also to Judaism do seem new.
One is that, like so much else today, Jew-hatred has been globalized and
leaps effortlessly across borders. In the past, antagonism to Jews tended to take
the form of localized activities, but thanks to the Internet and other global media,
anti-Semitism now belongs to the world at large. With the press of a computer
key, it can be accessed and distributed in a flash.
Two, while often drawing on the same repertoire of fabricated claims
against the Jews as in the past—that they are clannish, conspiratorial, money-
hungry, manipulative, predatory, etc.—anti-Semitism is protean and evolves. As
already indicated, it may, for instance, promote images of Jews as poisoners, but
instead of contaminating wells, as they were said to do in the medieval period, or
blood, as in the Nazi period, this time Jews may be accused of contaminating the
atmosphere itself or targeting DNA.
Three, some of the most virulent sources of today’s anti-Semitism are
located within the Muslim world, not, as in the past, within Christendom. While
 some of this negative passion is attributed to Muslim anger toward Israel for its
treatment of the Palestinians, much of it predates the violence brought on by the
recent intifadas and has roots within Arab Muslim culture. To understand Muslim
anti-Semitism today, one has to see it as part of a crisis within Islam itself, as well
as part of its deep-seated grievances against the West.
Four, and most prominently, some of the most impassioned charges
levelled against the Jews today involve vicious accusations against the Jewish
state. Anti-Zionism, in fact, is the form that much of today’s anti-Semitism takes,
so much so that some now see earlier attempts to rid the world of Jews finding a
parallel in present-day desires to get rid of the Jewish state.

The above is taken from an internet source, the title of the article heads this
passage, the subtitle is one section within it (page 7). The opening pages tell us about the
organization, as follows.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Alvin H. Rosenfeld

The American Jewish Committee protects the rights and freedoms of Jews the
world over ; combats bigotry and anti-Semitism and promotes human rights for
all ; works for the security of Israel and deepened understanding between
Americans and Israelis ; advocates public policy positions rooted in American
democratic values and the perspectives of the Jewish heritage ; and enhances the
creative vitality of the Jewish people. Founded in 1906, it is the pioneer human-
relations agency in the United States. To learn more about our mission, programs,
and publications, and to join and contribute to our efforts, please visit us at
www.ajc.org or contact us by phone at 212-751-4000 or by e-mail at
contribute@ajc.org.

Alvin H. Rosenfeld is professor of English and Jewish Studies and director of the
Institute for Jewish Culture and the Arts, Indiana University. His most recent
publication for the American Jewish Committee is Anti-Zionism in Great Britain
and Beyond : A “Respectable” Anti-Semitism ?, published in 2004.

______

What would Mr Rosenfeld think of Atheist Science, as portrayed by me ? Is it

anti-Semitic ? As we can see, the Jews never let go, there work tirelessly to promote
their existence, while denying any contrary opinions, people object to the existence of
Israel and the Jews rear up and call these people anti-Semitic, and see how they
shamelessly call on Hitler to help :
 “Despite the huge scandal of the Holocaust, which most Jews probably thought
would prevent public manifestations of anti-Semitism from ever appearing again”

What can we do against the Jews, nothing, we are their slaves.

So, what the hell, if the Jews will not tolerate their slaves having any opinions
antagonistic to the existence of Judaism, we may as well bite the bullet and insist that if
we are to be free of the poison of religion. For it is knowledge that Judaism really
poisons, not water or blood ; the Jews seep into our brains with their slave identity
programmes of Christianity and Islam, and within the slave dominions anti-Semitism
serves to bind each level of the superorganic physiology together.
But this sample of our master’s method shows the centrality of Jews in the war of
religion against science. All we want is to know what humans are, which involves us
knowing what religion is, which means we must know what Jews are. But to know what
religion is requires destroying religion, and the same applies to knowing what Jews are.
How can Jews continue to rule the world if we all know that Jews rule the world ? It
cannot be done, the mystery has to be preserved, God has to be preserved. By attacking
the Jews in an overtly anti-Semitic way the Christians and Muslims protect the Jews. The
mechanism is the same as the dualistic mechanism of politics where all opposing parties
subscribe to one ruling authority, in this case religion, and the belief in one universal
God, after which the subscribing parties are free to try and destroy each other with
impunity, as in order for any one branch to succeed in destroying another they must
destroy the institution to which they themselves belong, and this of course can never
happen. This dynamic of a bond of defence based upon a desire for annihilation, is the
key to the existence of the Jewish superorganism, and this little article above, shows the
Jewish role in the dynamic. Jews are not to blame, they are just doing what they must do,
they are no different to anyone else defending a cultural identity. We of course cannot
win, but here we see why this is so.
The reappearance of what our masters choose to call anti-Semitism, that anything
that is critical of Jews and Judaism as a whole, is exactly what we must expect to happen
according to our assumption that anti-Semitism is part of Judaism and the Jews are the
master race. The world wars and the holocaust were evidently just another move in the
millennial long pattern of superorganic growth extending the dominion of the Jewish
superorganism, and as such it is inevitable that anti-Semitism should raise its ugly head
again, not long after the Jews have engineered their war on humanity to advance itself
and to suppress the will of those that Judaism enslaves. I have only just become aware of
Rosenfeld’s book, so I have no idea what it says, but there have been snippets of elitist
criticism of Israel shown on TV, I seem to remember a programme in which Jews talked
about how they were coming under fire when out dining with friends because the Nazi
regime’s treatment of Palestinians in the Israeli dominions. I thought that it was
wonderful to hear that people with wealth and freedom to speak dared to complain about
the behaviour of our lords, but I took it that the programme was a Jewish chastisement of
these powerful people, and it is a rare thing for any criticism of Jews to be made in the
media, after all they have good old Adolf to thank for that.
One thing is for sure, if our idea that humans are a superorganic species is correct,
and as such our ideas are the one and only science of humanity, then Jews cannot allow
this knowledge to come into being. And it is very weird the way it did come into being,
dominated all the world, and then, after the war, it has been erased.

____________

Draper’s comprehension of the real meaning of the things he discusses in the

above passage, is like a man who has looked at the dirt under his feet and proclaimed to
know everything about the inner most depths of the earth, Draper sees absolutely nothing
about the subject he presumes to write about. The opening remarks in his preface seem
like a war cry, a call to arms for all who love religion above all other things. The decay
of pagan Europe was part of the process whereby the Roman slaves of Judaism had to
pass into oblivion, and thereby let the centuries long process of turning all Europe into a
mature slave territory of Judaism take effect, as it long since has. What is global
terrorism if it is not the ensuing of “social misfortunes, disastrous and enduring” ? Who
alive in 1874 would of wanted Islam to become a part of the Western world in order to
allow us to remain the degraded slaves of Judaism that we were, and still are ; albeit
placing us in a servile position that is the basis of our power and our glory ? We see the
glory that is preached to us, but do not see the servility that underpins it, glory which
must be paid for whether we know it or not ; a lesson America could of learned when the
Twin Towers went down. Few people would of wanted Islam to become what it has by
entering our world, and so becoming a significant part of it. But of course the only
people who get to determine these things are our masters, and they do not have our
interests or our sensibilities, because they have a different identity to us, which is how
their Jewish identity evolved to be a master identity. But the development of Islam is
exactly what we may suppose meets Draper’s prophecy of a new voyage beginning,
Draper was foreseeing the rise of Islam in the West, and the global terror it would being,
as the inevitable new phase of Jewish development, served, as ever, by world wide
warfare. But while Draper saw that radical change was inevitable, he had no idea
the form change would take, even though his efforts, along with those of all his other
concerned religious comrades, were vital to the preservation of the Jewish identity of our
world, which would require the ingress of Islam to preserve it. Draper saw the crisis,
which any fool could of seen, but having no idea what religion is, he had no means of
anticipating the physiological consequences of what looked like a crisis to him. Of
course there was no crisis, there was only a cusp in the superorganic growth process, that
required a new structural division to develop.
Draper declares that his book is the first in this genre, tackling head-on the
conflict between religion and science, and he predicts the development of a whole
literature from this meagre beginning. As we have seen, his work was the beginning and
the end, almost. We could refer to books like Benjamin Kidd’s Social Evolution, 1894,
which took a very radical view of the nature of religion, and did make the war between
science and religion an important element in their thinking. But while we might well of
expected Kidd’s book to of spawned a whole school of thought, in fact it generated
nothing, despite its great success in its own time.
Draper shows the mindless stupidity of the intellectual, whose sole concern is
always to preserve religion, and never to promote truth. We have his open declaration of
an intention to treat each party in the war even-handedly. What use is that ! Religion
rules the world, to treat religion as valid is to play religion’s game. We need someone
writing about the war waged by religion against science, who will fight for science
against religion. Draper is, as I have said, an enemy of science, compromise between
religion and science can only mean the death of science, exactly as has come to pass. I
once heard a youth talking about life in Northern Ireland during the troubles, and how he
had said he would of liked to of kept out of it, but this was not possible because those
around him made it plain that if you were not for them, you were against them. I
understood this, in such a situation, in a war, you cannot allow opt outs ; people are either
for freedom, or they are for fascism : either for science, or for religion. There is no fence
to be straddled here, it is one or the other, both cannot exist in the same space and time.
But Draper’s introduction is a fine anticipation of history, as it has panned out, and so we
can see why this work was produced when it was, to aid the transition of religion into a
new dispensation, where science was sterilised and used as a curative for religious creeds,
inoculating them against the new forms of knowledge. As ever when we inoculate, we
use the poison to block the poison.

Draper says :

“The tranquillity of society depends so much on the stability of its religious

convictions, that no one can be justified in wantonly disturbing them.”

And he is right, the tranquillity of society does depend entirely on the stability of
its religious beliefs. But the primary definition of science is ‘seeking knowledge for its
own sake’, in other words, the essence of science is the wanton destruction of ignorance
and false knowledge. In effect Draper is saying that we must not apply the most effective
method of seeking knowledge that we know of, to either religion, or society. Here then
Draper says that science simply is not possible, except he does not, he makes this
statement of fact a preliminary to a declaration as to how the problem may be solved
satisfactorily.
Of course, as we are about to see, White declares that the soul produces truth that
is as real as scientific truth, so he too finds a means of squaring the circle. But for us, this
kind of exposition nicely lays out the problem. These people indicate that there can be no
accommodation between religion and science, there can only be war, resulting in victory
for religion. And our work is about discovering how this victory has been accomplished,
so it is nice to discover some ideas evidently arising at a time when the problem was
forcing itself on the establishment, and demanding action.

White 1876 :

THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE.

______
 I PURPOSE to present an outline of the great, sacred struggle for the liberty
of science—a struggle which has lasted for so many centuries, and which yet
continues. A hard contest it has been ; a war waged longer, with battles fiercer,
with sieges more persistent, with strategy more shrewd than in any of the
comparatively transient warfare of Caesar or Napoleon or Moltke.
I shall ask you to go with me through some of the most protracted sieges,
and over some of the hardest-fought battle-fields of this war. We will look well at
the combatants ; we will listen to the battle-cries ; we will note the strategy of
leaders, the cut and thrust of champions, the weight of missiles, the temper of
weapons ; we will look also at the truces and treaties, and note the delusive
impotency of all compromises in which the warriors for scientific truth have
consented to receive direction or bias from the best of men uninspired by the
scientific spirit, or unfamiliar with scientific methods.
My thesis, which, by an historical study of this warfare, I expect to
develop, is the following : In all modern history, interference with science in the
supposed interest of religion, no matter how conscientious such interference may
have been, has resulted in the direst evils both to religion and to science—and
invariably. And, on the other hand, all untrammelled scientific investigation, no
matter how dangerous to religion some of its stages may have seemed, for the
time, to be, has invariably resulted in the highest good of religion and of science.
I say “invariably.” I mean exactly that. It is a rule to which history shows not one
exception.
It would seem, logically, that this statement cannot be gainsaid. God’s
truths must agree, whether discovered by looking within upon the soul, or without
upon the world. A truth written upon the human heart to-day, in its full play of
emotions or passions, cannot be at any real variance even with a truth written
upon a fossil whose poor life ebbed forth millions of years ago.
This being so, it would also seem a truth irrefragable, that the search for
each of these kinds of truth must be followed out on its own lines, by its own
methods, to its own results, without any interference from investigators on other
lines, or by other methods. And it would also seem logical to work on in absolute
confidence that whatever, at any moment, may seem to be the relative positions of
the two different bands of workers, they must at last come together, for Truth is
one.
But logic is not history. History is full of interferences which have cost the
earth dear. Strangest of all, some of the direst of them have been made by the best
of men, actuated by the purest motives, and. seeking the noblest results. These
interferences, and the struggle against them, make up the warfare of science.
One statement more, to clear the ground. You will not understand me at all
to say that religion has done nothing for science. It has done much for it. The
work of Christianity has been mighty indeed. Through these two thousand years,
despite the waste of its energies on all the things its Blessed Founder most
earnestly condemned—on fetish and subtlety and war and pomp—it has
undermined servitude, mitigated tyranny, given hope to the hopeless, comfort to
the afflicted, light to the blind, bread to the starving, joy to the dying, and this
work continues. And its work for science, too, has been great. It has fostered sci-
 ence often. Nay, it has nourished that feeling of self-sacrifice for human good,
which has nerved some of the bravest men for these battles.
Unfortunately, a devoted army of good men started centuries ago with the
idea that independent scientific investigation is unsafe—that theology must
intervene to superintend its methods, and the Biblical record, as an historical
compendium and scientific treatise, be taken as a standard to determine its results.
So began this great modern war.

(The Warfare of Science, 1877, Pages 7 – 10)

White is an absolute pest. Here we see him eulogise the beauty of religion, he
practically offers science as the handmaiden of religion. What degenerate gush is this
drivel about the truth, “truth written upon the human heart”. This is sick, it must make a
sane person want to vomit. This is the man who would be the champion of science !
Then he goes on to praise the degenerates that have inflicted horrific evil in the name of
religion, the people who have ruled our world until his day, and until ours, the people
who make lies the substance of our knowledge and war the daily meat of our public
concern.. Disgusting. He honours Jesus Christ, as if this demented illusion actually
existed ! Insane. Then he reveals all the mighty contributions religion has made to
human well being :

“it has undermined servitude, mitigated tyranny, given hope to the hopeless,
comfort to the afflicted, light to the blind, bread to the starving, joy to the dying,
and this work continues.”

So bleeding what ? Any long lived totalitarian authority ruling a massive world
would be bound to do as much according to some view of its activities. Hitler was a
fanatic for all sorts of positive things, anti-smoking, big on health and fitness, his party
did a lot for the German people. Should we be glad of it ?
The specifics of how religion aided science are lacking here, maybe they emerge
in the book. This book is a rather small, slim volume. To my amazement this book has
no contents page, this is practically unheard of, and quite inexplicable, the book is a
compilation of essays, but I still see no reason why a contents page could not be written
for it, I think I may do one for myself ; I did this once before for a book I bought, which
means I must of come across this previously. It has one hundred and fifty one pages, and
covers the main physical sciences. The heading Political Economy appears on page 122,
where we find its discussion associated with social sciences, but the only topic White
enters upon under this heading is that of usury, which has absolutely nothing to do with
anything worthy of the name science. Regulations pertaining to usury in Jewish slave
programmes are extremely important, but as mechanisms of superorganic physiology
such regulations must understood as a part of sociology, where sociology is understood to
be the science of superorganisms. This section concludes on page 133, where the next
heading is Industrial Sciences, so there are only eleven pages on usury and by the
author’s own admission this is all we get pertaining to the science of humanity.
 As I have been obliged to write a custom made contents page for this book I
might as well use it here to indicate the format of White’s essay. It reveals a heavy
emphasis on astronomy, which is notorious in the history of this knowledge war. This is
obviously because of the central position of astronomy as a knowledge base in the
foundation of religious power prior to the rise to dominance of the Jewish mythology,
which is based on a pure abstraction of reality in the shape of a creative personality, and
as such is inherently more resistant to scientific insight, a fact that is relentlessly
exploited to this day by saying that science cannot examine the question of God’s
existence, because this is outside the domain of science ! An insane, ludicrous,
essentially deviant notion of a criminal mentality. The contents also indicate the broad
sweep of subjects, which is of interest because this anticipates the much fuller exposition
of his later work that we will consider immediately.

CONTENTS
___

Preface 5

Warfare of Science 7

Ch 1 Geography 10
Ch 2 Astronomy 22
Ch 3 Chemistry and Physics 75
Ch 4 Anatomy and Medicine 99
Ch 5 Geology 111
Ch 6 Political Economy 122
Ch 7 Industrial Sciences 133
Ch 8 Various Sciences 134
Ch 9 Scientific Instruction 137

Summary 145

White 1896 :

INTRODUCTION.
_____

MY book is ready for the printer, and as I begin this preface my eye lights upon
the crowd of Russian peasants at work on the Neva under my windows. With pick and
shovel they are letting the rays of the April sun into the great ice barrier which binds
together the modern quays and the old granite fortress where lie the bones of the
Romanoff Czars.
This barrier is already weakened ; it is widely decayed, in many places thin, and
everywhere treacherous ; but it is, as a whole, so broad, so crystallized about old
boulders, so imbedded in shallows, so wedged into crannies on either shore, that it is a
great danger. The waters from thousands of swollen streamlets above are pressing behind
it ; wreckage and refuse are piling up against it ; every one knows that it must yield. But
there is danger that it may resist the pressure too long and break suddenly, wrenching
even the granite quays from their foundations, bringing desolation to a vast population,
and leaving, after the subsidence of the flood, a widespread residue of slime, a fertile
breeding-bed for the germs of disease.
But the patient mujiks are doing the right thing. The barrier, exposed more and
more to the warmth of spring by the scores of channels they are making, will break away
gradually, and the river will flow on beneficent and beautiful.
My work in this book is like that of the Russian mujik on the Neva. I simply try to
aid in letting the light of historical truth into that decaying mass of outworn thought
which attaches the modern world to mediæval conceptions of Christianity, and which still
lingers among us—a most serious barrier to religion and morals, and a menace to the
whole normal evolution of society.
For behind this barrier also the flood is rapidly rising—the flood of increased
knowledge and new thought ; and this barrier also, though honeycombed and in many
places thin, creates a danger—danger of a sudden breaking away, distressing and
calamitous, sweeping before it not only outworn creeds and noxious dogmas, but
cherished principles and ideals, and even wrenching out most precious religious and
moral foundations of the whole social and political fabric.
My hope is to aid—even if it be but a little—in the gradual and healthful
dissolving away of this mass of unreason, that the stream of “religion pure and undefiled”
may flow on broad and clear, a blessing to humanity.
And now a few words regarding the evolution of this book.
It is something over a quarter of a century since I laboured with Ezra Cornell in
founding the university which bears his honored name.
Our purpose was to establish in the State of New York an institution for advanced
instruction and research, in which science, pure and applied, should have an equal place
with literature ; in which the study of literature, ancient and modern, should be
emancipated as much as possible from pedantry ; and which should be free from various
useless trammels and vicious methods which at that period hampered many, if not most,
of the American universities and colleges.
We had especially determined that the institution should be under the control of
no political party and of no single religious sect, and with Mr. Cornell’s approval I
embodied stringent provisions to this effect in the charter.
It had certainly never entered into the mind of either of us that in all this we were
doing anything irreligious or unchristian. Mr. Cornell was reared a member of the Society
of Friends ; he had from his fortune liberally aided every form of Christian effort which
he found going on about him, and among the permanent trustees of the public library
which he had already founded, he had named all the clergymen of the town—Catholic
and Protestant. As for myself, I had been bred a churchman, had recently been elected a
trustee of one church college, and a professor in another ; those nearest and dearest to me
were devoutly religious ; and, if I may be allowed to speak of a matter so personal to
myself, my most cherished friendships were among deeply religious men and women,
and my greatest sources of enjoyment were ecclesiastical architecture, religious music,
and the more devout forms of poetry. So far from wishing to injure Christianity, we both
hoped to promote it ; but we did not confound religion with sectarianism, and we saw in
the sectarian character of American colleges and universities, as a whole, a reason for the
poverty of the advanced instruction then given in so many of them.
It required no great acuteness to see that a system of control which, in selecting a
Professor of Mathematics or Language or Rhetoric or Physics or Chemistry, asked first
and above all to what sect or even to what wing or branch of a sect he belonged, could
hardly do much to advance the moral, religious, or intellectual development of mankind.
The reasons for the new foundation seemed to us, then, so cogent that we
expected the co-operation of all good citizens, and anticipated no opposition from any
source.
As I look back across the intervening years, I know not whether to be more
astonished or amused at our simplicity.
Opposition began at once. In the State Legislature it confronted us at every turn,
and it was soon in full blaze throughout the State—from the good Protestant bishop who
proclaimed that all professors should be in holy orders, since to the Church alone was
given the command, “Go, teach all nations,” to the zealous priest who published a charge
that Goldwin Smith—a profoundly Christian scholar—had come to Cornell in order to
inculcate the “infidelity of the Westminster Review” ; and from the eminent divine who
went from city to city denouncing the “atheistic and pantheistic tendencies” of the
proposed education, to the perfervid minister who informed a denominational synod that
Agassiz, the last great opponent of Darwin, and a devout theist, was “preaching
Darwinism and atheism” in the new institution.
As the struggle deepened, as hostile resolutions were introduced into various
ecclesiastical bodies, as honored clergymen solemnly warned their flocks first against the
“atheism,” then against the “infidelity,” and finally against the “indifferentism” of the
university, as devoted pastors endeavoured to dissuade young men from matriculation, I
took the defensive, and, in answer to various attacks from pulpits and religious
newspapers, attempted to allay the fears of the public. “Sweet reasonableness” was fully
tried. There was established and endowed in the university perhaps the most effective
Christian pulpit, and one of the most vigorous branches of the Christian Association, then
in the United States ; but all this did nothing to ward off the attack. The clause in the
charter of the university forbidding it to give predominance to the doctrines of any sect,
and above all the fact that much prominence was given to instruction in various branches
of science, seemed to prevent all compromise, and it soon became clear that to stand on
the defensive only made matters worse. Then it was that there was borne in upon me a
sense of the real difficulty—the antagonism between the theological and scientific view
of the universe and of education in relation to it ; therefore it was that, having been
invited to deliver a lecture in the great hall of the Cooper Institute at New York, I took as
my subject The Battlefields of Science, maintaining this thesis which follows :
In all modern history, interference with science in the supposed interest of
religion, no matter how conscientious such interference may have been, has resulted in
the direst evils both to religion and to science, and invariably ; and, on the other hand,
all untrammelled scientific investigation, no matter how dangerous to religion some of its
stages may have seemed for the time to be, has invariably resulted in the highest good
both of religion and of science.
 The lecture was next day published in the New York Tribune at the request of
Horace Greeley, its editor, who was also one of the Cornell University trustees. As a
result of this widespread publication and of sundry attacks which it elicited, I was asked
to maintain my thesis before various university associations and literary clubs ; and I
shall always remember with gratitude that among those who stood by me and presented
me on the lecture platform with words of approval and cheer was my revered instructor,
the Rev. Dr. Theodore Dwight Woolsey, at that time President of Yale College.
My lecture grew—first into a couple of magazine articles, and then into a little
book called The Warfare of Science, for which, when republished in England, Prof. John
Tyndall wrote a preface.
Sundry translations of this little book were published, but the most curious thing
in its history is the fact that a very friendly introduction to the Swedish translation was
written by a Lutheran bishop.
Meanwhile Prof. John W. Draper published his book on The Conflict between
Science and Religion, a work of great ability, which, as I then thought, ended the matter,
so far as my giving it further attention was concerned.
But two things led me to keep on developing my own work in this field : First, I
had become deeply interested in it, and could not refrain from directing my observation
and study to it ; secondly, much as I admired Draper’s treatment of the questions
involved, his point of view and mode of looking at history were different from mine.
He regarded the struggle as one between Science and Religion. I believed then,
and am convinced now, that it was a struggle between Science and Dogmatic Theology
More and more I saw that it was the conflict between two epochs in the evolution
of human thought—the theological and the scientific. .......

This book is presented as a sort of Festschrift—a tribute to Cornell University as

it enters the second quarter-century of its existence, and probably my last tribute.
The ideas for which so bitter a struggle was made at its foundation have
triumphed. Its faculty, numbering over one hundred and fifty ; its students, numbering but
little short of two thousand ; its noble buildings and equipment ; the munificent gifts, now
amounting to millions of dollars, which it has received from public-spirited men and
women ; the evidences of public confidence on all sides ; and, above all, the adoption of
its cardinal principles and main features by various institutions of learning in other States,
show this abundantly. But there has been a triumph far greater and wider. Everywhere
among the leading modern nations the same general tendency is seen. During the quarter-
century just past the control of public instruction, not only in America but in the leading
nations of Europe, has passed more and more from the clergy to the laity. Not only are
the presidents of the larger universities in the United States, with but one or two
exceptions, laymen, but the same thing is seen in the old European strongholds of
metaphysical theology. At my first visit to Oxford and Cambridge, forty years ago, they
were entirely under ecclesiastical control. Now, all this is changed. An eminent member
of the present British Government has recently said, “A candidate for high university
position is handicapped by holy orders.” I refer to this with not the slightest feeling of
hostility toward the clergy, for I have none; among them are many of my dearest friends ;
no one honours their proper work more than I ; but the above fact is simply noted as
proving the continuance of that evolution which I have endeavoured to describe in this
series of monographs—an evolution, indeed, in which the warfare of Theology against
Science has been one of the most active and powerful agents. My belief is that in the field
left to them—their proper field—the clergy will more and more, as they cease to struggle
against scientific methods and conclusions, do work even nobler and more beautiful than
anything they have heretofore done. And this is saying much. My conviction is that
Science, though it has evidently conquered Dogmatic Theology based on biblical texts
and ancient modes of thought, will go hand in hand with Religion ; and that, although
theological control will continue to diminish, Religion, as seen in the recognition of “a
Power in the universe, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness,” and in the love of
God and of our neighbor, will steadily grow stronger and stronger, not only in the
American institutions of learning but in the world at large. Thus may the declaration of
Micah as to the requirements of Jehovah, the definition by St. James of “pure religion
and undefiled,” and, above all, the precepts and ideals of the blessed Founder of
Christianity himself, be brought to bear more and more effectively on mankind.

(Warfare of Science with Theology, Pages v – xii)

I like White’s use of a need to defend the social fabric against the threat of an
overwhelming flood, as the basis of an analogy for the objective behind his book, because
it happens to emulate our use of the analogy of academia standing against true
knowledge, as a Dutch dyke holds back the threat of a biblical scale flood drowning their
‘stolen’ world. The meaning of these analogies are essentially the same, knowledge is
threatening to burst the barricades defended by the theocracy, something had to be done,
exactly as Draper asserts too. White’s solution, like Draper’s, is to find some way of
saving religion by cutting away the dead wood of facile and outdated dogma. So neither
of these men want a free academic world, in which science can pursue knowledge for its
own sake. These works are therefore part of the strategy of the war conducted by religion
against science, as such they tell us nothing final ; but they do reveal the depth of the
problem and serve as a basis for argument.
White talks about enabling a normal evolution of society, which sounds
reasonable, he wants to allow development to take place, while avoiding social
meltdown. And after all we have no hesitation in conceding the point that society is
based on religious foundations, without which society must be destroyed. To demand
that this situation be ignored is ridiculous, we could not expect those who rule us to allow
this to happen, we would hold them responsible if they behaved so recklessly. So
compromise, which means the castration of science, is inevitable.
Yes, and it is nice to have some works helping us make this reasonable argument,
as we are not generally inclined to make it ourselves, since we are invariably under a
relentless cosh, and it is all we can do to struggle for a voice. But things are not as simple
as our confession suggests. We have just seen how our scientific abandonment leads us
toward making the most outrageous statements about Jews, leading us to say exactly the
same kind of thing that everyone was saying before the Nazis decided to do something
about the matter, by launching a programme to exterminate the Jews in Europe, thus
ensuring that no one could ever develop a scientific model of society ever again, without
finding themselves saying terrible things which it would be easy for our masters to
suppress.
It certainly appears that religion creates society as we know it, and it looks as
though simply removing religion could only lead to disaster. But with the benefit of a
free science we are able to see much more than this. We see that the problems related to
the loss of religion are not necessarily spontaneous, they are also due to relentless
resistance, on the part of those with power and influence, causing problems. As we can
see, even the holocaust is in fact a blessing in disguise for the Jews, and who would ever
of imagined that ? So we begin to discover that while society may decay without
religion, the way religion has been saved has required relentless warfare on a massive
scale. It is war that manages the integrity of the biomass, driven by an intuitive influence
that follows a religious programme. So, the question is, can we really do no better than
managing our society by means of religious fascism ? Naturally, as long as we live under
the cosh of religious fascism, we will never know, and what our work does is to let
people know, for the first time ever, what reality is, what everything means, so now we
are in a position to ask ourselves the question : Can we live in another way ? Can we be
free, can we have science ? I happened to read this passage yesterday, which perfectly
states what I have said here :

There is no such thing as freedom in the sense of “uncaused.” All our

acts and thoughts are determined as certainly as rain. Everything that happens in
the universe, inorganic, organic and cultural, is determined in the sense of being
caused by, of being dependent upon, all the antecedent events that have happened
since the beginning of time. Nothing can occur differently than it does.
“Everything has to be what it is.” This seems to leave us in a deterministic,
mechanistic, almost fatalistic position. Men have always revolted against such
philosophy—and rightly so, since it is refuted by careful observation in all fields.
Escape from the difficulty is not difficult. We have only to reflect that there are no
two objects exactly alike in the whole universe ; that no single object is exactly
the same for any successive instant, however small. Something is happening all
the time in this whirligig, kaleidoscopic world. Fundamentally, everything is
essentially unique, freshly new, instantaneously created, all the time. Whenever
an event occurs, the whole universe is changed ; it never again will be exactly the
same ; the universe never is ; it is always becoming. Therefore, while every event
is inexorably determined, the universe as a whole is indeterminate.
These principles applied to human affairs give us an explanation of
learning, and incidentally, of social control, rational and irrational. We can learn
because we—and everything else—are changing all the time. We are
continuously interacting with our external and internal environment,—physical,
biological and cultural. Another name for this is experiencing. Most experiencing
forever remains our own,—subjective, personal, uncommunicated, much of it
incommunicable. However, compared to the relative stability and time-span of
human lives and culture-complexes, there are innumerable phenomena which are
relatively much more stable. Hence, apparent uniformities, repetitions and
relevant sequences in the occurrences of natural phenomena are observable. This
 makes knowing possible, whether the knowledge be on the level of science or
commonsense ; but it also makes all knowledge relative to the human frame of
reference. This is a very interesting topic which we can pursue no further than to
say that all experience is subjective, always the behavior of a subject ; all
knowledge is objective, namely, communicated experience. Experience is
subjective, personal, private ; knowledge is objective, impersonal, public,
abstract, symbolic, and thus to some extent always fictional when judged by the
standard of subjective experience.

(Freedom, Law and Rational Social Control, Read Bain, in Journal of

Social Philosophy, p. 224, April 1939)

This is very odd stuff, it evokes the conundrum we have found everywhere, we
know that things are certain, and determined, and yet we know this idea is the most
repulsive idea known to humans, and Bain tells us why. But Bain completely misses the
point when he makes out that things are not determined in reality because there is
constant change, this is pure stupidity. We are not able to learn because of some free
space existing in the structure of the universe, as implied by Bain. We are free to learn
for the same reason we are free to run, or eat, or get sick, we are free to learn because we
have evolved to acquire an identity programme to make us function as units of a
superorganic being. Last night, 23/05/08, in a conversation at the bar with a man I have
now known for a couple of years, when I said that humans are superorganisms like ants,
he said “But ants do not send ants to school.” Man! this person talks like a complete
idiot, I told him I loved talking to him because he was someone who could tell me why
he was keen for knowledge yet he did not want to know anything. He did say that my
ideas were so directly racist, to which I replied “Well whose fault is that ? If that is what
science tells us then what can I do about it ?” But herein we see the power of creating
racism as a taboo subject that shields the interrogation of human nature from direct
enquiry, because to go near the question of human nature means standing where the
Nazis stood. So this man was saying we are not like ants because we send our children to
school. It was hard work talking to him, he just wanted to fight me all the way, and he is
by far and away the best person I have ever met to discuss these things with. Useless.
He told me I would never find anyone who would listen to me because I just wanted to
force my ideas on people. He is right, no one wants to know the truth, but I told him I do
not give a toss about what anyone believes, I just want to find people who are interested
in knowledge. He would not have this, he insisted that for me all that mattered was
getting people to accept that I was right. It is a tricky point to deal with, whether we want
to force our ideas on others, as religious people do, or whether we only want to make
knowledge available, the same appearance of delivering a fixed message is bound to be
on offer. If he cannot tell the difference, then that is the problem. I said to him that I just
do not get where he is coming from, is he a Jew or something ? Someone interested in
what I have to say for a reason, in the way police are interested in criminals because they
are paid to be interested in them. He said he was not a Jew, he still had a foreskin (I
cannot say the same for myself so I do not see what that has to do with anything), but I
cannot make sense of this man, why is he so keen to fight for ignorance. I got no
answers, but it was the most telling conversation we have had. Useless.
Anyway. The use of the term ‘free’ is idiotic, it is like saying that a wheel is free
to roll because it is round, whereas a square wheel would not have that freedom ! Too
idiotic for words. But this passage from Bain serves the purpose of indicating how the
priesthood work the problem of knowledge relentlessly, not by head-on resistance, but
through guile and twisted manipulation, forever directed at subverting knowledge and
protecting the special knowledge of superorganic identity which is centred upon religion.
(I say ‘the priesthood’ yet this young man in the pub last night was doing their work too,
so what is a priest ? Just anyone.) It is not possible to deny determinism so the priest
admits everything is deterministic, and then argues something else which is undeniable,
that every event is unique. But this is artful guile, (The same method was being used
against me last night, just swordplay with words.) the important point, that tells us
everything, is that the universe is a system created by forces that can be understood in
terms of fixed laws. The irrelevant point is that every detail of the process is unique :
primarily because it occurs at a different moment of time and may involve a different, but
identical particle, of an ongoing structural process. In the printing of a book the product
is determined by the layout, and by the set up of the machinery, but no matter how many
millions of copies are printed every single letter reproduced is unique. This letter ‘e’ is
not the same letter ‘e’ found at the end of the word ‘unique’ in the last sentence. Each
letter ‘e’ in this work is unique, just as every person in England is unique. Big deal! does
this mean that some books will read differently from others ? No, baring occasional
variations in the perfection of the printing all books of the same edition will be identical.
And when it comes to people does the uniqueness of each individual, as a unit of
superorganic physiology, mean each person will produce a self-focused outcome in the
social structure that can only be understood through their personal interpretation of their
actions ? Of course not, there is a variety of individuals as there is a variety of letters, but
each variation serves the physiology of the superorganic matrix, and has nothing
whatever to do with the uniqueness of the individual as a unit existing in its own
space/time frame within the social fabric. Science just cannot win against this kind of
corruption because the academic world is totally corrupted by people like Bain, whose
sole objective is to serve the authorities that have trained him, and employed him, and
who insist that he must undermine knowledge, as he has been trained to do.
The crux of the matter here is whether reality is prone to scientific investigation,
if it is then there is no freedom, if it is not then there is freedom. This is an either or, an
absolute, just like the question whether there is a God or not, and this is why finding
ways to allow there to be freedom in a universe which is obviously absolutely
deterministic is critical to the people who rule our world. So that what the kind of
philosophy we see in Bain is all about is nothing to do with philosophy, it is about
manoeuvring for control over knowledge. The question of ‘freedom’ is a substitute for
the war between religion and science, when we argue about freedom we are really taking
up sides for or against science. But this substitution is vital, it shifts the ground away
from the intellect and onto the emotion ; Who is going to argue against freedom ? And
the point is then not abstract, for those who have political power make the arguments
over freedom the basis of action, and hence we are forced to argue for freedom, and
hence we are forced to argue for religion, which is the antithesis of freedom ; religion is
slavery. But by associating freedom with religion we make freedom synonymous with
religion ! Incredible, by mere words biological slavery, undeniable slavery, is turned into
genuine freedom. I am saying this, but I cannot quite make sense of it, I cannot quite
believe my analysis is right, I want to discern it more plainly. But my analysis is right,
and I do not see how it can be put more straightforwardly.
By shifting the ground of debate into a political domain and making the
consequences real, we are forced to fight for slavery ; ameliorated slavery, where our
masters treat us as free, and we pretend to be free. This is the trick of language, we see it
operating in society all the time, it is a matter of routine that law work on the basis of an
artificial mimicry of real consequences. So, for example, if we have an accident we may
be injured, and we may be saved from coming to harm if we wear a seat belt. But
because it is almost unheard of, at the level of individual experience, for anyone to have
an accident, I have never had one in thirty years, and it is such a pain to put a seat belt on
and off, the government were forced to impose artificial consequences to substitute for
the real consequences of having an accident by making it illegal not to wear a seatbelt,
and then employing agents to hunt down and attack people who were not wearing
seatbelts, a sort of, making the accident come to you. And this basic mechanism of
control is what gives society its structure, but at the level of knowledge, the method of
working this mechanism into the social dynamic, is to introduce personalised ideas like
‘freedom’, and then making sure we understand that if we do not value freedom we will
lose it, we must believe in freedom otherwise rulers will come to the fore who will ‘bring
the accident’, the loss of freedom, to our door. So this is why we get this kind of
philosophising about nothing, it is not really about nothing, it is about the threat of social
power hanging over us. In the case of accidents, governments are impinged upon with a
massive wave of relentless death and injury, even though to all intents and purposes, at
the level of individual experience, there are no deaths or injuries whatever. This is
because the government acts as a sensory organ for the whole population, and so the
government learns to behave as if accidents were commonplace and had to be guarded
against. This projected super-consciousness that is the sum of all experience of a certain
kind across a population is easy to see and understand, but its operation indicates a
hidden aspect of government which explains why government comes to impose slavery
upon populations, without anyone ever intending to do so, by means of control that
involves supporting religion and subverting knowledge. Governments pick up the
‘correct’ response according to their task as a governing organ, and deliver the result
through the machinery of the state, just as they do in more mundane matters such as
traffic regulation.
 Chapter ??

The Secret of Eternal Power :

the

Making
and

The Re-Making of Social Identity

I am currently, 23/05/08, reading the work of the man whom I have decided is the
single greatest philosopher ever to of existed, I thought Kidd’s Social Evolution, 1894,
was something special, and made him worthy of being thought the greatest philosopher
ever, but at last I have ventured toward his other magnificent works. Principles of
Western Civilisation, 1902, is just amazing. I just bought this book for £28 and yesterday
while running through old print outs of desirable books I came across a price of £2.80 for
this volume ! Shit, why did I not buy it before, and why the hell were all the copies
suddenly so expensive ? no one reads Kidd now. Also, I use to say that Lilienfeld was
the greatest philosopher ever because he wrote a book called Human Society is a Real
Organism, I would not want to appear blasé about so important a matter, it invites
contempt, but as one learns more it is possible to change ones mind, but still, it is so
exceptional to find authors in any sense committed to the advance of anything
approximating to real knowledge.
Anyway. At one point in my reading yesterday I came to a passage where Kidd
provides a far reaching criticism of all nineteenth century philosophy which is, in its far
reaching nature, akin to my argument that simply overturns all modern philosophy, of all
kinds.

Kidd :

As we watch the statement of the principles of individual and of social conduct, as

they begin to be put forward on the eve of the French Revolution in the writings of
Condillac, Helvétius, Diderot, D’Alembert, and others, we may distinguish how Western
thought had at this point already begun to revolve round a fixed idea. In politics the phase
under which the ruling conception tends to express itself is unmistakable. The conception
of the State, efficiently organised to serve the ends of its existing members, is the pivot
upon which every principle of political and social science is made to turn. “Society” is,
as we see, conceived from the outset of the movement as consisting of the existing
citizens organised towards their own benefit. The “good of Society” and the interests of
the existing citizens are everywhere regarded as identical or interconvertible terms. And
the content of the welfare of society is always conceived and spoken of as if it was of
necessity included in the view which these citizens took of their own interests.
From this point forward, throughout all the literature of the Revolution, we see the
developmental process in Western history presented as a process in which the “will of the
sovereign people” is tending to progressively realise itself, simply in the interests of the
people as organised in the State. In the ideals of Rousseau, as in the later conceptions of
Marx, it is the theory of the interests of the people collectively organised in the State
which constitutes the science of society. In the theory of social development towards
which we are carried, it is, therefore, the economic factor, i.e. the interest of the existing
individuals, which is everywhere presented to us as the ruling factor in human history.
And in the theory of conduct which we see taking shape side by side with this view, the
science of morality, just as we encounter it later in the theories of James Mill 1 and in the
conceptions of current social democracy in Germany, becomes, in consequence, simply
the science of the interests of the individuals in the well-ordered State. “La science de la
morale,” in the words of Helvétius, “n’est autre chose que la science meme de la
legislation.” 2

¹ Cf. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, by James Mill, ch. xxiii.
vol. ii. ; and Fragment on Mackintosh, by the same author.
2
De l’Esprit, ii. 17, C. H. Helvétius.

As we follow the history of this self-centred movement in Western thought, as it

tends to more and more closely associate itself with the modern theory of democracy, it is
the same spectacle which continues to be presented to view. The science of human
society must be, as the evolutionist sees it, the science of the principles through which the
whole visible world around us is being subordinated to the ends of a process in which the
interests of the individual and of the present alike form a scarcely perceptible link. Yet
nowhere in the movement before us, as we watch it gradually expanding now into the
main stream of Western thought, is there to be discovered any statement whatever of the
principles of society as conceived in such a sense.
In England the history of the great intellectual movement, in which the principles
of modern democracy have been developed into something like the form in which they
have come down to the current generation, may be said to have begun with Adam
Smith’s Wealth of Nations. As the evolutionist takes his way through this work at the
present day its main idea and purpose are clearly to be distinguished by him. The
conceptions of the book represent, in reality, as Mr. Leslie Stephen has recently pointed
out, 1 only the spirit of business, and the revolt of men who were at the time building up
a vast industrial system against the fetters hitherto imposed on them by traditional
legislation. We have before us, as it were, the characteristic protest of the interests in the
present against the rule of the past. Yet we see the principles of the purely business State,
as therein set forth, beginning, from this point forward, to be received in England by a
school of writers of altogether exceptional prestige and authority, as if they constituted
the whole science of society. Under the influence of Bentham, Austin, James Mill,
Malthus, Ricardo, Grote, and John Stuart Mill, we see Adam Smith’s ideas being
gradually expanded into a complete and self-contained system of social philosophy, more
and more closely identifying itself with the theory of modern democracy. Through every
part of this system there runs, we see, the influence of a single dominant conception,
namely, that the “State” and “Society” are one and the same, and, therefore, that the
science of the State is the science of human evolution.

¹ The English Utilitarians, vol. i. p. 307.

Any inquirer who wishes to follow for himself the history of this remarkable
development in Western history finds all its stages clearly marked before him in the
literature of English thought during the nineteenth century. As we take down the volumes
of Bentham, whose influence in England in the middle decades of that century pervaded
the entire domain of political theory, and to a considerable extent that of moral science,
the characteristic features which have been here emphasised meet us at every step. The
conception that the theory of the State embraces the theory of society as a whole has
become absolute. That well-ordered conduct in the individual is a mere matter of
“felicific calculus,” and that the ends of human morality are synonymous with the
enlightened self-interest of the individual in the State, are the ideas which meet us at
every turn. “The interest of the community is,” says Bentham, “the sum of the interests
of the several members who compose it.” 1 The science of the interest of society is to him
the science of the interest of the members whom he sees around him in the State. That
there was any principle of antagonism between all such interests and the interests of
society in process of evolution ; that all the interests visible around us could only be
scientifically stated in relation to society in terms of the subordination of these interests to
the ends of a process the meaning of which entirely transcended them,—there is not the
slightest trace. 2 On the contrary, any theory whatever of the subordination of “interest”
to “duty” seemed to Bentham not only meaningless but absurd. Rather, in his opinion, “to
interest duty must and will be made subservient.” 3 For, where both were considered in
their broad sense, it was Bentham’s assertion that “the sacrifice of interest to duty is
neither practicable nor so much as desirable ; that it cannot in fact have place ; and that if
it could, the happiness of mankind would not be promoted by it.” 1 To Bentham, in short,
the identification of social utility with the self-interest of the individual had become the
fundamental principle of the science of society. To use his own words : “If every man,
acting correctly for his own interest, obtained the maximum of obtainable happiness,
mankind would reach the millennium of accessible bliss ; and the end of morality—the
general happiness—be accomplished.” 2

¹ An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 3.

2 3
Cf. Ibid., chaps, i.-xi. Deontology, vol. i. pp. 10, 11.

1 2
Deontology, supra. Op, cit., p. 12.

As we watch the conceptions of this school of thought being gradually developed

in England in the writings of James Mill and others ; 3 as we see Adam Smith’s doctrine
of the individual following his own interests, and thereby unintentionally attaining the
highest social good, becoming the basis of a self-contained theory of utilitarian morality ;
as we see the complete circle of ideas moving at last, in the system of social philosophy
of John Stuart Mill, towards the full sovereignty of an accepted theory of modern
society ;—the altogether remarkable nature of the spectacle we are regarding cannot fail
to deeply impress the mind. No system of opinion in recent times in England has so
profoundly influenced the intellectual centres of Liberalism as that of the school of
thought which culminates in the writings of John Stuart Mill. No theory of society has
been, in its time, so generally accepted in English thought as a presentation of the modern
democratic position. Mill’s system of ideas, as a consistent whole, has been a leading
cause which has determined, down even to the present day in England, the attitude on
social questions of nearly all the representatives of the older Liberalism. 1
3
See chaps, xxi. -xxv. vol. ii., in James Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the
Human Mind, and Bentham’s Principles of Morals and Legislation, c. ii. and c. x. The
origin of morality in utility, requiring no “moral sense” to discern it, and operating
through sympathy and the association of ideas, has been a characteristic ethical doctrine
of the utilitarian school.

¹ Cf. Principles of Economics, by Alfred Marshall, vol. i. p. 65 ; also The

English Utilitarians, by Leslie Stephen, vol. iii. c. iii.

Yet, as the evolutionist follows the ideas developed by J. S. Mill, their controlling
meaning is unmistakable. As we turn over the pages of his System of Logic and of his
essay On Liberty ; as we read the chapter in the Principles of Political Economy, “Of the
stationary State,” or follow him through the theory of conduct set forth in Utilitarianism,
—the ultimate meaning of it all is plainly before us. The fundamental conception which
rules all Mill’s ideas is, we see, that the science of the “State” constitutes the whole
science of society. “Society,” as Mill conceived it, is practically comprised of the
individuals capable at any particular moment of exercising the rights of universal
suffrage. The ideal of the highest social good is continually presented to us as one and the
same thing as that of the highest good of these individuals. The main duty of the
individual, as Mill sees it, is, therefore, so to influence the tendencies of development and
the provisions of government that this ideal should be reached in practice. The end of
human effort, and the ideal in all theories of human conduct is, in short, to bring about a
state in which the conciliation between the self-interest of the individual and of society as
a whole should be completely attained ; and in which, therefore, to use Mill’s words,
“laws and social arrangements should place the interests of every individual as nearly as
possible in harmony with the interests of the whole.” 1
1
Utilitarianism, by J. S. Mill, p. 25.

As the evolutionist, with the conception in his mind of human society as involved
in the sweep of an antinomy, in which he sees all the tendencies of human development
tending to be more and more directly governed by the meaning of a process in which the
present is being subordinated to the future, rises from the study of Mill’s writings, the
superficiality of the whole system of ideas represented profoundly impresses his mind. It
is, he sees, as if the world represented in the era in which we are living had never
existed ; as if we were transported back again into the theories of society of the ancient
civilisations ; into the political conceptions of Plato and Aristotle.
 That such a system of ideas should really express the meaning of our civilisation,
or of our social progress as a whole, must be, he perceives, inherently impossible. For if
the nature of the evolutionary process be not altogether misunderstood, if the principle of
Projected Efficiency as applied to the evolution of human society be not entirely without
meaning, the phenomenon of social progress as represented in human history must, he
sees, have a meaning which altogether transcends the content of these conceptions. The
process of development which our civilisation represents must be subject to laws more
far-reaching than any which could be compressed within the narrow formulæ of such a
theory of society. The very essence of the process of order represented in our Western
world must be that there is within it some organic principle effecting the continued
subordination and sacrifice, not only of individuals and of parties, but of whole
generations and of entire periods of time to the ends of a larger process of life.
But neither in the philosophy of human history as a whole, nor in the theory of
Western progress in particular, as presented in the writings of the school of thought here
seeking to give us a theory of the principles of modern democracy, is any such
conception of development to be distinguished. Mill’s theory of social progress is always,
as we see it, simply a theory of progress towards a fixed state in which a conciliation
between the self-interest of the individual in the present and the interest of society is to be
completed. His theory of human conduct and ethics is, therefore, a theory of a future
social condition so ordered that virtue is to be a matter simply of pursuing self-interest in
an enlightened manner, and vice, in Bentham’s terms, a kind of false moral arithmetic, a
mere “miscalculation of chances in estimating the value of pleasures and pains.” 1 In the
region of ethics, as in the domain of political philosophy, the ideal with which Mill
sought to associate the principles of Western Liberalism is, we see, simply a fixed
condition of society in which, to use Bentham’s terms, there would be given to the social,
nothing less and nothing more than the meaning and the influence of the self-regarding
motive. 2

¹ Deontology, vol. i. p. 131. ² Ibid. p. 23.

We see, in short, everywhere the principles of the utilitarian State conceived as if

they embraced the whole theory of society in process of evolution. 3 Nothing can be
more remarkable than the absolute unconsciousness displayed by Mill of the profound
difference—affecting, as we now see, every principle of social science—which exists
between the “State,” considered as a piece of social mechanism directed to further the
utilitarian ends of its existing members, and “Society” considered as a living organism,
and undergoing, under the influence of Natural Selection, a vast process of slow develop-
ment in which all the interests of the existing individuals are lost sight of in wider issues.
A discussion like that in book iv. of the Principles of Political Economy—in which Mill
objects to the trampling, crushing, and elbowing of the modem industrial world because
of their unpleasantness to the individual; in which the stationary social state 1 is regarded
as desirable and normal ; in which the limitation of population by prudential restraints,
dictated by the “enlightened selfishness” of the individual, is set up as a social ideal—
already belongs simply to the literature of a pre-scientific epoch, when men possessed as
yet no real insight into the character of the natural forces at work in the evolution of
society.
 3
Compare Mr. Frederic Harrison’s remarks in this respect in his article on Mill
in the Nineteenth Century, No. 235.

1
Principles of Political Economy, by J. S. Mill, vi., iv.

Remarkable in every particular must appear to the mind of the evolutionist the
position which has just been described. Yet we cannot fully understand how completely
the tendencies of Western thought have been controlled down into the period in which we
are living, by the conceptions from which it arose, until we proceed farther to extend our
view and carry it beyond the circle of ideas which the school of English utilitarians as a
whole represents.

(Principles of Western Civilisation, Kidd, 1902, pages 71 – 79)

_________

Where Kidd talks about Smith’s business oriented ideas centred on the individual,
coming to dominate all British philosophy thereafter, he is right, but on the continent
there were people who revolted against the idiocy of this political approach to the science
of society, a German author, might of been Muller or Mohl, in the early nineteenth
century wrote a book reacting against Smith’s individualism, treating society according to
an organicist idea of society as a natural being, within which people existed as a
component part, where the person did not exist as an end in themselves. I do not know
where to look for details of this man, and I do not have his book, it was not translated, of
course, but the gist of what I have said I am sure is correct even if I have the name wrong.
This serves to indicate the split between Britain and the continent in respect to
organicism, and we also see a whole trend of British leadership in the subversion of
modern knowledge, culminating in the deification of Darwin as the supreme scientist of
life, false prophet that he was. I bought a book called Darwinism and Human Life, by
J. Arthur Thomson, 1909, from a book fair yesterday, 25/05/08, in which Darwin is
lorded like a divine being “it may be said that no other man of science has influenced the
framework of human thought as Darwin has done.” (p.4). Adam Smith, whom Kidd
disparages here as the founder of the false knowledge of humanity, remains on a pedestal
of supreme intellectual beings to this day. We may wonder about the assertion just made
regarding the split between Britain and the continent regarding organicism, since Herbert
Spencer was a famous exponent of the idea that society was an organism, but in the work
we are addressing now Kidd makes the point, in regard to evolutionary ideas, that
Spencer was a great barrier to the advancement of the ideas he stood for, because of the
false basis upon which he developed his ideas of evolution.
Meanwhile, as we pick and mix our great British thinkers of the modern era, and
take note of how they are projected way beyond the common breed of human, their works
being worshipped as the creation of superhuman genius, we find that we ourselves are
currently dealing with the work of the greatest philosopher ever to of lived, Benjamin
Kidd, whose works are in a league all by themselves, uniquely they truly tell us what is
real, they make religion impossible, they make science come home to roost. And Kidd is
virtually unheard of, he is not the founder of any school, not one person ever took up his
ideas. The contrast is stark. False genius is eulogised, true genius is obscured ; what else
would we expect from a priesthood, what else has the world ever had ?
It is impossible to deny that there is a very deliberate and thorough filtering
process at work in the production of major scientific works, and all the offshoots thereof
that follow. Science is characterised by a process of filtration of ideas, tested by ........
tested by what ? This is the crux of the matter. Any scientist is free to expound any
nonsense he likes, all that is required of him is that he publish his work and shows his
method. His method is then replicated and if independent workers come up with the
same results the findings of the first are verified and he is fêted as a genius. This is the
ideal, it has nothing in common with what is real, not if we are to call the likes of men
such as Darwin and Smith scientists, and to ask how their work came to be acknowledged
as the work of scientific genius. In Darwin’s case the science is all bluff and shown, and
no substance whatsoever.
Kidd identifies a leading principle informing the production of all academic work
in Britain, and he defines this principle temporally, making it a matter of fixation within
the present. As we read Kidd’s astounding work we can enjoy this novel way of
discussing the topic, but our own definition of the same false principle guiding the
creation of all academic works in the world, is far more accurate and to the point. We
make it the obsession with the individual as an end in themselves. The result is the same,
the point about the individual existing as an end in themselves is that they are alive now,
whereas the real human animal is the superorganism which has a life that transcends the
present and holds the meaning of the present in the future, exactly as Kidd says, in his
own way. But Kidd’s approach is more conciliatory, it is not an accusation of malice
against all society, it is an attempt merely to illustrate the error. However when we deal
with criminals we cannot expect to gain their cooperation by circuitously and politely
pointing out the error of their ways, we must accuse them and pillory them in public.
Kidd’s criticism looks at intellectual error, ours sees political action. This means Kidd
can write as if his arguments might mean something, as if they may convince someone,
as if things may be different in the future, while we know we are discussing a natural
phenomenon, and nothing can change it, all out efforts are worthless and meaningless ;
we cannot defeat the priests.
This passage from Kidd is truly remarkable, it cannot be bettered as a review of
the period during which the church took control of science. But although this takeover is
what Kidd is describing, he himself does not see it, he does not see that the reason why
false knowledge excluded true knowledge is deliberate. And the incredible thing about
this failure is that Kidd is not only the sole figure in the proliferation of knowledge to
have seen this imposition of ignorance upon the world, he is also the only author to
provide an account of reality that reveals the basic mechanisms of why the world works
the way it does. And still he does not see that at this point in his work he should be
calling into question the reason why old tired knowledge ousts new proven knowledge.
In Social Evolution he says that the war between religion and science is the ruling theme
throughout human history, so how come he does not realise that this war is what is really
involved in the promotion of secular works that adhere to the old principles of
individualism, versus the new principles of science that should replace religious dogma ?
I do not understand why Kidd fails to see this, it all seems to be there, but he himself
sticks to the rules of etiquette laid down, whereby everyone must be treated as sincere,
instead of seeing the product of individual work as being selected according to some
larger plan dictated by Projected Efficiency, to use his conception. And yet, even more
extraordinary, previously in this book he makes a profound statement about the nature of
society being dictated by the competition between conceptions of existence, so now,
when considering how come idiot conceptions like those of Smith and Mill dominate the
field of public knowledge, is precisely the point at which to apply this fabulous insight
and so reveal the answer to understanding everything. But he does not do it !
At no point are we describing a conspiracy, the control of knowledge involves a
natural process in which humans take part unwittingly. The process involves the
development of corporate religious identities, and associated social structure controlling
knowledge. The self-serving actions of the individuals making up society cause the
desired outcome to occur, no one need know why or how. We see this happening today
all the time, Christian fundamentalist work openly and tirelessly to train their kind to
become qualified to run the machinery of the state, with the sole object of imposing
fascistic rule under God, as Jews have always done. But none of this is conscious in any
meaningful sense.

CHAPTER I I I
THE POSITION IN MODERN THOUGHT

To any one who comes fresh from the study of the position we have been
considering in the last chapter, the modern condition of the sciences dealing with
the social phenomena of our civilisation must present features of unusual interest.
We have seen in that chapter how the movement in progress in recent biological
science is gradually bringing into prominence a principle round which the theory
of the evolution of life, by Natural Selection, must now be considered to revolve.
Stated in a few words, the effect of the perception of this principle is to bring us to
understand how all previous ideas of a conciliation between the interests of the
existing individuals of any progressive form of life and those of the majority of
their kind, must give way to a conception of life as involved in a vast antinomy in
which we see the present continually envisaged with the future, and in which it is
never the present, but always the future which is of larger importance. We have
seen how in this conflict it is only those forms of life among which the interests of
the existing individuals have been continually subordinated to the greater interest
of their kind in the future that have come down to us as winning types, and how
amongst every existing form destined to successfully maintain its place in the
rivalry of existence, the conditions at any time prevailing must of necessity be
those wherein the process in progress is weighted and controlled at every point,
not by the interests of the present individuals, but by those of the generations yet
in the future.
As the mind, with this position clearly before it, is concentrated now on
the later phases of the evolutionary process in human history, and more
 particularly on the aspects of that process as they are presented in the complex
social phenomena of the modern world, we become conscious that we are
regarding one of the most remarkable spectacles which the history of knowledge
presents.
If we recognise that we have before us in human society the last and most
important phase of the evolutionary process in life ; if, therefore, we consider that
the law which we have beheld in operation from the beginning—that law which at
every point in the process of progress necessitated the prevalence of conditions in
which the interests of the present and the individual were subordinated to those of
the future and the universal—cannot have been suspended in human society ; if,
indeed, we must rather consider that these conditions must be more directly
operative, and this law, therefore, be more imperative in human society than ever
before in the history of life ;—then there can be no doubt as to the nature of the
position which confronts us at the threshold of the science of society. It would
seem that the controlling fact to which we must discover every principle of the
science of society to be related, is that the history of human development is, in the
last resort, the history of the development of the principles by which there is being
effected the subordination of the individual and the present to a process, the larger
meaning of which is always in the future.
As the evolutionist looks the conclusion here stated in the face the
enormous reach of its meaning begins to be visible to him. For it must be, he sees,
in the fact here brought into view—namely, that the history of human
development is to be regarded as the history of the development of the
conceptions, by which the interests of the present are being subordinated to those
of a process, the meaning of which is projected beyond the farthest limits of
political consciousness—that we have the ultimate principle to which the
philosophy of history is related. It must be primarily along the line of the
operation of this principle of Projected Efficiency that Natural Selection is
discriminating between the living, the dying, and the dead in human society. All
the phenomena of our social development must, therefore, whether we be
conscious of the fact or not, stand in subordinate relationship to it. For here, as
elsewhere, we see that in the formula of existence for any type of social order
destined to maintain its place in the future, the interests of all the visible world
around us can have no place, except in so far as they are included in the larger
interests of a future to which they are entirely subordinate.

(Kidd, pages 65 – 67)

I really only wanted the last paragraph of the above passage, where we see a
reference to the idea of ‘conceptions’ made paramount in the process of social evolution
in human society.

“that the history of human development is to be regarded as the history of the

development of the conceptions”
This is a profoundly important insight that reverberates through all my work on human
evolution, operating via a linguistic force that creates social structure. But there are no
signs that Kidd is going to earth this conceptual insight of his in anything more physical,
and so recognise how concepts operate as part of a biological process.
I took the larger selection because it is so easy to do this in the age of modern
digital technology, and it must always be good to place ideas in their wider setting.
However a couple of things are worth discussing with regard to Kidd which can be well
illustrated by this selection. As I say, I only wanted to indicate the place where Kidd
made his important statement regarding the nature of knowledge in the process of human
evolution, but in taking a wider selection I see that I risk causing some confusion, and
this is because of the bizarre mode of expression used by Kidd, he is extraordinarily
difficult to read. His mode of expression is something we do come across, indeed, I feel
as though I use to talk the way he addresses us when I was a youth. It denotes a
hyperactive mind, always getting ahead of itself. But if we want to communicate with
people we must try and restrain our exuberance when it pours forth in such manner.
Look at his sentence beginning the last paragraph above

“looks the conclusion here stated”

This is scarcely English, I feel the need to translate his words into a comprehensible form
of English.

“he sees, in the fact here brought into view”

And again, why do this ? It is so irritating, it is like being shown a demonstration by an

absent minded professor who frantically moves about his display, continually starting to
point things out, only to stop and move back to where he last began to make out a point,
before he broke off and moved to another part, all the while never actually ending by
telling us anything. Sometimes we see the mad genius portrayed in this way in movies,
and the plain man of action looking on gets exasperated and says “Yes yes, professor, but
what does it mean !” In some ways it seems archaic, pre-nineteenth century, at least.
I do not recall this obscure style in his Social Evolution, but it runs all the way
through Principles of Western Civilisation, so far. It makes me wonder whether, given
the difficult subject he is trying to relate, the ultimate revelation of reality, something
eternally outlawed in society, he is somehow trying to obfuscate the ideas in order to be
able to publish them, because if they were stated directly, as I state them, he would be
hounded out of society. A youth I was talking to last night in the pub, who has seen some
of my work, was most insistent that I should write my ideas in fictitious form, that they
were unacceptable to anyone as I state them. He wanted to give me a book to show me
the kind of thing he had in mind, a book written by an author who gave rise to some
word, Bowdlerism, I think. And of course there is a long tradition of truth being buried
in fiction, as I said to him, Animal Farm and Brave New World being two twentieth
century examples of the type. Still it seems a bit far fetched to think this could be true of
Kidd, but his style is most damnable, as you can see. To Bowdlerize is to expurgate, so
that cannot be the word, he said the definition meant something to do with viewing the
world in dystopian terms, as opposed to utopian terms.
 I have since read a further fifty or so pages and I did not find myself getting
caught up in any odd mode of expression. The book just keeps getting better and better.
But still continues to frustrate. At one point we suddenly find ourselves shifting though a
general discussion of religion, we are given no warning, and as tantalisingly gorgeous as
the discussion becomes, it soon peters out and we get back to the main theme of the
work. This really is too much, Kidd talks about religion and deplores the failure of
French authors to grasp the significance of religion as they bemoan its inevitable demise.
The implication seems to be that Kidd knows better, and he knows that religion cannot
die. But does he tell us this ? Does he hell. I know as much as Kidd, so I can read
between the lines, but unless you already know everything there is to know you simply
would not get the message, how could you ? This method of communicating at a public
level definitely evokes a sense of mystical writing where knowledge is fed to the
initiated, to those who have been taught the signs, who know the hidden meanings. Kidd
is not an occultist, he is using a scientific style, but he is not stating what the plain facts
of the case are, yet he is hinting that he knows what these facts are. And indeed, he
should.

Kidd :

As we look back at last, from the level of our own time, over the history of the
nineteenth century, the interest in this remarkable development in Western thought
culminates. Under a multitude of forms we see that the movement in social philosophy
has, in reality, run its course as the complement and supplement of corresponding
theories in the domain of moral philosophy and of religion. In the corresponding theory
in moral philosophy the tendency has been to assert that in the last resort human conduct
requires no principle of support whatever other than that of self-interest in society well
understood. In the corresponding theory in religion, the tendency has accordingly been to
assert, with equal emphasis, that the tendency of the evolutionary process in human
history is to empty the concepts of the system of belief associated with our civilisation of
that distinctive quality which projects their significance beyond the limits of political
consciousness. Under all three forms we are regarding, we see, but the different and
closely related phases of a single movement in Western history. The fundamental
conception underlying them all is the same. It is the conception that it is possible to
express the meaning of our social evolution, just as it was expressed in the civilisations of
the ancient Greek and Roman world, namely, by a mere theory of human interests
comprised within the limits of political consciousness.
In France of the present day it is impossible to come into contact with the higher
thought of the nation at any point without feeling how completely that unanalysed
element, which in the theories of Hobbes and Locke had projected the controlling
principles of society outside the limits of political consciousness, has been eliminated
from the synthesis of knowledge associated with the theory of Western Liberalism. In the
current life of the French people all those sociological symptoms which attract the
attention of observers ; the grave symptoms which accompany the phenomenon of
depopulation, on the one hand ; the still graver symptoms which are associated with the
ascendancy of the conception of the political State as expressing itself under the ethics of
militarism, on the other ;—may be summed up in a single sentence. They are the
symptoms of a people in whom the social consciousness is, as it were, in process of slow
contraction upon itself, and, therefore, of a people in whom that consciousness is again
tending, as in the ancient civilisations, to be no longer projected beyond the principles
and interests of political society.
In the position towards which evolutionary science has carried us, we see the race
being lifted forward by irresistible causes towards a condition in which the consciousness
of the winning sections must be more and more surely projected beyond the plane of
merely political consciousness ; toward a condition in which a political consciousness is,
beyond doubt, destined, in the end, to be transformed into a cosmic consciousness. Yet in
recent French thought it may be observed on all hands how the tendency sets in the
opposite direction. We observe a thinker like Renan surveying the problems of the
modern world with a scarcely concealed consciousness of a troubled future, and yet with
so little perception of the meaning of the great process of life which has culminated in the
forms of Western Democracy, that he seems to have no clearer message to deliver than
that religious beliefs are a surviving phenomenon destined to die slowly out undermined
by primary instruction. 1 We observe a writer like Arsène Dumont viewing with concern
in modern France that result, which Mill and leaders of the Manchester school actually
wished to see accomplished in England, namely, the general restriction of births. We see
him discussing the ominous phenomenon of depopulation and the consequent failure of
the French people to preserve their ancient place in our civilisation ; and yet seeking to
carry forward his analysis of the condition of his times only to the superficial assertion
that “des deux termes de la contradiction entre la démocratie et la religion, c’est bien ce
dernier qui doit être éliminé.” 1 We see the development in modern thought which began
with Darwin more and more surely presenting the history of the evolutionary process in
human society as the history of the conceptions which are subordinating the individual
and society alike to the meaning of a process infinite in the future ; and yet have to
observe this writer with nothing better to offer the mind of modern France than the
conclusion that “l’hypothèse Dieu est insoutenable et d’elle-même s’élimine par la seule
action des causes qui l’ont produite.” 2 M. Dumont sees perfectly clearly the relation to
the problem with which he is struggling of the fact that “l’homme sait fort aisément éviter
la fécondité en conservant le plaisir.” 3 But of the relationship of the same principle of
the ascendancy of the present to the problem in the great evolutionary drama in progress
in Western history he has no conception. In current French thought “l’hypothèse Dieu
s’élimine.” And so in France, in the theory of society which accompanies the conception,
it has come about that, to use the words of Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, “the State remains the
sole God of the modern world.” 1
1
Studies in Religious History.

1
Dépopulation et Civilisation, par Arsène Dumont, c. xxv.
2
Ibid. ³ Ibid., p. 31.

But it is in Germany of the present day that the movement in modern thought,
which has presented the meaning of Western Liberalism as a theory of material interests
within the limits of political consciousness, has obtained the clearest definition, and
already reached the inevitable stage at which it has begun to develop its own antithesis.
On the one side of this movement in Germany of the present day we have the Marx-
Engels theory of modern society. Hitherto general attention has been so closely occupied
with the economic aspect of Marxian socialism that the fact of first importance connected
with it has received little attention. This is that Marxian socialism is not merely, or even
chiefly, an economic theory, but rather a complete self-contained philosophy of human
life and society. In Marx’s theories of society those fundamental assumptions upon which
the principles of Democracy were, in the last resort, made to rest in the theories of Locke
have completely disappeared. For there is now, to use the words of Mr. Russell, “no
question of justice or virtue, no appeal to human sympathy or morality ; might alone is
right, communism is justified by its inevitable victory.” Marx “rests his doctrine not on
‘justice’ preached by Utopia-mongers (as he calls his Socialist predecessors), not a
sentimental love of man, which he never mentions without immeasurable scorn, but on
historical necessity alone, on the blind growth of productive forces, which must in the
end swallow up the capitalist.” 1 Social Democracy in Germany “denies wholly and
unreservedly any spiritual purpose in the universe.” It is optimistic simply because it
believes in a better world now and here. 2 In the movement represented by John Stuart
Mill in the middle decades of the nineteenth century in England there was lacking what
may be termed the full intellectual consistency which was necessary to carry its
principles to their complete logical development. But in Marx this has been supplied, and
the inherent and inevitable attitude of antagonism to the whole system of religious belief
on which our civilisation is founded is at length clearly in sight.
1
L’État Moderne et ses Functions, par Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, p. 18.

1
German Social Democracy, by Bertrand Russell, p. 14.
2
Op. cit. p. 94.

There has been reached, in short, the stage of frank political materialism. It is not
by accident, therefore, but of strict logical necessity, that we find the Sozialdemokrat
anticipating in Germany, with Arsène Dumont in France, the day when “l’hypothèse
Dieu” shall be “expelled from human brains.” For it is inherent in the Marxian position,
that in a condition of society in which the interests of the present are considered as in the
ascendant ; in which, therefore, the economic factor is conceived as the ruling factor in
human history ; and in which, consequently, the sphere of law, morality, and economic
action are coincident and co-extensive ;—there should be absolutely no place or meaning
for the principles and conceptions by which—if the meaning of the evolutionary process
as presented in the preceding chapters be not entirely misinterpreted—the present and all
its interests are to be conceived as being subordinated to the ends of a process of which
the controlling meaning is infinite in the future. 1

¹ Marx considered religion destined to finally vanish when social relations became
reasonable according to his view. Although the sixth clause of the demands of the social
democratic party of Germany in the programme of the Congress of Erfurt (1891) contains a
declaration that religion is a private affair, we must regard this as no more than evidence that the
previously avowed stand-point of the party in this matter was felt to be a tactical mistake in
practical politics. No close student of Marx, and of the existing movement, can fail to see that not
simply is the condition of dissociation implied, but that the principle of direct antagonism is
necessarily involved. As Mr. Russell, speaking of the history of the social democratic movement
in Germany, points out, “At the annual congress of 1872 a resolution was passed desiring all
members of the party to withdraw from religious organisations, and, from this time on, the
attitude of the party has been avowedly hostile to all existing religions. It is sufficiently evident
that the materialistic theory of history leaves no room for religion, since it regards all dogmas as
the product of economic conditions” (German Social Democracy).

(Kidd, pages 121 – 127)

When Kidd talks about a nation’s consciousness contracting in upon itself, and
losing any inspiration toward a future objective, he seems to do so as if he himself valued
religion. Certainly the way he talks about the communist antagonism toward religion he
seems angered by this antagonism. I have seen book details provided by dealers describe
Kidd as an anti-socialist author, although I have never noticed much invective directed
against the socialists in anything of his I have looked at. Even here I feel as though his
point is to develop his philosophy of society as an organism, in which he explains why all
intellectual formulations are falsely focused upon the political position of the individual,
and so he merely extends the argument from the capitalist Smith to the communistic
Marx. I would do exactly the same in terms of the focus upon the individual, it is indeed
perfectly obvious that in both cases the logic is identical, involving the usual adopting of
opposing positions by competing power seekers, by taking up opposing sides in a
competitive dynamic, the usual road to elite power being through the energy of
opposition existing between the masters who control and the workers who slave. But in
both cases the logic of any argument on either side must be equally wrong from a
scientific point of view, because there is no such thing as a person, there is only the social
organism and its structure which is composed of individuals. If a physicist were to
discuss the action of a wheel turning and the friction of the wheel on the road as two
antagonistic elements of a dynamic system, one good and the other evil, and the struggle
between the two to triumph, he would not be a scientist, he would be a magician. And
the same applies to those who talk about people as if they are human beings, instead of
talking about society as a superorganism created by nature. So on this basis Kidd is no
more against socialism than he is against communism. But obviously there is much more
to be known about Kidd than I have yet accessed, unfortunately I have run out of money
just as I have my eyes on the only biography of him to be written, that will have to wait.
Only one person has ever looked at any of my work, he must of had a copy of one
piece from me over a year ago, and it was only last weekend, today being 28/05/08, that I
got any reaction from him at all : he said my work was so in your face racist. My work is
not racist in anyway at all, ever, at anytime. So I feel that we can see how the priests who
run our society always want to pigeonhole people in a political manner, and deny anyone
the opportunity of being neutral. He accused me of simply wanting power, in the shape
of egotistical prestige, the sort that must gratify a priest, the sort he must crave, a
ludicrous suggestion in my case. He did not ask me what I want, he just accused me, and
when I denied it he simply told me to my face that I did, three times, until I looked him in
the eye and said “What do you mean ?” ; that shut the cretin up. This extremely nasty
person is a very nice appearing young man, a typical priest. Last weekend is the most
interesting he has been, thus far he has obviously only been interested in ‘working’ me,
trying to get the better of me. He must be a Christian deviant. Priests are in a struggle
for power, so neutrality cannot be tolerated in any war. If Kidd is against socialism it is a
product of his reasoning about the nature of society, as far as I can tell. If I am rabidly
anti-Semitic or Islamophic in places, it is because I want science to exist and in order to
discuss this topic anyone would have to be anti-Semitic in appearance because the sole
reason why we have no science is because we have Jews. That is a scientific statement,
not a racist statement, but how can we tell this is so ? Therein lies the secret of anti-
Semitism, it exists as a reaction to anti-religious arguments. Anti-Semitism is the key to
Jewish power, which is why anti-Semitism is ubiquitous in Jewish history, as a feature of
their culture’s impact on the alien cultures that Judaism evolved to parasitise. I do not
care, if the only way to do science is to make like a Nazi, then I will make like a Nazi.
But only a fascist would ever think to accuse me of being a Nazi. If we look at Nazi
propaganda on the internet today, we find the Nazi complain of this all the time, Jews
pretending to be Nazis making out that they hate Jews. The Nazis have no hatred for
Jews at all, so their websites say. The whole field is an absolute quagmire, and by this
means it is made impossible to tell anyone apart, to mention a Jew in a negative sense
makes you an anti-Semite, end of story, and this is exactly as it should be from a
scientific point of view. What use would language be if when it creates a linguistic
identity pattern for a master race, and a cloaking mechanism to protect that race from its
slaves, the cloaking device could simply be countermanded by some smart arse
individual ? If this subversion of superorganic identity were possible then religion could
not serve as the basis of superorganic structure, and a master identity like Judaism could
not exist. So as would be scientists we must simply plough ahead regardless and do what
we have to do.
If Kidd is antagonistic toward atheism then we may believe that he restrained
himself deliberately from revealing the true nature of religion and naming Judaism as the
true organic identity of Western Civilization, because he wanted to protect religion. In
which case we may wonder why he would even bother seeking such profound and deep
answers to social questions as he did in the first place, completely offending those who
were religious in the process. But then if we are to reason like this at all we must believe
Darwin restrained himself too, as he also played the part of an enemy of religion, acting
in the guise of a scientist. It is all so very convoluted. But how else could an organism
like our modern global civilization come into existence at the behest of wild nature, if the
involvement of individuals in the production of the superorganism was not this
convoluted ? It could not. The convolution is really no more complex than that involved
in the make up of matter based on the basic ninety-two discrete elements of the periodic
table. Just as the whole of material nature can ultimately be simplified once we have
discerned its basic elements, so in human society the same would apply if we were able
to defeat the forces of our own creation that exist to make us stupid and blind, and break
through the power of identity vested in religion. It is racism, of one shade or another, that
stops us doing this. Keeping away from racism however, simply means keeping away
from the truth, only by treating the power of racism as a natural positive force concerned
with superorganic identity, can we see what racism is and thus reach beyond it. To defeat
racism you have to pass through it, not stop before it, or scoot around it, the fire must be
faced.
 The above passage from Kidd is the most telling section of his work in respect to
the general nature of religion, and it tells us nothing, directly. It is only because we
already know everything there is to know about religion that we can make more sense of
what Kidd says than he could himself, apparently. It is amazing that Kidd should express
himself in these open terms, making it plain that religion is to be regarded as the very
means by which the present is connected to the future ; this is implicit in his criticism of
Renan who has “no clearer message to deliver than that religious beliefs are a surviving
phenomenon destined to die slowly out”. But does Kidd then fill in the blank left by
Renan ? No, he does not, he says absolutely nothing whatsoever about the nature of
religion, he only leaves the void created by Renan hanging in the air. It is not as if the
man had previously gone to some trouble to explain the nature of religion, he does not do
this anywhere. Certainly in Social Evolution religion comes into the discussion a great
deal, but the book was infuriating because he made Christianity a religion in its own
right, instead of seeing that Christianity can only be regarded as a Jewish slave identity,
which any idiot ought to be able to see once they have got anywhere near as full a
naturalistic conception of human society as Kidd had realised. Irritating or what ?

After reading this fabulous passage from Kidd in which we recognise, no thanks
to Kidd himself, that he appreciated the biological role of religion, in its essence, in
making the present social structure a slave to the future social structure, we then soon
come upon the true perfection of philosophical argument, that makes Kidd the greatest
philosopher ever to of lived. For he sees as much as there is to see, he sees it all. As we
have just seen, Kidd is not inclined to reveal what he sees in plain language, but as long
as we know the same as he knew, then we can identify the absolute and perfect scientific
knowledge of humanity in his writing, existing at a moment in time immediately prior to
the two world wars, and the massive imposition upon academia which has cast us back
into the dark ages of blind ignorance and stupidity, that we are forced to endure today, in
this great age of knowledge, power and freedom !

If, therefore, the process of social order in the midst of which we are living
in Western history be destined to maintain its place in the future, that principle of
the evolutionary process brought into prominence in a previous chapter must be
held to apply to it ; and we may say that, in the scientific formula of its life, the
interests of the existing individuals possess neither place nor meaning, except in
so far as they are included in, and are subordinate to, the interests of a developing
system of order the overwhelming proportion of whose members are still in the
future. We may have any opinions whatever about our own interests or those of
society. But, as J. Novicow points out, except the ideal we have in view conforms
to the natural laws which are governing the evolutionary process as a whole, all
our desires and attempts to permanently realise it are no more than—to use this
writer’s phrase—“de purs gaspillages,” vain efforts flung waste and squandered
beneath the wheels of destiny. ¹
Stripped of all metaphysical swaddling-clothes and reduced to its plainest
terms, the conception with which we are confronted in modern evolutionary
science as applied to the process of social progress is this. The history of the
 world has become, in the last analysis, the history of the development of the
conceptions by which the individual is being subordinated to the meaning of a
world-process infinite in its reach—the history of a development in which we are
concerned with a creature moving by inherent necessity towards a consciousness
no longer merely local, or national, or political, but cosmic, and from whom the
subordination in progress must, in the last resort, be demanded in terms of his
own mind. It is, therefore, in the meaning of the great social systems founded on
the conceptions which are effecting this process, and not in any petty theory of the
State conceived as an organisation of the political or economic interests of the
existing members of society, that science will have to find in the future the
controlling principles of the process of social development which the race is
undergoing. Our first duty is, accordingly, to endeavour to understand as an
organic whole the process of life represented in our civilisation.
1
One of the commonest errors to be met with in discussions as to the ultimate
principles of society is that man has become gifted with some power peculiar to himself
of suspending the cosmic process, and of substituting for it another of his own imagining.
“La faculté de prévoir,” says M. Novicow, “est la source de tous les progrès de
l’humanité. Imaginer un état à venir est la seul moyen d’en désirer la réalisation. Mais cet
idéal peut ne pas être conforme aux lois naturelles. Il peut constituter une véritable
utopie. Alors tous les efforts pour le mettre en practique sont de purs gaspillages qui
ralentissent le taux d’accroissement du bien être. Déterminer la trajectoire d’une force
naturelle et s’abandonner à son courant, c’est tout le progrès. Prévoir l’avenir, signifie se
soumettre aux lois de la nature. Or la science seule pourra déterminer un jour la
trajectoire de l’evolution sociale” (Les Luttes entre Sociétés Humaines, par J. Novicow,
p. 175).
Compare with Professor Marshall’s statement that our first duty in the study of
social forces is “never to allow our estimates as to what forces will prove the strongest in
any social contingency to be biased by our opinion as to what forces ought to prove the
strongest” (Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. xi.)

(Kidd, pages 136 – 137)

Using my computer, and a quick review of the result, adjusted to make a slightly
more readable product, I have rendered the quote from Novicow thus :

The faculty to foresee, is the source of all human progress. Imagining a

state to come is the only means for some to desire the realization. But this ideal
cannot be in accordance with the natural laws. It can constitute a true utopia.
Then all the efforts to put it into practice are a pure waste that slow down the
growth rate of well being. To determine the trajectory of a natural force and then
to abandon itself to its current, this is the whole of progress. Foreseeing the
future, means to subject oneself to the laws of nature. Now only science will be
able to determine the trajectory of social evolution. (Warfare in Human Society)

We should begin by praising the opening line in the above note. This criticism
from the greatest thinker ever to of put pen to paper in the history of human thought,
rings about our ears. Today the overriding principle of all science is that humans are in
no way constrained by universal laws. Humans have broken free of all such restraints.
Nature does not dictate how we live in any way, shape or form. Humans alone
determine, down to the finest detail of their existence, how humans live. If our greatest
passion is hatred of one another, and the perfection of the means to destroy one another,
this only goes to show how free we are, for no other animal has the power to choose to
exterminate itself ! Such is the insanity of the cretins who make our public knowledge
today. No scientist, of any kind, would ever dare deny this idea in public, and no works
exist that do not operate on the strictly religious principle that humans are uniquely divine
creatures, being self-made. Read Dawkins, the extremist defender of science, the sworn
enemy of religion, states in the plainest possible terms that humans are no longer
restricted by the laws of nature ! The mind boggles, but we are living in a true dark age,
and it is nice to see that our hero, Kidd, recognised the same poison corrupting of science
in his day that has totally ruined all knowledge of humanity today.
Darwin laid the foundation of this idiocy that blinds us today. Darwin’s career
makes no sense. Why was he selected to be the supreme voice of science, he has told us
nothing, we still do not know the place of our society in nature, and religion still exists,
yet Darwin is trumpeted as the supreme scientist in the field of life sciences. This is the
position today, but if we look back to the origin of Darwin we find this position was
created almost instantly. From the outset, despite his antagonism to religion, which
normally invokes howls of protest from the establishment, Darwin was hailed a hero. I
recently picked up a copy of a book celebrating the centenary of Darwin’s birth in 1809.
It is a particularly nice piece of work to study for an insight into the manner in which
Darwin’s imposition upon science was developed, to lead us back into the dark ages of
slavery to Judaism, that we continue to endure to this day.

SELECTION IN HUMAN SOCIETY

GRADUAL DIMINUTION OF NATURAL SELECTION IN MANKIND.—In

early days man had probably a precarious foothold on the earth, contending with
wild beasts and with physical conditions of which he had little mastery. The
serpent bit his heel, the thorns cut his naked skin, the floods rose and drowned
him in his cave. There was probably much squabbling around the platter of
subsistence, a keen and literal struggle, and it may be that we owe much to the
natural selection of those ancient days. But as age succeeded age, and man’s brain
developed, he cared less and less for what serpent or thorn or flood could do ; his
struggle for existence changed in tone and colour. And nowadays, except in the
outskirts of civilisation, there are few wild beasts that worry man much, the
serpent that bites his heel is usually more or less microscopic, every year
increases his mastery over physical forces, and he is extending his kingdom to the
heavens.
All through the ages there has been a winnowing by disease and famine,
still very marked in certain peoples, and to this also, as regards some of our
qualities, we have probably owed much. Of the primæval crudity of the struggle
for existence, to which sections of mankind are sometimes forced back, we get
occasional appalling glimpses ; for instance, when a panic unmans men
altogether. But every one knows that we do all that in us lies to put a stop to
elimination by disease and famine. Partly through genuine sympathy, partly from
a desire to avoid unpleasantness, we insist on keeping the unfit alive.
As the struggle with physical forces and with wild beasts became easier,
with more frequent breathing-times and with more encouragement to self-
assertiveness, there came to be more competition between fellows, and it may be
that we owe much to the deadly inter-tribal wars of ancient times, which would
tend to favour not only strength but solidarity. The conflict of races still continues
among civilised peoples, in trade as much as in war ; and, if there must be this
conflict, it is to be desired that, as the result of it, there may be “mastery for the
foreseeing nation, for the nation with the cleaner bill of health, the more united
purpose of all classes, and the sounder intellectual equipment of its units.” 1 It is
impossible to ignore, however, that the whole aspect has changed in modem
times, and that the issues are less clear. We cannot trust to the selective process
with equanimity. It is obvious, for instance, that the issue of the conflict often
depends very largely on length of purse and up-to-date-ness of equipment, and
only to a slight extent on the organic qualities of the race or people.
1
“The Scope and Importance to the State of the Science of National Eugenics,”
by Karl Pearson. London, 1909.

CONTRAST BETWEEN THE HUMAN RACE AND THE ANIMAL WORLD.—It

is not necessary to spend time in showing at length that the venue changes greatly
when we pass from the animal world to the human race. Apart from the social
feelings which make the cruder forms of natural selection intolerable, there are
many complicating factors.
(1) Animals have very little power outside their own constitution of
strengthening their position in the struggle for existence, but man has much. He
gets to himself appliances and instruments, engines and machines, and the dwarf
bends the Titan to his will.
(2) If a number of unsociable men were shipwrecked on a Robinson
Crusoe island and lived each for himself, a more or less natural selection might
occur. In human societary forms, however, there is so much division of labour
that, all social sentiment apart, many get a chance whom Nature would not
tolerate. As a simple illustration, we may note that the extremely short-sighted are
by no means excluded from having a successful career. Even short-sighted dogs
and horses survive in domestication. But in wild nature a short-sighted vulture
must perish ; it cannot get spectacles.
(3) Most animals have to get their own food directly ; we cite as great
rarities cases like that of the slave-keeping ants, who not only have their food
collected but have literally to be fed by their minions. But in mankind the
majority get their bread and butter in exchange for something else. Thus types that
could not survive in open nature flourish bravely.
(4) Most animals have no inheritance outside of themselves, but in
mankind there are many kinds of external legacies. It is only in a very literal sense
that the millionaire’s son can say, “Naked came I forth,” and an inherited title
may save a man in the social struggle for existence when neither his body nor his
brains could avail.
SOME NATURAL SELECTION REMAINS.—While much of the selection
that takes place in human society is very different from natural selection, and
while we systematically thwart the process of natural selection, some still persists
in present operation. Let us get a hold of Prof. Karl Pearson’s argument. If
Darwinism applies to man, “we must have evidence (1) that man varies, (2) that
these variations, favourable or unfavourable, are inherited, and (3) that they are
selected.” (1) “The extent of variation in both man and woman has been
measured by the Biometric School in nearly two hundred cases.” (2) “There
appears no doubt that good and bad physique, the liability to and the immunity
from disease, the moral characters and the mental temperament, are inherited in
man and with much the same intensity.” (3) Careful work has shown that the
death-rate in man is partly selective —a function of his constitution. But while
there is still some natural selection left at work, it has diminished out of all
proportion to the need for it. “Consciously or unconsciously, we have suspended
the racial purgation maintained in less developed communities by natural
selection.”
Sir Ray Lankester has pointed out that the ceaseless increase of man is
absolutely peculiar to him of all living species, animal or vegetable, and this is, as
Saleeby says, “the source of the major facts of history and the besetting condition
of every social problem that can be named at this hour.” Man’s persistent
increase is the more remarkable since he is well known to be a slowly reproducing
animal—slowest perhaps, except a few extreme cases like the elephant. The point
is this, that whereas most animals have a much higher birth-rate than man, there is
none with such a low death-rate. The meaning of this is that man has thrown off
the natural selection bondage, and insists on saying, and saying successfully, “I
will live,” when every natural chance is against him. ¹

¹ See “The Kingdom of Man,” by Sir E. Ray Lankester. (London, 1906.)

THE DILEMMA OF CIVILISATION.—The whole trend of evolution since

civilisation began has been to throw off the yoke of natural selection, and we are
thus brought face to face with a formidable dilemma. It is impossible to return to a
natural selection regime, and yet we have not been able to put an equally effective
social selection into operation. No one has stated the dilemma more clearly than
Herbert Spencer : “The law that each creature shall take the benefits and the evils
of its own nature has been the law under which life has evolved thus far. Any
arrangements which, in a considerable degree, prevent superiority from profiting
by the rewards of superiority, or shield inferiority from the evils it entails—any
arrangements which tend to make it as well to be inferior as to be superior, are
arrangements diametrically opposed to the progress of organisation, and the
reaching of a higher life.”

(Darwinism and Human Life, Thomson, 1909, pages 213 – 218)

 Here Thomson begins by talking about the moderation of the social struggle as
man’s brain evolved, and then shortly afterwards he talks about humans being the only
creature to have a major degree of ‘external legacies’ acting as part of the substance of
their evolution. Thus he provides us with two distinct mechanisms causing one single
effect. These two distinct mechanisms are indeed related, and it would be argued by the
priests who rule us that the former came to a halt when sufficiently advanced, and then let
loose the other. But this dualism is pathetic, it only serves to preserve the religious idiocy
of the view that humans are divine. Besides which science can now prove this dualistic
view generated by Darwinism is nonsense. Dualism never made any sense, and so the
proof that human physiology evolved before human psychology advanced has not altered
anything because after a century of developing ideas based on idiocy science is immune
to any kind of proof regarding reality. Science does not want to know, science just wants
to preserve religious ignorance.
There is quite a bit that is of interest in this short passage, put bluntly it shows the
link between Darwinism and Nazism, a link that books have been written about. It
indicates how crucial eugenics was to defending Judaism from science, and creating the
setting where the ultimate defence of Judaism could be unleashed in the shape of the
holocaust, which now makes any science of humanity, revealing the true biological
nature of Judaism, impossible. In the crude reasoning that fuelled the absurdity of
eugenicism we can also pick up some of the contemporary lines of thought which break
into some of the discussion we find in Kidd, which we are bound to find disagreeable
these days. It is difficult to avoid the major currents of the times in which we live. This
is why today we cannot avoid getting embroiled in racist arguments if we want to talk
about society in a scientific manner that holds no bars on what can be said in the name of
truth. Our society is ruled by racism, religion is refined racism, it is the racist impulse
that empowers modern religion. I am accused of writing racist works when I create a true
science of humanity, and I ask : Whose fault is that ? Mother nature’s, obviously.
We could pick our way through the official scientific stance represented by the
above passage from Thomson, but there is no need to state the fact that there can be no
difference between the existence of modern humans and that of any other living thing.
All must be subject to identical laws and forces, and neither can possibly have any
freedom whatsoever in anything they do. Humans are associated with their own special
force in the shape of the linguistic force that creates social structure, but the essence of
this superorganic force is not unique to humans, any superorganism must also be created
through the extension of genetic information into the social domain via the evolution of a
physiology enabling the existence of a system of intimate social interaction linking
individual bodies into a dynamic concrete mass..
1) The artificial domain, so called, is the physiology of the superorganism that
the human individual creates at the behest of the forces creating the animal they are part
of. Individuals have no choice about the form of the social structure in which they live
out their lives.
2) There is no such thing as an individual that exists as an end in themselves,
anymore than the purpose of a brick is to be a brick. A person exists to form part of a
structure, therefore the comparison of qualities differentiating between individuals as if
there is only one perfect form, is the height of absurdity. Blindness can be an advantage,
it creates intense dependence, dependence being the personification of the individuals
status in its superorganic being. The adoration of perfection is a conscious impulse of
individuals, but from a scientific viewpoint this attitude is part of a bigger story, not the
conclusion of all knowledge pertaining to the nature of humans.
3) Humans are superorganisms and in nature we find the peculiarities of human
existence mirrored in other superorganic species such as that of ants. Ants, not apes, are
our cousins in kind. In evolution kinship through a common nature overrides kinship
through a common form. The precedence of ‘nature’ over ‘form’ is because any basic
form can become adapted to express any nature offering a potential for living, which is
why mammalian form, the late comer in life on earth, has been moulded to suit all the
different niches of existence, even though they started out as land animals.
4) The process of biological evolution is a continuum that extends beyond the
immediate limit of the individual’s body where humans are concerned, because the body
of the human animal is composed of individuals that are inducted into one overarching
identity, which in the case of the living global organism today is Judaism.
All of these points were perfectly obvious when Thomson was at work, we can
tell this by studying the philosophy of the time, and especially that of Kidd. This is why
these points are picked off one by one with the aid of the ludicrous model of evolution
provided by state sponsored the high priest Charles Darwin. We can see from a cursory
glance at the method of subversion used by Thomson, just how vital it was that a priest
was projected onto a pedestal of scientific perfection, to become the voice of ignorance
for science, from which all future scientific fraud could be derived.

And so back to Kidd.

What is lacking in the above passage, as always, in all philosophy, is a plain
statement of the facts in reality, namely the plain statement that it is Judaism, as a
biological identity defining the body of the superorganism, that is the actual realisation of
the impulse to see the future, as expressed through the force of language that results in
knowledge. Why does Kidd not see this, and say it ? He talks about stripping the
metaphysical ‘swaddling-clothes’ from “the conception with which we are confronted in
modern evolutionary science as applied to the process of social progress”. This is nice,
but does he deliver ? Certainly this is good, and the key word in his delivery must be
‘cosmic’, for this can only mean ‘universal’, in the plain sense of ‘natural’, i.e. ‘of the
universe’, as opposed to being of ‘God’ or ‘divine intervention’. But he could do a
whole lot better. Today we would not use the word cosmic but it appears in Ward’s Pure
Sociology and it is a big word in Boodin’s philosophy. Evidently cosmic was a fad of the
time, I do not like the word, I associate it with hippy drug fests, “Yeah, cosmic man, far
out !”
Without cutting to the chase and stating exactly what this power of foresight is all
about we cannot deal with the real issues associated with it. Novicow’s book on war in
society is not available in English, and an alternative, his brief War and its Alleged
Benefits, does not appear to say anything useful to me. But once we have recognised that
Judaism is the identity of the superorganism, and this identity requires to be sustained by
a whole complex of related subidentities, and protected by imposing its influence on all
knowledge, then we can make sense of relentless warfare in terms of these requirements
for preserving the integrity of superorganic identity. And of course this is what we do all
the way through all our work, where we explain warfare as a means of keeping the
biomass enslaved to its Jewish core identity, and explain anti-Semitism as a device for
retaining the exclusive position of the Jews within their slave biomass by preserving the
integrity of the Jew’s social identity.
I must just interject here with a little contemporary life. Yesterday, 29/05/08,
there was a piece on the news informing us that Tony Blair had decided to do the God
thing, a reference to the fact that in British politics we not do the ‘God thing’, unlike in
America where that is all they do. It mentioned that he had recently converted to
Catholicism, which is old news, and told us he was to set up a faith foundation. In an
interview Blair said he wanted to encourage all faiths. Faith was an important part of our
lives, it had to do with our future, and no only our past. Boy do I hate that man ! Anyway
it was his reference to the future that caught my attention as it chimed with everything we
are dealing with right now as we look at Kidd’s conception of the nature of existence as it
applies to humans, and how it is the fact that the present is given up to the future that
explains everything about how we experience life in modern society. Blair would agree
with this sentiment presumably, but Blair is making the point as a religious fascist, Kidd
is being a philosopher, while we are being scientists. True, I am expressing my feelings
here as well as being a scientist in spirit, but as a true scientist I am obliged to work as a
philosopher, so I may as well enjoy the privileges of the position forced upon me and let
rip my personal sentiments too.
Do we get any of the ideas expressed in the above passage from Kidd anywhere
else, ever ? No we do not. At one point Kidd talks about Nietzsche’s vitriolic, hate filled
philosophy, which speaks of Christianity as a slave identity, and calls for someone, ‘us’,
the supreme masters, to make these slaves live as slaves, and not let them be the all
powerful force that they had become through mass political movements like communism
and democracy. So some people did say the vilest things possible, and this was
welcomed by many people, but only because it was more damnable lies protecting
Judaism, the master identity, the personification of elitism. No one told the real truth as
we tell it, as Kidd all but indicates it to be. The fact is that for all that Kidd reveals,
unless you already have worked out for yourself the true nature of reality you would not
have a clue what Kidd was going on about, you would be bound to be thinking in terms
of your own personal identity, and Kidd would appear, like all intellectuals, as just one
more twat. Maybe this is not so surprising, it takes a mathematician to understand a
mathematician, or even an artist to understand an artist. But in the case of the
philosopher, the challenge is to communicate in such a way that knowledge is made
known to all who desire to know. A lot of art requires that we understand the codes used
by the artist to express their ideas. To a certain extent such jargon is unavoidable as
knowledge becomes refined, but this should never be the case in any genuine attempt to
communicate knowledge of reality to a broadly intelligent, and moderately well educated
public.
If Kidd had done better he could of explained the emergence of the Jewish
Question which played such a huge part in the half century preceding the second world
war, and culminated in the holocaust which created the Jewish state of Israel, and hence
inflicted the current global war of terror upon us all today. If some true scientist, or true
philosopher, or true academic of some sort, had said what we are saying about Judaism,
there would of been no place for the Nazis, and Judaism could of been erased, peacefully,
from the earth, and all war brought to an end. It is time Judaism went its way as other
monstrous impositions like witchcraft, book burning and torture, except in the freedom
loving democracy of the USA, have gone their way. Or at least it pleases me to make this
suggestion, albeit I am rather overreaching any justified view of the benefit of destroying
Judaism, still we can but hope ! No doubt in reality some other evil would soon take
Judaism’s place. Of course it is Judaism that has created our wonderful world, the good
as well as the bad, by enslaving the whole planet to one uniform view of the future, ruled
by Jews, the power of all earth is focused into one great political object, Western
Civilization ; but that is neither here nor there, what we want is science, true knowledge.
I just do not see the point in all this bull from Kidd about the cosmic process
imbued into concepts that drive social progress as we know it. Unless we are going to get
down to brass tacks and name the actual ‘concepts’ in question, as we know them in life,
and describe the precise details of those concepts, that indicate how this process works, I
see no truth in any suggestion that we are doing anything through Kidd’s efforts. I
suspect Kidd would, or maybe he will, speak about this realisation of a ruling concept in
terms of Christianity, but if this is so, then his is as worthless and blind a philosophy as
any ever produced, it would in fact then just be an extension of the Christian slave
dogma. We either leap the chasm of ignorance or we plunge into the darkness of public
knowledge provided by the priesthood ; there are no half measures or second prizes, it is
reveal all, or nothing.

“Our first duty is, accordingly, to endeavour to understand as an organic whole

the process of life represented in our civilisation.”

This I take to be a promise, I have only read just past this sentence, we shall see.

Now we can return to the earlier content of this work, interrupted by my reading
Kidd, and return to discussing what White has to say in the previous quote from him,
about the war between religion and science.

White’s motivation for taking up the challenge posed by primitive Christian

religion is interesting, and relevant to our studies. We may note that the paragraph in
italics (p. 55 above) repeats one taken from his earlier volume on the same topic. In
listing his credentials for the job of founding an academic institution, White shows us just
how the religious control of academia was transferred from the hands of priests to the
hands of lay people without bating an eye, thus remaining, to this day, in the vice like
grip of an absolute, unrelenting theocracy. White, like Draper, only in far more detail,
shows us just how religion survived the coming of the scientific age by retaining its hold
on academia, shifting its power base from professional theologians while passing control
to secularised priests called ‘professors’ who were, before all else, committed to religion.
Taken in conjunction with the same strategy of secularisation applied across the whole of
the social fabric the theocracy could then pretend the world it ruled with an iron fist had
been secularised. We see the same process operating everywhere, as we noted above
when we spoke of the Pope’s phalange placed in the Houses of Parliament, obedient to
their pontiff first, and the British people second. Muslims make the secondary position
of state nationality relative to Islamic identity a matter of principle, but this hierarchy of
personal identity structures has always been inherent in Christianity even though it has
not been to the fore, revealing a contrast that indicates how Islam represents a deeper
perfection of Judaic slave identity compared to Christianity ; or a more highly perfected
‘concept’ subduing the present to the future, to put the same idea in Kiddian terms. We
can define a specific philosophical outlook on the basis of Kidd’s unique philosophy,
such that Kiddianism can be described as : the subjection of the social present to the
social future, through the medium of discrete concepts defining the nature, form and
identity of a living society. The new form of theocratic fascism arising from the tactics
employed by the theocracy to retain control of society is called Democracy. Today we
engage in the age of religious warfare in the name of Democracy. America, the land of
Jewish slaves, is founded on the principle of Democracy rooted in slavery to ignorance.
Nothing has changed since ancient times, our knowledge of ourselves has not altered one
jot ; something Kidd notes when discussing all social knowledge of the nineteenth
century. And religion continues to be the basis of social power to this day. All
democracy does is make a sham of including all individuals on an equal footing, and its
pretence of inclusivity certainly is a total sham. But this is how nature creates the human
superorganism, and the method works, everyone is happy with the pretence, no one
questions it, except our Kidd, and me.
Yesterday, 29/05/08, I was downloading some material off the net and the author
was some kind of rightwing fascist, adoring dictatorship, despising freedom, a lover of
Nietzsche. Exactly the kind of figure I loath. I have not had a chance to even skim any
of his scribblings, but, in common with Hitler, his contemporary, he was evidently much
troubled by democracy, and this made me think about the terrible things I say about
democracy right here. I need to point out that I love the idea of democracy, as I love the
idea of science, and all ideas pertaining to unfettered freedom of the individual. I was
brought up in a free society, in which freedom is the highest goal that we all exist to
serve. When I criticise democracy I only do so for the same reason I decry science,
because I see that in our society the outward show of these things has been robbed by the
age old masters of our slavery, ignorance and religion. So my condemnation of
democracy is a call for true democracy, and I would not want anyone to think otherwise.
However, that said, my real objective overall, is to be a voice for true science, and I have
no interest whatsoever in the ephemeral protestation of personal or idiosyncratic ideas.
So my real object is to delineate a true science of humanity, and in accordance with that
objective I recognise that the reason religion exists has to do with human nature, and
likewise the failure of democracy to be real is dictated by the same impulse toward the
development of concepts that make the mortal living act in accordance with the needs of
the living immortal being of the superorganism, in which the mortal play a passing part.
In Pure Sociology by Lester Ward, 1903, we have a nice statement that I feel fits
in here :

Finally, it may be said in general that all human institutions are

achievements. Even those that we now consider bad, even those that have been
abolished, were useful in the wider sense in their day and age. The fact that they
 were developed and actually came into existence proves to the sociologist that
they must have served a purpose. But there is really no such thing as abolishing an
institution. Institutions change their character to adapt them to their time, and the
successive forms may take different names, and be no longer recognized as the
same as the institutions out of which they have developed, but the fundamental
principle which underlies them is common to them all, and may usually be traced
through the entire series of changes that an institution may have undergone. The
term institution is capable of such expansion as to embrace all human achieve-
ment, and in this enlarged sense institutions become the chief study of the
sociologist. All achievements are institutions, and there is a decided gain to the
mind in seeking to determine the true subject-matter of sociology, to regard
human institutions and human achievement as synonymous terms, and as
constituting, in the broadest sense of both, the field of research of a great science.
These products of achievement that we have been considering have one
fundamental condition, without which they would have been impossible. They
absolutely require social continuity. I have said that they are permanent, that they
are never lost. This is implied in the term achievement. To be lost is not to exist.
We may illustrate this from biology. Individuals are short-lived, but the race
persists. Species may become extinct, but genera or families are carried on. We
find certain forms in existence. We know nothing of other forms. If there have
been such, they are the same to us as if they had not existed. The theory is that the
bathmic force is omnipresent and pushing in every direction, as from the center of
a sphere toward every point on its periphery. We may imagine that, besides the
few lines that succeeded in developing, there were hundreds or even thousands of
other lines tested, but found to fail, sooner or later, leaving only the ones we
know. Now a lost art or a lost institution would correspond to one of these
supposed failures of organic nature. It would be, to all intents and purposes, non-
existent. In other words, and it certainly sounds platitudinal, society consists of
existing institutions, just as life consists of existing forms.

(Ward, 2nd Ed., 1925, pages 31 – 32)

I would have something to say about this passage from Ward if I were analysing
it, but I am not, I just happened to read this passage a few weeks ago and found this
remark on the nature of institutions most perfect in respect to my insistence that modern
universities continue to form the basis of an absolute theocracy, even though universities
were decoupled from the direct control of the church a couple of centuries ago.
In addition, just the other day, I read this passage from another relevant work :

There is, however, no doubt about the burning of a book for its theological
sentiments at this time, though it was no Parliament but only an university which
committed it to the fire. Oxford University has always tempered her love for
learning with a dislike for inquiry, and set the cause of orthodoxy above the cause
 of truth. This phase of her character was never better illustrated than in the case
of The Naked Gospel, by the Rev. Arthur Bury, Rector of Exeter College (1690).

(Books Condemned to be Burnt, Farrer, 1904, p. 141)

Farrer, writing in the early 1890’s, speaks of ‘this phase’ of Oxford University’s
character, but we cannot rejoice in any change of heart regarding true knowledge, the fact
that Richard Dawkins, the ‘gatekeeper of the theocracy’, who assumes the guise of an
atheist and friend of unbridled evolutionary science, while denying that we can prove
God does not exist, and while asserting that humans are divine (unique), as an Oxford
professor, shows that all that has happened is that this university, like all other
universities on earth, uses more developed techniques of knowledge control that burning
books, more subtle techniques better suited to modern conditions. Farrer closes his brief
history of one narrow field of censorship with these thoughts :

The Present Crisis, therefore, of 1775, must retain the distinction of

having been the last book to be condemned to the public fire ; and with it a
practice which can appeal for its descent to classical Greece and Rome passed at
last out of fashion and favour, without any actual legislative abolition. When, in
1795, the great stir was made by Reeve’s Thoughts on English Government,
Sheridan’s proposal to have it burnt met with little approval, and it escaped with
only a censure. Reeve, president of an association against Republicans and
Levellers, like Cowell and Brecknock before him, gave offence by the extreme
claims he made for the English monarch. The relation between our two august
chambers and the monarchy he compared to that between goodly branches and the
tree itself : they were only branches, deriving their origin and nutriment from their
common parent ; but though they might be lopped off, the tree would remain a
tree still. The Houses could give advice and consent, but the Government and its
administration in all its parts rested wholly and solely with the King and his
nominees. That a book of such sentiments should have escaped burning is
doubtless partly due to the panic of Republicanism then raging in England ; but it
also shows the gradual growth of a sensible indifference to the power of the pen.
And when we think of the freedom, almost unchecked, of the literature of
the century now closing, of the impunity with which speculation attacks the very
roots of all our political and theological traditions, and compare this state of
liberty with the servitude of literature in the three preceding centuries, when it
rested with archbishop or Commons or Lords not only to commit writings to the
flames but to inflict cruelties and indignities on the writers, we cannot but
recognise how proportionate to the advance we have made in toleration have been
the benefits we have derived from it. Possibly this toleration arose from the
gradual discovery that the practical consequences of writings seldom keep pace
with the aim of the writer or the fears of authority ; that, for instance, neither is
property endangered by literary demonstrations of its immorality, nor are
churches emptied by criticism. At all events, taking the risk of consequences, we
 have entered on an era of almost complete literary impunity ; the bonfire is as
extinct as the pillory ; the only fiery ordeal is that of criticism, and dread of the
reviewer has taken the place of all fear of the hangman.

(Farrer, pages 186 – 188)

It seems to me, I get the feeling, from skipping through this delightful little
history, that the point of real significance since the book burning days, has changed.
Burning books simply could not keep up with the technology able to produce them,
society has certainly adjusted its strategy of control. After the last book was burnt in
1775 we approach the nineteenth century, and in doing so we shortly enter upon the
period that would lay the foundations for the modern world, and these foundations would
be all about adopting a tone of liberty and inclusiveness = Democracy ; the new fascist
strategy of absolute control, distancing the arrogance of government from the subject
people, instead of shoving power in their faces as rulers traditionally have. Sticking to
the theme of Farrer’s work we may say that the strategy of physically destroying, has
become one of physically swamping. I bought a very expensive, rare book, off the
internet last week, it cost me £85, and it came from America, there was one other copy
available in Sweden, I think that was £120. It is Britain’s Jewish Problem, by M. G.
Murchin (pseudonym), 1939. Doesn’t that say it all ? I have gone on a bit of a splurge
looking for anti-Semitic works this last few weeks, and the great problem one faces is
wading through the flood of anti-Semitic sounding works written by apologists for
Judaism, trying to find real anti-Semitic works is a struggle. What about this for a title,
The Necessity of Anti-Semitism, written by a Jew, Frederic Raphael, published 1997. The
Jews seem to love mimicking their adversaries, and why not, it is a good game, and a
most effective tactic of control as it spreads confusion and dissipates the energy of those
who want to understand Jews from a non-Jewish perspective ; but control is what
Judaism is all about, especially the control of knowledge. When you get your eye in you
can come up with a few titles, and some are freely and cheaply available, but there is no
doubt that this highly taboo area is a good point to examine in order to test the modern
method of knowledge control that Farrer’s historical work forms a minor, but highly
colourful, branch thereof. Now I have an apparently genuine piece of anti-Semitic work,
though you never quite know what is genuine in this field area of research, I thought I
would try and find something out about the author, but I can get nothing off the internet
on Murchin. I looked up his works in the British Library catalogue and it does not even
tell you what this man’s real name was. Obviously if I was licensed by the theocracy to
access such information, in other words if I were a professor of a university, I could get
all the information I wanted, but as a plebe, my means of accessing information are
limited to those that my masters have crafted for me, to compliment the implant their
education structures have given me. What need have I for information other than that
presented to me on a plate by the state ? To want anything else is surely an implicit act of
treason, since why else should I want unofficial knowledge than to usurp the authority of
my owners ? Quite !
I mention above that yesterday, 29/05/08, I was taking some material offline, the
work I actually wanted was called Jews, and the Jews in England, by Cobbett, 1938. I
had found a copy on the net, one only, price £200, wow, no chance. But here it is, a
genuine piece of anti-Semitism, about England, and it is free to download. As with
Murchin, Cobbett is a pseudonym, the author was Anthony M. Ludovici, and there is a
site dedicated to his works, you can take them all, I have. That is a lot easier on the
pocket, my recent manic book buying spree ended sharply last night when I crashed into
my credit limit, ouch, no more beer for me this summer, bummer ! Not to mention the
rare items I have spotted that I yearn to purchase, I just ordered a 1936 copy of The
Patriot from Ireland, £10, and I have found three more pre-world war copies for £10
each, plus post, in England ; and that is it, there are no more, at the moment, who knows
what delightfully ‘nasty’ anti-Semitic gems may be lurking in such rags.
The Patriot arrived a few hours after writing the previous paragraph, 4 p.m.!, I ask
you, who gets their post at that time ? I said to the postman “Get any later and you’ll be
delivering today’s post tomorrow.” He looked at me gone out, thought for a long
moment, and said “Yeah.” It is only a skinny little rag, it says it is registered with the
Post Office as a newspaper, and it is published weekly, I spent twenty minutes looking at
it, and there is only a small item dealing directly with these far-right, fascist Christian
activists’ concern with the Jews, and this item appears in a slot given over to their regular
selections from the Jewish press. It is a nice little item though, it shows how intense the
agitation of the Jews was to get their hands on Palestine at this time, it gives a passage
taken from a Muslim paper that had been reproduced in a Jewish monthly. The Muslims
are whining about the way the Jews are muscling the Muslims off Muslim land as the
Jews build up pressure for the Jewish state to created by Adolf Hitler. All this was of
course being managed by the Jews through the manipulation of their British slave state,
just as today the Jews use their American territories to further the same end, exactly as
they formerly used their Roman slaves two millennia ago.
A contemporary item like this copy of the Patriot is a real delight to possess, it is
highly ephemeral and as such it puts us in touch with the people of the time in a very
intimate way that you do not get in books, unless I write them perhaps, as I like to insert
contemporary material in real time. The importance of grasping that the fascistic, and
deeply anti-Semitic political activists of the time, are the most devout of Christians, is of
the highest importance for understanding the sociology of the living superorganism of
which we are a part. The supreme quality of any religion is intolerance, without
intolerance no religion can amount to anything, because religion is identity, and there can
be no compromise over identity. When we get it firmly rooted in our minds that the
fascist warmongers are Christians, it is so easy to see how the ball of Jewish dominion
was passed directly from the Romans to the Christians, exactly as we have been saying
the same ball was passed directly from the priests to the professors in the case of the
universities undergoing the process of secularisation. The institutions never change, they
never die, as Ward tells us, but they undergo transformations related to the state of
growth of the living superorganism. However this is not how these developments are
represented to us, we are told the exact opposite by our masters who engineer these
changes, therefore the reason these changes of identity occur in eternal unchanging
structures is to accommodate the incorporation of new components of identity as the
growth of the organism sucks in more and more of the global human biomass into its own
body mass, and turns them all into one uniform identity, that is uniformly Jewish.
 Rome, then the Christian empire, these can only be Jewish institutional structures,
at first running in tandem, then one emerging from the other, so that finally the former
exists independently as a new physiological phase of superorganic growth. But always
with the inheritors of overtly Jewish identity in firm control of everything, because Jews
are imbued into everything, which gives us the ultimate answer to the Jewish Question
that so plagued everyone’s minds in the early twentieth century : Why are the Jews so
powerful, and why do they pervade all the prominent structures of power in our Christian
societies ? This means that the Jews must of created the Romans, exactly as we know for
a fact that they created the Christians and the Muslims. Certainly the Romans were
created from scratch, they have no organic roots, they were a manufactured society, built,
from the outset according to highly civilised principles. The extraordinary formation of
the Romans can be likened to a ship full of high ranking moderns becoming stranded on a
desert island, and over the course of centuries of isolation developing a civilisation from
this original embryonic start, producing a modern society from a cleansed beginning, a
society with no real past, just like modern America, raw, fresh, ripe for exploitation by an
ancient identity with deep roots, and a powerful sense of motive. We see that the sole
political motive for American existence today is the goal seeking Jewish dominion of all
earth, and the Romans too were fired by a sense of eternal purpose, the trouble was, like
the Americans today, this driving force was not theirs, it belonged to their masters, the
Jews. In neither case can we be deceived into believing that the formation of Rome or
America was any kind of accidental affair, such accidents do not happen. These events
were part of an ongoing physiological process, the process is so natural that it forms the
basis of mythological storytelling. The James Bond movie that has a mad genius who
selects perfect specimens to launch onto a space station, while aiming a bio-weapon set to
wipe out all human life on earth, so the planet could be repopulated with perfect beings,
seems to cast the Nazi ideology, based on eugenic philosophy derived from Darwin, in
the form of a story for modern viewers, but it is in reality the story of how the Jews
became the masters of the earth via the creation of societies like that of Rome and
America. And once we have recognised the trick, why not say that it is in fact applicable
to every new type of national identity that has ever come into being since the Jews came
into existence ? This mechanism of making fresh social forms according to an advanced
template, cleansed of any motive force of their own, and as such lacking the urge toward
the future that Kidd makes essential to the existence of a civilised society, and which we
have seen Blair recently affirm is the vital derivative of religious belief, is the key to
understanding Jewish power that we have been searching for. A process reaching back to
the origin of the Jews, possessing the required degree of subtlety to carry the Jews from
nothing to absolute power over all humanity on the sole strength of an idea, a concept, a
concept of the future. A simple process of substitution that conforms to the natural
process of step by minute step evolution that we know creates all structure in the
universe. So much inspiration from one wee rag, I wish I had the £30 I need to buy the
other three.
For this process to work various factors must come into play in a controlled
fashion. Firstly humans must acquire their identity from their social environment. This
is why language is key to the evolution of a mammalian superorganism, and why we
speak of a linguistic force creating social structure. Once we have a cultural flux forming
the basis of superorganic physiology, via the development of a linguistic force which
includes more than just language itself, taking in the whole gamut of communicative
sensory perception, most obviously including vision and hearing, then, in order for the
process to move forward we need the natural inclination for cultural identity to become
fixed, to be transformed into a dualistic dynamic involving the unification of a ruling
fixed identity to fluid identity taking its fixity from the ruling identity. And it is here that
a master identity that is fixed, ruling over an identity that has the potential for change to
come into being on a semi-permanent basis, that allows a new type of complex
superorganism to come into being. The Jewish superorganism being the one of this kind
that we live as part of, but there have been many other examples of the type, most
notably, for me, the Japanese superorganic form, now subsumed into Jewish
physiological structures.
It is obviously important for us to take notice of the availability of anti-Semitic
works when the point has just been made that such works are not available openly. The
lesson to take from the contradictory discovery of Ludovici’s work is that we must be
subtle in our understanding of the superorganic process of knowledge control, that we are
concerned to understand in a strictly scientific manner. Nothing we say here is about
winning political points, it is all about possessing perfect, unbiased knowledge of the
nature of the human animal. There is no conspiracy in operation that controls knowledge,
none is necessary, the natural attributes of the superorganism are organized in the form of
social structures that give a certain desired result. Even when the church controlled these
things directly through overt censorship this was not a conspiracy, its was the open
imposition of authority. We have just been considering how the arrival of the modern era
has seen the development of far more subtle mechanisms of theocratic control. Hence
there is no absolute stricture against certain types of work, although there is one, in
Germany, where Mein Kampf is illegal, and the supreme global bookseller, surprise
surprise, is based in Germany, which means the only major book agent on the net is
forbidden by law from selling Hitler’s masterpiece. In a myriad of other similarly
tortuous ways the priests keep a tight grip on the flow of knowledge, but nowhere in our
society, apart from the one example cited, is the ban on knowledge enforced by law.
Given the amazing effect of Darwin on the total eradication of any life science from our
society, we can see that in fact the effect of providing a false message to supplant true
knowledge, is infinitely more successful than any attempt at direct eradication. Such
subtlety is an organic method that applies throughout the living world ; it is the subject of
one of the famous Aesop fables, as I often say, about the fight between the sun and the
wind to see who is stronger, the wind uses force against the grain, the sun uses force with
the grain. People want to know, they will die to know, so instead of killing them if they
try to know the truth, give them a terrible truth that makes them feel happy in their sense
of knowing that which they should not ; just make sure that the terrible ‘truth’ you feed
them is a suitable shade of bullshit. Humans, although wanting knowledge, and yearning
for the truth, bizarrely, do not really want the truth, they want to be persuaded, amused,
empowered, entertained and gratified. So the master and the slave are a natural dynamic,
they are not the perversion of human nature that our argument undoubtedly makes both
sides of the equation out to be.
With this scientific model depicting human social evolution toward a global
superorganic status, we produce a scheme within which all history and political
description fits perfectly well, albeit while losing all power of explanation, being reduced
to a purely descriptive capacity. We may characterise this process in ordinary prose that
we can all think about, and relate to, as one of Making and Remaking. The Making is the
creation of the one core identity of Judaism, the master identity, and the Re-Making is the
continual refabrication of the identity matrix of the dependant biomass. A remaking
enacted through an infinite variety of identities that have the same quality as the original,
and take their inspiration from the original, and pay homage, wittingly or unwittingly,
mostly unwittingly, to the original identity, but which vary in the crucial factor of
longevity. The variation of each identity component’s longevity relates to the position of
that component in the physiological structure of the superorganism.
When we talk about ‘identity components’ we are speaking about physiological
structures defined by discrete identities. These identities are always cultural, but they
may be political or religious, so they may be a national or a religious. Each nation will be
composed of a variety of religious identities, as it will also be composed of a variety of
political identities too, and likewise every religion will tend to be composed of a variety
of political identities. Kidd, see below, gives us a description of superorganic structure in
which religious and political identity are one and the same, but as we note in response to
this argument, this can never of been the case. It can only ever be a matter of the
intensity of the unification, compared to the laxity of unification at other times, so that
there is always a blend of religious and political identity structures in any civilised
society. If we travel back toward the age of tribal living, prior to civilised dependence
upon domesticated forms of sustenance, then it is likely that the religious will of be
united perfectly with the political, because the political would of been confined to the
racial identity of a tribe. But when people lived in such tribal units they formed a mosaic
of human superorganic bodies dispersed across a geographical range, and these units will
of been related to one another, but they will still of recognised their differences enough
discriminate between tribes with whom to associate, and tribes with whom to fight. The
basic dynamics we are seeking to recognise concern the behaviour of an animal, the
human superorganism, and as such all behaviour we are conscious of as individuals can
only ever be a subsequence of the biological reactions related to the physiology of the
superorganism of which we form a part. Therefore there must be continuity of function
from the present back to the furthest past of hominid existence, millions of years ago,
long before the evolution of our own species. Anyone who wants to claim to grasp
human existence today, as Kidd presumes to do, must be aware of this last point, and they
must show how their ideas make the link between modern existence and our animal status
reaching right back to the origins of life itself.

Since writing my last missive on the content of Kidd’s Principles of Western

Civilisation I had a bit of sunshine yesterday, 31/06/08, the last day of my fifteenth year
living in this fine little 1930’s bungalow, and so I sat in the greenhouse and read a bit
more of his masterpiece. What I read is so important I noted several passages to copy,
and I want to do this now, the subject matter concerns the nature of religion, and it will
link up with the preceding comments made about the nature of the Jews in the process of
social evolution, as inspired by the snippet of information in the form of The Patriot.

Kidd :
 Throughout the ancient civilisations from the earliest times the institution
of citizenship was, to use words of Mommsen, “altogether of a moral-religious
nature.” 1 What, therefore, in the first place, was the origin and character of this
moral-religious bond to which the entire constitution of the ancient State—moral,
political, and military—was in the last resort related ?
1
Mommsen’s History of Rome, translated by W. P. Dickson, vol. i. p. 246.

When we regard attentively the present state of knowledge concerning the

development of religious beliefs, a very striking natural law regarding them may
be seen to be slowly emerging into view. 1 It is that all the religious systems that
have influenced the race fall into two great and clearly defined categories ; and
farther, that the growth of the religious faculty itself is proceeding along the line
of development by which a system of religion rises from the first of these
categories into the second.
1
Compare the position reached in Edward Caird’s Evolution of Religion and his
Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

If we look closely, first of all, at the second category, which includes all
the higher forms of religious belief existing amongst the advanced peoples, the
characteristic which is distinctive of it may be perceived at once. This is that the
vital interests with which the religious beliefs included therein are concerned are
not primarily interests of a material character, or even interests which are to any
important degree expressed in the present time. What we have represented, over
and above everything else, in the systems of belief in this higher category, is a
series of ideas and conceptions by which the individual is brought into a state of
consciousness of his relation to the universal and the infinite, and through which
every material interest of the present is made to sink into a position of
comparative insignificance. 2
2
We are so constantly and familiarly brought into contact with this characteristic
in the prevailing forms of religious belief in our Western world, that we are hardly
conscious of one significant fact regarding it. It is entirely new and recent in the history
of religious development.

But when we turn now to the other category, its distinctive feature, as soon
as it is pointed out, is grasped with equal readiness by the mind. Through all the
systems of religious belief included in this lower category there runs also a feature
which is characteristic. It is that the great object of the religion is held by its
adherents to be that of obtaining material advantage in the present time for those
observing its rites and ceremonies. It is around the material interests of the
existing individuals in the present time that the whole cultus of the religion tends
to centre. The characteristic and consistent feature of all the systems included in
this category is, in short, that the controlling aims of the religious consciousness
are in the present time.
 The profound significance of the transition which is indicated in the
development from the lower to the higher of these two categories of religious
belief, is evidently closely related to that of the law of the two great eras of social
evolution, referred to in the last chapter ; in the first of which we see the
individual being subordinated simply to the existing social organisation, and in
the second of which we see society itself being subordinated to a meaning which
transcends the content of all its existing interests.
Now when we look closely at the religious systems of the Greek and
Roman worlds two facts are apparent. In the first place, it is immediately
perceived that these systems belong to the category in which the religious
consciousness is related to ends which express themselves, for the most part, in
the present time. In the second place, it may be perceived on examination that the
governing idea of the systems—to which all other ideas stand in subordinate
relationship—is that of an exclusive religious fellowship, in which all the
members of the community or of the State are joined ; but in which outsiders
cannot participate without sacrilege. This is the central idea in all the religious
systems of the ancient world. It is from it that the conception of exclusive
citizenship—the fundamental fact of the Greek and Roman civilisations—
proceeds. It is the ruling idea to which, in the last resort, all the life and
institutions of the social systems of the ancient world were related. What,
therefore, is the significance of this conception of exclusive citizenship,
“altogether moral-religious in its nature,” in that epoch of history in which the
development of society under the controlling principle of military efficiency is
about to culminate ?
Almost the first point which occupies attention in such an inquiry is the
fact that the fundamental conceptions underlying the institution of citizenship in
the ancient civilisations were not, as may readily be imagined, in any way
peculiar to the early Greek and Latin communities. They were conceptions
associated with an organisation of society which was common at the time to a vast
number of similar communities spread over wide territories in Europe and Asia.
They were conceptions which had doubtless persisted for an immense period of
time, and they appear to have characterised at one stage the history of all the races
from which have been descended the peoples that in modern times have come to
play a leading part on the stage of the world. They have, beyond doubt, some vital
significance in relation to the principle of overmastering efficiency in the present
which governs the first of the two eras of social evolution described in the last
chapter.

(Kidd, pages 158 – 162)

As ever with Kidd his lax style proves to be a great barrier to ease of
understanding. On page 159 we find a most important preliminary statement made in a
very loose fashion.
 “all the religious systems that have influenced the race fall into two great
and clearly defined categories ........ the growth of the religious faculty itself is
proceeding along the line of development by which a system of religion rises
from the first of these categories into the second.”

What damned categories my poor brain screamed at me when I read these words
yesterday. I wandered off to make a cup of tea, and tried again. Ah, enlightenment, the
two categories named by Mommsen in the preceding short paragraph, the ‘moral-
religious’ categories. Hell’s bells, how can anyone be expected to follow such a course
of reasoning ? This style is the difference between stopping someone in the street and
asking for directions, which of necessity are always full of holes and opportunities to go
awry, and having a nice ordnance survey map on your lap and following the smooth
portrayal of where you are to where you want to be effortlessly.
According to my notes, when I read this passage yesterday I found it of great
interest because I took his discussion to have a bearing on why religion should exist in
the modern world, something of great concern to any scientist of human life, I have
written a book specifically on the question How Religion Survived the Coming of Science.
Now it is not too clear to me how I got this impression from the above passage. If only
we knew what his two categories were. Kidd tells us that the most important revelation
regarding our understanding of human social evolution is that there are “two great and
clearly defined categories” into which religious systems generating modern civilisations
fall. And these categories are hierarchical and consecutive. I have deduced that one
category is ‘moral’ and the other ‘religious’, I can do no better, we are given no other
information whatsoever, unbelievably, yet this makes no sense since we are talking about
two religious categories, so how can one of those religious categories itself be religious !
He says “If we look closely, first of all, at the second category, which includes all
the higher forms of religious belief existing amongst the advanced peoples”, so clearly
the ‘religious’ category is the second category, and therefore the ‘moral’ category is the
first. Good, glad we got that sorted out, even if it does not make any sense. I guess we
can begin to feel comfortable with the idea once we have thought about it enough, but it
is so important a part of his discussion of the relationship of religion to the social
structure that it is worth being more explicit.
Despite the jarring effect of Kidd’s style which leaves us wondering what he is
talking about at times, he is nonetheless interesting, and it is best not to get hung up on
this failure of clarity on Kidd’s part, and to assume that we have understood him, and
press on. In reality he has no idea what he is talking about anyway, he is simply the best
there is, so we always have to make do and stumble along whoever we are reading on the
subject of human existence.

The Unconscious Knowledge of Reality in Religious Consciousness

The point of interest here then is Kidd’s overall approach. Once again he talks
about how the present is made subject to the future.

“What we have represented, over and above everything else, in the systems of
belief in this higher category, is a series of ideas and conceptions by which the
 individual is brought into a state of consciousness of his relation to the universal
and the infinite, and through which every material interest of the present is made
to sink into a position of comparative insignificance.”

He can only mean this projection of consciousness toward an overwhelming concern for
the future, to the exclusion of any material interest in the present, to refer to the
contemporary Christian system, of which he says in his note that its imposition upon us
leads to our unconscious accession to this commitment to the future. This is a rather
curious statement given that in the text he says that religious dogma brings us into a
‘conscious’ state of connection with the future. The general idea he is presenting is
useful, even if we fervently desire that he would be more explicit : Why not name the
religion in question ? He would then be giving a scientific analysis of Christianity that
necessarily destroys the possibility of Christian belief by revealing the nature of its
mystery, and thereby earthing the myth to reality ; exactly as the ancients were doing
when they revealed that the homes of the gods, the planets, were just material objects
identical in their nature to the earth ; only they were attacked as blasphemers for their
efforts. Revealing reality always means committing a blasphemy.
There is something delightful about this odd description of people being made
‘unconsciously conscious’ of facts of reality. We can make sense of this curious
suggestion by thinking about the nature of our existence as a sensory being located in a
reality that are our senses are designed to reveal, but where that reality we can only be
sensed to a limited degree of penetration. Hence we experience an ongoing state of
imperfect perception, where the consciousness of reality that we are aware of can only
ever equate to a sliver of the reality actually surrounding us. But, most importantly,
being utterly unaware of the deeper factors applying affecting the circumstances we
experience, we accept with absolute authority the ignorance that we take for knowledge.
Except that is not quite the end of the story, because we know perfectly well in life, that
there are many hidden factors causing day to day occurrences to run for or against us, and
this leads us to speculate, and to try and utilise our powers of control over reality by
extending their reach toward the unknown. Hence, in ordinary circumstances, we are
intensely aware of those aspects of reality that are of most immediate relevance to
ourselves, and social realities take precedence over everything else, because we are social
animals. And since we are largely responsible for creating social realities through our
own activity, we are preoccupied with our own behaviour, as most animals presumably
are. It is from this state of affairs that the idea which dominates science today arises,
namely that humans make their own world, it is a truly crude, primitive notion, but it is
ingrained into the animal psyche, and as such the obsession of the senses with the self is
fundamental to the role of being an animal entity, and as yet humans have not even begun
to free themselves of this restraint on their intelligence, hence the stupid way they live,
trashing the earth, abusing one another, slaughtering life, adhering to religious beliefs,
fabricating science to subvert knowledge, and so on. These social activities are a natural
aspect of superorganic physiology, but as individuals the consequences always appear
disastrous to us, a point Kidd makes central to his argument, where he says individuals
cannot possibly have any interest in the demands society makes upon them. So we
pretend we want to put a stop to the negative demands society imposes upon us, like
fighting war and living with inequality, but this pretence is a self deception, because the
key to stopping this activity is to reveal our true nature to ourselves, and this we most
certainly do not want to do.
An increasing depth of understanding, through science, has taught us there is
much more to the underlying dynamics of our human existence. We work tirelessly, and
invest huge amounts of resources into hiding this fact from ourselves. But it is an inkling
of these underlying dynamics that find a tentative expression in this section of Kidd’s
work quoted above. He is surely indicating that religion connects our consciousness with
those deeper underlying dynamics that arise from our being the product of a biological
process of evolution, that has meant humans have evolved to be a superorganic species.
Evolving to be a superorganic species, in which the individuals are reduced to the status
of units of a greater being, where individuals may be though of as ‘conscious bricks’ who
know their ‘duty’, their biological function, is to form a greater whole, means that nature
must of created individuals to serve a future state of being, realised in the superorganism
of which they are a part. And hence we see the trend of Kidd’s superb reasoning, but
how sad that he should feel he must express his thinking in such obscure ways, talking
about the subjection of the present to the future, instead of talking about the superorganic
nature of the human species.
But the central idea is there, that religion is an extension of our intuitive senses,
bringing us into contact with the physiology of the organism that we are part of. What
else can he possibly mean ? If only he would of said this in wholly uncompromising
terms. If he had said that religion is the way we are connected to the dynamics of our
superorganic nature that is beyond our immediate awareness, and it is the evolution of
ever increasingly perfect conceptions of these superorganic dynamics, realised in
religious dogma that represents a programme for us to follow without knowing its real
meaning or the real nature of its power, and so enabling social evolution to proceed to the
level it is in our modern era, where it is so intimately bound up with the illogicality of
religion. Therefore, for example, we come, through science, to know that the ‘social
organism’ is in reality nothing other than that which we call ‘God’ in our religious
mythology. So that all the attributes we associate with God are in reality the
mythological representation of the social organism’s demands, made upon us as
individuals, in order to bring into being an empowered form of social organism. Modern
religion is a state of perfected programming realised through the ordinary process of
competition between social bodies, exactly as Kidd proposes. It is all there in this section
of Kidd’s work, we can see it, so we must wonder how he could of failed to see it
himself, since he wrote it, but he sure does no say it.
Today, 03/06/08, a book arrived from America called The Promise of Scientific
Humanism, by Oliver Reiser, 1940. It looks interesting, but it is of far too philosophical a
nature. Reiser talks about the unification of all knowledge, in effect suggesting that
religion and science are part of one harmonious way of knowing. Naturally this is as
ludicrous a proposition as any we could ever meet with. But Reiser has a lot going for
him as an object of interest for us because of his organicist outlook. We are obliged to
study him therefore, and there is no time like the present given the relevance of the
passage below to the discussion of Kidd’s work that we have just been engaging in.

Reiser :
 IX. THE FUTURE OF LIGHT BEARERS

As we look back over the myths of the human race, we discover that the legends
and dreams of mankind frequently possess a certain similarity of theme and plot, and this
undoubtedly points to some underlying unity of psychic motivation. We have discussed
the motivation of the dreams of the alchemists. Another theme, closely related to the
tradition of alchemy, is found in the several myths concerning the intimate association
between knowledge and the appearance of evil and suffering. In the tradition of alchemy
this belief appears in the suspicion that the alchemists possessed a forbidden or secret
knowledge, a knowledge not accessible to the uninitiated, for the attainment of which the
Initiates had paid a high price.
Such a linkage of knowledge and evil can be found in a number of the world’s
legends. Whether we consider the “tree of knowledge” of the Old Testament, with its
forbidden fruit, or the legend of Prometheus, we see that knowledge is supposed to come
to man through suffering. In considering this matter one can hardly escape noting the
similarity between the role Prometheus plays in Greek folklore and that which Lucifer
plays in Christian mythology. In Milton’s Paradise Lost “Lucifer” is the name given to
Satan before the fall. But Lucifer, like the morning star that he is, is a light-giver. Thus
we find that in many cases the spirits who pass on to the human race the torch of
understanding have invited the “wrath fire” of the gods. Snatching the fire from the
jealous gods, the fallen angels have transmitted to man a spark of immortality, for from
this stolen flame man ignites his candles to light him on his way through the cosmic
wilderness. It is through imitating deity that man himself becomes more godlike.
The old alchemists had lighted their torches from this fire, which was kindled by
man with the aid of a rebel angel. These searchers were aflame with the passion to master
the secrets of nature ; they desired earnestly more of the light of understanding. They
were the lineal descendants of the ancient medicine men of primitive magic and the
ancestors of modern men of science. Some of these inheritors of the ancient wisdom were
charlatans ; but the true alchemists, the illuminati, were a sect of spiritual seers who had
kindled their fires upon a “peak of Darien,” and in the smoke of the ignited embers
beheld the appearance of a coming flame which was to dissipate the darkness of spiritual
ignorance. In the fumes of their chemicals they envisaged the process of spiritual
refinement and purification that would transmute the crude ore of biological nature into
the nobler products of a sublimated self.
If we are correct in interpreting the universality and persistence of alchemistic
doctrines as a manifestation of a psychic compulsion in human nature, if there is in man
this deep need for mystical sublimation, then we may interpret the ills of present-day
society as having their origin in part in the thwarting of the process of energic
sublimation. In his Introduction to Professor Silberer’s work, already referred to,
Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe states that mysticism, as an expression of the sublimation of human
activity, represents the spiritual striving of mankind toward perfection. Furthermore, this
psychiatrist states, the human race would go mad without this sublimation. In connection
with this mystical tendency to see in nature a divine language, we may recall the words of
Thomas Carlyle : “It is in and through symbols that man, consciously or unconsciously,
lives, works, and has his being : those ages, moreover, are counted the noblest which can
best recognize symbolical worth, and prize it highest.” And does not our own Emerson
give voice to the same doctrine ? Let him speak for himself : “I cannot say accurately
what is the analogon of each cosmical or chemical law ; Swedenborg, or a possible
Swedenborg, can ; but I affirm with perfect security that such an analogon for each
material law observed exists in spiritual nature. . . . The laws below are the sisters of the
laws above.” Thus speak the true sons of Hermes.
And so today we profit by the dreams of those visionaries who saw deep
analogies between the material and the spiritual, between metals and men. The synthetic
chemist of the modern world is the disciple of the medieval magician. Science is magic.
But will the magic of modern science prove itself to be white magic or black magic ?
Will it, like the transcendental art of alchemy, degenerate into the tool of mercenary
empirics ? Or will it live up to the best tradition of the Hermetic science ? The answer to
these all-important questions rests with those who impart the intellectual insight and the
power of learning to coming generations. With the passage of the years it is becoming
more and more evident, in a literal no less than a metaphorical sense, that the future of
the world is inseparably bound up with the future of light bearers.
Humanity, like Faust, is consumed with an insatiable desire for experience. To
satisfy this Faustian craving, the human race has apparently set out to sound all the depths
and shoals of the cosmic environment. It is a wonderful and a fearful quest. In moments
of circumspection we peer into the future, lighted up but a short distance ahead, and
fading into the black night of an unknown and terrifying obscurity. In such moments one
shudders and recalls the fate of Icarus, who struggled toward the light—only to plunge to
an ignoble end. But when we look back over the long and arduous path we have already
travelled, we see in the distance the promontories that man has already surmounted, and
courage returns. Perhaps in the new day a more glorified humanity will have mastered the
magic of the Hermetic art and turned it into a white magic of life and light.

X. CONCLUSION

In the foregoing pages we have observed that myths are the dreams of the race.
We have also noted—what the Freudian theorists have long realized—that humanity lives
in its dreams. To be happy, people must be aware of a purpose in life ; they must feel that
they are going somewhere—toward the attainment of their dreams, the realization of their
myths. But the old myths are exploded, and the time has come to create a new myth. This
new myth, a new dream for the human race, we think of in terms of a coming world
culture and a new mode of thinking.
This new mentality we have designated as global thinking. Its aim is the creation
of a world sensorium. The religion of the new humanism is based on planetism. It is
based on a non-elementalistic or non-Aristotelian logic, and looks upon the body of our
earth-organism as the environment within which the human race—the neuroblast of the
living embryo—is evolving. Thus the evolution of new species is a kind of phyletic
recapitulation occurring within the emerging world mind of the giant embryo.
In our own version of the coming world religion, we have sought to show that
religion is a transmutation of a form of response in lower animals known as heliotropism,
and that on the side of biological evolution, culminating on the mental and cultural level
in the emergence of the religious consciousness, there is evidence of a movement toward
a realization of vision. That is, starting with an unconscious desire to see (due—as we
have explained in our previous volume—to the invagination of the outer skin to form the
neural tube, which then grows outward from the brain through the optic cups toward the
external world), the life energy is eventually sublimated into the spiritual craving which
is the soul’s quest for illumination. In psychoanalytic terms, religious phenomena are
expressions of symbolic energy concretizations, the emergent outcome on the human
cultural level of the evolution of life as it has been regulated by the sun-planet-organism
relationship. To understand and control this evolving system of life as it takes place
within its wider cosmic environment, which acts as the pacemaker of evolution here on
earth, is the new challenge to the non-Aristotelian mentality.
In the application of these new ideas in social theory, interesting analogies
between geometry and ethics are suggested. As we have already noted, in the flat
universe of Euclid parallel lines go off to infinity ; they never meet, and they never return
to their points of origin. But, as we have also observed, in the spherical universe of
Einstein all lines return. In the expanding universe of relativity theory the lines of the
universe are not straight in Euclid’s sense—they are curvilinear. Now just as geometry,
or earth measurements, and astronomy, or star measurements, have been compelled to
adjust their ideas to the notion of curvature, so humanity in its social orientations must
realize that the earth is round. We must begin to think in spherical terms in our
international relations, not only geographically, but socially and spiritually. In astronomy
the shortest distance between two points is the path of a ray of light, and on the surface of
the earth the shortest distance between two points is the arc of a great circle, and both of
these prolonged indefinitely will return to their points of origin. In a similar way nations
and peoples must learn that we live on a spherical earth, rather than a flat earth, in the
sense that the consequences of what they do eventually return to them. Just as we have
learned to substitute global thinking for planal thinking in physical science, so in our
orientation in the social field similar transitions will have to be made. To bring about this
reconstruction is the task and the promise of scientific humanism.

(Reiser, pages 337 – 341)

These pages conclude the book, it is easy to see the unpleasantly mystical tenor of
the work, which is horrible to see. But in addition we also find a direct reference to a
couple of important ideas we have been trying to discern in Kidd’s work above. We have
the idea of myth representing a hidden reality, whose uniformity of expression indicates
something real, whereby myths can be understood as connecting people in a
semiconscious manner with the underlying dynamics of the reality that affects them.
Also we find a reference to the idea that people have an instinctive need for their
consciousness to be projected forward in time in terms of their ambition for something to
strive for. This ‘instinct’ may be a feature of people living in complex, civilised
superorganic structures, its presence seems unlikely in pre-civilised superorganic forms,
and Reiser opens his book by delineating three stages of consciousness, the primitive
being one that is distinct from that which we are attuned to because primitive people see
everything in terms of an interrelatedness that does not project consciousness into the
future, but which instead intertwines past, present and future.
 If we apply ourselves to this question of a need for a purpose in life, to give
people something to strive for, apart from questioning whether it is a cultural artifact, we
may even question the nature of this artifact such as it may be said to exist today.
Whenever someone talks about what the people want, we must be cautious. Yesterday,
03/06/08, the news reported the government’s intention to farm out the administration of
hospitals to private contractors. A commentator discussing the issues of whether this
amounted to a privatisation of the National Health Service concluded by saying the issues
raised were something the public was going to have to think about, and make a decision
on. I hate it when the priests talk like this, as if it were in any way, shape or form,
possible for anything approximating to a ‘public’ entity, or any portion of it, to think
about, discuss or decide upon anything !
This mode of expression, projecting the impositions of the master upon the
freewill of the slave, is the modern democratic technique, but it is entirely spurious, and
Reiser is acting as a priest when he imputes to the individual a desire that is forced upon
everyone via the structure of the superorganism that is controlled by an elite. The
organizing organ of social power rests on religion, law, war and economics. These social
factors are necessarily extended far into the future from the point of view of those who
make the decisions about how the social biomass will be farmed and exploited to best
effect. Consequently the priests talk about the behaviours people are forced to engage in,
in terms of their own intentions regarding the objectives these politicians themselves have
when they construct the regulatory framework dictating social behaviour. Politicians
never say directly what it is that they are doing, they always cloak their activities in false
descriptions, turning the things that people are forced to do into things people do because
people want to do them. Since politicians/business people, otherwise included in our
work under the catchall term ‘priests’, decide everything, and these priests are the only
people allowed to comment on anything, so they can set up a scenario and describe it as
they please. Meanwhile, economic systems, such as the use of money, do indeed result in
people ‘wanting’ to do the things they are forced to do, because if you do not ‘want’ to do
the things you ‘have’ to do, then you will not be given the opportunity by your masters
and owners to them at all, and so you will starve and die, because no one can live without
money. The first duty then, that our masters demand of us, is a grovelling willingness
that has all the appearances of a free willingness. And most of us learn to oblige our
masters unthinkingly, so all that is being said here about the real nature of how people
think, would most definitely be rejected by the people if we asked them to speak for
themselves ; they have no choice but to deceive themselves if they are going to be
successful in life. In the end all the threads must pull toward one core authority, if they
did not then society would exist.
In reality then people do not give a shit about the future, they care only about the
present, just like any other animal. But the superorganism, that humans evolved to
unwittingly create, can only be empowered in so far as individuals are induced to work
toward the future being of the organism of which they form a part. And thus people are
drawn into a social structure which is indeed all about the future, and in order to thrive as
a part of that organism the individual has to subscribe to the linguistic programmes that
create the social structure by projecting consciousness and activity forward in time. The
projection forward is the act of creativity, and it is what gives rise to the quality so prised
by our masters today, the quality called ‘progress’. But what the elite call ‘progress’ is
the exact opposite of what any sane individual living in a powerful society would call
progress, for in terms of everyday experience of life all that progress means is the ever
increasing perfection of the means of making the individual life ever more worthless,
ever more subject to the demands of the future.
Since introducing Reiser into our studies at this point I have been dipping into his
book, after is arrival yesterday, to try and get a handle on who he is as an intellectual. I
do not like what I have discovered. He is crazy about mystical science, which flourished
briefly in the pre-war period, within universities, when he was a professional academic.

Later on I shall indicate the evidence disproving axiom (6)—evidence showing

that, in a sense, the same body may be in two different places at the same time.
This means that certain supposed fundamental relations between objects (or
“matter”) in space and time (relations that classical physics took as axiomatic) are
now discovered to be valid only within certain limits. Thus we now find that
physics and logic must revise their ideas of what is “possible” in nature. Logic
cannot escape this revision, because the “laws of thought” have historically been
interpreted as laws of reality.
The significance of this development for ESP research can readily be seen
by turning for a moment to Dr. Rhine’s results. In experiments in which subjects
were set to the task of calling cards at a distance of several hundred miles, the
results that Dr. Rhine amassed, and reported in his book on Extra-Sensory
Perception, indicate that the ordinary laws of radiation do not hold, and suggest
that a non-radiant energy is at work in ESP. These facts of distance-clairvoyance
and telepathy therefore bring us face to face with the circumstance that space
relations, and possibly time relations also, are not binding for the mind as they
were supposed to be for the physical world in classical physical science. If
Dr. Rhine’s results are valid, they necessitate the acceptance of a kind of
energetics not limited by the customary inverse-square law ; that is, there is no
decrease of effectiveness of extra-sensory perception with increase of distance, as
is the case for known energies. Since this physical law is a consequence of the
geometrical properties of Euclidian space, and is necessitated by the Newtonian
law of force, the results obtained by Dr. Rhine really seem to suggest the need for
a non-Aristotelian logic in this field. Of course the validity of this argument rests
to a considerable extent on the soundness of our prior thesis that Newtonian
physics is indeed an exfoliation of the presuppositions of Aristotelian logic and
metaphysics, as that synthesis was passed over the historical bridge of Euclidian
geometry to become the conceptual framework of the Cartesian-Newtonian
mechanistic physics of modern science.

(Reiser, pages 285 – 6)

Why is it that a man who forcefully adopted the only true concept of humanity as
a superorganic species, turns out to be a raving lunatic ? We may wonder, but there it is,
there is no doubt of it. There is no need to extrapolate toward a lunatic fringe in our
reasoning about how human intelligence works as a medium for sensing reality, the
ordinary act of speech is an incredible form of genuinely Extra Sensory Perception, and it
has a strictly biological function. If science did discover that the brain possessed hitherto
unknown powers to see and move things at a distance, all this could possibly amount to is
an extension of the biological function of speech, a further means of creating social
structure that is superorganic physiology. Clearly the sort of nonsense taken from Reiser
in the above quote corrupts all knowledge with which it comes into contact, and thus
helps the priests control science. Reiser, a superb exponent of our precious idea that
society is a social organism, is one of our most vicious enemies, exactly as the greatest
living enemy of religion, to go by his words, is the true gatekeeper of the theocracy, and
the stalwart enemy of science : Richard Dawkins, atheist and scientist of life
extraordinaire. Any public exponent of truth is always a liar who exists to subvert the
truth they pretend to profess, no genuine and sincere exponent of truth would ever be
allowed a voce. Ordinarily no one publicly supports the idea that humans are a
superorganic species, but sometimes this genuine scientific idea leaks out into the public
domain, and then the priesthood appoint a token professional scientist to take up the idea,
and to bring it into disrepute. This is not a conspiracy, it is how the academic structure of
the superorganism performs its function of controlling knowledge.
 Chapter ??

The Holy Grail of Scientific Sociology

In this chapter we will continue our ongoing study of Kidd’s Principles of

Western Civilisation. In the sections that interest us here we will find the ultimate
answers to the ultimate questions posed by a true science of humanity in its search to
comprehend how humans as we know them today came into existence at the behest of
nature. In this chapter we do not seek the Holy Grail of all science, of all philosophy,
here we find the Holy Grail of all science !
$ We know that humans are a species of superorganic mammals, and we know that
under the umbrella of Jewish identity a world wide superorganism has come into being,
that incorporates within its being, all of humanity. The most pressing question therefore
is to understand how Judaism has produced this result. The result we know was always
inevitable because it is latent in human corporate nature, but as we live in the world, as
we know our world for ourselves, this knowledge is not permitted, and therefore this
knowledge does not exist. So we want to discover the answer to the question how it is
that religion has brought forth a master identity able to draw all humanity into itself,
without anyone being the least bit aware of the fact. Interestingly, at the opening of
chapter ten, Kidd evokes the idea of a universal process inherent in human existence, that
drives the formation of society as we know it, indeed, this is what his book is all about.
But, how weak is his development of the idea he describes ! He is fixated with
Christianity as an end in itself, he fails to appreciate the simple logic of his own idea of
an eternal biological process. Well, we are going to be delving into these matters now,
but here is the fascinating passage just mentioned.

CHAPTER X
THE MODERN WORLD-CONFLICT

As soon as the mind has endeavoured to realise the nature of the position outlined
in the last chapter, it is impossible to avoid receiving a deep impression of the
significance of its bearing on the complex movement of development, which,
under many phases, is unfolding itself beneath our eyes in the modern world-
process. If we have been right so far, we appear to have in sight a single
controlling principle, the operation of which divides, as by a clear line of
demarcation, the meaning of the era in which we are living from that of all the
past history of the race. We are regarding an integrating process, the larger
meaning of which is still in the future, the first stages of which have occupied
nearly two thousand years, and into the influence of which all the tendencies of
development in our civilisation are being slowly and increasingly drawn. The
impression made at first sight on the mind by the character of the position reached
loses nothing on reflection. On the contrary, the tendency is rather for it to grow
 and deepen as the nature of the transition in which the future is being emancipated
in history is better understood. In the modern conflict between tendencies in
ethics, in the State, in government, in national development, and in universal
politics, it is the meaning of the struggle between the future and the present which
weights all the processes of the intellect and all the developments of history. The
races and peoples who are competitors in the struggle may have any theory they
please of their interests, or of the ends or ideals of politics or of government. But,
if the principle of Projected Efficiency be accepted as operating in society in the
conditions described, then in respect of none of these alone will they retain their
places in the conflict. The winning conditions in the struggle are determined.
They are those of the people who already most efficiently bear on their shoulders
in the present, the burden of the principles with which the meaning of a process
infinite in the future is identified. Let us see, therefore, if we can follow, into the
midst of the current life of the time, the application of that principle under which
we see the ascendancy of the present moving now towards its challenge
throughout the whole range of the modern world-conflict.

(Kidd, pages 335 – 336)

We will find that the answer involves the ability of the Jewish identity formula to
dissolve lower order identity packages releasing the individuals attached to them who
thereby coalesce once again at an extended boundary of social identity set by Judaism
itself, whether in the form of Judaism of one its sub-Judaic slave identities of Christianity
or Islam. This attribute of dissolution and reintegration is a product of the structural, or
physiological condition, produced in an intermediate stage of superorganic expansion
beyond tribal condition toward global condition. The shift from a tribal physiology to a
State organised superorganic physiology of itself involves producing a new kind of
complex identity social compound. In part of his work Kidd makes much of the fact that
the Greek and Roman ancient world relied for its integrity upon the establishment of
strict boundaries between who was Greek or Roman and who was not, who was a citizen
and who was an outsider. Kidd understood this arrangement in political terms related to
the need for a military organisation to rule society, and hence inclusivity was all or
nothing and it defined the status of a human being, if you were not a citizen your were
not even human, and as such you were there to be treated like any other animal, and
hence slavery prevailed.
But this political interpretation is political, and as such not scientific, or
biological, as it should be. Traditionally the human sciences have thought about the rise
of civilisation in economic terms, as a shift from living off nature’s bounty to a shift
toward dependence upon farming. This is a perfectly acceptable first stage of wrestling
with the problem of human social evolution, but it is very crude. In the scientific age the
emergence of sociology took the matter to the core of the issue, the organization of the
social fabric, assuming the economic basis as a fact of reality. This was better, but of
course the theocracy crushed this science, and we are trying to resurrect it. The real
challenge manifest in the social evolution of human society is devising physiological
strategies to allow society to grow into the radically new form that is represented by a
city and a kingdom composed of cities, as opposed to a tribal population dispersed
comparatively thinly across a wide geographical area.
Humans were not starting from scratch, the new social structure had to work with
the material it had in hand. The crucial point we are driving toward is that the
establishment of civilised social structures involved the fracturing of pre-existing tribal
forms of social identity of a racial kind and their substitution with expressly structural
identities of a political nature, such as classes of elites versus the masses, or slaves. So
that from the outset the emergence of a civilised form of social structure must of been
based upon a plastic identity array bounded in a rather brittle fashion that was crying out
for a more organic, flexible and thought social identity pattern to emerge that was capable
of uniting such a civilised form of superorganism. As we look across the whole range of
human societies we find many kinds of solution to this need for a more fluid kind of
identity package, but it was the Jewish identity that cracked the code, and produced the
global master race.

Kidd deals with his first category from the above discussion, of which he says
this :

“the great object of the religion is held by its adherents to be that of obtaining
material advantage in the present time for those observing its rites and
ceremonies. It is around the material interests of the existing individuals in the
present time that the whole cultus of the religion tends to centre. The
characteristic and consistent feature of all the systems included in this category is,
in short, that the controlling aims of the religious consciousness are in the present
time”

Again we are obliged to strain ourselves to understand his meaning, I decided he

was referring to the practice of worship associated with the appeasement of the god, and
the request for favours to be granted. But at best all we can say is that the difference
between ancient religions and modern religions, in so far as they are based on this
principle of seeking advantage in the present, is only a matter of refinement in modern
times. The ancients may well of had a plethora of gods that were treated with familiarity,
as beings who could be addressed as superhumans living amongst them, but today the
idea of God is scarcely changed in real terms. People still think that God is on their side,
and that in war gods favour their adherents, in opposition to those of other allegiances.
All such ideas, modern or otherwise, are facile, hardly the basis for the far reaching
delineation of a category distinguishing between ancient and modern that Kidd makes
out. And on top of it all his ruling principle is that the former category is associated with
a military structure, while the latter is something entirely new that has only just arrived in
the world. This is really weak, and as contemptible as anything written by any other
philosopher. In science we are looking for continuity and depth, not novelty and
uniqueness suggesting radical and sudden innovation. And if authors do suggest such
flattering novelty in respect of modern humans then we must be suspicious of the logic of
their reasoning.
 But I was most impressed while by this section, it had the right feel to it. As we
follow the argument he moves onto the topic of ancestor worship, which is a bit of a
distraction, but it is Kidd’s link to a matter of great importance, the manner in which
religion became the means of imitating racial identity in its functional role of generating
social structure that is so characteristic of Judaism.

What, then, is this principle of social development ? There can be little

doubt as to the character of the answer which must be given to this question. What
we come to see is that in the stage of the world’s development, in which every
feature of social organisation is inevitably, and from the beginning, involved in
the sweep of a vast, slowly developing military process, the institution of
Ancestor Worship must be directly related to the controlling principle of the
epoch. It was, we must come to see, through the type of social order developed
from the institution of Ancestor Worship, and having for its central feature the
conception of exclusive citizenship, and through this type alone, that it was
possible to reach the culminating phase of that first epoch of human evolution in
which the social consciousness is related to ends expressing themselves
exclusively through the existing political organisation ; and of which the outward
political ideal was of necessity the military State, ever grimly tending towards the
only possible goal of its epoch—universal military conquest.
It may be observed, accordingly, that at the period when the tribal groups
of the ancestors of the Greek and Roman peoples wandered into the territories
upon which they afterwards founded the two last and greatest civilisations of the
ancient world, they possessed that type of social organisation which, as already
mentioned, prevailed at one time amongst all the leading peoples of the world. In
it we have already clearly outlined, not only the fundamental conception which,
throughout the whole period of Greek and Roman history, underlies the bond of
citizenship ; but also the direct evidence of the relationship of that bond to the
institution of Ancestor Worship, on the one hand, and to an immense period of
military development in the still earlier past, on the other.
Within these early tribal groups, each of which existed quite apart and
independent of the others, we find the members held together under conditions of
most extraordinary severity. The privilege of membership of the group is hedged
round with the most jealous precautions. Admission from the outside is almost
impossible, or is at best permitted only under the most rare and exceptional
circumstances or conditions ; and the theory underlying the membership of the
groups is invariably that of blood-relationship, to which is attached a religious
significance of the first importance.
When we inquire what is the nature of this significant blood-relationship,
we have in view at once the source from whence springs the entire conception of
citizenship, with its peculiarly exacting demands, its unexampled exclusiveness,
and its extraordinary potency and efficiency as a principle in human evolution.
The tribal groups, it has been said, are religious communities of the strictest type.
But the relationship of the communities to the deities who are worshipped is
always the same. These deities invariably appear as gods or deified heroes, from
 whom direct descent is claimed by the whole group. This is the origin of the
conception of blood-relationship, to which is attached a religious significance of
the first importance. It is from this conception that there springs, naturally and
inevitably, the institution of a citizenship to which is attached a sense of
exclusiveness and of superiority to all outsiders which is almost beyond
conception at the present day. 1

¹ The visible evidence of the possession of tribal blood, and at a later stage of
citizenship in the Greek States, was, accordingly, to use the expressive words of Mr.
Seebohm, “the undisputed participation, as one of kindred in the common religious
ceremonies, from which the blood-polluted and the stranger-in-blood are strictly shut
out” (The Structure of Greek Tribal Society, by Hugh E. Seebohm, p. 4; see also Fowler’s
City-State of the Greeks and Romans, pp. 28-33).

As the deities worshipped are supposed to belong to the community alone,

to be its protectors in peace, and its associates and leaders in war ; there springs
inevitably from the conception of common descent from deified ancestors a
system of morality the exclusiveness of which it is almost impossible for us to
fully realise ; a system of morality in which there is to be distinguished a feeling
of obligation to regard all outside the tie of the resulting moral-religious
citizenship, as not only without the pale of all duty and obligation, and beyond the
range of even those feelings which to us seem to be the outcome of a conception
of a common humanity ; but as persons whom it would actually be a kind of
sacrilege to admit under any circumstances as equals.
The enormous political significance of this conception will be
immediately evident. During the whole period of the history of Greek and Roman
peoples, it may be distinguished, accordingly, that there are always two
fundamental ideas underlying the bond of citizenship. In the first place, it has a
deep religious significance ; in the second place, this significance is associated
with the conception of exclusive blood-relationship in the State.

(Kidd, pages 164 – 166)

What is really being noticed here is that the instinctive, emotionally driven force
of racial identity that directs the formation of the tribal superorganism, as a more basic
expression of what we ordinarily call the creative linguistic force, has evolved into a
conscious, linguistically expressed form, that is still driven by purely emotional energy,
as we know all too well for ourselves, but which now generates what we call ‘civilised’
social structure. Racial identity was therefore translated into religious identity by passing
through a stage that was intermediate between racially formed tribal structure and our
modern social structure generated by an abstract religious identity programme, where
blood lineage is now projected onto the mythological representation of a racial figure, so
that racial identity has been levitated into a divine identity, producing gods that still bear
the roots of their racial origins through the claim of a direct bloodline to the living that,
this racial linkage provides a means of defining the inclusiveness upon which all
superorganic physiology must always be based.
 With these thoughts in mind it becomes easier to see why the Jesus myth was
constructed on the basis of what otherwise seems so childish a notion, on the basis of a
virgin birth, where a plebeian women was impregnated by God himself ! This is
painfully stupid to any modern educated person, but with the sense of a cultural,
collective consciousness, that evoked the relation of a blood lineage between humanity
and divinity, we can just about see some sense in this travesty of reason.
The idea of modern religion that fills our consciousness is far more abstract than
the early form evoking direct descent from the gods for everyone. The identity of Christ
providing the basis of our contemporary religion is idealised into the shape of one divine
person, and, since Islam is now endemic in Britain, whether we like it or not, and as such
is here to stay until the degeneracy of religion is removed altogether, also idealised the
relationship of people to God in the shape of a semi-divine prophet, Mohammed. Our
modern godhead is cast in the form of a man that lived, Jesus Christ, and he carries the
blood lineage connected to the true Godhead, the creator of the universe. Universality is
generated firstly by severing all personalised divinity traditionally obtained through a
divine lineage, while recognising one divine person through whom all the dispossessed
may now obtain their divinity, or ‘salvation’, by association with this one deified
personage.
Creating universality is therefore a two part process involving the decay of former
structural limits, and the establishment of one new limit defining racial identity. The key
to this Christian, linguistically projected ‘racial identity’, is its universality. Jesus is
racially defined by his attribute of being a man, and as such all men can be part of the
Christian race irrespective of their genetically defined racial identity. By labouring this
last point we emphasise the fact that language is a biological force that carries over the
genetic flow of biological information contained in our genes, from our bodies, into the
social domain, enabling us to see better just how language is a biological carrier of
physiological information. And it is because language is a carrier of biological
information, that creates living social fabric composed of individuals, that religion exists
in society as it does, as a wholly self-sustaining feature of life that transcends all reason,
but which is valued by most people as if it were a part of their very being, which it is.
When we denigrate religion we are making a political point, which is very naughty of us
in a treatise that we wish to be of a scientific nature ; but liberties are bound to be taken
where philosophical methods are resorted to be cause freedom to work honestly within
the establishment is not allowed, in reality religion is just part of nature, but like many
things in nature religion is ‘bad’ from a human point of view, and we need to recognise
this, and to work for its eradication. Unfortunately people with power, like Tony Blair,
are still able to stand up and declare religion ‘good’, and to put resources behind their
words ; thus serving humanity ill, as they have done all their lives.
The unseen significance of the Christian super-racial identity however, is its true
nature as an extension of the exclusively racial identity of Judaism, Judaism being
attached by a direct bloodline to the God of the universe, a divinity that the Jesus myth
therefore links all humanity to at second hand, via the umbilical cord of Jewish identity,
from which Christians, and Muslims, derive their life energy, without which these two
slave identities would wither and die, for without the purpose of the Jewish master
identity’s desire for global domination, these slave identities would have no purpose of
their own, because they have no identity of their own. The Jesus identity is Jewish, but
its persona offers the Jewish racial identity to all humanity in a pseudo Jewish form, as
indeed the Mohammedan religious identity also does. Muslims and Christians have no
idea that they are in reality two lower orders of the Jews, just as ants raised in a slave
maker ant’s nest have no idea that they are the slaves of the queen they serve. But this
unwitting possession of an alien identity is exactly as required if the Jewish
superorganism is to possess the necessary triadic macro structure that any human
superorganism would need in order to absorb all humanity into the fabric of its one
unified body. And the evolution of such a global superorganism was inevitable as soon
as modern hominids evolved, since this outcome is latent in the superorganic nature of
the human species. And so with Kidd’s assistance we have a nice window on the
evolution of the modern global Jewish superorganism, composed of a triad of religious
identities, all bound together into one racial identity of a slightly modified religious form
to that which formerly ruled the ancient world.
A never ending problem when trying to understand scientifically how modern
human developments can take place is the inevitable tendency to talk in terms that
suggest a conscious plan on the part of people who influence and control the
developments in question. I have continued to read Principles of Western Civilisation
since writing the above commentary on its insights, and I have reached sections where
Kidd attributes the rise of the new religion that is fundamental to Western Civilisation to
the Jews, where he describes how, having introduced the radical new outlook to
humanity, centuries follow in which the new religion is protected in its one crucial
element, the retention of the ‘antithesis’ which made it so unique and special.

$
Kidd :

It was, in short, the world in which was represented the culminating age of that
long epoch of human development, in which the significance that underlay every human
institution, in the last analysis, was the conception that there were no rights and no
responsibilities in man, no meaning and no significance in life, no hopes and no desires in
existence, save such as were related to present ends. All the wants, the desires, the
passions, the ambitions of men were correlated with the things which men saw around
them. It was the world in which all the theories of the State, all the ideals of art, all the
principles of conduct, all the conceptions of religion, centred round the things which men
hungered and thirsted for in that material and omnipotent present in which they lived.
It was in such a world and in such an environment that the evolutionist sees now
projected into the minds of men an ideal, developed among an insignificant non-military
people in an Eastern province of the Roman empire, involving the absolute negation of
the ruling principle which had thus moved and shaped the development of the world in
every leading detail of the past. The mind has to be able to state to itself in terms of
modern Darwinian principles the nature of the world-process at work in human history, to
realise the full significance of the transition which the acceptance of this ideal involved in
the epoch of evolution which now opens.
There is no more imposing spectacle disclosed in the research into human origins,
when we perceive the nature of the evolutionary process in history, than the growing
definition in the human mind of the concepts by which the controlling consciousness of
the race becomes destined to be projected at last beyond the content of all interests in the
present ; and by which that consciousness becomes related at last, in a sense of personal,
direct, and compelling responsibility, to principles which transcend the meaning of the
individual, the present, the State, and the whole visible world as it exists.
Far back in the religious systems of early Egypt, while as yet the military process
that was in time to envelop the northern world in its influence had not begun to leave its
record in history, we see being developed, amongst an agricultural people, who had
already carried the arts of life to a high state of cultivation, the first outlines of the
concept of monotheism. It is everywhere deeply overlaid in the general mind by those
crude and gross concepts of the present and the material that are peculiar to the first stage
of human evolution ; and it is only through the expositions of the higher minds that we
catch sight at times, beneath this overgrowth, of the expression of the first contact of the
human mind with that ascending process into which the sum of human activities is
destined in time to be drawn.
With progress ever continuing in the same direction, through the vicissitudes of
peoples and races, we see the concept taking shape, and the expression of it growing
clearer in the religious systems of the Eastern peoples who have come under its influence.
Throughout a prolonged period, moreover, in which the record of the growth and
purification of this concept is presented in the history of the Jewish people, we have
clearly in sight a phenomenon of the first scientific interest ; namely, the development of
an utterly opposing principle to that full, vigorous, and intense expression of the
ascendancy and efficiency of life, in all its uninterrupted play in the present, which was to
reach its climax in the Greek ethos. We see the Hebrew spirit, in some of the finest
passages in the literature of the race, rising in superior and eloquent scorn to all the works
of an existing world resting on force. In the vision of universal justice which haunts the
consciousness of the Jewish people throughout its history, it is the poor, the oppressed,
the fallen, the weak, the disinherited, that become all that the gifted, the noble, the darling
aristocrat of strength and perfection in the present are to the Greek. We follow the
development of this conception in Jewish history till it grows greater than the nation,
greater than all its present, greater than the race itself ; till, associated at last with an ideal
of self-subordination and self-abnegation which has burst all the bounds of the present
and the material, while it has become touched with the profoundest quality of human
emotion, it goes forth in the first century of our era to subdue that world in which the
principle of the ascendancy of the present has reached its culminating form of
expression ; to conquer the peoples able alone to provide for it a milieu in history—the
peoples amongst whom a process of military selection, probably the most searching,
strenuous, and prolonged that the race has undergone, has reached its climax. 1
1
How to reconcile the two opposing and seemingly irreconcilable tendencies summed up
in the words Hebraism and Hellenism is, says Professor Butcher, with insight, the problem of
modern civilisation :—how to unite the Hebrew ideal, in which the controlling meaning, to which
human consciousness is related, is projected out of the present, “with the Hellenic conception of
human energies, manifold and expansive, each of which claims for itself uninterrupted play” (cf.
Some Aspects of Greek Genius, by S. H. Butcher, p. 45).

As the observer recalls at this point the principle of development which came into
view in an earlier chapter—namely, that no progress could be made towards that second
and higher stage of social evolution, in which the future begins to control the present,
until natural selection had first of all developed a people or a type of society able to hold
the world against all comers in the present—the significance of the conditions into which
the new ideal has been projected begins to hold the imagination. For we see how far
removed from each other are the terms of the antinomy. The peoples upon whom has
devolved this new destiny in history are, of necessity, not allied to, but alien to, the spirit
of the new ideal. They are in the nature of things the very pagans of the pagan world. 1
We have disclosed to view, that is to say, the terms of an evolutionary problem of the
first order, evidently destined to become related to an immense sequence of phenomena
in the future—a problem of such a character that thousands of years must obviously
elapse before its full outlines and magnitude can become disclosed on the stage of
history. 2
1
It is necessary always to keep clearly before the mind a permanent fact, the import of
which still underlies the meaning of Western history, namely, that the peoples among whom the
development in progress in our civilisation is taking place represent by descent the great pagan
stock of the world ; the stock, that is to say, amongst whom the pagan spirit reached its fullest
development and produced its most characteristic results. Compare in this connection “Race and
Religion in India,” by A. M. Fairbairn, Contemporary Review, No. 404 ; and “the Influence of
Europe on Asia,” by M. Townsend, op. cit. No. 422.
2
Throughout a long period in the past, during which the life and literature of Greece and
Rome have been made the subject of close study by Western scholars, we may distinguish, on the
whole, a certain consciousness of the contrast between the remarkable results produced by these
civilisations in almost every department of human activity—and in particular between the general
range and depth of the products of the Greek intellect—and the crudeness and grossness of the
practical ideal which appear to be represented in the religious systems of the two peoples. If the
mind has remained fully open to the effect, a comparison between the general ideas and
conceptions expressed in the religious systems of Greece and Rome, and those which had already
begun to so profoundly influence the human mind in other religious systems of the Eastern world,
makes a marked impression on the observer. The clue to the contrast lies, however, as will be
perceived, in the fact, upon which emphasis has been laid in the preceding chapters, namely, the
relationship of the religious systems of Greece and Rome to the governing principle of that pro-
longed epoch of military selection which had culminated amongst the Western races.

As the evolutionist, therefore, at the present day turns over the literature of the
first centuries of our era, and follows, in the outward record of events therein, the contact
of this ideal with every existing phase of human activity ; it must be, if he has been able
to retain his position of detachment from all current theories and prepossessions, with a
clear and definite impression growing in his mind. Sooner or later the conviction must
take possession of him, that there must be underlying the phenomena he is regarding a
meaning, in relation to the central problem of human evolution, which is altogether larger
than any he is able to find expressed in the departments of knowledge which have dealt
with these phenomena in the past.
As he follows the movement itself in the inner history of it presented in that most
remarkable record of the human mind, the writings of the early Fathers of the Church ; as
he then turns outwards and notes the contact of the movement with the Roman, the
Greek, and the Alexandrian tendencies in the philosophy of the ancient world, its contact
with the mind of the northern military races, with the public opinion of the Roman world,
and, last of all, with the political institutions of the Roman empire ; and as he then turns
once more and closely regards the movement itself, with the schisms, the conflicts, the
developments which crowd around the low level from which it rises in history, and which
almost serve to conceal from view the integrating process of life which is slowly rising
through them all ;—one central idea will in all probability have taken possession of his
mind. We are watching beneath it all, he must feel convinced, a development of the first
importance in the evolution of life. Whatever the shape the movement may have taken for
the time being, whatever the developments it may be destined to undergo in the future ;
of a central fact underlying it as a whole there can be absolutely no doubt. An
evolutionary principle of entirely new significance has begun to operate in society.
The time has gone by in our day when we can imagine that, in discussing in the
name of science the meaning of the displays of ignorance and credulity, or of the savage
paroxysms of human passions which have from time to time found expression throughout
this movement, we are discussing the meaning of the movement itself. Beneath all these
things we are concerned with a vast process of development, rising slowly through the
centuries, the life-centre of which is still immeasurably remote in the future. The time has
come when this phenomenon must be discussed in the same spirit of austere devotion to
the truth, and therefore in that same attitude of passionless indifference to all
preconceived opinions and beliefs whatever, which has now come to be the ideal, if not
the characteristic, of the higher work of science in every other department of knowledge.
Now we can never understand the real significance of the development, which
begins in Western history with the rise into ascendancy of the influence of the new
system of religious belief, until we get to the heart of a curious intellectual phenomenon
of the ancient world. If we ask ourselves what was the ultimate meaning which the
ancient philosophy was trying to express at the point in history in which it comes into
contact with the new movement, the reply which we receive is of great interest. If we
look round us at the present day at the literature of current thought, it may be noticed that
there is sometimes expressed in it the views of a class of writers who, perplexed with the
modern outlook, carry the mind back with a kind of half-formed longing to the days of
that humanitarian philosophy which influenced some of the best minds in the first
centuries of the Roman empire. The lofty moral earnestness of Seneca and Epictetus, the
noble disciplined humanity of Marcus Aurelius, even nowadays makes so distinct an
impression on the mind that there are some who are inclined to regard the intervening
period of history as a kind of retrogression. What they seem almost to think is that if the
world had only been allowed to develop the inheritance won for the race by the intellect
of Greece and the political genius of Rome, it might have ripened down to the present
time, in view of a broader humanitarian ideal ; and with an outlook which would have
equalled, if not surpassed in promise that which the most optimistic minds amongst us are
now able to look forward to.
In support of this view much plausible reasoning is often adduced. Nevertheless it
represents a conception entirely superficial. It involves a misunderstanding not only of
the distinctive principle which is shaping the development of the modern world, but of
the very life-principle of the ancient world itself.

(Kidd, pages 199 – 206)

 It is at this point precisely, in the paragraph beginning “With progress . . .”,
where, in all the work that Kidd produced, we must surely have the best statement on his
views on the nature of the Jews in relation to the existence of Christianity. This is the
holy grail of our search of Kidd’s work, it is the holy grail of our search of all works ever
produced in the modern era, but this is the only example of its kind I have ever found, a
discussion of the nature of Judaism, and it indicates that Kidd knew, and saw, absolutely
nothing. This tells us that despite his obsession with science, with evolution, with
sociology and all, and his commitment to the idea that society is a social organism
created by religion, which we see in his Social Evolution, Kidd completely failed to grasp
the real meaning of the idea that human society is a product of nature.
This idea that the core idea of Christianity originated in Jewish culture, but
transcended the social organism of Jewish society to produce the social organism of
Christian society is so miserable, so mindless, such religious, priestly gibberish, it is
heartbreaking to read. The correct statement to be making at this point in his reasoning is
that this projection of the interests of humanity from being more immediately focused on
the present as realised in a localised social order, emerged in Judaism as a device for
extending the power and authority of the Jews, who had evolved as a master identity in
the milieu of the ancient world, and now, in order to realise their potential as a master
identity needed some means of projecting their identity onto the alien races they ruled by
virtue of their master identity that had evolved to function as the core of a mobile elite
organ able to move from superorganic body to superorganic body.
It is by understanding this physiological relationship between the Jewish identity
and its sub-Judaic Christian slave identity, that we are able to understand the mechanism
of projection toward the future, at the expense of the present, as written into the Jewish
slave making programme. Today all Christian people have no purpose in existence of
their own, their sole reason for existence is in order to bring the Jews into the position of
the ruling people of all the earth. Watching the debate in America this week, today being
6/6/08, I have seen the two democratic candidates for president swearing the total
commitment of America to the state of Israel, to loud applause from the audience ;
without Israel America is nothing, and never was anything, and never could be anything.
I am not sure what he trying to say when he talks about the people who are
destined to carry the new idea of existence forward being necessarily alien to the idea ... I
am going to have to examine this passage and make some sense of it, it sounds like it
might be saying something worth trying to make sense of.

As I continue my reading yet further into the profoundly fantastic work that is
Kidd’s Principles of Western Civilisation, yet more fabulous elements of perfect
enlightenment come to me from this greatest ever piece of work !
In my reading yesterday, 06/06/08, I picked out several passages for reproduction,
and in these I discovered the ultimate revelation, at last, the secret of Jewish power. It is
so simple, but I just have no been able to get it, now, with the guiding hand of Kidd, even
though he was oblivious of the solution himself, he has enabled me to see the key. The
key is all about identity. Certainly identity has been to the fore in all my work from its
beginning some half dozen or so years ago, but the question has always been to pin down
the mechanism whereby the Jewish identity was able to evolve some half dozen or so
millennia ago, and with relentless precision rise from a time of absolute nothingness in
terms of civilised life on earth, to the one we now know today. There has to be a simple
explanation, but that does not mean it is simple to see. Now I have it.
We already know that Kidd was living at the tail end of a period of free enquiry,
when the true nature of humans was dominant in intellectual circles, although heavily
under attack by the priesthood that control all means of developing knowledge, which
meant science was always doomed from the outset, it was only a matter of time. Kidd
had all the advantages of working in a rare window of opportunity, but he was still
constrained by the religious oppression that forms the social atmosphere of all human
worlds. He had the right basic ideas, but he just could not get the correct scientific
perspective from which to put his ideas together. In the work that our attentions are
focused currently, Kidd adopts one central principle about which to weave his ideas, and
this approach is certainly correct, it accords with the principle of the creation of structure
being driven by a related force. If we are talking about social structure than we could
flippantly suggest that the creative force driving the creation of social structure is social.
But that would carry us round in circles, merely weaving useless mental images from
stupid words. We of course have long recognised that the force creating social structure
is linguistic, and in this category we recognise all information that generates social form,
and therefore certain genetic factors must be included in the category of language, this
overreaches the normal definition of language by a long way, but we are not saying that
some genetic code is language, only that it is the precursor carrier of linguistic force. The
nature of force demands that its existence must predate the existence of the forms it
produces. Therefore the force of language had to of exited before the power of speech
was realised in human physiology. Elsewhere we have illustrated this principle by way
of the more easily understood idea that before the gravity that is made know in the shape
of celestial bodies could make those bodies the force of gravity must nonetheless of
existed in undifferentiated dust clouds. Here we are touching on the nature of the
relationship of force to matter, and we need to understand that the issue here is one of
understanding our own mode of understanding which delivers our conceptions of reality
to us.
Kidd makes ‘time’ the central principle of social evolution dictating the formation
of social structure. He says that it was the subjection of the ‘present’ to the ‘future’ that
transformed the world of humanity on this planet, introducing a radical new concept of a
kind never seen before.
From the outset this never seems right, but the logic and consistency of Kidd’s
argument centred on this principle of time shifting did make a good deal of sense taken
overall, because of the manner in which Kidd organised his argument, and for us, reading
his work, and knowing that this particularly device was unsatisfactory in itself, we could
try to make the required adjustment according to our far more scientific conception of
human social evolution understood in terms of humans being a species of superorganic
mammal. Now, at last, we have reached the midpoint in his treatise on Western
Civilisation, and the penny has dropped, we have it. If, wherever Kidd uses the word
‘present’ in the sense related to the time shifting factor of social evolution, we substitute
for the word ‘present’ the word ‘identity’, we will of cracked it, we will of turned a fine
philosophical effort into a perfect piece of scientific sociology.
Shall we try it on a section from the above quotation ? Yeah, lets !!
 It was, in short, the world in which was represented the culminating age of
that long epoch of human development, in which the significance that underlay
every human institution, in the last analysis, was the conception that there were no
rights and no responsibilities in man, no meaning and no significance in life, no
hopes and no desires in existence, save such as were related to present ends. All
the wants, the desires, the passions, the ambitions of men were correlated with the
things which men saw around them. It was the world in which all the theories of
the State, all the ideals of art, all the principles of conduct, all the conceptions of
religion, centred round the things which men hungered and thirsted for in that
material and omnipotent present in which they lived.

It was, in short, the world in which was represented the culminating age of
that long epoch of human development, in which the significance that underlay
every human institution, in the last analysis, was the conception that there were no
rights and no responsibilities in man, no meaning and no significance in life, no
hopes and no desires in existence, save such as were related to identity ends. All
the wants, the desires, the passions, the ambitions of men were correlated with the
things which men saw around them. It was the world in which all the theories of
the State, all the ideals of art, all the principles of conduct, all the conceptions of
religion, centred round the things which men hungered and thirsted for in that
material and omnipotent identity in which they lived.

Well, we would not expect to be able to simply substitute the word ‘identity’ for
the word ‘present’ in any piece of prose and to automatically obtain a grammatical result,
but the substitution does retain a sufficient degree of continuity of meaning, given that we
understand what we are trying to achieve here. But now lets refine our method and
explain ourselves.
The grammatical dislocation arises in the first place because Kidd is speaking of a
time frame in which people live, and we are also intent upon portraying identity as a
social flux within which people live, so that some meaning is carried over from the one
condition to the next. But to be clear we would want to phrase our description
differently. Nonetheless this is the first point we must recognise, identity is a social
atmosphere, part of the social environment in which people live. If we take the meaning
of Kidd’s argument that the new Jewish slave identity introduced a dislocation into the
social flux that removed the ultimate test of meaning which had been fixed upon
attainment in the present, toward a standard of achievement that was located in a future
beyond the existence of the individual, and relate this idea to the biological principle of
identity instead of the intellectual principle of time, then we can see how it is really the
shifting principle of identity that underlay the rise of Western Civilisation.
Kidd occupies a good portion of one chapter on the high art of the ancient Greeks,
and accounts for their attainment of hitherto unequalled perfection by virtue of their
fixation on realising their ultimate objectives in life in the present, and therefore their
seeking perfection here and now. But if we ask in what sense the ancient Greek would of
understood the personification of the present, our answer must be that the meaning of the
‘present’, to a Greek, would of meant the perfect expression of Greek identity. And
likewise for the Roman, or any other person living in a highly advanced, complex
superorganic being that relied for its formation upon the expression of a state based,
localised identity.
And now, along comes something wholly new, Christianity. A conception of
purpose that was not based on the present, but on the future, or, according to our
modification, was not based on the identity of the society in which its adherents lived, but
on an identity projected beyond the being of that society. Lets take a look at the section
in which Kidd expresses the significance of the dislocation represented by this new
stance.

These are all, it must be once more emphasised, but the first outward
expressions of the alteration in the stand-point of the human mind which was in
progress deep down beneath the surface of society, and of which the profounder
evolutionary results were still incalculably remote in the future. At the point at
which the new movement came into relations with the outward forms of the
Roman empire, it is the same principle which furnishes the clue to the phenomena
we are regarding. In its light we distinguish clearly the real nature of that vast,
half-formed, subconscious instinct of the populations of the ancient world against
the new belief in its earlier stages. Beneath all the confusing and conflicting
phenomena of distrust and hostility resulting from the contact of the movement
with the institutions of the Roman world, what we have in sight is, in reality,
nothing less than the ultimate fact of the pagan world instinctively standing at bay
before a cause, the operation of which was absolutely incompatible with the life-
principle of every institution which was characteristic of it. The instinct which, in
the Decian persecution of 249, and in the Diocletian persecution of 303, produced
deliberate attempts, supported by the whole machinery of Roman government, to
extirpate the new system of belief from the world, 1 rightly recognised the essen-
tial nature of the movement it confronted. That world, which could behold with
tolerance a thousand forms of religion existing under Roman rule, 2 but in all of
which it nevertheless saw the highest human interests and the highest human
ideals still conceived as comprised within the limits of the State, dimly but rightly
recognised that a religion by which there was opened in the human mind an
overruling sense of responsibility to principles which transcended all the interests
of the State, and all the ends for which the State existed, carried men entirely out
of that epoch in which they had hitherto lived, and struck at the very roots of the
system of social life around them. It was, therefore, we see, on no mere cause of
disrespect to the gods, or of impiety to the emperor, that the accusations against
the adherents of the new movement in the last resort rested. Profoundly, but
clearly, the general mind must have felt the difference between the spirit of that
movement and those developments of the ancient philosophy which, to superficial
observation, even still appear to run in the same direction. “The philosophers,”
said Tertullian, “destroy your gods openly, and write against your superstitions ;
 but with your approbation. Nay, many of them not only snarl, but bark aloud
against the emperors ; and you not only bear it very contentedly, but give them
statues and pensions in return.” It is only us, he adds, you throw to the beasts for
so doing. 1
1
Lecky’s European Morals, vol. i. pp. 449-468.
2
Cf. Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. i. ch. xvi.

1
Apology, xivi.

(Kidd, 229 – 231)

Again we find a conformity of meaning carrying forward in Kidd’s description

and our own modification which translates ‘present’ into ‘identity’, translating a political
term into a scientific term. For what else could Kidd really of identified in the Christian
dispensation but a break with the identity of the pagan world. To talk of the ‘present’ is
to talk of the nature of an idea, to talk of an ‘identity’ is to talk of the nature of an
organism. The former is exclusively human, and therefore political, the latter is
essentially natural and hence potentially scientific. How odd that Kidd should of
expressed his insights in this abstract temporal form, instead of the substantial organic
form of identity that we select. Even so, much of the reasoning Kidd brings to bear on
what he has observed suits us just fine. As he says, the Romans, famous for their
tolerance of many varied pagan gods, baulked at Christianity. And this was because this
religion evidently did something new, something intolerable. Kidd says this was to
project the sense of meaning beyond the present and thereby make the present subject to
the future. We have seen that this idea can be accommodated within the scientific idea
that individuals, as units of superorganic physiology, must indeed be mortal elements of a
comparatively immortal being, and as such inherently living in the present for the sake of
the future. But this temporal mode of description is not scientific because it is not
materialistic, and consequently its ability to account for either the nature of the Christian
religion, or the consequences of its appearance realised in the emergence of modern
Western Civilisation, is nil.
Better by far to express the idea of alienation represented in the above quote in
terms of identity. Christianity alienated people from Roman life, and as such to tolerate
these people within the empire was to invite an alien into its society, an alien that
threatened to, and eventually did take over the whole empire. Fine, this is OK as far as it
goes, but this can only be the beginning, now : What about Christianity, what was it, and
where did it come from ? What was Christianity’s identity, and where did its identity
come from ?
Herein, in the answer to this question, the origin of Christian identity, lies our
greatest treasure, the key to understanding the power of the master identity, Judaism ! As
we have said, the power of Judaism must be based on some very simple principle, it is
just a matter of discerning that principle, and Kidd’s examination of the origins and
nature of Christianity, converted by our modification of his terms of reference from the
intellectual to the organic gives us the key to knowing what Christian power is. The
translocation of identity beyond the bounds of the society in which Christianity exists is
the key to Christian power. And since Christian identity is Jewish identity in another
guise, we have the key to the actual physical power of Judaism, which had been
transcribed into the sub-Judaic slave identity of Christianity. The conditions for this act
of transcription were a product of the very success of the Roman military power in
fragmenting huge numbers of people, dispossessing them of their own true identities and
reducing them to the status of identity-lessness, in which their only social status was in
their identity as a slave. This slave status derived from being dispossessed of social
identity is identical to the slave identity of a Christian, a person is attached to the
conquering identity, Roman in this case, they live in, and work for the Roman identity,
but they are not Roman, hence, they are literally, in purely mechanistic terms, a slave
attachment. What Christianity did, once the conditions had reached a critical point, was
to create a substitute social identity adapted to the Roman society that was bent on
universal conquest, and thus all the dispossessed were given an identity which effectively
remade the identity of the whole superorganism, and thus Rome became Jewish. The
Jews had always had this dispossessed identity, this slave attachment identity, and it was
the key to power. This is why the Christian creed was based on the condition of identity
loss, and it replacement, the poor, the weak, would become the inheritors of the earth.
What this means in biological terms is that the process of militaristic expansion that had
produced a majority of identity-less people would now offer to those people the
opportunity of an identity which would become the identity of a new global being. and
this is exactly what happened. So whoever the priests were that devised the Jewish slave
identity, they really knew what the essential conditions were that they were tackling, and
they must of been Jews, and they must of been set on taking over the world in the name
of Judaism.
So now we perceive that where we have long spoken of Judaism as an evolved
response to the conditions of life we call ‘civilised’ such that Judaism became an
abstraction of the power base inherent in all national structures, we now have a basis
upon which to suggest what in fact the Jewish culture did to develop this power of master
identity, and in turn this allows us to see how this power was written into the two slave
identities of Christianity and Islam. And a most telling point regarding this subject,
which appears in the above passage from Kidd, is that utter powerlessness of the Romans
to defend themselves from this new identity strategy. This helplessness is a matter of
great significance, we experience exactly the same phenomenon today, fighting against
these specialised abstract identity patterns is like trying to extract yourself from a
quagmire, the more you struggle the further in your descend until you are lost, and it is
precisely this effect that created the Nazis in response to a sense of alien impregnation by
the Jews, which resulted in the European military elite going to war with themselves,
which ended with the Jews being catapulted into the position of supreme master race on
earth, producing a military power of hitherto unequalled might, from nothing to total
world domination in just little more than the time I have lived on this planet.
We do need to keep our feet on the ground as we discuss these momentous events,
we need to understand that the human biomass is an organic structure composed of a
pattern of identities, forming a geographical mosaic across a continental landscape. So
the identity dynamics associated with the transformation of the total structure of this
biomass must be understood in terms of the relationship of corporate identity, that is
social identity, to the total structure. Everything arises from human corporate nature
which evolved to produce superorganisms. How the superorganisms that exist come into
being is what we call history, or what the first sociologists like Kidd called social
evolution.

Note above where I use red for identity v present, later in his work he begins to
talk about spirituality of society as that which is made supreme over all temporal
interests, he does this when he begins to place his argument concerning the idea,
Christianity, in the context of Christianity’s relationship to the state. Accordingly we
find the same word ‘identity’ must substitute for another word, ‘spirituality’. Wherever
Kidd uses the word ‘spirituality’ we must substitute ‘identity’ in order to keep the
meaning real, scientific, that is biological.

This week, while searching for books on anti-Semitism I came upon the unusually
promising sounding title of a modern American work. I did not expect much, and I did
not get much either, the book proved to be written by a Christian Jewish slave, but
nonetheless the aggressive nature of the title suited the contents. As it happened a section
of the work was available for free off the net, and it has some interesting portions that we
may introduce into our discussion now.

Understanding Jewish Supremacism

 by David Duke

Are Jews a Race ?... They Certainly Think So !

One of the first things I discovered is that while Gentiles who call the Jews a “race” are
condemned, Jewish leaders have for centuries routinely called themselves a race. The
leader of American Jewry in the 1930s, Rabbi Stephen F. Wise, said it succinctly in this
dramatic statement, “Hitler was right in one thing. He calls the Jewish people a race and
we are a race.” Right up to the present day, there are many statements illustrating how
Jewish leaders matter-of-factly view themselves not just as a religion, but as an
identifiable race, genetically distinguishable from other peoples.

Zionism as Racism

After 2,000 years of conflict, the Jewish prayer “Next Year in Jerusalem” finally became
expressed in an open political movement called Zionism. In 1862, Moses Hess, teacher of
Karl Marx and the spiritual father of both Zionism and Communism, wrote Rome and
Jerusalem. In it, he expressed the familiar Talmudic values.

We Jews shall always remain strangers among the Goyim [Gentiles]. . . . It is a fact
the Jewish religion is above all Jewish nationalism. . . . Each and every Jew, whether
or not he wishes it, is automatically, by virtue of his birth, bound in solidarity with
his entire nation. . . . One must be a Jew first and human being second.

If Adolf Hitler had ever said the words “One must be a German first and a human being
second,” would not those words be repeated often as proof of his depravity ? For some
compelling reason, no one dares to condemn such words when they come from the
important Jewish leader who laid the foundations of both Zionism and Communism.
I began to survey Zionist literature, from the writings of Moses Hess to the
present day, and repeatedly I encountered the same supremacism expressed in the
Talmud.
A prominent Zionist historian, Simon Dubnow, wrote the Foundation of National
Judaism in 1906. In it, he expressed sentiments that would certainly be described as anti-
Semitic had they come from a Gentile.

Assimilation is common treason against the banner and ideals of the Jewish people. .
. . But one can never ‘become’ a member of a natural group, such as a family, a
tribe, or a nation…A Jew, on the other hand, even if he happened to be born in
France and still lives there, in spite of all this, he remains a member of the Jewish
nation, and whether he likes it or not, whether he is aware or unaware of it, he bears
the seal of the historic evolution of the Jewish nation.

Modern Jewish Supremacism

As I read more and more of the historical accounts of Jewish ethnocentrism, I wondered
how much of this applied to modern day Jews. I began to devour modern Jewish books
and publications. I chose their most popular and respected newspapers, books, and
magazines. Because I was now beginning to see a double standard, I began to look for
corroborating evidence, and what I found fascinated me. In fact, finding it was easy, and
it still is. Prominent Jews still proudly write and publish articles about their suspicion and
condemnation of Gentiles. They boast of Jewish moral, spiritual and genetic superiority.
Even admissions of control over key positions in media and government in Gentile
nations are in their contemporary literature. Any reader of publications meant for Jewish
consumption will find material no less anti-Gentile than the 1500-year-old Talmudic writ
I quoted. It is seldom as brazen as the old material, but the underlying themes are
inevitably present and sometimes even unvarnished hatred just spills out.
Many examples of what I am talking about can be found in the largest Jewish
newspaper outside of Israel, The Jewish Press, which sets the tone of Jewish religious
and cultural attitudes more than any other newspaper. One of its primary religious
authorities is Rabbi Simcha Cohen, who has an instructional Dear Abby-type of column
called “Halachic Questions.” Not long ago, Rabbi Cohen instructed his readers that the
Talmud denotes Gentiles as “animals” (as outlined by Talmudic writings from Gemara
Kiddushin 68a and Metzia 114b). In another section he discusses how a Jewish woman is
not designated as a prostitute if she has premarital sex with a Jew, but she is a whore if
she has any sexual relations with a Gentile, even if she is married.

Marriage to a Gentile can never be sanctified or condoned, such a liaison classifies

the woman as a zona...common parlance interprets the term zona to refer to a
prostitute.... Indeed, premarital sex of a Jewish woman to a Jewish man does not
automatically brand the woman a zona.... A Jewish woman becomes a prostitute or
zona in the eyes of the Talmud only when she marries or otherwise has sexual
relations with a non-Jew.

Another major Jewish publication, the Jewish Chronicle, in an article called “Some
Carefully and Carelessly Chosen Words,“ revealed that the Jewish term for Gentile
woman is the offensive Yiddish word shiksa — meaning “whore,” from the Hebrew root,
sheigetz (“abomination”). It also pointed out that a little Gentile girl is called shikselke,
meaning “little female abomination.” How would Jews react if Gentiles casually referred
to Jewish women and little girls as “whores” and “little whores” ?

Jews around the world, as a mechanism for preserving their

cultural and racial heritage.

Most of us never see the reality of Jewish chauvinism and power because we have not
organized the scattered facts into a coherent whole. Like a child’s connect-the-dot puzzle,
most of us have not yet connected the dots and completed the picture. The media erase as
many dots as they can from our awareness, and anyone who succeeds in connecting all
the dots is bludgeoned back with the ultimate moral weapon : accusations of Anti-
Semitism.
 Given the Jewish influences that have so much power in this nation’s media and
finance, it is amazing that any Gentiles would dare oppose them. One accused of being an
anti-Semite faces an intractable enemy organized around the world — one that will do
whatever it takes to discredit, intimidate, jail and destroy him.
After I completed a survey of readings in the Talmud and of the modern Zionist
writers, I realized that the Europeans were not the only historical practitioners of racial
and religious intolerance. Actually, the Jews have been quite proficient at it themselves.
Once I accepted that Jewish ethnocentrism existed, again I asked the question that had
arisen after my enlightenment on the “Russian Revolution :” Why were we forbidden to
know this ?
A Jew can rightly object to slanderous criticism from Christians. Why should I, as
a Christian, not be upset by slanderous criticism of my heritage by Jews ? If Christians
are wrong to voice hateful sentiments against Jews, why are Jews not just as
reprehensible for voicing hateful sentiments against Christians ? Are the media right in
suggesting that Christians have a monopoly on hate, while Jews have a monopoly on
charity ? Which religion, as judged by the evidence of its own writings, is more
motivated by hatred ?
Even as I write these provocative words, I harbor no hatred toward the Jewish
people. There are intolerant Jews just as there are intolerant Gentiles. It is also true that
there are many Jews who respect our Christian heritage. But unless the nonchauvinist
Jews are willing to work hard to bring to their own faith and community the same kind of
love and reconciliation that Christ taught, the cycle of hatred between Jew and Gentile
could fester. Unless they temper their supremacism with acceptance and love, they could
suffer a replay of the terrible excesses of the past.
The government, church, and media establishment work zealously to diminish
Gentile intolerance of Jews. That objective can be realized only through an equal effort to
lessen Jewish chauvinism, suspicion, and anger against Gentiles. As the Israeli human-
rights activist Israel Shahak wrote, “Anti-Semitism and Jewish chauvinism can only be
fought simultaneously.”
After reading the words of Zionism’s modern founder, Theodore Herzl, I fully
realized that there are, as he expressed it, “alien” power brokers in our civilization. These
are people who do not share our culture, our traditions, our faith, our interests, or our
values. I realized that if I desired to preserve the heritage and values of my people, I
would have to defend my people from the intolerant sector within the Jewish community
that seeks domination rather than conciliation.
When I was 16, I never suspected that just by pointing out the powerful Jewish
elements of anti-Gentilism I would be labelled anti-Semitic. I do not accept that label
today, and I still believe that it is no more anti-Semitic to oppose Jewish Supremacism
than it is anti-Italian to oppose the mafia.

___________

Duke has no idea what he is discussing, all he knows are the ideas revolving in his
brain. He cannot even begin to imagine these ideas may have an explanation beyond the
limits of their political significance. How can he imagine this, he is enslaved to Judaism
by his Christian identity, which the idiot actually thinks is real ! Poor sad insect.
But following on directly from Kidd’s discussion of exclusivity as a means of
harnessing genetic racial identity via a vastly more powerful linguistic medium of
superorganic form, we can see the extreme importance of Jewish fascism to the
domination of humanity by the Jews. All the Germans were doing, in the guise of the
Nazi ideology, was seeking to out Jew the Jews, and by attempting such a challenge they
could only reinforce the identity of the Jews, because the German national identity is a
Jewish slave structure, part of the physiology of the Jewish superorganism that makes the
Jewish religious identity so powerful as a master identity, which all Jews know is not
limited by such paltry boundaries as that of geographical location.
It follows from Kidd’s argument that having evolved the principle of racial
definition based on blood lineage linked to a religious figurehead, and therefore relying
upon a religious creed for its integrity, the grounds were laid for the evolution of an elite
form of the new religious type of corporate social identity, able to rule all other such
identities in existence. A universal racial identity was bound to evolve because the
evolution of this type of identity created a latent potential for one to emerge that was
supreme, and hence Judaism came into being.
However there is a very important point that comes into play here that never
occurs to Kidd, or anyone else, so it seems. Above we have made the radical assertion
that the Jews created the Romans, it is a tricky suggestion to try, it is so difficult to work
out how or why. Duke talks about the media seeking to eradicate all knowledge of
Jewish power and influence from the public domain, at the academic level the priests
apply the same method to the historical context, and have done for aeons, so we just do
not have the facts written down for us from which to develop these insights. But
logically we know we are on safe scientific ground to assert that the masters created their
slaves, it could hardly be the other way round, although there is necessarily a feedback
loop operating between the dependant and the ruling elements of any biological system.
Perhaps we should try and avoid altogether any talk of hierarchical order. But that is too
difficult, so I will not attempt it. But I have been straining my brain to work out the
nature of the relationship of the Jews to all the ancient civilisations. Using Kidd’s insight
into the dynamics of social evolution as they apply to the Greek and Roman civilisation,
may we suggest that in reality the mechanism that Kidd has described is valid, but his
time frame is mistaken, he needs to look way back beyond the pinnacle of civilisation
immediately precluding the emergence of the full blown Jewish global superorganism we
are all part of today, and think of the actual origins of the same being. For this we need
to seek the roots of militaristic organisation, say in Sumerian society of some five
thousand years ago, which is allied to Jewish origins. Maybe this is the point at which
the elite Jewish identity came into being and somehow, first in a very subtle manner, but
then in an ever increasingly direct manner, the influence of an elite culture in the region,
mobile and shifting from one localised dominant military organization to another, the
Jews actually generated the formation of all civilisations with which they are famed for
having contact. The Jews therefore created, if not the Sumerians, who may be supposed
to of created the Jews, then all those who came after, such as the Babylonians, Egyptians,
Cretans, Greek and Romans.
 Now this may be to overreach ourselves, to say the Jews created these peoples, it
may be overreaching to say the Jews created the Romans, but we are looking for organic
meanings here, not political meanings. We are therefore thinking of influences that take
effect beyond the senses, and lead to results that only suddenly become apparent. In life
this might be seen in conditions like the potato blight in Ireland where one crop had
become the only stable upon which a population depended, and where that very
dependence led to a situation where a virus could build up unseen and suddenly make
itself felt in a consequence we are all too painfully aware of. The same subterranean
effect could occur in cultural developments that manifest themselves miraculously in
social forms whose appearance is unaccountable by any means other than silly political
stories that obviously have no scientific validity whatsoever.

Unfortunately Kidd is as weak minded as everyone else on this point, he can do

no better than to think in short-sighted political terms. Hence while he applies the correct
logical proposition to the ideas he works on, he fails to recognise the true material form
of the object he is studying. From the above we see Kidd ask this question :

“What, therefore, is the significance of this conception of exclusive

citizenship, “altogether moral-religious in its nature,” in that epoch of history in
which the development of society under the controlling principle of military
efficiency is about to culminate ?”

And reveal thereby that he sees every aspect of the discussion he is engaged in dealing as
it does with the nature of religion and its role in the social evolution of human society,
that in the earlier phases of civilisation, it was the culmination in military efficiency that
was the primary factor of interest. In other words he looked at things exactly as people
have always looked at things, who had the most physical power, they were surely the
greatest leaders. Roman, British, American, each in their time, were, are, the ruling elite.
It really is frustrating to see Kidd doing this because at the heart of his argument
is religion, exactly as it should be, but unfortunately, unlike in our philosophy, atheism is
not an avowed position, demanding that the existence of religion be accounted for. And
as a consequence however close Kidd gets to taking religion into account he does not
manage to keep his eye on the ball, as soon as he approaches a conclusive statement he
lets the whole idea he has so carefully constructed fall to the ground, he drops religion
and puts military organization and power in its place. Wrong ! Idiot !
Identity, identity is the key, identity is everything. And there is only one ruling
identity, Judaism, even those who call themselves Christian and Muslim are so obviously
entirely and exclusively Jewish. I love the snippet in the passage from Duke where some
Jew says that all those who are Jews are Jews whether they know it or not. I am not quite
sure what he is getting at there, but it is of no importance, what is of importance is that
this is an ever recurring theme in our argument that we are all Jews whether we know it
or not, or whether we like or not. Out reason is because we recognise that the human
animal evolved to form a superorganism, and the superorganism alive today has
incorporated all living humans, none can be outside its reach, and on this basis we are all
Jews, because then identity of the living superorganism is Jewish. What the Jew had in
mind when he said Jews were Jews whether they knew it or not I cannot imagine, other
than some flowery political bullshit of the kind lunatics are always spouting. I once
discovered a youth was Jewish by accident, and I said to him “Your Jewish ?” and he
panicked, and denied it, and said “I don’t know, you could be Jewish, you don’t know.”
Wow, what the hell was that about, I have no idea. For the life of me I could not
understand how I could not know if I was Jewish, or not know why I would have a skull
cap lying on my bed, but I certainly knew I was not Jewish. The other day they showed
pictures of a tribe in the South American jungles viewed from a helicopter, bows at the
ready pointed at the flying ship, and they said these people had never met white races
before. It is amazing that some such unknown humans can still exist in 2008. Such
people are not part of the Jewish superorganism, they live separately from it and quite
independently of it, except they don’t anymore, now they are doomed.

My reading of Kidd has advanced a little, along with the sunshine. Today,
04/06/08, I have been reading some interesting stuff, including an acknowledgement that
the leading idea that rules our world today originated with the Jews. Here we get the
modern religion ruling our lives being named, but Christianity, as in his Social Evolution,
is viewed as something existing in its own right. As disappointing as Kidd’s scientific
explanation of the amazing impact of the Christian religion on human social evolution is,
I still get more out of reading his attempt than I do from anything anyone else has ever
written. He eulogies the effect of Christianity, to be understood in terms of its negation
of the individual as an end in themselves, which is rather remarkable as for years now the
central theme in all my work has been how religion is protected by insisting that man is
an end in himself. The solution to this curious conflict of logic is that religion denied
individuals their right to be understood as an end in themselves in their relationship to
nature, or to the divine, which was their position in ancient society which was focused on
the present, according to Kidd. The object of denying the individual a status as an end in
themselves in terms of their relationship to the divine, requires that conversely the
individual must be left with the status of being an end in themselves in the secular world.
and it is because the power of Christianity rests on stealing their divine essence from the
authority of the individual, and investing it in the church, that it is critical that no
naturalistic explanation of the loss of an individual’s status as an end in themselves
should be tolerated, such as we produce when we affirm that humans are superorganisms
and the individual does not exist as an end in themselves because they evolve dot be a
unit of the superorganism.
$
And we have drifted off White once again, all to a purpose.
The 1896 work is far more substantial than the previous book. The contents
pages extend to eleven in number, full of detail, and there are twelve chapters. There are
two volumes, one has 415 pages, and the next has 474. They should be nice books to
read, but in the couple of years since I bought them I have not been tempted, reading this
sycophantic introduction is enough to cool anyone’s ardour for reading the contents,
unless they love lies and deception. But such works are the best available in a society
where science is taboo, so they are still nice to own, and can be made use of here and
there. Besides, we have to look at what there is, otherwise how can we know what is
what ? and these works tell us how the theocracy has managed knowledge in the age of
science
 Just think about the trouble that White and Cornell, as two Christian fanatics, had
in setting up a university which intended to employ teachers able to teach scientific
subjects. These are the words of a Christian fanatic :

“Thus may the declaration of Micah as to the requirements of Jehovah, the

definition by St. James of “pure religion and undefiled,” and, above all, the
precepts and ideals of the blessed Founder of Christianity himself, be brought to
bear more and more effectively on mankind.”

These two stalwarts of Christian fascism were opposed, tooth and nail, by Christian
extremists who were determined that science should not exist, in any form. The same
incestuous mechanism operates at the core of all social authority today, both in academia
and in politics. Where the only options for life are kept strictly within the one ideological
family. The war today could be characterised as meeting through Dawkins and the
Creationists, where Dawkins, as a representative of science is the priest of Darwinism, as
well as an active atheist, and as such he is a supreme enemy of science. This is where the
vital importance of Darwin, as the founder of a religious science of life, presented in the
guise of a scientific science of life, can be seen to be so important. Darwin gives the idea
a spin, and all who come after him merely keep the initial rotation going. And just as
modern biologists, and scientists in general, are famous for being out and out atheists, so
Darwin is portrayed as an atheist, although he was nothing of the kind, he is said to of
lost his faith because his daughter died, so his atheism is made as weak as possible, there
is no conviction behind it. This profession of atheism without any substance behind it, a
mere denial of God’s existence, is worthless, a scientist must be committed to the
annihilation of religion in order to be a scientist.
Last night, 28/04/08, Am I Normal ? on BBC 2 asked if people who hold religious
beliefs were normal. In one conversation the presenter said that she had no more proof
that God did not exist than her religious interlocutor had that God did exist. The priests
do this all the time, they only want the status quo, a world in which religion reigns
supreme, a world in which science does not exist. So they do not push the matter, they
simply say, there it is, we believe, and why not ? Who is to say any different ? In
politics, as I am always pointing out, we use a system of absolute control that relies upon
two opposites that are absolutely identical in everything except the minutest, irrelevant
details. The job of the politician in many respects is to discover ways of magnifying, or
simply creating, and then boosting some differences between the two choices the voters
have. And this principle is exactly the one we see at work in the process White had to
engage with as a Christian seeking to set up a free academic institution in an absolute
Christian theocracy. From a political point of view this democratic system is excellent,
for it allows change to be fought for, and achieved, while ensuring that no change can
ever take place in any sense whatever. In other words, if society is likened to a car, it
allows the wheel to be turned as needs be, but it does not allow the car to be other than
the make and model that it is, fixed by the ruling corporation for all eternity. So White’s
description of how he had to struggle to establish his university is a picture of how the
theocracy has dealt with the modern scientific era, in a nutshell.

______________
 My attention has been drawn back to a favourite work this week, Kidd’s Social
Evolution. It is the finest work ever written, by a million miles, here’s why :

The Social Mind by Boodin, 1939, arrived from America yesterday, 01/05/08, and
immediately I feel this is the best book ever written, which makes me appear rather
fickle, and inclined to great exaggeration. Kidd’s work is extraordinary, and I have
copied in full the two chapters which are awesome, in order to demonstrate this fact. But
while my familiarity with Boodin’s Social Mind is slight at this moment, it is
immediately obvious that this book takes an approach to humans so perfect, so rare, and,
while being entirely different in kind, identical in sentiment to Kidd, that I feel this latest
arrival will prove to justify my excitement. Like Kidd, Boodin is seriously disappointing,
I see a remark declaring the wonderful effect of Christianity in freeing people, which is
tragic and sad, but I have not looked at this section to see what he is saying. Still, we
know that what makes our work so extraordinary, unique and utterly perfect in reasoning,
is that it is based on an avowedly atheist conviction. To do science a person must be a
proactive atheist.
Above I mention the last episode of a serial on BBC 2 called Am I Normal ?
which looked at religious belief. I did not watch this pathetic religious propaganda, but
dipped into it, one clip I caught showed the priestess presenting the programme sat with a
man in a white coat sitting before a computer screen. She said to him “So you hope to
find proof that God exists ?” He replied that he tried to find proof either way, but that he
would be happy to find proof that God did exist. I am curious what the object of
observation was that this priest made the focus of this search, but I cannot record
programmes now we have gone digital so I cannot be bothered watching programmes
like this that I would normally of recorded in the past. Anyway, the idea this priest was
putting forward was the principle that science makes no assumptions of any kind,
scientific facts rely upon the experimental method, hence he makes no assumptions about
the existence of God one way or the other. This is a sickening portrayal of science,
exactly what religion demands of its slave.
What is belief in God ? From a scientific point of view belief in God is a reality,
but, the ideas of those who believe in God is not a reality, and this differences is
everything. Does the scientists look to account for belief in God, or does the scientist
look to account for God ? The difference is huge. If we look at a comparative situation
where people had beliefs that were proven false we can see this. IN the eighteenth
century when science was beginning to make great strides through the application of the
experimental method to the physical world people sort to make sense of what they knew
by devising premature theories. Burning is a long standing mystery that invites people to
try and explain fire is such a special thing. Before the mystery was solved by identifying
the atmospheric gas we now call oxygen one popular idea proposed the existence of a
substance called phlogiston.
Now, how did scientists solve the problem of fire ? Did they ask themselves what
belief in phlogiston was all about, and set to try and find proof that phlogiston either did
or did not exist ? Or did they try to find out what aspect of nature was responsible for the
process of burning ? Obviously they did not set belief in phlogiston on a pedestal as if
phlogiston were as much a feature of nature as burning, they looked at what it was in
nature that the belief in phlogiston tried to explain. Coming back to belief in God then,
scientists need to ask what it is that belief in God tries to explain, or, another way of
putting this is, What is it in reality that causes people to believe in God ?
Any way we look at it, scientists should never approach the idea that God exists
as if it were on a par with anything that was real and cannot be questioned, such as the
fact that things burn. As it happens, however, this is exactly how we say scientists must
treat belief in God, as something real to be explained in natural terms, but not in terms
which accept the religious definition and account of God. In other words scientists
cannot accept what God is said to be by religious people as a starting point for scientific
investigations of God. Yes, belief in God is real, but the God of those beliefs is not real
unless it is shown to be real by science. Belief in phlogiston was real, but the attributes
of phlogiston were not.
So the priest disguised as a scientist in the religious propaganda on BBC 2 this
week was making religion the neutral point of origin in his scientific search for truth, but
science should always make reality the neutral point in any search for truth; i. e. the basis
of the scientific investigation of the unknown should always be knowing nothing, not
knowing something as an assumption. However, because all science is conducted within
an absolute theocracy, it is necessary for science to invert this position in order to obtain
a neutral point of origin for its outlook, hence science must be avowedly atheistic at all
times, in this way science is made unbiased relative to nature, and as such secures a
neutral base for investigations of nature. Of course any scientist appearing on television
is going to present the inverse of an unbiased foundation, as we have just seen, and hence
they will make perfect sense according to their own bias logic, when they speak of
beginning from a neutral position which recognises that God may or may not exist.

Lest have a look at a couple of things I spotted in Boodin today, 02/05/08.

We may believe that the biological evolution of man is still going on and
will go on until the human species reaches maturity. The human race is young. It
may be that man of the far future will look back upon us as we look back upon
Pithecanthropus. Perhaps some day man will reach permanent adaptation in a
social pattern, such as that of the beehive, unless indeed reason can keep him
plastic indefinitely.

(p. 545)
 To die for ! This is excruciatingly gorgeous, it makes me laugh and chuckle to
myself to read such words, sheer delight ! Boodin tells us in the foreword that this book
will published about the date which will make it “a celebration of my seventieth
birthday.” So he really lived n the ultimate period of the idea of the social organism
which inspires us, and the above selection bears this out. The only other item I have
where the idea of humans becoming like insects is in an esoteric work by Ouspensky, A
New Model of the Universe, 1931, that I have quoted in another place and will not repeat
now. (Need to check on which book this is in – probably There is no God)
The basic logic expressed by Boodin here is a delight, but we can do a lot better
because we have a far more perfect scientific insight into what humans actually are. I am
not sure why we should be able to out reason a person in Boodin’s position, given that he
lived his whole life in a atmosphere where it was accepted that humans were a social
animal. But as delightful as this whole work appears to be in terms of expressing this
idea of society as a biological phenomenon, Boodin relentlessly talks in terms of human
conscious effort, an idea which became divorced from the idea of humans as a social
animal, and existed in a pure form attached to the idea of the individual as an end in
themselves. Boodin expressly denounces the idea of the individual, but unfortunately he
fails to realise that, in that case, he must make his mind up, and make a commitment to
reasoning as if the individual is not an active element in human evolution, or else wreck
his own argument. And he does riddle his whole work with ridiculous statements of
man’s own role in developing his world. He never realises that language is a natural
force that creates social structure, he thinks that people had to struggle to learn how to
make their own world ; where we say that we live according to a linguistic programme
that is the equivalent of the genetic programme of the genome operating in the social
domain.

Nature is achieving in human life a new whole-form in which time has a

vastly greater significance than in life below man. The whole-form of man
includes not merely the organic cycle of maturing in the physical and organic
environment but it includes also the spiritual maturing in a spiritual environment.
The social group relations are as much part of the realization of the life of man as
are the physical and organic environment. We have looked upon society too
abstractly as though it were an artificial addition to man’s biological evolution. It
is in fact part of his biological evolution. The gestalt of the life of man requires
the social relations for its completion. The social group is an invention by the life
urge as truly as is the stomach. That life becomes to a certain degree consciously
inventive does not make it less of life. Brain and intelligence are evolved in the
service of life. They are manifestations of the urge for life and for fuller life. They
are part of the whole-pattern of life at a certain stage of evolution.
It has been said that thought is talk and it is true that communication is
essential to the development of abstract intelligence. Mind must develop in a
milieu of mind. But to say that thought is communication is to substitute a
consequent function for the rationale of the process. Talk which is not mere talk is
an instrument of thought. Thinking is a whole-function which involves the
evolution of a certain cerebral structure, of certain vocal mechanisms, of
 manipulatory mechanisms. Anaxagoras thought that the hand of man makes the
mind of man superior to the rest of nature. Thinking also involves the affective
organization of man—his emotional life. For effective intellectual functioning
requires the harmonious flow of the emotions. In short it includes the whole man
and the whole man includes the community of man. For thought is expression. If
we regard communication in the abstract it becomes indeed as much of a miracle
as transubstantiation, as Dewey says. But human communication is not just
language. It is rooted in the biological urge for expression which in turn is rooted
in the very mutuality of life. The lyric song of the frogs which millions of years
ago disturbed the stillness of the night was, as it is now, the expression of the
mating drive—that life might go on. The evolution of brain structure and vocal
mechanisms for more specific expression was a further development of this urge
for mutuality. Men do not need one another because they have vocal organs, but
they have vocal organs because they need one another. They can only complete
their life gestalt in mutuality with their kind.
While the life of the insect (as we now find it) is apparently organically
complete, so that the cycle of its gestalt is indicated in its biological heredity,
human life starts with a gestalt which, if viewed without reference to time, is
largely a blank. Its specialization of instincts and capacities lies in the future : in
its interactions with its milieu and more specifically its social milieu. Moreover,
the life of man must experiment consciously to discover new group patterns to
satisfy the demands of life in its growing complexity. The group pattern of man is
not prescribed by biological heredity as the group patterns of life, below man,
now seem to be. But the viable pattern of harmonious living together in the
psychological group is not arbitrary but as truly indicated in its conditions of
realization as the viable pattern of a molecule in the inorganic conditions of
nature. There is no doubt a difference in the texture of the biological life of man,
but this difference can become known only in the creative interactions of the
individual with his milieu, and only then if the milieu is adequate in its opportun-
ity for responsiveness. The urge in man for social creativeness is a manifestation
of the urge of life, throughout evolution, for the maintenance of life and for richer
life.

(The Biological Basis of Society, in Journal of Social Philosophy, July

1939, Pages 309 – 310)

I have taken this from the Journal copy because it is easier to lay on the scanner,
but this essay forms the first chapter in The Social Mind. He does that his essays have
evolved over time, but this essay is the latest one he reuses, and I checked the last
paragraph of the above and it is identical.
I absolute love the general tenor of the ideas we see expressed in this brief
passage above, but as a philosopher Boodin’s approach is useless, it is all eulogising
about nature and life, as if he were a poet, when all we want is knowledge. He does say
at one point that the whole purpose of thinking about society is to make society a better
pace to live in, but this is what politics does, the whole point of science thinking about
society is to understand society, and that is it. There may be benefits, and I would
assume there would be if we were capable of thinking in a detached manner about what
we are, but first things first.
Here is a fascinating passage in which we find the nature of science bound up
with the nature of freedom, which in turn is related to the emerging reality of the
individual as an end in themselves, to which is attached the role of Christianity in
destroying slavery and realising freedom as an ideal for all :

But here art becomes part of moral advance. Religion, too, whatever our
reverence may be for the great revelations of the past, must be part of the social
and moral evolution of the race, if religion is to be vital.
When we speak of progress, we generally think of science and the changes
which it has wrought. Science, in the strict sense of free inquiry into the nature of
things, was born in Greece in the sixth century, B.C. It moved with great
acceleration to its climax in Euclid, Aristarchus and Archimedes in the third
century, B.C. Greek science might have gone on and anticipated the modem era,
if the Roman barbarians had not slaughtered Archimedes and all his associates in
the taking of Syracuse. Science was set back seventeen hundred years. In the last
four hundred years science has had a continuous and accelerated development.
Incidentally it has transformed our civilization in a practical as well as a
theoretical way. Instead of going into decadence at the end of the nineteenth
century, as Spengler thought, it has had its most radical development in the
twentieth century. But considering the youth and intermittency of science, we
cannot look to science as the measure of the continuous spiritual advance of the
race, if there has been such advance.
It is in the moral field, I think, where we can trace the most continuous
spiritual advance. By moral advance I mean the increasing recognition of the
dignity and significance of the human individual. Hegel at the close of his
Philosophy of History makes the pregnant statement : “The History of the World
is nothing but the development of the Idea of Freedom.” Without accepting
Hegel’s dialectical framework, we can, on empirical grounds, and in a general
way, agree to this interpretation of history. But freedom is not an abstraction. It
means the realization of personality. For us, as for Hegel, it must include social
organization, since man can only realize freedom in society. Without society he is
a mere animal, and not even that, since he cannot survive without the nurture of
society. We may say that freedom is the root of creative culture. This holds for all
culture—for art, religion, science, as well as moral realization—for man cannot
create under compulsion. He may claim freedom against authority—against
custom and convention—and take the consequences, as all the great prophets of
mankind, in various fields of creativeness, have done. But free in spirit he must be
in order to create. “Love will not be constrained,” replied Lancelot to Queen
Guinevere (when she asked him to show just a little love to a love-sick maiden).
And this is true of the love of beauty, of truth, of righteousness, as well as the love
of woman. When we examine the great periods of creativeness, we find that they
have been periods of great expansiveness of spirit, whether in fifth century
Greece, in Ancient times, or in the modern Renaissance. Science is as much the
expression of the freedom of spirit as is art or morality. This freedom may be felt
within the life of an institution as in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries or in
protest against institutions as in the French Revolution. But without a sense of
freedom there can be no creativeness.
In primitive civilization we can scarcely speak of an individual. Man
exists for the group. It is the life of the group that matters. Just as their language is
holophrastic, every situation being expressed in a unique combination of sounds
which have meaning only as a combination, so the individual is significant only in
group patterns. Life is regulated from beginning to end by group customs and
taboos, though the desire to live does at times bring about a change of
“medicines.” We cannot speak of moral freedom unless there is the conscious
realization of ideals. Man must develop analytical language and analytical
concepts before the individual can have moral significance within the group. The
penalty of such analytical thought is that the individual may become an
abstraction and forget his group responsibility. Such individualism must be
overcome by the development of creative imagination and a sense of unity on a
higher moral plane.
We may consider the conscious struggle for freedom, with all that it
implies in creative thought, as beginning in Greece, at any rate so far as the
Occident is concerned. In Athens in the fifth century, B. C., we have the first
realization of a commonwealth of freemen controlling their own destiny in a
direct democracy, and we have noted the impetus which this new freedom gave to
cultural creativeness. But while Athens created the idea of free citizenship and
democracy, we must not forget that three-fourths of the population of Athens
were slaves. Not even such advanced thinkers as Plato and Aristotle suggest
abolishing slavery. It was the human energy of the slaves which provided the
leisure for people of culture. Slavery persisted in the Roman empire, but it was
not congenial to the Roman spirit and manumission was common. During the
empire freed slaves sometimes rose to high position in the state. The great Stoic
jurist, Ulpian, gave expression to the doctrine that all men are by nature free and
equal and that slavery is contrary to the laws of nature, but the concrete
realization of this insight required time. The development of Roman law during a
thousand years is an impressive story of the triumph of human rights for man,
woman and child ; and Roman law persisted through the vicissitudes of the
Middle Ages and formed the framework of modern society.
Christianity was a great emotional force in the emancipation of man,
though its political and economic effects were slow, and are slow, in making
themselves felt. But the belief in the absolute value of every human individual
before God and the equality of all men before God must make itself felt in human
relations. The doctrine of the common fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man
was a powerful leaven in the Middle Ages. In the Church at any rate there was
democracy of opportunity through which a carpenter’s son could rise to the
papacy. Rome had tried to achieve a universal empire of law ; and the medieval
church tried to bring mankind together into a spiritual unity, which at times was
also conceived as a political unity. It is true that the lot of the tenant under the
 feudal system was miserable enough, but at any rate it was somewhat better than
slavery. The development of the king’s court and the common law in England
gave impartial justice between lord and vassal.
In the modern period we have seen the abolition of black slavery and the
realization of political democracy. At the end of the eighteenth century the
revolutionary leaders thought that the realization of political democracy would
mean Utopia. Such had been the dream of Rousseau, and America seemed its
fulfilment. If men are free to determine their own destiny, will they not determine
it for the welfare of all ? But we have come to realize that political democracy is
but an instrument, and mankind was poorly prepared to use the instrument.
Democracy means little unless it is a democracy of opportunity, and that we are
far from having reached. But we must recognize that the great social movements
take time. It took several hundred years of bloody struggle before medieval
feudalism was fused into the new national unities which arose at the end of the
Middle Ages. The feudal lords survived only when they learned to subordinate
themselves to national authority.
In the industrial era, a new feudalism has arisen. The old feudalism was
based upon the soil. The new feudalism is based upon the control, direct or
indirect, of the means of production and distribution. It will take time before the
new feudalism is subordinated to a cooperative commonwealth. Whether this can
be accomplished peacefully under democratic institutions depends largely upon
the attitude of the new feudal lords. In north-western Europe long strides have
been taken in this direction in a peaceful democratic way. In other parts of Europe
the changes have been revolutionary and have abrogated democratic principles.

(Pages 548 – 551)

All of which just goes to show how far from a naturalistic comprehension of
humanity Boodin really was. Meaning we can only enjoy his work as a portrayal of the
true idea of human nature as corporate, and the existence of this idea in society up to the
outbreak of the last world war in 1939, precisely when this book was published in
September of that year. This last passage shows his essentially political conception of
history, rather than a scientific, physiological, none moral conception of social processes.

I am currently reading through this work for the first time, it is already at 379
pages. It has become an ad hoc compilation of ideas built upon the last six months book
purchases. This sounds like a poor way to construct a resounding intellectual piece of
work, but them I do not think of myself as some kind of genius, and I am certainly not a
trained intellectual. I am an amateur philosopher, I would liken myself to the amateur
antiquarian of the nineteenth century, a man with endless amounts of time, but, in my
case, unlike a Schliemann, with no money. I just explore intellectual deposits while
remaining always focused upon the central idea that humans are a part of nature,
specifically, humans are a superorganism. It surprises me to find that it is still possible
for me to find entirely new lines of thought echoing this organicist theme, as I have been
searching the internet relentlessly for half a dozen years now. But the internet is a rich
deposit where things do remain to be discovered in respect to this inspirational insight
that humans, down to their last details, are part of nature. And my method of searching
certainly lacks all rigour, that privilege belongs to the priests serving the establishment.
However, with the purchase of a couple of copies of the Journal of Social Philosophy
from Germany recently, in which I was delighted, and surprised to find a superb essay by
Boodin on The Biological Foundations of Society, I have suddenly found myself tapping
into an entirely new vein of ideas, which are very much a part of the later phase of the
nineteenth century interest in the idea of the social organism that petered out in the early
twentieth century, but which, it seems, in this new guise, was carried forward a little
longer.
I have naturally followed up my recent discovery of the most forthright exponent
of the idea that society is a social organism, with a search for other works by Boodin
expanding on this insight. Boodin was quite prolific, but as a philosopher his style is
evasive, rather than assertive, or positive. Accordingly we get books evoking the idea of
‘cosmic evolution’, an idea that has never caught my attention before, and which means
nothing to me, but I have decided this is simply a fancy way of referring to the universal
process of existence, what I suppose I would call universal evolution. One title, The
Social Mind, evokes the organicist theme. This got me running searches on the web for
the ‘social mind’, and as a result I found a title which I subsequently ordered from
America, just £10, only one original copy available, which I bought, although lots of
POD (print-on-demand) copies on offer. The Social Mind and Education, by George
Edgar Vincent, 1897, arrived just the other day, today being 21/04/08, and it is bang on
target, as we may now see from a snippet which resonates with the theme we have just
been examining, concerning our interest in how knowledge is controlled by organizing all
publicly available knowledge, so that people can only build their consciousness on the
basis set by those who own the relevant institutional structures :

The social mind, made possible by devices for the symbolizing and
communicating of thought, attains coördination and power in direct proportion to
the organization of this mechanism. That society in which individuals are careful
observers, accurate reporters, and in which the means exist for gathering up these
observations, organizing them with the traditions of the past, and distributing the
results widely, will, other things being equal, develop its collective knowledge to
a high degree of efficiency. This is in general the process which is going on
constantly in society. The absolutely essential importance of organized
communication is obvious. Division of intellectual labor is as dependent upon
communication as the specialization of industry upon a system of transportation. 3
3
The invention of printing was, in this view, the setting up of a communicating
apparatus by means of which the area of social consciousness might be greatly increased
and made the basis for the later emergence of social self-consciousness.

(Page 17)
 Well, a mixed bag this. He recognises the primary role of language, and the
relationship of language as a mechanism of collective consciousness to the social
structures controlling knowledge. But at the same time he implies that the social mind is
a product of civilised organization, not a feature of superorganic physiology created by
nature, in other words the social mind is made by man, not by nature. Which is like
saying a forest is made by the trees and not by nature, ridiculous ! So this is completely
antagonistic to the organicist logic that we have developed on the basis that humans
evolved to form a superorganism. Accordingly he finds a primary role for the individual
in the formation of the social mind, which is not surprising given that in the title of this
work the social mind is made prone to education. The preceding paragraph tells us that
“this essay is to deal chiefly with the cognitive function of both the individual and the
social mind”, and a note indicates that among other things this focus precludes any
attention being paid to authority. For us the essence of a social mind is authority over all
individual minds, so we can see that this work is not friendly to a scientific view of
society, and therefore we must regard it as a religious work, in pseudo scientific guise.
The main point to be clear about is that any ‘social mind’ possesses all individuals,
without exception, people do not possess the collective consciousness. The part cannot
own the whole to which it belongs, to think that it can is quite simply gaga.

Thursday, 31 January 2008

As it happens a rather nice book arrived from America today, I consider myself
very fortunate to have this book, it was bought for a mere tenner from what appeared to
be a bankruptcy dealer, they had ten copies, all brand new, and my copy is as new despite
being ten years old. But, my bibliophilic exuberance aside, this is a most exceptional
piece of work, the description was most extraordinary but the book is uniquely brilliant.
Human by Nature : Between Biology and the Social Sciences, by several editors, 1997.
The book was the product of a year in which biologists and sociologist lived together to
try and find some way of breaching the divide between these two disciplines. I have only
glanced at the opening pages of the introduction and it provides the most amazing
summary of the history of this subject, above I noted how it was possible to uncover this
history but that its complexity presented a problem in terms of knowing how it might be
used to develop our idea about the biological nature of human society. This said, this
work takes the same basic approach as that presented by Maclay, wherein the difficulties
over the split between science and sociology is accounted for in all sorts of legitimate
terms, and no suggestion is made that in reality scientists still live in a world where
religion determines what they may and may not say. In this work, unlike The Social
Organism, the role of the Nazis in bringing a genuine science of society into disrepute
and the role of religion in building resistance to a genuine science of humanity is stated
clearly, but there is no immediate indication that this difficulty represents the hidden
blockade mounted by the religious establishment against science.
Interestingly these people do use the terminology of war in the opening paragraph
of their introduction :
 “It has been twenty-two years since E. O. Wilson (1975) wrote
Sociobiology : The New Synthesis, which contained a final chapter advocating the
consideration of humans “in the free spirit of natural history, as though we were
zoologists from another planet completing a catalogue of social species on Earth”
(p.547). Wilson’s chapter ignited the “sociobiology controversy.” Its claims for
the relevance of evolutionary ideas from biology to the study of humans coincided
with a highly politicised involution of the social sciences that turned a previously
quiet disciplinary boundary into an intellectual Western front.”

(Page 1)

So how do these scientists account for this sudden flaring of war over
knowledge ?

“In fact, by and large social scientists have ignored the biological sciences
as irrelevant for their concerns. This attitude has its origins in the gaining of
disciplinary independence of both biology and sociology (as well as economics
and anthropology) around the turn of the century, and the different paths taken by
their theoretical development.”

Here we again find, despite the mealy mouthed excuses seeking to defend the
inexcusable, certain facts stated that are nice factual elements of this piece of
misinformation, namely the observations that sociology ignored the scientific foundations
developed over the course of decades, and this split away from a scientific foundation
occurred at about the turn of the century.
Next we have a delightful vindication of the argument presented here to the effect
that it is not enough to create a pseudo science to impose on society in the name of
religion, the true science which dominated society, as noted by Lloyd when he says
everyone recognised the organic nature of society about the time of writing his essay in
1901, must be forced out of the field of establishment ideas :

“In addition to being merely oblivious, however, there is also a more

aggressive repudiation of anything smacking of “biologization.” This attitude has
its origins in recent history—namely, the unholy union of biological determinism
and racism in the form of Nazi race policies that served to justify horrific
practices.”

(ibid.)

The excellence of the review provided by these professional science continues, as

does the failure of them to bite home on the true nature of the problem by identifying the
age old war between science religion as the true nature of the problem resurrected by
Wilson’s naive publication of Sociobiology.
We are given a brief review of the “theoretical history” (p. 2) of the split between
sociology and biology. The account begins by stating the warning of Nazism, and we
should not the significance of this, because in terms of the war between religion and
science, where the science of interest is the science of sociology which has recognised
that humans are a superorganic species of mammal, we must note that the Nazis were a
vital piece in the defence of religion from science, so that a scientific view of Nazism
would be to see the holocaust as a physiological sacrifice of bodily tissue required to
retain the integrity of the master identity of the human superorganism, whose cultural
identity is Jewish. These people begin their book by promising that they will not in any
way seek to breach the limitation imposed on social science by religion, whether they
know that this is what they are doing or not, and the intensity of the Nazis terror can be
easily justified as a social mechanism carried out in defence of the theocracy when we
see the power of its effect in this context. In other words, seen in a truly scientific mode,
the Nazis and their terror is a beautifully logical social movement, and s supreme
expression of Jewish identity, which, from a rational point of view makes perfect sense
since we know that anti-Jewish movements go with Jewish movement as surely as up
goes with down, so anti-Semitism must be a fundamental quality of Judaism without
which Jews could not exist.
They go on to say that “No scientific discourse is completely detached from the
political or the social. Scientific reasoning is both influenced by, and has effects on,
political thought and action, as well as social values.” (p. 3) Then we come to an overt
reference to the impact of religion on science, but this is not expressed as it should be in
terms of warfare in which science is always nothing more than a castrated slave of the
absolute authority vested in religious power :

“At the basis of dichotomous thinking is the notion of human uniqueness

with its deep roots in Judeo-Christian religion. Human and social scientists have
used the thesis of human uniqueness as an argument for ignoring biology. It is
claimed that entirely different theoretical constructs are required to understand
humans, and thus the natural sciences are of little relevance.”

(ibid.)

For us, looking at the above statement, the notion that a scientist of any kind
would use the religious mantra of human divinity, albeit translated into a secularised
form, as an excuse for ignoring science as a means of understanding humans would be
like a leading feminist claiming that rape was acceptable if it gave men pleasure ! or if a
police officer said crimes like murder or robbery committed by police officers were perks
of the job and could not be deemed crimes ! In the two latter cases we would say that the
feminist and police officer were not really feminists or police officers, and what this
comes down to is the need for a clear statement that to be a scientist means being a
proactive atheist, indeed science and atheism must be essentially synonymous. In this
book no sooner have the above quoted remarks been made and we find a discussion of
how the Creationist views the question of human uniqueness ! Good grief, what kind of
insanity is this ? And so we see how utterly victorious the theocracy has been in
subverting, corrupting and substituting fake science for true science and it is clear that the
willingness of universities to tolerate the present of religious people within its supposedly
scientific halls makes a mockery of science.
Yet this book is truly amazing and I must just note my blissful delight in finding
the names of Lilienfeld and Schäffle both appearing in this book, and the word
‘superorganism’ being used freely. This is truly exceptional. But the inevitable failure of
these works to be truly scientific, and to be in reality subservient to the religious mantra
of human uniqueness and the idea of the individual as the human being, thwarts any urge
to read this book.

The end of believing is the beginning of knowing refers to the fact that we often
use the phrase ‘I believe’ in conversation, and it is at precisely this point in our reasoning
process that we must stop, and think about the personal component implicit in this phrase,
and ask what follows is really the product of ‘I’ or of ‘another’.
The Saturday before last, today being Wednesday, 02 April 2008, I was hanging
on the bar of my local, in town, as is my wont, and a young women who has taken an
interest in me took up a conversation with me. She imagines that we think alike ! can
you believe it ? I cannot, but I like the idea of meeting someone, hell, anyone, who
thinks as I do. I am the proverbial anarchist, she wants to become a military police
officer, it is hard for me to imagine anything more different. But she said she wanted to
do this work because she believed in it, she was not religious, she believed in what it
meant to be British. I think that was the gist of what she said, and naturally I asked what
it was that she believed, and getting noting more definite than the general quality of our
famed nationality, I wanted to think of some way of teasing out something more
provocative.
I asked her why the war in Iraq was started, naturally i wanted her to tell me it
was a war mounted by the slaves of the Jews to continue the process of Jewish global
dominance, focused on the Middle East at present because of the fresh wound of Israel’s
formation. She said it was because Bush wanted oil. The most brain-dead answer
anyone could give, the answer everyone gives, the answer supplied by our masters. I
wanted to see if she had any notion of thinking beyond the bare face of mass
communication. I asked if she knew anything of biology, of evolution, and she said that
her father was a geneticist, so she must know something about these things. Then, I
asked does the idea that we are part of the natural world, evolved here, not prompt her to
wonder about what our true nature is, on a level beyond the obvious. She then came out
with pat answer that is the brick wall to all my work, she said that people had developed
to the point where they had control over how they lived, even to the point where they
could choose to destroy themselves is they were determined to do so. Oh, despair !
But this got me thinking just last night, that the next obvious question, if it were
possible to continue such conversations, which are always at best fleeting, would be to try
and investigate to what extent this intelligent, educated young women, might be able to
tackle the question about her beliefs, to what extent it meant anything to call her ideas
about what is valuable or true are her beliefs. And in terms of this conversation, thinking
of how I might pursue this women’s thinking, I decided that : the end of believing is the
beginning of knowing.
 If we consider the position of a person such as this young women, committed as
she is to a life of devotion to a cause, that is her own society, then we have a connection
with the value of belief over knowledge that allows us to think about how we can
preserve the value of blind faith, and ignorance to a purpose, while still advancing our
understanding of our ourselves and our existence.
It goes with the territory of anti-establishment thinking that no concern is shown
for the realities of life, dropping out, avoiding work and all responsibility is no worry for
the likes of myself. But I would hate to be so shallow as to be blind to the necessities of
life. On the other hand it is a pity to devote your life to figuring out why we should hate
and despise authority only to conclude by recognising that we are stuck withy what we
have because such is life. But these alternate positions, the ideal versus the pragmatic,
must be mastered alternately in order that life can be lived most happily.
Hence, we want to disabuse our young lady of her slave notions about one man
wanting oil being the reason for a major war, we want to obtain a recognition in this
women of her mindless adherence to a puerile idea of what people are. Yet we want to
leave untouched and undiminished her desire to follow her chosen path as an obedient
servant of the machine that has fed her the beliefs that have informed her life choices. In
other words we want to deliver a more subtle and more potent idea of why things are
what they are.

I said to this girl that I had spent my life trying to answer such questions as the
ones I have said I put to her above, and she said that a person could spend their life trying
to answer such questions, and get nowhere. Charming ! I did not bother to tell her I had
got everywhere, and had all the answers, and she did not ask. I sincerely hope we do not
think alike. But she is young, and even had I ever had the pleasure of meeting anyone
who even pretended to wisdom when I was so young — no, I would of asked the obvious
question, and not been so ignorant as to think that there is no answer to the simplest
question of all, What is the nature of existence, what are human beings ?

I would like to tell her that the actual reason we fight wars in the modern world is
in order to reaffirm our slave status, originally established in wars conducted against us
long ago, long ago in personal terms that is. Can you imagine how that would go down !
She would be a challenge, she intrigues me ; and I could shag her ! if she were lucky !!
 Chapter Two

Superorganics

If, as we contend, the problem that the good people who put so much effort into
trying to weld a relationship between the life sciences and social science comes down to a
structural dynamic implicit in the social structure, of precisely the same kind as that
found in the ancient world where naturalistic ideas about the cosmos threatened religious
ideas projected into the cosmic domain, then the problems faced by science cannot be
dealt with by any amount of effort to discern a true science of humanity, since we know
all such ideas will be doomed to subversion and destruction. But we want to explore our
subject, flipping through the book Human by Nature, which arrived from America today,
31/01/08, we find chapter six particularly alluring, as it deals with the evolution of social
fabric, albeit we find the encouraging title subverted by a classic individualising device
that makes the person the human, namely the idea of psychology. Chapter six opens :

“The standard rationale for the social sciences being separate disciplines
from biology rests on the assertion that human social behaviour is uniquely
complex. Anthropologists and sociologists often argue that human institutions
managing the reproductive, productive, and symbolic features of human social life
bear only remote connections to the phenomena of evolutionary biology.
Proponents of more interdisciplinary views assert that at the very least, biology
underpins sociocultural systems, to which evolutionary considerations add the fact
that humans must have evolved from an ape-human common ancestor relatively
recently.”

(Page 201)

We assert that humans evolved to form social structure, therefore we are very
keen to see some pertinent discussion of social structure. Over the page their somewhat
pathetic account dribbles on :

“Of course, even the most extreme proponents of the institutional

approach recognize that humans are biological organisms that evolved. They
merely find this relatively uninteresting. Taking comfort from an earlier
generation of evolutionary biologists like Dobzhansky (1968), they conceive of
human social institutions as an emergent superorganic system little constrained or
limited by the organic substratum.”
 (p. 202)

So what do we have here ? Institutions are superorganic structures that are not
constrained by evolved human physiology. How bizarre is this, why not think about the
positive dependence of human institutions on human physiology, why make this
statement in the negative mode ? Because these people are giving voice to the enemies of
science, and this is how they express themselves.

“Whether some individuals speak English or German is the result of the

linguistic environment in which they were reared, but that they speak any
language at all has a genetic basis.”

(p. 6)

Applying the negative explanation for human freedom we can say that although it
is human biology that makes speaking possible we need pay no attention to this fact, it is
irrelevant, because once humans could speak our biology had no power to determine
what languages we spoke !! This is a perfect application of the logic offered in the above
passages, yet the logic is insane. Clearly it is of no significance whatever whether people
speak German or English from a scientific point of view, the question of scientific
interest is the one rooted in human biology, not the nuances of human social action that
express the biological imperative. And the same applies to human social fabric, what
matters is that a social fabric exists, humans cannot exist without, it, but what precise
form that social fabric takes is, in the first instance, for science that only wants to
understand what humans are and why they exist as they do, is wholly meaningless. Yes,
we can see as we delve further into this work that as fantastic as it is because it is a
modern account devoted to our subject, it is nonetheless a subversive account intended to
continue bolstering the barricades against science, in the name of religion.

________

There is no way through the barricade of science set up by the social structure to
protect religion from science, but we can separate ourselves off in our own little world
and peruse a real science of sociology for our own pleasure. Where to begin.
When we live in a world pervaded by an all embracing pseudo scientific academic
establishment then we find ourselves continually drawn toward one false account of
reality after another, but in order for such an extensive imposition to be effected the
deception must rely upon a key. The existence of such a key requires the existence of a
logical duality providing two possible points of view of the same reality, and in terms of
sociology this duality is found in the division of human life according to the principle of
the individual versus the collective. We find this fact revealed abundantly in the book we
have just been considering. Human by Nature opens by considering a series of dualisms
which the authors say must be suppressed, we find a subtitle “Beyond Dichotomies” on
page six, and on page eight the one of particular interest to us would seem to be
“Ontology : Atomism Versus Holism”. Well, unfortunately, reading the short passage
appearing under this subtitle is of no help in determining why we must rid ourselves of
the particulate versus collective dualism in the human sciences, it is merely said that in
all science such dualities are proving to be illusory.
While we automatically dismiss this dualism, by asserting that humans are a
superorganic species and the social entity is the living organism, and the person is
therefore not an organism in any meaningful sense, and therefore we implicitly support
the idea of dismissing duality in the science of humans, the trouble is we find that despite
the emphasis of Human by Nature on the biological idea applied to society, such that
words like ‘superorganic’ become common parlance in its text, the fundamental
deception imposed by the theocracy upon the human sciences—that there is such a thing
as a human individual, as in the person—is used in detail throughout the work. Therefore
this is a work based on the dualism of society seen as a superorganic entity produced by
the active effort of individuals who may be driven in their actions by unseen natural
features of their biological nature. Reading the passage supposedly rejecting the macro-
micro dualism related to human biological nature we would of expected to see a scientist
tackling this matter head on by saying dualism in sociology related to the question
whether society was a biological form or a whether people were individuals who were
ends in the own right, living potentially, entirely independently of one another, as the
conscious fabricators of society, or whether there was some combination of the two. The
latter conclusion would of course be absurd, and defeat the very statement being made,
that is the denial of valid dualisms in nature.
These people never tire of asking the same question, they ask it repeatedly, there
is a whole section entitled Analogies, it begins thus :

“Introduction : The Value and Limitations of

Analogies from Biology in the Study of Culture

In what sense is society like an organism or population of organisms ? In

what way is the evolution of the state from less organized collectivities like the
evolution of multicellular organisms from unicellular ones ?”

(Page 283)

And so on, and on, it goes. This is nonsense. When they discuss the nineteenth
century thinkers who concerned themselves with the superorganic nature of human
society they mention that there was one who thought that society was actually an
organism, but this does not mean they know anything about his work, it was never
translated into English, and there is one excellent book from 1910 dealing with ideas
which people had on this topic, so we may assume that the authors of Human by Nature
read Coker’s work and derived these observations from it. Had they read Lilienfeld’s
work they would know that in asserting that society is a true organism he begins at the
beginning by discussing basic universal features of existence, such as the role of force in
the material world.
The idea of analogies is what created all the problems for our nineteenth century
social scientists, misled by Herbert Spencer they were made fools of for making too
much of silly comparisons between things like telegraph cables in society and nerves in
the body. Such analogies are only suggestive. A truly scientific approach to analogical
similarities is the comparative method, where comparative physiology might indicate the
true homologue between fishes gills say, that extract oxygen from water, and human
lungs that take oxygen from air. Such functional comparison would allow any sincere
sociologists seeking to envisage human society as a natural product of biological
processes to make meaningful comparisons. Hence the first thing to do is to see social
structure as a physiological form, and to work from this basic scientific conception.
Reference is made to insect societies, as it should be, but the key is to assume that human
society is of the same nature, these people never give this idea a moments thought.
How is this possible, why do scientists not at least try and see if it is possible to
think about humans as if they were mammalian insects ? The answer can be developed
along two lines, firstly the consciousness of individuals that precludes any possibility that
humans are some kind of automaton, and secondly the need to take religion as the basis
of a scientific argument asserting that humans are indeed automatons. And so we find
ourselves back with religion and the war between religion and science. There is no
escaping this topic because in our world this topic is the be all and end all of our subject,
it can not be otherwise as long as religion exists, in order for science to exist it must first
destroy religion.

The main stay of the theocratic party’s argument that society is made by
individuals for individuals is the contract theory of social organization, for which the
French philosopher Rousseau is famous, although we saw from Lloyd that the English
political philosopher Hobbes had developed a contractual conception of social
organization a century before, which the English philosopher of human nature, Locke,
had shown to be absurd when he pointed out the difference between society and
government.
A contractual arrangement is nothing more than a linguistically determined
pattern of social behaviour, and as our would be organicist thinkers have already be
shown to agree, language is a physiological feature of the human individual’s body.
People have no more choice in their commitment to linguistic activity than they have in
their activity determined by a need for food. It may be argued that whether people eat
grubs garnered from the wild or tinned food taken from a shop shelf is a choice each
individual makes for themselves, but this is complete nonsense, society moves en bloc
and none can escape the process of change. The same is true in the intellectual
department, contractual arrangements are made within centralised structures and imposed
on society, regardless of what anyone thinks. It is true that there is tension between the
core authority that dictates social behaviour, and the masses who are obliged to obey the
rules laid down, but such tension is miniscule at the best of times and may be disregarded
as being of any consequence in the determination of how individuals live their lives. This
argument flies in the face of the propaganda put out by the controllers of society, and as
part of their management of the social fabric they pay lip service to the idea of the
individual as the supreme point of authority, and they give this lip service value by
investing power in the idea. Even so, in the end, this homage to the individual is itself
only designed to make the individual more suited to the totality of the superorganic being
whose physiology is created through the linguistic routines that may be described in
terms of contractual arrangements made between free individuals who give up their
inalienable rights, as Lloyd indicates Hobbes had said, in order to make a better world for
themselves in society. But why would they do that ? The answer is simple, because they
have to live in society, so the inalienable rights that they are forced to alienate themselves
from, were, by definition, never rights in the first place, and this is because there is no
such thing as an individual as an end in themselves.
At the heart of superorganics is the study of language because it is language that
makes social structure. Natural forces direct, or may be said to indicate, the flow of
energy in the material world, and the flow of energy determines the creation of structure,
which in turn directs the flow of energy. This sounds like an over elaborated closed loop,
but its delineation of information and structure as two means of directing the flow of
energy are necessary for a creative process generating complexity to exist. Energy is the
uniform medium, information is structure that carries the energy medium, but
information appears in a pure form and a fixed form, in the physicist’s world this duality
is seen in the puzzling ability of light to exist as a wave and particle, perhaps, but in the
large scale world inhabited by humans we can see pure information directing the flow of
energy in such systems as the genome and languages. In both cases these pure forms of
directing the flow of energy, pure because they are information systems that exist to
create material systems, these information systems give rise to material structures that
carry the process of energy flow to a further degree of structuration. Energy is used in
building structures that in turn must commit a portion of their structure to the onward
flow of energy to the next phase of creative activity in the total process. This may bring
to mind the energy equations found in the use of fuels where, for example burning coal in
a domestic fire send most of the heat up the chimney simply in order to allow radiant heat
to warm the room. This may be seen as wasteful, but the system requires a flue to expel
gases and the lesson is that all processes in nature involve this kind of compromise.
Applying this basic rule of universal creativity to human society, we may say that for
society to exist it must generate structures, but in the process of generating such
structures a proportion of the social fabric will have to be devoted to ensuring the flow of
energy on through the total process of human beingness, and this is why such a massive
amount of our social fabric is largely wasteful, like the heat piling out of a chimney into
the cold night air, so much of our social fabric is not about living our lives, but about just
making sure the whole structure holds together in such a way that the element of its
existence that we need to have the integrity of the entire being continue in existence, is
sustained.
This raises the question, what is parts of the social structure are the warm
essentials of human existence, and what are the systems of maintenance ? This
description represents social structure in something of a mechanistic light, so if we think
of a familiar machine, a car, and ask the same question of it, we will find our thoughts
more readily able to answer the question, and in turn these answers may help us identify
what elements of our social fabric are the living part, what the dead matter necessary to
make the social soul live. But I wonder how far we will be able to disentangle the living
part from the dead undercarriage when it comes to society, because for us, as cellular
elements of the superorganism, we are made so that the vital undercarriage is everything
to us, things like religion, sport, media, music, these are the kinds of things that lock us in
place and make us sense life as precious, but they are perhaps the very things needed to
make the living being able to exist. It could be that if we seek to understand society in
this mechanistic light then we cannot avoid reducing the complex unity of society to a
living equivalent of a complex system such as that which we find in the making of the
planet on which we live, and how could we ever determined which part of the planets
geological systems are underpinning the real essentials ? Is plate tectonics just a million
year phase existing for the glorious moment of a volcanic eruption ? Hardly.
And so it seems we cannot avoid erasing meaning from human existence if we
apply a scientific scrutiny to human society, and it is this fact which tells us that our
mode of reasoning about human society is almost certain to be correct science. On the
face of it this seems to be a good argument against being scientific if we assume that we
cannot live without a sense of purpose or meaning, but the fact is that we evolved to live
in society, and irrespective of what we know about the nature of reality the capacity to
take pleasure from existing is built into us, that is what the tricks that beguile us tap into,
but it is by no means certain that we can only find gratification in social unity if we are
beguiled into taking existence to be something that it is not, something sacred for
example. The extraordinary power of pure knowledge of the kind made available to us
through science is so rich that there is every reason to think that it is rich enough to
sustain our inbuilt joie de vivre, if we will only give reality a chance to prove itself to us.
 Chapter Three

The Problem with Individualism

We noted that all knowledge was sublimated into a theocratic form, and that such
a process of sublimation required the imposition of a false key, that key derived from the
dualistic form of reality whereby our consciousness identifies parts as integral wholes,
especially in the case of ourselves. Consciousness, in the sense just alluded to, where we
become possessed of ideas, is a product of language, ideas are purely linguistic
phenomenon that are dependant for their form upon the language that creates them. It
follows from this idea that individuals cannot be control of the ideas they possess because
language is not the possession of any individual, and as experience becomes separated
from ideas, because language can transfer ideas directly from one person to another
without the need on anyone’s part for any experience related to the ideas themselves,
ideas become a thing of social interaction and nothing else. Language therefore
intensifies a state of individuality that is induced into our being by our genetic make up,
the consciousness produced by language sets up a barrier between our sense of existence
and ourselves that exists within our own bodies, within our brain. What this means is that
a conceptual, or psychological mechanism is developed which gives us an intense sense
of individuality while ensuring that we have no individuality whatsoever. But in the
process of performing such a service to the superorganic being of which we form a part
the idea of the individual is made supreme by the mechanisms of language that binds the
individual into the whole in way that the individual cannot know because language
provides the person with their self consciousness, from which they cannot escape.
We can illustrate how this perceptual trick making people think they are
individuals works by taking the words of a proud and demanding atheist, and show how
this man unwittingly did the work of religion while promoting atheism, simply by
thinking of himself, and everyone else, as an individual :

From a chapter called What is Religion ? we have the following :

The strange devotion that some people show to such a word as “religion,” or, to put the
same thing in another way, the fear they display of being thought to be without some sort
of a religion involves something wider and deeper than has yet been noted.
Adequately to deal with this would require much greater space than I can allot
myself, and I must rest content with a very rapid glance at the subject. It has already been
pointed out that when religion meets us in human society, it is there as essentially a belief
in the existence of supernatural beings. That is the common basis of all religion.
Religions may differ in a variety of beliefs and customs, but the point of general
agreement is reached in the belief in the supernatural. Gods differ in their shape, their
power, even in their duration, but in these respects they differ as men differ from each
other. Gods are made in the image of men and they have the character of their creators.
Gods are the thought-children of the race, and their vitality depends upon the clarity and
the strength of the thought-forms that give them birth. When men cease to believe in the
gods, the gods cease to exist.
But where, as in early society the gods are most evident and most active, where
everything is dependent upon gaining the good-will of the gods, and where offending
them may jeopardise the health of the tribe, or ruin the harvest, or bring about defeat in
battle, there is precisely the same justification for punishing the unbeliever as there is for
punishing people who so act that they are exposing individuals or communities to
disaster. To sap belief in the gods, or to affront them is equal to a man scattering disease
germs in Fleet Street. In such circumstances the unbeliever is a social pariah. He is
marked as standing apart from his fellows on the most vital of all questions. He is as
obnoxious as a pro-German was in 1915, and as unpopular as was a leper in a medieval
village. Disbelief in the gods of other peoples may be expressed, doubt as to their
greatness is perhaps expected, but to question the gods of your own tribe is something
that “simply is not done.”
It is at this stage of social development that there is created the feeling that the
man who does not obey the gods, the man who offends them by questioning their
decrees, or even their existence, is a social danger. He finds himself cut off from the
company of others, or he is punished as one punishes a criminal, and for exactly the same
reason—he is a standing threat to social security. The lawyers of the times of Elizabeth
and James who laid it down that blasphemy was of the nature of treason were stating a
greater anthropological truth than they knew. They were dealing with a phase of social
solidarity that goes back to the very dawn of associated human life.
At a further stage of social development, opposition to one god is made in the
name of another, and the deposed god may be reduced to the level of an evil spirit, or he
may be abolished altogether. And for a very long time the rejection of one god continues
to be made in the name of, or in the interests of, another, the Mohammedan god in favour
of the Christian one, the Roman Catholic deity in favour of the Protestant God, the
Presbyterian deity in favour of the Baptist deity, and so forth. But to be without a God
altogether ; that is the terrible thing ! To say, “I do not believe in your God,” with the
implication that one still has some sort of a God for presentation when required, or to say,
“I do not believe in your religion,” again with the implication that, for public purposes at
least, one still has a religion, saves one’s face. But to say plainly and deliberately, “I do
not believe in a God of any kind, I have no religion of any kind” to say this in the
simplest possible language, and without the slightest equivocation, implies a degree of
mental clarity and moral courage, of which but a minority of people are capable. It is to
be able to stand alone ; and how many can do that ? Where all the foxes have tails, how
many can bear to be without some spinal elongation ? It singles one out for
dishonourable mention, and as the subject of a social boycott that most men and women
will risk everything to avert. Genuine independence is still something that one must pay
for, and there are not many who care to indulge in that extravagance.
It is this dislike of being different from the herd in the matter in which unity was
most important to our ancestors, and for so many thousands of generations, that finds
expression in the desire to be credited with some kind of a religion.
The Chesterfieldian unbeliever who is of the religion of those avowedly “sensible
men,” who do not say what their religion is, discovers that he is out to reform religion, to
purify religion, to rationalize religion, to do almost anything rather than to make the plain
statement that he is without religion himself, is as much an example of a survival from a
pre-scientific age, as our rudimentary hair covering is of survival from ape-like ancestors.
I do not believe that it is the rightful work of the disbeliever in religion to purify
religion, or to make it rational. If that is the proper aim, then there are scores of churches
that one may join, and so help the parson to get on with his job. Besides you cannot make
religion commendable to the properly educated reason. You may make religion a little
less definite in its form, and for those who admire the clarity of a London fog that is
something. You may make religion a little less openly troublesome, but you cannot make
it fundamentally useful. You can express religious ideas a little differently, borrowing the
language of science and philosophy to do so, but you cannot alter the real character of
religious beliefs. You may even adopt the theory, now advanced by some religious
anthropologists, that primitive ideas of God are in fundamental agreement with those of
the “advanced” religionist. I can agree with that, only I would read it the other way
round, and say that the most advanced ideas of God are in fundamental agreement with
those of the savage. And although the two statements look identical, the religionist is too
artful to have it expressed in that form.
So I say that the work of the true reformer is not to rationalize religion, but to end
it. I say that his real task is not even to attempt to prove that he is fundamentally at one
with his religious neighbour, but to show that he is in complete and fundamental
disagreement with him. I do not think that it is a good policy or a wise policy for the
Freethinker to work for a time when Christians and Freethinkers may settle down
comfortably together. I believe that his real task should be to work for a time when there
are no Christians to settle down with. Our work is not to make religion rational, but to
make it impossible.
The best way to do this is for the Freethinker to stand on his own feet. The
measure of the real respect that the Freethinker will get from the religious world, will
ultimately depend upon the amount of respect he has for himself. If the other foxes will
wear tails, there is no reason whatever why a man who is born without one, or who has
lost the one he had, should acquire an ornament that adds nothing whatever to his dignity.
Of course, as I have said, this involves a man’s learning to stand alone. At the best it will
mean that he must be content with the company of a few; but in this matter one has to
decide whether one wishes to be in front or to be with the crowd. The certain thing is that
one cannot be in front with the crowd. Above all, if we really believe in the value of
truth-speaking, and in the importance of marrying language to exact thought, we must see
that our terminology is as free as possible from misleading connotations. There is plenty
of liberal thinking about to-day ; our growing need is for exact thinking ; and when we
have achieved this, the courage to express it without hesitation and without ambiguity.

(Primitive Survivals in Modern Thought, Chapman Cohen, 1935, Pages 40 – 45)

The title of this essay-cum-chapter is the most desirable title we could ever which
for, but unsurprisingly its author does not fulfil the promise of his bold words, not
deliberately anyway. Cohen describes the functional nature of religion in binding society
together remarkably well, but in so far as he means to tell us what religion is, all he
seems to mean by this statement is that he will define the word religion for us, a
necessary task because of the confusing way in which people use the word evasively so
as not to isolate themselves from society, so he says “Belief in the supernatural is the one
thing that really defines, that is, it is the one thing that marks religion off from other
things.” (Pages 33-4)
As we see from the passage quoted, he is a strident atheist, he wants in a world in
which it is not possible for Christians to exist, a desire we heartily approve of, but it
seems implicit in the argument presented that he means this to be achieved through the
exercise of reason, even though elsewhere in the essay he ridicules the use of the word
‘reason’ as a defining quality of atheistic thought. But what is implicit in his thinking is
that people are individuals who must be appealed to as individuals, one by one. And yet,
as we can see from the general tenor of his description of how belief systems serve
society, and serve to isolate individuals in such as way as to cause beliefs to be sustained
in opposition to any individualist rationale, religion has a force associated with the unity
of the collective being. And this man was thriving when the idea of the social organism
must still of been well known to all intellectually minded people, and was still being
argued for and against in some quarters, so Cohen must of been familiar with the
naturalistic sense of collective being, but we have no sign of it here, here we see only the
determined individualist. In actual fact, it would seem from the above that atheism is
linked directly with the most intensive expression of the sense of individuality, and in
actual fact, as a life long atheist, I can affirm that this is correct.
But the fact is that if we want to know what religion is, really is, and no just in
what way the word religion can be made discrete within the plethora of ways in which it
is used by a babble of competing individuals each seeking to make the word their own,
then we need to look at thwart religion does, and we can get a very nice sense of what
religion is in a functional sense from the way Cohen talks about religion binding people
together while isolating those who might disturb that same unity. Curiously enough
when Cohen begins his essay he defines definition by saying that what a definition must
do is to established inclusivity and exclusivity, and most especially to exclude, which it
seems is exactly what religion itself does in relation to the individuals of which a social
unit is composed. In other words a definition should fix a words identity, and it seems
this is precisely what religion does for the person, it fixes their identity as units of a social
body by making the individual one with the social body. And in effect when a person
denies religion they deny social identity.
So Cohen really does present the correct answer to the question proposed, but he
does not appear to know he has done so, and consequently he can hardly develop the
solution he offers by elaborating on its significance. He cannot indicate that people
evolved their physiological form in order to be able to bring a living being into existence
at the level of social structure, and therefore there was no question of religion being a
primitive throw back to an earlier time, but rather religion was as alive and well and as
valid as it had ever been because it was the identity uniting our social being under the
name of Judaism, so that to eradicate Christians we had to eradicate Jews and Moslems.
This is all perfectly obvious, but this man, the greatest of his generation dealing with such
questions, since he was publishing books for the Secular Society, and must therefore of
been the best they could find, failed to see this obvious fact. And this error is due to one
simple fact, he applies the key of individuality to the person in every thought he has,
which is fatal to any science of humanity and the key to saving religion from science,
making this atheist the best friend religion could ever hope to find, he is a gatekeeper of
religion, a man who prevents true atheistic thought from appearing by taking up the slots
in the public debate that would be left void if someone did not pretend to be an atheist,
today the likes of Dawkins fulfil this vital role in the theocratic establishment. Was
Cohen a Jew ? His name could not be more Jewish, Jews are great leaders of the
Christian slave body forever providing misguided ideas of a provocative and challenging
kind that pretend to be radical but in reality only reinforce the delusion of individuality,
Marx and Freud would be perfect examples of the type, but of course to ask such
questions is to invoke the great Jewish defence provided by brilliance of the ultimate
gatekeeper of Judaism, Adolf Hitler.

Once we understand what the basic biological format of human existence is then
we can make sense of any elaborations of social superstructure raised upon genetic
foundations such as Cohen indicates when he describes the development of religion
proceeding from the simple to the complex so that we from a phase that demands total
unity to one where talk of an atheistic kind develops between different conceptions of
true religion, thus creating social division, which is synonymous with social structure.
This transition away from discrete unity, to complex unity embracing diversity within a
concept of unity is the means by which an extended organic being can come into
existence, so that the process of intellectual liberation implied in Cohen’s essay is not a
process of intellectual liberation at all, it is a process of extended religious authority that
requires the flexibility that our modern liberality injects into a massive social being which
nonetheless remains tightly bound by religious identity vested in the core structures of
society.

When we spoke of the authors of books on the war between religion and science
we took no detail, lets do so :

THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE.

_______

I purpose to present an outline of the great, sacred struggle for the liberty of
science—a struggle which has lasted for so many centuries, and which yet continues. A
hard contest it has been ; a war waged longer, with battles fiercer, with sieges more
persistent, with strategy more shrewd than in any of the comparatively transient warfare
of Cæsar or Napoleon or Moltke.
I shall ask you to go with me through some of the most protracted sieges, and
over some of the hardest-fought battle-fields of this war. We will look well at the
combatants; we will listen to the battle-cries; we will note the strategy of leaders, the cut
and thrust of champions, the weight of missiles, the temper of weapons ; we will look
also at the truces and treaties, and note the delusive impotency of all compromises in
which the warriors for scientific truth have consented to receive direction or bias from the
best of men uninspired by the scientific spirit, or unfamiliar with scientific methods.
 My thesis, which, by an historical study of this warfare, I expect to develop, is the
following : In all modern history, interference with science in the supposed interest of
religion, no matter how conscientious such interference may have been, has resulted in
the direst evils both to religion and to science—and invariably. And, on the other hand,
all untrammelled scientific investigation, no matter how dangerous to religion some of its
stages may have seemed, for the time, to be, has invariably resulted in the highest good
of religion and of science. I say “invariably.” I mean exactly that. It is a rule to which
history shows not one exception.
It would seem, logically, that this statement cannot be gainsaid. God’s truths must
agree, whether discovered by looking within upon the soul, or without upon the world. A
truth written upon the human heart to-day, in its full play of emotions or passions, cannot
be at any real variance even with a truth written upon a fossil whose poor life ebbed forth
millions of years ago.
This being so, it would also seem a truth irrefragable, that the search for each of
these kinds of truth must be followed out on its own lines, by its own methods, to its own
results, without any interference from investigators on other lines, or by other methods.
And it would also seem logical to work on in absolute confidence that whatever, at any
moment, may seem to be the relative positions of the two different bands of workers, they
must at last come together, for Truth is one.
But logic is not history. History is full of interferences which have cost the earth
dear. Strangest of all, some of the direst of them have been made by the best of men,
actuated by the purest motives, and seeking the noblest results. These interferences, and
the struggle against them, make up the warfare of science.
One statement more, to clear the ground. You will not understand me at all to say
that religion has done nothing for science. It has done much for it. The work of
Christianity has been mighty indeed. Through these two thousand years, despite the waste
of its energies on all the things its Blessed Founder most earnestly condemned—on fetish
and subtlety and war and pomp—it has undermined servitude, mitigated tyranny, given
hope to the hopeless, comfort to the afflicted, light to the blind, bread to the starving, joy
to the dying, and this work continues. And its work for science, too, has been great. It has
fostered science often. Nay, it has nourished that feeling of self-sacrifice for human good,
which has nerved some of the bravest men for these battles.
Unfortunately, a devoted army of good men started centuries ago with the idea
that independent scientific investigation is unsafe—that theology must intervene to
superintend its methods, and the Biblical record, as an historical compendium and
scientific treatise, be taken as a standard to determine its results. So began this great
modern war.

(The Warfare of Science, Andrew White, 1877. First published 1876.

Pages 7 – 10)

This work is the most precious work any atheist could ever desire, and here we
see it is written by one so utterly devoted to religion, so undisguised an enemy of free
thought, of science, that the religious bigot must weep for joy at the sight of such a book.
And so, as we indicated above, the publication of such work came at a time when the
theocracy was constructing an escape strategy from the bind in which their dogma placed
them, so that instead of imposing obedience the social structure extruded a secular outer
shell to carry such false pieces of atheistic cum scientific work as this by White, to
pretend that finally the age old war was finished and all would be at peace, science would
be free. How on earth could religion ever be a peace with a truly free science, the idea is
insane, and yet this what White says here, and he asserts that religion felt in the heart is as
true as any evidence of science, truly pathetic, obscene and criminally perverse, a true
work of evil by any scientific standard, but fabulous work that it is a sheer delight to find,
because it is the best we can ever hope for in a slave world such as we live within.

The above quote is taken from a very slight volume, over the course of the next
two decades White continued to develop this theme, resulting in a new version of the
above book published in two volumes, a much more substantial piece of work. Rather
than pinch a bit from the new version of the old work, the critique of a reviewer offers us
some nice thoughts :

ART. IV.—A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom.

By ANDREW DICKSON WHITE, London 1896.

NOTHING is more remarkable in the history of the last few centuries than the additions
which have been made to the knowledge of mankind. The intellect of man is no greater
than it was, perhaps is not so great as it was, in the days of Athens. But the knowledge of
man has increased, and is increasing, at a constantly accelerating ratio. This addition to
our knowledge affects us in every department of life. It endows our inventors, our
engineers, our mechanics with new powers. It enables them to achieve successes which in
past ages they could not have even contemplated. But increased knowledge has not
merely enabled man to dominate nature ; it has furnished him with new materials for
explaining nature. The old theories which geologists, astronomers, and biologists
universally accepted a few centuries ago have been discarded for new theories, to which
new discoveries and new inventions have contributed; and the whole idea of the world in
which we live and of the surrounding universe has been modified and enlarged.
Ready, however, as most of us are to admit that the area of human knowledge has
been extended during the preceding centuries, many of us forget that only a
comparatively small number of persons have the means, the leisure, or the ability to
satisfy themselves of the truth of the conclusions which scientific men have established.
The ordinary citizen accepts the facts that the world is some 24,000 miles in
circumference, and that the sun is rather more than 90,000,000 miles from the earth, just
as he accepts the fact that a message handed to a telegraphist in London can be
transmitted within a second of time by electricity to New York. But he could no more
give an intelligent reason for his faith in the one case than he could himself construct an
electric battery in the other. The victory which the electrician has won over the forces of
nature is, indeed, impressed on him by the circumstance that he can himself communicate
by electricity with a distant friend. But the victory which the astronomer has concurrently
won over nature is not brought home to the ordinary citizen in the same way. He accepts
the facts which scientific men have established because he finds that other persons,
whose integrity he trusts and whose abilities he respects, have received them as proven.
Beyond this he cannot go : he cannot hope to measure for himself the circumference of
our globe or its distance from the sun.
If these circumstances be clearly borne in mind it will not seem surprising that
new discoveries in physics should have only slowly filtered into the popular
understanding. They could only be accepted by the great mass of men and women on the
authority of those who taught them ; and authority necessarily rests with those who
maintain old traditions and not with those who propound new theories.
The reluctance of mankind, moreover, to accept the new discoveries which
scientific men have made has been increased by the fact that religion in all ages has
assumed the task of interpreting nature. Both in the ancient and in the modern world the
ideas about the earth in which we live and the surrounding universe have been associated
with religious belief; and new theories, therefore, seemed not only opposed to authority,
but subversive in many cases of faith. This attitude of religion affected the ancient
heathen as well as the modern Christian world. Plutarch tells us in his life of Nicias—if
we remember rightly—that Anaxagoras was thrown into prison for explaining the manner
in which the moon was illuminated. Perhaps, therefore, it is not wholly surprising that
Galileo should have been similarly imprisoned for explaining the movement of the earth.
Authority in each case was in favour of the old faith ; and authority, in the interests of
religion, thought it necessary to interfere with the promulgation of what it supposed to be
error.
This attitude of religion, both in ancient as well as in modern times, was no doubt
unfortunate. It was specially disastrous in modern Europe, because the religion of modern
Europe is based on revelation, and a little courage might have taught its professors that
revelation did not cease with the dispersion of the Jews. The history of this people had
shown a continuous evolution in religious thought. The God of the Old Testament, who
walked in the garden in the cool of the day, became by an almost insensible change the
God of the New Testament, whom no man hath seen nor can see; and it was in reality
irrational to suppose that this evolution, which had continued through all time, should
have been abruptly terminated after the fall of Jerusalem. Unfortunately the Church found
it difficult to believe that the series of revelations, which had been given to mankind
through the agency of the prophets, should be continued through the agency of men of
science. It assumed that the infallibility with which it thought that it was endowed
invested it with a monopoly of knowledge ; and it resented the idea that men who had no
mission from the Church should promulgate new views of the world or of the universe
which were inconsistent with those which the Church herself had declared to be true.
It is, however, too often forgotten that, if the attitude of the Church towards
scientific discovery may have impeded the progress of learning, it proved still more
disastrous to the cause of religion. The worst thing that an institution which claims that it
is infallible can do is to afford a proof of its fallibility. And this is the precise mistake
which the Church made. From the seventeenth century downwards it has been constantly
asserting that certain discoveries were false, which subsequent experience convinced
every thinking man to be true. It did not prevent the ultimate acceptance of the new
doctrines, but it convinced men, by resisting them, that its own claims were unfounded.
Without seriously arresting the progress of knowledge it weakened its own position, and
it set thinking men to inquire whether, when it had been proved wrong on matters of fact,
it could be accepted as right on matters of opinion. ‘A bishop,’ wrote Archbishop
Whately, ‘who in Galileo’s time would have supported astronomy would have saved
many from infidelity.’ A frank acceptance of the new discovery would have preserved
the Church, at any rate, from a humiliating future.
These reflections are naturally suggested by a perusal of the important book
whose title we have placed at the head of this article. The work which Dr. White has
given to the world is the result of years of labour. More than a quarter of a century ago
our author—so he himself tells us in his preface—was associated with ‘Ezra Cornell in
founding the university which bears his honoured name.’ It was the intention of the
founders that the new institution should be under the control of no political party and of
no religious sect. It never entered into the minds of either of them that, in thus acting,
they were doing anything either irreligious or unchristian. But experience soon convinced
them of their mistake.

‘Opposition began at once. In the State Legislature it confronted us at every turn, and it
was soon in full blaze throughout the State, from the good Protestant bishop, who proclaimed that
all professors should be in Holy Orders (since to the Church alone was given the command, “Go
teach all nations”) . . . to the perfervid minister, who informed a denominational synod that
Agassiz—the last great opponent of Darwin, and a devout Theist—was preaching Darwinism and
Atheism in the new institution.’

This opposition convinced Dr. White of the constant antagonism between the theological
and the scientific view of the universe which it is the object of his present work to
demonstrate and combat.

(The Quarterly Review, Oct. 1897, Spencer Walpole, pages 357 – 9.)

We find the trends in reasoning that have already been revealed in nineteenth
century secular work continue to present themselves here. There is the poor old church
theme, wherein we hear how the good men of true faith just could not help thinking that
only they knew the truth and that scientists were in error, Ah !, what a pity, never mind,
they were such nice people and no one is perfect, so lets all love our church today, now
we have moved on.
As a passionate live long atheist I have always had it on my mind that the church
had shown itself to be utterly insincere in the most relentlessly evil way throughout its
entire history so it is nice to see this essay make precisely this point when it says that it
was the mindless resistance of the theocracy to science that brought the church into
disrepute and made religion contemptible. Indeed, so why has this not led to the
annihilation of the church which has shown that no matter what it is incapable of
behaving otherwise ? And herein we find a very telling revelation about why the
theocracy was forced to change its age old tack and to turn the overt theocracy in which
all people had always existed should become a covert theocracy, that is a free society, a
democracy. Accordingly the theocracy was obliged to find some way to produce a
castrated form of science that was safe for promotion as knowledge in an absolute
theocracy.
 It is also nice to find a statement of the dependence of all of us, except the most
wealthy and independent, upon the sanctioned professors who have been ascribed
authority by the theocracy. This indicates in the approach that people who obviously
understood this principle would take in the creation of secularised institutions of religious
power, and we can see just how concerned the overt representative of the theocracy were
to ensure that the secular professors should be committed to the theocracy. But the only
way this could be achieved was if science was created that passionate atheists could make
their own, but which was in actuality created to serve the theocracy, this was how
Darwinism came to be created for it serves this purpose by basing the process of
evolution upon the body if the individual, and thus making it impossible for the human
individual to be seen for what they are, a unit of the superorganic being that human
physiology evolved to bring into existence.

We are interested in the dynamics of the war on knowledge, waged relentlessly by

the social powers vested in a theocracy. It is a curious problem to try and think about
how the people who maintain the deception think about what they are doing. Thus,
dipping into my collection of books pertaining to the subject of human nature I find an
opportunity to quote an old statement on the insidious nature of priestly power. In a
facsimile edition of an 1813 publication called Researches into the Physical History of
Man, the lengthy preamble constitutes a small, and interesting book, in its own right, and
on page xlii (42) we find this :

“Brute-worship resulted from the deification of local heroes by political

leaders anxious to consolidate their power ; when the ignorant masses later began
to worship directly the animal hieroglyphs that had originally only represented
dead heroes in symbolic form, the priests opportunistically encouraged the
abomination, keeping to themselves the esoteric mysteries in which was preserved
the primitive monotheism originally revealed by God to man.”

This passage describes the thinking of an eighteenth century Anglican Bishop, William
Warburton, who joined the effort to account for the diverse ways in which religion had
been perceived by different peoples. We have seen from the reviewers of the war that in
their opinion the conflict is all a big mistake, certainly it involves thousands upon
thousands of the most highly educated and powerful people that exist at any one time,
throughout the entire world, but they cannot help their stupidity, they do the best they
can. Here though, because it is a Christian prelate speaking of heathen priests, the point
is made that priests are manipulative political figures, concerned exclusively with power.
Cohen said that casting aspersions on the religion of others was always socially
acceptable, but the same could not be said regarding the society to which we belong. The
fact is that Warburton’s description of priestly attitudes applies just as much to himself as
to anyone else. This said, there is something else of interest in the above quote because it
does suggest an evolutionary process whereby linguistic formulas prove themselves in
practice, as when a device utilising symbolism proves to be especially effective at
obtaining the subservience of the masses, so that the priests learn tricks about the control
of society through utilising levels of knowledge discreetly, and such knowledge acquired
over time generates formulas, that is new religions, which become fixed to associated
identities, resulting in a priesthood that does come to be based upon a covert body of
knowledge, a set of mysteries. And some such natural process is the only possible way to
account for the evolution of a Jewish master race able to trifurcate into superorganic
structure with three main branches, Judaism itself as master identity, and two Jewish
subidentities known by other names, Christianity and Islam. The utilisation of alternative
names to generate physiological substructures of the one superorganism utilises the same
principle of sublimation that Warburton refers to when he says that the masses began to
worship the symbols rather the heroes that the symbols originally represented. Some
such process must of been responsible for the generation of the Jewish Christian and
Islam identities which left an imbedded mast race existing within Christian and Islamic
communities, the Jews, who could not be identified by the Christian and Moslem people
for what they were because the symbols of their slave identities separated them off from
their true identity as Jews. In this way a complex physiology is generated by the force of
language creating a multitude of identities carrying one identity through a vast complex
of differentiated social structure just as we find in a body composed of living tissue.
But what is of especial interest to us at this point in our discussion is the
acquisition of some sense of understanding how the inducted manage their role of
especially wise educators whose role is deceive through teaching. In any practical
profession this strategy could not work, it would result in fraudsters that could be caught
out. But this is not the case where knowledge is concerned, as we are seeing, the whole
point is that knowledge is at the best of times symbolic, and as such if a body of
knowledge can be substituted for another body of knowledge then where there is no
practical application of the knowledge to material structures as in engineering, then,
where the consequences only concern social structures, what is to stop the substitute
serving as well as the real thing ? Nothing. This is all the more so since the use of
language to generate ideas about which social unity can develop begins from a state of
ignorance, whereby the knowledge builds the structure, as we have been saying, language
is a natural force that creates the physiology of the superorganism.
The reason that this discussion is of importance to ourselves is because we are
asserting that the theocracy made the transition from generating a body of theological
knowledge pretending to explain existence by intertwining itself with genuine knowledge
about existence, and then, when faced with the unstoppable pressure of naturalistic
knowledge revealed by the modern scientific method the forces of theocratic power
exerted their control of the fabric of the social being in order to create a pseudo science
that could be inducted into the academic institutions and be made the new extension of
religious dogma that a new kind of priesthood could disseminate. So, we are now
concerned to understand how the modern academic priesthood copes with being a
religious priesthood just like any other that ever existed, just like the one condemned by
Warburton, despite the fact that these people are staggeringly well educated scientists.
We must refer back to a comment taken from one of co-opted speakers, where it
was noted that in the end none of us can really be expected to test the veracity of
established knowledge for ourselves. What the theocracy had to do was to identify a
strategy and pursue it to the degree where it would result in a scientific foundation that
could allow any degree of science to develop in relation to the real world without ever
allowing the perfection of the same knowledge, which would be bound to conflict with
religion. Thus the object had to be to create a sterile form of science, rather as we would
create a sterile form of virus that the body could learn to cope with. Darwinism was that
sterile science, it covered the flesh and bones, but left out the social dimension, and this
could not be a mistake, but neither could it be an open conspiracy. The urge of people to
defend their religious power, as we see spoken of in the piece from Walpole talking about
what inspired White to write his treatise on the war, this is what applies a ceaseless
pressure that suppresses any true knowledge while ensuring that a struggle will go on
until some satisfactory compromise is reached. Such compromise is a recurring feature
of this war, where scientifically minded people are made to compromise their views time
and time again until these views are able to emerge into the open.
So the priests are no faking it, they are corrupted from within their very being,
individuals do not exist as an end in themselves, they evolved to have the constitution of
a conscious brick, evolved to take a message that would direct them to fulfil a role, and
being rewarded is proof of doing right and speaking the truth, this is as far as most
individuals are capable of being conscious of themselves, they are not evolved to possess
anything more than this degree of intelligence ; hardly intelligence at all really. The
institutions preserve the message and deliver the reward that commands obedience and
there is in the end therefore no essential difference between a religious creed and a
scientific creed in respect to this function of sustaining an enslaved priesthood that serves
to act as the consciousness of the masses.

Lets be clear what we are getting at here. We are trying to reduce the intellectual
status of the most brilliant academics to that of the uneducated plebe in terms of the
mechanism of oppression which makes our war interminable. We are able to achieve this
by recognising the insuperable barrier to the academic professional posed by the
massively inflated projection of the Darwinian dogma, which has been raised on a
pedestal that knows no limits to the extravagance of the claims made for this
contemptible theory, this all the while that the damn theory completely fails excludes
human existence from any scientific account. Consequently we find such extravagant
response to the problem created by the theocratic imposition of the foundations of
biological science upon the world, where we see the biologists and sociologists
performing dramatic shows of determination to overcome the fake difficulties that
sociology is obliged to face in order to preserve the rule of religion over society. This the
work of Human by Nature.
Faced with the relentless, mad promotion of Darwinism no academic can resist
this force anymore than any individual can hope to question the authority of any
professional intellectual, and this is the key to understanding how the church preserved
itself against science ; Darwinism. The tactic is by no means new, Descartes was the
most famous modern forerunner of the subversion of science by scientists imposed on the
world, and in Ancient Rome Ptolemy served the same function in the struggle to suppress
ideas concerned with the astronomy of planet earth.

Reinforcing the Deception

 Last night, 04/02/08, the film The Matrix was on ITV and I caught the early scene
where the nature of the matrix was explained, and most fascinating the explanation was
too. My impression of fiction is that people are incapable of imagining anything that they
have not actually seen or experienced in some suggestive form, the matrix would appear
to be based on the intuitive conception of humans as mammalian insects enslaved to a
superorganic beast. The ficticious portrayal of humans enslaved in this psychological
way is familiar enough, the Borg of Star Trek fame are a classic example of the type, and
if I were a fiction, fantasy or myth freak, then I dare say I could write a book exposing
the appearance of this theme in literature. We could argue for good reason that all
superhero themes are a representation of our slave status as dependants of a superbeing,
but this representation can as easily be made a secondary representation of God, which is
the primary mythological representation of the superorganism.
The beauty of the Matrix model was the way it placed people within an illusion so
that their entire conscious existence was the fabrication of a computer programme, this
obviously closely allies with the real state of affairs we are discussing in the preceding
section where we show that knowledge is a fixed body of linguistic information that
evolves in association with a priesthood, and even a secular extension of such a body,
precisely in order to create a world in which all knowledge is a fraud imposed on the
entire population causing their whole consciousness to be a fiction serving the ends of a
being whose existence they have no idea of.
Science fiction writers seem to make a meal from projecting this conception of
human existence into the future, but, as with futuristic doomsayers producing works like
1984 and Brave New World, these stories are based on ideas about real life in the world
known to the authors. The additional factor about these unpleasant portrayals of humans
as units of an extended being is that they make the contrast in such a way that their
account declares the freedom which we currently enjoy, and hence we can understand
such tales as an elaboration of the theocratic theme of religion backed by pseudo science.
In Star Trek and in The Matrix the war is against the all powerful machine like
omnipotence of the super entity which is capable of consuming the individual and
eradicating their individuality. So the true state of affairs is exaggerated in order to
reinforce the lie that we are not at all like the story says we might be like in the future,
and what is more, it is important that we never let anyone suggest that we are like this.
In The Matrix the idea is that about now, the early part of the twenty first century,
we created an AI, an artificial intelligence, that got the better of us, it is the same theme
as we find in the Terminator movies, only the Matrix is far more attuned to the idea of
humans as a superorganism because it is based on the conception of psychological
bondage. Humans blotted out the sun in order to deprive the machines of their energy
source, as they relied on solar power, but the machines recognised that humans generated
electric power and they incorporated humans into a circuitry accordingly. People were
farmed as units of the machine, when they grew old they were liquefied and fed
intravenously into the body of newly hatched humans, and so the process went on
interminably. They have a sick imagination these people ! The role of the matrix was
that of control, exactly as the role of religion backed by pseudo science and stories like
The Matrix, was to control the human elements of the super structure.
I never watch any programme right through, it is a war between the viewer and
the controllers to avoid the malevolent material that they bombard us with, the
advertising, and to keep watching something mildly entertaining, and they organize
themselves to ensure that movies compete with one another, so after ducking out of The
Matrix for a spell I came back in as the leader of the resistance was explaining to the
awakening super hero about the agents. I could of done with seeing the full explanation
because he called the agents the ‘gatekeepers’ which is a term I have applied to Richard
Dawkins for years and I even applied it to Hitler the other day, as the gatekeeper of
Judaism. So I am beginning to see all the millions of people i talk about as being
employed in the defence of the illusion, the priests, the academics the teachers and
countless other categories of professional person, as gatekeepers, and this is exactly how
the ‘agents’ were being portrayed in The Matrix. Because the matrix if a psychological
trick the role of its defenders, the ‘agents’ was to hold the illusion together, and they were
everywhere, as they had to be, as they are in real life. I assume the agents were part of
the programme, but that is the bit I think I missed.
Anyway, the purpose of delving into this story here is to give some thought to
how the authors of such works of popular art think about their topic, we are asking the
same question of these creative artists as we just asked of the rigorous intellectuals, the
scientists. Given what we have just said about the nature of the ‘agents’ in the movie we
can start to identify all people that sustain the basic illusion that people are individuals,
thus hiding the true fact that the human animal is a superorganic species of animal in
which individuals do not really exist from a scientific point of view, then we see these
artists as other major agents of the deception.
But we do not want to dilute this powerful conception of the ‘agent of the myth’
to a point where it becomes meaningless, we want to derives some physiological
significance from this insight so that we can make sense of society as we know it in
political ways interpreted into physiological terms. This brings us to a delicate
proposition whereby we develop the basic concept of the Jews as the master race by
seeing Jews as the agents in sub-Judaic Christian and Muslim social territories. The
central element in the myth is the assertion of the individual as a real entity, which flies in
the face of scientific reality which says humans are organisms evolved on this planet.
The Jews are the core of the mythology and their self perception as Chosen can be
rendered into a genuinely scientific sociological conception by making this Chosen
promoter of God the political promoter of the myth underpinning the superorganic
identity based on the individual. Therefore we do in fact find Jews taking a leading role
in promoting this false knowledge of the self that is so precious Christians.
Jews perform this subversive service in the supposedly host societies in a way that
is without conflict, since the Christians want exactly the same deception to be achieved,
the self interest of the Jews is transferred with the sub-Judaic identity package onto the
priesthood of subidentity. As the scientific insight into the true nature of religion reveals
that humans are a superorganic animal and God is the mythological name linking
political society to that superorganic being then the inner structure also comes to the
surface and then a new kind of gatekeeper, or agent, is needed to develop the principle of
individuality and bring the resulting conflicts between true knowledge and social
knowledge to a climax, the Nazis were the agents or gatekeepers of the moment, so they
focused on the Jews by taking what the Jews do naturally and vilifying their collective
function in individualistic terms, hence the rabid of racism of the Nazis, this was vital to
separate the Jews and this to save the Jewish identity.
 Ubiquitous Agents of Deception

All knowledge is deception in the end, there can be no escape, and this means
even non-knowledge, such as fiction, which has no intention of pretending to be
knowledge as such.
Today, 05/02/08, a very fine book arrived from America, Hegel’s Ethics of
Recognition, by Robert Williams, 1997, but how on earth anyone can write such a piece
of work beats me. We describe it as a technical piece, a piece of intellectual work so
excruciating to read because, like a mathematical piece, a work of physics or chemistry
written by a practicing scientist, it is written for the cognoscenti and of necessity these
people require their own language which the masses cannot expect to be able to read with
ease, if at all. But the trouble is that philosophy is nothing more than a bag of wind, in
reality much of mathematics is probably noting more than a flatulent exercise too when it
comes to that, but the fact is that one can see some kind of meaningful game even in the
most abstruse and absurd mathematical charade. There was quite an interesting
programme on one the extra digital channels a couple of weeks ago about an American
mathematical genius who is credited with having first demonstrated the theoretical
possibility of multiple universes. Expressed in plain English the achievement escaped
me, some noggin, Schrödinger I think, because I recall Shrödinger’s cat coming into the
debate, which I have heard of, had accounted for some aspect of deep reality by requiring
an observer and this absurdity was solved by this American genius by showing that
instead of needing one observer we could instead have an infinite number of potential
observers, or something like that, if I had written this the next day I would of made a
decent job of explaining my rejection of the whole business as idiotic. But while these
kind of rigmaroles are understandable in esoteric exercises such as those a mathematician
can engage in by using their highly stylised symbolic medium, this justification does not
apply to the work of philosophers, although philosophers do not appear to know this.
Williams book is quite readable, for me, but still replete with philosophical jargon
that, even if I are familiar with it, like ‘ontological’, which I think, without looking it up,
I recently saw defined as concerning ‘origins’, still causes me to come unstuck in any
attempt to really understand what is being said. When philosophers write such works
they are not intending that the layman should be able to understand them, anymore than
the mathematician, physicist or chemist is expects people to know what their script
means. But the basic meaning of the script used by scientists is absolute, whereas the
general body of philosophical work, and so the mass of specialised terminology
underpinning it, is no more meaningful that the babble that sputters of a baby’s lips when
he has sucked a satisfying teat. Williams introduces us to his work by way of a
staggering revelation, in the form of a question, “With over ten thousand books and
articles on Hegel, could there possibly be any justification for yet another, long book ?”
(Page xi)
10,000 ! Unbelievable, and what a load of rot the bloke wrote in the first place,
like all these superhuman authors, Kant, Descartes and Rousseau spring to mind, I always
ask why on earth anyone ever read the twaddle they came out with in the first place, Let
alone how it is that anyone gives a toss today, what these buffoons said centuries ago ?
But the answer, which is not to be found in my incapacity to comprehend the genius of
such people, anymore than my passionate atheism is a consequence of any inability on
my part to sense the sublime beauty of degenerates who preach religious ideas ; the
answer is to be found in the realms of the subject we are delving into here. The need for
an endless dispersal of meaningless drivel, orientated about the false point of focus at the
heart of the Jewish myth, upon which global civilization is based is what makes people
able to spin political ideas out of thin air so precious in the fabric of the human
superorganism. Just as we have seen that Darwin had to be propelled onto a pedestal
from which his lame ideas would be made untouchable, by the bolstering of a rigid
academic structure under the control of the political forces of theocracy, so, in the overtly
pseudo fields of intellectual endeavour encompassed by philosophy, an endless plethora
of inane, self opinionated people, have been likewise developed and eulogised by the
academic world in the awesome effort to keep humanity at the lowest state of intellectual
imbecility commensurate with the need to allow people to live within the natural world
occupied by the superorganism composed of billions of pseudo-conscious cellular
elements.

This said, it has been made perfectly plain throughout this work that it is
recognised that humanity cannot be anything other than it is and if we are to enjoy true
knowledge we can only do so as isolated individuals taking pleasure in the same for our
own personal sake. The way we take this pleasure is in knowing what is real and then
seeking out the telltale signs of this realities existence in the fabricated knowledge that is
allowed to permeate the world. As such this book of Williams is an absolute delight. I
discovered this book by running a search for the “social organism” a couple of months
ago and from a bounty of new titles I ordered a few, this book has a chapter called The
State as a Social Organism, which is an absolute dream, and although I have only spent
half an hour perusing this book I am delighted with it. From my specific point of view it
is a superb piece of work, which is, that I have for some years now been trying to
discover some precursor to Auguste Comte in the use of the phrase “social organism”
applied to the concept of human society, and here, at long last, I have it ; Eureka !
I am delighted to find quite a bit of pertinent discussion in the book, and what is
more I now have a lead to an author who wrote about society as being naturalistically
conceived of as a social organism, Montesquieu, who I have heard of before but never
quite been drawn to enough to track down, now he is my number one target. Hegel
levers us away from any such natural conception of society, making the conscious efforts
of individuals the basis of society, as the theocracy required they should be, but at the
same time Hegel appears to try and make sense of this idiotic approach by saying that the
family is a natural limit of any natural social forces, thus recognising that humans were a
product of nature, even though humans owe nothing to nature in terms of how they live.
So the same old rubbish that rules the scientific ideas about what humans are today can
be seen developing in the hands of these superhuman intellects at the time when the
scientific threat was pushing hard on the minds of priests fighting to keep people their
slaves in ignorance.

I recently bought a book pertaining to Comte’s Positivism listing great authors to

be taken note of, Montesquieu appears here, and the phrase ‘social organism’ appears in
the section about him. Montesquieu is also appreciated in Comte’s Positive Philosophy,
and we find his work is said to be informed by another early sociological writer,
Condorcet ! So, after years of wondering about how to understand Comte in relation to
his idea of society as a social organism I suddenly find that within a few hours of
receiving a book in which the phrase is discussed in connection with a contemporary of
Comte the whole issue is solved, at last ! Brilliant ; now why could I not of worked all
this out for myself ? All I had to do was read the books in my possession ! If only life
were a few thousand years longer than its fabled three score and ten, this might be a sure
means of achieving the goal named here, but then it would be true to say that individuals
are ends in themselves, and there would be no basis for saying that humans are a
superorganic species, and this is not the case, we are constrained by our particulate nature
as individuals ; we may think big, but we all know what thought did—nothing.

Well I say, its all happening now, it never rains but it pours. Not knowing how to
spell Schrödinger I glanced at my nearest book shelf in a forlorn hope of help, my eyes
fell on a book I have owned for a few years but never used, A Biographical Dictionary of
Scientists, and sure enough Schrödinger was there, but with interest I saw an entry for
Schwann on the next page. This man recently became of considerable interest to me
because I read that his cell theory had inspired Herbert Spencer’s development of the idea
that human society was a social organism. This was a bit curious because it is not long
since I read that it was a book by Carpenter on physiology that had performed this role by
introducing Spencer to similar ideas focused on embryology originating in von Baer ; all
a bit confusing, but of immense interest to me because, like Spencer or not, he is the one
and only exponent of the idea of the social organism that has ever written in English.
Before continuing with this little story in how to make profound intellectual
progress in a haphazard and ad hoc way, I should say I think such discoveries, and the
revelation of such methodology, is of interest, if only in indicating the highly flawed and
unacademic nature of my modus operandi. I was incredibly lucky to find a copy of The
R. P. A. Annual and Ethical Review 1924 in Australia recently, as the library was unable
to source this item for me. The item had become of interest to me because Morley
Roberts frequently referred to his friend’s article Does Man’s Body Represent A
Commonwealth ?, by Sir Arthur Keith, which appeared in this extremely rare publication.
Having got my copy I was delighted to find Keith informing us precisely where Spencer
derived his inspiration, as stated above, from “a third edition of Carpenter’s “Principles
of Physiology.” In this edition Carpenter introduced to his readers certain discoveries
which had been made by von Baer.” (Page 4.)
When I checked the internet book site of choice, I found a good selection of
Carpenter’s books, a confusing profusion in fact, Keith’s description hardly constituted a
reference in these circumstances, but after careful selection I ordered the only 1851 copy
of Principles of Physiology, General and Comparative that, if I remember rightly, was
available. To my considerable consternation however I could find neither hide nor hair
of anything to do with von Baer. Three months later, that is a couple of weeks ago I
decided to try again, and upon checking for Carpenter’s books I was amazed to find a
complete dearth of works, there was a fourth edition, the next one after mine, in America,
boards detached, for £23, and I emailed to see if von Baer was named in the index or
preliminaries, I got no reply. Where had all the copies of Carpenter gone, why would
people suddenly acquire an interest in this big old tome ? Beats me. But now, with my
Biographical Dictionary in my hands everything changed. Firstly, I had figured I needed
a rare book of Schwann’s costing about £100 and I was determined to buy it, but I was
guessing it was the right book to buy, and I was wrong ! The dictionary stated what his
great idea was, and in which book it had been published, the title of which had not
sounded very promising to me so I had discounted it. Bloody hell, how difficult do you
think this chasing down old ideas is ? Difficult !! Next I looked for Baer, and once again
I was rewarded with solid information, so I looked back at Keith’s essay, and then I
decided to glance at Carpenter once again, and, low and behold, would you believe it,
right there in the first few pages, on page xi, the third page of the Preface, sure enough,
spelt wrongly it is true, snuck in amongst some other general stuff indeed, but there was
no mistaking the statement showing that this book spoke of von Baer or, as Carpenter has
it “The application of Van Bär’s Law of Development from the General to the Special, to
the interpretation of the succession of Organic forms presented in Geological time
(§ 345) ; here first brought forwards.” Halleluya ! And while looking up section 345
caused me further frustration, persistence soon showed that section 348 brings forth a
sense of contentment at a remote and inaccessible pinnacle reached, bliss at last :

348. The general principle of Von Bär affords the real explanation of
those resemblances which are sometimes discernable, between the transitory
forms exhibited by the embryoes of the higher beings, and the permanent
conditions of the lower.

(Page 580.)

This quote is of no use here, it is just offered as a kind of ‘textual image’ of the
item found, that I have sought for some months, without previous success. I have not
read any of the section beyond taking this quote as I have been sorting out the details of
this round of active investigation, a unique moment of discovery which is the fruit of
spending so much money buying all the relevant titles I can. Only by being able to turn
to books in my possession can I follow a line of thought so easily and fruitfully, and as
can be seen from this description of following ideas of nineteenth century thinkers, it is
never easy. The problem, I suppose, was that interested people at that time tended to be
intellectuals who would all of been familiar with any works referred to simply at their
mentioning, and authors evidently had no active sense of the place their works might play
in an elongated scheme of academic development beyond their lifetimes. We sometimes
find modern reproductions make good this kind of deficiency by abstracting modern style
bibliographies from such old works as have been deemed worthy of reproduction, which
is a very fine thing indeed. Old books, don’t you just love them, here is a bit from a not
so old book, a paperback I picked up in Oxfam yesterday, 04/02/08, discussing the
problem of obtaining good reproductions of books :
 Loup de Ferrières, in particular, took great pains to bring together several
copies of the same text and collate them. In about 830 he was writing to Einhard :

Having once broken the bounds of all restraint, I ask you again to lend me some
of your books during my stay here : to beg the loan of a book is infinitely less
presumptuous than to demand the gift of friendship. The book of Cicero’s treatise on
Rhetoric : it is true that I have it, but it is full of errors in many places, which is why I
have collated my copy against a manuscript I discovered here. I thought this was better
than mine, but it is even worse . . .

(The Awakening of Europe, Philippe Wolff, 1968. Pages 62-3.)

Think of it, 830 ! 1200 years ago this man was writing passionately about his
quest to capture great knowledge from a lost world, exactly as I have been speaking of
doing just now. His lost world was 700 years past, mine is but 100, yet still the same
struggle goes on, to grasp great wisdom and knowledge, lost in a bygone age, lost to
those doomed to exist in a dark world of ignorance and stupidity, where everyone
wanders around making out they know much, but where all knowledge is but a blind,
preventing what was once known from ever being seen again.

I have been having fun today. Thanks to my Mum sending me a little gift of £40
on Saturday I was able to order a first edition of Mein Kampf yesterday, published by
Stackpole in 1939, this I take to be the edition I had heard of but had no details on, it was
a fluke find on the Net, £35, and the only copy I can see, I really only want it as a
collectors item, but this is an exceptionally important book and it is worth buying a rare
item like this, which means I just have one other first edition to buy—not too rare, but a
bit pricey—when I get some more dosh. To have three first editions all appearing in
1939 is nice, it allows comparison, And when has any book suddenly been transcribed in
this way ? Never, we can be sure ; and never again, for certain.
OK, so I have my Baer section, and I can read it ; now, What of Schwann ? The
passage in the dictionary suggests that he is much more likely to of fuelled Spencer’s
imagination in respect to his thinking on the social organism, and Keith’s discussion is a
bit too brief for immediate clarity on this point concerning Carpenter. Reading the
passage now, What do I see ? It seems that Keith is saying that Baer’s ideas on
embryology inspired Spencer to think of the idea of evolution, and hence, not Spencer’s
ideas about the ‘social organism’. In 1852, Keith tells us, “Spencer not only used the
word “evolution” in its modern significance, but the “developmental hypothesis” was
made to bear on all he saw and all he thought.” (Page 5.) In the next section he goes on
to say that “By 1860 he had tested the truth of his analogy in every conceivable direction,
and issued it in the elaborated form which we find in “The Social Organism.” (ibid.)
Unfortunately we are not told just where the word ‘evolution’ was used so
significantly in 1852, and I can see lots of fishing about being necessary to track that one
down, although it is a matter of common knowledge today that Spencer used the idea of
evolution before Darwin. So, after all that it seems that I got my knickers in a proper old
twist over these statements concerning the origin of Spencer’s ideas on the social
organism, Carpenter never had anything to do with this anyway, at best he was only
implicated in the hint at evolution as a process. Now where did I read that it was
Schwann that inspired Spencer to develop his ideas on the social organism ............. ? If I
only had a brain ........ it don’t matter, .......... still, be nice to know ...........

A few weeks later ............ ah, I forgot about my 1930’s book on Spencer’s
sociology that includes an extensive bibliography. The Development Hypothesis was a
short item first published in The Leader, March 20th, 1852, I have it in volume one of
Essays Scientific, Political and Speculative, 1892 (Yankee edition). Sure enough this
essay is all about evolution, it discusses the transmutation of species and the phrase
“Theory of Evolution” is there for all to see. But as I solve this mystery, not so great as I
thought, I find another. At the end of this essay there is a quote taken from Principles of
Comparative Physiology by Carpenter, which indicates page 474 to be the location, but
this quotation does not appear in my third edition of this work, not on that page anyway,
and life is not long enough to see if it appears on another page. This makes me wonder
about the details Keith provides regarding Carpenter as the source of Spencer’s ideas on
evolution, inspired by Baer as first mentioned by Carpenter ; Baer does not appear in the
brief essay just named. Does it matter ? Well, it would be nice to find things where they
are supposed to be, and as to the question whether we can be certain where people get
major ideas from, such as the notion of organic evolution or the literal conception that
human society is a social organism, I would find it difficult to think of anything more
important to know in an investigation of these ideas as handled by their leading
exponents. In my case the idea originated with me, and this is a very important fact in
understanding my pursuit of the idea at this time when no one else on the planet is even
remotely aware that the idea ever existed, or no one is aware that it is the true scientific
idea, once extant, and now exterminated.
Indeed I have just downloaded an item via the Auguste Comte website of much
interest, written by Comte’s leading English exponent, Frederic Harrison, in which
Harrison discusses the very question of how familiar Spencer was with Comte’s work, a
question that has already caught my attention recently as I have myself become more
familiar with the extent to which Comte was prepossessed by the idea of the social
organism, as evinced in his later work Positive Polity. So these questions were of interest
at the time that these debates were live, and they must forever be matters of interest to
any of us who would study these questions from an historical viewpoint.
Next day .......... There are some uncut pages toward the back of my copy of
Carpenter, so last night I decided to turn every page, and while I was at it I kept my eye
open for the missing quotation. I noticed the use of the word evolution in what appeared
to be the usual sense of the word as we understand it today, and when I glanced at one
page something of great significance leapt from the page, a phrase exactly as Spencer
uses it, word for word, and italicised the same too. Still, since I have decided to take
some selections from Spencer’s sociological writings, and the phrase appears there, we
can defer from here to that section below. Save to say, while we are discussing aspects of
researching into the work of past times, it is apparent when we come upon evidence of
this kind, just how important it is to be aware of any direct sources of inspiration
influencing a writers work. It makes all the difference in the world if you start from
nothing but a flash of inspiration originating with yourself, as I did, or whether your
imagination has been fired up by a wave of new knowledge pouring forth that you
happen to be the first to apply your imagination to in your own community. In the latter
case the product is likely to be shallow, if fertile and abundant, as in Spencer’s case,
whereas the former situation, speaking from experience, is deep, but certainly leaves one
isolated and struggling to develop ideas that are able to compete with the mass of
misinformation in a world built on establishment lies.
And, as it happens, I dropped on the misplaced quote from Carpenter, it appears
on page 867 of my third edition, 1851.
 Chapter Four

Knowledge as Territory

Having had my attention drawn toward the early origins of sociology and some
recent volumes related to my desire to develop a clear idea of the early period of
sociology as a science, a necessary study given the knowledge that we have that
sociology has been deliberately erased from society by the forces of religious fascism.
From Williams’ book on Hegel prompting me to look up Montesquieu I have now delved
into the excellent book of Great Men and been directed back to sections of interest in
Positive Philosophy so that I suddenly find myself with a able to make a clear statement
on sociological foundations as set out by Comte, the so called ‘father of sociology’. On
page 442 Montesquieu is discussed, followed by Condorcet on page 444 and then we
have this clear statement : “These two attempts are really all that have been made in the
right road to social science ; for they are the only speculations which have been based on
the aggregate of historical facts.” (445)
This section of Comte’s great work is immensely helpful to anyone attempting to
understand the history of sociology in terms where we recognise the emergence of the
discipline as a true science, its struggle to develop for a century, and its final total
eradication as a scientific subject and sublimation into a meaningless babble of nonsense
indistinguishable from the worst philosophy, and the usual gobbledegook of religious
guff. Montesquieu was born in 1689 and published his main work, the Spirit of Laws in
about 1748, for some daft reason the date is not given. Condorcet was born in 1743 and
published a major work, Progress of the Human Mind, again, stupidly, no date give, only
hinted at, but about 1793.
Comte wrote his masterpiece, Positive Philosophy, between 1830 – 42, so we
have a progression delineated by Comte, which Comte takes the trouble to explain, and it
is best to copy in full the relevant sections, they are not long, and they are critical to our
subject. Upon trying to find a point at which to begin copying Comte, working my way
back from Montesquieu, I just cannot find a place where I can stop going back, each time
I stop to read I find the argument so valuable I want to take it in, and now I can not keep
my glasses on my nose any longer, so I will have to stop reading, snot dribbling,
excruciating irritation, is the standard fare dealt to me by my nose, not good when you
love reading and your over forty five, and have to wear glasses to read comfortably.
Shit ! Anyway, Comte develops his explanation for the failure of his eminent
predecessors in a constructive and positive manner identical to that which we have
identified amongst modern academics whereby no one ever levels accusation or insults at
their fellow intellectuals, but rather they assume a honest sincerity that fails for
accountable reasons. We cannot be so cute since our whole thesis is one of deception and
corruption, yet it has to be said that on page 425 Comte makes corruption a fundamental
attribute of political life, “It is the systematic corruption which is set us as an
indispensable instrument of government.” His constructive approach is however justified
in a way that the same cannot be said of modern academics who, unlike Comte, do not
have any sense of emerging from a world dominated by a theological party, or any sense
of being in competition with such a party, these moderns actually think it is possible to
live in a society dominated by a thriving religious power and still to have a free science
of humanity.
Comte argues that science develops along a series of interdependent levels where
the hard sciences act as a foundation for the complex science of life, biology, and in turn
the most challenging science of society. Based on this understanding he excused the
shortcomings of brilliant thinkers like Montesquieu and Condorcet because they were too
far ahead of their time in their basic approach and not empowered by the revelations of
biology that Comte felt were available to his generation. In presenting this brief
statement of conditions applying at the point of modern sociological origins derived from
Comte’s account of the time we lead up to an explanation of the title of this chapter. We
are calling the struggle between religion and science about the focal point of sociology a
war, a war over the control of knowledge, therefore it is appropriate to think of
knowledge as a territorial domain, since warfare and territory are concomitant
phenomena. In effect Comte is describing a virgin territory being slowly colonised, the
powers that be see the process of colonisation taking place and, just as governments do
when new features of society arise, such as the internet, the social powers concerned with
the newly emerging ‘landmass, incorporate it into their scheme of ‘legislation’. So, using
this analogy, we are saying that sociology was a virgin territory open to all in Comte’s
day, following its discovery by men like Montesquieu and Condorcet. But over the
course of the nineteenth century the biological foundations were enacted as ‘intellectual
law’, in the shape of Darwinism, and then sociology was developed an extension of this
biological law, exactly as Comte said it should, and exactly as we say it should be. This
theologically derived scientific law of biology led to the Nazis, and thus to the
safeguarding of Judaism, because the law was created by the theological party. So, just
as today no one would think to treat land in most developed countries as if it were virgin
territory, because the law would act against them if they did, so the intellectual territory
has been colonised and incorporated into the theological domain too, and this is why we
have the immense contrast between the genuinely scientific approach of Comte and the
unequivocally mythological approach of academia to human science.
It is interesting to note that the critical need to base sociology on biology which is
dismissed out of hand today, but, as we have seen, is occasionally explored by some
peripheral sociologists feigning an attack on this no man’s land, but only dismissed after
the science of biology had been fatally undermined by academia through the development
and imposition of the fake science of evolution, made sacred through the raising of
Darwin to the status of an untouchable genius. Sociology was then built upon the basis
of competition between individuals laid down by Darwin, which led directly to the
holocaust and world war, thus sealing the fate of a true science of sociology, so that we
find comments made in Human by Nature warning those who would dare take a scientific
approach to sociology such as that which the authors of this sociological charade say they
are determined to do.

Continuing my new adventures, inspired by rooting out new veins in books long
in my possession, I am delighted to say that it occurred to me to check Maclay’s Social
Organism to see if he was aware of the work of Montesquieu, to my delight, at last !, I
find myself able to sing the praises of this magnificent book, that I ordinarily disparage
soundly, and which I have not been in the least inclined to read since I bought it a couple
or so years ago. I should restate my problem with this work. Its author pretends to be a
great admirer of the idea of the social organism, but in the end he is evidently no true
friend of the idea, in that he does no conclude his history by promoting the idea in the
modern context by explaining why the conception of human society as a social organism
is, in reality, the one true scientific outlook. This fact has always made me contemptuous
of the work and caused me to dismiss it, that said, I have always loved it for the fact that
it is the only book of its kind, based expressly on my subject as it is.
But now I find myself approaching the book for its real qualities, as a history of
the idea in question, and now I appreciate it. As I discern an historical continuum
regarding this idea of the social organism I am able to look at Maclay’s work and
recognise that he does put together a reasonable historical account. Still, the lack of
attention to the obscure late nineteenth century thinkers still stands out as a major
disappointment, and even as I find myself finally appreciating his full description of
Comte’s ideas. I also wonder about his inclusion of Rousseau and Durkheim in the series
of French thinkers expressing the idea of the social organism ; I think of these two as
high ranking enemies of this idea, which is precisely why they are such esteemed
intellectuals within the absolute theocracy that we all live in.
I am most delighted by the chapter in which he focuses on Comte, but again I
have to wonder just how far I approve of his account of Comte’s work. Chapter eight is
entitled The Baron de Montesquieu and Jean Jacques Rousseau and it makes a very
definite statement about the development of the ‘whole-society idea’. He uses Hobbes as
the simplistic voice of our idea, and makes the round of thinkers about to be considered
the ‘boldest of Hobbe’s successors.’ And he says that people may find the new
conception of the social being sinister :

The society is now portrayed as a far more powerful creature than Hobbes had
imagined, and as using its power to further its own interests rather than to protect
or care for the men and women living inside it. . . . .

It proposes that the society shapes the minds of all who are born inside it. In the
course of your childhood, so this theory argues, your containing society moulds
the way you think, and imposes on you the moral attitudes that you will gradually
come to regard as true. And this where the society’s greatest power lies—not in
its ability to force men to obey its laws [as Hobbes argued] but in its ability to
induce men to believe that its laws are intrinsically good. According to this view,
your containing society programs your mind so that you will value the things that
it values, and this often means training you to despise and reject those courses of
action that would be in your own best interests.

(Page 144-5)
 This last portion I find quite remarkable, what I would give to find some
nineteenth century authors expounding anything that in anyway shape of form made out
this argument, for this is exactly what I say, and I consider myself to be the only true
exponent of the idea that humans are a species of superorganic mammals that evolved to
form a living entity at the level of social organization. He says that ‘A great many
political philosophers and social reformers played a part in this considerable tradition’,
that is the French school of sociology that viewed society as an organic entity. All I can
say to that is I wish he had at least given us a list of them.
If we turn now to chapter nine, The strange little man who invented altruism and
sociology, the ‘strange little man’ being Comte, we are treated to lots more gems that
show us the kind of material that lead Maclay to make this fabulous assertion about the
views being expressed over the course of two centuries by those who have been
informally allotted to a French school.

However wonderful Comte may appear to be in places, the great problem with Comte is
summed up by an observation made by Maclay :

Comte presented a philosophy that had two facets to it. Most obviously it
championed the new scientific way of understanding the world. Comte argued
that the old ways of understanding should now be replaced by a new scientific
body of knowledge that grasped the reality of things. But at the same time he
presented this body of true knowledge as having a moral purpose, a social goal.
Positivism was not merely a passive intellectual exercise. It was action-oriented.
It incorporated a new ethic, a new vision of how men ought to live.

(Page 163)

Maclay says that the name Positivism may seem ridiculous to modern ears, but
that it can be regarded as a kind of ‘scientific humanism’ ; I want to record this
observation because of my recent decision to call my philosophy Atheist Science, which
is slightly similar to this phrase. But I regard humanism as a Christian religion cleansed
of a godhead, and I suppose Comte’s ‘religion of humanity’ has this godless quality about
it too. Elsewhere, I noticed yesterday, Maclay says the phrase ‘positivism’ would
probably be translated by modern English readers as ‘science’, and I agree with this
entirely, I always say that Positive Philosophy should of been called Scientific
Philosophy. And, perhaps, therein lies Comte’s Achilles’ heel as a scientific exponent of
the idea of the social organism. I have just been copying the section of Positive
Philosophy where he lays into Descartes for his idiotic resort to metaphysics, pages 380-
384, separating humanity from the scientific method that Descartes had otherwise been
applying brilliantly. But in the duality described by Maclay we see the same sin being
committed by Comte, the failure to keep to a scientific method, without concern for
anything else. We could refer to the physical sciences where theology no longer
interferes, so that discoveries can be used to boost the power of the theocratic society in
which we all live, and ask how it would be if scientists conflated the potential uses for
their work with the prosecution of their work. The issue is real, many people have
blamed scientists for empowering the politicians with nuclear weapons resulting in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and their are laws governing work dealing with the creation of
new forms of life, or clones.
I have never been tempted to read Positive Philosophy, it a huge volume, and it
has not drawn me in, until this week, now I am interested. However I wonder where
Maclay gets some of his magnificent quotes from Comte. It is a major puzzle to me that
the Positive Philosophy was never translated in full after Comte became famous,
although Maclay says his work is replete with inanities. But there as a four volume set of
work called Positive Polity published in 1852, translated in 1875, and I suspect this will
be the source of most of these fine quotes. If so it is a bugger, I had the good luck when I
first sought these books a year or so ago to get the second volume for £20, but the rest
were expensive, if available, and being four in the set I could not afford them when there
are always dozens of other volumes calling to me.

Comte was a particularly enthusiastic champion of the whole-society idea.

He referred to the human society variously as “the Social Organism” and as “the
Great Being,” and he devoted virtually his entire adult life to a study of its ways.
He regarded this Great Being as a living creature. And he did not merely observe
it at a distance from himself. He recognized that his own body and his own mind
formed a part of it. For more than thirty years he lived inside it and observed it,
and worked toward an understanding of it, recognizing all the while that his
learning mind was a part of it, and he never ceased to be spellbound by the
complexity of its structure and by the marvellous superbiological ways in which it
behaves.
To anyone interested in considering this almost hallucinatory whole-
society perspective he left an impassioned invitation :

Of course we cannot fully appreciate a phenomenon that is forever

proceeding before our eyes, and in which we bear a part ; but if we
withdraw ourselves in thought from the social system, and contemplate it
as if from afar, can we conceive of a more marvellous spectacle, in the
whole range of natural phenomena, than the regular and constant
convergence of an innumerable multitude of human beings, each
possessing a distinct and to some degree independent existence, and yet
continually disposed, amidst all their discordance of talent and character,
to concur in many ways in the same general development, without
agreement, nor even consciousness on the part of most of them, who
believe that they are merely following their personal impulses ?
 (Maclay, page 168.)

Maclay has his own unique system of labelling notes, he doesn’t ! A section at
the back is supposed to clarify the matter, so lets see if I can give the reference for the
above quote. PHIL 115-6, where PHIL = The Positive Philosophy, Volume II, 1896.
This does not help me locate the passage in my 1856, single volume copy, but there we
go. This quote is hardly scary, but it does hint at the insidious implications Maclay
described earlier. I find myself appreciating Maclay at last as I see this kind of deep
examination of Comte, this depth of evaluation took work, I like that, but Maclay
disappoints because, despite his evident interest in the subject, he adds nothing to it, there
is no original contribution to the job in hand, the idea of the social organism. There is no
inherent reason why history should add to its chosen topic, but in this case, where the
book represents the only historical work ever written on a subject two thousand years old,
the most important subject any human could ever wish to study or to know about, I feel
the one unique person who writes such a history ought to be a lot more than a mere
historian, such a person, almost of necessity, I would of thought, ought to be a
philosopher in their own right. Otherwise, why bother to write such a history at all ?

On the next page Maclay summarises Comte’s conception of the social organism
and says that we can discern a structure comparable to that of a ‘biological organism’
where anatomical structure can be decomposed “into elements, tissues and organs.” The
basic element being Family :

Here we might keep in mind that a society is composed of various

specialized types of interpersonal relationship, simple forms of which can be
found in the family but are totally absent from the biological individual, hence
“the family presents the true germ of the various characteristics of the social
organism.”

(Page 169)

The reference for the paragraph this last quote comes from is
POL II 240, 242 PHIL 115. Where POL II = System of Positive Polity, Volume II,
Harrison 1875, which I have. Examining my copy I see that this section is all about the
social organism, so there is a stroke of luck having this volume, but none of these pages
have been cut so I cannot check the actual page until I do this, still I can see I must read
this section, it looks extraordinary. The first question that comes to mind as I begin to
discover the full extent of Comte’s focus upon the social organism, thanks to Maclay
pointing the way, is how Herbert Spencer could of worked in such apparent isolation and
ignorance of these ideas, even if the book was not translated until 1875.
Forgetting Spencer for now, I can’t see the above quote in my Positive Polity, and
I ain’t go try and find it in my Positive Philosophy, but tidying up the messy cuts and
cutting the uncut pages just now I selected lots of passages which seemed interesting, and
Positive Polity is a most remarkable piece of work, here, apart from the section openly
devoted to the social organism, the whole work is an interpretation of existence based on
the assumption that humans are a superorganic species, exactly as Maclay indicates when
he says Comte devoted the remaining thirty years of his life to an elucidation of this
Great Being. But, whereas I use the scientific language of superorganic being, Comte is
stuck in some primitive mode of thinking that is deeply mystical, despite his commitment
to the exact opposite intention. This makes his work of the greatest fascination, but
decidedly frustrating for all that, still I think I must make the other three volumes a
primary target for my next flow of cash.
Lets delve into Positive Polity and see what takes my fancy.

I must however still more accurately define the fundamental conception which crowns
the entire system of positive thought ; and I must still further set forth the composite and
relative character of the highest existence we know.
This vast and eternal organism is peculiarly distinguished above all
Humanity is others by reason of its being formed of separable elements, each of which
a Being itself is conscious of its own cooperation, separable and consequently can give
composed of or withhold it, at least so far as its cooperation is direct. Its essential
separable attributes as well as its necessary conditions are both alike the
beings. consequence of this partial independence ; for it admits of combination on
a great scale, but at the same time of profound antagonism. In a word, the
chief superiority of the Great Being consists in this, that its organs are themselves beings,
individual or collective. All the functions belonging to it, whether those of the affections,
of the intellect, or the activity, are therefore ultimately exercised by certain individuals
whose free intervention is indispensable, although the refusal of any single individual
will generally be compensated by the assent of others. But to illustrate this point, we will
now consider separately the two existences belonging to each individual human unit,
which in the General View were considered together, without any difficulty thereby
arising.
The Supreme Power is the continuous result of all the forces
The subjective capable of voluntarily taking part in the amelioration of the race, even
life after death, without excepting our worthy helpmates amongst the animals. Each
is the period of individual member of this great whole has two successive existences,
true incorpora- the one, objective, and always transitory, in which he serves directly
tion with Hum- the Great Being by using the entire series of the previous labours of our
anity. race ; the other subjective, and of its essence perpetual, in which his
service is indirectly prolonged, by the results which he leaves to his
successors. Strictly speaking, scarcely any man becomes an organ of Humanity until this
second life has begun. The first really forms nothing but a trial of his worthiness for the
final incorporation ; which ordinarily should not be recognised until the objective
existence has been completely ended. Thus the individual is not yet a real organ of the
Great Being, though he aspires to become so by his services as a distinct being. His
relative independence exists only in this first life, during which he remains immediately
subject to the Order of nature ; to the laws of matter, of life, and of society. Once
incorporated with the Supreme Being he becomes truly inseparable from it. Thenceforth
he is removed from the influence of all physical laws, and remains only subject to the
higher laws which directly govern the development of Humanity.
It is by means of this passage to a subjective life that the chief extension of
The subject- the great organism is maintained. Other beings increase only by the law of
ive life is the the renovation of their elements, by the preponderance of absorption over
more domin- exhalation. But beside this source of expansion, the Supreme Power
ant. increases especially, by virtue of the subjective eternity to which its worthy
objective servants rise. Thus the subjective existences are necessarily more
and more in preponderance, both in number and in duration, in the total composition of
Humanity. It is on this ground that its power always exceeds that of any collection of
individuals. Even the insurrection of almost the entire living population against the
combined subjective influence of the past, would not prevent the evolution of the race
from following its course. Those servants of Humanity, who remained loyal, could easily
overcome this revolt, by basing their efforts upon the old principles, which, in spite of
anarchy, would be left in all hearts and intellects from the labours of all former
generations, they only being the genuine successors. In a word, the living are always
more and more ruled by the dead. But to meet the metaphysical error which would result
from too abstract a conception, we must never lose sight of the real nature of this
preponderance of the subjective organs of Humanity. Each subjective organ is the
product of a previous objective existence, and it requires the alliance of another objective
existence for its exercise. Thus man serves Humanity as a being during his life strictly so
called, and as an organ after his death, which finally transforms his objective into a
subjective life. In his first existence he freely receives and spontaneously employs the
resources of all kinds accumulated by the Great Being. In the second, if his personal
office has been worthily filled, he takes part in the work of directing the continual use of
the collective material of mankind. His individuality is at once the essential condition,
and yet the principal danger, of his objective cooperation ; for the problem is, how to
place the egoism which is unavoidable under the guidance of the altruism which is
indispensable. When his service has become subjective, the constant ascendancy of the
sociable over the personal faculties is a spontaneous consequence. For, not only is
Humanity composed only of existences capable of assimilation, but it assimilates only
from each, that portion of his life which is capable of being incorporated ; and rejects
every individual shortcoming.
In this general sketch I cannot hope to explain entirely, even to minds already
well prepared, the most extensive and most difficult of the positive conceptions, the sum
of the whole system of real doctrine. Still it will be proper to define exactly this the
essential centre of the true religion. All the rest of this treatise will illustrate still further
this radical notion, and show its applications in a manner more or less explicit. The last
volume will complete the theory as the general basis of the final system.
It is obvious that it is the leading characteristic of the true religion, that
Is it capable everything in it relates to Humanity. But the composite nature of the Great
of personal Being produces a difficulty which, whilst applying chiefly to the worship,
representa- affects the doctrine, and even the regimen. In fact this centre of human unity
tion. seems incapable of receiving any personal representation. This point which
will be hereafter dealt with, I will at once endeavour to clear up.
 This objection is removed by reflecting on the nature of the true Supreme
Every wort- Being. Although it is really composed of subjective existences, it can act
hy individu- directly only by means of objective agents. These are individual beings, of
al is in a se- the same nature as itself ; though less eminent, and not so permanent. Each
nse a repre- of these personal organs becomes therefore capable of representing the
sentative of Great Being in many ways, when duly incorporated therein. Thus the
Humanity. veneration of men of real greatness forms an essential part of the veneration
of Humanity. Even during his objective life, each of them forms a sort of
personification of the Great Being. It is however essential to this representation that they
be conceived as free from the serious imperfections which often obscure the best
characters. The variety of the individual types, and the connection between their social
duties, make this essential point of conception easy ; especially when a sound education
enables the true qualities of Humanity to be universally understood.

(Positive Polity, Vol. 2, pages 53 – 56.)

I have taken quite a chunk here but the selection I have made is so astounding that
I found it impossible to decide where to cut it after finding an interesting morsel. The
general tenor of Comte’s discourse is so strange as to be bizarre, and as such it needs
interpreting, and this section is highly useful in this respect with regard to some crucial
aspects of his way of expressing himself. Firstly we might deal with this weird idea
which describes his whole intellectual movement, The Religion of Humanity, in the
above we get a clue to why he uses this expression to describe the product of his
scientific revelation about human nature. Indeed the reason seems to be that it is human
nature itself that is the object of veneration. Hence we have this :

“It is obvious that it is the leading characteristic of the true religion, that
everything in it relates to Humanity.”

So, the social organism is the object of veneration, and it is human nature that
gives this organism its being, hence the Religion of Humanity. The actual phrase may
make sense when teased out like this but otherwise it is obscure as we are bound to think
of a phrase like this being about the worship of people as people, it is all a bit confusing.
Very odd. But I wanted the paragraph from which I have just taken a sentence for the
reference it makes to the difficulty of comprehending the supposed unity of the
superorganism given its extraordinary complex structure, being composed of such a
variety of individuals and cultural, economic and political forms. The failure of Comte to
make sense of this point is absolutely fundamental to his total failure as an expositor of
human nature seen in real terms.
Before trying to disentangle the explanation Comte offers as to how we may
overcome this difficulty we need to go back to remarks about the nature of life for the
human person. It may be that elsewhere in this work, or other volumes, we get a very
direct explanation for the curious description given in the above quite, but I have not
looked beyond this piece and it seems to be self contained, so I will take this explanation
as being as full as we can expect to find. Accordingly Comte explains that the
relationship between the individual and the organism of which the individual is but a part,
must be understood in two parts, the objective and subjective existence of the person.
This is really very strange, it appears that Comte has decided that since the
superorganism is composed of individuals, and the superorganism can only be derived
from the actions of individuals, then, because the superorganism is the only true being,
and the individuals are of necessity cellular units of its being, then the logical resolution
of the resulting difficulty we face in comprehending such a scheme of existence is to
produce of secularised version of religious lore, so that we actually regard our real life a
meaningless interlude, an objective experience that is full of meaning for us, but which
actually only has meaning after we die. Thus Comte is making the superorganism into
the domain of immortality in which the residue of our life’s effort is invested, so that we
obtain immortality in the life of the superorganism, giving us an existence that is
subjective, since we cannot experience it, but an existence that must be real for how else
can our individual existence serve, as we know it does, to create a living organism that
exists in its own right alone.
How odd is this ? I never came across such ideas, it is quite astounding. It is easy
to follow the logic, and to see how Comte gets to where he is going, but nothing could be
further from the scientific conception as I understand it, that he at first sight seems to be
so enamoured with. Comte is evidently concerned to make sense of the scientific insight
that humans are superorganisms in a personal way that makes the continuity of life
possible. This is a remarkable conception, but it is a religious conception, and as such it
cannot possibly be scientific. From a scientific point of view the only thing that makes
any sense is to try and understand existence as it is, it makes no sense to get embroiled in
the consequences of the idea, as we said above. And the fact is that if the idea that
humans are a superorganic species then that is the end of it, all we need do is understand
things as they are. Comte does seem to expend a considerable amount of effort in doing
just this, but he conflates all his speculations about the nature of the organism with the
state of knowledge. This is the critical flaw in Comte’s thinking, he recognises that there
is a relationship between the development of the social organism and the state of
knowledge and then evidently therefore concludes that in recognising that human society
is a living object, assumes that this act of recognition changes the nature of the organism.
So we have an example of the curious effect whereby people often speculate on the
nature of things being determined by the observation of things. But the whole basis of
science rests upon the possibility of making observations of things in a detached manner,
so that they can be understood in themselves, and it follows that this ought to of been
Comte’s concern.
The fact is that over a century and a half later, two world wars, a technological
revolution, the foundation of Israel, the ingress of Islam into Europe, and such like major
transformations of the world, all go to prove the enduring integrity of the social organism
in which Comte lived, and to prove that the emergence of radical new knowledge about
the nature of existence, of itself, has no bearing on the continuity of the social organism.
And so, we can answer the question Comte thought he was addressing when he said that :

“These are individual beings, of the same nature as itself ; though less
eminent, and not so permanent. Each of these personal organs becomes therefore
capable of representing the Great Being in many ways, when duly incorporated
 therein. Thus the veneration of men of real greatness forms an essential part of the
veneration of Humanity.”

His answer given here is absurd, it makes the individual an individual in their own right,
as we all know them to be ; but of course what we all know is wrong. He wants to go on
endlessly about the social being as some kind of divine and perfect being, and so he
makes our involvement in its creation all about moral rectitude. But we are talking about
a living object created by nature, and our concern should not be to make what we know
about how we feel about ourselves be the basis of how we understand our relationship to
the superorganism, we should be trying to understand how the superorganic physiology
incorporates us into its being. Therefore, aside from the structural elements of
complexity, we need just one other attribute, and that is identity, and the identity of the
superorganism is the key to the integration of the individual into its body. This is so
obvious it beggars belief that anyone could miss the point, and accordingly Comte should
of seen that there was no need for his idiotic religion, that the amazing global civilisation
was already in existence, and that it had a unifying identity, Judaism, if he had seen this
then he could of predicted the preservation of religion as we know it in the face of all
challenges, and what is more he might of been able to predict the world wars and the rise
of the Nazis, both of which events have been critical to the culmination of the Jewish
superorganisms coming of age, as marked by the foundation of the state of Israel as the
focal point of all humanity on earth ; although this last matter is just a wee way of been
clarified.
So in the above we really do have a very fine piece of Comtian reasoning based
on the modern conception of the social organism as provided by modern science, and it is
a complete farce, but it is the only such model we can examine in English. Herbert
Spencer offers nothing remotely like this, even though he too does make human society a
social organism. Other authors who developed the idea wrote in German, and maybe
some in French, some of which has been translated into Italian, but never into English,
and there are no followers of these continental authors, and only the slightest reviews of
their work to guide us. The problems of examining a wider field of exploration in human
superorganics are considerable ; hence my frustration that Maclay did nothing to address
this difficulty.
I love the way that Comte discusses, at the start of the passage taken above, the
manner in which his Great Being exists through the cooperation of the individuals of
which it is composed. This free and easy discussion of the social organism is a sheer
delight, it shows a total commitment to the idea. And yet there is only one thinker who is
said to of actually regarded human society as a true living organism, and it was not
Comte, which seems completely unjustified on the basis of his Positive Polity, although it
might possibly be justified on the basis of his more famous earlier work, Positive
Philosophy, which my glimpses at have not shown anything like the sort of discussion of
which the above is an example. But it would be a very poor reviewer who failed to take
into consideration this huge, and much later work.

I decided to look for copies of Positive Polity today, Tuesday, 12 February 2008,
there were no odd volumes unfortunately, a full four volume set was £200, 1880’s, while
a full set in two volumes was £126 and as such would have to be the best buy. An
America agency had one volume for just £4, 1968, but the idiot did not state the volume,
but it may be the one I have. Anyway I checked the internet itself in case anyone was
giving these books away as downloads, no luck, but there is a good site on Comte and his
Positive Philosophy was available in three volumes, so I took two and will get the third
next time. But I noticed a 1960’s work entitled Comte the Mad Philosopher, or
something like that, I found two copies in America so I will buy the cheapest at £5. But I
am guessing that he is ‘Mad’ because of his ideas based on the notion that society is an
organism, hence I must see this book. But it is truly magnificent that the only man ever
to grasp the true nature of human existence and to devout his life to expounding upon this
insight should be deemed mad, while nutter beyond count are extolled supreme geniuses
for their philosophies about mind, matter, God and such like, Berkley, Descartes, Kant
and such like being the names that spring to mind. Even so, we can see from the block
taken above that he was a prime candidate for singling out as crazy because his ideas
were unfamiliar and even though we know he was correct in terms of his basic principles,
he was barking mad in terms of how he chose to pursue his ideas. Why did he do this ?
Well, I happen to have a French work, in English, History of Modern Philosophy
in France, by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, published 1899, which I just dipped into while my
focus is on Comte and his precursors. This volume is useful in terms of the question
concluding the previous paragraph. I have read elsewhere that Saint-Simon was Comte’s
main inspiration, and from what is said here this philosopher seems to of had some notion
that scientific knowledge was introducing a new dispensation that would lead towards a
new kind of religion ; I need to examine this further to clarify these thoughts as I have
just quickly scanned these pages. But if this is the case then the remarks I noticed in
Maclay the other day regarding Comte’s apparent arrogance and conceited view of his
own importance and uniqueness, are not warranted in the sense that I was inclined to
think, in agreement with Maclay, they may be, because it would mean Comte was
following on from a precursor who inspired him, and therefore he could expect someone
to be inspired by himself. On this last point I would suggest that it is perhaps because he
overshot the mark so dramatically, with his eccentric use of a sound idea, that it was
impossible to follow in the shape of any kind of disciple.
The most important book anyone interested in the idea of the social organism can
own is Organismic Theories of the State, by Francis W. Coker, 1910. This is a unique
examination of the idea in hand, Maclay constitutes a second unique volume on this
subject, but Coker is of the period, and as such his work is a review of modern ideas,
rather than a history, his book is therefore, from a historical perspective, part of the
subject itself. To this end I have just consulted Coker regarding Comte and sure enough,
he absolutely disregards the astounding development of the idea of the social organism
presented in Positive Polity. As surprising as this omission is, it seems that Coker is not
really aware of Positive Polity, which seems most extraordinary. But Coker says :

Though the first systematic and detailed employment of the biological method
was made by Herbert Spencer, Comte had demonstrated at considerable length the
connection of sociology with biology as its immediate predecessor in the
hierarchy of science, and had traced many analogies between the “social” or
“collective” and plant and animal organisms.
 (Coker, Page 115 –114.)

This quote suggests that Coker really was a part of the debate, a negative part, as I
have always assumed him to be over the several years I have known his work, he
obviously dismisses the idea he reviews. But this detail of his review, where he totally
erroneously makes Spencer the first full promoter of the organic idea, and represents
Comte as a mere indicator of analogies, is a gross distortion of the facts. This
misrepresentation makes perfect sense to me when I think of the war between religion
and science, which was coming to fruition at this time in respect to our idea, because this
is a perfect time for such a review as that of Coker’s to appear, to lay the idea to bed, as
the academic world shows it has, at last, got a grip on this most dangerous of all scientific
ideas, precisely because it is the purest science of humanity attainable. Coker gives a
number of references for Spencer in respect to the idea, who was so prolific, for so long,
that it is no straightforward matter to check such references, but which I suppose I should
check before leaving this topic alone, but I recall no great elaboration of the biological
method applied to humans in Spencer, nothing that impressed me. And besides, we find
here, in Coker, an affirmation of Spencer’s commitment to the individual as an end in
themselves, even as he is supposed to be saying society is an organism !

As the nature of the whole is a consequence of, and can be known only from a
knowledge of, the nature of the parts, the study of the parts must logically precede
the study of the whole. The starting-point in the explanation of society must be
with the individual member of society—with the human being, which corresponds
to the cell of the plant or animal organism, the cell having been, since Comte’s
time, established as the original biological unit.

(Ibid. p. 125)

It reeks of conspiracy, which I must resist, but at the same time just as I recognise
Darwin is a monstrous fraud, I cannot help finding the same fault in Spencer because he
is such a flawed exponent of the social organism and yet a fraud elevated so high by his
own society that he sits aloft on a pedestal beside Darwin in this war of religion against
science, but on the side of science as the enemy of science, which we cannot avoid saying
is an inherent method used by the theocracy to control knowledge and thus all society to
serve its own continuity as the bonding programme of superorganic being.
This reference to the discovery of the cell it has been noted already concerns the
work of Schwann which I was delighted to discover recently, though I have still not come
across the reference again, and which it would of been nice of Coker to of pointed out
here for he obviously has in minds its significance in distinguishing between the
approaches of Comte and Spencer since it is implicit in this quote that he means to say
that Spencer had the advantages of ideas that Comte had no knowledge of. But the fact is
that Positive Polity was published in 1852 :
 [Schwann’s] ‘cell theory’ was formulated, and the foundations of modern
histology laid, in 1839 with the publication of Schwann’s Mikroskopische
Untersuchungen über die Ueberreinstimmung in der Struktur und dem Wachstum
der Tiere und Pflanzen (English translation, Microscopical Researches on the
Similarity in the Structure and Growth of Animals and Plants, 1847).

(Biographical Dictionary of Scientists, Williams, 1982, Page 467)

so, while we might wonder when the French got know about cells, we can assume it was
in time for Comte to take full account of the matter in his thinking.
The fact is that the exact opposite of what Coker says Spencer said is the truth, the
parts must be known from the whole, not the other way around, it is unmitigated bias to
assert otherwise. We do not discover a fish is a fish by examining its innards and finding
a swim bladder, and where there is confusion over the nature of an animal that can only
be resolved by the an internal examination, as may happen, the same hardly applies to
ourselves, we could, if we were allowed, easily see what we are. We are a superorganic
species of mammal, mammalian termites if you like, and anyone who had watched the
report on city slums taking over the planet faster than we can think, on Channel Four
News tonight, Tuesday, 12 February 2008, would readily concede the fact.

The discussion of St. Simon talks about his haphazard work and in this work I am
proceeding in a haphazard fashion myself, but that is because this work is developmental,
I am recording my search for material after a period of collecting books and ideas, I have
just suffered and enforced break in my work because of three months attendance at a
detention centre for the criminally unemployed, New Deal as our Orwellian state likes to
terms such programmes of control. And I have written other pieces that have attempted
to draw out a theme more consistently. Last night I checked out the book of Great Men
by Harrison with a view to looking up Hegel, I describe above my search for pre-Comte
uses of the phrase ‘social organism’ (p. 37) and following this thought again I have
discovered some other interesting precursors of Comte. Three in succession are Vico,
Herder and Fréret. The last name is wholly new to me, the usefulness of these people lies
in the way they represent the movement of the age in which the war between science and
religion simmered to boiling point. This helps build a picture that extends our ideas into
the past to balance out the extraordinary claims we make in the present, where we claim
that the nineteenth century was a period of entrenchment by the theocracy, the building of
incredibly elaborate schemes of false scientific knowledge, followed by catastrophic
world war to cement the work of academics in the nineteenth century. The general view
is extended beyond that ordinarily taken of society, and we need to reach back into the
past when religion was an overt absolute theocracy in order to understand how it has
become a covert absolute theocracy today.
The success of the act of subversion is so complete that it is very difficult for us to
comprehend, it has stolen our consciousness from us and forces us to think according to
its dictates at ever moment of our lives when there is a relevant occasion. I noticed an
example of this on a nature programme the other day. In Natural World on BBC 2,
9/02/08, we were informed in the confident, authoritative voice of the actor reading his
lines how the dolphins needed to evolve a social behaviour, and hence the associated
large brain, in order to meet the challenge posed by predators like sharks ! What utter
lunacy, you may as well have Sky at Night explaining that the earth is a flat disc
stationary at the centre of the universe, otherwise we would all fall off ! There is as much
scientific sense in both these accounts of nature. But one is espoused today, the other is
not, and the one that is espoused is so because the same illogical explanation of social
behaviour must run through all animal life, and it must be safe for contact with Jewish
beliefs, because our society is an absolute theocracy, a Jewish theocracy.
Is it possible such animals as dolphins could make a conscious decision to save a
human ? they asked. There answer shows the force of language exuding science in the
form of religious Darwinian myth that makes the environment push development, rather
than having a force drive development toward the exploitation of potential in terms of
energy and structure, as it does in physics or chemistry. Darwinian evolution is a positive
response to a negative challenge, making humans proactive agents in their own creation,
whereas true evolutionary development is a positive response opportunity. Dolphins
became social for the same reason ants and humans became social, because sociality is a
domain of latent potential that allows physiology to adapt toward the exploitation of this
physiologically convoluted form. Dolphins of course do not create themselves, therefore
their glory is a negative response to conditions. But humans choose to be social, they are,
according to the assumptions of scientists, predisposed to be solitary, each person being
an end in themselves, able to exist on their own all their lives, from birth to death ; this is
the implication, but of course it is too stupid, put like this, for even the boldest scientific
fraud to dare say this, but there is no other way to understand what they do say. The
glory of humanity is therefore a positive thing.
It is mid February and the sun has been glorious so I have already been
sunbathing in the greenhouse, and sunbathing means reading. My selection is a recent
acquisition, The Ritual Process by Victor Turner, 1969. It is very nice because Turner is
trying to relate ritual to social structure, the topic is so closely allied to the core reality of
the superorganic nature of humans that it is a sheer delight, forcing Turner to give a good
deal of thought to the dynamics of superorganic form based on the organization of
individuals. Turner has no more idea that humans are a superorganic species of mammal
evolved to form a social structure than the ancient Romans knew that the earth went
around the sun, indicating how magnificently the combined forces of intellectual
oppression had done their work in the aftermath of centuries of glorious enlightenment
that we have been seeking to discover in the course of this work. Even if the Romans had
had space craft and travelled to the moon, as we have done, we can be sure that they
would of been incapable of understanding that the earth was moving in space, if the work
of this brilliant Scottish anthropologist can be used to judge the capacity of the organism
to create a priesthood so empowered by a false point of view that even staring in the face
of the opposite reality cannot remove the blind spot. There is some excruciating jargon in
this anthropological work, the following selection comes under the heading Attributes of
Liminal Entities, which I hate to say I guess I ought to explain.
 Other characteristics are submissiveness and silence. Not only the chief in
the rites under discussion, but also neophytes in many rites de passage have to
submit to an authority that is nothing less than that of the total community. This
community is the repository of the whole gamut of the culture’s values, norms,
attitudes, sentiments, and relationships. Its representatives in the specific rites—
and these may vary from ritual to ritual—represent the generic authority of tradi-
tion. In tribal societies, too, speech is not merely communication but also power
and wisdom. The wisdom (mana) that is imparted in sacred liminality is not just
an aggregation of words and sentences ; it has ontological value, it refashions the
very being of the neophyte. That is why, in the Chisungu rites of the Bemba, so
well described by Audrey Richards (1956), the secluded girl is said to be “grown
into a woman” by the female elders—and she is so grown by the verbal and
nonverbal instruction she receives in precept and symbol, especially by the
revelation to her of tribal sacra in the form of pottery images.
The neophyte in liminality must be a tabula rasa, a blank slate, on which
is inscribed the knowledge and wisdom of the group, in those respects that pertain
to the new status. The ordeals and humiliations, often of a grossly physiological
character, to which neophytes are submitted represent partly a destruction of the
previous status and partly a tempering of their essence in order to prepare them to
cope with their new responsibilities and restrain them in advance from abusing
their new privileges. They have to be shown that in themselves they are clay or
dust, mere matter, whose form is impressed upon them by society.

(Turner, p. 103)

I ought to trace my reading back to the point where he defines ‘liminality’, but its
meaning was not clear and from what I have read I may as well just spew something
forth. No its no good I can’t, I have been reading this damn book all afternoon and i have
no real idea what liminality is, but it seems very interesting :

In liminality, the underlying comes uppermost. ........the supreme political

authority is portrayed “as a slave,”

(Ibid. p.102)

This remark from the same section is very interesting for, as Turner himself
unwittingly hints at, this is very much the guise in which the master race, the Jews, may
be said to beguile the entire population of humanity today ; a fact of crucial importance to
our exposition of the social organism, and the dynamics of the war between religion and
knowledge. We can see a fundamental recognition of the principle of deception in this
notion of liminality. So what the hell is it ?

Liminality
The attributes of liminality or of liminal personae (“threshold people”) are necessarily
ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of
classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities
are neither here nor there ; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and
arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial. As such, their ambiguous and
indeterminate attributes are expressed by a rich variety of symbols in the many societies
that ritualise social and cultural transitions. Thus, liminality is frequently likened to
death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness,
and to an eclipse of the sun or moon.
Liminal entities, such as neophytes in initiation or puberty rites, may be
represented as possessing nothing. They may be disguised as monsters, wear only a strip
of clothing, or even go naked, to demonstrate that as liminal beings they have no status,
property, insignia, secular clothing indicating rank or role, position in a kinship system —
in short, nothing that may distinguish them from their fellow neophytes or initiands.
Their behavior is normally passive or humble ; they must obey their instructors
implicitly, and accept arbitrary punishment without complaint. It is as though they are
being reduced or ground down to a uniform condition to be fashioned anew and endowed
with additional powers to enable them to cope with their new station in life. Among
themselves, neophytes tend to develop an intense comradeship and egalitarianism.
Secular distinctions of rank and status disappear or are homogenized. The condition of
the patient and her husband in Isoma had some of these attributes—passivity, humility,
near-nakedness—in a symbolic milieu that represented both a grave and a womb. In
initiations with a long period of seclusion, such as the circumcision rites of many tribal
societies or induction into secret societies, there is often a rich proliferation of liminal
symbols.

Communitas

What is interesting about liminal phenomena for our present purposes is the blend they
offer of lowliness and sacredness, of homogeneity and comradeship. We are presented, in
such rites, with a “moment in and out of time,” and in and out of secular social structure,
which reveals, however fleetingly, some recognition (in symbol if not always in
language) of a generalized social bond that has ceased to be and has simultaneously yet to
be fragmented into a multiplicity of structural ties. These are the ties organized in terms
either of caste, class, or rank hierarchies or of segmentary oppositions in the stateless
societies beloved of political anthropologists. It is as though there are here two major
“models” for human interrelatedness, juxtaposed and alternating. The first is of society as
a structured, differentiated, and often hierarchical system of politico-legal-economic
positions with many types of evaluation, separating men in terms of “more” or “less”.
The second, which emerges recognizably in the liminal period, is of society as an
unstructured or rudimentarily structured and relatively undifferentiated comitatus,
community, or even communion of equal individuals who submit together to the general
authority of the ritual elders.
I prefer the Latin term “communitas” to “community,” to distinguish this
modality of social relationship from an “area of common living.” The distinction
between structure and communitas is not simply the familiar one between “secular” and
“sacred,” or that, for example, between politics and religion. Certain fixed offices in
tribal societies have many sacred attributes ; indeed, every social position has some
sacred characteristics. But this “sacred” component is acquired by the incumbents of
positions during the rites de passage, through which they changed positions. Something
of the sacredness of that transient humility and modelessness goes over, and tempers the
pride of the incumbent of a higher position or office. This is not simply, as Fortes (1962,
p. 86) has cogently argued, a matter of giving a general stamp of legitimacy to a society’s
structural positions. It is rather a matter of giving recognition to an essential and generic
human bond, without which there could be no society. Liminality implies that the high
could not be high unless the low existed, and he who is high must experience what it is
like to be low. No doubt something of this thinking, a few years ago, lay behind Prince
Philip’s decision to send his son, the heir apparent to the British throne, to a bush school
in Australia for a time, where he could learn how “to rough it.”

Dialectic of the Developmental Cycle

From all this I infer that, for individuals and groups, social life is a type of dialectical
process that involves successive experience of high and low, communitas and structure,
homogeneity and differentiation, equality and inequality. The passage from lower to
higher status is through a limbo of statuslessness. In such a process, the opposites, as it
were, constitute one another and are mutually indispensable. Furthermore, since any
concrete tribal society is made up of multiple personae, groups, and categories, each of
which has its own developmental cycle, at a given moment many incumbencies of fixed
positions coexist with many passages between positions. In other words, each
individual’s life experience contains alternating exposure to structure and communitas,
and to states and transitions.

(Turner, pages 95 – 97)

You can, I suspect, see exactly why I have been reading this book without being
able to say what the central idea of some of the crucial jargon used means. My general
impression was that Turner is describing a state of limbo that people may enter, which
has a special character of structureless homogeneity that is nonetheless structurally
related to the total structure of society to which the people so isolated still, nonetheless,
belong. Even my attempt to explain the above in simple language ends up elaborate and
contorted. More simply yet : liminality may be summed up as the experience of
detachment from social order.
Liminality is a very interesting description of how a complex social structure
works at the comparatively simple level of pre-civilised societies. As usually applies in
biology, examining more simple organisms allows the basic mechanics of all life to be
elucidated. It is for precisely this reason that, as Turner tells us, no one studying
primitive people in the nineteenth century, like Morgan, made a sincere attempt to
understand these societies, and even since that time the leading expositors of religion
have failed to develop this obvious link between religion and social structure. In a world
where the idea of the social organism was still alive and well a true examination of these
ideas would be fatal to religion in Jewish societies like ours. Of course this is no longer a
problem post Second World War because the academic world has been reduced to the
status of an extension of the theocratic order, so that a leading, mature anthropologist like
Turner has no idea that humans are animals that evolved, he is programmed by
Darwinian religious dogma that detaches humans from nature and makes humans the
creators of society.
Yet it is when reading his own excellent descriptions of how behaviour is
organised by ritual that we get the most perfect confirmation of the idea that human
physiology evolved to produce social structure, as we see when he speaks of how people
can be incorporated into the social structure through a process that erases their ‘hard
drive’ and ‘rewrites’ it as periodic occasion demands for the continuity of the
superorganic being. It is clearly impossible to account for these behaviours in terms of
the individual, and we see from what I have quoted that Turner is obliged to concern
himself with the ludicrous notions of duality that plague academia, as we saw in the case
of the Human by Nature work considered above, making any rational account of humans
impossible.
Having come this far we ought to talk about communitas because communitas is
to liminality as walking is to legs. As I have said, liminality is an experience,
communitas is that which is experienced, or conversely that which the experience can be
said to create, depending upon which aspect of the situation you feel like making
primary. I have taken the full explanation of these ideas and yet I still feel I ought to state
for people what is meant by these terms, so weird are they, but you can make your own
mind up. Still, crucially, for us, it is clear that we cultural anthropology based on
scientifically valid data being reduced to the babble of philosophical gobbledegook, a real
tragedy. But the alternative is to allow people to do genuine science, based on the simple
fact that human physiology evolved to form social structure, and this must destroy
religion wherever it exists. And we can see that religion is essential to the structure of
society. I frequently talks about how language is a force that creates social structure but
when we these descriptions of how people are organized by ritual the underlying
physiological depth of the linguistic aspect of human physiology is made manifest and
reveals its solidly organic form, which we readily lose sight of in our infinitely more
massive and complex social structure.

It is from Turner’s ideas on liminality that we find our thoughts on the most
challenging aspect of the idea of the social organism being given some very powerful
stimulation. He inverts social power, making the powerless the powerful, and his
discussion of this point is fascinating for his description of people in the Sudan can be
related to the broad conditions of Judaism that preoccupied people before Hitler came to
the rescue of the Jews by making any critical examination of the nature of Judaism taboo.

Among the Nuer of the Sudan, the role of “leopard-skin priest”

interestingly links the symbolic value of the mother’s brother in patrilineal society
with some of the other attributes of liminal, marginal, and politically weak figures
 we have already considered. According to Evans-Pritchard (1956), “in some
myths of the Jikany tribes [of the Nuer] the leopard-skin [insignium of priestly
office] was given by the ancestors of the [territorially] dominant [agnatic]
lineages to their maternal uncles that they might serve as tribal priests. The
structurally opposed lineages of the clan were then in the common relationship of
sisters’ sons to the line of priests, which thus had a mediatory position between
them” (p. 293—my emphasis). As well as being categorical mothers’ brothers to
the political segments, leopard-skin priests are “in the category of rul, strangers,
and not of diel, members of the clans which own the tribal territories. . . . [They]
have no tribal territories of their own but live, as families and small lineages, in
most or all territories owned by other clans. They are like Levi, divided in Jacob
and scattered in Israel” (p. 292). (Something of this priestly character adheres to
the scattered lineages of circumcisers and rain makers among the Gisu of
Uganda.) Nuer leopard-skin priests have “a mystical relationship ... with the earth
in virtue of which their curses are thought to have special potency, for . . . they
can affect not only a man’s crops but his welfare generally, since human activities
all take place on the earth” (p. 291).

(Ibid. pages 119 – 120)

There is detail in this quote that we do not need, but I like full selections, the bit
we do need is that which indicates that people from outside a society are introduced into
it through the structure based on kin ; this also applies to the new born. We have
outsiders in an inferior position being given arbitrational authority over people who
‘own’ a territory. Viewed from a scientific perspective where we accept that society is an
extended superorganic structure, it is clear that this primitive arrangement is near
identical to that which someone like Sombart, in The Jews and Modern Capitalism, 1913,
that I have considered in other essays, has to say about the way Jews operate in the
societies they occupy as outsiders. If we are asked to compare the grubs eaten by
aborigines in the bush with a Sunday roast dinner we would feel entitled to say there was
no comparison to be made, but if asked whether these two things were functionally one
and the same, Were they both food ? we would have no problem admitting that they were
the same. And it is clear that the same comparison applies between the primitive ritual
and the primitive social structure observed in Africa by the likes of Turner, and the
religion, politics and economics, of our modern world. Which is of course only what any
scientist, not to say any sincere, rational person, would expect.

In making this comments I am induced to think of a work of a rare kind, The

Natural History of the State, by Henry Ford, (not the industrialist), 1915, which takes the
view that society is a true organism, and in which we find an anthropologist named who
interpreted the sort of relationships turner observed according to the idea that society was
a collective entity in which the individual played a subservient role to that collective state
of being.
 Howitt says that the classificatory system [of tribal society] is
unintelligible unless it is borne in mind that “the social unit is not the individual
but the group ; and the former simply takes the relationships of his group, which
are of group to group.” (The Native Tribes of Southeast Australia, p. 186.) The system is
not a crude but an elaborate one, making some distinctions which are lost in the
descriptive system of civilised peoples.

(Ford, p.117)

From our thoughts on the work of Turner we may say that this disappearance of
detail in the social structure referred to by Ford is not necessarily because the social
structure has changed in kind and lost some of its elements or rigour, but rather, as Turner
indicated, it is because some routine elements of primitive culture has taken on major
structural forms in advanced superorganic beings, so the obscurity is not due to loss, as
suggested, but due to elaboration, a bit like a fin becoming a leg, or scales becoming teeth
or feathers, so the idea of liminality placing individuals in a temporary state of
detachment from society to give expression to a sacred role is transformed in massive
superorganisms into a permanent state of living as in the case of monastic life, which is
then also permanently associated with a sacred profession.
However, despite the existence of works like that by Ford, although they are few
and far between, we find that according to a book that just arrived from Holland this
morning, 14/02/08, Foundations of Sociology by George Lundberg, 1939, there is a war
going on between sociologists and biology a quarter of a century after Ford, whereby a
relentless objection is raised to thinking of society as an organic whole, where instead the
age old terminology of individualistic mysticism is forced upon the discipline. And of
course this war between sociology and biology is just a major battle of the time occurring
within the overall struggle between religion and knowledge. Thus we have :

Another, and perhaps the central, reason for the inferiority feeling and
corresponding defense reactions of sociologists when confronted with the social-mind
bogey as a logical implication of their position, is the inglorious history of this concept as
a survival of the extreme social organicists of the last century. This group of writers,
becoming impressed with the same organic aspects of society which have impressed
thinkers of all ages, and having had their attention dramatically called to the post-
Darwinian developments in biology, became overenthusiastic and uncritical in the
application of individual-group analogies as an end in itself rather than as a means of
understanding the phenomena at hand. Much of their work in this connection has since
fallen into disrepute, and a general abandonment of their position has ensued. As
frequently happens in such cases, also, organismic theories of any kind have become a
sort of intellectual taboo. That is, any reference to the organic and functional unity of
society is usually accompanied by a disavowal of all organismic implications. As has
been pointed out above, this results in some interesting inconsistencies and confusions.
There is a large and apparently growing group of “cultural” sociologists who contend
vigorously, and I think correctly, for the organic unity and behavior of social groups. The
more realistically they hold to this position, the more closely they approach the position
of the condemned organicists. To take this view is intellectually taboo although it is
desired to retain a position, which, except for a functional instead of morphological
definition, is practically the same.
In short, sociologists find themselves in difficulties as a result of their adoption of
a vocabulary and a set of meanings from a theory which has already been abandoned in
the fields from which the terminology was borrowed, namely, nineteenth century
physiology and psychology. This orientation in sociology encounters precisely the same
difficulties as it has encountered in the fields from which it was adopted. On the other
hand, the acceptance of modern definitions of the concepts of physiology and psychology
makes some of these concepts as useful in sociology as in any other field.
Consider, for example, a modern definition of an organism. Child speaks of an
organism as “a more or less definite and discrete order and unity, in other words a
pattern, which not only determines its structure and the relations of its parts to each other,
but enables it to act as a whole with respect to the world about it.” This seems to me to
be also a very lucid and useful description of a social-group. It is certainly identical with
the sociologist’s definition of culture patterns. Apparently the biologist has found the
term “organism” a useful concept to describe these relationships and hence has adopted it
as a unit of investigation—a symbol for a set of relationships, a term for communication,
description, and thought. This usefulness is the sole warrant for the employment of the
concept in biology. If we find it useful in exactly the same way in sociology, is there any
canon of philosophy or science, not to mention biological patents or copyrights, which
forbids its use ?
We have remarked in the preceding chapters on the provincial view which regards
the terminology of science as determined by unique subject matters rather than as
designations of behavior and relationships of any subject matter. The real reason for the
sociologist’s inhibitions concerning the “organismic” view of society is his antiquated
and inadequate knowledge of biology. As Child very pertinently says :

“Objections such as those that human society is not a big animal, that it has, for example,
no stomach, no muscles, etc., etc., are just as true for many organisms as for society. It has been
said that social mind has no sensorium. But do not the individuals in relation to each other and to
environment constitute the sensorium of the social mind just as truly as cells and cell groups in
relation to each other and to the external world constitute the sensorium of the individual mind ?
. . . . Even though we decline to speak of the social organism we find it very difficult to dispense
with the term organization, simply because the term expresses better than any other certain
processes and phenomena in society as well as in the organism.”

A favourite point upon which much discussion of the “reality” of group

designations usually converges is the notion of the State. Recent developments in the
direction of so-called “totalitarianism” have warmly revived this venerable issue with its
principal practical problem of the relationship between the individual and society. The
idea of the State, it is felt, involves some notion of a “super-individual.” To attribute to
such a super-individual all the animistic behaviours, feelings, and characteristics
traditionally attributed to the individual can be made to appear quite absurd. Our point is
that it is also absurd, in a scientific frame of reference, to discuss individual behavior in
these terms, and for the same reasons. But so deep-seated are the linguistic habits
governing the use of certain words as applying only to the behavior of so-called
individuals that another set of words are felt to be necessary to describe the behavior of
either smaller (e.g., cells) or larger (e.g., social groups) behavior units. In the meantime
science, in conforming to the principle of parsimony, is constantly working in the
direction of showing that “different” and “unique” phenomena are only special cases of
its general principles. Accordingly, these unique phenomena are to be explained not by
special systems predicated on the intrinsic uniqueness of the subject matter but by a
broadened and more generalized definition of scientific categories so as to include the
hitherto excluded fields of phenomena. We shall deal in a later chapter (Chapter VIII)
with some of the traditional questions of the relationship of the individual and society,
mainly, to show the illusory nature of the issue, or more correctly that it arises from the
nature of certain traditional assumptions regarding man and society which are here
repudiated. We mention the matter here only as incidental to a discussion of group
mechanisms of behavior.
Except for the fact (a) that I wish to consider below the mechanisms of group
behavior and (b) that I wish to consider them from the same point of view as the
mechanisms of any other behavior whatsoever, I should not, of course, concern myself
even casually either with such a term as “group mind” or with the applicability of the
word “organism” to social groups. I have merely pointed out that there is no more
objection to such a category as “group mind” than there is to such a term as “individual
mind.” Both concepts in their traditional meaning are obsolete and I do not find either of
any value in explaining behavior. Sociologists must take the same attitude toward the
“group-mind” controversy as the behaviourists, and indeed most psychologists, now take
toward the individual mind as a scientific category, i.e., to define it, if at all, in terms of
the total behavior of the organism or entity under discussion. I am here merely making a
concrete application of the principle developed in earlier chapters that scientific terms
must be defined operationally in terms of the behavior they aim to represent, regardless
of preconceived notions that certain scientific behavior-and-relationship categories are
applicable only to certain restricted subject matters.
We may summarize our position on the theoretical aspects of the “group”
controversy as follows :
The question of the reality of the entities designated by such terms as “group,”
“crowd,” and “public” has arisen from a mistaken notion of the nature of all categories
and units. In this case, the argument has been that groups are merely “collections” of
individuals and that we cannot scientifically speak of a social group as acting and
thinking, since it is the individuals composing the group that think and act. This
reasoning is purely the result of habituation to one set of units rather than to another, and
the objections raised against such units as “group” and “public” are equally applicable to
the individual as a unit. Suppose that biologists should insist that it was improper for
psychologists to speak of the individual as such because it is, after all, cells that behave.
Suppose, further, that biochemists or physicists should thereupon remonstrate with the
biologists for speaking of the behavior of cells when everyone knows that it is the atoms,
molecules, electrons, etc., that behave. In such a controversy all parties would be right.
The size of the unit we see depends on the focus of our lenses, which in any given case is
determined and justified by whether it helps us to understand and explain the behavior of
the unit in which we are interested. We shall show below that the group concept is useful
in this sense. It serves, in fact, the same purpose relative to societal phenomena that the
concept of the individual has served in psychology. That is, when social units and
phenomena are recognized to possess the same kind of reality as other phenomena, the
same methods that have brought results in other sciences will be applied in sociology,
with corresponding results.
In short, all units are the constructs of man’s convenience, which is the sole
criterion of both their reality and their justifiability. That the behavior of any given unit
can be shown to be made up of the behavior of constituent units in no way invalidates our
use of the larger synthesis as a unit if such usage serves our purpose. It is therefore just as
permissible to speak, for example, of public opinion as of individual opinion and as
permissible to speak of the thinking, feeling, and acting of a group as it is to attribute
those phenomena to individuals. In both cases, these words merely indicate a technique
through which the unit referred to achieves a tentative adjustment.

(Lundberg, pages 168 – 172)

As you can see, although I choose to say this passage relates to the war between
religion and science, the author himself has no idea that this eternal war is the true object
of his topic, and this is because of the way that religious ideology had already been
insinuated into academia through the fashioning of pseudo scientific ideas by the
defenders of theocracy by the time this book was written in 1939. What was needed now
the message had been formulated was, to follow Hitler’s brilliant interpretation of Jewish
political dynamics, the violence necessary to seal the effect of the theocracy’s anti-
scientific propaganda that had been generated over the course of preceding decades. The
process of insinuation is relentless, and in this extensive quote we have the tail end of the
struggle against theocracy in the science of humanity, a struggle which as we are seeing
goes way back into the eighteenth century. It is a point of great interest to us to pick up
pieces like this by Lundberg appearing along the course of the last couple of centuries, up
to the present, showing how the process of insinuation has progressed as the means by
which academia is fossilised into a theocratically sympathetic form. But first the true
scientific form must show itself, before the pseudo form can be insinuated into the mould
provided by thinkers motivated by the search for truth, those who mimic the scientific
method apply the key to religious myth to their production of pseudo scientific models.
In many ways this rare piece of 1930’s work tallies nicely with the rare piece of
1990’s work we considered in the shape of Human by Nature. Works that argue this line
are always rare and extremely hard to find, but I hope I am demonstrating the persistence
of the theme in the post scientific era, that is post the Great War, where the cry is one of
complaint against the unmitigated idiocy of the fake human sciences. But, we should
note, this objection is exclusive to sociology, and this is because sociology is the
discipline at the pinnacle of the problem between religion and science, even though the
basic means of subversion by focusing on the individual are extruded as far as possible
throughout the entire range of scientific disciplines in the effort to reduce everyone to the
unwitting status of a priest of the theocracy.
It is particularly nice to see the vital influence of the Nazis regime on the
dynamics of the war against science brought out in the above passage. Lundberg talks
about the idea of the social organism having become taboo, and it is clear that something
critical is at work to produce this effect, it makes no sense to say that this is just because
nineteenth century thinkers took the idea too far. The truth is that it is the danger of the
idea to religion, and what is more, is that this danger is precisely why the Nazis emerged
as the vanguard of the theocracy taking this organicist line to a political end that took the
theocracy’s defence against science to its maximum potential by giving an impregnable
justification to the theocracy’s objections to science applied to humans. So although
Lundberg does not join the ends of this argument as we have done, still, because he was
alive at the time he cannot help being aware of the strands of the problem running
through contemporary social discourse. But as a person embedded within the social flux
the connections were too large to see, with the benefit of time however, we can see these
links between organicism and the Nazis, and the war between religion and science, as
plain as day. And of course we noticed that the authors of Human by Nature were careful
to point out the link created by the Nazis between a true science of humanity, and the
anti-Semitism which catapulted the Jews to their current position of untouchable master
race, reaching from Israel across the entire globe. Yesterday, 13/02/08, following an act
of pure terrorism, Jews appeared on TV celebrating the success of their endeavour, as
usual they ignore all law, because they know, like any absolute master, they are the law.

Overall then Lundberg is a bit dodgy in terms of his status as a champion of the
application of biological thinking to humans. He says that people like Lilienfeld (named
in his notes) overplayed an idea that had appealed to the imagination for time
immemorial, but that this was no reason why the idea should be ditched altogether. In
this way he is very tricky, a bit like Richard Dawkins cloaking himself in the linguistic
guise of an atheist today, while being utterly indistinguishable from the most rabid
Creationist priest when all is said and done. For Dawkins supports the idea that humans
are unique, while rejecting the idea that humans are a superorganic species of mammal.
And, while using the phrase ‘superorganic’ I shall say that I ditched Lundberg’s notes
which appear at the end of the chapter, one of which said that the use of this phrase was a
device for getting around the taboo against saying society is a social organism. I would
like to see an explanation of this claim, I think the phrase ‘superorganism’ is the best
possible scientific label for describing all creatures evolved to form living beings at the
level of social organization. So Lundberg is certainly no exponent of real scientific
sociology from our point of view. The fact is that making humans a superorganism in
exactly the same sense we make insect social entities superorganisms is the essential
insight that must inform all sociological work, there is no escaping this, and this fact is
implicit in the passage taken from Lindberg so that we can but wonder why he does not
see this, just as we must wonder why Dawkins does not the same idea today. How come
these apparent advocates of true atheistic positions never actually promote atheism ? The
answer is obvious, they are gatekeepers, there to ensure people like me are not the public
voice of atheism or science, the chosen public figures are a fraudulent voice, there to
block out true voices.
The argument for connecting biological thinking with sociological thinking put
forward by Lundberg is simple and logical. Basically he is saying that this is all about
unbiased scientific method being applied to a facet of the natural world, so that, If ideas
about the organization of living beings is helpful at one level of the life sciences, then
what is the problem with applying it at another level of life if it seems appropriate in
scientific terms ? As we have just noted, this show of commitment to science is all very
well, but it must be insincere, How can anyone not know that this conflict is all about the
threat posed, by knowledge, to religion ? Or at least appreciate that there is something of
this kind fuelling the conflict. Added to which, How does he manage to be so logical
with respect to levels of organization, yet adamant that we cannot think of humans in the
same way that we do social insects ? ; which could be equated to the total commitment of
the likes of Lilienfeld to the idea that Lundberg, in conformity with the mindless
sociological mass, likewise mindlessly rejects. All we are saying when we say that
people should be seen for what they obviously are, that is social mammals, is that people
are social mammals, and that is it. This approach to understanding ourselves is obviously
the only means of making sense of our existence in naturalistic terms. The failure of
science to break free of religion and pursue this course is precisely why no one today can
say one jot more about the nature of human existence than a host of ignorant Greeks said
millennia ago. All in all then, we must look with deep suspicion upon this fantastic
exponent of our idea, just as we do on all leading exponents of atheist science, who
induce us to adore and honour them by their wily ways, the supreme example of which is
Darwin !
Further questions arise over Lundberg’s credentials as a man seeking to be true to
the science of sociology by acting as an advocate for organicism. He gives Sorokin as a
reference for the idea, and for a criticism of it. Sorokin’s book is an abomination, it is an
unmitigated piece of moronic piffle, I would use expletives to talk about were I not
putting this in print ; revealing my roots. On the other hand he offers us no advocates in
English, for the idea, so we cannot use his work as a stepping stone to more information
on the idea. Exclusion is a crucial device in overtly antagonistic or religious critiques of
our idea, they are always careful to exclude the really telling names. But he does
mention Lilienfeld, and this is very rare, and I greatly approve, but while I have some of
his work I cannot read it. It is true to say that there are no great exponents of the idea
writing in English that I know of, but I do know a variety of authors that could be of
some use, Ford for example, used above, but I would bet that Lundberg knew nothing of
this American political scientist. So, unwittingly or otherwise the slow process of decay
causing true knowledge to retreat before the ever burgeoning growth in false knowledge
causes all knowledge to submit to the overlordship of the social authority that in political
terms results in us living in an absolute theocracy.
When I speak of an absolute theocracy I always have in mind the test of freedom
to know true knowledge, which I have more than amply proved we do not have in our
society. But I wonder whether there are implications for society as a whole that I am not
in a position to appreciate at this moment in time because we still live under a carefully
crafted illusion of freedom. Today, 14/02/08, the case was in the news of the Muslim
pilot residing in England, an Algerian, arrested after the Twin Towers attack. The appeal
court found that the police and the Criminal Prosecution Service conspired to misuse the
asylum process in order to hold this man for the Americans. There was no evidence
against him. After decades of autocratic rule under Thatcher and then Blair it is obvious
that the politicians in England are a law unto themselves, nothing knew in that, and things
are better here then elsewhere in many respects, but the more that a society can rely upon
its untouchable theocratic status, the more the voice of religious bigots like Rowan
Williams will try and play games to reduce society to an ever more servile state of
degradation, in subjection to the priest. And all these things link up. So I believe my test
of access to free knowledge, while it has never existed in any society, and probably can
never exist, is the surest touchstone of a free society in a modern knowledge rich world
like ours. To be able to reach for true knowledge is the test, when we reach into a
bottomless abyss of ignorance, and never touch anything, such as the theocracy always
seeks to push us toward, that is what we should be wary of, this should make us feel
scarred, make us fight back against these monstrous people who promote the vileness of
religion. Lets just hope we never become like the United States of America, that is the
black hole, a bottomless pit of ignorance, empowered, as usual, by wealth and inherent
corruption, into which we could all be sucked if we are not careful. Wealth does create a
vortex though that it is impossible to resist, we can but hope there is room for us around
the event horizon, a little bit of no man’s land in which to cherish our precious
knowledge of reality.
I was visiting the Auguste Comte website today and it became apparent to me that
the people who were promoting it, and very useful it is too, if I could just work out how
to download all the material to be found there, they are enamoured of the man for his
religious sentiments. This is a warning to take note of. Comte, for all he is a major
figure in the exposition of the idea of science applied to society, he really was a lunatic of
the first order, and it turns out he spent seven months in an asylum, so that could explain
rather a lot about the perversion of the idea he made his own like no one else since,
except perhaps Lilienfeld, but we have no way of knowing this because Lilienfeld’s work
is in German, although he too concluded his multi volume organicist sociology with a
volume on the religion to come ; a book I bought only to have it lost in the post,
heartbreaking, and utterly irreplaceable.
 Chapter Five

Unreal Reality

The real picture is there for all to see, as Turner says, people are born into a
structure. His second example of a ritual is the subject of chapter two Paradoxes of
Twinship in Ndembu Ritual, in which he explains that twins present a primitive
superorganism with a structural dilemma that its rituals are designed to normalise.

Professor Schapera (and other scholars) have drawn attention to the fact that
wherever kinship is structurally significant, and provides a frame for corporate
relationships and social status, the birth of twins is a source of classificatory
embarrassment. For it is widely held, in Africa and elsewhere, that children born
during a single parturition are mystically identical. Yet, under the ascriptive rules
associated with kinship systems, there is only one position in the structure of the
family or corporate kin-group for them to occupy. There is a classificatory
assumption that human beings bear only one child at a time and that there is only
one slot for them to occupy in the various groups articulated by kinship which that
one child enters by birth. Sibling order is another important factor; older siblings
exert certain rights over junior siblings and may in some cases succeed to political
office before them. Yet twinship presents the paradoxes that what is physically
double is structurally single and what is mystically one is empirically two.

(Turner, p. 45)

I like the phrase ‘corporate relationships’ as it chimes with my denomination of

human nature as ‘corporate’ – making a body. So here this phrase equates to saying :
making bodily structure ; that is : making social physiology.
There is an implicit caveat to this passage regarding the applicability of the
structural logic contained therein because Turner says “wherever kinship is structurally
significant”. It is inevitable that the formulation of a conception, or idea of reality, must
of necessity involve a key point of perspective, since the very existence of an observer
who inculcates, or holds a viewpoint on a panorama, defines that observer as a point of
focus for the panorama so viewed. The position of an observer within the state of reality
observed will define the key. But that position, or key, is itself part of the idea, that is to
say the place of the observer in a conception of reality must be part of the idea of reality.
Knowledge about physical reality therefore involves keys, keys define the place
of the observer in physical reality, keys are focal points of extensive ideas. I hope this
conception of knowledge is universal, but I derive this model of knowledge from its
relevance to those areas of contention in the war between religion and knowledge, for it is
certain that in this conflict the basis of the war involves the ability to create alternative
models of reality purely on the basis of adopting an alternative point of view for
observing the panorama in question, and then building a false idea accordingly. The
adoption of a false point of view is necessarily constrained to a logical displacement such
that everything that can be seen from a true perspective can also be seen from the chosen
false perspective.
But in speaking of ‘true’ and ‘false’ perspectives we need to understand that
knowledge about reality is a product of the ability to speak, and the ability to speak
evolved in order that the human organism could generate models of society that arranged
people accordingly. So the whole object of knowledge is to create key positions related
to social structures. At the same time, as revealed by Turner’s discussion of the way
language describing human activities used to create abstract conceptions of a ritual nature
that can dictate sacred activities relating to the organization of the social structure,
language is grounded in a lower order of group activities, hunting for example, which
themselves have a sacred value even though they are of a practical nature.
Both the key positions and the social structures form the body of a conception of
reality which unites the person in a collective world that exists in an environment. And
this, in a nut shell is a summation of the war between religion and science, because we
have the gist of the situation in these one sentence, we see language at the heart of the
matter, acting like a force relative to knowledge, where knowledge serves as a pattern for
the arrangement of human order in space and time.
Certainly it follows from this close summary of the war that any transformation in
any of the three elements of reality, social structure, environment or knowledge, must
impact on all three and demand an adjustment of these three permanent attributes of
human existence to one another.
Human existence is characterised by two opposite features, change and
changelessness. If we think of a human superorganism as one unified body, which it is,
travelling through time, and space if you like, then the material form of the organism
changes comparatively rapidly all around, while the conceptual form remains constant.
This process is prominent in the world today. All social structures are subject to
immense change, so that we move from an age of horses into a world dominated by cars
in a couple of generations, from no idea of flying to a world where planes fill the sky, and
from a world where space travel is the most fantastic idea to one in which it is a reality,
all in so few decades. In the midst of the society making these changes however,
absolutely nothing changes in the conception of existence, we remain transfixed in the
stone age, God continues to inform us of every detail of existence, nothing changes our
notion of what we are.
So the human superorganism is an entity hurtling through time and altering its
structure accordingly, at a massive rate, while retaining its identity in tact. And these two
opposing characteristics are not accidental, they are physiological. The material changes
are promoted by ideology, while the stability of religious belief is supported by exactly
the same voices of authority that promote change in the fabric. So these two opposite
characteristics are in reality two sides of one process, and as such they are in harmony.
But, as we all know, this picture of dynamic stability is not eternal, and so we refer back
to our comment that there are three basic elements to the superorganic entity, its
structure, its environment and its knowledge. Relating these three elements to the
dynamic process of growth just described we can envisage the social structure and
environment as two related elements, where the environment remains relatively stable
and the social structure alters rapidly, while it is the knowledge that remains fixed and
unchanging at the core. But these states are comparative, and in actual fact the whole
superorganism is subject to change over time, so that the form of the superorganism
eventually changes completely. But this gives us a picture of a dynamic body with a core
of knowledge which lags behind the physical being. The core of knowledge is of course
the knowledge of identity which preserves integrity of the whole as inevitable change
takes place due to the pressure of life as a biological process. So religious knowledge of
identity is distanced from the biological dynamics, but not separated from these
pressures.
Here we are trying to work out the nature of the relationship between religion and
social structure, and we are using Turner’s excellent ideas concerning the detachment he
talks about in terms of liminality and communitas, which creates a social element
distanced from the social structure and able to cross extensive structural boundaries, in
effect acting as the bonding agents for the unseen superorganic being that these spiritual
social forms actually define, both in the primitive and the modern organism. I say social
forms but Turner is keen to make them formless, however he has no idea what the true
nature of humans is so he is incapable of reasoning sensibly about his own observations
and ideas, so we can only make so much use of what Turner has to say.
What is apparent in Turner’s account is that a natural social structure exists and
can be identified in all known human societies, this is akin to finding the evidence for a
true human nature that makes itself known wherever humans exist. And so these
observations beg the question What is human nature, where do these large scale
structures come from ? This is only like asking the same questions the geologist was
asking two centuries ago about mountain formations and river valleys. Lets take a look at
more of Turner’s work, where he sums up his discussion of the topic in hand.
*

LIMINALITY, LOW STATUS, AND COMMUNITAS

The time has now come to make a careful review of a hypothesis that seeks to account for
the attributes of such seemingly diverse phenomena as neophytes in the liminal phase of
ritual, subjugated autochthones, small nations, court jesters, holy mendicants, good
Samaritans, millenarian movements, “dharma bums,” matrilaterality in patrilineal
systems, patrilaterality in matrilineal systems, and monastic orders. Surely an ill-assorted
bunch of social phenomena ! Yet all have this common characteristic : they are persons
or principles that (1) fall in the interstices of social structure, (2) are on its margins, or (3)
occupy its lowest rungs. This leads us back to the problem of the definition of social
structure. One authoritative source of definitions is A Dictionary of the Social Sciences
(Gould and Kolb, 1964), in which A. W. Eister reviews some major formulations of this
conception. Spencer and many modern sociologists regard social structure as “a more or
less distinctive arrangement (of which there may be more than one type) of specialized
and mutually dependent institutions [Eister’s emphasis] and the institutional
organizations of positions and/or of actors which they imply, all evolved in the natural
course of events, as groups of human beings, with given needs and capacities, have
interacted with each other (in various types or modes of interaction) and sought to cope
with their environment” (pp. 668-669). Raymond Firth’s (1951) more analytical
conception runs as follows : “In the types of societies ordinarily studied by
anthropologists, the social structure may include critical or basic relationships arising
similarly from a class system based on relations with the soil. Other aspects of social
structure arise through membership in other kinds of persistent groups, such as clans,
castes, age-sets, or secret societies. Other basic relations again are due to position in a
kinship system” (p. 32).
Most definitions contain the notion of an arrangement of positions or statuses.
Most involve the institutionalization and perdurance of groups and relationships.
Classical mechanics, the morphology and physiology of animals and plants, and, more
recently, with Levi-Strauss, structural linguistics have been ransacked for concepts,
models, and homologous forms by social scientists. All share in common the notion of a
superorganic arrangement of parts or positions that continues, with modifications more or
less gradual, through time. The concept of “conflict” has come to be connected with the
concept of “social structure,” since the differentiation of parts becomes opposition
between parts, and scarce status becomes the object of struggles between persons and
groups who lay claim to it.
The other dimension of “society” with which I have been concerned is less easy to
define. G. A. Hillery (1955) reviewed 94 definitions of the term “community” and
reached the conclusion that “beyond the concept that people are involved in community,
there is no complete agreement as to the nature of community” (p. 119). The field would,
therefore, seem to be still open for new attempts ! I have tried to eschew the notion that
communitas has a specific territorial locus, often limited in character, which pervades
many definitions. For me, communitas emerges where social structure is not. Perhaps the
best way of putting this difficult concept into words is Martin Buber’s—though I feel that
perhaps he should be regarded as a gifted native informant rather than as a social
scientist ! Buber (1961) uses the term “community” for “communitas” : “Community is
the being no longer side by side (and, one might add, above and below) but with one
another of a multitude of persons. And this multitude, though it moves towards one goal,
yet experiences everywhere a turning to, a dynamic facing of, the others, a flowing from
I to Thou. Community is where community happens” (p. 51).
Buber lays his finger on the spontaneous, immediate, concrete nature of
communitas, as opposed to the norm-governed, institutionalised, abstract nature of social
structure. Yet, communitas is made evident or accessible, so to speak, only through its
juxtaposition to, or hybridisation with, aspects of social structure. Just as in Gestalt
psychology, figure and ground are mutually determinative, or, as some rare elements are
never found in nature in their purity but only as components of chemical compounds, so
communitas can be grasped only in some relation to structure. Just because the
communitas component is elusive, hard to pin down, it is not unimportant. Here the story
of Lao-tse’s chariot wheel may be apposite. The spokes of the wheel and the nave (i.e.,
the central block of the wheel holding the axle and spokes) to which they are attached
would be useless, he said, but for the hole, the gap, the emptiness at the center.
Communitas, with its unstructured character, representing the “quick” of human
interrelatedness, what Buber has called das Zwischenmenschliche, might well be
represented by the “emptiness at the center,” which is nevertheless indispensable to the
functioning of the structure of the wheel.
 It is neither by chance nor by lack of scientific precision that, along with other
who have considered the conception of communitas, I find myself forced to have
recourse to metaphor and analogy. For communitas has an existential quality; it involves
the whole man in his relation to other whole men. Structure, on the other hand, has
cognitive quality; as Levi-Strauss has perceived, it is essentially a set of classifications, a
model for thinking about culture and nature and ordering one’s public life. Communitas
has also an aspect of potentiality; it is often in the subjunctive mood. Relations between
total beings are generative of symbols and metaphors and comparisons ; art and religion
are their products rather than legal and political structures. Bergson saw in the words and
writings of prophets and great artists the creation of an “open morality,” which was itself
an expression of what he called the élan vital, or evolutionary “life-force.” Prophets and
artists tend to be liminal and marginal people, “edgemen,” who strive with a passionate
sincerity to rid themselves of the clichés associated with status incumbency and role-
playing and to enter into vital relations with other men in fact or imagination. In their
productions we may catch glimpses of that unused evolutionary potential in mankind
which has not yet been externalised and fixed in structure.
Communitas breaks in through the interstices of structure, in liminality ; at the
edges of structure, in marginality ; and from beneath structure, in inferiority. It is almost
everywhere held to be sacred or “holy,” possibly because it transgresses or dissolves the
norms that govern structured and institutionalised relationships and is accompanied by
experiences of unprecedented potency. The processes of “levelling” and “stripping,” to
which Goffman has drawn our attention, often appear to flood their subjects with affect.
Instinctual energies are surely liberated by these processes, but I am now inclined to think
that communitas is not solely the product of biologically inherited drives released from
cultural constraints. Rather is it the product of peculiarly human faculties, which include
rationality, volition, and memory, and which develop with experience of life in society—
just as among the Tallensi it is only mature men who undergo the experiences that induce
them to receive bakologo shrines.
The notion that there is a generic bond between men, and its related sentiment of
“humankindness,” are not epiphenomena of. some kind of herd instinct but are products
of “men in their wholeness wholly attending.” Liminality, marginality, and structural
inferiority are conditions in which are frequently generated myths, symbols, rituals,
philosophical systems, and works of art. These cultural forms provide men with a set of
templates or models which are, at one level, periodical reclassifications of reality and
man’s relationship to society, nature, and culture. But they are more than classifications,
since they incite men to action as well as to thought. Each of these productions has a
multivocal character, having many meanings, and each is capable of moving people at
many psycho-biological levels simultaneously.
There is a dialectic here, for the immediacy of communitas gives way to the
mediacy of structure, while, in rites de passage, men are released from structure into
communitas only to return to structure revitalized by their experience of communitas.
What is certain is that no society can function adequately without this dialectic.
Exaggeration of structure may well lead to pathological manifestations of communitas
outside or against “the law.” Exaggeration of communitas, in certain religious or
political movements of the levelling type, may be speedily followed by despotism,
overbureaucratization, or other modes of structural rigidification. For, like the neophytes
in the African circumcision lodge, or the Benedictine monks, or the members of a
millenarian movement, those living in community seem to require, sooner or later, an
absolute authority, whether this be a religious commandment, a divinely inspired leader,
or a dictator. Communitas cannot stand alone if the material and organizational needs of
human beings are to be adequately met. Maximization of communitas provokes
maximization of structure, which in its turn produces revolutionary strivings for renewed
communitas. The history of any great society provides evidence at the political level for
this oscillation. And the next chapter deals with two major examples.
I mentioned earlier the close connection that exists between structure and
property, whether this be privately or corporately owned, inherited, and managed. Thus,
most millenarian movements try to abolish property or to hold all things in common.
Usually this is possible only for a short time—until the date set for the coming of the
millennium or the ancestral cargoes. When prophecy fails, property and structure return
and the movement becomes institutionalised, or the movement disintegrates and its
members merge into the environing structured order. I suspect that Lewis Henry Morgan
(1877) himself longed for the coming of world-wide communitas. For example, in the
last sonorous paragraphs of Ancient Society, he has this to say : “A mere property career
is not the final destiny of mankind, if progress is to be the law of the future as it has been
of the past. . . the dissolution of society bids fair to become the termination of a career of
which property is the end and aim ; because such a career contains the elements of self-
destruction. Democracy in government, brotherhood in society, equality in rights and
privileges, and universal education, foreshadow the next higher plane of society to which
experience, intelligence and knowledge are steadily tending” (p. 552). [Actually 561-2]
What is this “higher plane” ? It is here that Morgan seemingly succumbs to the
error made by such thinkers as Rousseau and Marx : the confusion between communitas,
which is a dimension of all societies, past and present, and archaic or primitive society.
“It will be a revival,” he continues, “in a higher form, of the liberty, equality and
fraternity of the ancient gentes.” Yet, as most anthropologists would now confirm,
customary norms and differences of status and prestige in preliterate societies allow of
little scope for individual liberty and choice—the individualist is often regarded as a
witch ; for true equality between, for example, men and women, elders and juniors, chiefs
and commoners; while fraternity itself frequently succumbs to the sharp distinction of
status between older and junior sibling. Membership of rivalrous segments in such
societies as the Tallensi, Nuer, and Tiv does not allow even of tribal brotherhood : such
membership commits the individual to structure and to the conflicts that are inseparable
from structural differentiation. However, even in the simplest societies, the distinction
between structure and communitas exists and obtains symbolic expression in the cultural
attributes of liminality, marginality, and inferiority. In different societies and at different
periods in each society, one or the other of these “immortal antagonists” (to borrow terms
that Freud used in a different sense) comes uppermost. But together they constitute the
“human condition,” as regards man’s relations with his fellow man.

(Turner, pages 125 – 130)

_____________________

Gonzalo’s commonwealth [Shakespeare’s Tempest] has many attributes of

communitas. Society is seen as a seamless and structureless whole, rejecting alike status
and contract—these evolutionary poles of Sir Henry Maine’s entire system of societal
development—eschewing private property, with its bourns and bounds of land, tilth, and
vineyard, and relying on nature’s bounty to supply all needs. Here he is, of course, rather
meretriciously accommodated by the Caribbean setting ; in more spartan circumstances,
men would have had to work if only to keep warm. Thus he circumvents the crucial
difficulty of all Utopias— that they have to produce life’s necessities through work—in
economists’ jargon, to mobilize resources. To mobilize resources also means to mobilize
people. This implies social organization, with its “ends” and “means” and necessary
“deferment of gratifications,” and all these entail the establishment, however transient, of
orderly structural relations between man and man. Since, under these conditions, some
must initiate and command, and others must respond and follow, a system for the
production and distribution of resources contains within it the seeds of structural
segmentation and hierarchy. Gonzalo gets around this awkward fact by assuming an
incredible fecundity of nature—and thereby indicating the absurdity of his whole noble
dream. Shakespeare also, as he often does, puts valid arguments into the mouths of less
than worthy characters when he makes Sebastian say, “Yet he would be king on’t” Here
we may be able to detect the intuition that whenever a perfect equality is assumed in one
social dimension, it provokes a perfect inequality in another.
A final communitas value stressed by Gonzalo is that of the innocence and purity
of those who live without sovereignty. We have the assumption here, later to be
developed most elaborately by Rousseau, of the natural goodness of human beings living
in a propertyless, structureless state of absolute equality. Indeed, Gonzalo suggests that
among his innocent people there would be no treason, felony, sword, pike, knife, gun—
with which he appears to equate the need of any engine, as though war, conflict, or
indeed any “politicking” were necessarily connected with technology, even of the most
rudimentary sort.

(Turner pages 135 – 6)

______________________

In considering the early history of the Franciscan Order, it becomes clear that
social structure is intimately connected with history, because it is the way a group
maintains its form over time. Structureless Communitas can bind and bond people
together only momentarily. In the history of religions, it is interesting to observe how
often communitas type movements develop an apocalyptic mythology, theology, or
ideology.

(Turner p. 153)
 Chapter Six

Saint-Simon

It has taken me some time to get round to this French philosopher, but better late
than never. As I have finally begun to pay more attention to Comte I have also become
more focused on those who influenced him. As far as I can tell St Simon wrote no major
works, and I only have one slim volume on him, which I perused last night as I worked
my way through it while rubbing out all the pencil underlining of some earlier enthusiast
of the man. This was enough to make something dramatic obvious to me, Comte was by
no means an original thinker, despite all the appearances to the contrary, nor was he a
loose canon like myself, he was following closely in St Simon’s footsteps, the author of
the introduction states this much, and says that Comte was perfectly open about this fact.
The work that I am generating here, in a spontaneous response to a period of
delving into the works I have accumulated recently, backed up by more long standing
acquisitions, has an ad hoc structure, and when a structural connection in the story of the
idea of the social organism or the eternal war on knowledge waged by religion comes up,
there is a cue to think about writing a more structured piece of work. This topic is
particularly relevant as our attention turns to St Simon for it appears he was, like me, a
lay philosopher, whose work was chaotic and unstructured. There is nothing to be
pleased about in drawing this kind of assessment. However there are two things to say on
this matter. Firstly we may note that the world is awash with brilliant works of a tightly
argued and well structured form. Content is superb, full of information, and these books
are easy, and enjoyable to read, leaving a person with a sense of being well informed and
knowledgeable, at the end. But all, without exception, are complete and utter garbage
because they are written, where necessary, to a formula generated by theocratic authority.
So what the hell is the use of that. They give the sense of knowing, of knowledge, yes,
but they do not give knowledge, quite the reverse, they make knowing impossible,
Turner’s work is a perfect example of this, as any good book is. This kind of thought
always reminds me of a delightful nature film in which an insect was studied that
obtained access to the female by offering her a gift in the shape of a meal, an insect to
eat. The competition to get the female’s attention led to the packaging of the meal in ever
more fancy bundles of inedible vegetable matter, and the meal got more fancy until the
only thing that was left was the packaging without contents. This is what the modern,
highly trained academic gives us, they present us with a fine piece of intellectual
gamesmanship, but in the end, after being seduced to devote our spare time and mental
effort to the study of these works, we are left with a sense of fulness that is based on the
consumption of nothing but a false image. But this only reiterates what we said above
about the fact that we are all in the hands of a few who garner knowledge, and we have
no means of checking what knowledge these people feed us. The establishment utilises
this fact to build the academic structure which allows it to control all knowledge of the
most complex and extensive kind, no matter how far knowledge advances.
 St Simon discusses the question of human progress, a popular topic in the period,
but one that has never attracted my attention, but I liked his remarks because they stated
that this progressive development was evidenced by the ever increasing intensity of
knowledge, such as maths, astronomy and so on. And yet it is central to our theme that
there is no advancement in knowledge whatsoever. But if we bring in the model of
stability encases in change, where the structure of the superorganism constantly alters but
within there is a core that never alters more than can be avoided, then we see something
of how the various elements of the superorganism’s exoskeleton develops, such as the
church and the university. The university is a hub surrounding the church and making it
possible for the social structure to spin frantically about the church, which remains still,
the university provides the oil of ignorance between the two so that while there is a
progressive development of a kind which includes the academic subjects concerned with
mechanical arts, the organ of knowledge generation is able to control the flow of
knowledge such that a synthesised product runs alongside the true knowledge in such a
way that while information accumulates and appears to progress, in actual fact no
progress occurs whatsoever. Thus knowledge, as a flux bonding society, is created in a
complex form which enables the material change in society to be organised on
progressive levels of change that actually mean that regressive effects are as much at
work as progressive effects, but the emphasis we see on the progressive indicates one of
the primary attributes of control built into the psychology of individuals that makes them
incapable of seeing the big picture because they are blinded by their personal experience
of reality, and their place in that experience.
I have been familiar with Comte for years, but never enticed to read his work,
getting more familiar with his ideas, especially those in his Positive Polity, this last week
or so has both delighted me at the depth of his commitment o the idea of the social
organism and reminded me how depressing his turn to religion is. In the introduction to
the works of St Simon I was looking at last night a remark caught my attention to the
effect that Comte only extended St Simon’s ideas, and that unlike St Simon Comte was a
trained philosopher. Six months ago I was enduring a short course designed to needle the
recalcitrant unemployed property of the state, and I use such occasions to expose people
to my ideas about the nature of society, in the course of which they generally get a sense
of my intellectual capacity. Inevitably a certain amount of life history gets
communicated during this sessions too, and having indicated that I did attend further
education briefly the women in charge, who had a degree herself, asked if I regretted
leaving academia, she asked this because she considered that that is where I belonged
since I liked to discuss ideas and the way I talked would only be appreciated by trained
academics, people given to thinking about deep subjects. My answer was no, precisely
because of the fact that academia is a structured environment that exists to control
knowledge, not to form knowledge and distribute it freely. And, the fact is that academia
is a rigidly theocratic structure, it is the bastion of religion, we could say it is the military
arm of the theocracy in the war against knowledge ; hardly the place for me.
Secondly then we need to bear in mind what my objective is when I write, and
that is quite simply to reveal the knowledge that humans are a superorganic species.
Therefore while being able to write a neatly packaged work is desirable, I am happy to
pile up factual information revealing the true nature of human nature, while letting the
fancy stuff pass to others with vacant minds, and flourishing imaginations to match their
ambitious egos.
As nice as it was to finally discover Comte’s inspiration last night, 17/02/08, St
Simon is just as much a disappointment as his disciple. There is actually one statement
effectively declaring that religion is a fraud and there is not God, and yet the whole book
is full of the most devoted religious statements and expression of commitment to God ! It
is a hopeless task trying to find anything written by an atheist. Even so the discussion of
St Simon portrays a period of turmoil for the theocracy when atheistic ideas were more
prevalent than at any other time, and this is a nice precursor to the nineteenth century and
the laying of the theocracy’s defence in the shape of Darwinism, upon which the religious
basis of our modern society depends.

What of progress then ? If knowledge is taken to be a uniform quality then we

can be sure there is no progress, because we have already indicated that while knowledge
to do with material form does become more extensive and complex, and thus progresses,
at the same time an inner core to do with identity and social unity remains constant and
fixed in the shape of religion. The duplicitous intellectual has no problem accounting for
such uneven flow, the idea of the individual as an end in themselves aids the subversion
of a scientific explanation for this disparate development for it can be said that there are
men of goodwill and evil men. But for us, with a scientific model of human being, we
know that the social body is an organism created by nature, so that we can look upon
what is called progress, simply as superorganic growth. As the superorganism grows its
form alters accordingly. I was attempting to decide whether to buy a book yesterday,
The Science and Philosophy of the Organism by Hans Driesch, 1908, by skipping
through his The Problem of Individuality, 1914, and so I will use a sentence from a
portion where he briefly alludes to the matter of whether humans have a superorganic
dimension because it comes readily to mind as I write about progress.

The problem of real evolution in history, then, seems in fact to be hardly

approachable. And yet there are certain signs of wholeness in history, or at least
in the object of history, i.e. the community of men, or “the State” in the widest
sense of the word. There is, firstly, the general biological fact of propagation,
which seems to signify something suprapersonal. In the second place, there is a
certain harmony among the professions of men that seems not to be due to
chance. In the third place, there are some changes with regard to the behaviour of
mankind in general, which seem to us to be “progress,” as, for instance, the
abolishing of torture and slavery. Fourthly, it has been said that what Wundt calls
the “heterogeny of purposes” is also a sign of suprapersonal evolution. This is the
fact that any action of a single person or of a community of men may have effects
which were not foreseen, and which were not at all intended, but which are yet of
benefit to the whole. Hegel speaks of the “List der Idee” in a similar sense.
But more than anything else, it seems to me, the existence of a moral
consciousness in man gives us a sign of suprapersonal unity. Moral feeling, taken
in itself, is quite unintelligible and absolutely isolated. It loses its isolated
character when—to put it briefly—ethics becomes part of logic, i.e. as soon as a
 man’s moral feeling is regarded as a sign of the part he is to play in a
suprapersonal wholeness, of which he would otherwise have no knowledge.
Conscience seems to be the means by which the suprapersonal agent guides the
will. And conscience is guided by the two ideals of pity and duty. Pity regulates
the relations between all men as mere men, whilst the feeling of duty tells a man
his own personal task, which nobody but himself can fulfil.

(Driesch, pages 59 – 61)

I only wanted to use his example of progress, but this passage is so relevant to the
central idea of concern to us, the superorganic nature of humans, that it can only be of
benefit to take it here, in passing. This is indeed just the kind of thing that the term
‘progress’ refers to, the move from overt means of creating order to cooperative means of
organization. However, once we have realised the extraordinary power of deceit inherent
in the modern free world, which remains just as much an absolute theocracy as any
society that ever existed, only today instead of being brutalised we are manipulated in far
more subversive and devious ways, only possible because the power of the state in terms
of its machinery has become so awesome that we cannot escape it, then we can see this
progressive shift from slavery to freedom is nothing of the sort. It is a growth process,
and all that this change of means signifies is the increasing mass of the organism based
on increasing complexity. The way our world changes is all about the introduction of
techniques for creating uniformity on a mass scale, that we call globalisation. Change
has nothing to do with progress, it can only be comprehended as growth, and indeed,
viewed in personal terms the changes involved in this shift to modern organization is the
exact opposite of progress, it is regress. But, at the same time, the world is empowered
by the regressive shift towards an ever more intensely and deviously coercive social
authority, so coercive and devious that we buy into the propaganda that tells us we are
free. There was a fascinating bout on Channel Four News the other night, today being
21/02/08, between the presenter and a fanatical MP George Galloway who had been
invited to talk about Fidel Castro. Galloway just wanted to ball out Channel Four as a
mouthpiece of establishment propaganda, and the presenter was bemused by this, he kept
trying to defend Channel Four against such a ‘ludicrous’ assertion, but each attempt he
made was ridiculed by Galloway, and Galloway was right, the presenter knew nothing
about the history of modern Britain. As my father was a journalist all his life I know just
how circumscribed the professional journalists instinctive scepticism can be, and, once
again, we have to admit that no one can know everything and until you have had an idea
brought before you then it is very difficult to be aware of an idea, it is very difficult to
generate original ideas of a valid kind. The highly intelligent, sincere and well educated
front man for a propaganda show is exactly what the theocracy ordered, and that is what
it gets, always.
What often comes to mind when I read this kind of pontificating, over elaborate
philosophising such as Driesch gives us in the work quoted from here, is the
extraordinary aloofness of these people. There is a team of men working next door
today, it is wet and cold, and they are grafting to erect an extension to my neighbours
house. These are working class blokes, tough looking fellas, they, I would guess, want to
think about beer, sex, football, horse racing, and they are honest, honourable, sound
human beings, highly unlikely to give a damn about religion, except in terms of its
practical relevance to them, if any. Where does their world connect with the kind of
sentiment expressed in the last sentence of the quote above, especially this “the feeling of
duty tells a man his own personal task, which nobody but himself can fulfil” ?
Bullshit. Like all animals, men have to eat, and that tells men what they must do.
The notion of a unique place in the order of the world, which only the individual can
know, is too vile a concept for words, it is an insult to any decent honest person, a sly
appeal to the malevolent sycophant who wants something for nothing, in other words
someone who wants the easy life of a person who serves as a voice of social authority, a
lawyer, politician, priest, schoolteacher, journalist, soldier, policeman, actor and so on ad
infinitum, so many hangers on, so few creators, workers. But the reason for this
proliferation of uselessness is that this bulk is the substance of the superorganism. The
fabric must be integrated, and this requires galvanizing fibres running through every
detail of the organism, just as all living parts of the living body must be connected to the
supplies upon which life depends, the blood, so it is in the superorganic body, and it is the
ever increasing ability to reach more intensely into the fabric of society that enables a
superorganism to grow. The nature of the Jewish identity is evolved to facilitate this
insinuation of command fibre into a social structure, which is why the Jewish
superorganism is the global superorganism. Sombart’s work The Jews and Modern
Capitalism mentioned previously, discusses the relationship of the Jewish way of doing
things as compared to that of their slave communities, such that we find all progress is
not really progress at all, it is manipulation toward the central objective of Jewish
identity, global domination : which, although known to us as a political phenomenon, is
in reality an organic process of growth. There is no such thing as progress, progress is a
political word, from a scientific point of view there can only be growth according to
physiological principles pertaining to the organism in question.

The casual discussion of the global superorganism in terms of a Jewish identity

which defines the Jewish people as the master race and all non-Jews as their slaves is
about as provocative as it is possible to be, a person might as well call themselves a neo-
Nazi and call the extermination of all Jews, that is to say, this is how the master race are
bound to represent such a mode of speech. But it is implicit in the assertion that there is a
war between science and religion that there must be some focal point for this conflict that
concentrates upon some real religious existence. Certainly the theocracy represents the
myriad of religions as unique and independent of one another, while all recognise one
God, so that the priests who determine the form that all public knowledge has would roll
out the usual drivel about the Jews being a poor alienated group of weak victims who
only wish to carry the torch of love for all humanity, While the true owners of power, if
anything, must be the Christians, or possibly the Muslims. But we have made it plain
that society is an organism and it has one identity, and that identity is Jewish, so that
Christians are second order Jews while Muslims are third order Jews, and these orders
define a macro physiology with a hierarchical structure.
Finding works that comment on the nature of the social organism requires
reaching back to the time when the topic was at its height in the public mind, toward the
end of the nineteenth century or thereabouts, and such works are few and far between. In
Maclay’s discussion of Comte’s idea of the social organism we find some specific
discussion of the extent of the social organism :

Before Comte came to putting down on paper his new nineteenth-century version
of this whole-society theory, he had thoroughly studied what earlier writers had already
said on the subject. He had carefully examined the whole-society theories proposed by
Aristotle and Hobbes, and he was especially well acquainted with the several
understandings of society and philosophies of history that his own French-speaking
predecessors had suggested. The new theory that he now presented was a synthesis of
these earlier ideas—updated, enormously edited, refined, and reconciled, and with a
number of his own new ideas added in.
His approach was more scientific than any of those earlier treatments of the
subject. The nineteenth century required its philosophers to be considerably more
meticulous than the eighteenth century had allowed. This greater respect for the proper
scientific procedure is something that strikes the reader immediately. Comte’s essays read
completely differently from those of Rousseau or Condorcet. But this regard for science
did not prevent him from echoing a number of the claims that earlier theorists had put
forward.
Again we are told that the physical make-up of the human society is comparable
to the anatomy of a man. Comte carefully weighs the evidence and concludes that there is
a “true correspondence” here. He objects to the practice of drawing mere “servile
analogies” between the social organism and the biological organism, but he argues that
we can detect “a real correspondence” between the two in several important respects : “If
we take the best ascertained points in Biology, we may decompose structure anatomically
into elements, tissues, and organs. We have the same things in the Social Organism ; and
we may even use the same names.”
As for the basic “element” of the social organism, “this is supplied by the Family,
which is more completely the germ of society than the cell or the fibre is of the body.”
Here we might keep in mind that a society is composed of various specialized types of
interpersonal relationship, simple forms of which can be found in the family but are
totally absent from the biological individual, hence “the family presents the true germ of
the various characteristics of the social organism.”
Where the biological organism has its differentiated “tissues,” the social organism
has its “Classes or Castes.” (Strictly speaking, the tissues of the society are the various
forces that hold it together and make it move, and Comte distinguishes three major kinds
or aspects of such social force—the “material,” the “intellectual,” and the “moral.” But
in practice these several kinds of force achieve their effects only by operating through the
agency of large classes of people, while the single individual and even the isolated family
have almost no noticeable effect on the behavior of whole societies.)
Cities and towns can then be seen as the “organs” of the society. The ancient
Greek versions of the theory had focused on the city-state as the total organism. Comte
now treats the human society as a far larger being, big enough to contain a number of
cities and towns, and so he represents the city as merely an organ within the total entity.
But he notes that each city contains all that it needs to develop into a complete organism :
 In truth, cities are themselves beings, so organically complete that, as each
is capable of separate life, it instinctively aspires to become the centre of
the vast organism of Humanity. In this tendency the Social organ differs
radically from the organ in Biology, which has no such separate
completeness. . . . The smallest city contains all the elements and tissues
required for the life of the Great Being in the Families and in the Classes
or Castes within it. The greatest human associations always began really in
a mere town, which gradually incorporated others by its attraction or by
arms. . . . When Property, Family and Language, have found a suitable
territory, and have reached the point at which they combine any given
population under the same government, at least in spirit, there a possible
nucleus of the Great Being has been formed. Such a community, or city,
be it ultimately large or small, is a true organ of Humanity.

(In other sections of his work Comte sometimes refers to individual human beings
as organs of the social whole.)
Again we hear the human society spoken of as if it were a living being. Again we
hear it spoken of as possessing its own society-kind of mind. Here in the paragraph
quoted we have been told that it is a type of organism capable of experiencing aspirations
—in some sense of the term. Elsewhere we read that it possesses its own “intelligence”
and its own society-kind of emotion or “will.”
Comte makes it clear that “this analogy must not be pushed too far.” The
composition of the social organism is only partially comparable to the anatomy of the
biological organism. To insist on an exact similarity between the two is to indulge in
“fanciful comparisons.” But it would be wrong to assume from this restraint that Comte
saw the social organism as being in some sense inferior. The fact that it is a different
form of life does not necessarily imply that it is a lesser form of life. On the contrary,
Comte consistently presents the differences between the social organism and the
biological organism as being in the social organism’s favour. It is the sociological
individual rather than the biological individual that ranks as the superior being. A society
is actually more “alive” than a man.
What Comte eventually proposes is a new version of the old society-is-a-giant-
man idea, amended in such a way as to bring it into line with the more scientific idiom of
the nineteenth century. To put it at its simplest : “The Social Organism is a single whole,
just as and even more so than the [Biological] Organism.” The human society
experiences life, mind, intelligence, and will, and while it is not precisely the same as a
man in its design, the differences between the society and the man show the society to be
the higher form of life.
And when we hear Comte referred to as the founder of sociology, we need to
remind ourselves that what Comte in fact proposed was a science devoted to the study of
this gigantic social life-form. The science of society that Comte had in mind was
something quite different from the sort of sociology taught in today’s universities. It was
to be a science that recognized the human society as an intelligent and wilful living
organism, and one of its most fundamental assumptions was that men and women
“should be regarded, not as so many distinct beings, but as organs of one Supreme
Being.”
 (According to Comte, there is a rule we should always keep in mind when dealing
with organic phenomena : “. . . the principle of all true classification [is that] the higher
organization determines the lower. . . . this is the point of view from which we must
conceive the relations of every unit to its system, whether in thought or in expression,
whether in the real or in the ideal world.” Hence, since men and women are essentially
“component parts” of the social organism, since the social organism is a “higher
organization” than these numerous “smaller organisms” that live inside it and compose it,
it follows that “The public and private life of the individual is, as it has ever been,
subordinate to the social Organism of which he is a part.” This again was partly why
sociology could be recognized as the supreme and all-containing science. It is the science
that deals with the highest organization of phenomena, and which therefore determines
the true natures of all lesser phenomena that exist at lower levels of organization. The
evident wholeness of the social organism and the interconnectedness of all its parts, and
hence the subordinate station of all these parts in the natural order of things—all this is
part of the argument that necessitates our “assigning to social science its encyclopaedic
rank.”)

(Maclay, pages 168 – 171)

As ever when I tap into a superb piece of writing that is saturated with our idea
which is so rare to find being discussed, I cannot help dipping my spoon deep into the
offering, but it is still only the matter of extension that is of current interest. And in fact
this selection continues from the one taken above, identified as page 168. But it is an
immense help to take fulsome selections as it is only by this means that get a sense of the
idea we are looking at in other works. The total commitment to the idea of the social
organism, as we have said, is fantastic, but it is also utterly useless in Comte’s hands.
The point is that humans are a superorganic species of mammal, that evolved their form
in order to bring a living structure, that is a structure that is the product of life, into
existence at the level of social organization. To talk about this in terms of comparison
with the individual body of an animal, or even a human person, is simple pathetic, and
inexcusable. What on earth was going on in Comte’s brain !
As I have been delving into Comte a bit more this last week I have downloaded
material of the net throwing more light on his religious nature, today, 21/02/08, I
obtained a piece by Huxley :

To put the matter briefly, M. Comte, finding Christianity and Science at daggers
drawn, seems to have said to Science : “You find Christianity rotten at the core,
do you ? Well, I will scoop out the inside of it.” And to Romanism : “You find
Science mere dry light — cold and bare. Well, I will put your shell over it, and so,
as schoolboys make a spectre out of a turnip and a tallow candle, behold the new
religion of Humanity complete !”

(Agnosticism, Thomas Huxley)

Unfortunately I am not clear about the date or page numbers to give so it will have to be
left poorly referenced. But this criticism by Huxley expresses what I think, and this was
written by a man living in the time when Comte was still a figure to be reckoned with in
society. I also took a commemoration speech by Congreve the other day, celebrating the
religion of Positivism in which Comte is talked about as the Master ; with is rather gut
churning. I also took piece today by his leading English disciple, Harrison from which
may select a snippet :

I come, then, to show what this analysis of Religion by Comte is, and how it is
applied to real life. Religion is the state of harmony that results when man’s
entire life, both as an individual and as a member of society, corresponds with the
real conditions—first of human nature ; and secondly of the world around us.
This is a rather abstract way of putting it ; but it can be shown that all systems of
religion aim in spirit at this : the ordering human life in a true way, so as to make
it accord with man’s own nature and the facts of the Universe.

(The Religion of Humanity, Harrison)

Again I apologise for the lack of good referencing, and I can’t be bothered fishing
the references out of Maclay either, which is a bit naughty, I know. Harrison seems
moderate enough, but his ideas deserve the condemnation levelled at their object of
veneration by Huxley. It is in fact true to say that all religion aims at ordering society in
accord with human nature. But it is also true that the stomach has to do with the
consumption of food, so does this mean that if a leading physiologist had written a book
on human physiology in the late nineteenth century it would of been thought sufficient if
he had simple stated this fact, and nothing more ? Of course not, the whole point about
the period in which Comte worked was that science was coming of age and this meant the
death of religion. When I first got my hands on my copy of Positive Philosophy a few
years ago I was delighted by the way Comte made it plain that religion was dead and
science was the new way of knowing that had to strive for the eradication of all religion,
religion being the demon that had thwarted mankind’s well being for centuries. Now,
suddenly, I find myself discovering this was an illusion, and he is as much a friend of
religion and therefore an enemy of science as Darwin or Dawkins, or Huxley, we may
note in passing, Darwin’s bulldog.
There is no need to talk about the social organism in analogical terms that
compare its structure to that of the person. But crucially what is required is that the role
of religion be identified because although we get the very fine observation coming out in
Maclay’s account of Comte’s idea of the social organism whereby it is noted that
whatever forces to organize social physiology they do through the medium of a large
array of social structures :

But in practice these several kinds of force achieve their effects only by operating
through the agency of large classes of people, while the single individual and even
 the isolated family have almost no noticeable effect on the behavior of whole
societies.

Precisely, this is correct, but the crucial point needed now is to recognise the nature of the
organizing principle. Comte makes fundamental error by delineating three social forces,
and then denominating them in material terms which ought to be regarded as structures,
while also naming the one true force, just to throw the whole conception into hopeless
confusion. So instead of the “three major kinds or aspects of such social force—the
“material,” the “intellectual,” and the “moral.” ” There should simply be one natural
force created by nature through the medium of human physiology, that force is the
linguistic force that creates all social structure. Religion, language and identity are the
key factors that are nowhere to be seen in Comte’s primary analysis of the social
organism, and this is why he differs so much from ourselves and why, as a consequence,
he ends up being very much as one with all his predecessors that Maclay says he studied
so assiduously, and wrongly says Comte improved on so brilliantly. Comte made no
improvements at all.
The fact is that his concoction of a new religion, as previously stated, was idiotic.
His job as a would be scientific investigator was to discover the religion that had got us to
the point at which we had arrived in his day, and this he expressly fails to do by making
out that science revealed a human nature that had not been accommodated by religion
hitherto, and now science could create a religion that would do the job right. The whole
approach is so disgusting, it makes no sense whatever. What was needed was to identify
the relationship between Christianity and Judaism, and then the relationship of Islam to
the two should of been transparent. And the solution of all sociological knowledge
would fall into place from this point because instead of needing a new religion to account
for human existence thus far, thereby making an understanding of human existence
unattainable, we would of been able to examine the Jewish creed and explain directly
how Western civilization had come into existence, and what was bound to happen next,
namely the development of the Jewish superorganism and the foundation of Israel
alongside further rounds of anti-Semitic revolution and world war, all of which we know
did happen, but all of which had to happen given that the human species is a
superorganism whose extent is defined by religion, and whose physiological definition,
what Comte refers to when he speaks of “operating through the agency of large classes of
people”.
And so, we find our way back to the topic which we set out to discuss a moment
ago, the extent of the social organism. We see that the ancients apparently thought of the
city as an integral and independent organism, and that Comte extended this dimension so
that the city became an organ of a greater whole. When Comte says this :

When Property, Family and Language, have found a suitable territory, and have
reached the point at which they combine any given population under the same
government, at least in spirit, there a possible nucleus of the Great Being has been
formed.

He is inspired, and because he is dealing with the correct model of human existence he
cannot help unwittingly discovering correct formulas, like the one just mentioned
regarding the operation of the social, that is linguistic, force through an array of different
classes of people, and he hits another bull’s-eye when he speaks in terms of a various
social elements emerging and coalescing to form a nucleus that becomes an embryo of a
true superorganism. Here he even recognises the role of language, but confounds this
primary feature with secondary feature that arise from linguistic organization, namely
property and family. All he need do at this point is think of language and identity and
recognise the role of religion in generating the modern superorganism and then recognise
that Judaism is the core, so wherever the influence of Jews exists the extent of the
organism is identified. There could be discussion about the intensity versus diffuse
nature of the superorganisms being, but with a simple recognitions of the role of language
and its expression through religion as the propagator of identity that captures individuals
for the living being, we get a method of saying all we need say about the true extent of a
living human superorganism. At the same tie we are not tempted to talk in infantile terms
about the analogical comparison of the superorganism with the life of a person. Comte
really is, the more we read him, a most disappointing advocate of our Oh so precious
idea !
The usual error made in the age of the social organism as an idea was that of
identifying the state with the social organism, and the only work I know that does not
make this mistake, and correctly identifies that it is religion that identifies the extent of
the superorganism, is Social Evolution by Benjamin Kidd, 1894. But Kidd gets nowhere
because he then makes the idiotic assumption that each religion is integral to itself, so
that Christianity, instead of being a sub-Judaic identity making Christians the slaves of
the Jews, is made to be the leading religion on earth. This is too idiotic for words.
Making the state an organism is the same as the ancients making the city an organism,
and it is clear that these definitions are both political, but Kidd’s application of his insight
regarding the relationship of religion to the social being fails for the same reason, it fails
to cross the sutures of the organism and reach a true living extent of the superorganic
being. Anyway, people discussing this point are rare, as we said, so here are a couple of
English examples of the importance of recognising the extent of the social organism :

In the second place, it is extraordinarily difficult to determine the area of

social life which may be regarded as one organism. Is it a national individual such
as Hobbes conceived ? Or must we take the nation itself to be a limb of some
larger unity ? Is it one whole generation that we are regarding as a descendant
from the generation before ? Or is the state in the entire course of its history
thought of as a continuous individual ? Here, obviously, are endless sources of
difficulty. We may indeed think of the whole life of mankind as that of one tree
living continuously from the root to the twigs ; or we may regard it as such only
during some particular space of time as an individual descended from other
individuals. And, further, even if this question was determined, the greatest
possible care would have to be taken, in applying biological notions to its study,
to distinguish those conclusions which are drawn in biology concerning the
individual and those which have reference to the development of a stock or race—
the specialisation of a species. That is to say, we have to distinguish problems of
phylogeny from problems of ontogeny. ¹ I do not in the least forget the difficulty
 of making this distinction ; but I contend that the difficulty should be fully
recognised, and, in consequence, the greatest caution used in all theoretical
conclusions with regard to society. A still more jealous care is called for in regard
to all conclusions which are practical.
1
Ontogeny is the growth of the individual from the germ. Phylogeny is the descent of the
species from a less specialised form. Baldwin has annexed the word development to the first, and
the word evolution to the second.

(Religion and Science, Waggett, 1904, pages 143 – 4)

There follows some discussion of the question raised here about the application of
ontological and phylogenetic ideas to questions of society as an organism versus the
person, but I have to stop taking such big slices of these works, no matter how
interesting. Our point is made well enough, Waggett is fully versed in the idea, and here
we see him pulling his hair out over how to define its extent. But we must take note of
the fact that this book is an overtly religious text, so we are not going to get any kind of
scientific analysis here.

Next :

III. Communities and societies.—The bond existing between all the constituent
parts of a society is not of the same nature as that which unites the members of a colony
or the cells of an animal or plant. These physiological bonds are not comparable, without
forcing the analogy, although they have been so compared by some sociologists, to such
means of communication between individuals and societies as exchange, traffic, roads,
railways, telegrams and telephones. It is merely a matter of definition, and if societies are
to be termed organisms, they should be distinguished as organisms by social contract,
organismes contractuels (Fouillée).
This definition, however, only applies to those societies which owe their existence
to a formal contract with definite objects in view, and not to ready-made communities
consisting of individuals already united together without any preliminary contract. The
latter is the case, for instance, in societies of ants or bees, and in human societies in those
social groups in which the individuals are united by the bonds of consanguinity. The
characters of such communities partly approach the characters of organic associations,
but precisely as such natural communities approach societies by social contract, the
differences between social groups and actual organisms become more marked. In the
more complex forms of societies the results of the characters we have distinguished
become most accentuated.

IV. Distinctive characters of societies of which the members are united by social
contract.—(1) A cell cannot be part of two organisms or of two organs at the same time. 1
On the other hand, there is no reason why the members of one social community should
not belong to other communities at the same time.
 2. Speaking generally, the biological conception of an organism denotes a
definite thing—a plant or an animal in itself, quite distinct from similar organisms. In
sociology, however, there is no precise line between co-existing social communities. Are
we to regard, for instance, the families, communes and cantons of a state as distinct
organisms, or merely as organs ? Does a free town such as Hamburg or Frankfort cease
to be an organism when it loses its independence ? Take the various Swiss cantons,
which are now mere organs of the Helvetic Confederation, like the Provinces of Belgium,
or the Departments of France, would they become organisms on the rupture of the
Federal bond ? On the other hand, with the growth of international treaties between the
states of Eastern Europe, will their social individuality disappear, and will they come to
be regarded as are the United States of America, as the organs of an organism in process
of formation ? These few examples suffice to show that, so far as social matters are
concerned, the conception of organisms is a pure convention. In the course of this
treatise, we may therefore regard families, societies and nations as distinct organisms, or,
with regard to their connection with other and vaster organizations, as organs of the latter.
1
When two organs are united into one whole, the cell exercises two totally different functions.
The liver, as we now know, is a double organ consisting of a bile-forming liver, and the glycogen-
producing liver, two organs which are embryologically distinct. The cells of which the liver is composed
are both bile-secreting and glycogen-forming organs.

(Evolution by Atrophy, 1899, pages 13 – 15)

This is a most unusual book, it is written by a group of continental academics who

are dead set against using science in social science, they object to the notion that society
is created by nature and insist upon applying religious principles to the understanding of
how society comes to exist, hence their fixation on the Rousseauan notion of social
contract. A team of social scientists dedicated to cleansing sociology of science while
ensuring religious principles rule, is commonplace, what is unusual is the discussion of
the scientific principles implicit in the idea that society is a social organism. What we see
here is a rare example of sociologists dealing with this issue, happily, after the world war
this issue was able to be disregarded and we never see it discussed in anything but the
most contemptuous way thereafter (see Sorokin, 1928), until, that is, the publication of
Human by Nature which we discuss above ; but in this latter work the sociologists are so
far removed from the intellectual conditions that allowed science to be applied to the
study of humans in the nineteenth century that they are powerless to begin thinking
logically about their subject.
What then, is essentially wrong with the arguments presented in the above
passage regarding the nature of a social body, as compared to that of an organic
organism ? These people are determined to oppose an idea rather than solve a problem.
As sociologists the problem is to understand human society from a scientific point of
view, where we must assume human society is created by nature and it is the sociologists
task to comprehend how nature realised this outcome. This objective should be
informing all sociologists at all times. Here they say that the nature of the bonds uniting
the organic organism is different to the nature of the bonds uniting a society. True. So
what ? This is an attempt to refute arguments by picking faults, what we want is to refute
arguments by trying to prove arguments to be sound. So in this case the approach of a
sincere academic would be to say it is evident that the manner in which organic bodies
and social bodies find themselves organized into tightly bound wholes is different,
therefore, given this obvious difference, is there anything about the unification of these
two forms of living structure that allows us to identify some underlying similarity that
makes both entities, the organic and the social, natural phenomena of a common kind ?
But our professional scientists have no interest in discovering some means of
accounting for human existence in a purely naturalist manner. They continue to look for
problems by emphasising disparate appearances. They speak of ready made
communities, “for instance, in societies of ants or bees, and in human societies in those
social groups in which the individuals are united by the bonds of consanguinity”. They
assert that organic forms attributable to the direct action of genetic factors are ‘ready
made’ ! Ready made, what the hell is that supposed to mean ? it sounds like the kind of
babble a kid would come up with, or a priest. The point is that such ready made forms
have evolved to be so constituted, and in the process of evolution genetic means have still
had to be found to allow what these contemptible fools call ready made social
organizations. There are factors allowing ants to act as a social body, what are these
factors ? Primarily, communication. Insect communication is pheromone based and as
such generated directly by genetic programmes dictating the form of hormones, but slave
maker ants indicate that individuals acquire their idea of self from hormones present in
their social environment, so that social bonding in ants relies upon learning. Given these
facts the question we could then ask is how can this arrangement be compared with
humans, and we would find that it is practically impossible to distinguish between
humans and ants in this most important respect, otherwise how could Europe or America
of been enslaved to Judaism ? These questions nobody wants to ask. Why not ?
They then make a leap to the notion of a social contract. This idea of a social
contract bears the hallmark of the aloof philosopher we recognised when looking at the
words of Driesch above, where he spoke of people having some kind of divine place in
society that only they could realise ; it makes you want to puke to read such gush. Social
contract is precisely the same. Who, where, when, ever, in any way shape or form,
agreed to subscribe to a contract of any kind ? Tell me, please. The only way this notion
can possibly be justified is if every single person upon reaching the age of eight is asked
to examine every single law that from that moment on might in any way impact upon
their activity, and to conform that they agree to abide by that law. If this is not done then
on what basis is there any kind of contract between the person and the social organization
that rules every detail of their lives ?
Of course the conditions of a meaningful social contract set out here are absurd,
and that is because the idea of a social contract is absurd. In actual fact if we study the
process whereby the idea of the social contract has been realised in practice we find that
lawyers have developed ideas of sovereignty, going back to the likes of Hobbes, and
beyond, which is invested in various institutions, and the people are connected to these
institutions via a thread of collective sovereignty that is expressed periodically. So that
we have a form of social contract based upon the idea that when once the people have
given their consent then forever more that consent will be assumed to be given by those
who come after.
 The whole point of this legalistic, that is to say linguistic formula, or programme
for generating social structure, is that its primary quality is that of recognising the
supremacy of the collective being while paying lip service to the notion of individual
will. The reason why such elaborate means of coercing people into a unified
confederation under the illusion of being free has developed, is because of the difficulty
of extending the reach of social authority in a constructive manner. And so we may refer
back to the earlier remarks on the idea of abolishing slavery as representing progress,
while we say that such changes only represent means of inducing organic growth. It is
nonetheless fair to say that the Western model of oppression through the mechanism of
freedom is of a different nature to pre-Western programmes of social evolution, and while
the notion of social contracts and freedom are idiotic from a scientific point of view, they
are a very effective means of allowing a complex social structure to come into being
while at the same time satisfying that degree of innate need that individuals have for a
sense of autonomy. We must realise that individuals evolved to be part of a social being,
so that all their urges for freedom and autonomy are not really about freedom and
autonomy, they are about jostling for a place in the order of the social being that they
need, and want to be part of. No one wants to be free, what everyone wants is power,
with a small ‘p’, for most of us. The word freedom is a substitute mode of expressing
this desire in an acceptable way, this kind of inversion is like calling rape love, or murder
justice. The inversion of meaning is a routine device in the formulation of linguistic
programmes that generate social structure, the phrase ‘social contract’ is a typical
example of this kind of linguistic device, from which extensive linguistic programmes
can be developed, upon which social structure can be based. Democracy arises from this
one simple linguistic mechanism, which is in turn is based upon more fundamental
linguistic mechanisms, equally absurd, such as the linguistic mechanism of
‘individuality’ that says individuals have free will, and that they exist as an end in
themselves.
So the idea of a social contract is perfectly reasonable and functional, just as the
idea of a God is likewise. But it is not the job of scientists studying humans to take part
in the activities of the people they study. No anthropologist sent to study the customs of
primitive people would try to become immersed in those customs to the point where they
could not see outside the cultural group which they had been sent to study, that would be
crazy. And by the same token if we want to comment on Western civilization then we
cannot allow ourselves to carry the values of the members of Western society, such as the
affirmation of the idea of a social contract or the existence of a divine being concerned
with our affairs. We must seek to distance ourselves from such vital mechanisms of
social order, and to understand them, just as Turner sort to make sense of the unfamiliar
world of the Ndembu while being careful to remain a detached observer.
I have offered this last selection under the auspices of a discussion of the extent of
the social organism, we can see that Waggett’s discussion dealt precisely with this point,
whereas the above does not. But the latter quote implicitly deals with the boundaries
between social and organic organisms, and it does manipulate some of the more puerile
Spencerian arguments, and the commonplace stupidity of thinking of the state as a social
organism, when discussing whether political changes mean that a social body is an
organism at one moment, and then an organ the next. This disingenuous argument can be
turned against its professors, since it is so pathetic that we can say the stupidity it
highlights ought to indicate that there must be a better solution to the question of how we
define the limits of a social organism, and five years before this work was published the
correct solution was presented to the world in a very famous and successful book,
mentioned above, Kidd’s Social Evolution. Clearly such political structures as cities and
states cannot be organisms, ever, they must be structural elements of a more organic
being, and the crucial feature of any organic being is its identity, so this is where religion
comes in. But no one ever realises this, apart from Kidd, and no one takes up his
argument, and he does not even take up his argument.

Having raised the matter of the idea of social contract as the antagonist of the
social organism we must enjoy seeing an essay specifically setting out to contrast the two
views of society. Here we have an essay by A. H. Lloyd, about whom I have garnered
the following information from a book dealer’s advert of a rare book of Lloyd’s that I
will order next week : “Lloyd was acting President of the University of Michigan in 1925
and a hard and true Idealist. In the late 1890’s when this work [Philosophy of History]
was completed John Dewey was the Department head at the University of Michigan,
which included fellow philosopher Lloyd, George H Mead and Tufts.”

THE ORGANIC THEORY OF SOCIETY.

PASSING OF THE CONTRACT THEORY.

THE organic theory of society is entertained by nearly every serious thinker

of the present time. Everyone seems ready to declare, although often with some
reservations, that society is an organism ; in other words, that man and nature are
one, and so, among many other things, that no device or institution of human life
is free from conditions of change. Indeed, not merely in political science, but in
the thought of our time at large, the word “organism” is getting to be used as a
key to all the mysteries. Simply, a new fetishism is in possession of us, but the
forerunner perhaps of a thoroughly enlightened worship ; and, in consequence, we
have a stern, exacting duty to the thought which underlies it. Politically, we feel
the need of knowing, as directly and as accurately as possible, just what the
organic theory of society implies, what conditions and relations and activities,
what natural or developed interests, it involves society in. Not, Is society an
organism ?—for that is a question that looks only to some mere analogy—but as
more direct and as deeper, What is an organic society ?
Several approaches to this question are open. Thus it would be pertinent,
not to say intensely interesting, to make a psychological—or sociological—study
of an organic society, dealing specifically with the nature of the social will and
the social consciousness ; or to take the standpoint, not of psychology or
sociology, but of biology, so given nowadays to the doctrines of evolution ; or,
again, to confine the attention to industrial organization ; or, finally, to examine
Christianity and religious experience generally from the standpoint of the organic
theory ; but no one of these approaches to the question in hand is now intended.
 What I propose is a historical study—historical, too, in the narrower sense, in the
sense chiefly of man’s development under law and government.
The organic theory, with reference to its legal implications, has been
supplanting and fulfilling the famous theory of the social contract, the theory of
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, peculiar to the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, but surviving far into the nineteenth, if not into the twentieth. The
importance of this contract theory has been very great, and conspicuously in our
own history. The minds, for example, of those who wrote and who ratified our
American constitution were thoroughly imbued with it, and it has shaped many of
our political actions since, the great controversies about state rights, as well as
about individual rights, often being inspired by it, and the constantly recurring
idolatry of the constitution being also referable to it. In our proposed historical
study, then, the contract theory is a natural starting-point. We have first to see
exactly what it was, and then to consider how its inner logic, by dint of the
conditions and distinctions that were necessary to it and that it brought to
consciousness, has led inevitably, although perhaps for a time unwittingly, to the
organic theory ; and, in the end, if the great practical movements of our political
evolution do not come to mind as effective illustrations, if our study of the rise of
the organic theory with the passing of the contract theory does not bring some
light to bear even upon the central problems of political life today, then, in part at
least—yes, in large part—our study will have been a failure.

(American Journal of Sociology, Vol. VI, Number 5, March, 1901, pages

577 – 8)

Straightaway we find the two views are made to complete each other in a
consecutive sense that makes social contract the progenitor of social organism. This
view is in one sense obvious since the idea of the social contract is taken back to Hobbes
by Lloyd and made the basis of American social structure, a development which in turn
helped inspire the idea of the social organism because of the greater degree of universal
unity sensed by people due to the effect of the social contract as a means of building
social structure. I have not the continuation of the above in which this latter point is
developed.
Lloyd’s essay is immensely interesting on several points because of its timing.
We see that he asserts that in 1901 everyone recognised that the idea of the social
organism was in the ascendant. This is confirmed by the opening part of Evolution by
Atrophy too, in which this idea is discussed in detail and opposed, the authors noting that
they are at variance with the prevailing view. And the timing is so important in our story
of the war between religion and science, reaching a crescendo at just this time over the
clash with the science of society, based on the idea that humans were part of nature, as
Lloyd is able to say, before the war of annihilation was launched by the Jewish theocracy,
“that man and nature are one”. And in being able to make a declaration of this kind at
this time, prior to the war of annihilation launched by the priesthood against us, to push
society into a state of liminality, whereby the biomass was homogenised, so that it could
settle once again about its Jewish core identity, Lloyd was able to think about the
relationship between the social contract idea and the social organism idea as a
developmental one, whereas for us it is so obvious that while the idea of the social
contract remains foremost, the idea of the social organism, vastly superior as it is in terms
of explaining the theory of social contract as a means of creating social structure, is dead
and gone, and more than this, subject to the extreme pressure of taboo. Today, 22/02/08,
the news reported that David Cameron, the Conservative leader, made a serious
misjudgement in a speech when he linked the word ‘gimmick’ with “Auschwitz” when
commenting on the government’s funding of school children’s visit to the death camp
was. There has been an all-round howl of horror and demands for apologist and much
grovelling, and the party has hurried to reverse and remake the remark and recover from
their careless encroachment on the taboo subject so precious to our masters heart. No one
can question the nature of the Jews, or that of their ultimate saviours, the Nazis. You
really could not want a better guardian angel than Adolf Hitler, and he is the Jews angel
of life.
But just before the creation of the Hitler defence, we find the deadly ideas of
people like Lloyd in full swing. These people are already being squeezed out of any
public position by the force of the overtly theocratic people working there way into the
public domain, as we see with the utterly religious science of the professional sociologists
who wrote Evolution by Atrophy, and by books written for the clergy like Religion and
Science which presume to speak about our atheistic idea of the social organism as if it
was at one with their own theology. It is necessary to say that the horrors of the Nazi
period were real, and they are tragic, but these horrors are not like those in the news
today concerning the murder of five prostitutes in one English town, or the brutal murder
of some gorgeous eighteen year old in another town, by a seriously dangerous man.
These events are all real, all natural, but they are not the same in that while the horrors of
the Nazis period are focused on one person for the usual purpose of making collective
action personal, on Hitler that is, and thus making politics and history conform to the
religious principle of the individual as a human being, as an end in themselves, the fact is
that Hitler, like Thatcher, Blair or Bush, was just a figurehead delivering the programme
of the state at the particular time in which he lived. Human society is an organism, and
all political and historical events are equally biological, natural, and positive, no matter
how they are experienced by us. Thus the holocaust was a good thing, essential for the
survival of the Jews, and to hear some mouthpiece on TV condemning Cameron tonight
because all his family was wiped out in the Nazi death camps, is simply to hear the voice
of the organism evoking an event to obtain our collective conformity to the total
programme of Jewish identity. Why else should we suppose these sorts of events occur
time and time again throughout history ? Because there is such a thing as evil ? That is
what the priests say, it is what Joe Bloggs says, so is it a scientific answer ? Hardly.
I wrote the above last night, this morning, Saturday, 23 February 2008, I found
this in the free rag pushed through my door :

A journey to Auschwitz
HIGH school sixth formers have been telling fellow students about their
harrowing visit to the Auschwitz death camp in Poland. The girls are A-level
 history students, and visited the camp as part of the Lessons from Auschwitz
Project. Before the visit the girls took part in a seminar in Liverpool, where they
met a woman who survived her time in the death camp. “A few days later we
were standing where the woman had described, among the snow and fog,” said
the girls. “The average temperature was minus seven degrees centigrade, and the
harrowing reality of the Holocaust was omnipresent.” The girls spent six hours at
the camp, and following their return led lessons with Year 9 pupils who are
studying The Holocaust. They also showed pictures of their visit at school
assemblies to mark Holocaust Memorial Day.

(February 22, 2008)

There were two girls named in this piece, and their school was identified too, but I
prefer not to give precise information of this kind in my work. We can see from this
what a huge resource the Nazis created for the Jews, a massive propaganda potential that
our Jewish masters are only just beginning to tap. Nothing like this has ever existed
before as far as I know, although our scientific analysis of modern society based on the
knowledge that society is a natural organism, created by nature, tells us that anti-
Semitism is a vital feature of Judaism that exists to preserve the sacred elite status of the
Jews as a distinct structural element of the society that bears the Jewish identity in the
shape of the slave formulation Christian or Muslim.
Faced with the relentless religious propaganda, able to exploit such potent
resources as this for their own political ends, we are obliged to meet the attack on
knowledge in this vicious form head-on. Auschwitz exists, the terror took place, the old
Jew the girls met told a true tale and now the girls have become the carriers of that
experience, they are able to take the story of how the Jews were treated by the Nazis on
for another century in a real living form, this is akin to the process of ritual described by
Turner in his work on the relationship of ritual to social structure. The old Jew and the
young girls are real people living real lives, they are honest and sincere vectors of the
message, telling it as it has been for them, any account we give of the nature of the Nazis,
the Jews or the holocaust has no bearing on these individuals, it is about the meaning of
the events and behaviours of which they are a part. Lets take a look at an important
observation Turner makes in respect to the nature of the relationship of intellectual
observation to social action.

Clearly, both sociological and psychological modes of explanation are

pertinent here. What is structurally “visible” to a trained anthropological observer
is psychologically “unconscious” to the individual member of the observed
society ; yet his orectic responses [concerning desire or appetite] to structural changes
and regularities, multiplied by the number of members exposed to change
generation after generation, have to be taken into cultural, notably ritual, account
if the society is to survive without disruptive tension. Life-crisis rites and rituals
of reversal take these responses into account in different ways. Through
successive life crises and rites of status elevation, individuals ascend structurally.
 But rituals of status reversal make visible in their symbolic and behavioural
patterns social categories and forms of grouping that are considered to be
axiomatic and unchanging both in essence and in relationships to one another.

(Turner, p. 176)

The relevant element of this passage for what we have placed before it is the
description of unconsciousness pertaining to the individuals taking part in the social
behaviours observed by the outsider who makes a naturalistic study of what he sees. This
state of unconsciousness means that the participants in these social rituals, the celebration
of the holocaust, are oblivious of the true meaning of the celebration, and they
unwittingly play a role in a purpose that is only manifested in the higher level
organization of the superorganism’s identity, which is religious.
This example of state involvement in an ‘educational’ programme that is
unmitigated religious propaganda brings home forcibly the obvious fact that the British
state functions as a machine serving Jewish interests, and that all states that have ever
existed throughout the existence of the Jews have operated accordingly, Sumerian,
Babylonian, Egyptian, Roman, European, American. I have not named the Greek
because I believe the Greeks someone had no fully discernable place in the development
of the Jewish global organism, and I put this down to the independent origins of the
Greeks occurring at the same time the Jews were coming into fruition in the Near East
and North Africa, and this also explains why it was necessary for a wholly new center of
power to be created from nothing, in the shape of the Romans, in order to act as a new
focal point of structural power to carry Judaism onto the next level of superorganic
growth. I must say I find this description of Jewish development extravagant, but I have
no choice but to make it since it occurs to me as a direct response to what I have learnt
about the nature of the human animal and the Jews as the focal point of its existence
today.
What we are saying is that just as we see the Jews acting as the core focus of
power in our society today, so the Jews must always of been the core focus of power in
the empires that existence as their host biomasses in the past, and as unfamiliar as I am
with the detail of Biblical history, I think that the basic story of Jewish relationships
indicates the central role the Jews played in the great structural powers of the past. And
this continues today, with the Jews playing the leading role in world affairs today, but, as
ever, always in a manner one step removed from structural definition, so that the Jews
always take the role of identity, or symbolic force. Thus the leading structural motivation
providing definition to social action today is the war of global terror, and this war is
initiated for one reason and one reason only, to rid the world of the Jew, so that the
response of the major powers, the response being what interests us when we think about
the formation of social structure and social motivation realised in the global
superorganism, is likewise, driven by the existence of the Jews in Israel today. Our
leaders have made it clear that Israel, come hell or high water, is here to stay, Tony Blair
made a statement of this kind when faced with the usual challenge from political groups
in Palestine.
 It is very difficult to provide a convincing account of the Jewish place in world
history based on the proposition put forward here, it would take the expertise of a
professional historian who had spent years working on the project to even attempt such
an account. The proposition given here is therefore of a different kind, it is a
philosophical proposition, just as, despite the claim that the idea of the social organism is
the only possible scientific idea capable of explaining human existence, it too can only be
expounded as a philosophical idea by someone who is not a scientist. This is because we
are living in a phase of the war between religion and knowledge where religion, as we see
from this discussion of the status of Jewish propaganda in our society today, has erased
science completely from our world and the only voice of reason must perforce come from
rebels and outsiders existing within the fabric of Jewish slave society.
Adhering to the principle of a philosophical dissertation we are able to validate
the extraordinary claim made concerning the status of the Jews throughout the course of
Western civilization’s history because the extravagant conclusion that the Jews have
always been the focal point of that history, about which all other elements of that history
have revolved, accords with a general principle pertaining to the nature of social
organisms which we have just been teasing out of the arguments we find from the period
when the idea of the social organism was flourishing, when people wanted to know what
the extent of the social organism was. We have stated that the extent of the organism is
defined by an identity, and that identity is not of a material kind that can be defined in
political terms, it is of a far more organic kind, imbued into the fabric of each individual
existing in a wide variety of social structures of many diverse kinds, exactly as we would
expect to find in a social organism. This defining identity we have said is religious, and
we have also stated that the actual religious identity in question is Judaism. Here then, as
bizarre as our assertions may appear regarding the place of the Jews in world history over
all its existence, or indeed during ongoing political events such as the propagation of
news last night, this universal presence is precisely what we must find in any true extent
of a social being, appearing as a uniform presence at all times and in all places, exactly as
the Jewish presence and influence does, and always has throughout history.
Jewish history, and ongoing activity in society, both indicate that there is one
human superorganism in the world, and it is defined by the Jewish identity Therefore, as
odd as it has to be for us as living individuals, embedded within the matrix of the
superorganism within which we find ourselves isolated and defined by personal attributes
and circumstances, and thereby differentiated from many other people defined by their
own specific social determinants, we can see that, in actual fact, all social phenomenon
are coordinated and of a common kind, oriented toward one common goal, even as the
organs of ingestion and excretion are, despite their opposite nature, oriented toward one
common goal in our own bodies, in both cases this is the maintenance of the one living
being of which they are a structural part. So that the Nazis and their holocaust may be
likened to the bowls and the anus, they are dynamically negative aspects of superorganic
physiology, being concerned with the reduction of disorder to a homogeneous state ready
to be revitalised according to a complex programme of identity definition that overrides
and embraces all identity within the superorganism, be it Jewish, pacifist, racist, fascist,
democratic, Nazi, murderous, generous, or whatever, all is embraced by the uniformity of
the one being.
 Following on from this assertion we can turn again to the question of the need for
a war between science and religion, and how this need tested all points in the pantheon of
knowledge, leading it to become finely tuned as it focused on the idea of the social
organism, which alone, of all ideas, could not be subverted, and had to be caste into the
realms of the forbidden. This is not to say that the priest could not make the idea of the
social organism their own, far from it, we see the overt man of divinity extolling the fact
that society is an organism in Waggett’s Religion and Science, 1904, but since this idea is
the only possible way that can provide a naturalistic model of human existence able to
contain ever last detail of our being, it is impossible to allow scientists to use it as a
model, because in the end if they do they will oust any alternative use by mystics and the
like. Our efforts have been directed at tracing how the process of knowledge formation
bears out this model of social progress, whereby religion imposes ignorance in the form
of knowledge, and we come as close as we can to the pinpoint focus of the war when we
home in on later nineteenth century works, and those following shortly afterward up to
the outbreak of world war. But our story continues thereafter, only it changes its nature,
as the structural makeover has its intended effect, and the process of remaking knowledge
according to the old religious principles newly imbued into the academic world is free to
fill the blank sheet of collective consciousness, which has just had its memory violently
erased by the military organ of the superorganic being.

I was tempted to take page one of Driesch’s Problem of Individuality for its
observations on how we may think about nature, where he says “there is something
factual, so to speak, in all the concepts of logic, except the principle of identity”. But he
has the manner of a full blown philosopher who makes understanding exactly what he
means impossible ; unless this statement is opened out further into the work, but I am not
about to read it to find out. Identity is special, in many ways it is the most important
aspect of any life form, yet identity is pure information, without any structural form,
which is what I read into this remark taken from Driesch : identity has no factual, that is
material elements, no structure of its own. When I have discussed identity I have spoken
of it as a ‘colour’, colours are real, colours are important, but colours have no substance,
in effect colours in life possess structures, and this is what gives them there primacy in
organic structures, because identities are not the structure, identities are the owners of the
structure. Thus, when we speak of Judaism as the identity of the superorganism, we do
so with this thought in mind : that Judaism is the ‘colour’ possessing the social structure
which ‘belongs’ to other sub-Judaic identities, such as Christianity, and overtly political
sub-theistic identities such as British, and so on. This is a difficult thought to be definite
about in a world where so much effort goes into getting us to think of social identities as
discrete personal attributes, which must be respected according to a multicultural
philosophy. Hence I am pleased to pick up even an obscure and cursive reflection of this
elusive thought when I happen upon one during my travels through intellectual time.

An additional support for the above assertions concerning the nature of the Jews
in human society appear in another item I picked of my shelf yesterday, 23/02/08. I have
said that my claim that the Jews are the master race that all humanity exist to serve is
extravagant and difficult to justify in historical terms, simply because of the scale of the
task, and that we are driven to this assessment by the idea that society is a biological
entity created by nature, which gives us the macro level interpretation of history wherein
we need no detail to justify ourselves in making this observation. This is a pantheistic
view of human society, and I was interested to find a pantheistic statement of an equally
broad kind made by a famous name in the ‘theory of religion’ department :

M. Weber

Major Features of World Religions

Excerpt from chapter 11 of H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (eds.). From Max Weber,
Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 267-87. (First published 1915.)

By ‘world religions’, we understand the five religions or religiously determined

systems of life regulation which have known how to gather multitudes of
confessors around them. The term is used here in a completely value-neutral
sense. The Confucian, Hinduist, Buddhist, Christian and Islamist religious ethics
all belong to the category of world religion. A sixth religion, Judaism, will also be
dealt with. It is included because it contains historical preconditions decisive for
understanding Christianity and Islamism, and because of its historic and
autonomous significance for the development of the modem economic ethic of the
Occident — a significance, partly real and partly alleged, which has been
discussed several times recently. References to other religions will be made only
when they are indispensable for historical connexions.

(Sociology of Religion, Ed. R. Robertson, 1969, p. 19)

There are elements of this exert that affirm my assertion that Judaism provides a
dynamic and essential thread running through the acknowledged leaders of religions that
have a global potential. We find this is Weber’s recognition that although Judaism is in
no sense a ‘world religion’ he cannot avoid including it in a discussion of world religions,
because Judaism informs the essence of Christian and Muslim identity that gives these
religions their political power. This passage therefore shows how people are able to
cobble together ludicrous notions of identity integrity and overarching identity uniformity
simply by playing word games in which identities are allowed to stand for themselves, as
if identity did indeed have a factual, or structural basis, as if Jews were in some biological
way Jews and not Christians, just as in some mysterious biological way cats are cats and
not dogs, oh, but cats do not only have a different identity from dogs, they have a
different structure. But then Jews have a different structure from Christians, I saw one of
TV today, Sunday, 24 February 2008, a Jew, in the BBC 1 Big Questions programme,
they were talking about the right of parents to use violence against their children and he
was saying that he had seen people who stutter, who ... well I am not sure what else, he
seemed struck by an inability to get his words out, appropriately, and I switched off. But
I knew he was a Jew immediately, because he had a structure that it would be impossible
to find on a Christian, he had a disc of cloth pinned to his head. Then again a Christian
have such a structure, I saw a government minister on TV yesterday inside a mosque, and
there was a structure on her head that showed she was a Muslim, a headscarf, but I think
we can be sure she is not Muslim nonetheless ; which is a bit like hearing a cat bark.
As usual my method of research is without any structural plan, it is based on the
environment in which I work, books being arraigned about my home, from whence I
select them as if I were arranging flowers or cooking a stew by selecting what is available
in my garden. This sounds deeply flawed, but just as we would expect a flower arranger
or a keen cook to plant their gardens with their pleasure in mind, so my walls are stocked
with the fruit of years of searching for works pertaining to my passion for the idea of the
social organism. As the previous bit from Weber fell into my hands last night from a
chance selection, I made a more deliberate choice today from which I add this pinch :

The interpretation of religious beliefs and social institutions as different

expressions of a common psychological attitude, which Weber elaborated in his
Aufsätze zur Religionssociologie, is no longer so novel as when he advanced it.
Once stated, indeed, it has the air of a platitude. The capacity of human beings to
departmentalise themselves is surprising, but it is not unlimited. It is obvious that,
in so far as doctrines as to man’s place in the universe are held with conviction,
they will be reflected in the opinions formed of the nature of the social order most
conducive to well-being, and that the habits moulded by the pressure of the
economic environment will in turn set their stamp on religion.

(The Protestant Ethic, Weber, 1930, first published. 1904-5, Foreword, by

Tawney, p.5)

Tawney tells us that Weber had a deliberate attitude toward religious identity, one
that does not accord with our attitude. Tawney says it is a matter of some significance
that people have so profound an ability to compartmentalise themselves, to segregate
themselves off from one another on the most flimsy basis. And yet despite this capacity,
their ability to self segregate is not infinite, every person does not build their own church,
establish their own army or run their own personal government, I suppose he means. It
would be nice to read a full discussion of this question as given by Weber, if we are write
to assume from the above that such a piece of work exists, but I do not have it and I am
not inclined to try and get the work in question to see for myself. This last snippet is
sufficient for our purposes. It is good to see that Weber has a definite view on the
curious way people are able to separate themselves out into diverse religious categories
while still being driven to obey an impulse toward unification. It is clear however that
Weber acknowledges the validity of religious identity taken at face value even as he
develops a model of religious philosophy that expressly set out to show how universal
principles derived from religious identities pervade the world. As usual, people want to
have their cake and eat it. But the way for us to make sense of this hopelessly flawed
approach imposed on society via the works of people like Weber, promoted as they are
by the machinery of intellectual propaganda in all its forms, is to refer back to the work
of Turner, specifically at that point when he discusses the impossibility of those who take
part in social rituals seeing that which an outsider sees when he analyses the same. By
taking religious identities at face value, as Weber does when he names the five distinct
world religions, Weber places himself squarely within the realms of a participant within
the society he pretends to describe, and as such he cannot be expected to offer a
description of the society of which he is a p[art, he can at best only be augmenting the
modes of activating social behaviour within the society he sustains in the guise of a
description.
In taking this religious approach Weber to the study of religion Weber is able to
provide an interpretation of issues emerging from the unbiased, dispassionate observation
of society according to a scientific method, so he is able to provide an explanation of
Jewish influence that is safe for release into a society ruled by a Jewish theocracy without
revealing anything about the true nature of that society. Weber dresses himself up in the
guise of a detached scientist, he says the phrase ‘world religion’ is used without making
any value judgements, this is of course not at all true, for he fails to tell us that from a
scientific point of view, as opposed to a religious standpoint, there is only one true world
religion, and that is Judaism, in fact he sets out to obscure and hide this irrefutable fact,
the release of which would be fatal to the Jewish theocracy. Since the scientific age has
come into being the leading scientists, people like Descartes and Darwin, have all had
this quality of a an impostor, and they have been accepted because the establishment
exists to serve precisely this function of selecting such impostors to be the representative
of the knowledge that informs our world about who and what we are. There is no other
way in which religion could continue to exist, with its inherently absurd attribute of
defining people as different, on no other basis than a linguistic formula, topped off with
cloth caps and silk scarves, crosses and stars, churches and temples, and so on and on.
But this whole phenomenon of deception and imposition is the product of our
genes. Certainly the Chinese are not obliged to use chopsticks because chopsticks are
encoded in their genes, but, just as the need to speak a language is encoded in the genes,
so the need to posses a linguistically generated cultural identity is likewise encoded in the
human genome, and the use of chopsticks, like the use of Chinese language, is dictated by
the need for humans to self define themselves as different from others. Warfare is a
major form of human ritual used to organize this pattern of self identification, and this is
why the Japanese have adopted many of the Western tokens of linguistically generated
identity, as a reflection of their defeat in warfare, and likewise the Chinese have been
obliged to take on the Western political forms, first as Communists, and more recently
through transition into what can only be described as capitalist communism.
The point to get at it here is that from the perspective of an identity, the associated
structure should be invisible, that is to say when an identity of one entity matches the
identity of another entity then the structure should be likewise identical. According to
this conception of identity when Jew meets Christian there should be no way to tell
themselves apart, but we have seen that this is not true, a Christian may show a cross and
a Jew a skull cap. Yet we assert that the Christian is in reality a Jew. If this is true then
there must be some level at which an identity exists where there is no means of telling the
Jew and the Christian apart.
The fact is that if we are going to acknowledge the symbols of these religious
affiliations as true indicators of real differences between Jews and Christians, then we are
going to make ourselves part of the Jewish organism that we seek to describe. These
symbols are structural markers, if we acknowledge them then we are part of the structure
they define, if we note them without acknowledging their validity as defining real
difference then we are in the position of alien observers relative to that the structure these
symbols define, we are then in a position to see beyond that which those within the same
structure can be conscious of. This is why priests are so keen to place atheists within the
pantheon of multiculturalism, so that to call yourself an atheist can be made just another
structural marker, to be tolerated like any other. But atheism is not an identity marker, it
is an intellectual view of reality, relative to the conception of social authority vested in a
divine being. Whatever devious games Weber sort to play when he constructed his
religious notion of religion, with which to fool us all, and no doubt himself, by making
out that despite being indissolubly connected to Judaism, Christianity and Islam were
distinct, he should fool no one. It is precisely because of the disconnected status of
Judaism, as a precursor identity of the two latter forms that it spawned, that we can say
that the original identity is Jewish, and therefore all three together form a unity in which
the Christian and Muslim symbols only constitute structural definitions of internal fabric
possessed by the original Jewish identity. There is no structural difference between a
Jew, a Christian and a Muslim, which is why a none Muslim can wear a head scarf in
obedience to a Muslim stricture, and why she would want to do so. All this is because
human nature is corporate, meaning that human physiology evolved to create individuals
who have the nature of a conscious brick that knows its duty is to come together with
others bricks to build social structure.
__________

What is an Idealist ? I find myself asking this in respect to Lloyd’s description

taken from a book dealer’s sales pitch. I must have a general book on philosophy
somewhere that would offer a direct answer to this question, but I can’t be bothered
scouring the book shelves to find one. I got it into my head to scour Maclay last night for
signs of Spencer after I fished Principles of Sociology of the shelf to look at the chapter
Society is an Organism which is mentioned by Leslie White, who we will be discussing
shortly. As with Comte, I have ignored Spencer since I discovered him because reading
his ideas does nothing for me, but, as with Comte on the continent, so it is with Spencer
at home, he is the major exponent of the idea of the social organism from the period when
the idea lived. Maclay makes no mention of Spencer, yet he has a lengthy chapter
devoted to Durkheim, who said absolutely nothing about the social organism, and as
such, coming at the time he did, must be regarded as the supreme enemy of the idea, for
Durkheim laid the foundations, within sociology, of the functionalist substitute that
enabled sociology to become disconnected from biology by turning the logic implicit in
organicism into a political formulation. Thus Durkheim broke the link with science in
sociology, then sociology was able to make all references to past sociology begin with
Durkheim, from whom sociology could then break its links, pretending Durkheim was
one of its great scientifically minded founders, as it became completely severed from
science. We will look at some evidence of how Durkheim served this function of
decoupling sociology from biology in the next chapter where such a topic rightly belongs.
Spencer was as much of a plonker as Comte when it comes to his use of the
biological conception of human society, but at least he wrote profusely on the idea as the
only valid conception of society, hence he has a title within a volume as named above.
Why does Maclay ignore Spencer ? As I perused his book last night in search of Spencer
I found this :

I have focused on the French school of social philosophers, and

particularly on the writings of Comte and Durkheim, on the grounds that these
French writers were among the boldest of Hobbes’s successors and that their
proposals remain the most interesting.

(Page 329)

What more can I say, except that this is taken from the final chapter The selective
character of this history, and there is no need to add to that confessional title here, it says
it all ! Anyway, the third chapter is The original Idealist, in which Maclay develops the
idea, which he later questions after giving some thought to pre-civilised conceptions of
the superorganic, that Plato was the first philosopher to really promote the idea that
society was a grand living being. Maclay tells us that in his famous work Republic,
which, properly translated, might of been entitled The Being We Call the State—much
more catchy don’t you think !—Plato “gradually builds up a picture of his ideal city-state,
the nearest thing that he could visualize to the perfect form of a fully developed human
society.” (Page 23). And so we may as well take it that an idealist is someone who
adheres to the notion of designing a perfect human society. Not that I care much for this
definition since it makes the idealist out to be the personification of everything we must
despise most given that our agenda is to promote the idea that society is what it is
because nature is responsible for ever last detail of how humans exist. In the following
chapter we will be looking at the work of Leslie White and he is a tricky customer for us
because his ideas are so attractive, but ultimately he too is no friend of science and must
be classed with Durkheim as an intermediary between science and religion working in the
science of humans who served to help distance modern studies of humans from biology
by decoupling the absolute conviction that sociology is a biological, a life science, from
the subject by offering an intermediate idea, in White’s case the idea that culture existed
as a distinct natural phenomenon. But White takes the rouble to argue the point just
made by saying that although culture is a natural phenomenon no one would such that the
Chinese use chop sticks because of their genetic make up “No one would argue that the
Chinese speak the language that they do, or eat with chopsticks, because of biological
structure or genetic constitution. “ (Concept of Cultural Systems, p. 8). I see no need to
be so obvious myself. Actually, as it happens, I was reading a book yesterday in which
precisely this kind of argument was indeed made :

The structure of an animal or plant depends upon the physical

arrangements of its parts, and on the physiological links between those parts. The
structure of a society depends upon the links of social contract existing among its
members. We regard these as two very different things, and we cannot follow
Tarde in pressing the analogy between them in the following way : “The length,
 breadth, and height of an organism are never very much out of proportion. With
snakes and poplars the height or length preponderates ; among flat fish the
thickness is very small compared to the other dimensions, but in each instance the
disproportion exhibited in extreme cases is not comparable to that shown by any
social aggregate—such as China for instance, which is 3000 kilometres in length
and breadth, and only one or two yards in average height, for the Chinese being a
short race, build their edifices correspondingly low.” 1

¹ Les Monades et la Science sociale. (Tarde. Revue de Sociologie, 1893, p. 169.)

(Evolution by Atrophy, 1899, p. 16)

The professional sociologists writing here oppose the use of science in sociology,
as we have seen, but it has to be said that Tarde provides ammunition for these
miscreants of the academic world when he links genetic stature to exoskeletal form in
such a direct manner. On this basis what height might we expect Americans to be !
When people say things like this they are simply running off at the mouth, and this kind
of comment does seem to plague the field of sociology where the idea of the social
organism is applied. It is difficult not to think of people like Spencer or Tarde as enemies
of organicism disguised as friends, but it is best not to resort to such conspiratorial
motives and best to make sense of this problem in terms of the difficulty people have
separating themselves from themselves when seeking to understand themselves in a
detached manner that accords with the scientific method. As Turner notes it is all very
well for him to study the Ndembu but this involves him seeing something the Ndembu
cannot see about themselves, if they could see what he sees then their rituals would
become meaningless to them, and this is exactly the point, you have to be an outsider to
interpret rituals like periodic warfare conducted between friendly societies, like Britain
and Germany, designed to control the social structure of both according to the
requirements of a common core identity, namely Judaism.
 Chapter Seven

After the War

Today the war between religion and science is over, the war was won by religion
and science no longer has an independent intellectual existence. But nobody knows this
apart from me, as far as I can tell, and I want everyone to have the opportunity of
knowing what I know, hence the effort to write these works. Although I have been trying
to communicate with others for half a dozen years now without the slightest glimmer of
success, so I do not actually expect to ever communicate my ideas to anyone. Therefore
when I work I do so with the conscious idea in my head that I do so just for the pleasure
my efforts give me. Searching for, and buying of books, the discovery of yet another
commentator on the social organism, is a fulfilling occupation, just as a person might
engage in any pleasurable pastime, gardening, fishing, whatever. But it is not work, I do
not work, if I can help it, work is for insects, for slaves. Mind you, without the benefits
system I would be screwed, I would be a benumbed slave like everyone else. When I die
all that I have done will die with me, only the lies that make life so worthless will be
preserved, as they always have been, and forever will be, Amen
After the military levelling of Jewish global society by the forces of Jewish order,
as we have said, the process of remaking went ahead unopposed, exactly as Turner says
happens in primitive societies following the ritual process of levelling social structure by
casting a portion of the biomass into a state of temporary liminality as a means of
reasserting the necessity of the social authority that has just been denied in a ritual event.
Warfare in a Jewish society is therefore the modern equivalent of ritual in a pre-Jewish
society, warfare demonstrates in a real way the need for order and stability, it makes
everyone grateful for the oppressive state, because they know what they alternative is. If
all states are Jewish, which they are, then in any war between nations, while France may
beat Italy, or Russia defeat America, in the end the victor will always be Jewish. And
this, in essence, is why Judaism is associated with the state structure we know. This
arrangement is biological, not legal, because while states are legal constructs, linguistic
constructs that is, no one knows the biological nature of a state because the dynamics of
state structure as elements of superorganic physiology are too far beyond the
consciousness of any individual, or group of academic individuals, just as the spinning of
the planet is beyond sensing. All anyone can see is the active role people take in
founding and perpetuating political systems, the biological substratum is beyond them.
This substratum is however only language, nothing else, but still, people cannot see that
language is not of them, but of another, of the superorganism. This is so because the
energy of language becomes fixed in superorganic physiology, social structure, in the
form of institutions and laws, which people have an intimate relationship with, so
intimate that they cannot take a detached view of what they are an integral part of.
Warfare has always been a central element of Jewish history, as I understand it,
and it continues to be so today. This counterintuitive idea, the idea that warfare is a
constructive activity serving a special purpose in our social life, can be allied to the other
counterintuitive observations we often make concerning the true nature of the Nazi
holocaust, which is that of a sacrifice. For it is clear that since we know that the Nazis
were the saviours of Judaism, as we have just seen that the Nazis established a huge
potential of social power, vested in the Jews, that we see being tapped in the programme
of indoctrination attacked by the opposition leader David Cameron just yesterday,
mentioned above. So the holocaust was, like the war itself, a good thing, vital to the
health and well-being of the Jewish superorganism, which simply could not exist without
such period ‘rituals’ of cleansing and remaking, that allow the fabric of the
superorganism to be levelled, where a portion is caste into a temporary liminal state of
flux, and so grounded afresh upon the principles of Jewish order. When we think about it
properly, we know that the curious way in which a fine people, the Germans, respected,
honoured and loved by all, suddenly become the vehicle of a monstrous outrage, only to
immediately afterward return to their former state of perfect harmony with all the rest of
humanity, it is clear that something very weird is going. Of course, as ever, the priests
who feed us their lying propaganda through the machinery of the state, make out the
nonsensical argument that this was all about one man, and a sick idea that appealed to a
few acolytes. But this excuse is in total conformity to the principle of the individual as
the defining form of the human animal, which we constantly say is the religious principle
upon which the whole subversion of all knowledge depends, the idea of the individual is
the false key upon which Jewish identity is founded, and which therefore creates the
whole exoskeletal social structure of the Jewish superorganism. You cannot have people
knowing that there is a superorganic dimension overriding their personal being, because
this factual knowledge negates the need for a mystical God to account for social
existence, upon which the Jewish religion relies for its meaning, that places Jews at the
heart of the mythical knowledge that rules our social world.
19/03/08. I note that in the news yesterday, the Germans were making an
atonement to Israel for the holocaust by supplying weapons of war ; like giving sweeties
to a baby, what could make a slave master, a Jew, happier ! The report was infinitesimal,
but it showed a picture of a submarine on its way to serve the master that the Germans
have always served faithfully, always ! The process of life rotates about a vortex, all that
is within the vortex is good, being in the vortex we see only our fellow passengers, so we
distinguish between elements in terms of their place relative to us, as positive and
negative, but the vortex is a flux of organic energy unified by one identity, Judaism. As
long as Judaism exists there can be nothing against Judaism. Just as we say in the war
against religion : as long as religion exists there can be nothing against religion, so there
can be no science. And this means, I am afraid, that as long as Judaism exists there can
be no science, no freedom : to want an end to religion is to want an end of Judaism,
obviously. Is this anti-Semitic ? Certainly not, it is progressive. Unless of course you
think war is wonderful, or religious ignorance admirable.
$
In a manner of speaking the war between religion and science is over, just as the
war between the Americans and the indigenous Indians is over, because in both cases one
party has been reduced to a stump of no consequence in terms of mounting any
opposition to their foe. The Americans have absorbed the indigenous population and
made them American according to their own sense of identity, and the theocracy has
done likewise with the scientist. So lets see how those scientists concerned especially
with our subject first represented the end of this warfare before between religion and
science. To this end we will take a look at a piece of work by Leslie A, White, The
Concept of Cultural Systems, published in 1975, shortly after White’s death. The section
I want to turn to is, although the book is not divided into chapters, where chapter four
would be if it were, and is entitled Vectors of Cultural Systems. This chapter holds out
the promise of all sorts of good things. Even when the war is over, we can still say that
Kidd’s idea that this war between religion and knowledge has always been the central
theme in human history is true, and by looking at how White explains the final resolution
of this conflict we will see how the peculiar fact we are concerned with now can be true,
how a war that has ended once and for all can be thriving and continuing, undiminished
by having ended.

Of course this is only possible because the war has been transformed, the victor
has become its enemy, religion has become science, and religion cannot fight itself. This
fact is what we have found all along, that the scientist has been reduced to the status of a
priest expounding science according to false principles laid down as its foundation stone
in the nineteenth century, most particularly in the life sciences, by the imposition of
Darwin’s theory of evolution based on competition between individuals, so that
individuals always exist as an end in themselves, the ultimate vectors of evolutionary
form. We might say, to continue the analogy above, that the Americans have become the
Indians, the Europeans have become the indigenous people of America, which, they have
in a manner of speaking. And yet this is not correct, for the usual meaning of the word
‘indigenous’ is that the people so described are the original inhabitants existing in a place
now occupied by new comers, so that the Europeans can never be the indigenous people
of America as long as their culture occupies that place. Likewise, the religious have
supplanted the scientific in the academic establishment by remaking the scientist in their
own image, a process achieved by formulating a scientific creed based on the primary
religious principle of the integrity of the individual as a social being. But this too cannot
be done, although in this case the word ‘scientist’ does not refer to people who do
science, it refers to professional scientists, people who have the power to act as if they do
science, and therefore there is no linguistic barrier to the essence of the priest being
infused into the body of the scientist and becoming one with it. The only real problem
arising here is the simple fact that religious principles cannot be the progenitor of
scientific knowledge, and so, in the end, the result is the same in both cases, the
indigenous people of America are gone, they are not replaced, and the scientist is gone,
they too have not been replaced, they have been exterminated. A fact born out by the fact
that we no longer have any discussion of the idea of the social organism leading the
scientific debate on what humans are. White was one of the first to provide a full blown
substitute for the idea of the social organism according to the new formulation provided
by the progenitors of religious science. White was one of the first therefore to begin the
process of refilling the blank slate produced by the ritual warfare that is periodically
enacted in the human superorganism created by the Jewish type of corporate identity, that
is based on an exclusively linguistic formula that requires the continual remaking of the
social constitution on the fixed lines of logic inherent in the Jewish identity programme.
The idea that God made man in his own image is a piece of Christian dogma, and
it is interesting to find ourselves recognising the transformation of scientists into priests
in the above discussion, because the fact is that this is exactly what Judaism does. The
essence of Judaism, and the word ‘Judaism’ names a superorganism, therefore Judaism is
literally a god, the God in our world, is to transform non-Jews into Jews, and to
reinvigorate the Jewish identity of those already so transformed. Reinvigoration being
necessary because of the manner in which persons receive their corporate identity from
the prevailing superorganic form, their received identity being prone to decay over time
because it is an imposed, or slave identity, as we discuss in many places in my work. In
this sense we find we have decoded yet another vital piece of the Jewish identity
programme by showing what the scientific meaning of the important idea that God made
man in his own image is : Judaism makes all humans into Jews. And the process
whereby Judaism turns scientists into priests is one example of the process of
invigorating internal structure that is vital to the existence of the Jewish superorganism.

Here we want material from Needham, using Malinowski, and discussing how he
uses Durkheim to help him promote religion as a personal feature of human life.

IV

THE PUBLIC AND TRIBAL CHARACTER OF PRIMITIVE CULTS

The festive and public character of the ceremonies of cult is a conspicuous feature
of religion in general. Most sacred acts happen in a congregation ; indeed, the solemn
conclave of the faithful united in prayer, sacrifice, supplication, or thanksgiving is the
very prototype of a religious ceremony. Religion needs the community as a whole so that
its members may worship in common its sacred things and its divinities, and society
needs religion for the maintenance of moral law and order.
In primitive societies the public character of worship, the give-and-take between
religious faith and social organisation, is at least as pronounced as in higher cultures. It is
sufficient to glance over our previous inventory of religious phenomena to see that
ceremonies at birth, rites of initiation, mortuary attentions to the dead, burial, the acts of
mourning and commemoration, sacrifice and totemic ritual, are one and all public and
collective, frequently affecting the tribe as a whole and absorbing all its energies for the
time being. This public character, the gathering together of big numbers, is especially
pronounced in the annual or periodical feasts held at times of plenty, at harvest or at the
height of the hunting or fishing season. Such feasts allow the people to indulge in their
gay mood, to enjoy the abundance of crops and quarry, to meet their friends and relatives,
to muster the whole community in full force, and to do all this in a mood of happiness
and harmony. At times during such festivals visits of the departed take place : the spirits
of ancestors and dead relatives return and receive offerings and sacrificial libations,
mingle with the survivors in the acts of cult and in the rejoicings of the feast. Or the dead,
even if they do not actually revisit the survivors, are commemorated by them, usually in
the form of ancestor cult. Again, such festivities being frequently held embody the ritual
of garnered crops and other cults of vegetation. But whatever the other issues of such
festivities, there can be no doubt that religion demands the existence of seasonal,
periodical feasts with a big concourse of people, with rejoicings and festive apparel, with
an abundance of food, and with relaxation of rules and taboos. The members of the tribe
come together, and they relax the usual restrictions, especially the barriers of
conventional reserve in social and in sexual intercourse. The appetites are provided for,
indeed pandered to, and there is a common participation in the pleasures, a display to
everyone of all that is good, the sharing of it in a universal mood of generosity. To the
interest in plenty of material goods there is joined the interest in the multitude of people,
in the congregation, in the tribe as a body.
With these facts of periodical festive gathering a number of other distinctly social
elements must be ranged : the tribal character of almost all religious ceremonies, the
social universality of moral rules, the contagion of sin, the importance of sheer
convention and tradition in primitive religion and morals, above all the identification of
the whole tribe as a social unit with its religion ; that is, the absence of any religious
sectarianism, dissension, or heterodoxy in primitive creed.

I. Society as the Substance of God

All these facts, especially the last one, show that religion is a tribal affair, and we
are reminded of the famous dictum of Robertson Smith, that primitive religion is the
concern of the community rather than of the individual. This exaggerated view contains a
great deal of truth, but, in science, to recognise where the truth lies, on the one hand, and
to unearth it and bring it fully to light, on the other, are by no means the same. Robertson
Smith did not do much more in this matter, in fact, than set forth the important problem :
why is it that primitive man performs his ceremonies in public ? What is the relation
between society and the truth revealed by religion and worshipped in it ?
To these questions, some modern anthropologists, as we know, give a trenchant,
apparently conclusive, and exceedingly simple answer. Professor Durkheim and his
followers maintain that religion is social, for all its Entities, its God or Gods, the Stuff all
things religious are made of, are nothing more nor less than Society divinised.
This theory seems very well to explain the public nature of cult, the inspiration
and comfort drawn by man, the social animal, from congregation, the intolerance shown
by religion, especially in its early manifestations, the cogency of morals and other similar
facts. It also satisfies our modern democratic bias, which in social science appears as a
tendency to explain all by “collective” rather than by “individual” forces. This, the theory
which makes vox populi vox Dei appear as a sober, scientific truth, must surely be
congenial to modern man.
Yet, upon reflection, critical misgivings, and very serious ones at that, arise.
Everyone who has experienced religion deeply and sincerely knows that the strongest
religious moments come in solitude, in turning away from the world, in concentration and
in mental detachment, and not in the distraction of a crowd. Can primitive religion be so
entirely devoid of the inspiration of solitude ? No one who knows savages at first-hand
or from a careful study of literature will have any doubts. Such facts as the seclusion of
novices at initiation, their individual, personal struggles during the ordeal, the
communion with spirits, divinities, and powers in lonely spots, all these show us
primitive religion frequently lived through in solitude. Again, as we have seen before, the
belief in immortality cannot be explained without the consideration of the religious frame
of mind of the individual, who faces his own pending death in fear and sorrow. Primitive
religion does not entirely lack its prophets, seers, soothsayers and interpreters of belief.
All such facts, though they certainly do not prove that religion is exclusively individual,
make it difficult to understand how it can be regarded as the Social pure and simple.
And again, the essence of morals, as opposed to legal or customary rules, is that
they are enforced by conscience. The savage does not keep his taboo for fear of social
punishment or of public opinion. He abstains from breaking it partly because he fears the
direct evil consequences flowing from the will of a divinity, or from the forces of the
sacred, but mainly because his personal responsibility and conscience forbid him doing it.
The forbidden totem animal, incestuous or forbidden intercourse, the tabooed action or
food, are directly abhorrent to him. I have seen and felt savages shrink from an illicit
action with the same horror and disgust with which the religious Christian will shrink
from the committing of what he considers sin. Now this mental attitude is undoubtedly
due in part to the influence of society, in so far as the particular prohibition is branded as
horrible and disgusting by tradition. But it works in the individual and through forces of
the individual mind. It is, therefore, neither exclusively social nor individual, but a
mixture of both.
Professor Durkheim tries to establish his striking theory that Society is the raw
material of Godhead by an analysis of primitive tribal festivities. He studies especially
the seasonal ceremonies of the Central Australians. In these “the great collective
effervescence during the periods of concentration” causes all the phenomena of their
religion, and “the religious idea is born out of their effervescence.” Professor Durkheim
lays thus the emphasis on emotional ebullition, on exaltation, on the increased power
which every individual feels when part of such a gathering. Yet but a little reflection is
sufficient to show that even in primitive societies the heightening of emotions and the
lifting of the individual out of himself are by no means restricted to gatherings and to
crowd phenomena. The lover near his sweetheart, the daring adventurer conquering his
fears in the face of real danger, the hunter at grips with a wild animal, the craftsman
achieving a masterpiece, whether he be savage or civilised, will under such conditions
feel altered, uplifted, endowed with higher forces. And there can be no doubt that from
many of these solitary experiences where man feels the forebodings of death, the pangs
of anxiety, the exaltation of bliss, there flows a great deal of religious inspiration. Though
most ceremonies are carried out in public, much of religious revelation takes place in
solitude.
On the other hand there are in primitive societies collective acts with as much
effervescence and passion as any religious ceremony can possibly have, yet without the
slightest religious colouring. Collective work in the gardens, as I have seen it in
Melanesia, when men become carried away with emulation and zest for work, singing
rhythmic songs, uttering shouts of joy and slogans of competitive challenge, is full of this
“collective effervescence.” But it is entirely profane, and society which “reveals itself”
in this as in any other public performance assumes no divine grandeur or godlike
appearance. A battle, a sailing regatta, one of the big tribal gatherings for trading
purposes, an Australian lay-corrobboree, a village brawl, are all from the social as well as
from the psychological point of view essentially examples of crowd effervescence. Yet
no religion is generated on any of these occasions. Thus the collective and the religious,
though impinging on each other, are by no means coextensive, and while a great deal of
belief and religious inspiration must be traced back to solitary experiences of man, there
is much concourse and effervescence which has no religious meaning nor religious
consequence.
If we extend yet further the definition of “society” and regard it as a permanent
entity, continuous through tradition and culture, each generation brought up by its
predecessor and moulded into its likeness by the social heritage of civilisation—can we
not regard then Society as the prototype of Godhead ? Even thus the facts of primitive
life will remain rebellious to this theory. For tradition comprises the sum-total of social
norms and customs, rules of art and knowledge, injunctions, precepts, legends and myths,
and part of this only is religious, while the rest is essentially profane. As we have seen in
the second section of this essay, primitive man’s empirical and rational knowledge of
nature, which is the foundation of his arts and crafts, of his economic enterprises and of
his constructive abilities, forms an autonomous domain of social tradition. Society as the
keeper of lay tradition, of the profane, cannot be the religious principle or Divinity, for
the place of this latter is within the domain of the sacred only. We have found, moreover,
that one of the chief tasks of primitive religion, especially in the performance of initiation
ceremonies and tribal mysteries, is to sacralise the religious part of tradition. It is clear,
therefore, that religion cannot derive all its sanctity from that source which itself is made
sacred by religion.
It is in fact only by a clever play on words and by a double-edged sophistication
of the argument that “society” can be identified with the Divine and the Sacred. If,
indeed, we set equal the social to the moral and widen this concept so that it covers all
belief, all rules of conduct, all dictates of conscience, if, further, we personify the Moral
Force and regard it as a Collective Soul, then the identification of Society with Godhead
needs not much dialectical skill to be defended. But since the moral rules are only one
part of the traditional heritage of man, since morality is not identical with the Power or
Being from which it is believed to spring, since finally the metaphysical concept of
“Collective Soul” is barren in anthropology, we have to reject the sociological theory of
religion.
To sum up, the views of Durkheim and his school cannot be accepted. First of all,
in primitive societies religion arises to a great extent from purely individual sources.
Secondly, society as a crowd is by no means always given to the production of religious
beliefs or even to religious states of mind, while collective effervescence is often of an
entirely secular nature. Thirdly, tradition, the sum-total of certain rules and cultural
achievements, embraces, and in primitive societies keeps in a tight grip, both Profane and
Sacred. Finally, the personification of society, the conception of a “Collective Soul,” is
without any foundation in fact, and is against the sound methods of social science.

2. The Moral Efficiency of Savage Beliefs

With all this, in order to do justice to Robertson Smith, Durkheim, and their
school, we have to admit that they have brought out a number of relevant features of
primitive religion. Above all, by the very exaggeration of the sociological aspect of
primitive faith they have set forth a number of most important questions : Why are most
religious acts in primitive societies performed collectively and in public ? What is the
part of society in the establishment of the rules of moral conduct ? Why are not only
morality but also belief, mythology, and all sacred tradition compulsory to all the
members of a primitive tribe ? In other words, why is there only one body of religious
beliefs in each tribe, and why is no difference of opinion ever tolerated ?

(Magic Science and Religion, Malinowski, in Science Religion and

Reality, ed. by Needham, 1925, pages 52 – 57)

This is a very important piece of text for our purposes, and an extremely
distasteful piece of work to have to examine, a more corrupt example of science could not
exist. We have been arguing that Durkheim performed an important service in the war of
religion against science by acting as a staging post in the subversion of the genuine
science of the social organism which had dominated sociological science in the
nineteenth century. Here we have the most perfect example of just how the next
generation of priests disguised as scientists developed the work begun by Durkheim. The
subtitle referring to society as the substance of God is a most delightful configuration of
words, as near perfect as any I have ever seen, save my own, and being derived from the
most famous idea produced by Durkheim we can understand why such a close
approximation to a true scientific idea would be found in this context, even though it is
not at all intended as a scientific statement, but rather as a guide to the furtherance of the
war against science as enabled by Durkheim.
We are told that Durkheim showed that “the Stuff all things religious are made of,
are nothing more nor less than Society divinised.”, which is oh so close to our genuinely
scientific assertion that the word ‘God’ names the superorganic being of which we are all
a part. The difference between ourselves and Durkheim is that while our terminology is
strictly scientific, Durkheim’s is exclusively political, and as such strictly religious, and
the antithesis of a scientific statement. Any idea is political when it validates the idea of
the individual as an end in themselves, conversely, any idea that is unbiased by personal
motives, whether right or wrong, has the nature of scientific logic informing its approach.
The use Malinowski makes of Durkheim taking the true scientific conception of the
social organism and transposing it into a political form, derived from the will of
individuals understood as a end in themselves, is plain for all to see, as Malinowski
ridicules Durkheim’s logic by developing a self consistent political argument which
makes the elements of social structure into a series of discrete packages serving
individual needs, exactly as Durkheim makes inevitable by asserting that society is the
substance worshipped by people in their religious activities, rather than saying that
society is a living organic entity, in which religion constitutes the essence derived from
human corporate nature, an essence produced by the evolved physiology of linguistic
communication. So that religion is the bonding information of the superorganism that
locks individuals unwittingly into the social structure that human physiology evolved to
create, exactly as the pheromone based language of ants locks ants into the
superorganism that ant physiology evolved to form.
There is no avoiding the logic that religion exists to bond social structure, so the
struggle to take control of the science of society involved ensuring that society was made
to serve the needs of individuals, rather than having individuals existing to serve the
social being. So this is what we see Malinowski employing his lying tongue to achieve,
to make religion serve the individual, who cannot be made sense of in Durkheim’s plan
of society as a religious structure. It is all so much garbage as to be sickening to have to
read, it is as if when reading about the law we had to study the criminal self justification
on a par with the testament of the law maker who is supposed to be putting the case of the
victim, so that we would have to read the basis upon which a person sees themselves as
having the right to rob, rape and murder. In law of course the criminal does not get a say,
and in science the priest should not have a say either, but this is why the priest has been
transformed into a scientist in the shape of a sociologist like Durkheim, or an
anthropologist like Malinowski. All in all this results in a vile piece of work, but still
interesting, and a valuable piece in the context of our effort to understand how the war
against science has been carried forward during the course of recent times, at the
beginning of which, a couple or three centuries ago, science spelt certain doom for
religion.
$
Sunday, 02 March 2008, this morning the Big Question on BBC 1 was discussing
the existence of heaven and hell, and if they were useful in making us obey the rules set
out by our masters and owners to make us into obedient slaves. All I saw in the minute I
spent watching this tripe was some moronic Muslim saying he lives in fear of going to
hell, and it makes him obedient, followed by an equally revolting Muslim women adding
her disgusting thoughts on the topic. Why do these primitives from an alien place get to
sit on our TV screens in the shape of our identity, using our English voices as their own,
yet speaking of things no English person would be capable of even thinking of because
we left the damned stone age behind us over two centuries ago ! This is Hitler’s legacy
to the Jews, to hand our territory back to the damn bastards that shaft us, and rule us by
making us timid, pathetic, ignorant worms. This is the purpose of the world wars, to
fragment our social biomass and introduce an alien primitive into our fabric to reduce us
back into the tame substance we use to be before science released us from our inner
bonds of ignorance. It is interesting to see Malinowski talking about the one mind
imposed on all in primitive society, here we see how his own work is designed to allow
the same conditions to prevail in our modern society with an equal force by cleansing
knowledge of the one true element and then letting all ideas flow freely thereafter in the
freedom permitted in a world that says we can know nothing, lets see a later essay that
promotes the ideal of ignorance that is so important in any theocracy. There weren’t any
bloody Muslims in our society when I was a kid, not so you would know, although where
I grew is taken over by them now, but even though I live in a corner of old England still
free of this poison, just starting to trickle in, and that no accident as hundreds of cheap
accommodation is built to make homes for city overspill no doubt with exactly this
intention in mind of poisoning the whole of society with this terrible religious identity,
anyway, already we see these damned Muslims ruling our society with their horrible
identity. I am no Islamophobe, I hate all religion, but if we said we hate war, or fascists,
we would be bound to name the guise in which I most reviled enemy comes calling, and
so it must be, the Muslim is the vanguard of Jewish fascist power in Europe at this time.
Of course the Muslim could not exist here without the Christian fascist that is the face of
ownership in these territories of superorganic form, but still the Muslim is the frontline in
the war of homogenisation aimed at remaking the biomass of the continent in slavery to
the Jewish identity.
 But if we recoil from this vitriolic attack on good people, for certainly the
individual Christian, Jew or Muslim are just regular folk, we must keep in mind this is all
about the war between religion and science and the fact that we do not live in the free
world we are programmed to think we live in, and if this does no bother you then you
will condemn me for my manner of attack. But in the selection from Needham below we
see a telling sentence in which we are told that religion cannot die, and science cannot
replace religion :

“Positive philosophy, by systematising science, aims at realising the intellectual

unity of human knowledge. Yet the intellect is powerless to create or to preserve
the social bond. The feelings alone can really unite men. Religion which, in the
past, had, above all egoistic theories, strengthened the social bond, could and must
still fulfil that duty.”

This statement could be taken straight from Hitler’s Mein Kampf if sentiment is
all we desire to emulate, but they are the words of a team of scientists and philosophers
dedicated to the subversion of science in the name of religion. The sentiment expressed
here is true of course, this is what religion does, it creates the fabric of the superorganism,
and if we know this we destroy religion by making it impossible for religion to be the
basis of our ‘feelings’, and so we destroy the superorganism, we destroy society. And the
tragedy is that we cannot replace religion with a true body of knowledge ....... or can we ?
The problem is that nature has so made us that we are subject of a master identity, that is
the Jewish identity, and it is the function of this identity to ensure that we cannot supplant
it, so how can we ever know if we could live without religion, the existence of Jews
means we have no chance. But, to be fair, it seems unlikely that society can exist without
a master identity coordinating the organization of social structure toward a common goal.
Therefore, my savage attack upon Muslim aliens who have poisoned our world is futile,
and can only be likened to the ranting of a Chanute beseeching the tide to turn. Except I
am not making a request, I am making an observation. My work is a cry, a cry of sorrow
for the lost world of our great British society, built on freedom, that I was born into, as its
light was going out.

__________________

3. POSITIVISM AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

The speculative caprices of the romantic spirit led to a reaction against

metaphysics and to an over-valuation of objective science with its positive social
advances as against the subjectivism of the individual who sought freedom to create a
world for himself. It is not merely by chance that the Positivism of Auguste Comte bears
a sociological imprint, because the world of human society is the same as the world of
science, with its objective laws which can be controlled by all, and which reasserts itself
against the romantic individualism of sentiment which recognises no law outside itself.
Auguste Comte, however, did not wish to banish the feelings, but merely to deprive them
of all arbitrary character and therefore to make them emerge from the close and
uncontrollable intimacy of the subject in order to consider them in their social aspects,
which could be observed objectively. From such a point of view religion could be, and
had to be, preserved. Positive philosophy, by systematising science, aims at realising the
intellectual unity of human knowledge. Yet the intellect is powerless to create or to
preserve the social bond. The feelings alone can really unite men. Religion which, in the
past, had, above all egoistic theories, strengthened the social bond, could and must still
fulfil that duty. It was necessary, however, to purify the traditional religions from their
negative and decaying elements, in order to leave in them only the positive, human, and
indestructible element. God and immortality were to be the two dogmas in which the
fundamental content of all religions was to be summed up. It remained to seek their
positive significance. The idea of God was at bottom that of a universal, immense, and
eternal Being, with whom human souls communicate, and who fills them with the power
to conquer their selfish tendencies in order to harmonise and reunite them in Himself.
The positive significance of immortality is to be found in the fact that it allows a
participation in the eternal life of the Divine Being to the just who have truly loved God
and their neighbour in this life. Now the idea of Humanity is the positive notion which
corresponds to both these demands. The traditional religions, purified of their
metaphysical elements, are thus transformed into the religion of Humanity, which takes
the place of God.

4. CAUSES WHICH FAVOURED THE PREVALENCE OF POSITIVISM

Positivism held sway in the world of culture for about fifty years down to the year
1870, by reason of the favourable atmosphere for its development which was created by
the advances of science. Let us deal with the most important of these.
I. The atomic theory, with its principle of the conservation of matter and of the
equivalence of the weight of the compound with that of its elements in all chemical
changes, built itself up on solid experimental foundations and reasserted the ancient
aphorism of materialism : “nothing is created and nothing is destroyed.”
2. The discovery of the law of the conservation of energy, according to which all
forms of energies, such as heat, electric energy, and chemical energy, can be transformed
into motion and vice versa, and according to which the same quality of mechanical power
is always equal to a certain quantity of those forms of energies, brought forward a new
argument in favour of materialism and the mechanical conception of the world which
explains all phenomena by the laws of motion.
3. The progress of physiology showed that the chemical changes of organisms, the
exchanges between these and their surroundings, and the relations between animal heat
and muscular labour, enter also into the great law of the conservation of energy.
4. The theory of evolution gave rise to the hope that it would be possible to
explain on mechanical lines not merely the origin and transformation of living species,
but also the genesis of psychic life and human society, eliminating the intervention of
supernatural causes.
5. Psychology, by becoming an experimental science, brought out the connection
between psychic phenomena and the functioning of the nervous system, and led to the
hope that it would be possible to formulate mathematically with necessitatory laws even
the life of consciousness, which until then had been the impregnable rock of spiritual
theories.
6. Pathological psychology, by experimenting on hypnotic phenomena, on the
subconscious mind and on changes in personality, and by establishing their affinity with
mystic phenomena, seemed to take from the latter their character of supernatural
revelations.
7. Historical, ethnological, and sociological studies of primitive religions
explained such phenomena as being due to the same natural, biological, and
psychological causes as explained other social facts. Of special note was the school of
Durkheim, which, overturning the social philosophy of Comte, regarded religion as a
deification of society, brought into existence through the individual consciousness at
solemn moments in the collective life.
8. The historical criticism of the Gospels, carried out on scientific lines, and the
study of the historical formation of dogmas, helped to shake the belief in supernatural
revelation.

5. BEGINNINGS OF THE REACTION AGAINST NATURALISM

While science was thus following its ascending curve, the germs of reaction
against naturalism were coming to maturity in its own bosom.
1. The theory of evolution called attention to the new qualities which arise in the
process of time. How can mechanics, which are the science of eternal laws, and which
deal only with facts in their changeless aspect which is repeated time after time in the
same manner—how can they deal with those novelties through which the evolution of the
world is being accomplished ? Auguste Comte, in his classification of the sciences, had
already laid down the impossibility of reducing the more complex phenomena with which
the more concrete sciences deal to the level of the more simple phenomena of the more
abstract sciences. Boutroux, with his theory of probability, was to insist later on this
impossibility of deducing new qualitative forms from the inferior grades of fact, such as
physical and chemical properties from geometrical properties, life from physico-chemical
phenomena, or biological products from physical facts. Every new quality which is added
to existence is a new creation which is outside the determination of laws.
The theory of evolution, in short, by enforcing the consideration of the world
from the aspect of concrete historical development, showed the insufficiency of abstract
mechanical conceptions and, in general, of all abstract rationalism, through which reality
is to be found in a system of types, of immutable beings, and of eternal relationships
outside the bounds of time, progress, and development. Reality no longer appeared as a
closed system, but as a perennial action, and as an irreversible process in its real duration,
which possesses creative efficacy (Bergson).
2. The conception of science also was transfigured by the theory of evolution. The
intellect, like all the other organs of life, was considered as a means of adaptation to
surroundings, as a weapon in the struggle for existence, as a useful instrument for the
preservation and development of life. Like all other organs, it is not something fixed or
immutable, but subject to modifications in connection with new conditions of life. The
intellectual categories are not for that reason stereotyped forms a priori, having a value of
necessary universality, but mutable and relative forms.

(Science and Religion in the Nineteenth Century, Antonio Aliotta, in

Needham, pages 153 – 156)

Note these bits –

Of special note was the school of Durkheim, which, overturning the social
philosophy of Comte, regarded religion as a deification of society, brought into
existence through the individual consciousness at solemn moments in the
collective life.

BEGINNINGS OF THE REACTION AGAINST NATURALISM

The use if the word ‘naturalism’ in this context makes its meaning synonymous
with the word ‘science’, it is sheer insanity to speak of a reaction within science against
naturalism, that is like saying that the legal system reacted as the existence of law !

Auguste Comte, in his classification of the sciences, had already laid down the
impossibility of reducing the more complex phenomena with which the more
concrete sciences deal to the level of the more simple phenomena of the more
abstract sciences.
This section shows the urgency of the desire to show that we cannot have
knowledge, we can only ever be faced by the unknowable, vital for religion to exist.

The conception of science also was transfigured by the theory of evolution. The
intellect, like all the other organs of life, was considered as a means of adaptation
to surroundings, as a weapon in the struggle for existence, as a useful instrument
for the preservation and development of life
This passage uses the fraudulent science of Darwin to good effect by making
features of animals serve the existence of the struggling individual, but this idea, as
absurd as it is, could just as well be used to make the intellect a feature of a superorganic
being.

__________

8. When the first enthusiasm aroused by mathematical formulations of

psychic phenomena had disappeared, the discussions concerning the value of the
law of Weber and Fechner, and concerning the methods of measuring in
experimental psychology, clearly revealed the fact that the conception of measure
could not have the same value in this field as in the physical field. Psychic facts
are qualitatively different, and therefore cannot be directly measured with regard
to each other. The law of the conservation of quantity has no significance in the
spiritual life, but is rather a perennial creation of new qualities. Every moment of
our interior life has, in its concreteness, its own original physiognomy, which
evades all generic schemes of quantitative formulae. (Bergson.)

6. THE CRISIS OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLECTUALISM : AGNOSTICISM

Some of the foregoing observations have shown us that there was a

profound contradiction in the very bosom of the theory of evolution, which was
the pet idea of Positivism. That is to say, they have shown the contrast between
the mechanical conception of the world, according to which everything is settled
ab aeterno in a changeless system of mathematical relations outside of time, and
the historic vision of reality in its concrete development, according to which time
has a living efficacy and new forms of existence continually arise which were not
contained in the preceding phases The one is the world of the foreseeable, the
other of the unforeseeable. The one is the world of homogeneous quantity, the
other is the world of heterogeneous qualities, because evolution has no sense of
the purely quantitative point of view, in which nothing new ever arises, but
implies stages of development which are qualitatively different. The one is the
world considered in its objectivity, where all facts are on the same level as terms
of fixed relations and of the same laws which explain equally the fall of a stone
and the birth of a man. The other is the world of a hierarchy of beings ascending
higher, which presupposes a criterion of subjective valuation, a term of
comparison which is considered as the highest step in the evolutionary scale, and
in relation to which the lower steps are arranged. This difference was to finish
towards the close of the nineteenth century with the triumph of the world of
heterogeneous quality and subjective valuation over that of quantity, of the
historic vision over the mechanical conception. In the system of Spencer we find
the welding of the two worlds and the attempt to make the historical process of
development fit into the Procrustean bed of the formulae of universal mechanics.
In this welding of two opposite conceptions which are ill-fitted for lying together,
lies the crisis of scientific intellectualism which finds its expression in
agnosticism. At bottom it is a confession of the impossibility of enclosing within
mechanical schemes the life of the experience in its richness, and of
comprehending and exhausting in one finite concept the inexhaustible dynamic
infinity of the spirit and of the universe. This is fatal to every kind of
intellectualism. Let us try to consider it.
How does intellectualism advance ? Its method is conceptual abstraction.
To explain, says Spencer, means to collect similarities of fact, to include them in
more and more general classes, until we obtain a law, a principle common to all.
This law is for Spencer the law of the conservation of energy. Now, in such a
way, by abstracting from the experience of concrete facts the common and
persistent elements, we eliminate the variable aspects, the singular physiognomy
of events. That which is enclosed in our formulae is not the whole reality, but
 only some fragments of it. The living continuity of experience is broken when we
engrave upon it, with precise limits, stable things exactly determined, which can
be fixed by means of equal concepts for all. This purpose is served quite well by
the quantitative consideration, which cancels the differences and reduces
everything to a texture homogeneous with the schemes of space and time,
conceived as abstractions, as an alignment of uniform points and moments.

(Ibid. pages 159 – 161)

This section is taken to indicate the extraordinary lengths to which the priests of
science are driven to castrate the simple beauty of science as the sole means of knowing
anything about existence. All this crap about what mechanics says and what evolution
means, and therefore does not mean, what utter shit ! All of this is fine if we want to
drive ourselves into a place where we know nothing, which is exactly what the priest
wants so that they can going saying that we know everything when we know what they
say is true, or at least what they say is as good as anything else because there is no way of
knowing anything. But the one simple fact about science is that it is self evidently the
only way to know everything and it is not possible to conceive of anything that cannot be
known by applying a scientific method to its study. So, if we want to know, if we want
science, then we are obliged to begin by accepting that science can tell us everything and
then we look for answers that bear this out, answers which makes sense in scientific
terms, such as the idea that humans are animals like any other and as such humans
evolved. Once we accept this undeniable fact we only need conceive of some means of
making sense of our existence in a manner that conforms to this fact, and this leads us
toward one simple fact, humans are a superorganic mammal who share a common nature
with other superorganic forms of animal whose physiology evolved to bring into
existence a living structure at the level of social organization.
 Chapter Eight

Excursion into Spencerism

It is time to look at Spencer. Spencer was just as much committed to the idea of
the social organism as Comte, between the two of them they are the foremost authors of
this idea whose work we can examine in English. I must say that anyone wishing to write
a history of the idea of the social organism has made a pretty poor job of it if they do
nothing to attend to Spencer, if they are an English speaking author, and they have
committed a strange act of selection if they have not examined the three major
continental authors of the later nineteenth and early twentieth century, namely Lilienfeld,
Schaffle and Worms. We have seen that Maclay did just this and his excuse was that he
found the French school of though superior But this is absurd, we may as well say we
like the history of the Japanese best and so we have based our English history book
mainly on Japanese history ! The fact is that Durkheim is not a forerunner of the idea of
the social organism, not in any way shape or form, the phrase appears nowhere in his
work, and he makes no attempt to interpret society as an organism, as we have said the
man acts as a means of severing the link between modern religious sociology which
dominates academia, and early scientific sociology as initiated by Comte and his
eighteenth century predecessors. Since we find Maclay’s own explanation for his
inexplicable behaviour worthless we are obliged to think of some underlying explanation
that is plausible. I have always though of Maclay as part of the academic framework
seeking to defend religion from science, his book appearing at a particularly traumatic
time following the publication of Wilson’s Sociobiology in 1975. The fact is that it is of
immense frustration to me that I cannot access the ideas of Lilienfeld and Schaffle, even
though I have some of their works in German, and the same goes for Worms who was
French, so for me I would like to have had translations of these authors who were ignored
in their own day by the English speaking world. It seems to me that any friend of the
idea would want to make good this act of treachery by the keepers of our knowledge of
that period, and anyone who does not at least express a wish to do this must be an enemy
of the idea continuing the work of deception.

Maclay did not even look at Spencer, who was prolific on the topic, and who took
a very different tack to that of Comte. The suggestion that Spencer got his line of sight
on the idea that society was organic from the newly emerging biological ideas on the
body certainly comes to the forefront of our thoughts when we read the relevant parts of
his Principles of Sociology. I have to say that Spencer was so prolific and so popular an
author that no matter how I try I find it impossible to be certain what he wrote, never
mind when. So, for example, I have noted already that Keith gives some important
details about the origin of Spencer’s ideas in his short essay in a work that is now rare
and difficult to obtain, the R. P. A. Annual for 1924 in which he mentions that Spencer
revealed his idea of the social organism in 1860, but Keith gives no more details than this
date, much to my frustration. However, while working my way through my copy of
volume one of Principles of Sociology with a pencil rubber I came upon this passage
which pointed me in the right direction, indication the Westminster Review to be the
place Keith is talking about, and it also provides lots of other good stuff for our purpose
of examining Spencer’s relationship to the idea of the social organism :

CHAPTER XII.

QUALIFICATIONS AND SUMMARY.

§ 268. ONE who made the analogies between individual organization and social
organization his special subject, might carry them further in several directions.
He might illustrate the general truth that as fast as structure approaches
completeness, modifiability diminishes and growth ends. The finished animal, moulded
in all details, resists change by the sum of those forces which have evolved its parts into
their respective shapes ; and the finished society does the like. In either case results, at
length, rigidity. Every organ of the one and institution of the other becomes, as maturity
is neared, more coherent and definite, and offers a greater obstacle to alterations, required
either by increase of size or variation of conditions.
Then he might enlarge on the fact that, as in individual organisms so in social
organisms, after the structures proper to the type have fully evolved there presently
begins a slow decay. He could not, indeed, furnish satisfactory proof of this ; since
among ancient societies, essentially militant in their activities, dissolution by conquest
habitually prevented the cycles of changes from being completed ; and since modern
societies are passing through their cycles. But the minor parts of modem societies,
especially during those earlier times when local development was little implicated with
general development, would yield him evidence. He might instance the fact that ancient
corporate towns, with their guilds and regulations of industry, gradually made more
numerous and stringent, slowly dwindled, and gave way before towns in which the
absence of privileged classes permitted freedom of industry : the rigid aid structure
having its function usurped by a plastic new one. In each institution, private or public, he
might point to the ever-multiplying usages and bye-laws, severally introduced to fit the
actions to the passing time, but eventually making adaptation to a coming time
impracticable. And he might infer that a like fate awaits each entire society, which, as its
adjustments to present circumstances are finished, loses power to re-adjust itself to the
circumstances of the future : eventually disappearing, if not by violence, then by a decline
consequent on inability to compete with younger and more modifiable societies.
Were his speculative audacity sufficient, he might end by alleging parallelisms
between the processes of reproduction in the two cases. Among primitive societies which
habitually multiply by fission, but are by conquest occasionally fused, group with group,
after which there is presently a recurrence of fission, he might, trace an analogy to what
happens in the lowest types of organisms, which, multiplying fissiparously, from time to
time reverse the process by that fusion which naturalists call conjugation. Then he might
point out that in either case the larger and stationary types propagate by the dispersion of
germs. Adult organisms which are fixed, send off groups of such units as they are
themselves composed of, to settle down elsewhere and grow into organisms like
themselves, as settled societies send off their groups of colonists. And he might even say
that as union of the germinal group detached from one organism with a group detached
from a similar organism, is either essential to, or conducive to, the vigorous evolution of
a new organism ; so the mixture of colonists derived from one society with others derived
from a kindred society, is, if not essential to, still conducive to, the evolution of a new
society more plastic than the old ones from which the mingled units were derived. But
without committing ourselves to any such further adventurous suggestions, we may leave
the comparison as it stands in preceding chapters.

§ 269. This comparison has justified to a degree that could scarcely have been
anticipated, the idea propounded by certain philosophers and implied even in popular
language. Naturally it happened that this idea took at first crude forms. Let us glance at
some of them.
In the Republic of Plato, asserting the fact, not even yet adequately recognised,
that “the States are as the men are ; they grow out of human characters,” Socrates is
represented as arguing—“then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of
individual minds will also be five :” an absurd corollary from a rational proposition.
Division of labour is described as a social need ; but it is represented rather as having to
be established than as establishing itself. Throughout, the conception, like indeed to
conceptions that prevail still, is that society may be artificially arranged thus or thus.
Alleging such likeness between the State and the citizen that from the institutions of the
one may be deduced the faculties of the other, Plato, with the belief that the States,
growing “out of human characters,” are “as the men are,” joins the belief that these
States, with characters thus determined, can yet determine the characters of their citizens.
Chiefly, however, the erroneous nature of the analogy held by Plato to exist between the
individual and the State, he shows by comparing reason, passion or spirit, and desire, in
the one, to counsellors, auxiliaries, and traders in the other. Not to the mutually-
dependent parts of the bodily organization are the mutually-dependent parts of the
political organization supposed to be analogous, but rather to the co-operating powers of
the mind. The conception of Hobbes in one respect only, approaches nearer to a rational
conception. Like Plato he regards social organization not as natural but as factitious :
propounding, as he does, the notion of a social contract as originating governmental
institutions, and as endowing the sovereign with irrevocable authority. The analogy as
conceived by him is best expressed in his own words. He says :—“For by art is created
that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, in Latin CIVITAS, which is but
an artificial man ; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose
protection and defence it was intended ; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul,
as giving life and motion to the whole body ; the magistrates, and other officers of
judicature, artificial joints ; reward and punishment, by which fastened to the seat of the
sovereignty every joint and member is moved to perform his duty, are the nerves, that do
the same in the body natural ;” etc. Here, in so far as the comparison drawn is in the
main between the structures of the two, is it less indefensible than that of Plato ; which is
a comparison between structures in the one and functions in the other. But the special
analogies named are erroneous ; as is also, in common with that of Plato, the general
analogy ; since it is alleged between the organization of a society and the organization of
a human being—an analogy far too special. Living at a later time, when biologists had
revealed to some extent the principles of organization, and recognizing social structures
as not artificially made but naturally developed, M. Comte avoided these errors ; and, not
comparing the social organism to an individual organism of any one kind, held simply
that the principles of organization are common to societies and animals. He regarded each
stage of social progress as a product of preceding stages ; and he saw that the evolution of
structures advances from the general to the special. He did not, however, entirely escape
the early misconception that institutions are artificial arrangements ; for he inconsistently
held it possible for societies to be forthwith re-organized in conformity with the
principles of his “Positive Philosophy.”
Here let it once more be distinctly asserted that there exist no analogies between
the body politic and a living body, save those necessitated by that mutual dependence of
parts which they display in common. Though, in foregoing chapters, sundry comparisons
of social structures and functions to structures and functions in the human body, have
been made, they have been made only because structures and functions in the human
body furnish familiar illustrations of structures and functions in general. The social
organism, discrete instead of concrete, asymmetrical instead of symmetrical, sensitive in
all its units instead of having a single sensitive centre, is not comparable to any particular
type of individual organism, animal or vegetal. All kinds of creatures are alike in so far as
each exhibits co-operation among its components for the benefit of the whole, and this
trait, common to them, is a trait common also to societies. Further, among individual
organisms, the degree of co-operation measures the degree of evolution ; and this general
truth, too, holds among social organisms. Once more, to effect increasing co-operation,
creatures of every order show us increasingly-complex appliances for transfer and mutual
influence ; and to this general characteristic, societies of every order furnish a
corresponding characteristic. These, then are the analogies alleged : community in the
fundamental principles of organization is the only community asserted. *

* This emphatic repudiation of the belief that there is any special analogy between the
social organism and the human organism, I have a motive for making. A rude outline of the
general conception elaborated in the preceding eleven chapters, was published by me in the
Westminster Review for January, 1860. In it I expressly rejected the conception of Plato and
Hobbes, that there is a likeness between social organization and the organization of a man ;
saying that “there is no warrant whatever for assuming this.” Nevertheless, a criticism on the
article in the Saturday Review, ascribed to me the idea which I had thus distinctly condemned.

§ 270. But now let us drop this alleged parallelism between individual
organizations and social organizations. I have used the analogies elaborated, but as a
scaffolding to help in building up a coherent body of sociological inductions. Let us take
away the scaffolding : the inductions will stand by themselves.
We saw that societies are aggregates which grow ; that in the various types of
them there are great varieties in the growths reached ; that types of successively larger
sizes result from the aggregation and re-aggregation of those of smaller sizes ; and that
this increase by coalescence, joined with interstitial increase, is the process through
which have been formed the vast civilized nations.
Along with increase of size in societies goes increase of structure. Primitive
hordes are without established distinctions of parts. With growth of them into tribes
habitually come some unlikenesses ; both in the powers and occupations of their
members. Unions of tribes are followed by more unlikenesses, governmental and
industrial—social grades running through the whole mass, and contrasts between the
differently occupied parts in different localities. Such differentiations multiply as the
compounding progresses. They proceed from the general to the special. First the broad
division between ruling and ruled ; then within the ruling part divisions into political,
religious, military, and within the ruled part divisions into food-producing classes and
handi-craftsmen ; then within each of these divisions minor ones, and so on.
Passing from the structural aspect to the functional aspect, we note that so long as
all parts of a society have like natures and activities, there is hardly any mutual
dependence, and the aggregate scarcely forms a vital whole. As its parts assume different
functions they become dependent on one another, so that injury to one hurts others ; until,
in highly-evolved societies, general perturbation is caused by derangement of any
portion. This contrast between undeveloped and developed societies, arises from the fact
that with increasing specialization of functions comes increasing inability in each part to
perform the functions of other parts.
The organization of every society begins with a contrast between the division
which carries on relations, habitually hostile, with environing societies, and the division
which is devoted to procuring necessaries of life ; and during the earlier stages of
development these two divisions constitute the whole. Eventually there arises an
intermediate division serving to transfer products and influences from part to part. And in
all subsequent stages, evolution of the two earlier systems of structures depends on
evolution of this additional system.
While the society as a whole has the character of its sustaining system determined
by the character of its environment, inorganic and organic, the respective parts of this
system differentiate in adaptation to local circumstances ; and, after primary industries
have been thus localized and specialized, secondary industries dependent on them arise in
conformity with the same principle. Further, as fast as societies become compounded and
re-compounded, and the distributing system develops, the parts devoted to each kind of
industry, originally scattered, aggregate in the most favourable localities ; and the
localized industrial structures, unlike the governmental structures, grow regardless of the
original lines of division.
Increase of size, resulting from the massing of groups, necessitates means of
communication ; both for achieving combined offensive and defensive actions, and for
exchange of products. Faint tracks, then paths, rude roads, finished roads, successively
arise ; and as fast as intercourse is thus facilitated, there is a transition from direct barter
to trading carried on by a separate class ; out of which evolves a complex mercantile
agency of wholesale and retail distributors. The movement of commodities effected by
this agency, beginning as a slow flux to and re-flux from certain places at long intervals,
passes into rhythmical, regular, rapid currents ; and materials for sustentation distributed
hither and thither, from being few and crude become numerous and elaborated. Growing
efficiency of transfer with greater variety of transferred products, increases the mutual
dependence of parts at the same time that it enables each part to fulfil its function better.
Unlike the sustaining system, evolved by converse with the organic and inorganic
environments, the regulating system is evolved by converse, offensive and defensive,
with environing societies. In primitive headless groups temporary chieftainship results
from temporary war ; chronic hostilities generate permanent chieftainship ; and gradually
from the military control results the civil control. Habitual war, requiring prompt
combination in the actions of parts, necessitates subordination. Societies in which there is
little subordination disappear, and leave outstanding those in which subordination is
great ; and so there are produced, societies in which the habit fostered by war and
surviving in peace, brings about permanent submission to a government. The centralized
regulating system thus evolved, is in early stages the sole regulating system. But in large
societies which have become predominantly industrial, there is added a decentralized
regulating system for the industrial structures ; and this, at first subject in every way to
the original system, acquires at length substantial independence. Finally there arises for
the distributing structures also, an independent controlling agency.
Societies fall firstly into the classes of simple, compound, doubly-compound,
trebly-compound ; and from the lowest the transition to the highest is through these
stages. Otherwise, though less definitely, societies may be grouped as militant and
industrial ; of which the one type in its developed form is organized on the principle of.
compulsory co-operation, while the other in its developed form is organized on the
principle of voluntary co-operation. The one is characterized not only by a despotic
central power, but also by unlimited political control of personal conduct ; while the other
is characterized not only by a democratic or representative central power, but also by
limitation of political control over personal conduct.
Lastly we noted the corollary that change in the predominant social activities
brings metamorphosis. If, where the militant type has not elaborated into so rigid a form
as to prevent change, a considerable industrial system arises, there come mitigations of
the coercive restraints characterizing the militant type, and weakening of its structures.
Conversely, where an industrial system largely developed has established freer social
forms, resumption of offensive and defensive activities causes reversion towards the
militant type.

§ 271. And now, summing up the results of this general survey, let us observe
the extent to which we are prepared by it for further inquiries.
The many facts contemplated unite in proving that social evolution forms a part of
evolution at large. Like evolving aggregates in general, societies show integration, both
by simple increase of mass and by coalescence and re-coalescence of masses. The change
from homogeneity to heterogeneity is multitudinously exemplified ; up from the simple
tribe, alike in all its parts, to the civilized nation, full of structural and functional
unlikenesses. With progressing integration and heterogeneity goes increasing coherence.
We see the wandering group dispersing, dividing, held together by no bonds ; the tribe
with parts made more coherent by subordination to a dominant man ; the cluster of tribes
united in a political plexus under a chief with sub-chiefs ; and so on up to the civilized
nation, consolidated enough to hold together for a thousand years or more.
Simultaneously comes increasing definiteness. Social organization is at first vague ;
advance brings settled arrangements which grow slowly more precise ; customs pass into
laws which, while gaining fixity, also become more specific in their applications to
varieties of actions ; and all institutions, at first confusedly intermingled, slowly separate,
at the same time that each within itself marks off more distinctly its component
structures. Thus in all respects is fulfilled the formula of evolution. There is progress
towards greater size, coherence, multiformity, and definiteness.
 Besides these general truths, a number of special truths have been disclosed by
our survey. Comparisons of societies in their ascending grades, have made manifest
certain cardinal facts respecting their growths, structures, and functions—facts respecting
the systems of structures, sustaining, distributing, regulating, of which they are
composed ; respecting the relations of these structures to the surrounding conditions and
the dominant forms of social activities entailed ; and respecting the metamorphoses of
types caused by changes in the activities. The inductions arrived at, thus constituting in
rude outline an Empirical Sociology, show that in social phenomena there is a general
order of co-existence and sequence ; and that therefore social phenomena form the
subject-matter of a science reducible, in some measure at least, to the deductive form.
Guided, then, by the law of evolution in general, and, in subordination to it,
guided by the foregoing inductions, we are now prepared for following out the synthesis
of social phenomena. We must begin with those simplest ones presented by the evolution
of the family.

(Principles of Sociology, Vol. 1, Spencer, 1885, pages 576 – 585)

The most important thing to take away from this passage from Spencer, is his
complete denial of the idea that society is a social organism, he only ever asserts that
society is an organism in so far as mechanisms operate in society of a comparable kind to
those that operate in organisms. Why then does he insist upon calling society a social
organism ? He just wants to have his cake and eat it, like any priest promoting religious
propaganda. In the section quoted below we can see the culmination of this religious
logic, he indicates that there is no such thing as society, there is only the individual, this
is implicit in his assertion that society serves individuals because while individuals are
conscious, societies are not.
Given how mischievous this assessment of Spencer makes him, we can affirm the
suspicions we invariably have when we read any of his work, excluding the sort of detail
such as appears in the lead up to the above selection, where he really lays it on thick that
society is a true living social organism. In addition, as we have mentioned above, this
duplicitous interpretation of Spencer would make sense of any argument there is over
whether he owed any debt to Comte for his sociological ideas. We can see in this
selection that he knew Comte well enough to provide a cursory summation of his ideas,
but if he wanted to mount a full scale attack on Comte’s views then denying any debt to
Comte would be inevitable, and Spencer’s entirely different method of interpreting the
biological nature of the social organism, on the basis of a strictly physiological method,
would make some sense as a method of subverting Comte’s work which does not adopt
this biological approach at all. Spencer is a an analogical extremist, he takes the first
sophisticated scientific works of physiology and overlays them upon social structure and
reads of social structure accordingly. Although, even as I try and wrestle these thoughts
out of my own brain, I find them reaching, fanciful, and in need of supporting evidence.
I am saying that Spencer simply sort to mimic Comte in a stupid manner in order to
destroy him, it is a strategy that people use in the competition of everyday life, so it is not
inconceivable, but it is a dramatic route for a philosopher to take, to set themselves up as
a philosopher in order to undermine the work of someone else. But it could be a
spontaneous reaction to a philosophical argument, rather than planned and contrived.
Even so the damn philosophers of the nineteenth century, as dedicated to the task as they
appear in terms of devoting their entire lives to it, are worthless, and today their work is
forgotten. It takes so long to discover the right works, to obtain them is often difficult if
not impossible, I cannot afford this effort of reproducing the age in which these people
actually lived, to experience what they experienced as the ideas they responded to and
generated, formed the flux of a living consciousness. So I cannot insist upon such a
radical interpretation as a bare faced subversion of Comte by Spencer, but I do suspect it,
and in a way it is the result.
But what we should be doing from a scientific point of view is seeking to negate
the individuals while focusing on the factors of superorganic being. In this case the
substance of importance is the idea in hand, the idea that humans are a natural
phenomenon that can be tackled as part of a natural science. Comte took this idea to its
heights, and Spencer pushed it beyond reason, so it is the idea that we should be
concerned with, the individual names that carry it are of no consequence whatever in
terms of understanding the physiology of human existence. The fact is that Spencer’s
commitment to individuality has never made any sense in the field of sociology, we see
this conflict being questioned and answered in the postscript below, and Spencer really
did go overboard in his attack on authority vested in social institutions, in favour of
power vested in the person. A fact that was perfectly well understood in his own time by
some of those who observed this absurdity in Spencer’s logic.

POSTSCRIPT TO PART II.

_______

Some remarks made in the Revue Philosophique for May, 1877, by an acute and
yet sympathetic critic, M. Henri Marion, show me the need for adding here an
explanation which may prevent other readers from being puzzled by a seeming
inconsistency.
M. Marion indicates the contrast I have drawn between those individual
organisms in which, along with a developed nutritive system there is an undeveloped
nervous system, and those in which a developed nervous system enables the organism to
co-ordinate its outer actions so as to secure prey and escape enemies : rightly saying that I
class the first as relatively low and the second as relatively high. He then points out that I
regard as analogous to these types of individual organisms, those types of social
organisms which are characterized, the one by a largely-developed sustaining or
industrial system with a feeble regulating or governmental system, and the other by a
less-developed industrial system joined with a centralized governmental system, enabling
the society effectually to combine its forces in conflict with other societies. And he
proceeds to show that though, in classing the types of animals, I put those with
undeveloped nervous systems as low and those with developed nervous systems as high ;
in classing societies I tacitly imply that those with predominant industrial or sustaining
systems are superior to those with highly-centralized and powerful regulating systems.
He says :— “En naturaliste qu’il est, il regarde visiblement comme supérieurs aux autres
les états les plus centralisés.” (III, 516.) And then commenting on the dislike which, as
“an Englishman of the Liberal school,” I show for such centralized societies, and my
admiration for the free, less-governed, industrial societies, he emphasizes the incongruity
by saying :—“Mais bientôt le moraliste en lui combat le naturaliste ; et la liberté
individuelle, principe d’anarchie cependant, trouve en lui un défenseur aussi chaleureux
qu’inattendu.” (ib.)
I regret that when writing the foregoing chapters I omitted to contrast the lives of
individual organisms and of social organisms in such way as to show the origin of this
seeming incongruity. It is this :—Individual organisms, whether low or high, have to
maintain their lives by offensive or defensive activities, or both : to get food and escape
enemies ever remain the essential requirements. Hence the need for a regulating system
by which the actions of senses and limbs may be co-ordinated. Hence the superiority that
results from a centralized nervous apparatus to which all the outer organs are completely
subordinate. It is otherwise with societies. Doubtless during the militant stages of social
evolution, the lives of societies, like the lives of animals, are largely, or even mainly,
dependent on their powers of offence and defence ; and during these stages, societies
having the most centralized regulating systems can use their powers most effectually, and
are thus, relatively to the temporary requirements, the highest. Such requirements,
however, are but temporary. Increase of industrialism and decrease of militancy,
gradually bring about a state in which the lives of societies do not depend mainly on their
powers of dealing offensively and defensively with other societies, but depend mainly on
those powers which enable them to hold their own in the struggles of industrial
competition. So that, relatively to these ultimate requirements, societies become high in
proportion to the evolution of their industrial systems, and not in proportion to the
evolution of those centralized regulating systems fitting them for carrying on wars. In
animals, then, the measure of superiority remains the same throughout, because the ends
to be achieved remain the same throughout ; but in societies the measure of superiority is
entirely changed, because the ends to be achieved are entirely changed.
This answer prepares the way for an answer to a previous objection M. Marion
makes. I have pointed out that whereas, in the individual organism, the component units,
mostly devoid of feeling, carry on their activities for the welfare of certain groups of units
(forming the nervous centres) which monopolize feeling ; in the social organism, all the
units are endowed with feeling. And I have added the corollary that whereas, in the
individual organism, the units exist for the benefit of the aggregate, in the social organism
the aggregate exists for the benefit of the units. M. Marion, after indicating these views,
expresses his astonishment that, having clearly recognized this difference, I afterwards
take so little account of it, and do not regard it as affecting the analogies I draw. The
reply is that my recognition of this profound difference between the ends to be subserved
by individual organizations and by social organizations, causes the seemingly-anomalous
estimation of social types explained above. Social organization is to be considered high in
proportion as it subserves individual welfare, because in a society the units are sentient
and the aggregate insentient ; and the industrial type is the higher because, in that state of
permanent peace to which civilization is tending, it subserves individual welfare better
than the militant type. During the progressive stages of militancy, the welfare of the
aggregate takes precedence of individual welfare, because this depends on preservation of
the aggregate from destruction by enemies ; and hence, under the militant régime, the
individual, regarded as existing for the benefit of the State, has his personal ends
consulted only so far as consists with maintaining the power of the State. But as the
necessity for self-preservation of the society in conflict with other societies, decreases,
the subordination of individual welfare to corporate welfare becomes less ; and finally,
when the aggregate has no external dangers to meet, the organization proper to complete
industrialism which it acquires, conduces to individual welfare in the greatest degree. The
industrial type of society, with its de-centralized structures, is the highest, because it is
the one which most subserves that happiness of the units which is to be achieved by
social organization, as distinguished from that happiness of the aggregate which is to be
achieved by individual organization with its centralized structures.

(Principles of Sociology, Vol. 1, Spencer, pages 586 – 588)

Delving into the body of Spencer’s works where he expounds upon the
physiology of the social organism is, as with Comte in the same context, a real pleasure
for one so infused with a passion for the idea of the social organism as I am. I suppose
that it is possible to be a friend of the idea of the social organism while still being its
worst enemy. In this work we have found this curious phenomenon of mutually
antagonistic natures being united in one character, most particularly when we make the
scientist a priest dedicated to the preservation of religion and the destruction of science.
We have argued that the way religion won its war with science was to insinuate its
religiously programmed intellectuals into the academic infrastructure and convert science
into a pseudo science based on the principle of individualism as laid down by Darwin.
So then even when we get men like White leading the way for a true science of humanity
all we really get is someone who cannot help furthering the war against science waged in
the name of religion.
There is a fundamental reason why this dualism exists in the field of knowledge
whereby the scientist can be subverted into a true priest. This reason is the ultimate
proof that humans are indeed a social organism and there is no such thing as an individual
person. We have seen that identity has no structural form, identity is a colour, a colour is
a package of information, therefore the name ‘priest’ or ‘scientist’ is nothing more than a
colour, and as such it is possible for the colour ‘priest’ to supplant the colour ‘scientist’ if
conditions allow this to happen, and the whole purpose of a social structure is to ensure
that this can happen. In the context of this discussion, which is human society, the word
we use for the colour of social identity is ‘knowledge’. There we have the knowledge
colour ‘priest’, and the knowledge colour ‘scientist’. At this point in this tricky
explanation the thing to make sure we avoid is thinking that in the act of substitution
what is needed is for the priest to adopt the knowledge colour of the scientist and then
substitute themselves for an opposite individual. This cannot be how the physiology of
the superorganism works. The process of substitution must come from the central
organization of knowledge, the colour of knowledge must be fixed at the centre, and this
is why the British arm of the Jewish theocracy developed the Darwinian spectrum with
which all academics have to be programmed in order to be accepted within the academic
establishment. So the knowledge colour comes from within the centralised order, and it
is acquired by individuals as they grow up. Believing yourself to be an individual is the
basis of this system so there is no issue in this respect, but the social structure ensures that
only those people who obey the dictates of the central authority have a voice.
In making out this argument we of course entirely discount the ludicrous
suggestion that individuals are conscious while societies are not, individuals are no more
conscious than are societies, this point is made amply by Turner when he indicates that it
is possible for an outside to observe collective behaviours and interpret it in real
functional terms which it is impossible for the participants to be aware of. Why should
we imagine that the same does not apply to ourselves ? At this time, today being
25/02/08, BBC 2 afternoon programming has included a show called The People
Watchers, which I have not watched, but it is based on the tricks psychologists have
developed over years to examine the extent to which the individual is malleable in social
context or under the influence of a social pressure on a one to one or small group basis.
Freudian notions of an unconscious dictating behaviour is a typical piece of religious
subversion of the scientific fact that there is no such thing as an individual, Freud makes
out that the subconscious programme that exists to run the cellular units of the
superorganism are an attribute of the independent individual, so the war of religion
against the consciousness of the individual is relentless.
And so, as we were saying, there is this curious sense in which opposite qualities
unite when the focal point of knowledge is met with, this is like the nucleus of knowledge
where positive and negative meet, but in the meeting of opposites the resulting expression
of force only gives expression to the positive, that is the deceptive that allows the
individual to bond into the social aggregate, the positive is the religious because the
religious is the identity programme. Of course we use positive in this context in a strictly
materialist sense, not in any moral sense, for the materially positive is the literally
dishonest.
At this focal point of knowledge, where the positive and negative meet, where the
false and the true meet, where religion and science meet, a measure of neutrality also
emerges, and we see this neutrality in the work of anyone who tries to work at the focal
point of knowledge. The neutral element arises because no negative scientific work of
science can ever exist, only negative works of religious science can actually exist in the
public domain, and hence when we look at those works that do exist, like that of Spencer
above, or that of Comte, or anyone else, we are able to find delightful aspects of their
reasoning which simply cannot help being inspired because these people are genuinely
working with the true solution to the ultimate question any human can ever ask, What is
human nature, what does it mean to be human, what does existence mean ? No wonder
that some of the greatest philosophers have dealt with this topic, Plato and Hobbes for
example, as disappointing as any such authors must be for anyone whose sole desire is
for knowledge, for truth, for science, these latter things, as we can see are unattainable,
not because they cannot be known as such, but because they cannot be know because
there is no such thing as a human individual so that we, as people, have no means of
enabling our liberation from the oppression of our corporate nature that makes slaves to
our corporate identity, which is always religious, which is Jewish.
But still, what a delight it is to read these author’s encroachments on
commonsense. I suppose in making out our argument that deception is positive because
it is deception that locks people into the social structure created by knowledge, the
linguistic programme has to be unlimited by any real structure in order to generate a
programme able to embrace a variety of individuals into one identity with in which
people are organized into a complex structure, this argument resonates with that which
we just saw Spencer making use of to explain an apparent incongruity in his own
description of social structures that denotes degrees of positivity, so that he manages to
adjust his assessment of human society to suit the strictly religious, anti-scientific agenda
his philosophy is designed to provide by making modern society serve the individual. Of
course as long as religion exists then politics and religion are per force one and the same
thing, so any apparently, or superficially political argument, is always inherently religious
because it ultimately serves the preservation of the identity political activity is always
subservient to.
Spencer contemptuously dismisses Comte’s considerable efforts to make us of the
idea of the social organism by correctly pointing out the following absurdity :

“He did not, however, entirely escape the early misconception that
institutions are artificial arrangements ; for he inconsistently held it possible for
societies to be forthwith re-organized in conformity with the principles of his
“Positive Philosophy.” ”

But Spencer finds his own ruse to allow society to be made according to man’s personal
needs by saying that political institutions are only positive in so far as they serve the
person by allowing him freedom to make money in trade. A more obscure connection to
the deliberate will of the person this model may be, but it clearly imparts the same sense
of the person being in control as a conscious being.
What then are we saying ? Are we saying that we must make it our express
intention to refute any possibility of humans having any say in the form their world
takes ? Indeed, what else could any sincere philosopher, applying a naturalistic method
to the understanding of human existence do ? It is at this point that we need to bring in
what we may call the ‘mantra of being’ associated with a philosophy of human nature
based on a scientific method, which asserts that “what is, is,” and what is does not change
because knowledge changes. The earth is spinning, and just because people were certain
that a spinning world would mean turmoil on the planet’s surface does not mean that
when it was finally accepted that the earth was spinning that then all chaos broke out as
the fixed features of the surface lost their hold. Likewise, the same applies to the
recognition of our true status as a true superorganism. If we are a superorganism in
which the individual does not exist then this means we are indistinguishable from ants,
some say, we are automatons. This is true, but if this is true if we know it is true then it is
also true when we do not know it, So what the hell ? It is a case of knowledge setting
you free, yet the slave makers manage to make us think knowing the truth is what makes
us slaves, it is a most odd thing, it goes to show how utterly programmed we are by our
cultural, linguistic identity programme.
In making out this argument we do have the complication inherent in our capacity
to generate knowledge as a biological activity. It has been a consistent theme of our
work that language is a force that creates superorganic structure, above we have given the
title Knowledge as Territory to a chapter. Clearly if knowledge is territory, or if
knowledge is identity, and knowledge changes, then territory and identity both become
subject to some degree of displacement. This complication arises because of the two
kinds of linguistic product, the reflective, which represents external reality that is
independent of human existence and the creative which represents the reality generated
by language itself. Language is really all about the creative aspect, but it is founded upon
the reflective aspect, the two are inseparable. Therefore we must qualify our statement
that nothing changes just because knowledge changes, this cannot be right. The fact is
that while the discussion about the nature of the cosmos and the place of the earth in it
was tangled up with physical conceptions about what a moving world would mean, the
real importance of the challenge to conventional ideas was of course the fact that the
creative expression of linguistic force that generates the fabric of social order, known to
us in the mythology of religion, is rooted to reality through ideas about the tangible
world. So that changing ideas about the earth, while this would not dislodge the surface
structures, it necessarily undermined the mythical ideas evolved in connection with social
structures which were the enclave of social authority and power.
And this is precisely the point here, knowing our true nature cannot make us
something that we are not already, but the fact that our society continues to be based on
the age old theocratic order, means that discovering our true nature must dislodge the
mythical dogma of the theocracy that is based upon its own very definite idea of human
nature. This we must admit is a serious problem, science cannot help but destroy
Judaism, and this is why there is a relentless war between Judaism and knowledge. It
was interesting to here Paxman discussing the cost of the current Iraq war on BBC 2’s
Newsnight last night, 25/02/08. They were trying to decide if the massive cost was worth
it, but what they do not understand is that warfare of this kind is a vital ritual of Jewish
power, and the prize of such eternal warfare is the planet itself, and the possession of the
whole human race. The Jews know this in a conscious way, but no one else does,
apparently, it is imbued into Jewish identity, and their slave identities, the Christians and
Muslims, have it imbued into them subliminally in the evangelical portion of their
identity programme that forces them to try and make everyone a slave in their own
image ; what Christians call being free ! And this idiot Nobel prize winning economist
just kept wittering on about the right of people to know what they are spending their
money on in a democracy ; Twat ! Of course the word ‘democracy’ is how Christians
name the political form of the Christian slave society in which the guiding principle is
freedom. Paxman’s economist has no more idea what his words mean than a parrot
would have if it had been taught to say “No taxation without representation, no taxation
without representation, squawk ! squawk !”

Today, 29/02/08, I have been dipping into a book I got from Oxfam yesterday,
which I have already decided must have a chapter to itself, but in which I find this :

But we may be reminded that this is the age of science, and that science
has tried its hand at moral and political philosophy. Perhaps what we want may be
found here. The new knowledge ought surely to have something new to teach us
about the art and philosophy of government. This claim has been made. As
Professor David Ritchie says : ‘Evolution has become not merely a theory but a
creed, not merely a conception of the universe, but a guide to direct us how to
order our lives.’ It is in this aspect that we have to consider the social ethics of
science. Can we find in its teachings a realm of ideas which may form a standard
for social life, to take the place of the supernatural sanctions which are no longer
operative in the nations of the West ? Can we retrace the steps of philosophy to
its earliest beginnings in Ionia, when Thales and his successors sought to find in
the ultimate constitution of matter and the laws of nature a basis for individual
and public morality ?
I do not think that the scientific school has produced any political
philosopher of the first rank. Darwin wisely confined himself to his own subject,
though it was Malthus on Population that first set him thinking on biological
problems. Herbert Spencer, though he does not by any means deserve the
acrimonious aspersions of critics who hate him on political grounds, started with
strong prejudices—those of a Radical dissenter—and never corrected them by
study of earlier writers on political philosophy. His education on this side
remained very scrappy, and it is not difficult to trace some of his leading ideas to
their source in the few books which he had read. ‘Morality,’ he said, ‘is a species
of transcendental physiology.’ The adjective gave admittance to a mystical theory
of ‘life,’ as a quasi-divine force, operating in all nature, from the highest to the
lowest forms—a Plotinian doctrine which he probably borrowed from
S. T. Coleridge. This loan from Platonism was given a peculiar character by
combining it with a doctrine of universal evolution, which was then in the air, and
which Spencer began to hold before the appearance of Darwin’s famous book.
The process of upward development, according to Spencer, is always in the
direction of higher individuation. The higher organisms are more complex and
more specialised. This furnishes him with a teleological standard of value, to
which, as he supposes, all nature tries to conform. By a very superficial reading of
history, he regards militarism as a lower integration of the social organism, and
industrialism as a higher stage—a condition of differentiation. He looked forward
to a time when this (differentiation into independent units should be complete,
after which he hoped that an ‘equilibrium’ would be reached, and the individual
would be free from all external control in a permanent and ‘static’ paradise of
unlimited liberty and low taxes. It is not easy to reconcile this ideal with all that
he says about the social organism, nor to defend his rather absurd analogy
between the State and our bodily frame, with nerves for telegraph wires, and so
on. But it is his justification of competition, as ‘a beneficent private war, which
makes one man strive to stand on the shoulders of another,’ which has made so
many writers of the younger generation treat him as a personal enemy. Only a
middle-class Victorian Englishman could have fallen into the error of contrasting
militarism with industrialism—two systems which, as Germany has shown, may
easily be fellow-workmen and fellow-conspirators. Strauss, who goes even further
than Spencer in his dislike of trade unionism, advising that employers ‘should
send to foreign countries for workmen, and then let the refractory see who will be
able to hold out longest,’ defends military conquest as well as social inequality as
right, because natural, and ridicules those who hope for or expect the abolition of
war. Mr. Clodd sees that militarism and industrial competition are equally war,
though the weapons are different, and thinks that war, in one form or the other, is
a law of nature. ‘Man’s normal state is one of conflict ; further back than we can
 trace, it impelled the defenceless bipeds from whom he sprung to unity, and the
more so because of their relative inferiority in physique to many other animals.
The struggle was ferocious, and under one form or another rages along the line to
this day. “There is no discharge in that war.” It may change its tactics and its
weapons ; the military method may be more or less superseded by the industrial, a
man may be mercilessly starved instead of being mercilessly slain ; but be it war
of camp or markets, the ultimate appeal is to force of brain or muscles, and the
hardest or craftiest win.’ It was indeed plain that the ‘survival of the fittest’ can
only mean that those survive who are fittest to survive, not the fittest by any moral
standard ; evolutionary optimism, though it continued to be preached by many,
was an amiable superstition, based perhaps on the superficial Deism of the
eighteenth century.

(Inge, pages 142 – 144)

which, although I would like to put it in its own chapter, with the other parts of this
discussion from Inge, I must place here, where we are discussing Spencer’s highly flawed
status as a philosopher, because here Inge makes the same point for us, in a fuller and far
more informed way than we could ever hope to produce on our own.
It is nice to see the remark that science has produced no philosophers of note, and
this observation stands to this day. This is essentially because philosophy is, and always
has been, the handmaiden of religion. In a world where free and unfettered science
existed there could be no religion, and it is difficult to think of there being a role for any
serious kind of philosophy in such a world too. In this passage Inge is in any case calling
for a philosopher of science to use philosophy as the bastion of religious values, to tell us
how we should live according to some ideal standard. No philosopher can do this on the
basis of science and at the same time be scientific, although I am frequently driven to
take up the challenge because I know this is what people want, so that when I break off
from expounding upon what science tells us about the nature of human existence I do
sometimes think about what this might mean for us in life. It is a tricky subject however,
and I often deal with this difficulty by talking about things like the impossibility of
having science, so that we can only have science as a hobby, so to speak, where we
recognise that religion rules the world and we just want the right to know what is real, but
that we know there has to be another science that is false science that is taught in schools,
and forms the basis of all public knowledge. So that we need two parallel systems of
scientific knowledge, hence we have atheist science as distinct from official science.
Aside from Spencer’s worthless philosophy we have other topics raised here, the
evolution of humans being driven by warfare “it impelled the defenceless bipeds from
whom he sprung to unity, and the more so because of their relative inferiority in physique
to many other animals.” I love this kind of remark, it echoes down the decades into our
own time, and is so mind numbingly idiotic it leaves one struggling to unlock one’s mind
from the state of catatonic freezing such an idea imposes upon the brain when it receives
such a stupid idea. It is like be asked why you have poured the tree into the teacup, or
walked over the house, or some other utterly inane comment that could only come from
the mouth of a clinically debilitated person. The point being that such people are in
effect saying that over the course of millions of years nature produced a creature that
suddenly found it had evolved to be utterly powerless in the world, unable to feed itself
or defend itself, and thus, finding itself suddenly thrown into an untenable position it
immediately took the only possible way out, it did not grow fur, besides it had already
evolved to be hairless, a very stupid strategy for sure, for now it would have to evolve a
brain and hands to make it able to built shelters, and it did not evolve a means of running
fast, it had already forgone its evasive capacity by becoming bipedal, another truly stupid
thing to do, and it would now have to evolve speech so it could gang up with others in its
self defence, and it did not evolve huge muscles to allow it to wrestle like a gorilla, no the
proto human did none of these things, it took the only way out that was open to it, the one
thing that no other animal had ever done, it evolved a brain so staggeringly oversized as
to make no sense whatever, but that, as luck would have it, it turned out, after it had
evolved, that this solution had some most amazing benefits, it was a hidden trick that all
other animals had missed, for although it had seemed a monumentally dumb thing to do
evolving over a course of millions of years to be defenceless in a dangerous world, of dog
eat dog, it transpired that by fusing a host of defenceless pathetic creatures into one
unified blob the product of this fusion was a beast to be reckoned with. Shit ! Oops, I’ll
never get to be a scientific philosopher of the first rank by encapsulating my summation
and criticism of ideas in this four letter word, but what else can a sane person say ?
The other delightful snippet to come out of this passage is courtesy of Strauss,
whoever he was, and this idea is in fact a standard mechanism in Jewish superorganic
physiology. Today, still leap day, is that what we call February 29th ?, the news
announced that a new system of immigration control comes into effect that aims to stave
of the flow of people into this country by applying quality control standards. But they
said it was about trying to give immigration a better press, the fact is that from the time
when the Sumerians were deposed by aliens who first entered its society five millennia
ago to provide the labour for this first civilization, the dynamic of raising a civlized
society on the back of impoverished aliens has been shown to be unavoidable because no
one in their right mind wants to do the jobs that most people are forced to do in order to
keep a massive superorganic structure functioning. It is nice, in a sick way, therefore to
see that Strauss’s tactic of undermining the workers by importing alien slaves is exactly
the one that has been used to trash the unions in this country since the working class
voted Thatcher into power in the eighties after she bribed them by giving them the
accumulated wealth of social fabric that had been built up by the politicians that working
class people had put into power when unions were genuine arms of working men’s
power, before the priests worked their way into the ranks of union officials and corrupted
the power base by driving the political machine toward a fascist worker state through
tactics of closed shops, working to rule and such like anti-working class tactics that
alienated workers from their own political institutions until the only choice workers had
was to vote for the destruction of their own precious edifices of social justice, a truly sad
and lamentable situation, but inevitable, because that is the nature of superorganic
physiology, power must always rest in the hands of the priesthood, the Jews.
It is curious to read this kind of account of the first decades of the twentieth
century, and then to give a brief summary of the history of working institutions of
political power in the last decades of the same period, while having in mind the ideas of
Hitler relative to the rise of communism, it really presents a most complex blend of social
musculature. We see anatomist’s drawings of muscle arranged in strands of discrete
tissue, interwoven, and being drawn toward common connecting points, and when we
think about the diversity of the main strands of political thought bundled up as the
elements of the social biomass, brought to bear on focal points of the exoskeletal
structure, communist, unionist, fascist, priest-cum-Jew, capitalist, where, in many
respects, everyone seems to have exactly the same view on every topic, but being placed
at different points in the social fabric, means that when each pulled toward their own
point of interest, the diverse segments, as muscles do, oppose one another, but act as one
unified muscle shifting toward a corporate goal realised in the identity of the
superorganic being of which all structures of all kind form a functional part, so that in
politics society moves toward the direction of sustaining Judaism, just as it did likewise
in the field of knowledge, where science fights to destroy science in order to save
religion, so it is in politics, where all aspects of the political constitution work away at
undermining the interests of the people, so that only a corrupt priesthood can ever rule
society.

(v) RELIGION AND THE STATE

An impartial consideration of the various forms of State which have

appeared in human history, and of the various theories and ideals which thinkers
have evolved in the course of their attempts to devise a perfect scheme of
government, must lead the student to one conclusion. Good government is the
hardest of all problems, and it has never yet been solved. Political history is an
almost unrelieved tragedy, because there has never yet been a hopeful experiment
that did not break down after a time ; there has never been a constitution that did
not bear within itself the seeds of its own decay and dissolution. Theocracy,
which in theory is the organisation of mankind under the authority of divine
revelation, has in practice meant the domination of a priestly caste ruling by
superstitious fear and fraud, and extorting money by false pretences.

(Inge, p. 139)

What no body ever realises is that the Jews are that priestly caste, and this mode
of organization based on religious identity is natural, and when the idea that the Jews
have some special role to play rises to the surface of the collective consciousness then
‘muscles of identity’ become engorged, so that joints of the exoskeletal framework start
moving, until all hell breaks loose, for a spell. Thus order is re-established as the
muscular tension subsides, the Jews are reaffirmed, and the superorganism expands a
notch as its internal fabric begins the process of resettling itself according to the time
honoured process of arranging its biomass by way of linguistically determined structures
that sort people according to an array of diverse identities.

How do we make a philosophical programme out of this strictly scientific analysis

of our social being ? Who cares, I just want knowledge. My philosophy is that truth is
supreme, and truth is the product of scientific method. Find the truth and all else follows
of its own accord, would be my intuitive suggestion ; a longer consideration is not in my
mind today.

Living in England and seeing the way the establishment work so hard to bring
Muslims into this country and establish these horrid identity here it is clear that they are
doing what the Jews have always done, infesting the world with their ugly identity. It has
long been obvious to me that this was a deliberate policy, in the same way that when my
apple tree began producing apples after a few years I knew this was a deliberate action. I
have suggested that Britain, not to say Europe, will be a Muslims territory in a
millennia’s time, just as much as any country in the Middle East is today, and that the
primary object of the British government is to ensure that this comes to pass. However,
the government does not know this is its goal and the purpose of every move it makes,
anymore than the central system of control that allows the apple tree to act as one knew
that its activity was directing it toward making apples at some time in its future. The
transformation of England into a new form of nation, with a different identity
constitution, which is as effective a means of taking over a state, indeed, more effective,
how much of the old British Empire do we own today !, is a natural process and the
Jewish identity evolved to perform this act of insinuation from within, it is the very
means by which the Sumerians were taken over. It is assumed that an alien people took
over the ancient Sumerian nation by infusing themselves into it, they entered the body
and took it over, taking the culture entire, language, script, art form and all, we might
wonder what was left to reveal the act of replacement. What will be left to reveal the act
of replacement perpetrated by the Muslims against us, with the aid of the Christians who
rule our world today ? We will have a Muslim nation, women will be a low order,
wearing emblems of their slave status, the head scarf, mosques will be everywhere,
Sharia law will rule our once noble land, and everyone will speak English, there will be
no monarchy, no democracy, nothing against Islam, but otherwise the people will be as
English in outer form as we are today, because that is the means by which the human
superorganism at its most sophisticated grows and spreads itself across the surface of the
planet on which this most remarkable mammal has evolved.
And knowing this does us no good, because it is so easy to attack what I am
saying as a dangerous and vile idea, and since the government determines what we are
allowed to think there is no way for us to resist this death by infusion, it is calculated to
take effect over a period that exceeds the term of a person’s life, in one century from now
it may not be possible to tell if there is really anything in these words, only after five
centuries can we expect real proof of the veracity of this argument, and only after a
millennia can we hope to see this horrific prediction proven. But we can turn around and
behind us, and see where we have come from, Christianity is a comparatively tame beast
today, but it is still a vile a ugly thing that we all ought to be ashamed of, and to hate with
a passion. But it is not so long since it was as sick and deranged as Islam is today, or as
Judaism has always been. These poisonous identities are a bane upon all humanity, and
this is so because they are so excruciating perfect expressions of our human corporate
nature, that enslave with a power that is awesome. In the next chapter we ill take a chunk
of Inge on the topic of Jewish dominion and the spread of identity programmes.
 The general tenor of the logic derived from a biological account of human society
in which religion is seen as a linguistically generated corporate identity which subverts
lower order identities of a more parochial kind by eradicating them and insinuating
themselves in their place, so Judaism replaces national identity, exactly as Hitler
complained of. It is of course our contention that Hitler’s reaction was a vital component
of the process of identity destruction and subversion, and this kind of reaction is built into
the overlying Christian Jewish slave identity, so that the emergence of the Nazis from a
Christian society was just as natural and predetermined as the emergence of the apples on
my apple tree after the requisite period of maturation had passed. When we look at what
Inge has to say we will find his essays from 1922 are perfect for illuminating the manner
in which the Christian establishments war on science culminated in the rise of the Nazis
who delivered the coup de grâce to the failing science of humanity whose death knell had
been rung the day origin of Species burst forth upon the scene. This connection between
the Christian theory of evolution produced by Darwin, to comply with religious needs for
a political notion of the evolutionary process, rather a detached scientific notion, is
revealed nicely in the discussion Inge gives us of the manner in which the religious
science of evolution produced by Darwin had become a creed. Inge does not mention the
National Socialists, the Nazis were just coming into their own in Germany, but it is
evident that Inge has some such social phenomenon in mind when he describes the
transformation of the science of evolution into a religion.
It is of course not possible to have information of the kind we have here freely
available in society, if these ideas were made public and captured attention then there
would be an outcry against them. But since these ideas are correct, and we have no
interest in their political significance, we can pretend that if our society really was the
free society our masters force us to believe it to be, and we were allowed to know our
true nature and hence to know exactly how our social structure comes to have the form
that it does, as we describe it here, then we might imagine that in a free and democratic
fashion we decide to outlaw religion and to be a true democratic society in which people
vote as individuals for the life style they want. In this case, relative to the rest of the
global biomass that is imbued with a Jewish identity and enslaved to the Jewish dogma of
global dominance according to one identity pattern, we would suddenly take on the
attributes of a void, and nature abhors a vacuum. By whatever means necessary,
infiltration, war, corruption, capitalism, Jews would invade the vacuum, as they have
invaded every other place on earth that has been void of Jews ever since these people
came into existence over six thousand years ago, according to their calendar. There is
now way any society can rid itself of Jews, by any means of any kind. When the brief
phase of creative anti-Semitism burst forth in the mid twentieth century opening the way
to the new phase of Jewish global expansion associated with the foundation of the
modern state of Israel and the global war of terror mounted by the Muslims in the name
of Judaism, the void created in Germany and Russia has soon begin to fill up as Jews
return to the cavities of the exoskeleton from which they were exuded just a few years
ago. Whenever we assess superorganic physiology we need to understand that the reach
of our living consciousness sets a boundary upon the organization of the internal
physiology, as we have noted when discussing the manner in which our society is to be
turned into an alien society that we hate and despise, a Muslims society. Tradition
preserves the affiliation of mortal consciousness, but warfare and techniques like
capitalist control, break down these immortal modes of identity extension, allowing the
one Jewish identity to pervade everywhere. So these processes are allied to temporal
dynamics which relate to the consciousness of the individual units of which the
superorganism is made, and this is why history takes the highly regular and predictable
form that we see occur wherever and whenever we look at it, as Inge suggests below
when talking about the difficulty of creating a stable happy state of the kind Spencer
longs for in his puerile speculations about the future of human society as described Inge
in the selection above.

Of course as atheists, for whom atheism is the beginning and end of all things we
cherish, cursing religion to the limit is a great joy, but it is futile to rail against religion
with any hope of damning it out of existence because religion is the product of our
greatest gift, the power of speech, religion exists to make us what we are.

They [the authors of this series of religious books] desire to lay stress upon the value
and validity of religious experience and to develop their theology on the basis of
the religious consciousness. In so doing they claim to be in harmony with modern
thought. The massive achievements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have
been built up on the method of observation and experiment, on experience, not on
abstract a priori reasoning. Our contention is that the moral and spiritual
experience of mankind has the right to be considered, and demands to be
understood.
Many distinguished thinkers might be quoted in support of the assertion
that philosophers are now prepared in a greater measure than formerly to consider
religious experience as among the most significant of their data. One of the
greatest has said, “There is nothing more real than what comes in religion. To
compare facts such as these with what is given to us in outward existence would
be to trifle with the subject. The man who demands a reality more solid than that
of the religious consciousness, seeks he does not know what.” 1 Nor does this
estimate of religious experience come only from idealist thinkers. A philosopher
who writes from the standpoint of mathematics and natural science has expressed
the same thought in even more forcible language. “The fact of religious vision,
and its history of persistent expansion, is our one ground for optimism. Apart
from it, human life is a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up a mass of pain
and misery, a bagatelle of transient experience.” l
1
F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 449
1
A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 275.

(The Relevance of Christianity, F. R. Barry, 1936, pages viii – ix. First

pub. 1931.)

Here we see the activity of the theocracy exerting an immense effort to develop a
sterile science that can be allied to religion, we see the recruitment of leading scientists to
the task of bringing science into contempt. Who the hell is Whitehead to make life
worthless without the slave identity of Judaism forcing us to live according to its
dictates ? But it has to be conceded, that as we evolved to form a superorganism, we
individuals are made to feel a need that has given rise to the biological phenomenon of
the Jewish master identity that draws us on, mindlessly, like a moth to a flame. In terms
of their being intellectuals people like Whitehead can only be regarded as utter
degenerates, criminals of the lowest kind, doing the bidding of a master authority purely
to serve their own ego. These people are the enemies of truth and knowledge, and hence
they are the supreme authorities in our theocracy, as priests always have been.
Certainly science must pay attention to the “moral and spiritual experience of
mankind”, this experience must be explained as a behavioural phenomenon, to be made
sense of in strictly biological terms. But here the priest is demanding that science take
cognizance of religious knowledge according to the principles laid down by that
knowledge. Yet these people only mean to apply this self justification to their own Nazi
ideology.

The conviction that religious experience is to be taken as the starting-point

of theological reconstruction does not, of course, imply that we are absolved from
the labour of thought. On the contrary, it should serve as the stimulus to thought.
No experience can be taken at its face value ; it must be criticised and interpreted.
Just as natural science could not exist without experience and the thought
concerning experience, so theology cannot exist without the religious
consciousness and reflection upon it. Nor do we mean by “experience” anything
less than the whole experience of the human race, so far as it has shared in the
Christian consciousness.

(Ibid., p. ix)

They would not accept that scientist must accept the ideas expressed in the ritual
activity of the Ndembu described by Turner, and yet if science were to apply the principle
called for in the previous selection, then they would be obliged to accept the “moral and
spiritual experience of mankind” in all its forms, which would of course lead to a
cacophony of nonsense, instead of the harmony of pure nonsense derived from the study
of Jewish slave identities, or primitive integral identities take at their own estimate of
themselves. Science obviously has to abstract the function for which a capacity for
“moral and spiritual experience” evolved, and this is the last thing these damn priests
want. As we can see from this kind of sick, degenerate intellectual activity, the war
between religion and science can never be set aside.
Although religion, most especially Christianity, since the people we are observing
now were Christian, and so am I, derivatively, is the very personification of
mindlessness, demanding that people always decline to think about anything. The
Christian never tires of telling us how the Lord demands that they keep an open mind,
and that they must always think and about, and question, everything. How do they do
that ? It is like someone smashing their head into a wall so that blood pours down their
skull while insisting that banging your head against a wall is something they would never
do ! The demented bullshit of Christians staggers me. I said to some Jehovah’s
Witnesses at my door a decade ago that they never think about anything and they said the
Bible tells them they must always be prepared to question, yet their submission to
Christianity is an act of faith, which means believing in that which we know not to be
true, as some wit on an old movie once said, and these morons, intellectual degenerates,
presumably mean to suggest it is by thinking about the meaning of life and such like that
they come to have faith. So they use words within a crucible of thought which is of the
making of their own social order, which is exactly as we would expect, they follow the
linguistic programme which gives them their identity at the same time as it forms the
superorganic physiology of the superorganism to which we all belong. And this is why
no one likes atheism, because when they seek knowledge they want to be fulfilled as an
animal evolved to be part of a superorganic being, this is why people subscribe to a faith
when they are outside a power base and inclusion is offered. Atheism, truth, offers a
person nothing, not because social unity is based on feeling, as we see stated in a quote
below taken from Needham, but because people are mammalian insects, ants, that need to
run a programme to have a life and if a social authority has smashed their social order
then they are in need of a new one, hence wherever Jews go and destroy the social order
the remains of the biomass sign up to the Jewish slave identity on offer, either
Christianity or Islam, in all its various forms.
 Chapter Nine

Inge

Yesterday, 28/02/08, I happened upon a book in my local Oxfam shop that is

worth making the basis of a its own chapter, Outspoken Essays by William Inge, 1922, is
the work of a detestable fellow, a priest, the supreme enemy of the science we love, but
of course he had a leading role in the promotion of science, naturally, after all our society
is an absolute theocracy. Obviously, in the first place, this book is within the time frame
of interest to us, therefore anyone writing at this time in a philosophical vein is a
candidate for our interest. In this work Inge approaches questions of great interest to us
in our search for the impact and influence of the idea of the social organism on society
and thought, it is an odd selection to make, but here is the contents page, minus its
numbers :

CONTENTS

I. ‘CONFESSIO FIDEI’

II. THE STATE, VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE :

(i) THEOCRACIES
(ii) THE GREEK CITY STATE
(iii) THE MEDIEVAL IDEAL
(iv) THE MODERN GOD-STATE
(v) RELIGION AND THE STATE

III. THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

IV. THE VICTORIAN AGE
V. THE WHITE MAN AND HIS RIVALS
VI. THE DILEMMA OF CIVILISATION
VII. EUGENICS

(Inge, 1922)

Some potentially interesting topics appear here. For the purposes of our interest
in the idea of the social organism the discussion of the nature of the state should catch our
eye first. Although we recognise that the state has nothing whatever to do with the idea
that humans are a superorganic species of mammal, it is a fact that aside from me, no one
has ever realised this obvious fact, it has always been an obvious question, as we have
seen, What extent does the social organism have ? But since the only true answer is that
its extension is defined by religion, and the only religion that can count is Judaism, no
one has ever dared think this unthinkable thought, to my knowledge. On the topic of
religion as the defining quality of superorganic being, we noted that only Kidd had ever
so much as mentioned this fact. I noticed that Kidd is singled out for attack in Inge’s
book, as I flipped though it yesterday, we even have some mention of the social organism
(page 114). I cannot find the reference to Kidd just now, Inge said that in a nation that
chose such irrationalists as Kidd for their prophets their was bound to be some
problem ..... bla, bla, bla. It is rich for a man who wants to promote religion, Inge was
Dean St. Paul’s, to speak of others as irrationalists ! But it is nice that in 1922 we find
evidence of the high esteem in which the author of Social Evolution was held by the
public, the author of, from a scientific point of view, one of the greatest books ever
written in the whole of human history, a man who has consequently been erased from
history by the theocracy’s destruction of the science of humanity, in which Kidd’s notion
of the war between religion and science being the central element of human history, and
the idea that religion is the generating essence of superorganic form, should make Social
Evolution take a place vastly more important in sociology than Origin of Species is to
biology.
Anyway, I decided I must make this book the basis of a chapter in this work
because of what I found being said in The State, Visible and Invisible, about the nature of
the Jewish state and its relationship to the Christian hegemony ; and I must say I do love
the title of this chapter too, visible and invisible states, that is nice. Remember, for us the
world we live in today is an absolute theocracy, we know this because we have no
science of humanity, despite having a huge academic structure devoted to the science of
humanity, just as in the days of the superb astronomical science of Ptolemy, the ancient
world had no science of astronomy, because then, as now, in a different area of
knowledge, the science given to us is a mockery created by the forces of theocratic order.
Thus we are obliged to speak of the covert theocracy and the overt theocracy, in other
words, the visible and the invisible theocracy.
Inge was a leading menace to science in the war between religion and science
because he was a great friend of science, and who needs friends whose true allegiance is
placed within the bastion of hate that feeds your enemies ? As we have been saying all
along, the ruse has been for the establishment to create a substitute science sterilised in
such a way that it was save for release into a theocracy. See religion and the state ........
 Chapter Ten

Modern Evaluations of Organicism

To my delight today, 04/03/08, I got a modern account of Paul von Lilienfeld

from the internet, courtesy of Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. I did a search for him
years ago and got nothing, but the details available today are superb and I took advantage
immediately by ordering a copy of Mind from 1878 in which there is an anonymous
review of Lilienfeld’s work, just £15, from America, it is amazing what you can find, but
only one copy available so I hope this does not get lost as volume five of Lilienfeld’s
major work coming from Austria did.
There is so much information here that I will have to take a printable version and
print it off next time I am in town, but it is impressive to see that some people exist
somewhere who are able to put together such a brilliant summary of this man’s life that
has been my passion for several years, during which time have found next to nothing. It
goes to show how important it is to have the connections within academia and to be able
to read foreign languages too.
I noticed as I ran through the Wikipedia piece that one quote said that Lilienfeld
absolutely rejected the idea that society was a superorganism and insisted that it was an
organism, this may of come from Ward, but what a fantastic thin g to be able to know,
this is the first such detail of Lilienfeld’s thinking i have picked up, I do not recall getting
much from Coker, but I could try again. I wonder what this distinction is all about, it
does not sound promising in terms of Lilienfeld being any good, But who is ; apart from
me ?

Faced with such a fine presentation makes a fumbling thinker like myself feel
pathetic in comparison. A book also arrived from America today, The “Mad”
Philosopher Auguste Comte, by Boris Sokoloff, 1961. Another piece of demented
religious propaganda, there is nothing else in the world if what you want it science. And
this is the problem. A good number of references were provided of high ranking
academics who gave their verdict on the idea that humans are part of nature subject to a
scientific examination, in other words they examined the organicist view of society, and I
would love to see them all, but that will take some getting together, unfortunately, all will
be utter bullshit. So in demonstrating a recognition of the existence of ideas treating
humans as part of nature, it is futile to hope for any reasoned examination by these
professional academics who have every advantage when it comes to accessing
information, but who are nothing more than priests dead set on serving themselves by
serving the theocracy.
A short essay arrived yesterday, 03/03/08, The Sociology of Comte : An
Appreciation, by Evans-Pritchard, 1970. I have selected two passages after a brief
perusal.
 Here we may pause and ask some questions, but before asking them it has
to be noticed, and of course often has been, that Comte does not include
psychology in his series (to the annoyance, among others, of Mill and Spencer)
and indeed expresses his utmost contempt for it—which made it easier to endow
social phenomena with specificity. His contempt for the introspective
observations which passed as psychology in his day may well have been
deserved, but my impression is that he held that on logical grounds there could be
no such science. Man is born into the world an animal. His moral and intellectual
functions are what are implanted on the organism by society, the products of
culture. Consequently one must not define ‘humanity’ by ‘man’ but ‘man’ by
‘humanity’. Furthermore it is quite irrational to try to explain society, even in its
simplest fetishistic stage, in terms of individual needs, it being the most vicious of
metaphysical (Comte’s dirtiest word) theories which derives faculties from needs
of the individual. 6 Men only respond to needs by creating new institutions when
social conditions determine the response.
So all in all what place could there be for an autonomous science of
psychology in between physiology and sociology ? What people might call
psychology was to Comte a branch of physiology, what he called cerebral
physiology, and he later, much to the embarrassment of some of his erstwhile
admirers, advocated phrenology as the most appropriate means of studying mental
phenomena. Leaving out the phrenology, it seems to me that Durkheim took up
much the same position, that there is no place for an intermediate science between
the organic and the social sciences, though, so far as I know, he never actually
said this in so many words.
6
Comte, indeed, more or less ignores the individual, to him an abstraction : ‘La
société humaine se compose de familles, et non d’individus.’ (Système, II, p. 181.) The
family is the true unit (élément) of society.

(Evans-Pritchard, p. 5)

and :

But what about the little word with the big—and, it seems to me,
ambiguous—sense, ‘nature’ ? In one way of looking at the matter, everything
which exists is ‘natural’ and is also part of a system and has a structure, and can
therefore be studied as such. But in this sense the concept is so amorphous, so all-
embracing, that it is of doubtful utility. When a word means everything it can also
mean nothing. It is true that in this sense the planetary system and an Act of
Parliament are equally parts of nature but they are phenomena of such different
orders that one may indeed question whether much is gained by making the
statement. To give any precision to the term ‘natural’ it seems to me what is
required is to define what is ‘non-natural’ and to furnish some examples to
illustrate the use of that term. After all, Comte’s scientific (positivist) philosophy
is no less ‘natural’, in the sense of being determined—as positivist philosophy
must hold—by social conditions, than the theological and metaphysical
philosophies he rejected—as indeed he might have admitted—so we are back to
 the old dilemma of the science of knowledge, a mirror facing a mirror with
nothing in between. Who is the potter, pray, and who the pot ?

(Evans-Pritchard, p. 7 – 8)

I was keen to get hold of this essay because it gives us an assessment of Comte by
an anthropologist. I love the first selection because of the way it summarises Comte’s
conception of human nature in a way that matches my own view perfectly. I have seen
no indication anywhere that Comte was so completely committed to the idea that humans
must be treated in a purely scientific way and that society was a superorganic being, the
trouble is that the diversion into the realms of prophet of new religion so overwhelms
anything else that Comte had to say that it makes all his ideas worthless, if he said
anything good, and he did, then it is in brought into total disrepute by everything else he
had to say in addition.
The second passage meanwhile, gives us a window on our famous
anthropologist’s mind, and it is a window onto an empty space, exactly as we would
expect upon examining the ideas of any professional academic focused on human beings.
But in this case the chosen fragment of thought, the meaning of the word ‘nature’ is
useful as a lever for us to address the whole issue at stake here, What does it mean to say
that humans should be treated as just another part of nature to be examined according to
the scientific method ?
It is this question that Evans-Pritchard is addressing when he turns to the meaning
of the word ‘nature’. My own response to this passage is three fold. Thirdly, I see the
passage as highly negative, I was going to put it above in the place where I was writing
about the immense efforts academics go to to make the point that we can never know
anything, thus allowing anyone to say anything without being ruled beyond the pale, in
other words allowing religious bullshit to persist as an account of human existence. So I
saw this passage as fitting into the usual ugly priestcraft of academics.
I also saw it as having a bizarrely servile fixation on words as real, and hence the
products of words in the shape of ideas as real. By this I mean the curious way in which
Evans-Pritchard treats the word ‘nature’ as used in relation to science as possessing a
meaning so extensive as to be worthless ! This evaluation of the problem is so juvenile
as to be extremely ugly, the mind that produced it is vile, contemptible. This gives the
sense of a paragraph in the form of a bundle of words, whose consistency can be
conceptualised by imagining a load of rubber bands being tied together into a ball that
when bounced of any surface ricochet off at a deranged and unpredictable angle. The
problem is that at the level of word play, poetry, or simple commonsense, what Evans-
Pritchard say sounds rather astute, and this is what makes it so vile when we actually
think about it for a minute or two and try and work out how he has managed to attack the
notion that science should be based on what is real, that is natural, so effectively. As ever
when trying to prevent anyone from affirming any knowledge conclusive, that would be
fatal to religion, it is important to fragment unity, and enable diversity. Which is the
same as we said in point three, it is all about allowing the obscenity of religion to prevail
against the certainty of reality.
 It is certainly true that all things are part of nature, everything that exists is
natural, but that is not the issue here. And so lastly we come to the first point, the artful
conclusion, where science is made a mirror catching its own reflection so that we have no
way of knowing what is what. I have ordered these points according to the sequence in
which I feel they occurred to me, not the sequence in which I have presented them. This
is best because their is no hierarchy of importance in each of these points of criticism,
they are three aspects of one whole act of misrepresentation. The idea of the priest is
always to impart an idea, the idea is always the same, mystery and ignorance, but they
wish to seem like the all knowing person who alone can justify the idea emerging out of
their presentation of the facts, so they tell us all sorts, but end by telling us nothing, so
that forever, everything is permissible, unless politics makes it forbidden.
So lets actually deal with these elements of misrepresentation. Why is it wrong to
condemn the link between science and nature as a true means of asserting the validity of
science alone as a way of knowing anything ?
The answer is perfectly simple, but a clever person could spend a millions years
avoiding the answer if they wanted to, even though, if determined to destroy religion,
they could as well find the incontestable solution I am about to give almost instantly.
The question here concerns the nature of knowledge, knowledge is a product of language,
therefore we can reduce this logical problem to the formula : the question here concerns
the nature of language. The answer we need now, is : language is symbolic. No matter
what language says, language, no matter how true, will never be the thing it represents.
That water is wet, it true, but the words ‘water is wet’ are wet, these words are not water
and we can neither drink them if lost in a desert and dying of thirst, nor wash in them
after a dirty day’s work. The words are never the thing.
What this means, is that, because language is symbolic, then ideas are
representative, and hence knowledge will always have the nature of being an impression.
In saying that knowledge will always have quality of an impression we identify the aspect
of knowledge that allows Evans-Pritchard to liken scientific knowledge to a mirror
catching a reflection of itself, for all knowledge can only ever have the quality of a
reflection. BUT, and this is the crucial thing, in so far as we liken knowledge to an
impression, we must note that this is only an analogy for the physical reality of seeing by
means of light. Knowledge is not an impression taken from reality, as visual images are,
knowledge is an impression taken from a lexicon of linguistic symbols. While intuitively
we may sense a considerable affinity between these two modes of perception, visual and
linguistic, there is a huge difference between visual imagery and ideas expressed in
linguistic form. Linguistically constituted ideas can be complied independently of
anything other than their constituent parts, just as a visual image can be compiled
independently of anything other than the components of which an image may be made.
The difference being that even if we look at an artist’s picture of a fantasy we still see
using light, whereas when we look at an idea of someone’s fantasy we see the words of
which the representation is composed without any additional parameters to indicate the
fantastic nature of the representation. Words stand alone, words are self validating, and
we could almost define science by saying that the job of science is to subvert the self
definition of words and force them to be fixed to points of reality, indeed this definition
of science would suit the exponent of atheist science very well because atheist science is
a realisation that to do science we must first destroy religion, and this is because of this
very problem illustrated here by Evans-Pritchard, the relentless use of language to
subvert true knowledge of the scientific kind. The difference between creating a work of
art with a paint palette and creating knowledge with a lexicon of linguistic symbols is that
the palette is a part of the body’s physiological apparatus, but there may be a clue in this
statement as to how we evolved the power of symbolic representation through speech via
a transition in which our dexterity took the baton of representation, which is why art is so
important to us, because art was the precursor of speech as we know it now.
This said then, we would never find ourselves faced with unnatural realities,
precisely because, as Evans-Pritchard says, everything is natural, so we would never
encounter a group of people sitting round a campfire made of stones, and have to ask why
they do no use wood like everyone else, because you cannot make a campfire out of
stones. So we could never come face to face with anything that was not natural : nothing
can exist that is not natural. And so it is that just as nothing can exist that is not natural,
so we should always base our ideas of what exist on what is natural. This is what it
means to link the word natural to science, science is about the study of what is. Evans-
Pritchard meanwhile deviously tries to make the idea that we can ever assert that there is
such a thing as natural absurd, because then it poses the problem what is unnatural, since
all things are natural which must include the unnatural too ! But all we have here is a
word game arising out of the symbolic nature of words which have the capacity to
produce anything, just as a paint palette has the capacity to produce images of anything
the artist cares to conjure up.
The problem we are faced with is that the naive form of knowledge means that
knowledge comes into existence in the form independent of reality, and as such, when
judged according to its own lights, in an unnatural form. When we say this about the
evaluation of knowledge we are reminded of the previous discussion found in Barry
where the priest demanded that religious values had a place and had to be reckoned with
by science, and we noted that what these people wanted was for science to assess religion
according to the way religion sees itself. This then is what Evans-Pritchard is doing here,
he is assessing words according to how the words ‘see themselves’, so that he is making
the word ‘unnatural’ as valid as the word ‘natural’ just because, taken at face value as
words, one compared to the other, both are equally valid, just as a religious advocate
would say that if a person says water is wet and another says God exists then both ideas
are equally valid because both are proclaimed to be valid.
So, to curtail this convoluted trip around a linguistic ball of rubber bands, the
silvering of the mirror of knowledge only arises when we allow the symbol to take on the
attributes of that which symbols represent. This kind of illusion arises when we treat
knowledge as independent of nature, or physical reality, so, just as we would not
entertain a discussion of the campers who were warming themselves beside a fire
composed of burning rocks, instead of sticks, neither should we tolerate any image of
reality that has no point of reference in the real world. This is all that science ever says
we would we do, but of course the work of th priest is to create confusion by trying to
make us think that ideas are real in their own right, and this is easy to do because the fact
is that intellectual ideas are so complex and abstruse that it takes effort to know where to
draw the line. What we therefore do then is to recognise that religion is part of nature,
and treat it as such, so we look for a way of making sense of this physiology of symbolic
representation that exudes an irrepressible flood of unnatural knowledge that rules our
world. We solve the mystery when we realise that humans are a superorganic species and
we get to be so because our form evolved to enable the coming into being of a living
structure at the level of social organization, and the means by which this extension of
individual biology into a superorganic biology is found in the capacity for language
which generates superorganic physiology through the medium of knowledge.
Knowledge is real, just as Evans-Pritchard says it is, religion is real, but only in the sense
in which science says religion is real, religion is not real in the sense that religion says
religion is real. Just as the word unnatural is not unnatural in the sense that the word
unnatural sense it is unnatural, the word unnatural is only unnatural in the sense that the
word natural says it is unreal. The word unnatural is real in the sense that it is a symbolic
element that plays a role in the formation of knowledge that is the flux of information
orchestrating the flow of energy through the body of the superorganism. Everything is
real, nothing is unreal, and it is ludicrous to say that the word real is so diffuse that it has
no meaning, the reason this subject arises is because priests like Evans-Pritchard want to
serve their master by promoting the idea that because someone wants to confront their
religious dogma with reason then a split exists in reality, it does not, the split exists in the
pantheon of knowledge, because there is a war between science and religion that religion
has to win because that is how human organisms are made.

It is a matter of routine in our work to say that there is no God, but that does not
mean that what the word ‘God’ refers to does not exist, this is indeed how we prove that
God does not exist, by showing what God is : God is the superorganism. Likewise, just
because the idea of the unnatural, which coincides with the artificial in the
anthropological context of human existence, exist in the form of this word, does not mean
that there is such a thing as the unnatural really exists, but it does mean that if we are
going to look at this question from a naturalistic perspective then we must discover what
really exists that the word ‘unnatural’ refers to. Of course once we have discovered that
humans are a superorganic species and the superorganism is created by linguistic force
that creates all social structure then in fact all such acts of decoding will always come
down to the original act which recognises that God is a code word for superorganism, so
unnatural refers to that aspect of reality or nature that is created by linguistic force, over
which we have a sense of conscious control that makes us think we are the creators,
hence the idea of the artificial, artifacts of our will.

The Mad Philosopher

Back to Sokoloff. I have only just dipped the tip of my tongue into the opening
pages of this work, to get its flavour, I have, as you see immediately condemned it a piece
of religious propaganda, I have done this because it is a piece of religious propaganda,
Why else would I do this ?

The tragic story of Auguste Comte’s life offers additional proof that the
secular philosophy, with which most Westerners have been living in practice for
 the last three hundred years, is proving to be an inadequate guide for the human
race, and that a spiritual reawakening in the West seems to be inevitable.

(Sokoloff, p. 14)

Sokoloff is making a call for a return to religious values, as we saw in Barry, the
voice of religion rules over all commentaries of a scientific kind that veer toward the
subject of religion, everyone agrees that science is worthless and only religion, only
feeling, can tell humans how to live ; anyone with a public voce that is, and obviously we
can only look at work by people with a public voice. It is inconceivable that any atheist
work could ever exist, and I am beginning to think this is not merely a matter of
oppressive fascism resulting from the war of religion against freedom of knowledge,
people do not want the simple truth. A book like Sokoloff’s is superb for getting to grips
with this frustrating and depressing fact, as it seems to be. And we need some such help
to try and escape from the powerful urge to think in conspiratorial ways about the work
of people like Comte, Spencer, Darwin, Durkheim, Dawkins (the gatekeeper of the
theocracy, a sham atheist scientist, all noise and no substance) and all the rest. Certainly
we have insisted that we must never think in such conspiratorial terms, not in a raw sense
at least, and we have sort to think in terms of the evolved physiology which turns out
conscious bricks who receive a programme that gives impetus to that consciousness that
the ‘brick’, the person, then knows as their duty toward the collective being, and is, no
matter how clever and well educate, incapable of seeing past, they see only the reflection
of in the mirror of the programme implanted in their brains, as it made evident by the
insectivorously moronic conception Evans-Pritchard had of the difficulty of making use
of so universal a term as ‘nature’ in the context of scientific definition.
Sokoloff makes out that Comte placed himself in an impossible position through
an insistence upon reason as the only way of knowing, rejecting divinity and feeling,
Comte was a pathological rationalist, we might say. This was the nature of Comte’s
mental illness, his bizarre ideas are an attempt to cure him of his self imposed affliction
of a belief in reason. I guess when you put it like that, this is a deeply sick and revolving
book, But what’s new there ? Show me a book, that comments on people, that is not sick
and depraved, from a scientific point of view, and I will show you a pile of rocking horse
shit, still steaming. To avoid this total condemnation a book must make it plain that the
author knows that human nature is corporate and the human animal is a superorganism,
whose common nature is to found, not in apes, but in ants, termites, bees, and the like. A
Horizon programme has just begun Are We Alone in the Universe ? looking at the work
of people who have discovered the first earth like planet, Gliese 581c. The opening line I
caught said the big question in the search for alien life was whether intelligence was the
norm in the universe or if it were unique. But the search for life as a means of answering
this question is just another distraction, like the examination of apes, trying to see if we
can teach chimpanzees to talk and such like, a distraction all designed to make us think
that there is a big mystery, we want to understand, oh we really do, so muuuuch, but we
just cannot do it. Oh dear ! Still, never mind, we will keep trying. And here we see how
this poison, the poison of religion, although focused upon sociology and its associated
disciplines, does in fact colour all science, and here we see it perverting astronomy, still.
How is it that these idiot astronomers do not see that if you want to ask whether
intelligence exists throughout the universe, then your first question must be to know what
‘intelligence’ is ? The SETI (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence) project seeks
communication coming from space, as we send communications into space ourselves.
But this is pure priestcraft, it is a manifestation of the idea that we are unique, the
establishment that pays for these performances does not reason about what we are, and
theorise about whether our like may exist elsewhere, because it knows that the answer is
of no interest, it is all about the performance. Just as the business about apes being our
close relatives, holding the secret of our roots, is simply the manifestation of the
ludicrous ideas of Darwin about human origins, a means of making the lying fiction of
the scientists seem real to the poor ignorant dupe that has no more means to know what is
what than a slave ant can compete with a slave maker that has evolved to steal it from its
superorganism and raise it in a alien guise that it thinks is its own.
Once we know that humans are superorganisms we are able to account for every
last detail of our existence, we thus place ourselves in the domain of nature, and so when
we wonder about the possibilities of life existing on other planets, or elsewhere in the
universe, the question whether or not intelligence of our kind is natural, i.e. liable to be a
normal and inevitable product of life wherever suitable conditions for life arise, becomes
just the usual piece of self obsessed priests. The question about intelligence is irrelevant,
because intelligence is irrelevant, the only meaningful question on this scale is whether
life might exist elsewhere, and this question is idiotic, it would be like me asking if
anyone else anywhere on earth is typing the letter ‘e’ at precisely the same moment I
typed this letter. Who cares, do cows eat grass, do fish in America swim, these questions
are inane, and we do not ask them. But the question these powerful intelligent, wealthy
scientists are devoting their lives to asking, according to the horizon programme
chundering away behind me now, is no less inane than any of the dumb questions I have
just suggested. Of course life exists elsewhere, and obviously superorganisms are
inevitable too, end of story ! Once mammals evolved mammalian superorganism were
inevitable, humans are that inevitable outcome.

In this volume [The System of Positive Polity], Comte departed

considerably from the basic ideas of Saint-Simon. Comte divided history into
three successive stages : theological, metaphysical, and scientific or positive.
Accepting that human society has reached the positive stage of existence, the art
of governing must become a science also. All sciences, he said, have undergone
the successive three stages ; but government, being a complex phenomenon, was
for this reason the last one to reach the positive stage.
He postulated that the greatest hindrance to the progress of society was
the continued fermentation of the revolutionary spirit. A new power must be
substituted for the medieval hierarchy in Church and state. This power should
reside in the hands of men who will govern in accordance with positive principles.
Rejecting the basic ideas of the French Revolution, Comte declared that,
from a scientific point of view, freedom of thought and the sovereignty of the
people are wrong principles, since both of them were “born for destruction, and
unfit for construction.” And he refers to the scientific disciplines :
 “There is no freedom of thought in astronomy, physics, chemistry,
physiology, in the sense that everyone would think it absurd not to believe
implicitly in the principles established in those sciences by competent men.”
He attacked the principles of democracy.
“Freedom of thought is merely individual infallibility taking the place of
papal infallibility. The sovereignty of the people replaced the arbitrary power of
the kings by the arbitrary power of the masses. It entrusts the most ignorant
among men with the right of absolute control of ideas and principles discovered
by superior minds, and it tends to disrupt the political body by giving power to the
least educated classes.”
Instead of a democratic regime, he offered the industrial system, a sort of
dictatorship of the industrialists. The fundamental idea of his book was that the
political government should be replaced by an economic administration, which, in
fact, was promoted and defended by Saint-Simon long before his association with
Comte.
The System of Positive Polity, the ideas of which were further developed
and enlarged by Comte during the following twenty years, particularly in his
Positive Philosophy, reflected the influence of many postulates outlined and de-
fended by Saint-Simon.

(Sokoloff, pages 53 – 4)

I like this passage, it offers a nice resume of Comte’s attitude, the way he makes
sweeping assumptions and generalisations that have nothing to do with anything, except
that they are inspired by the logic of science, while most definitely not being of the logic
of science. So that the notion of stages of development that all sciences have gone
through and where politics is deemed complex and thereby belated, is as much drivel as
any, and pretty much all, philosophical ruminating that ever was, or is. We do not care
for this kind of philosophy, and have no pretensions of this political kind. Our equivalent
explanation is that politics is screwed because this is the zone wherein power resides
within the structure of the social organism, this is where the basis of the war against
science is to be found, allowing religion to build structure in its name, and this
controlling knowledge. Comte, in common with all philosophisers that ever put thought
to page, works out an artificial, self serving, narrow notion of what affects his tiny
microcosm of a world, and then makes the whole universe subject to the same.
We have a useful observation as to why Comte would be so absurd as to propose
a scientific philosophy, and then produce a religious dogma in its stead. He saw the old
theocratic establishment as defunct, and wanted to replace it with an entirely new one,
based on science. This rings true with the ideas we have been uncovering in other work
over the course of the last fortnight, but it is nicely summed here, and I would not like to
have to make my way through his work myself to get to a position where I might be able
to make this kind of astute sounding statement myself. In addition, we may note, that it
seems to me that Sokoloff and Evans-Pritchard were fluent in French, and were using
Comte’s original six volume editions of Positive Philosophy, whereas, amazingly, only
the much abbreviated version by Martineau, 1853, has ever appeared in English ; the
reason being that his original was found impossibly tortuous to read, so that her English
version was turned back into French, would you believe !! I still like originals myself,
and wish his devotees had translated his work accordingly.
But the reason I took this selection is because of the remarks on freedom of
thought, which I find intriguing. At first thought they seem to have the illogical nature of
the reasoning brought to bear by Evans-Pritchard on the word ‘nature’. Comte is taking
the phrase ‘freedom of thought’ at face value, too literally. He is right to say that it is
absurd to set freedom of thought, centred upon the individual, upon a pedestal, for
precisely the reasons he gives. Indeed, as the greatest possible exponent of freedom of
thought, I find myself frequently extolling the necessity of making freedom of religious
expression the single most serious crime anyone can commit against a free society. But I
would never concern myself with what individuals ‘think’, I would only want teaching,
or preaching religion, to be a crime punishable by death. What could be more reasonable
than that ? People are made slaves by religion, if religion exists then we are all placed in
a position of slavery, this is why we struggle to free knowledge from the black hole of
religious power. So that we must have a world in which the religion that nature has
created in order to build the social organism is outlawed, so that we can make society as
we want it, not as the forces of the universe, of God, as the priest has it, insist it must be.
As ever, if humans want to build the world they want, they must wrestle with nature for
the privilege, and now the time has come to fight against the human nature that has made
us. Of course we could never have such a free society, or anything remotely like it, but
the logic of our reasoning about the desire to win the war against religion, and so to have
free access to knowledge, that is, freedom of thought, leads toward this ideal aspiration,
of a world without religion. All that happens however, when the development of
knowledge takes us in this direction is that the Jews give us a Jewish form of the desired
ideal, a monstrous thing, namely, communism ; which gives us everything we hate about
religion : the oppression, ignorance and slavery, but nothing by way of compensation :
the joy which can be summed up under the curious heading ‘love’ ; and so the game goes
on as before.
We cannot get around the power of the priesthood ensconced within the structure
of the superorganic physiology, of which we are all a constituent part at one hierarchical
level or another, because the priesthood’s location within the core fabric of authority
causes it to wage a war on knowledge that is carried out as instinctively as we individuals
perform the intuitive promotion of our interests in the political area of life accessible to
our atomistically limited consciousness, centred upon its ‘self’ nucleus. The
consciousness of self generated by religious consciousness is the self of the
superorganism, by acquiring a religious identity individuals are polarised toward the
collective consciousness. The Jewish identity is the line of force centred on the collective
consciousness of our superorganism, so that Jewish identity is the self of the
superorganism : the superorganism, of which we are all a part at some hierarchical level,
is Jewish. So that when lines of force, which are always linguistic, and manifested in the
form of knowledge, compete with Judaism, the biomass of individuals concentrated
within the exoskeletal structure of power, who are oriented toward the Jewish identity,
generalised as religion, just as surely as any individual is galvanised toward their personal
identity, generate a new form of the competing knowledge as a defence, the threat soon
emerges in a form attuned to the Jewish identity, hence Marx gave us communism, a
godless form of Judaism.
To ask for a world without religion is like asking for a planet that stands still, it
ain’t gonna happen, we are doomed to be slaves, it is a bloody good thing that everybody
loves being a slave, is all I can say, I just wish I could learn the trick of moronicity that
such a love seems to me to depend upon. How do people manage to be so stupid ? Why
doesn’t anyone care for truth more than life ? Why does no one have the slightest interest
in what is true ?
The answer to this kind of question can only be that there is no such thing as an
individual, so that true is what the superorganism tells us is true, and we care about this
‘truth’ more than anything, we are more than happy to die for it, as martyrs have proved
down the ages. Which is why we get the appalling phenomenon of poor Muslim slaves
blowing themselves up as an act of love for the superbeing that programmes their brain,
and tells them what truth is. It is a shame that we cannot envisage a world beyond this
state of moronic existence, being stuck, as we are, in a world where we cannot enjoy
knowledge for knowledge sake. I think knowledge is the greatest joy known to
humanity, but I mean knowledge defined by itself, not knowledge as a biological feature
of our physiology that exists to locate us in a physiological structure. We keep saying
that we must not let word, as symbols of reality, be self defining, which is how they are
ordinarily used by the priests who rule our world, especially by scientists who exist to
deceive us. But it stands to reason that if being self defined is a means of power over a
creature that evolved to experience knowledge, then there must be a genuine sense in
which self definition is real, and this genuineness occurs when the symbol and the reality
are identical, and when this happens we can say that knowledge is defined by itself, what
we know is then true, the symbol and the reality are as one. When this match occurs we
all know it is so, and this is what makes science possible, but if we are so placed by the
biological role of knowledge in the superorganism as to need to deny the overlap of the
symbol and the reality because it conflicts with structural aspects of our social being, then
we deny the truth and insist upon our own version, but such acts of malignity can only be
performed on the basis of power, which is why political institutions of all kinds, evolved.

His philosophy, which was a part of his personality, reflecting the intrinsic
structure of his nature, his behavior and drivings, was that of an avowed
intellectual who denied all emotions, who rejected any religious or metaphysical
inclinations. His philosophy was in this respect an extreme form of
intellectualism, for to him “The Intellect was my Lord.”
One would have expected that in his case, as was often the case with other
philosophers, his deeper subconscious life would have found its expression in the
type of religion which might be called the cosmic interpretation. Nothing of this
kind of psychological evolution occurred with Comte. For in his case, his love for
a woman, who was neither his wife nor his mistress (a woman whom he knew
hardly more than one year) was the major factor in the change of his personality.
The long-repressed affective element shaped his unconscious projection to
a religion in its extreme form. At the age of forty-seven, he completely reversed
 his credo, his basic philosophy. He adhered to a new philosophy, a philosophy of
religion, with his beloved as a Saint of this movement. Under the influence of his
love for Madame de Vaux, the affective element in Comte assumed gigantic
proportions.. Dead, she remained alive in his imagination, as Beatrice remained
alive to Dante.
His introvertive tendencies swung over wholly and irrevocably to the
ambivalent impulses of extroversion. The pattern of his personality was altered to
such an extent that a completely new personality emerged from this spiritual
revolution. He changed his habits, his attitudes toward men. He created a new
religion of which he became the High Priest. In his Positive Polity, he reversed his
stand in regard to everything he had defended and preached in his Positive
Philosophy. It was an open revolt, of extreme intensity, against intellectualism,
against himself, in fact. It was a craving of incredible force for an emotional
existence which he had denied himself all his life.

(Sokoloff p. 12 – 13)

This is a very interesting description of Comte, quite shocking and unbelievable

really. However, as chance would have it the third volume of Positive Polity arrived
from America today, 05/03/08, and immediately I find this :

I must also attribute the rapidity with which I have been able to travel over
the vast field of Human History to the sainted patroness who is the subjective
partner of all my labours. This indissoluble association has shown itself since the
publication of the preceding volume in the Positivist Catechism, a little treatise
which was not embraced in the scheme of the present work, and was meant as a
decisive and systematic step towards spreading a general knowledge of the
Universal Religion. It will be easily perceived that I should never have been able
to execute it worthily or even to plan it properly without the constant aid of the
angel with whom I hold converse. Its success leads me to assume more
completely my final position as founder of the Religion of Humanity, the
ascendancy of which is becoming more and more suitable to the essential
tendencies of the situation in the West. The historical summary which terminates
this little treatise, and the fact that it was composed when I was in the middle of
my principal work, made the Positive Synthesis as a whole more familiar to me,
and so rendered it easier for me to think out the other two volumes.
After this just acknowledgment of the three influences by which this
volume has specially benefited, I must next point out its natural connection with
the preceding volume and the relation it bears to the corresponding portion of my
fundamental work on Positive Philosophy.

(Positive Polity, Vol. 3, Comte, 1973, p. x)

 And there we have it, in black and white, exactly as Sokoloff describes it. How
weird is this, this Comte bloke gets weirder and weirder. Yet, at the same time, as I
found myself being led by Maclay into the text of Comte’s work, especially getting in
touch with volume two of his Positive Polity, as can be seen from the preceding work
here, it was clear that nothing about Comte made sense, and the real calamity was this
shift from a highly atheistic science based philosophy presented in the 1830’s Positive
Philosophy, to the overtly religious programme, still based on science, in his 1850’s
Positive Polity. All very odd, but human enough I suppose. For us we need only remind
ourselves that our interest in the man derives from the fact that he is a major exponent of
the idea that society is an organic entity. Comte was evidently just the kind of man I
always despise to the maximum, and no someone I would want to have anything to do
with as a thinker. Yet as we saw in Evans-Pritchard, page five, as above, this
representation of Comte is wonderful from our point of view. But then, someone reading
the work of Dawkins in a century’s time is liable to be highly impressed by his atheistic
credentials, yet as contemporary atheists we see the man in real time, and we know he is
a fraud. But this reality would not pass down the decades so easily as his written front,
and the same evidently applies to Comte. He would of been known for what he was in
his own day, by those interested in him, whereas it is a lengthy process discovering this
today if attention is only drawn to his ideas, so that it is only when incongruity causes us
to become curious, and we find peripheral aspects of a personal kind take on a necessary
role in explaining the problems standing out in the intellectual products. Comte certainly
comes off as a complete lunatic in the above introductory section, speaking of a dead
women as his angel, with whom he discusses all his ideas. Stone me !

Sokoloff opens his work thus :

INSTEAD OF INTRODUCTION

In spite of the progress of modern civilization, and the achievements in the

fields of medicine, science and technology, the human race is confronted with a
tragic situation. The number of mental cases is ever-increasing and hundreds of
thousands of schizophrenic patients overcrowd hospitals in this country and
Europe.
Millions of Americans, anxious to find an answer to their inner conflicts
and mental confusion, are being treated by psychoanalysis, psychiatrists, and
psychologists, often with very little, if any, success. Most of them belong to the
so-called intellectual groups of the population : professional men and women,
lawyers, businessmen, and educators. No wonder that the teachings of Zen are
recently attracting much attention on the part of Americans. The writings of
D. T. Suzuki as well as the articles of C. C. Jung and Karen Horney, both
prominent practicing psychiatrists who enthusiastically endorsed the Zen
teaching, permit us to understand and evaluate its essence and its postulates.
This is a natural reaction of modern man to the intellectualism of our
civilization. It is not a new reaction. Again and again, one may find the signs of
 revolt against intellectualism in the writings of Pascal, James, Tolstoy and others.
Modern man is not happy, in spite of all his achievements in his profession or
business. He is unhappy because of his inability to live in the present. He escapes
from the present, either to his past or to obsessive thoughts of his future. Actually
he is trying to escape from the reality of his present-day existence. Dualism of the
mind, a product of Western philosophy, seems to be the chief contributing factor,
as many of us readily admit, to the present unhappiness of a large sector of our
population.
Western traditions are essentially dualistic. They were crystallized under
the influences of Greek and Hebrew civilizations. “They divide reality into two
parts, and set one part off against the other,” as William Barrett admirably
remarked. While the Greeks divided reality along intellectual lines, the Hebrews
used religion and moral principles for the same purpose, with painful and
devastating results to Western man.
Western philosophy, as it is now, as it has been for centuries, reflects the
basic ideas of Plato, and is virtually their extension and supplementation. It makes
reason the highest and the most valued function of man’s existence. It glorifies
man’s intellect as the only factor in the progress of civilization. It considers the
intellect as the omnipowerful center of human personality. The world of the
emotions is considered of secondary, almost insignificant, importance—
subordinated to the intellect.
As Martin Heidegger, the German Existentialist pointed out. Western
philosophy was the greatest mistake of modern civilization, having contributed
greatly to the dualistic spiritual life of the human race. For the dichotomizing
intellect makes the unity of Self impossible. The disunity of Self, its duality, is an
inexhaustible source of inner conflict, of split-personality and schizophrenia in
many instances.
In the field of religion. Western man also does not find the unity of Self.
The basic principles of Hebrew traditions still dominate the Western religion of
today. God is separated from the world. He transcends it. Human beings are not a
part of God, who is distant and unapproachable, embodying moral principles
which man has to follow obediently and in servitude. Man’s world of emotions
and feelings is repressed, if not rejected altogether. This creates a constant source
of antagonistic emotions, conflicting with the moral principles of religion. Thus
Western man in his inbred driving for the unity of Self, in his natural desire to
escape from his dualistic existence, finds no solace either in intellectualism or in
religion.

(Sokoloff, pages 9 – 11)

The conclusion in the above selection blames science for dividing humans from
their nature, and asserts that religion should exist alone, and supreme, in a world where
intellect plays no part in our understanding of reality. Dualism is the problem, but it is
religion that creates dualism by dividing humans from reality. This is what religion is
meant to do, it is natural, in the same way birds wings, which represent the essence of
what it is to be a bird, divide humans from reality too, for wings make it possible for
animals to fly, which is impossible, animals do not fly, unless they have wings, then they
do, so then flying is possible. The point being, that the essence of an organic form
defines the nature of that form, and in so doing sets the creature apart from what hitherto
had been natural. In humans it is religion that personifies human biological nature, by
separating humans off from all that has gone before in the mammalian domain, by
turning humans into a fully fledged superorganic animal, thus making the impossible
possible, and thus we came to be.
So, while we speak in derogatory terms of the dualism of religion, and take up an
argument like this by Sokoloff by turning his argument around and making religion the
villain of the piece, we, as scientist, know that everything is natural and ordained by
nature, and as such is positive, in the sense of being constructive, or good. So, the
dualism is created by religion, science reveals this, and so science creates the problem,
not by conflicting with reality, but by clashing with the long established religion which
has a functional role in the reality of our existence.
The scientific solution is to recognise that there is no such thing as an individual,
there is only the social organism. A science liberated from the oppression of religious
authority would not be dualistic. It is all very well to whiter on about Western
philosophy being derived from Plato, And why is this so ! Because the bloody priests
make it so. All duality stems from religion, science, done right, is inherently monistic,
what else could it be for crying out loud ? This is why the war between religion and
science has been the central issue throughout all human history, as Kidd has it. But
Sokoloff argues for unity by seeking to end the struggle for unity, so that unity, as
sponsored by him, can exist only in the form of a slave identity forced upon humanity by
Jewish authority which brooks no dissent. This is why we are plagued by confusion in
life, especially if we are educated, caring and intelligent. It has taken me over forty years
to discover a simple truth that was well known a hundred years ago, a truth which it took
world wars and monstrous terror to destroy, and which is suppressed relentlessly by
people like Sokoloff. For religion to rule the trick employed here, which the above quote
exploits, is to simply deny access to true knowledge, leaving people flailing around in
misery for a century or two, until they have no choice but to come back to the only place
where comfort can be found, the lies which form the cage and shackles of Jewish
identity. The state of confusion produced by leaving a void in society, by preventing
science from explaining human existence, typified the sixties and seventies, and this is
the state of affairs Sokoloff describes. He personifies the slave master trying to explain
to a slave that if they would only bend over and take the will of their master then the
terrible pain they are causing themselves would end ! Make life into a living hell, and
leave only one escape route open, this mechanism is the essence of Judaism, and it rules
every detail of social process, and the means by which this mechanism is applied is the
law. As ever, anyone promoting religion, in any shape or form, is a sick degenerate
criminal, to be hated and despised by any decent person. The only excuse they have is
that as birds were made to fly so humans were made to be slaves, and as such the priest,
in trying to degrade freedom and impose slavery, is only doing what comes naturally,
they are honouring God.
 After my marvellous success in obtaining a good piece on Lilienfeld from
Wikipedia the other day I decided to give Schäffle a shot today, 06/03/08, and joy of
joys, I got a belting little essay which begins thus :

Darwin and the Body Politic : Schaffle, Veblen, and the

Shift of Biological Metaphor in Economics
Sophus A. Reinert,

University of Cambridge

May 2006

Analogy, which offers to many an author stimulus

for occasional witty comparisons, becomes with
writers of the sort referred to the axis upon which
everything turns—Adam Smith

A long tradition of thought in Western political philosophy compares the

body of man to the political body. Known as the “body politic,” this
anthropomorphic rendering of the public sphere enforced the interdependence of
individuals in society—the harmony of the human body mirroring the assumed
natural harmony of humanity. This traditional cosmological frame of reference
was, with the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, overcome by the
emergence of evolutionary social systems. Both theories had their roots in
biology, although with different dynamics at fundamentally different levels of
abstraction. While the old tradition used the metaphor of biology to catalogue the
concrete equivalency of parts connecting the body to society, the new way of
thinking abandoned this taxonomic exercise to conceptualise society in the same
natural forces of selection and change as evolutionary biology. One was based on
principles of harmony and normality, the other on disharmony and relativity.
There was, however, as in the Kuhnian model of a paradigm-shift, a transitional
period when Darwinian concepts were internalised in the pre-existing model of
society. Albert Schäffle [1831-1903] can fruitfully be considered the last major
representative of the old trajectory of thought, and Thorstein Veblen [1853-1929]
the first of the new. Both writers are characterized by a sociological approach to
the economic sphere and were conscious outsiders to what now would be
considered the mainstream of their field. By comparing and contrasting their uses
of biological metaphors and the places these occupied in their larger visions of
society and the economy, I will explore some of the tensions generated in late
nineteenth century political philosophy by the dramatic change in biological
paradigm—in other words by Darwin’s first encounter with the body politic.
 Of course when I say ‘belting’ I mean by this to indicate my delight at finding a
discussion of our leading characters from nineteenth century science, before the
theocracy had managed to totally eradicate scientific thought from all aspects of
academic life. Reinert picks a fabulous subject, but his intention is to ridicule it, not
intentionally, as a modern unit of superorganic being he has no means of thinking freely
about the questions he deals with and no means of seeing past the mirror of his own
linguistic programming, derived from the superorganic mind ensconced in the
institutional elements of the exoskeletal framework.
This is the first ever selections from Schäffle I have found, again, as I said
regarding Lilienfeld I suppose there must be some in Coker, but I have never read the
book and neither have I checked these authors recently, Coker is a must have text book
on the social organism but he is an enemy of the idea. Thanks to Reinert’s quotes from
Schäffle I can see that his organicism was ludicrous, just like Spencer’s, although I did
not notice as a dashed through the text document just now any reference to the fact that
Schäffle produced a shortened version of his original treatise and he expressly denied
being an organicist.
So on what grounds must we immediately condemn Reinert ? He begins with a
condemnation of analogical reasoning, for a start. The significance of this is that the war
against the science of humanity which has to be based upon the idea that humans are a
superorganic form of mammal was largely waged from the standpoint of flawed
analogical reasoning as personified by Spencer, and obviously others like Schäffle, whom
Reinert notes was never translated into English. Reinert even mentions Lilienfeld, but
once you have named Schäffle this is not too surprising. So the indoctrinated stance is
revealed immediately, we know we are going to get nothing from this man before we
begin, nothing proper, but that is no reason why we should not pick the meagre bones
from the item and use the item itself as a means to attack the theocracy according to our
usual method of pointing out the failings of the high ranking priests trained by academia
to undermine science today.
This is economics too, which is nice because I do have a few books in which the
social organism was used in relation to economics, indeed the one book I have in English,
or American even, which uses the idea of the social organism blatantly in its title, in an
economic treatise. Sadly however it is a right load I don’t know what, The Social
Organism and its Natural Laws by Henry Rawie, 1926, has a title unrelated to its
contents, as I remember it from a couple of years ago, and I am not inclined to try again
to find some sense in this odd item. So it is good to see economists entering the
discussion, as we have seen modern sociologist being obliged to take notice of these
scientific ideas too, as in Human by Nature.
We must concede that Spencerian modes of thinking, which from Reinert we can
see Schäffle emulated, do invite contempt, but it is clear from the first words of this essay
that Reinert is interested in this topic from an academic point of view, and no even
remotely drawn to ask whether it has any validity in actual fact, despite recognising, in
common with all commentaries of the type, that the biological model has long inspired
model of social order. There can be no more dismissive word applied by would be
scientists to generalised ideas than “anthropomorphic”. So we have the opening attack on
analogy from the godfather of economics, followed by the atomic bomb of verbal ridicule
used against the idea of the social organism. Not a good start for science and reason.
Bloody marvellous for religion and ignorance though. So full credit to Reinert, he is
going to go far, and being at Cambridge that is likely anyway ; no greater centre of
theocratic fascism ever existed. Still, there is no such thing as bad publicity and this
applies to our idea too, for remember the whole point of the Nazi regime and the
holocaust, accordingly to our, perhaps somewhat focused line of sight, was to protect the
Jews from the genuine science of sociology, and thus make the idea of the social
organism taboo. The idea is still taboo, but my impression has been that the preferred
stance is not to let it see the light of day, so the pleasure of finding an essay like this
might be likened to getting suddenly finding yourself getting your teeth kicked in while
stuck at the bottom of dark hole where you have lain in isolation for a decade or two, a
real pleasure, and not masochistic at all for if someone can be bothered to smack your
head in after so long left for dead : the prospect of coming back to life is the one thing we
must take from such mindless attacks as this by a Cambridge academic.

So what is wrong with these people, why can they not see what we can see ?
Remember, we have the great benefit of being able to look to a time long past in which
an identical set of circumstances prevailed. In the ancient world the equivalent situation
would of existed if there was ever a person who wrote exactly as I do but in the context
of astronomy. Such a person might of been an atheist, such a person might of worked out
for themselves that the earth might be in motion, and then they will of chased down the
ideas of authors who proclaimed that this idea was correct and offered accounts to this
effect. Then this former realist will of found that all around, wherever he looked,
everyone with a voice opposed the idea that the earth moved. And if he tackled
individuals one on one, or joined groups where astronomy was the topic, or philosophy,
he will of found that while people might listen momentarily, there was absolutely no
interest in such an idea. Convinced that he was right to think the earth was not the centre
of the universe and it was obvious the earth moved, and recognising that the position of
the earth was bound up with all sorts of political and personal factors, he would of
realised that the brilliant, highly educated people all around just could not break through
the bubble that was their mind, their consciousness. And in doing this, this person would
be in exactly the same position in which I find myself today.
The beauty of having a bang up to date essay touching on the work of a notorious
nineteenth century organicist author, is that this gives us a person, in the flesh, to hold up
as our object of blind ignorance, and so focuses our attention on the nature of the
problem, we can ask, Why Reinert simply absorbs the conventional wisdom of his day,
accepts the convention that modern scientific ideas are superior to those of the past, ideas
which have been thoroughly discredited and abandoned, and ridiculed to boot ?
Why ? There is an assumption here of monumental proportions. Yesterday, or
the day before, I was rummaging about in one of my recent acquisitions from which I
have abstracted some content above ..... now which one was it ? Bloody hell ...... let me
see ..... well the thing was this, the author offered ..... it is coming, coming ......... no ........
he offered some nice references to conclude his religious diatribe, and included some
earlier, late nineteenth century works, on the origin and nature of religion, which he said
were old fashioned and out of date, but still worth looking at ; naturally these were the
ones I went for straightaway, but which bloody book was it ? Hell’s teeth, this
philosophy lark would be a whole lot easier if I had half soddin brain to work with.
Never mind, you get the point. It is standard practice in our so called scientific world to
assume that things always get better, knowledge always improves. Theoretically this
progressive improvement is inherent in the scientific method, as sure as the flow of time,
as tomorrow follows today so perfect knowledge comes on the morrow.
Its a fine fairy tale, and, as I say, one heck of an assumption. However, while the
modern academic is somewhat in a bind as regards this predicament, because it is
inherently impossible for an academic not to assume that knowledge improves, if they did
not make this assumption then this would be tantamount to saying that their work was
inferior to that which it replaced, for ourselves, because our whole project conceives of
society as one massive fraud, requiring the creation of a parallel science, an atheist
science to run alongside the theocratic science that has to exist to enable religion to exist,
we are obliged to assert something which at its heart directly opposes this sentiment.
And indeed it has been a much played out theme in all my work that knowledge gets
worse. But although this it is correct to say that our argument necessarily says that
science get worse, the situation is by no means as simple as it sounds when stated so
bluntly.
This particular work is not focused upon the manner in which science has been
subverted, nor has it made the opposite side of the coin, how religion has survived, its
central thread. This work has instead turned to the kind of work that has been available,
it is a kind of archaeological examination of the academic stratigraphy pertaining to our
subject, seeking to pick out works in profusion, examining them like finds unearthed on a
Time Team programme, using each find, as we go, to expound upon the correct scientific
conception of humans as animals, evolved on earth, with a natural nature, and to criticise
the opposite point of view promoted by science, that says humans are divine beings living
under a blue sky, beyond which there is nothing.

Reinert is inside the bubble of collective consciousness. What would it take for
him to be otherwise ? We must understand, indeed it is precisely the object of this work
to make it possible for people to understand, exactly how this situation has come about.
The whole point of everything we are doing here, and in all my other works, is to make it
known how there was once a great scientific idea, which was fatal to religion, and which
was erased to be replaced by another image of scientific reality. We clearly have to
believe that the subversion of knowledge on this scale is possible, and so we cannot at the
same time express genuine amazement that today the bubble has been inflated, leaving
only the mirrored side of its inner wall there to be seen, an inner wall that reflects what is
in placed into our minds, just as the ant taken as a pupae by a slave maker ant, wakes in
an alien nest as a slave and receives its mind from that superorganic physiology to which
it has been transferred because its physiology evolved to make it emerge as a blank discs
ready to be have its identity written to it, so that this slave ant then looks about its world
and find the image of its mind imprinted in its brain is all it can see when it ‘looks’
around, it sees outside what it sees inside, inside its says ‘me, me’, looks about itself and
sees reflected ‘you, you’, to which it replies, with joy and satisfaction, ‘me, me’, and so it
is for Reinert when he reads the modern accounts of human sociology that tell him he is a
human being, he sees ‘me’ all around him, and all around him everywhere he looks the
world shouts back at him, reassuringly, ‘you’.
 And the whole point about our labour of love aimed at revealing the true nature of
the world in which we live is that the inflated bubble of fraudulent knowledge which is
imbibed by us as we grow and then floats all around us as we live, is that it is constructed
with the minute attention to detail found in a fossil imprint of a past life form. So even
when a modern, advanced being, is brought face to face with the truth, so that reality
stares them in the face, in the shape of the lost idea of the social organism, they will find
this idea embedded in a surrounding concretion of accompanying ideas that were
excreted by the superorganism in the process of subverting science and extruding its
substitute. So that when faced with the likes of Schaffle today, the enquiring young man
does not find he has hit upon an idea that stands out on its own, forcing him to come to
terms with a shocking revelation, no, he finds the idea already bound and gagged, ready
to take another kicking, he kicks it in the teeth, as he is supposed to do, and thinks he has
done a service to knowledge in the process. And so the superorganic process rolls on, the
linguistic flux generated by the linguistic force derived from human linguistic
physiology, drives the physiology of the organism by connecting directly, and intimately,
with the cells which form the elemental parts of its body.
It was one of the delights of Reinert’s piece that he mentions the various notions
of the ‘person as cell’ of superorganism, noting that organicists actually thought of the
person as literally being the cells of the superorganism in precisely the same sense as a
cell found throughout nature :

The Anatomy of Schäffle’s Body Politic

Society, Schäffle therefore proclaims, is made of the same ideal tissues as

man. Five “social tissues” form Schäffle’s body politic, corresponding to the
osseous (i.e. the bones), tegumentary (i.e. the skin), vascular (i.e. the vessels
carrying fluids), muscular, and nervous organic tissues of the biological body
respectively. They are the locative (i.e. the material, connecting the body politic to
the soil), the protective, commercial, administrative, and psycho-spiritual.
Whereas many of Schäffle’s biological metaphors were inspired by the earlier
work of Paul von Lilienfeld [1829-1903], their basic social units differed
considerably. Whereas Lilienfeld affirmed the individual human being was the
social counterpart of the biological cell, Schäffle affirmed his sociological
approach to economics by arguing “the family” to be “for the social body what
the cell is for the organic body.”

(Reinert, p. 6)

Ah, excuse me, a glut of riches today overwhelms me :

Lilienfeld and Worms both agree that individual men constitute the cells of the
social organism, and both take this in a literal biological sense, that they represent
the “real” cells as made known by Schleiden and Schwann. But the first of these
 authors maintains that the individual men in society taken together only constitute
the nervous system of society, and that society is devoid of all the other systems
of the animal body.

(Ward, in Wikipedia, p 3)

I have conflated the two documents that I looked at a few hours ago because they
touched on the same topic, the nature of people as cells of a social being. So I was
thinking of how Ward had actually named the men who first described the cell as a
biological unit, when I said Reinert tells us Schaffle meant individuals were literally a
biological cell, as we can see from the actual sections, the situation was not exactly so.
Ward was a contemporary sociologist so he would of been in immediate touch with the
influences pervading society at the time our idea was live, hence it is not surprising that
he is more specific. We may also note that Comte, as we see in the quote from Evans-
Pritchard, denies the existence of the individual as a unit and makes the family the
fundamental element of the social organism
I too freely refer to the person as a cell of the superorganism, if we are to call the
social extent a ‘superorganism’ in the first place, then I can think of nothing more
legitimate than calling the ‘person’ a cell of this body. However, I am not only not
inspired or influenced by biology in my reasoning, I cannot even begin to imagine how
anyone could be. In saying this I am perhaps for the first time ever, just getting an
inkling of the difference between the nineteenth century exponents of the view that
society was a social organism and my recognition of the same reality today. It can be no
coincidence that I sense such a feeling of connection as I get my two most perfect
documents on the leading exponents of this idea after five years of looking, brief as they
are, it is so difficult to find anything written in English discussing these people in a
sensible and serious manner. And none of their work is available, my own attempts at
translation I do not count as they rely on a machine.

So even those people who were the great exponents of the idea that society was a
biological phenomenon do not appear to of really perceived the true significance of this
idea from a scientific point of view which makes it a normal reality, Comte, Spencer,
Lilienfeld, Schaffle and Worms, all devoted their lives to this idea, and none even began
to suspect its true meaning.
This failure has been obvious enough and frequently been discussed by me. I
have attributed it to the primitive state of science, in respect to modern knowledge, rather
as we see Comte excusing his forebears whom he nonetheless much admired, to the
undeveloped state of biology, believing that the advance in biology was what opened the
way for his grand entrance upon the stage of life. For us the shift would have to be
centred upon anthropology, physical anthropology, and biology, specifically genetics. As
I have said elsewhere, it is the major advances in these two fields that have allowed a
man born in the post world war period, where knowledge of the genetic basis of life and
the fossil remains of men was coming into its own as I reached adulthood, that allows me
to find in the idea that humans are a superorganism a very natural and normal explanation
for life as we know it that is rooted firmly in science as it applies to ourselves.
 And now this allows us to return to the point raised a moment ago, regarding .....
what ? ......... Reinert, yes, ...... anybody would think I’d been smoking weed or
something ....... yes, so as these organicists failed to see past the bubble of their time, so
we today are equally contained within the same conceptual space. How to see beyond it
is the question. Speaking as the one who has seen beyond, I freely admit to the difficulty,
I am sure I have written elsewhere about how the bubble burst for me, I will not repeat
myself now. More apposite at this juncture is the normalisation of the idea. We can see
from the section where Reinert describes how Schaffle conceived of social physiology
that such a model is cumbersome and basically worthless, Reinert’s say :

Schäffle’s chimera might have been compelling to some, but its seeming lack of
practical value led one of his most ardent contemporary critics [Thon, “The Present
Status of Sociology in Germany”, p. 728] to ask the damning question: “of what good is
all this ?”

(Reinert, p 10)

Quite. And the whole point is that the nature of the world in which these people
lived made it impossible to do any better, because, in order to do a science of humanity
justice you have make the destruction of religion a primary objective, there is no other
way. It is not as if this fact was not more than evident in all that the nineteenth century
intellectual world stood for, it was ! No, the problem was quite simply the sheer power
of the theocracy.
Look at what I write, when I go to town on religion I come smack bang up against
the Jews. Even this did in fact occur in the nineteenth century, not within academic
circles of anything approximating to a scientific nature in anything I have ever come
across. And again this topic has been a major element of our work. Science was bursting
the bubble of Jewish identity, this culminated in the world wars and Nazis, and so the
power of the theocracy which caused the bubble to resist the penetrating minds of
nineteenth century scientists has been transposed into a modern expression, the taboo
against discussing the Jews from a biological point of view which we have already noted
above is well recognised, and stated in Human by Nature.

So that when we talk rather sophisticatedly of people’s self perception being taken
inwards, from outside themselves, and then reflected back at them again, when they look
around, reinforcing what went inside in the first place, we have to realise that this
description of the situation that makes it impossible for anyone to penetrate that ever so
fragile sounding bubble of collective illusion, describes the fabric of which the bubble is
composed, telling us that this bubble of knowledge surrounding us is in effect the
substance of our consciousness.
I think we can all agree that while a fabric of consciousness sounds frail and
tenuous, the fact is that, in reality, if what we see in our consciousness is what we see,
then if we see a brick wall that is not there, and we are required to pass through it, then to
all intents and purposes the tenuous consciousness of this nonexistent something in our
consciousness, makes that immaterial nothing as substantial as any material something
could ever hope to be. And this is precisely the situation in which we all find ourselves
when faced with the subject in hand, and we see this fact spelt out in the hands of our
contemporary thinker for whom the bubble of academic fiction is as the blue sky might
be above his head, little suspecting the deep dark blackness that lies immediately beyond
that blueness, and not suspecting at all, the absolute truth of human nature that lies not
beyond, but in the eyes of the beholder. All Reinert needs to do is stare a moment,
vacantly, being open, letting his preconceptions fade, and then the idea held in the
organicist literature could flick forward into three dimensional form, penetrating his
consciousness and revealing to him what was revealed to me, humans are a species of
superorganic mammal, this is the true scientific solution to all our questions :
OBVIOUSLY !!!
As we have discussed, the linguistic force arising from linguistic physiology is
what extends the reach of nature to allow energy to flow toward the social domain and
build superorganic physiology, so that the linguistic achieves this result by generating a
behavioural programme which symbolises reality by creating conceptual images of
reality, and inherent in this capacity for creative generation of images, in conjunction
with the mechanical capacity allied to this linguistic capacity in the shape of human
dexterity, linguistic force is able to generate conceptions which can be turned into
material realities too. But, all of this requires that we individuals hang as bodies from our
brains, dependant upon the images they contain for our consciousness of reality. This
makes us something other than ourselves, but, as we saw when discussing the symbolic
nature of words, this curious state of affairs arises because we take words and their
products, ideas and knowledge, at face value, so we think that because a word ‘unnatural’
exists and makes sense that there is actually something in reality that can be called
unnatural, and there is not !
We hang from our brains, because the mental images in our brains that dominate
the uppermost flux of our consciousness detach us from our collective being by telling us
we are individuals. It serves the organization of the superorganic physiology to have us
so detached at the upper most levels of consciousness so that we can operate
independently within the body of the organism to which we belong. But the reality is that
we are as imbedded in our superorganic body as an army ant is embedded in the bivouac
its makes with its fellows by linking bodies as one into a giant structure, as we sometimes
have the pleasure of seeing on wildlife programmes. This idea evokes the subconscious
of Fraud, but of course such schemes are religious, political, not scientific, not real.
According to the description just given our full consciousness is what imbeds our bodies
into the flesh of the superorganism, and we have said the real self of the individual hangs,
unawares, from this state of full consciousness. If we think about, this illogical inversion
of our experience makes perfect sense, for if the whole of knowledge is about inducting
us unwittingly into being part of a superorganism then, if this is the true situation, and we
do not have any real idea of it, then this can only mean that the rich life’s we enjoy full of
experience, must in fact be an inverted tip of the iceberg.
Now then, this idea of the brain being a kind of nodule that implants itself into the
fabric of the superorganism through the medium of a linguistic programme that holds us
in place within the social structure provides us with a nice model for explaining the
evolution of the human brain, along with all its attributes, for this is a tricky problem to
work out, but under the influence of this functional scheme of we have the representation
of a physical environment, the superorganic physiology, made real in the form of a
linguistic, or symbolic-cum-cultural programme, evolving toward a linguistic
programme, which relates to one specific organ of facilitation, the brain. So, as the brain
increases in size, the body of the individual withers in its animal capacity, and the head
becomes more and more deeply embedded in the superorganic physiology that this
process of capacity for symbolisation represents. And in accord with this model, our
consciousness, while increasing in its overall capacity, becomes forever more and more
projected into the fabric of superorganic structure, so that we see more, but we are unable
to see outside the inside of the superorganic being. Accordingly, a growing
superorganism must build structure that enables a state of balance to persist between this
capacity for consciousness as a function, and an absolute limit of this capacity for
expression. And this is essentially what we have been talking about as we discussed the
work of Reinert, so clever, so well educated and full of experience, yet utterly unable to
see past the end of his nose where the bubble of collective knowledge brings his vision to
a point.
This model of the human brain seen as an engine of superorganic growth, can be
likened to that of any ordinary engine defined by its ability to generate power, or handle
energy, within which, at the same time there must be a means to contain it the energy
generated. For any engine to be of use, to do useful work, the energy within it must be
able to be contained, and thus managed, otherwise whatever capacity the engine has to
generate useful energy would escape through a natural process of diffusion. We have
admitted that all things are natural, atomic bombs are natural, car engines, steam engines,
all these artificial things are natural, according to a real scientific conception of reality.
And contrary to the limited capacity of an Evans-Pritchard, this universal use of the word
‘natural’ is shown to be exactly what we need in order to accommodate humans within a
natural scheme of existence.
In our engine-brain the energy is captured and fixed in the form of information,
the brain is an information engine therefore. If this principle applies to humans then it
must apply to all brains wherever they are found, and if the nucleus of a cell is the engine
of the cell, then this indicates how physiologists, biologists and biochemists could
develop this line of reasoning. No doubt much thinking along these lines has already
been done, but I have no books to hand on this topic now, although I feel I have
discovered some in the past but that I did no buy them. But we are interested in the
highest level of speculation concerned with the nature of our brains relative to the
superorganic being that we say is the true human organism. So we want to think about
the fuel that this brain-engine works on, and we say it is information, but more than that,
in humans this fuel has been refined into linguistic form, and this ties in nicely with our
notion of a linguistic force being responsible for the formation of superorganic
physiology.
Not that we are not getting bogged down in inane ideas about bodily physiology
being projected into the domain of social structure, we are more concerned to understand
social structure as we know it and to conceive of how nature has evolved our form in
such a way that it dictates the form of the social structure. We are saying that the brain is
an engine and information in the form of linguistic product is the fuel that generates
work, and this is a living body, so the product of work is living fabric, exoskeletal fabric.
The fabric of the body has to be related to the engine providing the power, so the
relationship between the brain function and the social being must revolve around the
generation of energy and its distribution. We have already noted that generating energy
is inherently linked to the containment of energy, and in a living being this means a
structural containment which controls distribution. From these basic principles of
organic energy, related to the evolution of the linguistically empowered human brain
relative to the social structure which it evolved to create, we can roughly speculate about
the nature and form of the social structure that comes into existence.
We have said that the brain must be allowed to increase its capacity to generate
information, but that capacity must be contained within a structure, from what we have
said we can add that the social structure is then the structure intended to contain the
energy generated by the brain. The point to bring in here is that when we speak of the
brain as an engine we have been doing so in the singular sense of a single ideal brain, but
of course the real situation means that the brain or each individual is obliged to function
as an engine acting in perfect unison with all other brains with which it is associated. So,
going back to the notion of the brain as an evolving engine, we have in this scenario a
model relating the capacity of the brain to handle information, which we can say is
synonymous with our capacity for consciousness, because the capacity for consciousness
is a measure of capacity to handle information, directly to the complexity of social
structures. But in making this link between the capacity of the brain to handle
information and the complexity of social structure we are not here talking about the
single ideal brain, now, when we bring the complexity of social structure into the
equation too, we have shifted away from the ideal brain as a unit, and we are concerned
with the sum of brains linked to the complexity of social structure. The individual ideal
brain is now reduced to the true status of a uniform cellular unit within a corporate
physiology unified by a common information flux.
And so, from this model of brain-engine social structure dynamics we are able to
deduce the precise form of social development relative to the utilisation of brain capacity,
because we know that the sum of the above principles means that social structure must
evolve by developing means of linking brain-engines into ever more complex structures
under one directive programme. The fuel the engine uses is information that synthesised
into a symbolic form that comes generally under the heading of ‘knowledge’, so that the
knowledge generated by the brain-engine produces social structure that is empowered by
evolving knowledge that produces ever more complex social structure. So now we have
a relationship between the brain-engine and the social structure mediated by a
dynamically variable information flux in the form of knowledge. And we know from
everyday experience that this abstract model is precisely what causes every detail of our
social lives to take the form it does, and to be animated as it is. The crucial form of the
knowledge flux organizing the containment, and hence the utilisation of the energy
generated by the brain-engine, is identity. Knowledge imparting identity is what defines
social structure within which all activity takes place.
How far removed are we from the direct comparison of the person to a cell within
the body ? And yet how well have we advanced the justification of the denomination of
the person as the cellular unit of the superorganism ?
In actual fact we have stuck to a biological model of a cell, but instead of utilising
the crude idea of a cell as a building block of tissues from which social equivalents of
organs and tissues are made, as we see Schaffle saw fit to suggest, we have, without even
trying, taken our everyday knowledge of the inner workings of the cell to make the inner
workings of the person become the inspiration for our representation of the person as a
cellular unit of the superorganism. We have stripped away the irrelevant outer casing of
the person and homed in on the nitty-gritty of the cellular unit, the brain, which we have
reduced to the status of a fuel cell, communicating with the body of the organism via the
its own structural fabric, the body of the person to which it belongs, the substance that we
know as ourselves, damn liberty, talk about alien invaders ! And so it is in this sense that
we find ourselves reduced to a husk, hanging from the root of a brain stem, the substance
of which is in effect the actual living tissue of the superorganism, so that our brains
belong the superorganism, and in order to keep us happy, this brain allocates a portion of
its capacity to our existence, and it is this portion that gives us our self consciousness, so
that the superorganism effectively exudes a drip feed of mental stimulant in the form of a
conscious image of individual being that we experience with an intensity that is all we
know, it consumes us, it is us !
It is fun to pay with these ideas, and as we do so we veer rapidly into the land of
abstraction, as we do so we cannot help but find ourselves reminded forcefully of so
much artistic work that plays on this kind of reasoning about the self. To adhere to a
scientific analysis of this social interchange of individual consciousness, individual
consciousness projected into the social fabric, we would of course say this is part of the
process of implanting an identity that is then reinforced when the implant looks out to see
if it can find itself outside, where unbeknownst to itself, is where it bloody well came
from !
It is easy to get into a mess of intertwined, over elaboration, when playing with
such ideas, and this is exactly what artistic minded people do in the act of producing the
art we love so much. Art might be seen as the finest juice of selfishness that the
superorganism exudes to feed our sense of self, keeping us blissfully happy in our
purpose as its slave cells, by using art as a soporific to obscure the reality of our organic
nature from us, behind a screen of mental imagery. But our objective is only to make
sense of our existence in terms of what science tells us we must be as an organism. So it
is counterproductive for us to get carried away with an over imaginative attempt to
elucidate this relationship between our consciousness and the social structure with which
our minds connect us, making us part of an organic whole. It has been a primary aspect
of our work to elucidate the function of religion in purely organic terms, and this
conception of the superorganism feeding us a sense of self to beguile us into being its
unwitting extensions exactly matches the place in which we have put religion, standing as
religion does between our mundane conscious and our intuitive consciousness of there
being something greater than ourselves which creates us, and upon which we depend for
everything, something which knows our innermost thoughts, and which loves us and
demands that we love, and serve it. We call this thing God, in religious speak, but in
science speak it is the superorganism.
In speaking in such abstract terms about our personal selves we have presenting
the conceptual equivalent of the scientist most abstract visual tools. When pulling
together data to form a picture we can comprehend the scientist will often use visual aids
such as graphs and diagrams that represent a mass of data in an orderly fashion that
shows how systems change or work. The above highly abstract verbal representation of
the human person as a biological element of a superorganic organism is an attempt to do
something similar.

Lets take advantage of the “damning question” posed by one of Schäffle’s “most
ardent” critics and ask “of what good is all this ?”, of ourselves. The problem with
casting social form in the light of organic form is that all we get is a description, not an
explanation. At rock bottom the proposition that society can only be conceived of as a
true organic entity in the light of science arises because of the power of science to bring
all existence under one dynamic scheme. It is seeing this undeniable fact that led a man
like Comte to systematize the whole of knowledge according to a scientific conception, in
which he could do nothing else but make sociology an extension of biology. No one can
deny the veracity of this approach, and no one does, the trick used by the priesthood is to
develop lines of argument and bodies of false knowledge that segregate humans from
reality and make humans their own creators, a self evidently ludicrous proposition for
which there is no justification, other than as part of the act of deception that nature has
evolved to develop the potential of individuals to act as the elementary units of a
superorganic being.
To address our worst enemies worst question then we must be able to answer it by
showing that our explanation is good for the science of humanity, anthropology, and
good for the science of sociology, because it connects what we know about our own
existence with the basic premise that what we know must of been created by nature
without any help or influence from our conscious selves. Just taking elements of the
social structure and labelling them according to their approximate likeness to the
functionality of the parts of the organic body does nothing, it is useless. But when we
take the basic ideas of biology and reduce them to their abstract essence and then extend
them from the somatic body to the social body, by making genetic information extend
into linguistic information, whereby both strands of information act as carriers of
information via the creation of structure they generate in their own respective domains,
we provide a deep model reaching back from the material structure of society to the
physiology of the somatic organism understood as an evolving organic object.
We are then able to bring in highly abstract conceptions of our own most
personal, and hence most precious, qualities, as we speak of linguistic force, a purely
natural force, existing in nature, created by nature, that creates all social structure and
dictates all social behaviour. None of these nineteenth century advocates of humans as
part of nature developed such ideas as this. In a way Kidd’s unique realisation that it is
religion that acts as the binding agent creating the social organism is the closest that
anyone got, which is why we must place his Social Evolution at the pinnacle of all works
produced by humanity throughout all time, until the arrival of my works, but since my
works remain known only to me, and there is no prospect of this changing, my work is of
no consequence. Besides, by comparison with what I have to say Kidd, the best there is,
says absolutely nothing. There is a book on its way from America which I bought
because the contents indicated the use of the idea that language created religion, but until
it arrives i will not be able to see what the line of reasoning is, and it looked religious,
and there was only one copy so if it does not arrive we are screwed. In any case I would
stake my life that it says nothing of any great moment, in all that we do, as real seekers
after knowledge we are doomed to forever read the thoughts of children. But the material
these all powerful children have access to, and the superb intellectual training they have
the benefit of makes the works they produce the source of all our knowledge, bar the
pinch of sane reasoning that, added to the mix, rearranges everything into a coherent
whole, turning a mess into a masterpiece.
I have never seen the name Thon before, and do not know this work, but I will
look for it when next visiting the library, so I do not have the benefit of seeing the context
in which this critic dismisses Schäffle’s ideas. The point for us is to ask in what sense
anyone has the right to ask what good a set of ideas may be. Scientists appearing in the
public domain of television sometimes have to defend the abstruse nature of their work,
being faced with the same question, which may be phrased slightly differently as What us
is it ? The standard reply is that knowledge is always worth having and that it is
impossible to foresee the benefits that may arise in the future from fundamental work
done in the present on the determination of scientific facts. Therefore the immense
amount of work that goes into discovering hominid fossils and related evidence of early
ancestors of our kind is never seriously faced with this kind of interrogation. It is
generally accepted that such work is of value, if only because it satisfies our desire to
know about ourselves. However, we have seen how the Darwinian imposition shocked
the world by suggesting that apes were the ancestors of humans, so that the search for
proto human forms can be placed in the artificial jigsaw puzzle generated under the
influence of Darwin, so this work is supported by the establishment as a way of
understanding the evolutionary relationship between modern apes and man, and then fed
to the public as the fascinating story of our existence.
So there is a well established context in which ideas are accepted as being of
value for their own sake

Not only in the present treatise, but throughout his great five-volume work, and, later
than either, in a pamphlet recently issued, he denies that society can properly be
called a superorganism, as Mr. Spencer proposes, and insists that it is in very truth
an organism. But what manner of organism does he make it out to be ? An
organism consisting entirely of a “social nervous system” and “social intercellular
structure.” . . . . . But the first of these authors [Lilienfeld and Worms] maintains
that the individual men in society taken together only constitute the nervous
system of society, and that society is devoid of all the other systems of the animal
body. In their stead we have the intercellular structure, which, as he says, is
produced by the nervous system, or, as the biologists would say, secreted by it.
And what is this intercellular structure of society ? As I understand him it
consists chiefly of the material (and perhaps spiritual) capital of society, the
product of human labor and thought. Sometimes he seems to give it somewhat the
scope that Mr. Spencer gives to society itself, as including the soil, water, air,
flora, and fauna, in short, the environment of society. But if this is all intercellular
structure and is only the product of the nervous system and not part of that system
itself, where is the consistency in speaking, as both our authors do, of telegraph
lines as analogues of nerves ? (Ward 1897 : 260-261).

(Reinert, p. 3)
 While it is very difficult to make good use of this abbreviated representation of
Lilienfeld’s ideas, this selection is worth dropping in here because it has a certain
empathy with the effort we are making at this point to try and relate the state of
consciousness we experience to the physiology of the superorganic structure, in which it
must be said people might be likened to the nervous substance of the body in which we
would then be obliged to think there was no other equivalent animal like physiology.
However our own rather more sophisticated reasoning on the matter, in which we extract
the brain of the individual from the body and reduce the body to the status of a structural
extension of the brain which has been reduced to a neuron of the superorganic being,
does automatically make some differentiation between the material consisting of
individuals, for we make the brains exclusively the substance of the nervous system, and
the extension of the brains, our bodies excluding our brains, then become the muscular
framework, the whole existing within the exoskeletal fabric that is what seems to be
being reached for in the description Ward gives of Lilienfeld’s and Worm’s ideas in the
last two sentences of the above. All in all then we can see how it appears that Lilienfeld
was searching along the same logical lines as we are driven to do, trying to make sense of
society in terms of human individuals as true elemental parts of a superorganic whole.
He just needed to take the matter to a deeper, more extensive level of speculation. But as
ever it seems to me that the key to achieving this deeper comprehension of the problem
relies upon making an overt attempt to produce an atheistic science which makes the
eradication of religion is primary objective, an act of demolition, necessary to the
foundation of science, a pretence of which we even see in the deeply religious scientist
Descartes, who made his premise of beginning with nothing and starting with all there
was, himself, the pathetic imitation of a scientific method.
We repeatedly have to remind ourselves that nothing real changes as a
consequence of new knowledge, no matter how much this knowledge may change our
conception of existence, so that, as we say, the earth did not suddenly start doing all the
things that the philosophers had said it would do if it were spinning when we discovered
the earth was indeed spinning, tress did not uproot, and such like. And this is yet another
one of the those occasions when we need to bring this thought to mind, because we have
just been descending into a highly detached view of the nature of our existence,
describing ourselves as brains with muscular ganglion attached which serve as the agents
of superorganic physiology, whereby our brains are best understood as being the true
living flesh of which the superorganism itself is composed, so that our brains do not
really belong to us, and all that ‘us’ can really refer to is an excretion of consciousness
which the superorganism exudes from the brain, in connection with the sensory apparatus
of the body to define the individual as a physiological unit of the superorganic body.
This description is an imaginative attempt to visualise our real nature in the light
of the fact that we know we do not exist as ends in ourselves and the true human animal
is a superorganism of which we are unwitting parts. The object of such a description is to
erase our individuality and to reduce us to functional parts, so it is inevitable that the
result is a highly detached image of the self as a mechanism. Even so, just as the trees
did not lose their grip of the soil when we discovered that the earth was spinning, so we
do not lose our sense of the reality of the self as an end in itself operating in a society that
exists for its sake, just because we learn that all of our self consciousness is nothing more
than a linguistic juice exuded to make us feel as though we exist as an end in ourselves.
There is only one real insurmountable difficulty posed by this scientific view of
our self, and that is that it forces God to materialise out of the ether and to become the
superorganic being of which we are a part. Religion, when all is said and done, pretty
much describes our self in identical terms as we have done when we say that the
superorganism exudes mental juice which gives us our consciousness, except instead of
using real terms for material forms that can be observed and measured and manipulated,
as w do, religion appears in the forms that we recognise. So, we recognise that the juice
of consciousness exuded by the superorganism appears in the form of a linguistic
programme which gives us our identity and dictates social form and activity, whereas
religion is the mental juice that we describe.
So nothing changes in as much as we continue to be here, living our lives in
society, but, religion is decoded by this insight and must be destroyed, so that the reality
created by our physiological being in the shape of the superorganism is destroyed by this
revelation, science must destroy religion. And we have seen it argued in a quote already
taken in this work that science cannot offer a means of bonding society, only an appeal to
our feelings can do this. But whether this is true or not is hard to say because it is of
course the job of the priest to ensure that this is the case, and in the process they of course
argue that this is the case because it is the case, as if they had no role in guaranteeing that
freedom can never be the foundation of our lives.

I have just read the full Wikipedia entry for Lilienfeld, 07/03/08, and I was very
impressed by the richness of its discussion, from which I have taken a dozen leads to
follow up in search of articles and books. Food for our discussion is to be found in the
section which discusses a meeting of sociologist in Paris in 1898 which took organicism
as its main theme. Here we find, well lets take the whole junk because it is really very
good, even if cutting and pasting from web pages into Word documents is a right pain.

In July of 1897, the Third Congress of the International Institute of Sociology at

the Sorbonne in Paris erupted with debate over the organic theory of societies. In
the capacity of the Institute’s president, Lilienfeld, then a senator in the Russian
parliament, travelled from Saint Petersburg and delivered the opening address on
the afternoon of Wednesday, July 21. Remarks and the reading of two papers
followed. The next day, Thursday, July 22, a paper by Lester F. Ward (not able to
attend the conference) on “Pain and Pleasure Economy” was read in the morning,
along with another paper by Italian sociologist Achille Loria. It was only after the
break for lunch that the debate over the organic theory began. Jacques Novicow
started by reading a paper in support of the theory. He was followed by Lilienfeld.
Next, Gabriel Tarde heavily critiqued Lilienfeld and Novicow, “and presented in
opposition to the organic theory a psychological theory of social life” (Worms
1898 : 110). The session adjourned for the evening, and discussion resumed the
next afternoon, Friday, July 23. Casimir de Kelles-Krauz opened the offensive
against the organic theory with a salvo of economic materialism. Ludwig Stein
then backed up Tarde and Kelles-Krauz with “the principles of the historical and
psychogenetic method of research” (Worms 1898: 111). The founder and general
secretary of the Institute, René Worms, next “tried to show something of the
exactness and utility of the analogy between organisms and society” (Worms
1898 : 111). Worms’s attempt, however, was rebuffed by S. R. Steinmetz.
Furthermore, though Raphael Garofalo, Charles Limousin, and C. N. Starcke
accepted the organic theory, they did so with reservations. The most withering
attack on the organic theory seemed to come from Nikolai Karéiev, who “showed
that this theory shared, together with Darwin’s social theory, economic
materialism and social psychic theories, the fate of all exclusive theories” (Worms
1898 : 111). Alfred Espinas then tried to salvage the theory by maintaining that
societies must “constitute organisms,” or else one would have “to abandon
altogether the idea of social life and social laws” (Worms 1898 : 111). Novicow
closed the section by reaffirming his faith in the organic theory, and Worms in his
report stated that, by and large, the congress had “been productive of the most
happy results” (Worms 1898 : 109).

Though these debates in Paris were characterized as “more animated” than usual
(Small 1898 : 412), a reviewer across the Atlantic seemed to take them lightly :

It would hardly be possible to arouse American sociologists to very lively controversy

over what remains in dispute. The men among us who make most use of the organic
concept are satisfied that their opponents disagree with them only verbally, so far as the
essential idea is concerned. Beyond that there remain merely differences of judgement
about details in employing the concept. Since these differences relate to details and not to
essentials, even the most zealous friends of the organic concept are satisfied that it can
now take care of itself. They are content to assume that it is taken for granted, and their
interest is transferred to other fields (Small 1898 : 412).

A couple of years earlier, the same reviewer, Albion W. Small, had also expressed
an optimistic outlook for organicism. Discussing both Lilienfeld’s and Schäffle’s
uses of society-organism analogies, Small wrote

the tracing of these analogies is not the essence of sociology, but merely the most vivid
method of presenting the phenomena of society in such form that the actual problems of
sociology will appear. The analogies and terms suggested by them are tools of research
and report, not solutions of problems.... The metaphors emphasize obvious analogies
between social relations and physiological relations. They are used as spurs to scientific
curiosity, so as to facilitate discovery of the limits of analogy, and thus of the
distinctively social phenomena (Small 1896 : 311).

An earlier critic, however, was not so sanguine. Émile Durkheim rejected

Lilienfeld’s ideas on both ideological and methodological grounds. Ideologically,
Durkheim objected that one could find in Lilienfeld’s Gedanken, “the
transformationist [evolutionary] hypothesis reconciled with the dogma of the
Holy Trinity” (Durkheim 1887a : 21) Methodologically, Durkheim stated that
“the sole object of Lilienfeld’s work is to show the analogies between societies
and organisms,” thus missing the point of seeing “in moral phenomena sui
 generis facts necessitating study in themselves, for themselves, by a special
method” (Durkheim 1887b : 16, note 17)

Reviewing Lilienfeld’s main French exposition of his ideas, La Pathologie

Sociale, Franklin H. Giddings a few years later echoed Durkheim’s criticism :

In the work of Dr. von Lilienfeld we have the first opportunity to judge whether the
biological conception of society can throw any new light on practical social questions.
That “the body politic” is subject to “disease” is a very ancient notion. But is anything
gained by taking a figure of speech literally and converting analogy into identity ?
Dr. von Lilienfeld’s pages are rich in learning and in wisdom. He has investigated
thoroughly and thought deeply ; and no one can dip into his chapters without being
impressed with the value of his reflections on the economic inequalities, the political
corruption, the moral degeneration, the educational imbecilities, the religious indifference
of the present day. A thousand hints are thrown out by the way on which statesmen and
reformers might well reflect. But there is nothing in the entire book that could not have
been better said in a simpler language than that of an ingeniously elaborated “social
pathology.” To describe fads and crazes, degeneracy, outbreaks of insanity, crime and
lubricity, as “anomalies of the social nervous system,” is only calculated to hasten the
wear and tear of the nervous systems of individuals ; and to argue that wealth is a “social
intercellular substance,” is simply to set up a doctrine of sociological transubstantiation
(Giddings 1896 : 348).

(Lilienfeld, Wikipedia, pages 3 – 5)

There is quite a bit of interest here, toward the end we get some interesting
insights into Durkheim’s position regarding the idea that humans are part of the natural
world, which is of immense interest in terms of our previous discussion because we have
noted that it makes no sense for Maclay to include a chapter on Durkheim in his book on
the history of the social organism, and that we must regard Durkheim as a major gateway
in the diversion of the flow of true scientific knowledge away from the public domain to
be replaced by his idiotic notion of what religion is. And here we see that Durkheim was
a reviewer of the greatest exponent of the idea that society was social organism, and he
evidently used this experience to help him model his fraudulent functionalism in such a
way that it could rob organicism of all its imperative essence and caste sociological
science into a religious, that is a political mold. And here we see it stated as plain as we
could ever wish that Durkheim considered that “in moral phenomena sui generis [were]
facts necessitating study in themselves, for themselves, by a special method”. We could
not have a less scientific, more religious statement of intent toward the interpretation of
human society than this, and being in harmony with all leading exponents of the human
sciences, there has been no more baneful person for sociology than Durkheim, he broke
the link between real sociology and the sociology that the likes of Reinert have to see
today when then look at modern science and think things have progressed. The trick with
creating this delusion is to severe the real science at the root, once it has revealed itself,
and then to graft a substitute in its place, and we have just noted that Durkheim was the
grafter in this case, having made a special study of true sociologist before setting about
his malevolent priestcraft. Such facts add to our suspicions about Maclay’s true
motivation, but we still have to accept that these post scientific-age commentators have
no means of seeing reality, all that exists to see is the fraud imposed via the institutions of
the theocracy.
Giddings’ witty criticism of Lilienfeld’s ideas on the nature of the social fabric
seems fair enough, as far as we can judge from this snippet, but this induces us to
compare Lilienfeld’s mode of description with our own. It seems that Lilienfeld was
struggling to conceive of a social organism that was truly an organism, yet which was
composed of living fabric and non-living structure, that was nonetheless just as much a
part of the organism as the living material, and accordingly he represented the living
matter as the nervous substance, the cells of the organism, and all other essential
substance as intercellular material of the organism.
It has to be said that any organic conception of society is necessarily forced,
which is precisely why we end up with this problem of analogical reasoning plaguing all
attempts to talk about society according to such a biological plan. I decided years ago,
when I first began to reason along these lines that the only possible way to think about
the inanimate matter of which society conceived as a superorganism could be discussed
was to represent this ‘intercellular material’ as an exoskeleton, and I have used this label
freely ever since, without any difficulty of which I am aware, but I have never had the
benefit of any feedback to give me any clues to difficulties that may exist in adopting this
label. The idea of calling a social unit a ‘superorganism’ goes back to Wheeler, who used
in to describe ant societies, yet, as we see from the above selection Lilienfeld is supposed
to of rejected the term ‘superorganism’ and Spencer is supposed to of approved it. Never
mind, the point is I can use this term with confidence in line with Wheeler’s application
of it to insect societies, which he justified at length, somewhere, that does not come to
mind just at this moment. So, it is a fairly simple proposition for me to apply the idea
that we can think of the social structure created via the activity of the individuals as
representing an exoskeleton, and once we have this idea in mind it is no distance at all to
represent anything and everything associated with the social organism as exoskeletal
material, even the land on which the organism exists, since this territory has come to be
formed according to the same creative process that any artificial products are made. So
this difficulty that Lilienfeld experienced was entirely unnecessary, and we neatly
manage to include the aspects that Lilienfeld tried to deal with that left Ward flummoxed
to make sense of Lilienfeld’s argument.
The suggestion by Giddings that an attempt to write a pathology of society
offered a real test of the organicist idea is sound, and it gives us some indication of what
might be meant when it is asked what good there can be in ideas of men like Lilienfeld
and Schaffle. Unfortunately the idea of a social pathology never did strike a cord with
me, and it would never occur to me to think along such lines, indeed it is here that I
would be likely to concur with Durkheim’s thoughts on negative aspects of social life
being positive in reality, he, I believe, said that if crime did not exist then it would have
to be invented because of its beneficial effects in galvanizing collective action toward
cooperative ends.
All we need say about things like money is that the appearance of such
mechanisms of social physiology are a product of linguistic force. Without language
such behavioural processes embodied in trading activity, idealised in fiscal forms, could
not exist. And this is the whole point about the organicist model, it simply makes the
point that all social structure arises from the evolved physiology of the individual. And
we have a passage revealing statements to this effect in the piece from Wikipedia.

Organicism also reacted to a widely held political idea of the time : that
individualism had been taken to extremes in modern society and that it was
necessary to bring balance through an opposite emphasis. Against the self-
sufficient individual of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the organicists
claimed to bring the support of science to the primacy of the social bond. For
these authors, the natural human state was that of association. As Worms put it in
a critique of the contract theory : “Men did not need to associate themselves, they
were born associated, and they remained so.” Psychological and moral capacities
developed through this association ; in other words, humans owed their
consciousness and their capacity for relative autonomy to society. Individuality as
it was known and prized in modern society was a product of society. Lilienfeld
stated this as a simple fact : “The intellectual and moral faculties of man are
exclusively the product of social life.” The organicists believed this should settle
the conflict between individual liberty and social solidarity ; humans would come
to realize their strict dependence on the collective (Barberis 2003 : 62).

(Ibid. p.5)

There are issues we could take up in this passage. We have to be so careful to

express ourselves in terms the deny any possibility of anyone ever thinking that humans
can ever in any way whatsoever be responsible for any aspect of their existence, beyond
merest ephemeral details which constitute the material of the individuals fleeting
existence. To this end we cannot agree with the suggestion that there are such things as
“intellectual and moral faculties”, anymore than we can agree that there is a God, or
things that are unnatural. Whatever attributes there are that the phrase “intellectual and
moral faculties” refers to, these cannot be the product of social life, to say this suggests
that these qualities have an existence that is separate from social life because social life
has produced them. And we have to be scrupulously careful about this kind of expression
because we have just seen exactly what a highly intelligent man bent on destroying
science and substituting religion can do, as we saw Durkheim expressly attacks Lilienfeld
for not recognising that “intellectual and moral faculties” existed on some level exclusive
to themselves that required separate laws of the universe in order to be made sense of. In
other words, for Durkheim, human qualities could only be understood scientifically if
they were understood according to strictly religious principles ; but of course he crafts his
ideas in such a way as to obscure this obviously absurd act of misrepresentation. There is
no reason why a person should perform such an act of corruption knowingly, people
receive their mind from the social flux, and they then spit it back out where it came from,
so the powers that form the flux see a clever representation of that which it feeds to its
‘brains’ and welcomes it, making the individual the representative of its slave ideology,
and no one need know this is so, just as in Ndembu society no one can know the real
nature of the peculiar rituals they take part in, but we do don’t we, because we look on
from without. But who looks on from without in our society ? Certainly not the likes of
Durkheim. And when we do get a brilliant piece of overtly atheistic sociology such as
that by Peter Berger in the sixties, the job’s a bad’un in the end, as he eventually self
destructs all the good done in expounding a genuine account of religion in society
(Invitation to Sociology : A Humanistic Perspective, 1963).
And lets just pick up on a remark just made, people in Ndembu society do not
know the real function of the rituals they take part in, this is not our observation, even
though we thoroughly approve of it, it was made by Turner, as we have seen. But this
mode of speech makes the rituals the extant reality, within which the people, who do not
really exist in so far as their self perception is not one with the reality of the ritual, are
reduced to the status of structural elements, sentient bricks performing their duty in such
a way that they serve the function of creating living structure at the level of social
organization. We easily see the truth of this analysis when examining a simple society,
but the fact is that when civilized people act on their personal ideas they also act as
unwitting elements of an organic physiology, and the function of government is to
organize social structure in such a way that we are left free to choose those things that
serve the needs of the social organism, while being blocked regarding any inclination to
act contrary to the same purpose. The actual picture is far more complex than this simple
statement sets out, because there are degrees of ‘facilitation’ and ‘blocking’ attached to
different segments of the biomass, which is why a massive superorganism needs a
complex of identities, which can manifest this variety of expression. Really this
differentiated relationship to the dynamics of social organization is what the likes of
Sombart were addressing in Jews and Modern Capitalism, and it is because of the need
for differential degrees of activity within one united biomass that different identities
evolve in response to the pressure of linguistic force as this force drives the evolution of
social structure, or superorganic physiology if we prefer.
The participants in rituals make the rituals happen, but they have no idea why, and
no possibility of acting differently. The usual formula of priests in our world says that it
is absurd to speak of society as an independent entity because it is only the actions of
individuals that make anything happen. Sure enough this verbal trick states a fact, but it
is a partial and limited fact, like saying the wheels make the horse cart move because they
do the rolling, true, but it is the horse that makes the wheel roll. In society the activity of
people makes society what it is, but it is the accumulated impetus of past actions built
into the structure of society that makes action in real time take the form that it does. So
that although people makes society, because of the nature of social activity, no human
ever acts as a free agent of society, all members of society are obliged by the nature of
their existence within society to act as the social structure of their predecessors
determines they must act in the present. Change is part of the social process,
predetermined by the established social structure, so that even this feature of social life is
no evidence of our personal involvement, indeed for the most part we hate change, but
we just cannot stop it, and hence we have various sayings telling us change is good, we
“can’t stop progress” ; more’s the pity ! This dislike of change is real at an individual
level, yet it is true that over time modern societies present a degree of change which is so
intense and extraordinary that it truly deserves the word ‘progress’, and while this is a
two edged sword in certain respects, as we see with the global concern over
environmental issues arising from technological developments, the things we can do
today are awesomely beautiful, quite enough for me to forgive all that I hate in religion in
so far as it is only because of the Jewish slave identity that I hate and despise that we
have been able to become so organised as to achieve the magnificent things we have. But
we still have to achieve the greatest step of all, to leave religion behind us, to become
truly the makers of our own existence, in so far as we are conscious of what we are doing
in the fullest possible sense of the word.

Below is a piece that belongs above, where I was struggling to think of what I
wanted to say about Reinert and then thought I remembered, but I did not

The idea of knowledge getting better, we say is false, knowledge gets worse, but, the
matter is not so straightforward. In a world in which science is free scientific knowledge
can only improve, but in a world where science is not free scientific knowledge cannot
exist. The war against science is always motivated by religion, therefore any society that
does not allow science to be free must be an absolute theocracy, if a society does not
allow science to be free and it is not a theocracy, then this can only mean that the
theocracy is covert. In this case, where the power of the theocracy is infused into the
social fabric the means to perform this kind of control can only exist via an extension of
religious structure into a secular form, from a church into a university. And under these
conditions the dynamics effecting the production of scientific knowledge are adjusted
accordingly. Hence science is, as we have often remarked, subject of a process of
eradication combined with substitution. Thus scientific knowledge appears to progress,
and may well do so in real terms, such as we have recognised when we say that it is now
possible for us to breath new life into the organicist idea in a genuinely scientific manner
empowered by physical anthropology and genetics that were not available to nineteenth
century thinkers. Yet, at the same time as these positive developments have been
accruing under the auspices of a primary imposition that prevents any genuine scientific
conception developing from the facts into a body of real knowledge, the body of false
knowledge derived from the primary imposition does progress according to its own
lights. So that Reinert looks out of his shell upon a world of modern science immensely
empowered by lots of fantastic new knowledge, tools and ideas, and, unless something
strikes him as not quite right, he accepts all that he sees and fails to question any of the
deeper fundamental aspects of the subject he is involved in, which he takes to be so
fundamental as to be well settled long ago. Thus while lots of people will readily accept
the provisional nature of Darwinism, rather as the provisional nature Newton has been
proven by the arrival of Einstein, no one would ever guess that Darwin was a total fraud,
cleverly attuned to subvert just that essential element of reality that would of opened the
way to the resolution of all questions that could ever be asked about the nature of
existence from the viewpoint of human existence.
 Talking about this process of advancing knowledge in conjunction with the
process of knowledge subversion induced by the relentless war between religion and
science allows us to be quite subtle about how knowledge changes in a complex way that
allows people to be an active part of the process of change and advancement while still
being complete isolated from the real subject to which they devote their lives. If we take
the idea we developed above regarding the way the brain seen as a piece of superorganic
tissue from which the body hangs like a ganglion, the brain passing instructions to the
exoskeleton via this ganglion composed of various tissues and organs that allow it to
perform tasks related to the demands of superorganic physiology, like a Borg from Star
Trek, then, given this analysis of the body of knowledge taken as a whole, passing into
and in-between the sum of brains concerned in this aspect of physiological activity, then
we have the image of all such brains constituting one brain, that is, by virtue of the
collective imposition of crafted knowledge, itself imbedded into the body of the
superorganism in such a way that we can think of the exoskeletal fabric of society
associated with knowledge production and promotion, as the body hanging from its
massive brain too. In all of this thinking it is interesting to see what the superb material
presented in the Wikipedia tells us about Lilienfeld’s views on the physiological
arrangement of the social organism.
 Chapter Eleven

Good for What ?

The material, and the ideas arising from it, that were considered in the previous
chapter are of immense significance in this work for the reason indicated, in the
discussion of organicist ideas in late nineteenth century Europe, illustrated y both our
modern sources, Wikipedia’s entry for Lilienfeld and Reinert’s essay on Schaffle, the
most useful revelation is the close association Durkheim had with these ideas, and their
eradication.
If we apply the acid test of asking what use organicist ideas are, we find the
answer has been extracted from organicism by Durkheim to give us functionalism.
Durkheim has taken the essence of science and made that essence sociological. I was
going to say he made science political, or I might sometimes say ‘religious’ in this
context since I regard religion and politics in the domain of knowledge to be
synonymous, and the two, religion and politics, can be reduced to religion because
religion is primary and politics always serves religion, even when it is atheistic, as in
communism. The reason atheist politics serves religion is because communism is, like
religion, an absolute authority that brooks no dissent and is based on purely imaginary
political principles, exactly as religion is, so communism is indistinguishable from
religion, therefore communism serves religion ; it sure ain’t science.
Functionalism without organicism is absurd, it is like geology without geography,
or flying without flight. But, while I have never so much as dipped my toe in Durkheim,
I cannot bring myself to do so, I have not tried for a long time but I did buy a couple of
his books so I must of tried to see if the man had anything to say worth reading, and
Likewise I must of decided the answer was a resounding no. I am becoming more and
more fascinated by the inclusion of Durkheim in Maclay, I must take a peek at the
chapter on Durkheim to see if Maclay tells us why this man belongs in a history of the
social organism.
There are two key ideas about Durkheim that I keep in my mind to allow me to
know what he is about, the idea that men, when worshipping their divinities are
unwittingly worshipping their society, or themselves as a collective entity, and the idea
mentioned above, that bad things are good in terms of their functional role in society. It
is the tenor of these two ideas which makes Durkheim a functionalist, the first of this
class of sociologists. By rights Durkheim ought to be my great hero, being a
functionalist, but I came to sociology very late in life, and only after discovering the idea
that humans were a superorganic species of mammal, via a personal insight, prior to this,
and uncovering the real sociology based on this idea, like everyone else I always
considered sociology to be a load of bullshit. Now we know sociology is no more
bullshit than religion, it is in fact religion in another guise, so it is not nonsense we are
dealing with here, but carefully crafted fake knowledge designed to have a finely tuned
relationship with our inner sense of self.
 So now we have reduced Durkheim’s sociology to a religion, designed, like all
religious dogma, to be related to our personal needs in society. This is an interesting idea
because when we talk about the functional role of religion, and we say that religion
codifies knowledge of reality in such a way that it captures the essence of reality and then
castes that essence in a personal form that extracts power from our social dynamics by
becoming the organising programme of those same dynamics, as it formulates a
programme for utilising social dynamics, so that words like God, which are purely
ficticious and absurd on the face of it, to imagine a creator of the universe that has made
humans in his image and cares about us especially being a self evidently ludicrous idea,
an idea so vile in its inanity as to be sickening. But these ideas are precious to many
people, and this is so because they are crafted to give people something they need, and
these ideas are interwoven with the life’s of the people who value them, look at the shit
that went down in Jerusalem yesterday, 07/03/08, eight students shot dead at a place of
religious learning, “Shot while holding their holy books.” The reporter said, “Which to
some Israelis is tantamount to an attack on God.” Please, give me strength, do I have to
listen to such moronic drivel in my own living room when all I want is to know what is
going on in the world. Hell’s bells ! One dickhead killed a bunch of dickheads is all the
man has to say, and move on to the price of toilet paper in a corner shop in Bedford, or
something of real importance in the world, such as Are there any corner shops in Bedford
? What use it ?
Of course this kind of palaver over religious stuff (cold blooded murder) is what
makes religion an important matter for all us, even more important than the price of bog
paper, which, I would not waste on keeping a record of religious ideas, even if I could
still use it for the purpose for which it was made. The terrible vileness of religious ideas,
we had cause to mention the people on the BBC 1 Big Questions programme last Sunday
talking about the reality of heaven, I mean, it makes a sane person want to weep ; to think
there are humans thinking such things, but they are all over the place, there are Godites
(people who believe in God) in my own family. Yuk. It makes me want to scream to
think of it, what is wrong with these people.
Sorry, I lost the plot a bit there, I got hot under the collar thinking about religious
obscenity ; now to get back to where we were. Having reduced Durkheim’s sociology to
a religion, designed, like all religious dogma, to be related to our personal needs in
society, we have a piece of work useful to us because it has been fashioned in a manner
that perhaps emulates the way religious dogma evolves by extracting the essence of ideas
about reality to create something useful.
It is rather strange to think about what it means to be useful, strange because we
feel as though the usefulness of something is liable to be more or less apparent, or at least
not that difficult to know. But this question is not even that transparent, we are not
asking whether some thing is useful but what it means to be useful, what is the abstract
meaning of usefulness. This peculiar problem arises because of the special nature of
knowledge as a phenomenon of reality, we are seeking to have knowledge about
knowledge when we ask such a question, and in so doing we begin to tread a path that
has no definite limits to it, so How do we define usefulness ? Lets make use of the
material we have to hand that causes us to think about usefulness.
The organicist theory must be essentially correct, this is utterly indisputable. All
this theory says is that the reason people walk is because they have legs, and fish swim
because they have fins, birds fly because they have wings ; the organicist theory says
nothing more and nothing less than this, taken at is most basic. It is impossible to argue
against this, yet this is exactly what all academia does, it absolutely rejects the idea that
there is any use in saying that people walk because they have legs, they want to be able to
say why people walk when they walk, why they walk where they walk, and how can
knowing that people walk because they have legs tell us anything about when and why
any given individual walks ?
In actuality what academia does is allocate these questions to different disciplines,
so that the fact that people have legs which are used for walking would belong to the hard
life science of biology, physiology and physical anthropology. While the behaviour
relating to the fact that people are a uniquely bipedal mammal that walks would be
related to the study of human activity. And there is no doubt that this is exactly the kind
of tussle that is going on toward the late nineteenth century, the struggle of sociology to
become a subject in its own right distinct from all other disciplines. Hence it is not useful
to sociological studies to concern ourselves with ideas about human physiology because
even though humans are made for social activity, this activity is so diverse that it cannot
be understood as a simple product of this physiology, and the social structure within
which people live is not dictated by physiology either. This is the drift of anti-scientific
sociologist like Durkheim who want sociology to be a response to social activity, not
biological physiology.
Today sociologists concern themselves with any aspect of society that can be
thought of, in effect sociologists are physical sociologist, they study what an organicist
would think of as social physiology. A modern sociologist is therefore extremely useful
because they actively seek to gain knowledge of questions that face society, questions
that demand responses from politicians. So if we are going to say that modern
sociologists are physical sociologist, or technical sociologists because they work with real
social materials as social materials, then we might suggest that the aspects of social
science that exercised the organicist sociologist would come under the heading of
theoretical sociology. I am never tempter to try and outdo the professionals, nor do I ever
imagine that I can do things that they do as a product of their professional expertise, and
for that reason I am not given to trying to set out technical arrangements for academic
disciplines. I am concerned to address those open questions that anyone is free to try and
resolve because the professionals decline to give any definitive answers, indeed, as we
have noted what is most important to all academics of every kind is to make is
understood that under no circumstances can we ever say anything definite about human
beings, these creatures, are amazingly, simply not part of the universe in any technical
sense, they are made of some kind of divine substance that has the power of God imbued
into it, is the scientific explanation. And it is this ludicrous position alone that I am
interested to try and account for.
Obviously no scientist would say that humans are made of a substance that is not
of the universe, they love to tell us the most fabulous things about how we are in fact
made of material that has been manufactured in supernovas. But, as we are delving into
right now, scientist are determined to designate aspects of existence to their won distinct
zones which each contain their own unique qualities that are cannot be conflated with any
other domain of reality, as we saw Durkheim saying about moral and intellectual
faculties. So here we are acknowledging that academics break up domains of reality into
discrete segments along lines of demarcation that are justified by the facts themselves, or
that is what they would have us believe. Here we are affirming that there are legitimate
divisions occurring in a subject such as anthropology which seeks to study humans as
natural beings, so that there are the two broad categories of physical anthropology and the
social anthropology, and the same kind of split might be defined if modern science were
prepared to acknowledge the biological foundations of sociology. Accordingly I have
offered some names for such a department of sociology just for the purposes of
illustration, without any pretence to being qualified to perform such an act of definition.
But how do my denominations work, Theoretical Sociology, I would of thought
this would exist, I will have to do a search for books with this title next week, and see, I
do have a book called Theoretical Anthropology, by David Bidney, 1953. Lets grab a
fragment which illustrates the fact that academics have long wrestled with these issues.

If it were simply a matter of “different levels of abstraction,” one might

regard the distinction between social anthropology and ethnology as valid, having
practical heuristic value. Both social anthropology and cultural anthropology, or
ethnology, would then be regarded as complementary branches of a more general
science of anthropology. A significant theoretical issue arises only if the social
anthropologist, like the sociologist, insists upon the primacy of society and social
structure as the focus of integration of all cultural phenomena. Then he is
confronted with the contrary thesis of the culturologist or ethnologist to the effect
that culture is, or is to be conceived “as if” it were, a historical reality sui generis,
requiring no reference to social structure or function. In general, American
cultural anthropologists recognize their common affinity in regarding the category
of culture as primary and object to any restriction of their sphere of interest and
research, such as the exclusion of technology, culture changes, and culture
history. In sum, the metascientific, or philosophical, presupposition as to the
ontological primacy of either society or culture does make a pragmatic, significant
difference in the scope and methodology of anthropological research. Once the
issue is clearly faced, not dismissed as being merely verbal or academic, then the
way will be prepared for a rapprochement between British and American
anthropological research.
There are signs that such a reconciliation is in the making. There is an
increasing awareness on the part of British anthropologists of the complementary
nature of society and culture. As Nadel has stated, “Actually, neither ‘social’ nor
‘cultural’ anthropology defines our subject matter satisfactorily ; as I hope to
show, it is essentially two-dimensional, being always both ‘cultural’ and ‘social.’
” (Nadel, The Foundations of Social Anthropology, p. 21.) Similarly Firth states,

The terms “society” and “culture” are used to express the idea of totality, but
each can express only a few of the qualities of the subject-matter. They tend to be
contrasted. But they represent different facets or components in the same basic human
situations. “Society” emphasizes the human component, the people and the relations
between them ; “culture” emphasizes the component of accumulated resources, non-
material and material, which the people through social learning have acquired and use,
modify and transmit. But the study of either must involve the study of social relations and
 values, through examination of human behaviour. (Murdock, “British Social Anthropology,”
American Anthropologist, LIII (1951), 465-73.)

(Bidney, pages 101 – 2)

The preceding argument to this passage talks about the origins of the differences
between American and British views of how to study human society, the British studied
structure and functions and the Americans studied culture. The reason was because
Americans had primitive culture in their faces, in the shape of the indigenous peoples that
the Jewish slave culture of modern America had exterminated. This sounds highly
plausible to me, and, more to the point, it shows that people want knowledge that is
useful to the activity in which people are engaged. No academic gives a toss as to
whether their ideas are real or true, or that maters is that their activities serve the political
purposes inherent in their own personal existence. To read the above passage is
excruciating, causing us to speak somewhat as Giddings spoke of reading Lilienfeld’s
Social Pathology. Look at this :

A significant theoretical issue arises only if the social anthropologist, like the
sociologist, insists upon the primacy of society and social structure as the focus of
integration of all cultural phenomena

What are they blithering on about ? Jargon wrapped up in jargon, no better way is
there to shut out all those who hope to understand the simple nature of simple things.
And what about this :

Human Nature and the

Cultural Process
THE BASIC CONCEPT of contemporary social science is undoubtedly that of culture.
We are indebted to anthropologists especially for having distinguished explicitly
the category of culture from that of society and for having drawn attention to the
role of the cultural process and the “cultural heritage” in moulding the life of the
individual within society. There is, moreover, general agreement among social
scientists that culture is historically acquired by man as a member of society and
that it is communicated largely by language or symbolic forms and through
participation in social institutions. There is, however, considerable disagreement
regarding the ontological status of culture, that is to say, regarding the sense in
which culture may be understood as real and the conception of human nature in
relation to the cultural process. These problems we shall endeavor to investigate.

1. THE GENESIS OF THE CULTURAL PROCESS

The concept of culture is best understood from a genetic and functional

point of view. To cultivate an object is to develop the potentialities of its nature in
 a specific manner with a view to a definite end or result. Thus, for example,
agriculture is the process whereby the potentialities of the earth and of seeds are
cultivated with a view to the growing of edible plants. In like manner,
“anthropoculture,” as it may be called, comprises the various ways in which man
has tended his nature so as to make it grow or develop. But human culture differs
from agriculture in that every stage and phase of the anthropocultural process is to
some extent supervised and directed and either consciously or unconsciously
imitated, with a view to producing a type of man and society which is adjusted to
its geographic and social environment. Anthropoculture so conceived refers to the
dynamic process of human self-cultivation, whether from conscious or largely
unconscious motives, and is identical with education in the original sense of that
term. The cultural process, as applied to man, differs from other natural processes
in that the former is not autonomous and does not guide itself, but requires
constant and deliberate selection and effort on the part of its actual and potential
adherents. This process of conscious selection and conditioning does not preclude
unpremeditated and unconscious imitation through social suggestion. For
example, what language a child shall speak is a matter not left to chance, but is
determined for it by its sociocultural milieu and by the deliberate educational
efforts of the community. As Sapir observed, much of linguistic behavior is
unconsciously patterned so that the people who utilize a given language are hardly
conscious themselves of its intricate patterns. But language, in common with the
cultural pattern as a whole, involves deliberate selection and direction on the part
of its adherents in order to insure continuity in cultural life.
From a historical point of view it is easy to understand why, as men came
to attach greater importance to the cultivation of their mental natures, or “souls,”
the term “culture” came to refer specifically to the latter, and culture became
identified with cultura animi. But genetically, integral culture refers to the
education, or cultivation, of the whole man considered as an organism, not merely
to the mental or spiritual aspects of his nature and behavior.
Man is by nature a cultural animal, since he is a self-cultivating, self-
reflective, self-conditioning animal and attains to the full development of his
natural potentialities only insofar as he lives a cultural life. As contrasted with
other animals whose range of development is biologically limited, man is largely
a self-formed animal capable of the most diverse types of activity and personality.
This point is no new discovery of modern ethnologists and was commented upon
by the Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives in his “Fable about Man” and by Pico
della Mirandola in his classic “Oration on the Dignity of Man.” Man’s special
dignity is said to consist in this, that he is of indeterminate nature and may
exercise freedom of choice as though he were “the maker and moulder” of
himself.

(Bidney, pages 125 – 6)

Too painful ! Think of the joy any fanatical Christian would have upon seeing
science speak thus of human nature, even the Bible cannot pretend humans are as utterly
independent of nature as this idiot—its not possible to do so. At the same time this man
pays lip service to the most precious ideas that any scientist could wish to take notice of,
he hints at linguistic programming, and he speaks of people acting unwittingly in their
social activities, but still he makes social development a wilful process. This is trash
science at its worst, and exactly the kind of thing people became free to generate after
Durkheim and his kind had finally decoupled academic science from the substance of
scientific method, by formulating a truly useful concept of science, that could be made to
serve theocratic needs in the manipulation of social activities.
And most important of all, it is this vindication of wilfulness, asserting the self
made nature of human existence, found in the scientific work of all kinds that makes the
show of peace possible between science and religion. For, as the individual is an end in
themselves, free to pick and choose every aspect of their lives, whether to speak a given
language or not, oh no, they cannot do this ; whether they work or not, oh, I suppose no
scientist would suggest they are free in this respect either ; whether they, I cannot think,
What are people free to think or do ? Nothing, I know, but according to scientists. They
are free to believe in God or not, that much is certain, according to scientists of human
nature. Yet there is no way a person can find true peace in modern secular life, as
Sokoloff told us, and this is because the theocracy will not allow us to know what our real
nature is, but aside from this suppression of true knowledge that would make a person
free, meaning they only having the chance of felling a sense of peace in society by being
religious, all are free to choose not to be religious or not, just as they are free to choose
not to eat, if they like !
Yeah, I guess Theoretical Sociology is not such a bright idea. What about
Physical Sociology ? This poses the question, what then would not be physical within
sociology ? The idea derives from physical anthropology which deals with the human
body, so we would be making the social substance that normally comes under such
technical disciplines as architecture the province of sociology. But, this is not entirely
beyond reason. One of the things we must always keep in mind when we deal with these
difficulties thrown up by an alternative scientific sociology as opposed to the current
religious sociology that is all we have, is that we understand by the word sociology the
study of society, in which, for all intents and purposes there are no individuals, no people
as we know them on an everyday basis. The life of individuals, their feelings and
motives have absolutely nothing to do with sociologist. It is because of this fact that the
idea that nothing changes just because we happen to know new facts about reality makes
sense. So if we want to understand the social phenomenon of sport we must observe this
activity and speculate why it takes place, we can no more discover why people attend
football matches by asking people for their own explanations than we can hope to
discover why animals gather in herds by asking the individual. This does not mean that
people do not have reasons for attending sporting events, it means that this kind of
behaviour does no exist at the behest of the individual, it a structural feature of human
activity which exists solely due to reasons beyond those existing in any individuals set of
motives.
In the first quote from Bidney we find this remark :

In general, American cultural anthropologists recognize their common affinity in

regarding the category of culture as primary and object to any restriction of their
 sphere of interest and research, such as the exclusion of technology, culture
changes, and culture history. In sum, the metascientific, or philosophical,
presupposition as to the ontological primacy of either society or culture does
make a pragmatic, significant difference in the scope and methodology of
anthropological research.

Here we have been discussing the organization of knowledge into distinct

domains, we are bound to come up against an issue like this when we are seeking to
confront the way modern sociology was founded on a bedrock of ideas specifically aimed
at separating sociology from biology. But as soon as we tried to approach this topic we
were obliged to acknowledge that there are naturally occurring areas of knowledge,
species of knowledge one might say, derived from the nature of the realities they apply
to. Knowledge we must keep in mind is an exclusively social phenomenon, in the sense
of scientific knowledge at least, since it is about knowledge that is accumulated and past
on. And therefore we cannot, for this reason alone, simply act as modern scientists do, by
pretending that there is no tendency toward the control of knowledge for social purposes,
meaning political purposes. Accordingly we can regard knowledge as a physical domain,
which it is, knowledge cannot exist in a vacuum, and furthermore we can see in the
allocation of knowledge to a variety of distinct, and more or less mutually exclusive
disciplines, a form of territorial division. And it is toward making this point that we
repeat the two sentences above, in which we see it stated that anthropologists “object to
any restriction of their sphere of interest”. Whether this is reasonable or not is irrelevant
to the point we are making, the fact is that in keeping with the idea of an all pervading
war on knowledge by religion, this characteristic of knowledge organization runs through
the whole body of knowledge. And in so far as knowledge is a domain organized into
territorial compartments then the practice of knowledge keeping is liable to be a political,
and not a scientific endeavour.
The second sentence above indicates the pressure brought to bear by none
scientific arguments on the setting of the boundaries determining where knowledge
compartments should be, and what they should contain. This is exactly where the priest
gets their foot in the scientific door and ends up by taking charge of science in the way
we have described. When I was focused upon the way in which religion controls science
some time ago I use to write about the way false dichotomies were generated that act as a
means of control by revolving around each other in a simulation of scientific debate while
ensuring that the discussion would never touch the base of reality that the two schools of
thought both proclaimed to represent. I would have to look back at my earlier work to
see exactly what material was exercising my mind at the time, but it is being exercised
right now in the same direction by this absurd dualism realised in the American versus
the British school of anthropology. I noticed that Turner’s lectures were given to an
American audience, in the 1960’s, and he described himself as being of the British
school ; he was Scottish and attended Manchester University. I wondered what this
signified, and he did say something about it, to do with a concern for structure I think,
without looking back. Anyway we see this illustrated in the more fulsome account of this
difference provided by Bidney. Lets focus on what Bidney says :
 A significant theoretical issue arises only if the social anthropologist, like the
sociologist, insists upon the primacy of society and social structure as the focus of
integration of all cultural phenomena. Then he is confronted with the contrary
thesis of the culturologist or ethnologist to the effect that culture is, or is to be
conceived “as if” it were, a historical reality sui generis, requiring no reference to
social structure or function.

These two sentences are the sharp end of the argument, and appearing in this 1953
work, in the immediate period following world war two, they show the reward gained by
the priesthood for wreaking havoc and destruction across the globe, but especially in the
decimation inflicted on its own core organic element, that of European society.
American society was in any case the bedrock of intellectual corruption, as is easily
demonstrated by looking at the works coming out of America over the course of the late
nineteenth century and on into the twentieth, a subject I think I have dealt with in other
pieces of work that I do not really want to start trawling through at this moment, but The
Emergence of Professional Social Science by Haskell, 1977 is the kind of item I was
utilising when my attention was drawn to the express role the Yanks were playing in the
war of religion against knowledge. The English speaking nations are in any case the
leaders in this field of knowledge perversion, a role associated with their position as
primary slave states of Judaic imperialist power. When I spoke of my previous interest in
the idea of false dichotomies revolving about a common artificial hub of pseudo scientific
knowledge, the Darwinian-Creationist dualism is the most notorious example of this
mechanism of knowledge control, employed by the theocracy, the two parts of this
equation derive from English pseudo science and the reaction of American state
sponsored religious fascism, whose power is built into the constitutions of the America,
resting as it does upon the freedom of religious fascism above all other rights of the
individual. We see the result in the famous 1920’s legal case intended to suppress
science, and the ongoing overt war against science fought by means of the legal system.
Yet, of course, the cutest thing about this overt war conducted by religious fascism
through the machinery of the state, machinery put in place to serve precisely this purpose,
is that it is levelled against a purely religious scientific creed, set up by the theocracy, for
the express purpose of creating a punch bag that can be beaten, and more importantly,
defended, without fear of ever destroying, or most importantly, revealing any real
scientific ideas about the nature of human existence. Here then we see how two closely
allied superorganic structures, in the shape of two independent and integral national
states, with their own take on law and culture, complement each other, and by working
together at a level beyond conscious revelation, promote and protect the theocracy that
their structure is part of. This physiological dynamic gives us some idea why the Jewish
superorganism is divided into national state structures, defined by laws that, while they
pretend to be autonomous, are really just variations on a common, religious, theme.
The world wars were waged by the theocracy against, the human species, but
especially against its own people, this theocracy is Jewish. I frequently just use the word
‘theocracy’ in a very casual manner that in no way whatsoever obeys the rules of
compartmentalisation applied by the theocracy to the meaning of words in order to allow
a social authority to control the linguistic force and thus allow a social power to exist. I
am perfectly well aware of the danger in this cavalier use of words according to my own
scientific view of humans, it is vulnerable to the ridicule that is one of the privileges of
power used by the priesthood to undermines reason ; we saw an example of this where
Giddings contemptuously dismisses Lilienfeld’s Social Pathology as a strain on a
person’s brain because of his use of analogy. The criticism may of been justified in this
case, but it is in any case used as a substitute to deal with the real question of biology in
sociology. We have no voice because we live in a fascist society, but as a rule we are
subject to soft fascism, and only occasionally does the theocracy subject us to a bout of
hard fascism to make us appreciate what we have when we are controlled in a sweet
manner. While it is perfectly obvious that the Nazis were part of the Jewish theocracy,
this fact cannot be seen by us in the ordinary course of our lives even when we are made
aware of it, just as we cannot see that the earth is spinning even when we are told that it
is. The reason we cannot that the Nazis were Jews is because we are deceived by the
meaning of words, we think that the word ‘Jew’ means something different from the
word ‘Christian’ and we simply have no way to tell that the two words are in fact
identical in their meaning at the level of absolute authority. The best way to visualise this
is to think about the way we would respond to questions about the identity of our own
bodies. If our name were Bob and someone pointed to our arm or our leg and asked if
this was Bob too, we would say yes, “I am Bob and each part of me is Bob too.”
However the essence of Bob is not contained in the knew or the elbow, because there is
an element of Bob’s structure especially devoted to preserving the sense of self that
makes the name Bob meaningful as the identity of the whole. The structural location of
Bobishness in a person called Bob is the brain, and the same general structure applies
equally to the superorganism. All superorganisms have an identity, just as a person has
an identity, and this superorganic identity has to be focused in one particular portion of
the social structure. Any element in society that has power, of any kind, represents the
identity of the superorganism, a teacher, a politician, a TV broadcaster, an actor, a
musician, artist and so on, you name it, any public voice can only exist if it represents the
identity of the superorganism. Our superorganism is Jewish, the Jews themselves
therefore represent the organ of identity par excellence, but each know of social power,
no matter what name it carries as its linguistic marker, is expressly devoted to the
corporate identity, which is Jewish, the more powerful, the more devoted to this central
identity. It cannot be otherwise, because if it were, the superorganism would annihilate
it. It is for this reason that human superorganisms grow relentlessly through war, and
even once in control of a territorial domain and the biomass resident upon, the warfare
against the population continues, this may take the form of purges, revolutions, inflicting
waves of immigration, enforcing the ethnic cleansing of a culture through law, as we see
in Europe today, although as an Englishman I see this ethnic cleansing of my identity by
our politicians as an Englishman, and here the process is brutal and relentless. These
people are so powerful they can even produce propaganda to make us feel as though we
are included in the wonderful development of society which is how they present the
ethnic cleansing of our culture, last night, 08/03/08, BBC 2 had a programme on the
Rivers of Blood speech by Enoch Powell ; I was in the ale house, mercifully, otherwise I
might of been tempted to see what pretentious excuse for contemporary historical
analysis our masters were ramming down our throats now.
Thus, the theocracy is the equivalent of the brain, it is all pervasive in the same
sense that our personal identities are all pervasive across the whole of our body. But as in
our body the theocracy is focused where power lies in society. The point at which I lay
myself open to an easy job of ridicule is where I disregard the meaning of the words that
define the structure for the purposes of creating our consciousness. I ignore this veil of
linguistically induced consciousness because it is implicit that my scientific approach to
the study of society based on biological premises does not see this organic veil produced
by language. But all the priest need do is pick up on this failure to comply with the
meaning understood by everyone to be able to ridicule me, and thus to dismiss my
argument as facile and idiotic. It is worth my taking a moment to say, from time to time,
that this is only to be expected given that social structure is created by linguistic force
which floods society with a flux of information from which we acquire our consciousness
of our social surroundings, we have no choice but to see the Jew as being different from
the Christian, besides anything else there is plenty of evidence that this is no mere
illusion, and this type of distinction becomes even more telling when Nazis representative
of the Christian Jewish slave identity comes up against the master Jewish slave identity.
How on earth can any person see past these veils of identity that define structure that is
there for all to see in the shape of warfare and horror ?
And yet once we have recognised that humans form a superorganism and there is
no such thing as an individual, and we have worked out what the meaning of religious
identities is, we can see through all the veils of linguistic identity and recognise the
relationship between structural elements that appear to be in collision at a political level
of linguistic understanding but which are obviously acting cooperatively at the organic
level of superorganic physiology where the biomass, consisting of more or less loosely
arranged individuals, needs to be constantly galvanised into a state of tightly bound unity
under one corporate identity. If when we have been made aware of this by science we
cannot expect to see it in the world about us, anymore than being made aware that the
continents drift across the surface of the globe means that we will then be able to see this
macro level phenomenon taking place. Science should reveal things beyond our normal
capacity to see, in sociology it did, and this is why science in sociology was shut down
and in its place we get the kind of pathetic drivel we can see in Bidney’s work quoted
above.
There are no copies of Lilienfeld’s Social Pathology available on the net at this
time so I thought I would dip into my copy and run a couple of pages through some
translation software and see what they look like :

L’anthropologie et l’ethnographie, en étudiant les lois de la lutte pour

l’existence, de l’adaptation, de la sélection, de la ségrégation et de l’hérédité dans
leur application à l’homme, n’ont en vue que l’individu en sa qualité as
représentant d’une race ou de l’espèce humaine. La Sociologie le considère
comme membre de la société humaine. Or, ces lois se modifient d’une manière
profonde dans leur application à la vie sociale. La cellule, faisant partie d’un
organisme individuel, lutte pour son existence ; elle s’adapte au milieu, elle est
soumise à la sélection, à la ségrégation, à la loi d’hérédité, mais elle vit non-
seulement comme individu, mais encore comme partie d’un tout ; elle agit non-
seulement dans ses propres intérêts, mais encore sous l’influence et en vue
d’intérêts communs ; pour elle le milieu ambiant n’est pas seulement la nature qui
 l’entoure, mais encore les forces sociales, physiques et psychiques, auxquelles
elle doit s’adapter; elle se spécialise comme unité physiologique et
morphologique non-seulement par la sélection et la ségrégation individuelles,
mais sous l’influence de la totalité des forces de l’organisme ; c’est sous cette
influence enfin et à ces conditions qu’elle hérite des qualités physiques et
psychiques de ses ancêtres et les lègue à sa descendance. Il en est de même de
l’homme au sein de la société, autant en ce qui concerne son évolution
progressive qu’en ce qui a rapport aux déviations de la marche normale de
développement. Quoique ces déviations se manifestent toujours par une
dégénérescence physique, intellectuelle ou morale de l’individu, elles n’en
touchent pas moins le système nerveux social, dont l’individu constitue l’unité
organique élémentaire.

(Lilienfeld, pages 39 – 40)

Translated by machine :

The anthropology and the ethnography, while studying the laws of the
fight for the existence, adaptation, selection, segregation and heredity in their
application to the man, have not some seen that the individual in his quality have
representing of a race or human type. Sociology considers it as member of the
human corporation. Now, these laws modify themselves in a deep way in their
application to social life. The cell, being part of an individual organism, fights for
his existence ; she adapts herself in the middle of she is subjected to the selection,
to the segregation, to the heredity law, but she lives not only as individual, but
again as left an all ; she acts not only in its own interests, but again under the
influence and with a view to common interests ; for her the ambient environment.
But again force them social, physical and psychiques, to which ones she must
adapt herself ; she specializes herself as unity physiologique and morphologique
not only by the selection and the individual segregations, but under the influence
of the entirety of the forces of the organism ; this is under this influence at last
and to these conditions that she inherits physical qualities and psychiques of its
ancestors and the lègue to his descent. The same applies to the man at the heart of
the corporation, as much in regards to his progressive evolution that in this that
has to do with the deviations of the normal market of development. Although
these deviations show themselves always by a physical, intellectual
dégénérescence or moral of the individual, they not in touch less the social
nervous system, of which the individual constitutes organic elementary unity.

A nice bit to take I think, not exactly readable, but not entirely incomprehensible.
French comes through quite well in the raw, as you can see, and if I spent a few hours on
this passage and used a few dictionaries I could lick it into shape so that you would think
it was translated by someone who spoke French fluently, unless you are suitably
bilingual, then you would spot the obvious discrepancies which would be bound to exist
in a work performed under this conditions. The gist of the piece is that we can liken the
role played by cells in our bodies relative to the life of the body to the role of the person
in the life of society taken the true whole. The inadequacy of the automated translation
obscures the deeper thrust of the quote, which is evidently trying to make this comparison
seem reasonable. As such it would be worth making the effort to perfect the translation,
but it is an effort, and I cannot be bothered now, it is the sort of thing I have to gear up to
by gathering my resources, dictionaries and notes, and so it must pass, even though I do
enjoy the task, I feel like I am unearthing the lost wisdom of a long vanished civilization,
but I am not, any twat who happened to be bilingual could do the job effortlessly, in a
flash, and perfectly, which is what really baulks my enthusiasm, and makes me think it
would be easier to sell the house and move to France for a year, and get the job done
right !
Why not just learn the ruddy language ? I hear some of you ask. It has been said
to me before. Indeed, and why not just become a multi millionaire and pay people to do
the translations ? I know which option I would consider the easier. I was taught French at
school from the age of seven, probably up to fourteen, but there is no inherent connection
between being taught and learning as far as I am aware. My father taught me to drive as
soon as I was seventeen, and so I learned to drive, but there is no such connection
between being taught in school and learning. Schools exist to induct people into their
slave identity, and that is all there is to that. In effect the object of school is to prevent
learning just as much as it might be to teach knowledge, unless by learning we mean
being taught to be ignorant. The idea of being taught to be ignorant is not as strange as it
sounds. The whole objective of religious teaching could be described as teaching
ignorance to a purpose. If teaching people that there is life after death is not teaching
ignorance then I would like to know what might be. What schools teach is intended to
train a person to be a good slave, obedience being one of the primary lessons. School,
now there is a good candidate for hell on earth to be recognised if ever there was one.
I hated school, but most people liked school, so I believe, and in keeping with
what we have done in many places in this, and other works, we have not hesitated to
acknowledge that humans evolved to be slaves, and as such people want to be obedient,
we want to be dependant, not in a gross way, but in a subtle way, by means of which we
feel empowered and set free. And therefore while school aggravated me beyond telling,
the regime I describe in the most negative terms, if caste in the political language that
priests use to describe it, is welcomed by people, and it serves its proper job. So it is
important that, in expressing my personal feelings about things as I develop the ideas
presented here, we keep in mind what is personal to me, and what is real is terms of the
true scientific nature of the world in which we all live. In this way we discover a natural
vein of tolerance inherent in atheistic science, for while I have always hated religion with
a passion, having discovered what religion is, it becomes an automatic reaction to set the
passion of hatred for something seen as so evil and disgusting, into a true perspective,
and to recognise that like a terrible disease or natural catastrophe, religion is ultimately
just one of nature’s many challenges that we must strive to rise above.

There is a final chapter of Social Pathology called Science and Religion from
which we may take a sample that looks like it might be interesting :
 Les deux pôles autour desquels tourne toute évolution sociale comme
aussi toute évolution organique, sont l’individualité et la solidarité. Cette vérité
constitue les points de départ et d’arrivée tant de la Sociologie positive que de la
Pathologie sociale. La Théologie chrétienne en fait autant.
Qu’est-ce que le péché originel d’après le dogme chrétien ? — C’était la
faute d’un seul dont toute l’humanité est devenue solidaire.
La science moderne se trouve-t-elle sur ce point en contradiction avec la
théologie chrétienne ? — Nullement, puisque le principe d’hérédité est reconnu
aujourd’hui par la biologie comme le lien qui unit toutes les générations
descendant du même centre organique, non seulement dans leur développement
normal, mais de même en ce qui concerne les déviations et les anomalies.
C’est de la poussière que, d’après les Écritures Saintes, Dieu a formé le
premier homme. La biologie ne cherche-t-elle pas, de son côté, à prouver que la
vie organique de notre globe a été originairement le résultat de l’action des forces
inorganiques ?
C’est le souffle de Dieu, dira-t-on, qui, d’après les Écritures Saintes, a
donné la vie à l’homme, ce qui est nié par la science moderne. — Mais ce souffle
ne peut-il durer que l’espace de temps que dure le souffle de l’homme ? Les
Saintes Écritures elles mêmes n’énoncent-elles pas que, devant la face du Très-
Haut, les éternités ne sont que des moments, et que son souffle anime la nature
entière ?
Le dogme chrétien de la rédemption, l’apôtre saint Paul le résume ainsi
(Rom., V, 19) : « Comme par la désobéissance d’un seul homme plusieurs ont été
rendus pécheurs, ainsi, par l’obéissance d’un seul, plusieurs sont rendus justes. »
Exprimée en termes usuels, cette vérité théologique pourrait être formulée
de la manière suivante :
Comme, pour les déviations de l’état normal, il y a eu originairement un
centre commun dont les à-coups se font sentir dans l’humanité entière, de même
le mouvement réparateur a dû partir d’un individu et, par la solidarité qui unit tous
les hommes, est devenu le patrimoine de tout le monde. Ainsi, la doctrine
chrétienne d’une régénération du genre humain par une personnalité unique, qui
est devenue le centre du mouvement réparateur, ne se trouve pas non plus en
contradiction avec les lois biologiques et sociales.
La Sociologie positive, en concevant la société humaine en sa qualité
d’organisme réel doué d’un système nerveux et d’une substance sociale
intercellulaire, et en reconnaissant l’individu comme l’élément anatomique
primaire lié à l’organisme social dans son ensemble par des réflexes réels, directs
ou indirects, constitue un domaine intermédiaire entre la théologie et la biologie,
où les principes d’individuation et de solidarité prennent des formes concrètes
communes à l’une et à l’autre de ces disciplines. Ce n’est aussi que sur ce terrain
qu’un rapprochement entre les dogmes du péché originel et de la rédemption avec
les démonstrations des sciences naturelles est possible.
Ce qui est remarquable, c’est que la Théologie chrétienne conçoit
l’association des croyants, l’église, comme un organisme réel parfaitement dans le
même sens que le fait la Sociologie positive pour la société humaine en général.
D’après le Nouveau Testament, l’église c’est le corps du Sauveur qui fait son
 évolution dans l’espace et le temps, qui, non seulement est soumis aux lois qui
président au développement de la société humaine en général, mais qui en subit
également les anomalies et les défectuosités.

(Lilienfeld, pages 283 – 285)

Translated by machine, plus some casual adjustments :

The two centres around which all social evolution turns, as also all organic
evolution, are individuality and solidarity. This truth constitutes the points of
departure and arrival of positive sociology, as well as social pathology. Christian
Theology does likewise.
What was original sin according to Christian dogma ? — It was the
singular failure of all humanity become as one.
Does modern science find itself in contradiction with Christian theology
on this point ? - Not at all, since the heredity principle is recognized today by
biology as the link that unites all the generations descending from an organic
center, not only in their normal development, but even in regard to deviations and
abnormalities.
It was from dust that, according to Holy Scripture, God formed the first
man. Does not biology seek, in this respect, to prove that organic life on our
globe was originally the result of the action of inorganic forces ?
It is the breath of God, some will say, that, according to Holy Scripture,
gave life to man, is this denied by modern science. — This breath cannot last the
times space that lasts the breath of the man ? Holy Scripture does not even
enunciate that, in front of the face of the Very Top, eternities are only moments,
and that his breath animates all nature ?
Christian dogma of the redemption, the holy apostle Paul summarizes thus
(Rom., V, 19) : “As by the disobedience of a single man several were made
sinners, thus, by the obedience of only one, several are rendered just.”
Expressed in ordinary terms, this true theology could be formulated as
follows :
As the deviations of the normal state, had originally a common center of
which them to blows do to feel in all humanity, of even the soothing movement
had to leave an individual and, by the solidarity that unites all the men, became
everyone’s heritage. Thus, the Christian doctrine of the regeneration of mankind
by a unique personality, that became the center of the soothing movement, is not
placed any more in contradiction with biological and social laws.
Positive Sociology, while conceiving the human corporation as a real
organism having the quality of a nervous system and an inter cellular social
substance, and while recognizing the individual as the primary anatomical
element linked to the social organism in his body by real reflexes, direct or
indirect, constitutes an intermediary domain between theology and biology, where
the principles of individuation and of solidarity apply to these disciplines. This is
also not as on this land as a parallel between the dogmas of the original sin and
redemption with the demonstrations of the natural sciences is possible.
 This that is remarkable, this is that Christian Theology conceives the
association of believers, the church, as a real organism perfectly in the same
direction as the facts of positive sociology usually do for the human corporation.
According to the New Will, the church this the body of the Saviour that did his
evolution in the space and the time, that, not only is subjected to the laws that
usually preside over the development of the human corporation, but that some
undergoes equally the abnormalities and imperfections.

Yikes ! This automatic translation shows much better how tricky it is to get a
good result in one go, and I have heavily edited the result just by reading it twice and
trying to make it read like English, but a couple of bits I could not make sense of
sufficiently to do anything with them, the breath of God in space and time threw me, I
would need to get stuck into a dictionary to see what the machine had taken various
words to mean here. Nonetheless we get a sense of how heavily Lilienfeld was trying to
pander to the nineteenth century audience of Christian fanatics, even as he strove to
provide an unbiased scientific analysis of society. The third volume of Comte’s Positive
Polity that arrived the other day, bears similar marks of total oppression which all
thinkers were unwittingly submerged then, as now, it contains a lengthy introduction in
the shape of a letter written to the ruler of Russia in which Comte exerts all his power to
assure the potentate that his ideas do not undermine the Jewish slave identity upon which
all power in the Western world, and Russia, was then, and is still, based.
So even when science was free, as free as it has ever been, a lot freer than today,
this overt display of obsequious devotion to religion was the best anyone could do.
Revealing that the real driving force in society was toward the accommodation of new
knowledge to religion ; Christianity, the Jewish slave identity, had to be preserved, this
was all that mattered. But how was this to be achieved ? The obvious route of
suppression and subversion was all well and good, but as Hitler tells us in Mein Kampf,
for a ruling authority to exists over society having a message was not enough on its own,
this had to be back up by violence, and so we had the world wars, and the Nazis, and sure
enough this did the trick, with the social structure cleansed, the prepared dogma of
modern science, typified in the nonsense we just looked at in Bidney, was ready t be
rolled out, and it has been rolling out ever since, which is why today we find books like
Human by Nature being produced which describe the incredible lengths academics are
being driven to in order to cover up the tracks of the eradication of science as we have
been talking about it in this work and elsewhere.
Today we see that this need for science to be forever kowtowing to religion is
long gone, science is now free. It is free because science does not exist. The two forms
of knowledge have been rendered separate by forcing science to adopt the religious
principle that humans are self made, exactly as Bidney describes. So we can talk of the
unsatisfactory state that we see in the late nineteenth century as being genuinely the best
ever condition in which people have lived in terms of their freedom to access real
knowledge, because as bad as we can see things were, and as good as they are now, the
badness is a sign of the highest state of freedom ever enjoyed in any society, and the
goodness we know today is a sign of our complete subjection to an absolute rule against
which we are powerless to resist, because we do not even know it exists ! We are like the
slave ant taken by the slave maker ant at the stage of the pupae, raised in an alien nest we
know not that our identity is given to us by those who have made us slaves. And what is
worse yet, the damn masters do not know what they have done, and are doing, for they
are just as much slaves as we are !
It might just be worth noting at this point that where we saw Durkheim make a
criticism of Lilienfeld that we were in no position to understand, such that Lilienfeld’s
ideas united organicism with the Holy Trinity, I think it was, we can perhaps get some
sense of why this comment was made from the above quote, and we can see that here
Lilienfeld has fallen foul of the fascistic power of arrogant dismissal, that we noted we
were in danger of leaving ourselves vulnerable to if we did not take care to set in place
pieces of argument designed to forestall this mechanism of control by way of ridicule, in
place of reason. Again, as we conceded when we discussed this matter in respect to
Giddings review of Lilienfeld’s work, there may of been some obvious justification for
this kind of criticism, but since we know that Lilienfeld was struggling to promote a
naturalistic account of humans in a world ruled by religion, which the likes of Durkheim
and Giddings simply lent their considerable talents to avoiding, by leading science away
from the problem so that religion could be left in peace, we have every right to defend
Lilienfeld’s admittedly sad conflation of organicism with religion, even as we set him on
a far higher plain of intellectual integrity than the likes of his detractors could ever hope
to comprehend.
And I must say that since early on I decided that religion represented a linguistic
identity programme that had extracted the essence of human nature from the reality of
social existence, to bring into being a priesthood as an organ of superorganic power, it
immediately occurred to me that it should be possible to decode Jewish dogma, just as we
decode the single word ‘God’ when we see that God is the superorganism. Therefore
there is a great deal to be said for Lilienfeld’s comparative analysis of Christianity
relative to organicism, even though it does not look as though he conducted his analysis
according to the ideas we have just set forth here. It would still be of great interest to see
just how he elaborated on this comparative similitude between a real science of society
and the Christian religion. He does give a cursive reference to a book examining this
topic, which I think is volume five of his main work, a book I did buy but which to my
deepest regret I did not receive, a book I can never hope to find again. I wonder most of
all whether there were any hints about the nature of the relationship between Judaism and
Christianity in the book, from an organicist point of view, if I had the damn thing I could
of looked for references to Jews and translated any promising looking sections, I cannot
believe I let that one slip through my fingers !!!
It has to be said however, to be realistic, that I would be amazed if I had got a
copy of the book in question and it had actually discussed the physiological relationship
between Judaism, Christianity and Islam. While raising this matter I was surprised and
delighted to see a most unexpected reference to the Islam in Comte the other day, where
he speculates upon the prospect that Islam is so ordained as to be better placed to receive
the tenets of Positivism than the Christian territories. What is most pleasing about this is
his description of the two halves of the Roman empire, the Christian and the Muslim, so
that, as we know, the Romans were the vanguard of the Jewish slave identity, initiating
the onset of the global superorganism in the name of Judaism, here then we see the two
Jewish slave identities linked to this precursor of Jewish expansion.
 Recognising that the Nazis were an ephemeral form of master Jewish identity that
appeared spontaneously within the Jewish superorganism to enforce the protection of the
Jewish master identity at a critical moment in time reveals that the holocaust was a highly
positive response to the tension existing between knowledge and Jewish identity, and as
such the holocaust could only be understood as an act of sacrifice by the Jews for the
Jews. Bearing in mind when we make this controversial statement that according to this
view of society as a superorganism, we area all Jews.
Just on this point about social break down caused by the clash between real
knowledge and the knowledge of identity which is religion, there is a suggestion in a
sentence taken from Comte, from a larger quote taken below, that makes a connection
between the advance of scientific knowledge and the break down of society. Such
turmoil is necessary to allow the fabric of society to be cleansed of the anti-Jewish, that is
anti-religious knowledge of reality, that reveals true identity to people.

For they [the Orientals] were thus preserved from the principal intellectual and
social difficulties entailed on the modern inhabitants of the West by the too
mystical character of their beliefs, and, above all, they have been saved from the
metaphysical disorder involved in the spontaneous decomposition of their
artificial regime.

I think that where Comte talks about “the spontaneous decomposition of their artificial
regime” he is referring to the break down of religiously bonded unity due to the ingress of
new knowledge ; although he is not using clear enough language to be sure, it is the
feeling I get from reading this sentence in context, as below. We can discern a theme in
Jewish religion concerning sacrifice of the body to God which is mirrored in the real
physiological dynamics of superorganic existence, that Judaism especially evolved to
reflect. And we could also take the story of the flood which cleanses the earth of the
unwanted, while preserving the chosen, as pertinent to the same historical events where
we see the act of sacrifice occur, since our whole argument in respect to the role of the
Nazis as organs of Jewish authority, makes a considerable use of the idea that both world
wars were about ridding society of the anti-religious, that is anti-Jewish, scientific
structure which had emerged over the course of the nineteenth century, while preserving
the core religious identity within the appropriately dedicated institutions of the
establishment that constitute exoskeletal substance which evolved expressly to perform
this role in the superorganic body. So that Noah’s Ark and sacrifice find real expression
in the world wars, and their associated terrors. Here then we see how an understanding of
theological ideas might be related to superorganic physiology, and hence why
Lilienfeld’s analysis of Christianity along these lines should strike a cord with any
scientist interested in human existence.
The association between Jews and internecine conflict within Jewish slave
societies, understood by Christians to be Christian societies, was a subject of interest to
the anti-Semitic Christians during the time when Hitler was coming into his own. World
Revolution : The Plot Against Civilization, by Nesta Webster, 1921, being a case in
point ; a work that has been discussed elsewhere by me, in the same context. But we can
take notice of it here, and also note that this women was anti-Semitic because she was a
Christian, in other words she was not an atheist taking a dispassionate interest in the
course of historical events, as we are. History is peculiar to Judaism, it is in fact a central
plank of the Jewish identity programme, for history vindicates the idea of the individual
as an end in themselves, who has power in life to serve their own ends. Whereas in
reality the very idea of history makes no sense at all, since there is no such thing as an
individual who exists to serve their own ends. The logic of history has that special
quality belonging expressly to religious ideas, the quality of an absolute inversion of
reality. So that, for example, in Christianity death is the moment of birth, because it is
then that we enter heaven and meet our maker, and this logical inversion inspired the
martyrs, as the same inverted logic inspires the modern Islamic terrorist. History takes
the purest evidence that human society cannot possibly exist to serve the individual as an
end in themselves, and inverts it, making history do just this, making history an account
of how people have served themselves relentlessly down the ages, and in so doing giving
us our history !
We saw this question make an appearance in a quote taken from Bidney above,
where he says :

Then he is confronted with the contrary thesis of the culturologist or ethnologist

to the effect that culture is, or is to be conceived “as if” it were, a historical reality
sui generis, requiring no reference to social structure or function.

The object of the remark is to indicate that culture might be represented as an historical
phenomenon, that is to say culture would have the same qualities as history is deemed to
have. Meaning that history is real, which by implication means that the individual is an
end in themselves, an end that, through their ambition and belief, generates history,
history which has no other driving force than the force of intent applied by the conscious
will of individuals. So that history arises from an exclusively historical force, sui
generis : generated from within history itself. This definition of history is really a fine
description of the manner in which the linguistic programme that is Judaism works. A
definition that is the antithesis of science, and the personification of religion. Here we
see that what has been long applied to an analysis of social activity, in the shape of
history, can also be applied to culture, in order to ensure that, as with history, no
scientific notions can enter the human domain through this avenue.
This observation taken from Bidney is of considerable interest since it is an
example of a highly convoluted elaboration of false logic, that relies for its existence
upon one simple act of misrepresentation, that which allowed Darwin to create his
monstrous theory of evolution, and which makes all false knowledge possible : the idea
that there is such a thing as an individual. Once you have the basic principle of deception
in place, it can be easily transposed across the range of relevant objects. Thus once we
have a fraudulent conception of human political activity conceived of as a pattern arising
from an endless sequence of competing individuals, seeking to secure their position and
power in life, and passing on the results to posterity, resulting in what we call History, the
model can be applied when a new dimension of society takes an intellectual form, thus
Culture comes to the fore in science, and so the priests set about cloaking it in the
religious guise of historicity.
It is the convoluted nature of ideas that can be produced with a sophisticated
language, which makes it possible to create a whole world of deception, which the
individual has no means of seeing through, because of the ubiquity and consistency of
every idea they ever meet, or ever have. It takes a trick of the mind to flip the
consciousness into a different state of perception, where the whole image of reality can
then take on the shimmering form of a mirage, and fall away to reveal the truth ; but a
person needs to want to see such thing, And who wants that ?

I want to take a piece from Comte now, regarding Islam :

For many centuries East and West have been seeking with equal ardour for
the Universal Religion, but till now have never been able to attain it. In both
quarters it came to be recognised that Polytheism could only furnish national
beliefs, and Monotheism was then looked to as a sure source of unanimity. But
experience and reasoning have completely demonstrated the emptiness of such a
hope. The two great attempts of the white race to establish a monotheistic
universality have mutually neutralised one another, the Roman world being
irremediably divided between Catholicism and Islamism. This double failure is no
matter of wonder to the disciples of sound philosophy, which directly points out
the impossibility of such an agreement upon opinions essentially vague and
necessarily undemonstrable.
The spontaneous accord between Orientals and Occidentals with respect to
the scientific domain which they have simultaneously cultivated, forms an
instructive contrast with these irreconcilable divergences. Taking this
fundamental fact for my clue, I was led to discover the really universal religion,
which puts aside every theological belief, and embraces the whole of human
existence, collective as well as individual, in a completely Positive faith. Having
had the happiness to hold this view from my early youth, I have been able to
devote my whole life to systematise and develop this final solution of the highest
of all problems.
The emancipation of the higher minds from theology, since the end of the
Middle Age, necessarily proceeded pari passu in both East and West, though
under different forms. For it resulted principally from the decisive conflict which
compelled men to feel that the incompatible pretensions of both Monotheisms to
the universality reserved for Positivism were alike ill founded. The genius of
Islamism must even be less opposed than that of Catholicism to the final advent of
the Positive Religion, inasmuch as it has always tended more towards reality, in
virtue of its simpler creed and its more practical direction.
The incomparable Mahomet, observing the profound contrast between the
two dogmatically identical religions of Rome and Byzantium, duly recognised the
intellectual and moral advantages belonging to the normal separation between the
two human powers. But his eminently social turn of mind enabled him to see that
this improvement, to be decisive, required a more advanced civilisation than that
which went along with the theological principle. With a presentiment that so
premature though admirable an attempt must fail, he contented himself with
instituting a transitional regime which was simpler and better adapted to the
nature of Theologism.
 The East had therefore to leave it to the West and to the true Catholic
regime to initiate the glorious social revolution consisting in the two gradual
emancipations of women and labourers. But the Orientals became better fitted
than ourselves to reap the definitive fruits of the great movement which followed
this decisive prelude. For they were thus preserved from the principal intellectual
and social difficulties entailed on the modern inhabitants of the West by the too
mystical character of their beliefs, and, above all, they have been saved from the
metaphysical disorder involved in the spontaneous decomposition of their
artificial regime.
Although by reason of the whole preparation required for the Positive
Religion, its birthplace was necessarily in the West, Islamism must be held to
have rendered the East more favourable to its final admission. For, on the one
hand, that religion has protected the populations against the revolutionary poison,
since its doctrine was not susceptible of the Protestant or Deistic degenerations,
while its regime was far from admitting the hereditary principle in its strictest
form. And on the other hand it has maintained the normal supremacy of
governments, because it has made Mussulman rulers always more disposed than
Christian sovereigns to look at the social problem as a whole, in consequence of
the less imperfect harmony subsisting between their theoretic conceptions and
their practical notions. Hence the final regeneration may triumph in the East
without arousing the anarchical agitation to which the West was condemned by its
initiative ; the philosophers being obliged there to address themselves to the lower
classes, because they cannot get the upper classes to understand them.
Reasoning from this historical estimate of the genius of Mahometanism, I
do not doubt that its present representatives, when their first astonishment has
passed away, will welcome the Positive Religion as offering them spontaneously
the unexpected satisfaction of their chiefest aspirations. Passing straight from
Islamism to Positivism, without any metaphysical transition, they will feel that
they are worthily continuing the admirable designs of their great Prophet, the
universal glorification of whom is systematised for ever by the Positivist worship.
The Osmanlis will thus be led to repudiate a vain political unity, and will
cease to grieve over the necessary dismemberment of their empire. For they will
see in it a normal application of the sociological law which everywhere restricts
the territory of temporal dominions to its natural size. Moreover, the Ottoman
rulers will be relieved from their anxiety, as disastrous as it is chimerical, with
reference to the approaching aggressions of a power still less homogeneous than
their own, and therefore still more subject to this spontaneous dismemberment.
And since, according to the fundamental spirit of Islamism, the only purpose of
political concentration is to procure and consolidate a uniformity of opinions and
manners, they will soon recognise that this great end is better secured when God
is replaced by Humanity.

(Comte, pages xlii – xliv)

 The above is part of missive sent to Reschid Pacha, late Grand Vizier of the
Ottoman Empire, dated 1853. He really was on weird git, but it is interesting to see such
curious musings on the nature of the Islamic sense of self, though we might wonder that
anyone could be so blind to the real nature of religion, of whatever kind, as a slave
identity that is fixed in people’s brains, assuming they had the clearest impression that
society was a social organism in their minds, as Comte had. An organism has a
physiology, a structure, and structure means differentiation under one unity, hence
structural differentiation under one identity, which ought to of led any half reasoning
person interested in the subject to see that Judaism was the universal religion, the
universal identity, and Islam, along with Christianity, was its slave identity. Comte really
was a totally disgusting thinker for whom we should have nothing but contempt as a
thinker, and as a person by the sound of it, for he was just like everyone who wishes to be
a priest honouring the absolute authority that reduces us to menial blobs of living matter,
just to please their own self centred egos. He tells us he had his ideas about a Positive
religion from youth, which is worth keeping in mind, he clearly never had any sympathy
with science, and his concern with revolution, although the French Revolution rocked his
society, shows he was not concerned with ideas of freedom, but inclined to be interested
only in order at any price, like all priests and enemies of science.

The other day I took an essay of the net attacking Hobbes’ Leviathan, written by a
man who new Hobbes well and condemns his work because its offers way of
understanding government on the basis of human nature rather than divine influence, thus
he condemned Hobbes for being a bad Christian. We are more accepting of the idea that
in the middle of the seventeenth century our society was indeed something close to an
absolute theocracy, but as we can see from the way Comte is obsessed by religion and an
admirer of Hobbes such as Lilienfeld cannot launch an unmitigated assault on religion
such as we offer, nor ignore the subject when seeking to describe society according to
natural principles.

And I am still of opinion, that even of those who have read his book, and not
frequented his company, there are many, who being delighted with some new
notions, and the pleasant and clear style throughout the book, have not taken
notice of those down-right Conclusions, which overthrow or undermine all those
Principles of Government, which have preserved the Peace of this Kingdom
through so many ages, even from the time of its first Institution ; or restored it to
Peace, when it had at some times been interrupted : and much less of those odious
insinuations, and perverting some texts of Scripture, which do dishonour, and
would destroy the very Essence of the Religion of Christ. And when I called to
mind the good acquaintance that had been between us, and what I had said to
many who I knew had informed him of it, and which indeed I had sent to himself
upon the first publishing of his Leviathan, I thought my self even bound to give
him some satisfaction why I had entertained so evil an opinion of his Book.

(A Survey of Mr Hobbes His Leviathan, by Edward, Earl of Clarendon)

 The item taken from the internet contains no publishing details. Hobbes is
reckoned by Maclay to be the beginning of the modern idea of the social organism, and
Lilienfeld certainly speaks of him, and others when discussing this topic do also, so it is
always worth taking a look at how he was received in his own day, and we see that he
was disliked because he combined a threat to civil power with a threat to religious power,
and this is just a typical mark of war between religion and science in relation to the
advancement of knowledge, a war religion cannot lose precisely because of its link with
social power, and that science cannot win for the same reason.

__________

This chapter is supposed to be looking at modern ideas pertaining to our subject

and a central theme in our work is the relentless war waged by religion against
knowledge, a war in which we have seen science eradicated from society so that all we
have is religion belittling science and science sucking up to religion. But, as we have
seen, the main way in which the charade of accommodation has been presented since
science was destroyed in the opening decades of the twentieth century is by setting up a
false science to oppose religion, or sympathetic science, so that both for and against
revolved about a common point of nonsense, set up by Darwin.
But while the main piece of work that makes the imposition of religion upon
science appears in the shape of Origin of Species, as we frequently say, this works by
applying the basic principle of splitting reality in two and then basing ideas on the false
remiss of individuality while eradicating from the scene of intellectual thought any ideas
of anything else other than the individual as an end in themselves, as we have just been
seeing in Bidney’s thoughts on the possibility of History as a facet of existence that exists
at its own behest and in its own right, a representation of the individual as an end in
themselves, writ large.
Now lets take a junk of extremely unpleasant work, from the greatest of
contemporary enemies of science, working within the scientific field, excepting perhaps
Dawkins,

HOW NOW DICHOTOMY—AND HOW NOT

If, in general, dichotomy represents such a false mode for parsing either the structure of
nature or the forms of human discourse ; and if, in particular, we have erred grievously
every time in depicting the history of interaction between science and the humanities as a
series of episodes in dichotomous struggle, then why does this fallacy of reasoning, like
the proverbial bad penny, keep turning up to poison our understanding and sour our
relationships ? I would end this critical yet hopeful commentary (for the optimistic side
of my being compels me to believe that the exposure of a fallacy can lead to its
correction, whatever the odds or the entrenchments) by reiterating three major reasons for
the hold of dichotomy upon our schemes and perceptions. The third and most important
factor also grants me the literary license to end this meandering section in tight and
recursive form by returning to the opening discussion of Francis Bacon, the much
misunderstood and underappreciated avatar of the Scientific Revolution, but also a wise
social and philosophical critic who, so long ago, presented the best refutation of
dichotomy, both in the lesson of his life and the content of his argument.
1. The turf wars of history. However tight the logic of respectful separation may
be, and however salutary the benefits of such equal and mutually supportive regard might
prove, a basic foible of human affairs prevents the achievement of such gracious sharing
when the history of turf—whether the prize be actual land and resources or just
intellectual space—begins with one side as steward of the totality. No one (or at least no
institution in full unanimity) cedes turf voluntarily, however ultimately beneficial the
move and strategy. Thus, if basic human inquisitiveness forces us to ask great questions
about why the sky is blue and the grass green, and if, faute de mieux, this discourse fell
under the rubric of theology before modern science arose to claim proper dominion over
factual aspects of such inquiries about the natural world, then some theologians will resist
(while others will see farther and strongly approve) the exit of religion from a domain
that never properly fell under its competence.
Similarly, if Renaissance humanists once assumed that their techniques of
locating and explicating Ancient texts could best resolve all questions about factual
nature, then some adherents to this orthodoxy will resist the legitimate claims of a new
institution—modern science—for observation and experiment as a more effective
pathway to the same goal. With goodwill and the passage of time, these inevitable
roilings and suspicions should settle down into an honourable peace based on advantages
for both sides (a “win-win” situation in the jargon of our times). But we should probably
regard the initial (and heated) skirmishes as unavoidable—the basic theme of the first
part of this book, on the “rite and rights of an initiating spring” for modern science. And
we should confine our task to deploring and correcting the continuation of such a conflict
well beyond this early period of legitimacy—as this inevitable opening move can only
become destructive once a novel field has secured its birthright, for generosity and
mutual support should then prevail.
2. The hopes of psychology. Scientists must understand the limits of their calling
for a second practical and powerful reason beyond the first argument above, about turf
wars. We live in a vale of tears, and bad things often happen to good people. These
unpleasant facts about life cannot be avoided. Therefore, and especially, we need to
sustain a realm of human goodness, and a calm place of optimism based on value and
meaning, amid realities that we yearn to avoid but cannot deny. Yet our hopes and needs
run so high that, until the reality of reiterated experience forces us to bite the bullet and
bow to the inevitable, we also try to invest factual nature with the sustaining myths of “all
things bright and beautiful,” or the psalmist’s vain hope (37 : 25) and massive self-
deception : “I have been young, and now am old ; yet have I not seen the righteous
forsaken, nor his seed begging bread.”
Science can only document these realities that all of us would rather deny or
mitigate. And because humans have long practiced a lamentable tendency to slay the
innocent messenger of bad news, science does need to specify and defend its role as a
messenger and not a moralizer, and then to insist that the message, properly read
(admittedly against the hopes and traditions of ages), truly contains seeds of resolution
and grounds for genuine optimism. That is, science must insist that, whatever the factual
state of nature, our yearnings and quest for morality and meaning belong to the different
domains of the humanities, the arts, philosophy, and theology—and cannot be
adjudicated by the findings of science. Facts may enrich and enlighten our moral
questions (about the definition of death, the beginning of life, or the validity of using
embryonic stem cells in biological research). But facts cannot dictate the answers to
questions about the “oughts” of conduct or the spiritual meanings of our lives. If we keep
these distinctions clear, then nature’s unpleasant facts, as ascertained by science, pose no
threat to humane studies, and may even foster our discourse in morality and art by posing
new issues in different ways.
Still, scientists must recognize and understand how legitimate fear often trumps
solid logic to cast unfair suspicion upon a messenger, especially when such a long
tradition fuels the false dichotomy and resulting enmity. Thus I do acknowledge how
much Wordsworth loved nature, and I do not begrudge his fears, though I must criticize
his argument, when he wrote so famously, in a beautiful, but tragically flawed, verse :

Sweet is the lore which nature brings,

Our meddling intellect
Distorts the beauteous forms of things.
We murder to dissect.

I would only say to the poets that science must dissect as one path to
understanding, but never to destroy the beauty and joy of wholeness. And I do regret that
some of my colleagues have made rash claims for granting science a decisive role in
aesthetic and moral judgment. To all our Wordsworths, I would only grant assurance and
strongly affirm that my profession can never challenge, and should only admire, your
identification and reverence for those “thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears,” to
cite the final line of the Ode on Intimations of Immortality, judged by Emerson (and I
agree) as the finest poem ever written in the English language. I would also remind Mr.
Wordsworth that the “host of golden daffodils,” his embodiment of joy in nature, grew
within my realm and under my rules—and that I experience nothing but pleasure and
gratitude in learning about his appreciation and inspiration.
3. The inborn habits of dichotomy. I have argued throughout this part that,
however intensified by particular reasons of history and psychology, the affliction of
dichotomy—the basis for our false, yet persistent, model of opposition between science
and the humanities—probably lies deep within our neurological wiring as an evolved
property of mental functioning, once adaptive in distant ancestors with far more limited
brain power, but now inherited as cognitive baggage. This impediment from our
evolutionary past engenders great harm in leading us to misunderstand the complexities
that now define our lives and dangers—thus overwhelming whatever benefit dichotomy
might still provide in simplifying the immediate cognitive decisions that defined the “do
or die” of some ancient forebears, but that now rarely impact our current lives in the same
way.
In an admittedly ironic paradox of recursion (the requirement that mind must
reflect upon mind in order to break the primary impediment), our best chance for
exposing and expunging the fallacy of dichotomous opposition between science and the
humanities lies in showing that a powerful myth about scientific procedure—the legend
that spawned the impression of science as an objective activity, strictly divorced from all
the mental quirks and subjectivities underlying creative work in the humanities—
founders on a false assumption best exposed by scrutinizing such intrinsic mental biases
as our propensity for dichotomy itself. These universal cognitive biases affect the work of
scientists as strongly as they impact any other human activity—perhaps with even greater
force because scientists have so firmly enclosed themselves within an ideology that
denies the efficacy, or even the existence, of such biases. And what influence can be
more pervasive or insidious than a strong effect that cannot be perceived because the
rules of the game preclude a proper perception of the problem ?
This myth of objectivity—the belief that scientists achieve their special status by
freeing their minds of constraining social bias and learning to see nature directly under
established rules of “the scientific method”—drives a wedge between science and the
humanities, because historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science know that such a
mental state cannot be achieved (while they do not doubt the ability of science to gain
reliable factual knowledge about the natural world, even if this knowledge must be
obtained in curiously roundabout ways by flawed human reasoning) ; whereas scientists
mistake these truthful and helpful analyses by colleagues in the humanities as attacks
upon the purity of their enterprise, rather than an intended affirmation that all our mental
activities, including science, can only be pursued by gutsy human beings, warts and all
(and that we often learn more from the warts than from the idealizations).
If scientists would admit the ineluctable human character of their enterprise, and
if students of science within the humanities would then acknowledge the power of
science to increase the storehouse of genuine knowledge by working with all the flaws of
human foibles, then we could break the hold of dichotomy and break bread together. The
first, and in many ways still the best, analysis of the inherent mental biases underlying all
scientific work resides in the most important treatise written by Francis Bacon himself—a
particularly ironic situation because Bacon’s name then became associated with the
opposite position that has fuelled the flames of dichotomy for centuries. For reasons
described just below, the “objective” process of simply recording facts, and then drawing
logical inferences from these lists of facts alone, became known, in Anglophone jargon,
as “the Baconian method,” thus tying the name of this avatar of the Scientific Revolution
to the myth that then drove a wedge between science and other intellectual activities—not
Bacon’s intention at all, as we shall see.

(The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister’s Pox : Mending and minding
the misconceived gap between science and the humanities, Gould, 2003, pages
104 – 108)

Get this :

And what influence can be more pervasive or insidious than a strong effect
that cannot be perceived because the rules of the game preclude a proper
perception of the problem ?

I loath Gould with a passion, but we can be as gracious toward the man as he is
toward all humanity is his Christian style sycophantic drool, evoking good will and love
to all, when really, as with Christians, this conceited superiority, assuming a genuine
intent, is the calm arrogance of one who is in the position of supreme power that comes
from evil done in past times, when necessary, to ensure no enemies, with a voice, exist in
the present. But, we can be gracious, because in this snippet I have immediately selected
to repeat from the above quote, we find a sentiment echoing the most basic tenet of our
work, so that, as with the ant taken captive by a slave maker ant, the poor human slave
simply has no way of knowing that the sense of self implanted into his brain is not really
his sense of self, and in this piece taken from Gould we see this sentiment well noted, by
one who, even as he notes it, we will graciously suppose, did not have the faintest idea of
the fact that the position he was describing and applying to others, was in fact describing
himself to a T.
We of course would simply say that no one alive today can think about science
from a true perspective because the true perspective elucidated by scientists in the
nineteenth century has been eradicated and expunged from our collective consciousness.
But the mechanism of being beyond the possibility of thought because an idea is pushed
out of reach through carefully crafted modes of reasoning designed to have this effect,
combined with strategies such as making the discussion of Judaism taboo, are exactly the
same as what Gould is talking about here when he says scientists deny that they have
biases within their mental regime. He also says “that mind must reflect upon mind in
order to break the primary impediment” due to dichotomy, and this is indeed correct ; it is
very much the sum of what we are saying. For mind is information planted into the brain
in the form of a linguistic programme, it is this linguistic programme that we use to look
upon what is real, and when we look we see the linguistic programme reflected back at us
from what others say. So, as we have already discussed, we see an image of our own
mind when we look upon the social world. Therefore the only escape from an act of
fiendish deception of this insidious kind imposed upon us by nature, requires that we are
able to develop an ability that defines scientific knowledge, so that “scientists achieve
their special status by freeing their minds of constraining social bias and learning to see
nature directly under established rules of “the scientific method” ”, which Gould says
“drives a wedge between science and the humanities, because historians, sociologists, and
philosophers of science know that such a mental state cannot be achieved”.
And there we have it, in a nutshell, why I curse Gould as the nastiest of
contemporary enemies of science, but, mercifully, he is no longer a living foe ; someone
told me a few moths ago that he died a couple of years ago, so this only leaves a few
hundreds of millions of highly trained brilliant scientists just like him for us to worry
about, dedicated to the cause of destroying science anyway they can, phew !
What is the best way to address this pathetic drivel Gould comes out with here ?
He picks up on a number of pivotal points in this selection, which makes it easy for us to
focus on what matters and to annihilate his stupid argument. We have already drawn
attention to the basic difficulties of importance that Gould highlights. The last ne we
took notice of, wherein Gould says that the scientific method is impossible to perform is
perhaps the most critical. There are certain logical propositions behind this state which
the likes of sociologists certainly use to ensure that they have an argument to present to
the morons that study their subject with a gullible desire to be spoon fed comforting
knowledge of the kind Gould excuses in the above. This says that it is not possible for
anyone to remove themselves from the society in which they live, self evidently, so the
attainment of the kind of bias inherent in the ideal definition of the scientific method is
unattainable. We have already taken notice of this kind of word game where words were
made sacred so that their meanings were taken at face value and made the basis of
assertions about the nature of reality. Previously we considered the argument presented
by Evans-Pritchard in a like vein to Gould, to undermines the basic assumptions of
science, by asserting that a naturalistic approach to reality was impossible because that
would mean making the word natural include everything, even that which was
supposedly unnatural, resulting in a logical absurdity that demonstrated the untenable
nature of the scientific position. Such people really make me want to puke, you can
almost feel the sense of glee emanating from their words, at the sublime perfection of
their poetic reasoning, which no cold blooded scientist has the power to see ! Arrrrgh !
Aggravating or what ?
So if we are going to say that Evans-Pritchard was playing word games because
he toyed with the meaning of one word, then we might say Gould is doing the same thing
here except he is playing idea games because he is encapsulating the meaning of an idea,
implicit in the scientific method that denotes separation from bias, and I suppose take all
together we may say that these most famous representatives of their scientific filed are
just playing mind games, as priests have always done in their effort to promote the war
against knowledge on behalf of the theocracy they serve and are part of.
Throughout this work, and others, we have made it plain that it is perfectly
possible to place oneself outside the social flux within which we live and to present
analyses of existence that are without the slightest hint of bias, and that any apparent bias
arises only because of the position Gould refers to in his piece, whereby, treating
knowledge as a territory to be occupied, the prior occupation of such territory by a social
authority means that new ideas threatening to usurp that possession are seen as bias to
those already in possession. Putting aside this temporal difficulty, by asking whether
science can take possession of knowledge in an unbiased way the problem then swings in
a new direction, whereby those who have become dispossessed change tack and seek to
regain possession by taking over science itself, exactly as we have been describing. So
that before an apologist such as Gould has any right to make his pronouncements on the
subject he made his own during his lifetime, he has one duty to perform, he needs to
satisfy himself that whatever science exists is truly science, and as such free, and no
corrupted, for only then can there be any discussion about what science can and cannot
do in terms of creating an unbiased view of human existence. But saying this only takes
us round in circles because we began by saying that any idea that there is a competing
notion of reality aside from the Darwinian competing with modern humanist disciplines
is erased from the filed of consciousness, so Gould is clear in his own blinkered mind that
there is no real science to be considered. But this is a good thing for us to see, because
this shows just how vital it was for the theocracy to devise a long slow method of
subversion and substitution enabled via a short bout of brutal devastation, to bring into
being a state where a man like Gould could take on the mantle of a scientist fighting for
science but unwittingly trying to make peace between religious science in the shape of
Darwinism and religious secularism in the shape of the humanities.
But the whole of Gould’s ludicrous argument falls by the wayside when we offer
up the idea that humans are a superorganic species, and there is no such thing as an
individual person, no such thing as God, or history or the artificial, or unnatural. With
our truly unbiased scientific idea we have a real concept of reality, wherein bias is
irrelevant, scientists can be as biased as they like, once faced with the irrefutable fact that
humans are a species of superorganic mammal, then every single idea that can be thought
of or discussed, is liable to be dealt with in an unbiased manner at some point, because
the model is correct and inherently unbiased. If this attribute of scientific models of
reality were not so then the scientific method would never work in any place, or time, this
is why the scientific method is supreme and unassailable. Once we know the earth is
round and rotating, and moving about the sun, it is simply impossible to apply any useful
political bias to a misrepresentation of this model, so all resulting science is bound to be
unbiased thereafter, and only flawed in so far as science has yet to develop itself on its
own terms. And this is the reason why the idea of the social organism had to be, and was
destroyed, and then made taboo by the work of the high priest of Judaism, Adolf Hitler.
But of course the high priest of Darwinism, Gould, would not want us to make any
outrageously unbiased remarks such as this, for they are distasteful, and as such the
messenger coming forth which such unbiased science deserves to be shot by the poor old
priest, who after all just wants to be left alone in his innocent possession of all
knowledge, and allowed to be happy.
This is section is against dichotomy, and splitting our perception of human
existence in two is our primary objection to the form knowledge takes, providing as it
does the basis upon which to build the mythological mirror of religion in which people
see themselves reflected according the slave programme language puts into their brain.
Gould gives us three reasons why dichotomy arises despite the fact that is it obvious to
everyone who cares to think about it from a even a vaguely scientific perspective that this
splitting is wrong. “The turf wars of history” are the first excuse he offers to defend the
existence of religious modes of understanding the science of humanity. This gives the
sweetest possible interpretation of what we talk about under the heading of The War
Between Religion and Science. Next comes “The hopes of psychology.” in which Gould
further eulogises on the religious sentiment that cannot help its urge to suppress freedom
of though by whatever means of evil are available to it because :

We live in a vale of tears, and bad things often happen to good people. These
unpleasant facts about life cannot be avoided. Therefore, and especially, we need
to sustain a realm of human goodness, and a calm place of optimism based on
value and meaning, amid realities that we yearn to avoid but cannot deny.

Reach for the bucket, and make it a big’un ! How much do we loath this disgusting
man ? Here is the raw face of the priesthood as scientist. This kind of gush is fit only for
seven year old and Yanks. But in terms of sensible criticise, having recovered from the
involuntary ripple of revulsion running across the surface of our consciousness when we
find ourselves concentrating on such a piece of vile poison in a book masquerading as the
work of a scientific mind, we can see that all that Gould is doing is taking to its
maximum expression the dichotomous split imposed on knowledge by the omnipotent
theocracy that he lives to serve. He is making the minimum extent of the weakest
individual the ultimate expression of the human intellect, exactly as he must do if he is to
defend religion in a scientific world. Never mind the fact that it is the social force
expressed in the blind ignorance of religion that creates responses such as the world wars
and Nazis movements in order to sustain ignorance to a purpose and suppress science.
What kind of scientific statement is it to say that bad things happen to good people, hell’s
teeth just being born is a bad thing when we realise that we all have to die and between
birth and dying we are liable to have to face an awful lot of grief, meaningless drivel, it
is no wonder that Gould was so prolific an author, the machine could not get enough of
his sick anti-scientific bullshit.
And then we come to number three, which was all I really had anything in my
mind to speak about,

the affliction of dichotomy—the basis for our false, yet persistent, model of
opposition between science and the humanities—probably lies deep within our
neurological wiring as an evolved property of mental functioning,

What ! What is this moron of the first order, going on about now ? We evolved a
tendency to split reality in two as a survival strategy when we were still monkey-men
struggling like monkeys with the world as simple animals ; seems to be the drift of this
drivel. This overwhelming quality of our present intellectuality was :

“once adaptive in distant ancestors with far more limited brain power, but now
inherited as cognitive baggage.”

Where does the man get this shit from ? Does he throw words in bucket and pull them
out one by one to see if he can make a syntactical sentence from them that will fit on the
page ? What utter mindless rubbish. What basis does he have ........ na, na, na, do not
even go there, we do not ask what sense there is in the arguments of a psychotic, criminal
madman, and in terms of scientific reasoning there could never be a more psychotic,
twisted, and criminally perverse man than Gould.
However, to be fair, as fair as it is possible to be under this assault upon our
intelligence as human beings, his logic only takes the basic theological science ushered in
by Darwin to its ultimate expression, and this mode of expression, it has to be admitted,
is a common place amongst professional scientists, the priests who are the modern
spokespeople for the priesthood of the theocracy. In a theocracy existing in a scientific
age it is obvious that the priests must be scientists.
We get this argument concerning the fact that the logic of Darwinian evolution
means that our brains evolved to fit us to a world now gone, resulting in physiological lag
—could we ever imagine a more idiotic, anti-evolutionary idea than such lag ?—because
humans have supposedly catapulted themselves into the civilized world by virtue of their
anti-evolutionary nature, meaning humans act independently of evolutionary forces, and
progress rather than evolve. And as a penalty for biting the apple of wisdom, and
assuming the position of God the creator, something we are constantly berated for today
as we perfect our ability to manipulate the mechanics of life, we are left with a baggage
of regrettably primitive features, once a boon of strength, that are now a deleterious
hindrance to our intelligence.
You would think, from the way these pathetic excuses for scientists speak all the
time, that people who make up such nonsense were talking about a degenerate spastic
species of animal on the brink of extinction, that there was no means of comprehending
how such poor creatures ever came into existence given the known laws of evolutionary
biology. We would never guess that these misbegotten academics are actually talking
about the most extraordinary animal ever produced by nature, extraordinary by a factor so
great it benumbs imagination to think about the difference between ourselves and our
fellow earthlings ; we rule the planet, we do not grovel about in difficulty. Our
uniqueness is caste in the mold of an impossible vulnerability, a weakness that we only
overcome because we are an impossible part of nature, because we are not a part of
nature in any ordinary sense of the word. This is really what all this nasty Gouldian,
American style reasoning, is all about.
The Americans are forever exploiting their linguistic affinity with British culture
to feed their degenerate and digesting mentality back toward the place that gave it birth.
Yesterday, 11/03/08, the news was all about how we were going to introduce a ceremony
for school children like the American oath of allegiance they have to swear in school
everyday. Doesn’t it make you sick to see American kidds doing this ! But what we
have to remember is that the Yanks have developed such traditions because they are a
mixed bag of cultures thrown into a ferment of newly constituted organic being. It was
said that the prime minister Brown was keen to invigorate a sense of Britishness in us,
and so this disgusting method used by the pathetic Yanks is the kind of rubbish our
masters come up with to manage their cattle. But the interesting point here is the way
this tactic is exactly what we would expect as part of the process of reworking the fabric
of European identity to get it back to the pure Jewish slave identity it use to be before our
independence as a nation empowered us to throw Christianity aside. So the world wars
decimated the slave biomass, the Muslims were used as a transfusion of Jewish slave
identity, and now the process of telling us our British identity is dead, the job of
fragmenting our unity through devolution and such like, these proposals to give an
American style identity constitution which marks the fact that the priests have done their
job and reconstituted our identity, all these are signs of how the superorganism manages
its fabric by managing our consciousness.
What have these proposals for an oath of allegiance to do with the Americans ?
How do we know where these ideas come from, the umbilical cord of our shared culture
is a constant source of degenerate ideas this side of the pond. In this particular case the
idea looks like the Brits mimicking the Yanks, a common enough habit amongst our
rulers, the Yanks set the pace of cultural change because they have no morality, the day
before yesterday their president stepped into to stymie an attempt by their politicians to
outlaw torture, a typical demonstration of what America is really all about. Our
politicians are always looking for way to introduce vicious means of civil control that the
Americans impose without restraint, and I see this as more than a product of our master’s
desire to find means of controlling their cattle more effectively. But the real force of
American infiltration of our society derives from the power of money. I am always
smelling the work of American lobby groups, religious lobby groups, seeking to make
our state run systems open to private finance, last week the Conservatives were talking
about providing five thousand more prison places by selling the prisons to private
consortiums who would then build more places ! Schools, hospitals and ever aspect of
social governance is being directed this way, and the real reason is because the theocracy
knows it can always draw money toward itself and if it can take control of social
infrastructure, which is how the overt theocracy always worked, then is can get its feelers
insinuated into ever detail of superorganic life and rule as it use to. And all this is an
American method because the Americans are the seat of the Jewish hegemony, from
whence this capitalist system derives, as Sombart said, but no one who is not brain dead
needs to be told about this relationship between money and religion, our society reeks of
it from every pore of its being.
Whereas, instead of this dichotomous model of understanding touted by Gould in
his attack on dichotomous thinking, here we extol a monistic view of human nature, in
which all features of our existence accord with one ongoing biological process, for us the
mental dichotomy we certainly experience, is a product of our evolved capacity for
language, the functional role of which is not to simplify the decision making process
under difficult conditions, as Gould says, but to allow the linguistic force that creates all
social structure to build a superorganism via a linguistic programme that gives us our
mind, or consciousness, and so dictates what we will think and do, at ever moment of our
waking lives. The result of this linguistic function, projecting a superorganic reality into
existence, is that as individuals we are bound to be split from the world that is
independent of linguistic intercession, that we see and feel in a manner comparative to
the way other animals see and experience, and that which is created directly by way of
linguistic representation that is unique to ourselves because it is part of ourselves. We
recognise a unique feature of humans, but we make this uniqueness as part of our
biological form, and as such it is saying nothing special to say that we have some aspect
of ourselves that is unique, you could say the same of a penguin or a earwig, I would
imagine, though I have not tried to see if this is true by thinking about it. Therefore
Gould’s idea that there is a mental basis to our urge to split knowledge in two is perfectly
valid, but where he wants to make this a mental aberration, we want to make it a primary
quality of human nature from which our social world arises. We are scientists thinking
without bias, he is a priest expressing nothing but bias in service to the linguistic
programme that drives him in obedience to his master, the superorganism.
 Chapter Twelve

Durkheim

I have just happened upon my copy of Durkheim’s Rules of Sociological Method

and dipping into it now I think it is about time I tried to get to grips with Durkheim, my
attention having been drawn in his direction through Maclay and other references to him I
have mentioned here. The question is then just how far we can relate Durkheim’s ideas
to the idea of the social organism, which we have just seen he was not much enamoured
of in Lilienfeld’s hands ?
This book is the best item of Durkheim’s I have looked at, here we do find
something much more in harmony with the kind of thinking we are obliged to develop
from the idea that human nature is corporate and humans are a true superorganic species
of mammal. We can rip out a junk from the body of his work and see what we might
make of it in terms of its relationship to our strictly scientific approach, but there is a
lengthy introduction to this shortest of al pieces by Durkheim, and there is a paragraph
we must take from here.

Durkheim’s method, most suggestive in itself, yet involves, it so happens,

the use of the hypothesis of a collective consciousness ; it results in a deplorable
effort to interpret social phenomena in terms of this alleged consciousness. In this
Durkheim is at one with a series of writers—theorists of the “social organism”—
excellently discussed by Professor Coker of Yale. Durkheim, however, is not
singular among men of science in being more valuable in respect of the by-
products of his theory than in his main contention.

(Introduction, George Catlin, in Durkheim, 1966, p. xiv. First pub. 1938.)

Durkheim’s Les Règles de la méthode sociologique was first published in 1895,

well imbedded in that period when the theocracy was rearing itself up and dragging
science out of its true position in society and preparing the way to force science to
become the exclusively religious doctrine we see extolled by the likes of Gould. In the
selection we see here, it is delightful to see our phrase making an appearance, and we see
that the man of academic influence is, by this time, already able to speak of the idea of
society as a biological phenomenon, produced by nature, in accord with scientific logic,
deplorable.

CHAPTER V

RULES FOR THE EXPLANATION

OF SOCIAL FACTS
 The establishment of species is, above all, a means of grouping facts in order to
facilitate their interpretation. But social morphology is only an introduction to the truly
explanatory part of the science. What is the proper method of this part ?

Most sociologists think they have accounted for phenomena once they have
shown how they are useful, what role they play, reasoning as if facts existed only from
the point of view of this role and with no other determining cause than the sentiment,
clear or confused, of the services they are called to render. That is why they think they
have said all that is necessary, to render them intelligible, when they have established the
reality of these services and have shown what social needs they satisfy.
Thus Comte traces the entire progressive force of the human species to this
fundamental tendency “which directly impels man constantly to ameliorate his condition,
whatever it may be, under all circumstances”; 1 and Spencer relates this force to the need
for greater happiness. It is in accordance with this principle that Spencer explains the
formation of society by the alleged advantages which result from cooperation; the
institution of government, by the utility of the regularization of military co-operation ; 2
the transformations through which the family has passed, by the need for reconciling
more and more perfectly the interests of parents, children, and society.

¹ Cours de philosophie positive, IV, 262.

² Principles of Sociology, II, 247.

But this method confuses two very different questions. To show how a fact is
useful is not to explain how it originated or why it is what it is. The uses which it serves
presuppose the specific properties characterizing it but do not create them. The need we
have of things cannot give them existence, nor can it confer their specific nature upon
them. It is to causes of another sort that they owe their existence. The idea we have of
their utility may indeed motivate us to put these forces to work and to elicit from them
their characteristic effects, but it will not enable us to produce these effects out of
nothing. This proposition is evident so long as it is a question only of material, or even
psychological, phenomena. It would be equally evident in sociology if social facts,
because of their extreme intangibility, did not wrongly appear to us as without all
intrinsic reality. Since we usually see them as a product purely of mental effort, it seems
to us that they may be produced at will whenever we find it necessary. But since each one
of them is a force, superior to that of the individual, and since it has a separate existence,
it is not true that merely by willing to do so may one call them into being. No force can
be engendered except by an antecedent force. To revive the spirit of the family, where it
has become weakened, it is not enough that everyone understand its advantages ; the
causes which alone can engender it must be made to act directly. To give a government
the authority necessary for it, it is not enough to feel the need for this authority ; we must
have recourse to the only sources from which all authority is derived. We must, namely,
establish traditions, a common spirit, etc.; and for this it is necessary again to go back
along the chain of causes and effects until we find a point where the action of man may
be effectively brought to bear.
What shows plainly the dualism of these two orders of research is that a fact can
exist without being at all useful, either because it has never been adjusted to any vital end
or because, after having been useful, it has lost all utility while continuing to exist by the
inertia of habit alone. There are, indeed, more survivals in society than in biological
organisms. There are even cases where a practice or a social institution changes its
function without thereby changing its nature. The rule, Is pater quem justae nuptiae
declarant, 3 has remained in our code essentially the same as it was in the old Roman law.
While its purpose then was to safeguard the property rights of a father over children born
to the legitimate wife, it is rather the rights of children that it protects today. The custom
of taking an oath began by being a sort of judiciary test and has become today simply a
solemn and imposing formality. The religious dogmas of Christianity have not changed
for centuries, but the role which they play is not the same in our modern societies as in
the Middle Ages. Thus, the same words may serve to express new ideas. It is, moreover,
a proposition true in sociology, as in biology, that the organ is independent of the
function—in other words, while remaining the same, it can serve different ends. The
causes of its existence are, then, independent of the ends it serves.
3
Legal marriage with the mother establishes the father’s rights over the children.

Nevertheless, we do not mean to say that the impulses, needs, and desires of men
never intervene actively in social evolution. On the contrary, it is certain that they can
hasten or retard its development, according to the circumstances which determine the
social phenomena. Apart from the fact that they cannot, in any case, make something out
of nothing, their actual intervention, whatever may be its effects, can take place only by
means of efficient causes. A deliberate intention can contribute, even in this limited way,
to the production of a new phenomenon only if it has itself been newly formed or if it is
itself a result of some transformation of a previous intention. For, unless we postulate a
truly providential and pre-established harmony, we cannot admit that man has carried
with him from the beginning—potentially ready to be awakened at the call of
circumstances—all the intentions which conditions were destined to demand in the
course of human evolution. It must further be recognized that a deliberate intention is
itself something objectively real ; it can, then, neither be created nor modified by the
mere fact that we judge it useful. It is a force having a nature of its own ; for that nature
to be given existence or altered, it is not enough that we should find this advantageous. In
order to bring about such changes, there must be a sufficient cause.
For example, we have explained the constant development of the division of labor
by showing that it is necessary in order that man may maintain himself in the new
conditions of existence as he advances in history. We have attributed to this tendency,
which is rather improperly named the “instinct of self-preservation,” an important role in
our explanations. But, in the first place, this instinct alone could not account for even the
most rudimentary specialization. It can do nothing if the conditions on which the division
of labor depends do not already exist, i.e., if individual differences have not increased
sufficiently as a consequence of the progressive disintegration of the common
consciousness and of hereditary influences. 4 It was even necessary that division of labor
should have already begun to exist for its usefulness to be seen and for the need of it to
make itself felt. The very development of individual differences, necessarily accom-
panied by a greater diversity of tastes and aptitudes, produced this first result. Further, the
instinct of self-preservation did not, of itself and without cause, come to fertilize this first
germ of specialization. We were started in this new direction, first, because the course we
previously followed was now barred and because the greater intensity of the struggle,
owing to the more extensive consolidation of societies, made more and more difficult the
survival of individuals who continued to devote themselves to unspecialized tasks. For
such reasons it became necessary for us to change our mode of living. Moreover, if our
activity has been turned toward a constantly more developed division of labor, it is
because this was also the direction of least resistance. The other possible solutions were
emigration, suicide, and crime. Now, in the average case, the ties attaching us to life and
country and the sympathy we have for our fellows are sentiments stronger and more
resistant than the habits which could deflect us from narrower specialization. These
habits, then, had inevitably to yield to each impulse that arose. Thus the fact that we
allow a place for human needs in sociological explanations does not mean that we even
partially revert to teleology. These needs can influence social evolution only on condition
that they themselves, and the changes they undergo, can be explained solely by causes
that are deterministic and not at all purposive.
4
Division du travail, Book II, chaps, iii and iv.

But what is even more convincing than the preceding considerations is a study of
actual social behavior. Where purpose reigns, there reigns also a more or less wide
contingency ; for there are no ends, and even fewer means, which necessarily control all
men, even when it is assumed that they are placed in the same circumstances. Given the
same environment, each individual adapts himself to it according to his own disposition
and in his own way, which he prefers to all other ways. One person will seek to change it
and make it conform to his needs ; another will prefer to change himself and moderate his
desires. To arrive at the same goal, many different ways can be and actually are followed.
If, then, it were true that historic development took place in terms of ends clearly or
obscurely felt, social facts should present the most infinite diversity; and all comparison
should be almost impossible.
To be sure, the external events which constitute the superficial part of social life
vary from one people to another, just as each individual has his own history, although the
bases of physical and moral organization are the same for all. But when one comes in
contact with social phenomena, one is, on the contrary, surprised by the astonishing
regularity with which they occur under the same circumstances. Even the most minute
and the most trivial practices recur with the most astonishing uniformity. A certain
nuptial ceremony, purely symbolical in appearance, such as the carrying-off of the
betrothed, is found to be exactly the same wherever a certain family type exists ; and
again this family type itself is linked to a whole social organization. The most bizarre
customs, such as the couvade, the levirate, exogamy, etc., are observed among the most
diverse peoples and are symptomatic of a certain social state. The right to make one’s
will appears at a certain phase of history, and the more or less important restrictions
limiting it offer a fairly exact clue to the particular stage of social evolution. It would be
easy to multiply examples. This wide diffusion of collective forms would be inexplicable
if purpose or final causes had the predominant place in sociology that is attributed to
them.
When, then, the explanation of a social phenomenon is undertaken, we must seek
separately the efficient cause which produces it and the function it fulfils. We use the
word “function,” in preference to “end” or “purpose,” precisely because social
phenomena do not generally exist for the useful results they produce. We must determine
whether there is a correspondence between the fact under consideration and the general
needs of the social organism, and in what this correspondence consists, without
occupying ourselves with whether it has been intentional or not. All these questions of
intention are too subjective to allow of scientific treatment.
Not only must these two types of problems be separated. but it is proper, in
general, to treat the former before the latter. This sequence, indeed, corresponds to that of
experience. It is natural to seek the causes of a phenomenon before trying to determine its
effects. This method is all the more logical since the first question, once answered, will
often help to answer the second. Indeed, the bond which unites the cause to the effect is
reciprocal to an extent which has not been sufficiently recognized. The effect can
doubtless not exist without its cause ; but the latter, in turn, needs its effect. It is from the
cause that the effect draws its energy ; but it also restores it to the cause on occasion, and
consequently it cannot disappear without the cause showing the effects of its
disappearance. 5
5
We do not wish to raise here questions of general philosophy, which would not
be in place. Let us say, however, that, if more profoundly analyzed, this reciprocity of
cause and effect might furnish a means of reconciling scientific mechanism with the
teleology which the existence, and especially the persistence, of life implies.

For example, the social reaction that we call “punishment” is due to the intensity
of the collective sentiments which the crime offends ; but, from another angle, it has the
useful function of maintaining these sentiments at the same degree of intensity, for they
would soon diminish if offences against them were not punished. Similarly, in
proportion as the social milieu becomes more complex and more unstable, traditions and
conventional beliefs are shaken, become more indeterminate and more unsteady, and
reflective powers are developed. Such rationality is indispensable to societies and
individuals in adapting themselves to a more mobile and more complex environment. 7
And again, in proportion as men are obliged to furnish more highly specialized work, the
products of this work are multiplied and are of better quality ; but this increase in
products and improvement in quality are necessary to compensate for the expense which
this more considerable work entails. Thus, instead of the cause of social phenomena
consisting of a mental anticipation of the function they are called to fill, this function, on
the contrary, at least in a number of cases, serves to maintain the pre-existent cause from
which they are derived. We shall, then, find the function more easily if the cause is
already known.
If the determination of function is thus to be delayed, it is still no less necessary
for the complete explanation of the phenomena. Indeed, if the usefulness of a fact is not
the cause of its existence, it is generally necessary that it be useful in order that it may
maintain itself. For the fact that it is not useful suffices to make it harmful, since in that
case it costs effort without bringing in any returns. If, then, the majority of social
phenomena had this parasitic character, the budget of the organism would have a deficit
and social life would be impossible. Consequently, to have a satisfactory understanding
of the latter, it is necessary to show how the phenomena comprising it combine in such a
way as to put society in harmony with itself and with the environment external to it. No
doubt, the current formula, which defines social life as a correspondence between the
internal and the external milieu, is only an approximation ; however, it is in general true.
Consequently, to explain a social fact it is not enough to show the cause on which it
depends ; we must also, at least in most cases, show its function in the establishment of
social order.

(Durkheim, pages 89 – 97)

The first question has to be, What is a social fact ? And as luck would have it the
first chapter is called What is a Social Fact ? Unfortunately this does not mean that we
get a simple statement as to what such a fact is. But we can tease one out.

I am not obliged to speak French with my fellow-countrymen nor to use the legal
currency, but I cannot possibly do otherwise. If I tried to escape this necessity, my
attempt would fail miserably. As an industrialist, I am free to apply the technical
methods of former centuries ; but by doing so, I should invite certain ruin. Even
when I free myself from these rules and violate them successfully, I am always
compelled to struggle with them. When finally overcome, they make their
constraining power sufficiently felt by the resistance they offer. The enterprises of
all innovators, including successful ones, come up against resistance of this kind.
Here, then, is a category of facts with very distinctive characteristics : it
consists of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, external to the individual, and
endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him. These
ways of thinking could not be confused with biological phenomena, since they
consist of representations and of actions ; nor with psychological phenomena,
which exist only in the individual consciousness and through it. They constitute,
thus, a new variety of phenomena ; and it is to them exclusively that the term
“social” ought to be applied. And this term fits them quite well, for it is clear that,
since their source is not in the individual, their substratum can be no other than
society, either the political society as a whole or some one of the partial groups it
includes, such as religious denominations, political, literary, and occupational
associations, etc. On the other hand, this term “social” applies to them
exclusively, for it has a distinct meaning only if it designates exclusively the
phenomena which are not included in any of the categories of facts that have
already been established and classified. These ways of thinking and acting
therefore constitute the proper domain of sociology. It is true that, when we define
them with this word “constraint,” we risk shocking the zealous partisans of
absolute individualism. For those who profess the complete autonomy of the
 individual, man’s dignity is diminished whenever he is made to feel that he is not
completely self-determinant. It is generally accepted today, however, that most of
our ideas and our tendencies are not developed by ourselves but come to us from
without. How can they become a part of us except by imposing themselves upon
us ? This is the whole meaning of our definition. And it is generally accepted,
moreover, that social constraint is not necessarily incompatible with the
individual personality.

(Durkheim, pages 3 – 4)

I could drop down on my knees and worship the man who wrote these words, if I
did not know this is a fraudulent representation of the science I adore, the real object of
which is to subvert that science. Even so, where else than in my own work could I ever
hope to see this kind of idea expressed ? Nowhere I know of. Interestingly we see that
he indicates that anyone trying to go against the established collective bias is bound to
find themselves up against a powerful and oppressive force—“The enterprises of all
innovators, including successful ones, come up against resistance of this kind.”—that
most people are simply incapable of feeling because they are attuned to the force of
consciousness impressing itself upon their brains from outside. And here we find
Durkheim working toward the eradication of a real science of sociology, by replacing it
with a conceptual form that can be adopted as sacrosanct by the establishment, so that his
false ideas will become part of the solid block of social force that we must struggle
against, if we want to be free to have the ideas that he had in his day, because he knew
genuine philosophers of human nature like Lilienfeld.
As to the social fact, Durkheim gives some useful examples of what he has in
mind, but I cannot transcribe the whole book, even if I had a copy old enough to allow
me to do so, so we must use the above summation of his thoughts on this subject to see
what we make of his idea of a social fact. It is evident that he is seeking to delineate
sociology as distinct from biology in the same way that physics can be distinguished from
chemistry. This is a reasonable idea, but we must suspect it because we know that this is
the point at which to place a wedge if we want to separate sociology, not from biology,
but from science ; which is exactly what Durkheim proceeds to do. He wants to have his
cake and eat it, he wants to use the logic of the organicists while making out that people
create themselves. This is because he sees that the social organism is the only valid way
to understand human existence, for him the social force he is faced with is anti-religious,
so he has to try and come to terms with the mass of social force obliging him to approach
humans as a natural object, as much as he obviously hates and despises such a scientific
approach to society. At the same time then he wants to fight against a true science of
sociology dominating society in his day, just as much as we want to fight against the false
science of society ruling the world today, as initiated by himself and his army of priestly
confederates and successors. His introduction tells us that it was the establishment of a
“course in sociology” that made him into an official academic of sociology, so we know
he was one of the first official priests employed by the theocracy to wreck any chance of
a true science of society coming into existence. Durkheim wants to make sociology
acceptable to the theocracy, of which he is implicitly a part, not officially, but in terms of
the consciousness he possesses, or we may say possesses him, because, as he says, no one
is the source of their own ideas, and while as a man interested in sociology in late
nineteenth century France he is impinged upon by organicist ideas, most of all his brain is
programmed with religious and political conceptions of existence that dominate everyone
in society.
Regarding the nature of social facts, the question is, What is the point of trying to
make an absolute distinction between sociological facts and biological facts ? Is it just to
define a zone of sociology ? Is it a precondition of defining a zone of sociology to
separate any potentially biological facts from those which are strictly sociological ?
Evidently many people, namely the organicists, did not think so. And there were a few
early twentieth century thinkers who still firmly believed that sociology was a strictly
biological science, such a Morley Roberts ; although he was not a professional academic.
What should we think about this ? The first impression we get from reading this
passage is that by ‘social facts’ Durkheim means what we might call ‘cultural features’
today. This is interesting because not too long after Durkheim we see the appearance of
culturologists such as Leslie White. As obvious as it is that Durkheim opened the door to
these charlatans of social science, by actually looking at the ideas Durkheim brought
forth, we can see that the ideas of these charlatans are perfectly legitimate logical
extensions of the ideas Durkheim first developed when he inserted the wedge between
sociology and science by creating a moderated, functionalist version of organicism,
which was infused with a political notion of social facts, replacing the biological
imperative informing our understanding of the same objects of sociological interest. This
transformation from the biological imperatives of sociology to the political conception of
sociology, is what really emerges from an effort to strictly allocate social factors of study
as distinct from all other features of human existence.
Accordingly we get a very nice picture of exactly how sociology was separated,
detail by detail, from science, via a strict sociological method developed by the academic
team represented by Durkheim. Science was then set adrift as a nonsensical science, with
its own logical basis, upon which people could freely build with confidence, and
complete sincerity, oblivious of the true nature of a sociological science that Durkheim
himself had had to contend with, because Durkheim had been the last active academic to
have a real connection with science, and he had set sociology adrift from foundations first
mooted by Comte. Thus we should not think of Durkheim as the first Functionalist
Sociologists but rather as the first Theocratic Sociologist.
In effect we are reducing the likes of Durkheim to an automaton by speaking of
his work as the product of an external linguistic flux impinging on his brain, giving him a
consciousness that induces him to act as an agent of theocracy, fighting the natural flow
of ideas that had hitherto informed the new science of sociology. And while this idea
would be dismissed with utter contempt by everyone today, although, as we can see from
Durkheim’s own work, it would not of been completely ridiculed in his own time, no one
would see anything evil in such a suggestion applied to Durkheim. And for this reason it
is a good idea to bring Hitler into this discussion, as the same idea has been applied to
Hitler when making Hitler an unwitting saviour of the Jews. There is absolutely no
difference between our analysis of Durkheim and of Hitler, nor is their one iota of
difference in the conclusions we come to about the nature of Durkheim’s life’s work and
that of Hitler’s. In both cases the nature and the product of their effort is identical, both
exist to serve and further Judaism, as all people with any kind of sanctioned role in any
society must do, because the entire biomass of the planet has now been subsumed into the
global superorganism which is Jewish. We raise this point here to indicate that while in
the case of a person like Durkheim our ideas would be dismissed as disgusting and
idiotic, yet in the case of Hitler they would be bound to be condemned as being, in
addition, downright evil, and so we want to take this opportunity to indicate that any such
distinction is a sign of the degenerate nature of any would be critics, and not a true
representation of the nature of our ideas.
Regarding social facts as cultural units, there is no problem speaking of cultural
features as distinct from biological features, and so making culture the substance of social
structure and activity ; the question is where it is intended we should go under the
influence of such an act of definition.

These ways of thinking could not be confused with biological phenomena, since
they consist of representations and of actions ; nor with psychological
phenomena, which exist only in the individual consciousness and through it. They
constitute, thus, a new variety of phenomena ; and it is to them exclusively that
the term “social” ought to be applied.

Obviously, once we define something we are not going to confuse these things
with other things, So what ?
The question about the validity of the definition remains. Just because we can
discern distinct attributes of social life, that appear wholly distinct from biological
attributes, does not mean that they are wholly distinct from biological attributes. Our
ability to make things appear to be something that they are not is inherent in the creative
power of language. But the creative power of language is not real in a magical sense, it is
only real in the sense in which it acts through ourselves. The reality of linguistic
meaning has to be substantiated through material forms independent of the linguistic
meaning. So that if we define sociological features as distinct from biological features of
human existence, and make the two absolutely distinct, then we must be able to show,
without the use of words, but by demonstration, as with an experiment, that the two are
indeed absolutely distinct in physical reality, and not just in our ability to identify
generalised features of a given form. The distinction between our cultural activities and
our biological activities are not created by us, but by our biologically evolved physiology,
so that when all is said and done the cultural must remain a part of the biological field of
interest. This is why, prior to Durkheim, people were so certain that society was a social
organism. The true nature of the split established by Durkheim through the imposition of
an artificial linguistic method, is between the genetic and the linguistic, not between the
biological and the sociological. It is fair to say, in defence of Durkheim, that, as far as we
can tell, no one appears to of recognised that language is biological, and that social facts,
or cultural phenomena, are linguistic forms, and as such secondary biological forms that
can never be made absolutely distinct from biology, any more than facts of chemistry can
ever be justifiably represented as being entirely independent of facts of physics.
All that we strive to argue for here does seem to be emphasised by Durkheim
from time to time, regarding social facts he says of their point of origin, “their substratum
can be no other than society”. An observation of which we must heartily approve. All of
this indicates the transitional nature of Durkheim’s work, which, presumably, is what
Maclay was impressed by, and which made him include Durkheim in his history of the
idea of the social organism, even though to us Durkheim is the supreme enemy of the
idea of the social organism, because our interpretation makes his transitional work
subversive toward real science, not a development of an extravagant science into a more
developed form, such as must be implicit in Maclay’s inclusion of Durkheim amongst the
exponents of the idea that society is a social organism. In the nineteenth century it was
possible to reason mechanistically about any aspect of society, and religion was well and
truly doomed ; as it must be by any true science of humanity since there cannot be two
distinct accounts of one reality. But today we cannot even begin to imagine how to
account for the least aspect of our social life in a scientific manner, and religion thrives
like it has never done in the whole existence of humanity, we are even fighting a global
war in honour of religion, more specifically in honour of Judaism !
Supposing we were to accept Durkheim’s absurd idea of what constitutes a social
fact : something pertaining to life, yet exclusive from biological facts ; the falsity of this
approach would still be evident if, according to scientific principles, we applied
Durkheim’s method to life in general. For we could attack and undermine the religious
motive for creating this absurd disjunction between science and society, by applying the
same logic to nature across the board. Thus we could say that the induction of a social
insect into its community, had to be regarded as being based upon an array of ‘social
facts’, because it received its identity from without, from what can only be called, to
apply the logic of Durkheim’s method, a social substratum, within which the pool
collective identity is stored.
Why should the pool of collective identity we know exists in social insect
superorganisms, not be said to consist of a body of social facts ? And if such an
insectivorous pool of social facts does exist, then why should these facts not be defined as
cultural artifacts, just as much as those identified by Durkheim when he speaks about
social facts in terms of agreed ways of behaving in humans ; albeit that insect behaviour
patterns are far less complex than those of humans. The differential between humans and
ants in terms of cultural complexity could be attributed purely to the difference in sheer
relative mass. When all is said and done, according to our analysis of the situation,
which we have no reason to doubt, there is no difference between the way a highly
intelligent, well educated, elite human like Durkheim, or an immensely powerful, single
minded human like Hitler, think, and the way a social insect thinks. The only way we
might be induced to think that humans were different to ants in their capacity to think
would be if we could find people like Durkheim or Hitler who would, when suitably
placed to be free to reveal the true state of their mind, reveal that they actually know
everything that we know, but they were playing politics. So there is a very curious
convolution of the organicist logic, and the mystical notion of man as a unique feature of
existence, united in Durkheim’s work, exactly as we should expect to find in our quest to
discover how science came to be eradicated in the war between religion and science, to
leave religion the sole ruler of human self consciousness with any political presence.
It is all very well to say that it is absurd to argue that insects think like humans,
but what kind of thinking is it that leads a whole society of humans to devote almost all
its intellectual capacity, and much of its wealth and emotional energy, to destroying true
knowledge for the sake of knowledge which, although vital for the existence of society as
we know it, is utterly contemptible and puerile ? The masses take the garbage knowledge
because they can do no other, because knowledge is the product of a highly complex
system of processing ideas that they must accept at face value, being powerless to
question the material their masters present to them. But the elite have to adopt a paternal
attitude to their role in the development and dissemination of false knowledge, combined
with an uncompromising hatred and antagonism for true knowledge ; espousing a duty of
loving care, personified in the nauseating image of Christ, which means their duty as
leaders is to support and comfort the poor commoner who needs the lies propagated and
validated by an educated elite, to feel a sense of purpose in their otherwise worthless and
pointless lives. And we can relate this reference to how the life of an ordinary person is
rendered worthless if it does not have a sense of purpose coming from a central source,
from the pool of social facts, to the suggestion made above that the theocracy allows
freedom in society, to be an atheist for example, but does not allow a competing authority
to emerge on the basis of such freedom, so that society is periodically smashed, while the
core religious identity is preserved, on the inbuilt, structural understanding, that in the
end most people will need to come back to the support offered by religion, because
people are not made to be free, they need some core ideal to make their lives meaningful,
and this is because there is n such thing as an individual existing as an end in themselves.
And ultimately, this is why we see people like Saint-Simon, Comte and Lilienfeld,
concerned with science in relation to society, but nonetheless irresistibly drawn to
recognise a need for religion, even though they are implicitly debunking the idea of
religion in the ideas they develop, they are living in a time when only a highly exclusive
elite had any access to education, and this education was intended to cultivate an elite that
knew it had a duty to nurture the masses. And, in truth, nothing has changed to this day,
despite universal education, because, as my experience certainly bears out, mass
education is about placing the slave in their slot, and elite education still exists to produce
a master organ of social guidance, within which the pool of social facts is concentrated,
from which lies are fed to the masses, lies they need because there is nothing else to fill
the void that nature decrees must be filled to give a person their social identity. So,
viewed in terms of Durkheim’s notion of cause linked to function, just how is all this
different from what ants do when they rob pupae from another species and raise them in
their own pool of social facts to make them comfortable with the life they will lead as
units of an alien superorganism ? In the end all that matters is the life of the
superorganism, be it ant or human, neither individual ants nor individual humans know
this, but both equally act as if they did, and so unwittingly ensure that nature achieves its
end accordingly.
And we can see how thinking of God, ‘God’ being the linguistic symbol for the
‘real organism’, to use Lilienfeld’s chosen agnomen for the superorganism, would lead
people to serve the superorganism just as well as if they knew what ‘God’ really was,
since we know that in life, people who obey a religious creed that sets doing God’s work
or bidding above all other things are responsible for creating and sustaining society as we
know it, the Jewish global society that is. It is the unity of identity under the umbrella of
the idea of God that causes ends to flow as nature dictates they must, according to the
physiological parameters culminating in human biological form. Social facts cannot be
separated from biological facts for the simple reason that when we seek the social
substratum underlying social activity, as described by Durkheim, we only connect with
that substratum when we recognise that humans have a corporate nature, meaning that
humans evolved a form in which the function of the individual is to bring into being a
living structure at the level of social organization. Therefore the cause of observed social
functions are latent in the evolved form of human physiology, the two primary features of
which are linguistic acuity to create social bonding and dextrous endowment to enable
the fabrication social substance ; although there are many secondary features of human
physiology which are essential to the overall package, such as nakedness, extended
longevity, loss of seasonal reproduction, enhanced nurturing and so on.
Talking about people like Durkheim in the way we have just been doing, lays us
open to a certain kind of attack. Philosophers are alert to the practice of attacking the
man rather than the idea, it is a mistake we can all slip into far too easily. If we set out to
say that someone is acting like an automaton then we are in danger of being interpreted as
attacking the person rather than the ideas that they put forward. To protect ourselves
from such an accusation it is important that we state that in levelling this criticism against
Durkheim we do so only in the general context of the argument in hand, which concerns
issues that Durkheim deals with himself, such as the fact that innovators are invariably
prone to established attitudes that resist their novel approaches, of whatever kind. So our
assertion that Durkheim is an automaton is not a personal slur, it is a general evaluation
applied to anyone who fails to see that simple scientific ideas which we say Durkheim
fought to destroy, are the only valid ideas to adopt in science. As a generalisation then,
we are making a blanket accusation of automatism against any religious person, or any
scientists who fail to see that all scientists, in order to be scientists, must be actively
devoted to ridding society of ignorance, and therefore ridding society of religion, since
religion is, from a scientific point of view, a form of ignorance, no matter what biological
function religion may have from the same scientific viewpoint. This blanket attack on
certain ways of thinking is not a slur either, it is a fact demonstrated by our work
prosecuting the war of science against religion.

The above is a fair junk to take in one go and as I turned each page into text and
read it I made some notes, thus :

Page 89 – “social morphology” is an organicist style phrase of the kind I always look for
when searching for books of an organicist type, but very rarely find in the titles, the use
of it here therefore expresses an organicist sentiment.

It is excellent to point out that merely describing why we think things are good is
not a scientific explanation as to why these things exist. Although we may note that
Durkheim does not discuss this question in the definitive manner we use. He does not
say that this behaviour is not scientific, as if he were about to tell us what would be
scientific. Still, we wait with baited breath, to see him fulfil the promise inherent in this
remark.
The argument gets tantalisingly good as he talks about how the mere desire for
actions cannot be the cause of their effectiveness, there must be some underlying
foundation to the ability to call forth actions that we deem useful. He then becomes
vague as he says that every ‘fact’, ‘thing’ or ‘effect’ is a “is a force”, and is dependant
upon some “antecedent force”. All of which is extremely difficult to follow by dipping
straight into this passage, as I have just done, we may imagine that reading more fully, or
the whole book even, might allow us to know what is behind these remarks, but they
certainly hang loose here. He does go on to give a couple of useful examples about
family and state structures being subject to wilful effort only if that effort develops
underlying forces to do with cultural dynamics. So as we follow this lovely sounding
reasoning we find it runs into the dry sands of intellectual nothingness, exactly as we
know Durkheim always does. This is why he is so renowned as a sociologist, because he
tells us nothing, which is exactly what the church need to stay alive, scientists that say
nothing, or, more precisely, pour forth words ceaselessly, while saying nothing. The
track he should of been following was that of biology, as we always do, as we make all
social activity dependant upon the genetically evolved attributes of individual
physiology, which has produced a sentient ‘social brick’ with a consciousness that tells it
that its duty is to build social structure as best it can, wherever it can, and to the
maximum potential that it can. Therefore our social actions have nothing whatever to do
with our perceived needs. We do not institute a state or government with laws to attack
us and force us to pay taxes, and send us to prison, because we feel an urgent need to pay
taxes and go to war and to prison, and so on and so forth. Unfortunately you would of
had to of heard of the idea of the social organism in order to understand our account of
how society comes into existence as we find it, or else to of hit on the idea yourself, and
it is obvious that Durkheim has never had the benefit of this incredible, incontrovertibly
scientific idea ......... except, of course, we know he had the great privilege of writing a
review of the greatest ever exponent of the idea of the social organism, Lilienfeld, and he
rubbished it, indeed, Durkheim’s whole life’s work is evidently an effort to subvert the
science that Lilienfeld and his ilk sort to give to humanity.
The point we need to pick up is the use Durkheim makes of the idea of force in a
social context, so that he indicates that there are a plethora of social forces. I would like
to see him name them specifically. Here he indicates that family and state authority need
to be supported by an underlying related force, but what name would he give to such a
force, and how many such forces would he recognise ? It was actually from reading the
opening part of Lilienfeld’s first volume Society is a Real Organism, 1873, a couple of
years ago, from which I had translated the first thirty pages or so, that the importance of
force in social activity was made plain to me, and this led me to recognise that the force
creating social structure had to be linguistic. So we can only recognise one true social
force, and that is language, and of course this force would be experienced through an
infinite variety of modes, and it would indeed always crystallise in the form of a supreme
authority. In its simplest state the meaning of a word is a particle of supreme social
authority, which is why we find ourselves continually at odds with the social authority,
that we oppose in our war of science against religion, discussing the meaning of words,
such as ‘God’ or ‘unnatural’, in which our usual conclusion is to assert the fact that just
because a word exists describing something, such as ‘mind’, does not mean that this thing
we talk about all the time actually exists. But the authority inherent in a word means that
we cannot help but be under the impression that things we speak about do exist, minds
exist because we talk about them, and think about them as if they exist, but, in actual fact,
minds, as attributes of reality that can be identified separately from the brains in which
mind phenomena exist, do not exist, because the mind is simply the sum of information
held within a brain, and the collective mind is the flux of information moving through the
public domain of social activity. The individual mind is a droplet of the collective mind,
the collective mind is the true mind, the individual mind is a particulate extension of the
collective mind. All in all, there is no such thing as mind, but we have no way of
knowing this directly, just as we have no direct way of knowing the earth spins, and this
is because of the relationship we have to the information of mind that gives us our
consciousness. We are too small a particle of the biomass of the superorganism to sense
the real unified organic being, the real organism, of which we are a part, just as we are
too small a particle of the physical mass of which the planet consists, to feel the motion
of the whole mass as it moves as one unified physical entity.

Page 91 – This is weird, here Durkheim applies the Darwinian notions of

evolution to social forms. Not only do we find him using the word ‘species’ applied to
societies, that we have used ourselves perhaps, occasionally, but not too much, here we
find him utilising the idea of redundancy in physiological parts to develop his analogical
argument along Darwinian lines. I cannot recall of hand how redundancy was used in
arguments about Darwinian evolution, it is too long since i have read about this subject,
but I think it did inspire ideas, today the most obvious feature of our bodies which denote
redundancy are our appendix that can kill us when it gets inflamed and needs to be
removed.
So we continue to find an argument with a distinctly analogical, and biological
feel to it, but still Durkheim is not using the phrase social organism routinely himself, and
he never pays homage to Lilienfeld, though he likes to refer to two useless thinkers,
Comte and Spencer. So he is preserving a very tight, narrow, circumscribed thread of
organicist thinking within an overall theological, that is political rationale, which is
entirely useless from a scientific point of view, and evidently, therefore, perfect for his
political purposes as a professional academic specialising in human society. His example
of a Roman law persisting in modern times, but for a different purpose, must leave us
cold and uninspired as to a validation of the analogical point he is seeking to make here.
God forbid we should ever be so crass and stupid in our reasoning, after all we are not
priests looking for glory, we just love knowledge.

What shows plainly the dualism of these two orders of research is that a
fact can exist without being at all useful, either because it has never been adjusted
to any vital end or because, after having been useful, it has lost all utility while
continuing to exist by the inertia of habit alone. There are, indeed, more survivals
in society than in biological organisms. There are even cases where a practice or a
social institution changes its function without thereby changing its nature. The
rule, Is pater quem justae nuptiae declarant, 3 has remained in our code essentially
the same as it was in the old Roman law. While its purpose then was to safeguard
the property rights of a father over children born to the legitimate wife, it is rather
the rights of children that it protects today. The custom of taking an oath began by
being a sort of judiciary test and has become today simply a solemn and imposing
formality. The religious dogmas of Christianity have not changed for centuries,
but the role which they play is not the same in our modern societies as in the
Middle Ages. Thus, the same words may serve to express new ideas. It is,
moreover, a proposition true in sociology, as in biology, that the organ is
independent of the function—in other words, while remaining the same, it can
 serve different ends. The causes of its existence are, then, independent of the ends
it serves.
3
Legal marriage with the mother establishes the father’s rights over the children.

So here Durkheim talks about a specific social fact, a written law concerning the
rights existing between people, and he makes this ‘fact’, by analogical reasoning of the
old Spencerian biological type, equivalent to the appendix we have just mentioned, in
that it is a material object capable of showing redundancy. This is extremely childish
logic, and such a method represents the lowest level of reasoning it is possible for any
human to rise to, over and above the kind of reasoning about the nature of reality we may
imagine a dog, a butterfly or a fish engaging in !
What is he trying to say here ? I do not really want to think about it, but I feel I
ought to try and pin this argument down because it is so specific that it seems capable of
being pinned down. The attributes of a social fact are being discussed in order to
demonstrate “the dualism of these two orders of research” so we had best be clear about
what the two orders of research are. What two orders of research ? I find myself asking,
and I cannot find an answer, it makes me feel rather stupid, I perhaps need to return to the
hard copy, to sit and read it carefully while trying to understand what Durkheim had in
his conscious mind when he referred to “two orders of research”. I have just taken the
preceding bit where he talks about the two ways in which Comte and Spencer felt they
were providing scientifically valid sociological accounts by taking an approach based on
demonstrating the perceived usefulness of social facts, in Comte’s case, and by
demonstrating the increase in well being engendered by a social fact, in Spencer’s case.
Do these two approaches represent two orders of sociological research ?

Thus Comte traces the entire progressive force of the human species to
this fundamental tendency “which directly impels man constantly to ameliorate
his condition, whatever it may be, under all circumstances” ; and Spencer relates
this force to the need for greater happiness. It is in accordance with this principle
that Spencer explains the formation of society by the alleged advantages which
result from cooperation ; the institution of government, by the utility of the
regularization of military co-operation ; the transformations through which the
family has passed, by the need for reconciling more and more perfectly the
interests of parents, children, and society.

Certainly not to me, the term research does not come into such ways of speaking about
society anymore than it does to the way Durkheim handles the subject. Comte and
Spencer, if rightly distinguished by Durkheim, provide two distinct lines of reasoning
about society, but I would not call this lines of reasoning “order of research”, that is
grandiose absurdity writ large. and so, we can now come back to the matter of
Durkheim’s use of the social fact appearing the shape of an old roman law appearing in
the guise of a contemporary law, the same in appearance, but transmogrified in its
function because it has sifted its focus from father to child. Now this makes not sense,
because it is reasoning that is not informed by any underlying idea about the nature of all
laws. Laws as a product of linguistic force, and as such laws are the evident means by
which the evolved biological capacity for symbolic representations creates physiological
structure. so the function of the law in question has not changed, anymore than a brick
used to build a house has changed its function when the house is demolished and the
brick is reused to build a garden wall on a new site. The function of a brick is the
function of a brick, and the function of a law is the function of a law, and ever the twain
shall remain.
Durkheim uses the language of scientific organicism in the production of ideas
that are based upon the logic of a priest, the logic of individuality, because, while his
description of laws as social facts having the attributes of physiological elements that
may become organically displaced relative to the structure of whole social organism they
are part of, he speaks about these same elements in individualistic terms, casting the laws
in a personal frame of reference, this is why he has the laws remaining the same while
changing their personality, so to speak, that is changing their objective. So he derives the
material conception of social facts from the holistic idea of the social organism, while
insisting upon understanding the same laws in terms that make the law an end in itself,
being self contained in the sense that it can be understood in terms of the object it focuses
upon, the father or the child, for example. But this makes no sense, except from the
religious point of view where the object of knowledge is to control the individual
consciousness through the propagation of a collective idea of reality. From a scientific
logic we would want to define both the material nature of a social fact such as a law, and
the function of the law in terms of the one reality of the social organism, so there would
be not temptation to try and make sense of laws in terms of themselves, but always to
make sense of laws in terms of the superorganic physiology within which they must
always perform a positive function. So we would have no use the puerile mode of
analogical Spencerian reasoning, we would never be drawn into thinking of aspects of
social life as redundant in any sense suggested by the redundancy of the appendix which
performs no apparent purpose in our bodies but can nonetheless pose a threat to our lives.
Besides which, since we are on the subject, and I am able to speak from personal
experience, the fact is that since we do not exist as ends in ourselves, and we only exist to
serve the collective being of the superorganism, there may well be subconscious
physiological purposes served by apparent design flaws such as th appendix which
hitherto science has been unable to consider because the religious science that denies the
reality of the superorganism forestalls on possibility of our lives being interpreted in
terms of our function as units of a superorganic being.
The question is, why does the brain inflict damage on the body when a person
undergoes certain kinds of stressful experiences ? It may seems as if emotional diseases
like eczema, and, in my case my attack of appendicitis which required an operation came
at a time when I was emotionally vulnerable, are some kind of illness from which a
person suffers like any other, but if we think that people are actually specially, and highly
evolved, to be units of an extended living being, then this casts human disease in a whole
new light. Just as we may say that bad things such as criminality have good effects from
a collective point of view because they induce unified reactions particularly supportive of
imposed regulation applied to everyone, so we may wonder if certain kinds of
vulnerability such as we see in emotionally involved illness do not also have some kind
of positive effect of the same kind, since stress is bound to be experienced by alienation
given that we have noted that conformity is painless as long as we do not feel it because
we are at one with the collective will. Therefore certain kinds of illness could be a
physiological way of inducing conformity of the kind that we recognise in the linguistic
field in relation to the effect of law, and the need to obey it.
When we think of a social fact such as a law we readily perceive it in terms that
mean something to us, and since we have to think about the making of laws we naturally
imagine that the laws are a product of our intellect informed by our experience. However
a phrase that often appears in the lexicon of political speak is “carrot and stick”, by which
the politicians mean the exercise of authority in a way that evokes the mirror image
centred on the person as “rights and responsibilities”, so that we have a dynamic focused
on getting the individual to behave in a certain way by rewarding them and punishing
them, and this unifies individual actions, causing people to behave according to a pattern
fixed at a centre of authority, which is created by means of linguistic physiology, and the
effect of this concentration of linguistic information beamed emitted in the shape of a
uniform message is to create social structure according to the ideas of the people devising
the linguistic programme. Talking about this after bringing to mind the idea of nervous
diseases as a device for encouraging conformity and punishing nonconformity makes the
dynamic link obvious, and as such we find a social substratum firmly located in the
biological make up of the individual. And the people devising the linguistic programme
that creates a uniform response that results in social structure are acting at the behest of
the same kind of impulses that people are subject to under pressure from stress related, or
emotionally based illnesses. The kind of positive ends identified by Comte and Spencer,
according to Durkheim, are lacking explanation by their method, and Durkheim
recognises this and presumes to remedy the fault by talking about underlying forces, but
he only locates these in the superficial elements of the social structure that appear to be
external to the individual, such as laws and traditions, but he still has these laws shaped
by people, not according to the dictates of superorganic physiology fed back upon
individuals via a concentration of authority able to emit a uniform message dictating
behaviour across a biomass composed of individuals.
That an organ is independent of the end it serves, or independent of its function,
seems to me to be like saying that the word ‘gay’ is independent of its meaning because
its meaning has shifted over recent times away from the mundane use of denoting joy, to
provide the politically corrected accolades like “arse bandit” or “queer”. There was a
football ground called Gay Park, or Field, of Ground—I hate football—but a bloke in the
pub this weekend happened to mention it, but it “has been changed now” he said. Does
this mean a word is independent of its meaning ! Hardly. It just goes to show what the
true nature of words is. Words are structural elements of a pattern formed by language to
make living tissue. And the parts of the pattern are not the things the pattern makes. In
other words laws are not organs, patterns are not forms, institutions might be likened to
organs, I suppose, for institutions are intermediate forms between elements of the pattern
and the whole structure or being, that the whole pattern creates. But I see no need for this
facile way of trying to develop the insight that humans are a superorganic species of
mammal. I do not see how this kind of poor analogical reasoning can ever make sense.
Words are always attached to their meaning, no matter how much the meaning of a word
may change, it is normal for the meaning of words to change over time, because words
are the product of a physiological organ that produces speech, and as such there can only
be so many elements to a pattern, so that over time the meaning of words must adapt to
suit circumstances. The deliberate manipulation of the word ‘gay’ by a biologically
defined political group is only a reflection of the highly intense development of
superorganic physiology which allows such conscious manipulation of language in order
to influence the composition of the social structure, and it also shows how important the
manipulation of words are to the organization of social structure, and the relationship of
language to social power. Even so, the fact remains that homosexuals are created upon a
genetic foundation, even if environmental influences augment the genetic base.
Homosexuality therefore nicely indicates the link between genetics and linguistics in the
formation of superorganic structure, and this is no accident for we must assume that
homosexuality evolved to perform precisely this biological function of creating specialist
social tissue, since there is no other way to account for this natural attribute of human
nature. Darwinism makes it impossible to account for homosexuality, since it makes
each person an end in themselves, and clearly a sterile end would not exist. Why did
Darwin not deal with the question of homosexuality ? Because this would of been
unthinkable in overt theocracy in which he lived, and which he served.
Durkheim is a totally insincere thinker, with no intention of trying to develop
knowledge, but rather a real desire to generate ignorance to a purpose, which is the usual
religious intent of a priest. A sincere thinker would recognise the relationship between
the information which creates an organ and the function the organ serves, resulting in a
subtle relationship between a form and its product, which means that these two features
of reality, form and product, are always in perfect harmony no matter how our
manipulation of knowledge for political purposes uses a dichotomous mode of reasoning
to split them apart, thereby enabling us to create ways of thinking that give us control of
knowledge. Looking at Durkheim’s work we find all the evidence of his malevolent
intent toward science that we could ever hope to discover, revealing him to be the
supreme founder of the false sociology, who based his ugly conception of society on
Darwinism. Look at this :

“unless we postulate a truly providential and pre-established harmony, we cannot

admit that man has carried with him from the beginning—potentially ready to be
awakened at the call of circumstances—all the intentions which conditions were
destined to demand in the course of human evolution.”

This sounds like a solid scientific statement, disparaging the religious notion of a
“providential and pre-established harmony”, but in actual fact it is, of course, anything
but. When we assert that there is such a thing as human nature, and we name it by saying
it is an evolved attribute imposed upon individuals, obliging them to form ever more
complex superorganic, social forms, we are in effect saying that there is “pre-established
harmony”, that is indeed “potentially ready to be awakened at the call of circumstances”.
But while this awakening appears in the form of people’s intentions, the way people
respond is as determined by nature as the responses of insects are in their own setting.
This particular passage from Durkheim is an intensely powerful assertion of the
separation of humans from nature, for it is implicit in Darwin’s account of evolution that
there must be a process that dictates that life forms will always change to meet their
circumstances, he called the process evolution, it is what Darwinism is all about. Yet,
despite Durkheim’s use of the Darwinian model to work out aspects of social structure, as
we have seen, here he fatally undermines any possibility of this evolutionary process
applying to humans. No wonder he, like Darwin, was loved by the authorities that chose
him to be the leading exponent of organicist thinking, one step removed, and made the
first functionalist, and so lifted onto the pedestal of awesome intellect, from which the
theocracy can control knowledge by anointing false prophets an miscreants, while
burying the real exponents of truth like Lilienfeld.
I often refer to the regular use of language as a means of control, whereby the
establishment does not translate works of great importance that undermine religion. Thus
we have seen that Schaffle was very influential yet his work on social structure,
developed along organicist lines, was only translated into Italian. Last week I bought a
copy of a journal which contained the notice of Lilienfeld’s work, and as luck would have
it there is a review of a most important book from an organicist perspective, Des Sociétés
Animales by Espinas, 1877. The review concludes by saying “Even the foregoing rapid
analysis may have served to show that M. Espinas’s volume is one of first-rate
importance as a contribution both to social and mental science.” (Collier, pages 111- 112,
in Mind, January 1878). This book is often referred to in other books, and I have seen an
American 1970’s reprint for sale, the seller describing the book as founding the science
of ethnology, I think it was ethnology, it was a while ago. Yet this important book has
never been rendered into English, and the only reason can be because of its significance
in relation to organicist thinking, which made it a dangerously astute piece of scientific
reasoning of exactly the kind the theocracy fears. Just thought I would mention Espinas
in passing, while the subject of this short review was fresh in my mind.
There are very few passages from Espinas translated into English, but I have a
book written under the auspices of the Institute of Sociology at Brussels that is intent
upon attacking organicism, which was of course translated into English, for just as
anything antagonistic to religion is blocked, so anything favourable to religion, no matter
how pathetic, is invariably translated, so we may just see the kind of sentiment Espinas
espoused :

See Les Sociétés Animales, p. 128 (Espinas). “Integration, or grouping

together, is a universal law common to all organic or inorganic existence.
Society, properly speaking, is only a complex and important instance of this
universal law.”

(Evolution by Atrophy, Demoor, Massart & Vandervelde, 1899, footnote,

p. 8)

I suppose I could run off some machine translated segments from my copy of
Espinas, but that is too much trouble at the moment. The above indicates the attention
this book received, how it was opposed by professional sociologists seeking to suppress
science while supporting religious values in sociology, and it indicates the unbiased sense
Espinas tried to apply to our precious little world.
________

We can note the phrase “common consciousness” which Catlin condemned

because it smacked of the strictly scientific idea that humans were a superorganic species
of mammal, as we note above, and so we should get a sense of how Durkheim is using
this idea here.

It can do nothing if the conditions on which the division of labor depends do not
already exist, i.e., if individual differences have not increased sufficiently as a
consequence of the progressive disintegration of the common consciousness and
of hereditary influences.

Common consciousness, as used here, is a pseudonym for “culture”, it clearly does not
mean a collective mind, which Catlin said Durkheim believed in. This is a rather
interesting, because suggestive, remark, on the foundation of social hierarchies as realised
in the structural differentiation of work. As we talk about the need for a master identity
in the pattern of Judaism, which has two major sub-Judaic identities, and we associate
this pattern of superorganic physiology with the need to constantly shift populations
geographically, ensuring that there are always movements between peoples to sustain
structural differentiation, we may wonder why there is this physiological need for
differentiation within the body of the superorganism. But here Durkheim makes the link
between individual differences, i.e. individuality as an idea to be promoted, and the decay
of group mind and genetic unity, that is racial unity. So these are topics of great
relevance in understanding society, and we can see why these ideas burst forth in the only
way they could, in virulent anti-Semitism, which saves the Jews and all religious
identities, and the social structure associated with Judaism, from being undermined by the
realisation of the role identity plays in organizing the superorganism through the process
of differentiation which Durkheim chooses to discuss in the superficial, political context,
of the division of labour.
Twice now we have examined Durkheim’s text and found that he creates
categories that merely implicitly define the uniqueness of the self made human social
form that Judaism invokes in its identity programme, providing a model that later
sociological priests turned into a science of culture. Both his ‘social facts’, and his
‘common consciousness’ mean nothing more or less than ‘culture’, which subliminal,
preparatory definition, prepares the way for the separation of man from nature, and the
delivery of social structure into the hands of politicians. We can relate this manipulation
of meaning to the observation we have just made regarding the relationship of meaning to
words. We have seen that a political lobby, homosexuals, can take control of a word like
‘gay’ and give it a new meaning, forcing everyone to adopt the imposition of definition
by dropping names formerly relying on the original use of the word, and thus renaming a
football ground. And this is something which I can swear from living at the time of this
forced change of meaning, has been bitterly resented by most English people ; my father,
for example, use to say that he was damned if he was going to give up using a word that
he had hitherto always used without any idea of an alternative meaning. The control of
meaning is therefore extremely important, and this is what Durkheim’s magnificent
sociology is all about, taking control of sociology for religion, by stealing the meaning of
organicism from the scientifically minded thinkers who had hitherto dominated
sociological ideas according to a scientific agenda. If a word is a ‘brick’ that has a
meaning within a linguistically generated structure, but where meaning is not necessarily
fixed to any given word, then we can only make sense of words in terms of the structure
within which they are placed. And Durkheim even presents a logical justification of the
job of robbing out words from their scientific location in an organicist framework, when
he describes how an organ is not necessarily related to the function it performs. This
shows us how a priest works by developing a whole pattern of misrepresentation intended
to build a social structure based on a linguistic model serving a purpose, rather than
simply interpreting a function. For this purpose a priest has to justify the use of words
that they themselves make, and thus Durkheim vindicates the absurd idea that a form may
be distinct from its function, yes, this is so in his scheme of things, but that does not make
its so in reality. In Durkheim’s scheme the organs of social structure are detached from
their function in order that the role of religion in society can continue to perform its
hidden function without being unmasked by scientific explanations of what that function
is. And so we are able to account for the success of this man as a professional
sociologist, a man whom we denounce as a complete fraud. Like Darwin Durkheim
produced an elaborate scheme of existence which impressed many people, but which was
based on an elaborate deception, even as all religion is an elaborate deception that
nonetheless forms the basis of our existence. This remarkable result is simply due to the
remarkable ability for communication via linguistic symbolism, that is built into our
bodies. We do not control this process of communication however, anymore than we
control the process of digestion or breathing, as we think we do, and as we are told we
do, this communication process controls us.

The way this man reasons is like the fanciful nonsense we are use to from works
of the ancients, who speculated on the basis of pure imagination, without the slightest
basis in fact to constrain their output. This use to be called in philosophical jargon
deductive, as opposed to what became famous in science as inductive reasoning. We
deduce from general principles, we induce from specific facts.
What on earth is this supposed to mean ?

It was even necessary that division of labor should have already begun to exist for
its usefulness to be seen and for the need of it to make itself felt. The very
development of individual differences, necessarily accompanied by a greater
diversity of tastes and aptitudes, produced this first result.

We may as well take this stuff seriously, as trawl the infant schools and ask the pupils to
write stories about what life is, and then print their answers as the highest achievement of
science ! This statement is so pathetic it does not even bear responding to. The man
wants to talk about social substructure dictating individual actions, and yet he says that
social structure has to come into being before it can be appreciated. To make this the
work of a great sociologist is akin to saying the most profound statement of a professor of
language might be to announce that when the word ‘red’ is written it says red. These
statements from Durkheim are so stupid as to make me feel that I must be missing
something, no one could be dumb enough to write such rubbish, and if they were who
would print it, let alone read it. Any way, these statements are as committed to the idea
of people as ends in themselves as it is possible to be. However it is inconceivable that
anyone writing with the opposite intention of seeing humans as part of nature, asserting
that humans were subject to laws of nature like any other life form, would of been
allowed to work in an academic setting, and to publish their work. People do appreciate
the social systems that they live with, as indicated by Durkheim. Today is Sunday once
again, Sunday, 16 March 2008, so we have the revolting exhibition of self serving trash
put out by the BBC to suffer, if we switch on the TV, the Big Questions programme
always captures my attention, to see what is being spouted at us now. I was fascinated to
see a Muslim working on an inter faith programme defending the established church, the
Church of England, and he gave exactly the same reason for its established position being
preserved as I would give, except he expressed praise while I express hatred and
contempt for the existence of such institutions, without which the disgrace of Islam
would not exist in this country. At least, he said, the place of religion in the
establishment is preserved. Sure enough, without the preservation of Christianity through
the world wars, and by the efforts of the Nazis, the Muslims would not of been imported
into Europe to save Christianity down to this time. Precisely, and this is why the
superorganism needs its triadic physiology of identity, just as it needs the physiology of
state structure to allow war and terror to be utilised by the priesthood to unify the
physiology of the superorganism under the core identity of Judaism. People recognise
these facts in terms of values they express as their own. So they ordinarily recognise
social facts in personal ways, and it is according to the logic of personal recognition that
Durkheim offers us his pseudo scientific analysis of how society is organised. In this
way he validates the personal consciousness of individuals as the source of the social
facts which make society exist as it does. And that is what makes Durkheim a priest,
pure and simple, and no scientist ; a scientist would tell us what the function of these
various ways of behaving is in structural terms that were independent of ideas about the
value of these mechanisms. Durkheim never does this. In all of this we can see how
utterly essential it is to see the individual as an end in themselves, otherwise programmes
like the Big Question would be no more meaningful in their protestations about how
society should work than if they were to invite an audience to answer questions about the
nature of astronomy, geology or nuclear physics, as if some ignoramus’ attitude meant
anything in this areas. But, when it comes to society, and how it exists and why, then the
word of these idiots, intellectual criminals, intellectual degenerates, priests, priests’
wives, retired military men and juveniles, this gaggle of voices becomes a valid voice of
wisdom. And this is so simply because the individual is an end in themselves. Science
tells us otherwise, science tells us there is no such thing as an individual existing as an
end in themselves, and for this very reason science has been erased from our society
through the ceaseless efforts of these disgusting priests, who care for nothing and for no
one, as long as their sick, degenerate identity, is preserved. Well, that is to look at it in
religious terms, but of course these people are programmed units, incapable of possessing
any meaningful consciousness of reality, just doing what the programme tells them to do,
supported by the institutions that invite them to spout, while ensuring no contrary voice is
ever heard.

We were started in this new direction, first, because the course we previously
followed was now barred and because the greater intensity of the struggle, owing
to the more extensive consolidation of societies, made more and more difficult the
survival of individuals who continued to devote themselves to unspecialized
tasks. For such reasons it became necessary for us to change our mode of living.
 There is a certain self consistent logic in this last selection, but in terms of
providing any meaningful explanation of what it pretends to explain it is nonsense. The
whole drift of Durkheim’s argument is to assume that individuals exist as ends in
themselves, who must learn to act socially because of underlying forces derived from
underlying circumstances, that push them to develop new ways of organization. It is no
wonder the theocracy selected this man to be the foremost sociologist at just that time
when the priesthood was ready to supplant the true science where all these factors came
together under the naturalistic explanation centred upon the knowledge that human
society was a superorganism.

Moreover, if our activity has been turned toward a constantly more developed
division of labor, it is because this was also the direction of least resistance. The
other possible solutions were emigration, suicide, and crime.

This remark constitutes an explanation for progress, which likewise preserves the
integrity of the individual seen as an end in themselves, because it defines society as a
physical environment which people respond to as they would a geographical
environment, by selecting the easiest ways of locating themselves according to what
pleases them in terms of their physical needs. We would explain progress as a biological
system of growth, in which Durkheim’s Jewish identity plays a central role, thus
explaining the vital importance of religion in directing the unification of human biomass,
for the structural division of labour as such is of little interest compared with the
unification of people under one religious identity. So the effort to seek a path of least
resistance, in so far as it exists, is not about allowing individuals to live well, but about
allowing the one identity, Judaism, to become the identity to which all humans are
attached.

These needs can influence social evolution only on condition that they
themselves, and the changes they undergo, can be explained solely by causes that
are deterministic and not at all purposive.

Here we have a delightful sentiment. But this is a fraudulent expression of

Durkheim’s ideas, paying lip service to the true scientific view that humans must be a
product of deterministic mechanisms. The incorporation of such rouses into his work
makes it easy to understand how Durkheim performed the service of decoupling
sociology from science, that it is perfectly obvious he performed, after all, with this
disingenuous rubbish established as a basis for further work it is not a difficult task for
new people like the man who wrote the introduction to Rules of Sociological Method, and
men like White, the self appointed discoverer of the science of culture, or Kroeber the
anti-Scientist of anthropology, to continue the effort to destroy science in the human
sciences.

Page 94 –
 But what is even more convincing than the preceding considerations is a study of
actual social behavior. Where purpose reigns, there reigns also a more or less
wide contingency ; for there are no ends, and even fewer means, which
necessarily control all men, even when it is assumed that they are placed in the
same circumstances. Given the same environment, each individual adapts himself
to it according to his own disposition and in his own way, which he prefers to all
other ways.

Talk about double-Dutch, what is this nonsense. Such a jumble of contradictory

thoughts. At times like this I like to ask what the person writing the words we read
actually had flowing through their mind when they wrote them. I think along these lines
because I write about ideas all the time and I know how difficult it can be to know what I
mean if I read my own words not long after writing them if I do not make the effort to be
specific. But, at the same time, I am aware that if I return to something I have written
which I do not understand myself, then I know that when I wrote my ideas I will of been
trying to put down an idea that was flowing through my mind at the time. The problem is
that when we write ideas that are descriptive we are often inspired by a particular
example, of a theme we have been thinking about, and while getting our ideas down we
can sometimes lose the thread, and later on it is just not possible to think what it was that
was fuelling our ideas. So, if I read something like this from Durkheim, even though I
know I am just dipping into his work, so I do not know if the clue to his reasoning is to be
found elsewhere, I assume that the man had something on his mind when he wrote what
is incomprehensible to me now.
This passage however is obviously focused on the question of whether people
make their own world, or whether the human world is made by nature just as certainly as
any organic domain is made by nature. Here we insist that humans are made, down to
their last details, by nature. And to account for this we say a human is a superorganism,
an idea that obviously has the potential to cover all aspects of human existence.
Durkheim came to maturity at the time when everyone knew humans were social
organisms, he was a French Jew, and he was clearly determined to suppress the idea that
humans were produced by nature, and thereby to preserve the ideas which make Judaism
meaningful. Although he did not have to see things in this way, consciously, he could of
been acting as most people do, as robots, obeying a programme placed in their brain by
the flux of social information which creates superorganism. As we have said, a
programme written into his brain would give him his consciousness, and when he looked
at the world he would see that scientific ideas such as those produced by Lilienfeld made
no sense, because they were not based on the ludicrous identity programme written into
his brain. So he would then of sort to make sense of the undeniable facts presented by
the scientifically minded philosophers like Lilienfeld, and to transpose them so that what
was in the outer world matched what was in his inner world. His effort to create a pseudo
science would of been sponsored by the academic setting within the institution paying
him to do his malevolent work, such places are always highly theocratic in their
constitution, so that the more he succeeded in producing a ludicrous non scientific
account of society that closely mimicked science, and could be passed off as science, just
like Darwin’s Origin of Species, the more he would be touted as a brilliant thinker by the
academic establishment, someone whose work should be passed around the world’s
academic institutions and made the basis of argument. And so it was. So Durkheim
made science match the religious identity implanted into his brain. Exactly as we may
suppose ant does when it communicates with its world and shows its own inner identity
matching the flux of corporate identity pervading the social milieu outside, even though
its inner self is a slave identity.
As we are free of our slave identity, and we know that humans are a
superorganism, we know that Lilienfeld and his kind must of been on the right tracks, and
so we see exactly what Durkheim is doing when he talks nonsense of the kind we see
here, where he juggles ideas about individuals and ends, and collective forces, and selects
which ball he will present as real and which he will hide to suit his objective of
supporting the idea that individuals are everything.
It is obvious that what Durkheim says here about different people approaching the
problems they face according to their own disposition, in order to arrive at the same end,
is utterly untrue, and it would be impossible to have a more perfect expression of
religious sentiment than this coming from within a model pretending to be scientific. We
all obey, and indeed are obliged by law to obey, a common mode of life, over which we
have no more choice than a brick has about where it is placed in a brick wall.
Theoretically we could say that a child of a millionaire could choose to go to an inner city
sink school rather than a superb private school, but how many times has this happened ?
None. And it is certain that the plebes condemned to attend a bad state school have no
choice to attend an elite school. And this is just one example of the fixity of the
conscious bricks that make up the body of the superorganism. Durkheim knows this as
he says “the bases of physical and moral organization are the same for all” but he is intent
upon undermining this idea, which is why he mentions this fact, so that he can then
subvert it. He holds the item up, so he can shoot it down. He works science like a lawyer
works words, to achieve of political end that serves his personal being within the
establishment.

Page 95 –

This wide diffusion of collective forms would be inexplicable if purpose or final

causes had the predominant place in sociology that is attributed to them.

Excellent ! It is not possible for anyone supporting the idea of the social
organism to ever come out with a statement more perfect than this, almost, yet this
sentence contains an inbuilt caveat, for he inserts the word ‘predominant’, which
undermines the whole drift of the mechanistic sentiment. This might not matter if it were
not for the fact that this caveat provides the basis for the whole of his religiously inspired
sociology, that portrays the individual as the supreme factor in social life, even as here he
denies that the individual has the ultimate place seen in this idea of splitting causes from
functions on a point by point basis, as we have already remarked. What on earth can he
have in mind when he thinks there are an array of forces, or a variety of causes and
related functions ? There can only be one cause, one function, one force, a social force,
which is the cause of the social function of all aspects of human existence.
Wonderful to see Durkheim actually use the phrase social organism, but saying
that “questions of intention are too subjective to allow of scientific treatment.” will not
do. In effect this is saying that there can be aspects of existence that are beyond the reach
of science, and this is the most religious statement any human can ever make about the
nature of knowledge. Science, by definition, can answer any and all meaningful
questions that can be asked. The answer in this case is that there is no such thing as
intention, because people do not know why they do what they do, people do not even
know what they are, not even the trained professionals whose job it is to know what we
are. A meaningful question is a question that has an answer. If we ask what 2 x 2 equals,
this is meaningful. Whereas, if we ask why horses are fed on sandstone, this would be a
meaningless question because horses are not fed on sandstone. Meaningless questions
are the product of linguistic symbolism which creates conceptual fabric that causes much
of what we think about to be meaningless and unanswerable. Just now, 17/03/08
19:03:06, on the local BBC news, a women who had a kidney transplant was featured
talking about how the transplant had given her a new personality. Instead of reading
celebrity biographies she now reads Dostoyevsky and listens to classical music ! Boy oh
boy. What more need we say ? Science cannot explain why a kidney transplant causes
this kind of change because kidney transplants do not impart an element of the former
owners personality, as implied by this women. The very idea is ludicrous. Science could
explain why people would have this experience however, because the experience is self
evidently real, it is just not what the person experiencing it takes it to be.

I would like to give a little further thought to the question of meaningfulness in

language. A particular question, that will of been raised in my work from time to time, is
that of the finite potential to know. I have frequently pointed out the extreme importance
in philosophy of promoting ignorance as the highest quality of human intelligence,
essential to enable any philosophy to be done. After all, in a world where everything can
be known what place is there for speculation about the meaning or purpose of life ? I
would place this emphatic law of knowledge alongside the absolute certainty expressed
by all, with a public voice, that we cannot prove God does not exist. Both these
affirmations are fatal to atheist science, and as such these two laws of knowledge must be
rejected, firstly on principle, and preferably by reason. Disproving God has been dealt
with frequently by me, and is of no interest at this moment.
Whereas the intellectual priest insists that perfect knowledge cannot exist, and
that everything cannot be known, I insist that, by definition, science can indeed know
everything. Obviously there are many things that can be conjured up that science cannot
know, so I fall at the first hurdle on that basis. On the other hand, the academic priest is
seeking to promote a mantra intended to limit and contain science, in order to protect
religion and social authority. Accordingly we only need make our assertion on the part of
science match the intent of the priest that is wrapped up in deceitful language, in which
all priests specialize, and demonstrate when they seek to undermine science by professing
the limited potential of science to examine reality. The point of the professional scientist,
paid by the theocracy, is really to justify the assertion that scientists cannot examine
society, or morality, and such like, with any meaningful scientific certainty. So when we
tackle this question we do so only to oppose the work of our enemies, other than this such
questions are of no interest, therefore all we are concerned with is the question of intent.
Lets see what we can do with the question of intent disguised in the language of
artful intellectuals. Is it possible for a librarian to know exactly how many letters in
printed form, as in the letter ‘a’, exist in items in the possession of the British Library ?
The answer must be no, even though at any given time there must be a finite and definite
answer to this question, assuming there are no ambiguous letters, and the items in the
ownership of the library is finite, even if no one knows all that would come under the
category of belonging to the library, and even if we accept that the number of letters may
vary at the rate of thousands per second. So we have set up an impossible task that
nonetheless must have a definite and comprehensible answer. What earthly point could
there be in asking a question about the number of letters in the library collections, from a
scientific point of view ? When science tackles questions about reality it seeks to
understand reality, science is therefore not really simply about producing abstract
knowledge in the sense that the above question suggests. If science wanted to discuss the
number of letters as asked in the above question it would want to set boundaries on the
nature of the question, and by doing so science would identify the logical limits of the
subject. As such, to all intents and purposes, science can answer such a question, even if
the answer only means defining the limits of our ability to give a precise answer. There
can be no question that science cannot tackle in the same manner. And all we need know
about the limits of knowledge is that the mantra of the priest, who always wants to say
science cannot know everything, or that perfect knowledge cannot exist, is that this
mantra contains a wilful intent to control knowledge. To refute this malign intent against
knowledge and freedom, all we need do is to indicate that such assertions concerning the
powerlessness of knowledge against the splendour of existence, is indicate that this
assertion is simple a linguistic ploy aimed at disempowering the powerless, in order to
protect the powerful ; because knowledge is power, because language is a natural force
that creates social structure, and knowledge is the accumulation of linguistic force within
the social structure that the force of language creates.

_____

We have to give some thought to the nature of the difficulty we are taking on
when we tackle Durkheim. When we develop modern ideas of society as a
superorganism, which we caste in the form of an atheist science running alongside
official science, we pretty much have the field to ourselves, and as such we are firmly
placed upon regular philosophical ground in that we are developing our own ideas, on our
own terms. But when we choose to examine the likes of Durkheim we are delving into a
terrain that will have many professional academics well versed in the subject and all its
material. It may seem that given the way we routinely reject Darwin in the most
dismissive terms, we might have already shown a total disregard for what any academic
thinks about this willingness to treat our era’s greatest intellectual heroes with utter
contempt. But there is a fair difference between Darwin and Durkheim in terms of our
approach to science. We are not pretending to represent biology in any detail, we only
quarrel with the basic philosophical tenet of Darwinism, which is in no way a scientific
fact, it is, as Creationists love to say, a theory that evolution proceeds due to competition
focused upon individuals fighting for the right to breed. Certainly biologists of all kinds
seem to proceed as if this was a real fact, as certain as the fact that the earth rotates ; but it
is not. There is no reason whatsoever to think that evolution is a competitive process,
unless you view life from the perspective of an individual, as Darwin did, no reason
therefore to see evolution as competitive other than the fact that Darwin has said it is, and
everyone of any consequence agrees with him. Two thousand years ago the best
astronomers, such as Ptolemy, would have said the earth is the centre of the universe, and
anyone of any consequence would of agreed with him : and they were all wrong, their
wrongness was not stupid as such, it was wrongness to a purpose, exactly as Darwinism
is wrongness to a purpose today. The purpose being to protect Judaism from science, or
protect religion from science, if you prefer, or shield our superorganic identity from
science, if you prefer this alternative description of the reason for constructive stupidity.
It is far better to think of evolution as a physical process, concerned with the flow of
energy relative to extant structures, a process in which life forms evolve to obtain
maximum access to energy within the global bio-structure. The biological domain can
then be conceived of as an extension of planetary geology, and seen as having a
geological form in which different life forms represent geographical features that can be
delineated relative to each other in terms of energy gradients. Which would result in
ecosystems being represented in a manner something like a weather chart perhaps,
showing how energy was flowing from one organic source to another. We already have
similar models regarding chemical processes, such as the carbon cycle. In such a
biological geology human society would appear as just one feature, of no importance for
most of its existence, then peaking precipitously like the arrival of a asteroid, a moments
impact, devastation, then a process of healing, as the bio-geology continues to move the
surface energy of the planet hither and thither, eroding the peak of human effervescence
back down to a plane of bio-stability. But, since life feeds on life, it is obvious that from
a political or religious point of view, the effort to eat one another could be interpreted
from a personal point of view, and be seen as competitive, but this competitive
interpretation is absurd from a scientific viewpoint.
When we come to examine Durkheim we find that this man is treading on our
toes, in that we are promoting the idea of the social organism which he sort to destroy.
This means that we can take on his ideas far more directly than those of Darwin that were
focused upon the biology of life. In turn this means our analyses are prone to easy
dismissal by professional priests, whose job it is to ensure that science cannot be open to
scientific reasoning, and must remain rooted in the religious principles fixed by the likes
of Durkheim and Darwin who preserved the idea of the person as end of nature, and
therefore a starting point of something new, and therefore not of nature. There is nothing
we can do about this difficulty, but we should make it known that we are not interested in
competing with these people on the terms they lay down. We are atheist scientists, we
know that for science to exist in a world where religion exists there have to be two
parallel sciences, the state sponsored science of the establishment, and the free science
we offer the world.
In conclusion, regarding this close look at a bit of Durkheim’s reasoning, as he
lived in the age of free science, and strove to turn science into religion for the sake of the
theocracy he served, so, in turn, we find ourselves living in the age of religious science
that we want to turn back into scientific science, or atheist science. Accordingly, as
Durkheim translated organicism into functionalism we have, in effect, been translating
his functionalism back into organicism. And so the story goes. As language is a force
that creates social structure we ought to find, within the cultural flux, a linguistic cycle of
exactly this kind. The idea of cycles in history is one that has impressed itself upon many
people, and it was a subject that caught the imagination of people at the time when the
organicist view of society was still alive, Revolutions of Civilization by the famous
archaeologist Flinders Petrie, 1911, appears in my list of books, and I think I bought this
short volume because it expressed a belief in social cycles, which has an organic logic to
it. I do not think I was impressed by the book, and I do not know where it is at this
minute, but I like the idea.

Today, 17/03/08, Philosophy of History by Lloyd, 1899, that I mention above,

arrived, and it looks as good as I had hoped it would be. He gives quite a full
examination of Spencer’s conflicting ideas on society as an organism, in which Lloyd
seeks to promote the idea that society is a real organism ; it seems surprising to me that
he does not refer to Lilienfeld in such circumstances, but no one does. But the first thing
about Lloyd is that he opens by delineating philosophy from science, not too impressively
at a first swift glance, but still at least we have an attempt to make the distinction, from
which we can develop a response that might be fruitful.
This effort on Lloyd’s part struck me as having some bearing on the discussion of
Durkheim above because Lloyd tries to validate the idea of philosophy as distinct from
science on the basis that philosophy is purposeful, which, basically, is what we are
accusing not only Durkheim, but all of humanity of doing, making purpose transcendant
over reality. This just cannot be right, it cannot be possible to promote the need for
knowledge in a scientific sense that is trumped by philosophical truth which is ultimate
because we relate to it. But at least Lloyd tackles the problem, and as an advocate of the
idea that society is an organism he is worthy of our respectful attention.

Today, 18/03/08, I collected the Journal of Social Philosophy, for April 1939,
from the post office, it arrived from Germany yesterday while I was in the garden
patching up my greenhouse after recent winds broke some glass, I used some steel sheet
taken from an old bed I picked up fifteen years ago ; the book was registered and I did
not hear the knock. What does my DIY bodging have to do with my philosophical
efforts ? More than you would think. This bodge up saves me thinking about spending
£20 on perspex, which allows me to buy the copy of Mind with the notice of Lilienfeld’s
fourth volume, which I am keen to get before it goes, there is only one and it will not
appear again.
This journal caught my attention because it had an essay called Gestalt
Psychology and the Organismic Theory, by Oliver Reiser, but I thought it would be
ninety pages long, not eleven ! That is what comes from buying off Germans when you
don’t speak German. However this essay looks great, it uses our phrase ‘social
organism’, but I do not imagine contributions to this American journal will be favouring
the scientific conception of humanity. Still it is a very nice item and I am thinking this
item journal looks worth keen study, worth a chapter to itself I should think. It is likely
to be a useful look at the transition still taking place prior to the world war that was
essential to help tidy up the remnant of free thought persisting in Western civilization
until the efforts of the Nazis to save the Jewish master identity that rules our world sealed
the deal for the theocracy. This journal shows how the science was kept alive by those
who knew it and were dedicated to its eradication, as sociology shifted from being a
strictly scientific venture into an exclusively religious mantra. And these people seem to
have a more sophisticated way of arguing about the need to break down the science of
humanity and let the religion of humanity flow inwards and smother all we can think of.
And the beauty of this evidence of how the elite academics continued the work of
Durkheim by distancing sociology from science is that we get to see how it takes a couple
of generations to lose a powerful intellectual idea, the idea of the social organism, in this
case. Also, given the discussion of Gestalt ideas which uses the phrase in earnest in
1939, we might wonder how many such articles appeared post world war ; none I
imagine, and if so this is indicative of the effectiveness of war in wiping the slate clean in
the field of intellectual endeavour, where it suits the priesthood to cleanse ideas of
science, we saw this effect with the first world war, and the second world war was a
second cull of scientific thought preserved in the surviving generation of cellular social
units.
A quick glance at an essay called Freedom, Law and Rational Social Control by
Read Bain looks very intriguing, although we still have the typical ambiguity that we saw
in our examination of Durkheim’s Rules. A curiosity appears in the arrival of this and
Lloyd’s Philosophy of History yesterday which bears an inscription to ‘Morris Cohen’,
and under the heading of the ‘Advisory Board’ for the journal is one Morris R. Cohen of
the College of the City of New York ; I was wondering who Cohen was ! You think
there might of been more than one Morris Cohen ? Maybe, but I think this is the man.
Anyway, as it happens, the suggestions we have just been making in regard to the way
this journal indicates how academics were unwittingly obeying the biological dictates of
the superorganism, happens to be unwittingly addressed rather well in Bain’s essay, as
we shall see when I get around to looking at it.
A volume like this does however continue an important aspect of this alternative
sociology, it fills out the continuum of the idea of human nature seen as superorganic.
 Chapter Thirteen

Social Philosophy

We might begin by looking at what Lloyd had to say about the nature of
philosophy relative to science, but the object of this chapter is to provide a space to focus
on the two essays in the Journal of Social Philosophy by Bain and Reiser.

$
 Chapter Fourteen

Worms

Would you believe it, Worms was a Jew ! Cor, I have been treating this man as
someone to be revered for a few years now because he is one the foremost exponents of
the organicist idea. Today, 20/03/08, I got it into my head to do a search for Worms after
the brilliant success in the last week or so searching for Lilienfeld on line, and the first
options I get, to my amazement, is the entry in the Jewish Encyclopedia. I cannot believe
nothing has given away Worms Jewish identity before this, because the Jews are the
master identity it is inevitably of major significance if anyone is a Jew, and it seems
Worms was a highly committed Jew. The concern that virulent anti-Semites like Hitler
had about the poisonous influence of Jews on our society are absolutely valid from a
scientific point of view where we wish to wage war on religion and must therefore seek a
world in which no one can call themselves a Jew. For Jews to exist the rest of us must be
enslaved, that is what Judaism is.
Anyway, while my time was extremely limited at the library, as ever, I did get a
nice item from the net, I found “Race” and Gender in Non-Durkheimian French
Sociology, 1893-1914, posted on : Sunday, 16 December 2007, 03:00 CST, by Martin
Staum. I have read the first half just as I tidied it up to my liking, and while the gender
issues are boring, yawn, the race stuff is of some interest. From our point of view, as
scientists, interested in the nature of humans, we want to look for evidence of ideas
relating to the knowledge that humans were a superorganic species, and at this time
everyone was immersed in this knowledge, and the discussions of the people considered
in this essay rotate around the vortex of our idea that society is an organism. Staum is
automatically dismissive of organicism, he mentions it as one might refer to the weather
while describing a battle, he never occurs to him to consider the merits of organicism
anymore than it would occur to him to consider the merits of racist theorists who believed
in a gradation of racial types forming a human hierarchy, based on race.
Much of our interest has been concerned with the failure of the people of this age
to make use of the organicist idea, and this criticism is incidentally referred to in Staum’s
piece. It is for this reason that after the world war organicism was dismissed as a dead
end. This is a fact that it has often struck us as being of a very telling nature, and we
have used it to promote the astounding idea that the world wars were actually fought
expressly to cleanse society of such ideas as organicism, which threatened the destruction
of religion. But while we have made this extravagant claim, because it was so obviously
correct, we have been unable to give any depth to the claim, and we have been obliged to
justify ourselves by offering what amount to theoretical propositions about the manner in
which people are driven to act unwittingly according to a flux of collective ideas that
generate a movement bringing about the required effect, resulting in the cleansing of
knowledge and the reinvigoration of religious slave identities. This essay is perhaps the
first hard evidence we have of this process in action, and it is so special because it deals
with this area of interest to us, the organicist sociologists and their contemporary
detractors.
The beauty of the argument drawn out by Staum is that we find the basic logic of
organicism forcing itself into the consciousness of those shown, in an attempt to make
sense of society in political, which equates to religious, terms, exactly as we would
expect if there is a natural force dictating the collective consciousness expressed in the
ideas of leading thinkers. The maddening thing is that nowhere do these organicists
given any thought to organicist ideas, it is as if socialist never mentioned the workers, or
capitalist never discussed business. It is enough to make us ask what on earth was it that
made the organicists organicists ? In this essay we see time and again the difficulty of
making sense of the racial basis of society in contrast with the religious basis of society,
but never once does anyone think to mention religion, instead they make the contrast
between the racial basis of society and the social basis of society, which is absurd.
Lets take a look at this essay :

“Race” and Gender in Non-Durkheimian French Sociology, 1893-1914

Posted on : Sunday, 16 December 2007, 03:00 CST

By Staum, Martin

The non-Durkheimian sociologists in the institutions founded by Rene Worms

were not simply biological determinists. A hard-line contingent among Worms’s
associates continued to accept the anthropological paradigm of racial hierarchy, but a
larger group questioned the validity of the concept of race as its anthropological precision
faltered. The critique of race, however, did not challenge the French civilizing imperial
mission. The male sociologists did not parallel this critique with a corresponding critique
of gender roles. The positivists in the Worms group, sometimes more liberal on race,
believed in an essential, complementary nature of women. However, the participation of
well-known feminists revealed that most male sociologists endorsed a “relational
feminism” that was based less on essential nature than on the need for stable social roles.
The sociologists’ discussions displayed the cultural assumptions about stable households
that prevented revision of old gender stereotypes. At the same time the degree of
responsiveness to feminist claims foreshadowed a more expanded notion of citizenship.

I. The Durkheimian and Non-Durkheimian Sociologists

Aspiring French social scientists in the nineteenth century frequently asked how
much “nature” fixed the status of non-Europeans and all women, and how much
“nurture” could alter it. The emergence of sociology in specialized periodicals and
institutions in the 1890s elicited a direct revolt against anthropological varieties of
biological determinism and “raciology.” Emile Durkheim and his collaborators on the
Annie sociologique (first published in 1898) have long had the reputation of promoting
this “discovery of the social.” The neglected non-Durkheimian sociologists associated
with Rene Worms (1869-1926) have suffered from the taint of “organicism — advocating
the analogy of societies to biological organisms. The academic expectation has been that
the non-Durkheimians were more rigid on “race” and gender. Some scholars have even
associated the Worms group with individualistic social Darwinism as well as racial
hierarchy.
This general portrait is due for re-evaluation. The revolt of the Durkheimians
against the biological now seems less definitive. Durkheim recognized a certain
rationality in traditional castes in previous epochs and rejected equal perfectibility of all
races. His early work in the Division of Social Labour contained biological models and
organic metaphors. Durkheim’s dominant gender theory argued that sexual similarity
and equality in structure and function were primitive, while greater sexual differentiation
occurred with modern division of labour. Despite agreeing to legal equality for women,
he thought their natural aptitudes and their functions in modern society would limit
choices of occupations.
The approach to race and gender of the sociologists affiliated with the
philosopher, lawyer, and political economy teacher Rene Worms did not consistently
allow nature to trump nurture. They were not uniformly on one side of the nature-nurture
axis with regard to race, nor were their views on gender entirely congruent with their
views on race. A substantial contingent among Worms’s associates, including critical
anthropologists, Russian emigres, and active contributors to the Revue Internationale de
Sociologie, criticized racial theory, while a minority remained committed to old
anthropological concepts of hierarchy disavowed by the Durkheimians. Worms himself
retained a belief in the inequality of races.
While belief in racial hierarchy often helped legitimise empire, its absence did not
guarantee opposition to French imperial expansion. Organicists in the Worms group
viewed colonization as a necessary form of reproduction in growing societies. Other
associates shared the common economic and strategic motives of French politicians and
imperial theorists.
The inadequacy of an exclusive nature-nurture framework becomes even clearer
on gender issues. While many non-Durkheimians did not insist on an indelible biological
nature of women, their acknowledgment of socially variable gender roles did not easily
translate into approval of full civil and political equality for women. They were
progressive in admitting women as Society members and listening even to the most
radical feminists. But a strong contingent worried about childbearing in a context of
depopulation if women worked outside the home and participated in the public sphere.
Some still defended traditional theories of the “nature” of women. The most numerous
group used social, not biological, justifications to refuse radical feminist demands. The
stability of households, as with Durkheim himself, remained a major issue. In this way
the sociologists illustrate with some qualifications the general historiographical claim
about cultural assumptions (shared by conservatives, so not uniquely liberal or
republican) creating obstacles to women’s full citizenship.
Rene Worms established three sociological institutions — the periodical he
edited, the Revue Internationale de Sociologie (founded in 1893) ; the prestigious
International Institute of Sociology (1893), with publication of annual or periodic
accounts of its congresses ; and the Paris Society de Sociologie (1895). The International
Institute of Sociology, with 100 members and 200 associates, included well-known
philosophers, anthropologists, and sociologists from Europe and from the Americas. The
Institute had a preponderance of university lecturers already famous in their home
countries and often established in the neighbouring disciplines of law, economics,
history, and anthropology. At any given annual (or later triennial) congress there might
be only twenty delegates in attendance. The Revue contributors included an assortment of
Spanish and Italian scholars as well as a conspicuous circle of Russian emigres to France
who had also joined the Institute. Since Britain, Germany, and the United States had their
own sociological journals, they were less likely to furnish periodical authors than
members of the Institute. The Paris Society de Sociologie had between 100 and 300
members in the period from 1895 to 1914. The famous criminologist Gabriel Tarde was
the first president, but the animated discussions usually occurred among a small group of
ten to twenty journalists, civil servants, and the same Russian Emigres. Eclipsed by the
Durkheimians as founders of the discipline in France, the group, like its founder Worms,
remained eclectic, without a unifying theoretical outlook. Their discussions of race and
gender, however, remain fascinating. To understand the context, a brief detour through
anthropological assumptions is necessary.

II. Anthropologists and the Nature-Nurture Issue

Early anthropologists debated the “perfectibility” of various ethnic groups (1860-

61) and measured the allegedly smaller brain size of non-European “races” and of all
women. The influential psychologist Theodore Ribot published a thesis on
“psychological heredity” that attributed the most important psychological aptitudes to
inherited “organic memories.” In his view innate endowment largely accounted for
moral and intellectual differences in races and national character.
Anthropologists and psychologists who were aware of anthropological discourse
thus set the tone for the widely prevalent nature-nurture discussions of the nineteenth
century. In France their predominantly neo-Lamarckian outlook complicated their
tendency to stress the importance of physical endowment and the measurement of crania.
Exceptional conservative hereditarians such as Gustave Le Bon (1841-193l), later
acclaimed for his crowd psychology, argued that the disparity from the male European
norm in brain weight or cranial capacity for other races and women increased with
civilization. But mainstream republican anthropologists such as Paul Broca (1824-1880)
believed that milieu had to play a role in the inheritance of acquired characteristics
affecting intelligence and character. However, milieu did not affect all people in
equivalent fashion, so its influence could be neutralized. Education of European men and
women, for example, could lessen intellectual and social inequalities among them. Non-
Europeans on the other hand might take centuries to catch up despite the influence of the
milieu. Race and gender were thus asymmetrical, since the advancement of European
women could be more easily contemplated than the rapid development of “retarded”
races. The non-Durkheimian sociologists would end up reversing this asymmetry with
more flexibility in practice on race than on gender. By the time emerging sociologists
created their own institutions, an anthropological counter-current had emerged. Leone
Manouvrier (1850-1927), a pupil of Broca, lab director and teacher of physiological
anthropology at the private Ecole d’anthropologie, opposed common notions of racial
inferiority and, while far from being a wholehearted feminist, refuted the idea that small
brain size indicated lower intelligence for women.
The old racial paradigm did not entirely collapse in the face of this critique. While
the late nineteenth-century sociologists almost all attributed a lesser influence of race to
the complexity of developed societies, including mixing of groups, and the phenomena of
modernization, the actual difficulty of finding reliable racial indicators and demarcation
lines via anthropometry was principally responsible for the critical onslaught. Neither the
cephalic index nor the facial angle nor cranial size seemed to suffice. Peoples and nations
were not homogeneous, and there was no firm agreement on the substratum of races.
Hence the fin-de-siecle era witnessed the increasing inadequacy of a nevertheless
persistent paradigm.

IV. Rene Worms on Racial Hierarchy and Colonization

Worms in a way represents the split personality of his group. His conflicted view
of race considered it an important, though not predominant, variable. In 1895, he
criticized the work of the conservative, pessimistic, anti-republican racial theorist Arthur
Gobineau as an “effort to glorify the white race.” The same year he commended the
republican philosopher Alfred Fouillée for opposing “doctrines too widely spread today
about the radical inferiority of certain fractions of the human species and the progressive
elimination of more enlightened races by the inferior fractions.” Three years later he also
agreed with Fouillée, in a very commonly expressed outlook, that “the more a people
approaches a modern type, the action of the social milieu wins out over the physical
milieu, and even more, physical factors tend to be transformed into social factors.” In the
1902 discussion at the International Institute, Worms warned his colleagues not to
attribute too much to race : “Milieu is a factor of social evolution, modified by social
functioning, while race cannot be modified and cannot modify other factors. It can only
prevent transformations as a conservative factor.”
For someone eager to highlight the influence of milieu rather than heredity,
Worms stubbornly refused in later years to give up the racial paradigm. Somatic structure
was a measure of progressive adaptation to the environment. “To the extent one rises in
the series of human races,” cranial volume and brain weight increase, the facial angle
increases, and prognathic (receding forehead and prominent jaw) face conformation
decreases. In trying to “modify the mentality of Negroes by a European education,”
Worms believed there were “countless disappointments,” such as the return of a dark-
skinned Filipino to savage life after failed efforts to civilize him. He attributed the failure
of democracy in Liberia or Haiti to racial inferiority. On the other hand, he conceded that
remarkable recent progress of the Chinese and Japanese might herald a “transformation
more profound than we can now believe.”
Like many pro-colonialists who argued for the civilizing mission, in 1898 Worms
believed that “inferior races” needed the influence of a “superior race for progress.”
Worms’s nuanced view on the importance of race did not prevent him from encouraging
the “praiseworthy task of development of our far-flung possessions by sending workers
and capital” to the colonies and from acting as secretary of the Colonial Congress in
1905. Nor did the Dreyfus Affair make Worms more receptive to the arguments of the
noted Durkheimian critic of racial theory Celestin Bougle. Worms warned that Bougle’s
exclusion of physiological and psychological methods from sociology “would restrain the
resources of the science.”
Worms also permitted publication of the views of the anti-democratic extremist
“anthroposociologist” Vacher de Lapouge. In 1893 Lapouge argued contrary to Broca
that the effects of education were limited and did not enlarge the brain. Lapouge believed
that the narrow head shape of “Homo Europaeus” created an aristocratic elite of
intelligence and character compared to the more round-headed, plodding peasant types.
Moreover, he advocated eugenic measures to assure that war, urban-induced alcoholism,
disease, marriages to the merely wealthy, or healing the mediocre sick would not threaten
the dominance of the elite. The Revue published discussions of the so-called cephalic
index (ratio of width to anterior-posterior length of the head) by his disciples. In the first
years of the Annee sociologique, of course, even the Durkheimians allocated space to
Lapouge, though they removed the “anthroposociology” heading by 1901. One cannot,
however, conclude that Worms’s institutions were mouthpieces for extremist advocates
of racial hierarchy. A more nuanced interpretation emerges from three substantive
discussions of race and heredity.

V. The Sociology Society and International Institute on Racial Hierarchy

At the 1895 second annual Congress of the International Institute the Polish
expatriate, anarchist pamphleteer, and literary critic Mecislas Golberg (1868-1907)
highlighted the importance of milieu in more recent times by asserting that the “stable
morphological units” of races in early times adapted to their geographic milieu to create a
division of labor. Conquest and enslavement of one race by another was one possible
outcome, but another, as with Durkheim, was greater specialization leading to natural
commerce and cooperation. In historical times Golberg called races “subjective and
unstable social units” since nations are unions of different peoples.
A recalcitrant hard-line critic of Golberg was a former Proudhonist typographer,
Charles-Mathieu Limousin (1840-1909), a councillor and eventually officer of the Paris
Society. For Limousin, racial attributes were permanent, and the hereditary constitution
of Africans made progress toward civilization impossible. In the subsequent discussions
of 1900 and 1902 Limousin again insisted that the once-useful ideals of equality had no
place in a science of society where one could not contest the “differences of social
aptitude for each race.” Asians were in a state of arrested development, and Native
Americans in a “state of decadence.” Limousin represented almost the stereotype of the
“reactionary Left,” a type of intellectual steeped in French revolutionary values harking
back to Jacques-Rend Hubert, an opinion receptive to nineteenth-century socialism, and a
firm conviction that progressive science taught hierarchy, not egalitarianism. However,
at the Congress of 1895, after the conviction of Dreyfus, but before the press helped
create the Dreyfus Affair of 1898-99, three major figures, all active in the Paris Society,
strongly supported the primacy of social, not racial, factors. The Odessa cordage
manufacturer, Jacques Novicow (1849-1912), was a staunch organicist, social Darwinist,
and economic liberal, but also a strong pacifist. For him, Golberg’s adoption of Le Bon’s
“historical races” confused race and culture. The physiological aspects of race, however
useful in biology, were unimportant in sociology. Therefore, sociologists should
“abandon this criterion of race for tracing serious limits between human groups.” He
remarked on his own sensitivity to prejudice because others frequently assumed him to be
Jewish, but he had no such ancestry. The next year Novicow argued against any
correlation of intelligence with brain size or physiology, and found no evidence that
primitive races or present-day Africans were not “perfectible.” Novicow would also turn
out to be an ardent supporter of equality for women.
The statistician, economist, and future president of the Society Adolphe Coste
(1842-1901) asserted that marriages, uniform traditions, and education were far more
important for group mentality than physical attributes. Physiology had no direct influence
on mental characteristics, and, like most colleagues, he believed all existing races were
mixed. Finally, in 1895, four years before his attack on Lapouge, Leone Manouvrier, an
officer of the International Institute and critical anthropologist, stressed the importance of
“conditions of civilization” attainable by all races. Rejecting “original and inherent
features of a race,” Manouvrier wished to react against “the habit of explaining by race,
blood, heredity, atavism what is explicable by the external milieu and the action of living
beings assembled together.” He had little doubt, he said, that on the average “as a whole
the Europeans are superior to exotic races” but he thought culture, education, and
favorable conditions could counteract current inferiority. Manouvrier later admitted the
cerebral inferiority of some existing human “races,” but still rejected Le Bon’s serial
ranking of intelligence testifying to progressive evolution. He would take a similarly
nuanced position on feminism — against considering women to be of inferior
intelligence, but convinced that women’s nature meant adherence to certain social roles.
The second explicit discussion on race in sociology occurred at the International
Institute Congress of 1900, well after the Dreyfus Affair had galvanized concern about
prejudicial labelling of individuals. Here another nobleman and wealthy emigre, Eugene
de Roberty (1843-1915), who still lived half the year in Russia and also taught at the
Paris College libre des sciences sociales, vigorously attacked the “prejudices of
contemporary sociology.” The positivist Roberty blamed political conservative
Hippolyte Taine, as well as republicans Jean-Marie Guyau and Fouillée, and British
philosopher Herbert Spencer for overemphasizing organic adaptations transmitted by
heredity. They made race significant, but it was actually a deus ex machina with the
“external veneer of science.” Even so-called “ancestral concepts” were acquired. As long
as education and instruction were different from animal raising, he believed race itself not
a great social factor. Furthermore, he called anti-Semitism “the greatest infamy the
nineteenth century will have to blush about before posterity.” Race was a biological fact,
good only for prehistory, but otherwise civilization was a more essential sociological
factor than race.
In the subsequent discussion, Novicow and Coste endorsed Roberty’s opinions.
Coste insisted Egyptians were a black African civilization, and deliberately cited the
failure of Lapouge’s cephalic index as a successful indicator of racial difference. The
Breton magistrate, sociologist of law, and South American linguistics expert Raoul de la
Grasserie (1839-1916) contradicted Roberty in maintaining that nations were now
artificial, historically created races — a principal premise of his view that all true nations
deserved self-determination. The analyst of Russian peasantry Maxime Kovalewsky
supported the conventional anthropological assumption that all races evolve along the
same path, but some are in a state of arrested development. Limousin adhered to his hard-
line position about the pure sentimentality of egalitarianism.
 In the third discussion of this theme, at the Paris Société de Sociologie in April
1902, La Grasserie translated race as an “ethnic” quality anterior to society, necessary for
“anthroposociological practice,” a term used by Vacher de Lapouge. He agreed this
ethnic quality was most powerful in earlier eras and unmixed groups. However, he
refused to surrender a firm naturalistic component — poor ethnic stock would hamper a
people regardless of the two other dimensions of geographic milieu and historical epoch.
La Grasserie postulated a perpetual struggle between a hereditary ethnic factor (a “better
name” for race, given their mixing), remade by history, and the geography of soil and
climate. At present the nations, or “sociological races,” were more significant, but nations
now took on the characteristics of races. He unabashedly noted that the “ethnic”
characteristics of Jews, including an aptitude for international commerce and finance,
always triumphed over the “telluric” (geographic) milieu.
In the discussion Worms took his usual conciliatory position by cautioning that
while race was an immutable factor important in the past, only the milieu promoted social
evolution. Limousin again endorsed La Grasserie’s argument for the importance of race.
The anthropologist Georges Papillault, a laboratory colleague of Manouvrier, insisted on
the old paradigm — a parallel between racial morphology and functional aptitudes in an
evolutionary series. In a given epoch different races reacted differently to the same
excitation, so the influence of the milieu was limited, though important. However, he
tried to separate his science and his ethics — there was no excuse for savage destruction
of an inferior race.
The increasing disunity at the Ecole d’anthropologie appeared in the critique of
the cartographer Francois Schrader, a colleague of Manouvrier. Schrader argued that the
constantly changing nature of “races” robbed the word of its meaning. The criminologist
and magistrate Gabriel Tarde agreed, like Durkheim and Worms, that as evolution
continued, the ethnic factor decreased in importance, while “continually operating
causes” such as social life increased. He concluded peremptorily, “the idea of exclusive
or preponderant influence of race leads, at bottom, only to a historical fatalism......a
sociological mysticism.” Moreover, the genius, not the average person, promoted social
evolution, so that differences in racial averages had relatively little significance for the
establishment of civilization.
Hence Limousin and Papillault, and to a lesser degree Kovalewsky, defended the
traditional anthropological paradigm relating physical natural attributes, intellectual
aptitudes, and moral character. La Grasserie postulated a pre-existing ethnic factor that
could strongly affect adjustments to the milieu. Worms remained in an intermediate
position, refusing to deny or magnify the influence of race. Manouvrier and Schrader
from the Ecole d’anthropologie, Novicow, Coste, and Tarde declined to attach great
significance to racial variables alone. For Coste and Manouvrier, at least, the failure of
anthropological indicators was a major influence.
Was there another argument that attracted all the participants as well as the
Durkheimian — the increasing importance of social factors as ethnic groups became
more mixed ? It would be a tempting reading of these debates to say that processes of
modernization in Europe in the late nineteenth century made it impossible to defend a
fixed racial category. But modernization did not eliminate the old paradigm. Some
anthropologists still questioned whether metis [half-breeds] of allegedly “distant” races
would result in the deterioration of the species. Moreover, the racial ideology of Vichy
as late as 1941 still gained anthropological support with Ecole d’anthropologie professor
George Montandon working for the Commissariat for Jewish Affairs. Hence it is still
speculative to attribute the fall of the old paradigm to an overarching process of
modernization.

VI. The Revue on Race and Ethnic Identity

Aside from these explicit discussions, the book reviewers of Worms’s periodical
demonstrated a mostly critical attitude toward racial theory. However, Society
discussions or publications about African-Americans and Jews were less clear-cut. The
workhorse reviewers after 1900 included the lycee philosophy teacher Guillaume Leone
Duprat and the social democratic lawyer Alfred Lambert. The most far-reaching
disavowal of conventional anthropology was Duprat’s review of the Austrian sociologist
Ludwig Gumplowicz’s theory of conflict among historical races. While Duprat believed
in hereditary dispositions, he noted, “we find contestable the hypothesis of the natural
existence of race.”
Lambert also favourably reviewed the noted work of the naturalized Polish
journalist Jean Finot, who attacked the racial theories of Gobineau and Vacher de
Lapouge. Lambert approved Finot’s strictures against the “harmful and vain doctrine of
races,” an “intransigent dogma unleashed by political passions,” not scientifically
justified. He concluded, “the cultivation of hatred of races is criminal ; internally it would
be a seed of death for peoples that would let it take root ; externally, it would lead to the
worst sort of decline ; it is therefore a human and patriotic desire fulfilled by Jean Finot
in chasing from the scientific throne a disastrous usurper.” However, the direct
comments on African-Americans and Jews in the Revue were far from uniformly
sympathetic. La Grasserie failed to criticize an American statistician’s pessimism on
educating African-Americans. A former southern American resident, Mrs. Oscar Lovell
Triggs, one of the few women who participated in the debate on race, told the Society
that blacks would never achieve the superior qualities of whites. Conversely, the
historian, economist, and commentator on Haiti, Paul Vibert (1851-1918), married to a
West Indian woman, argued that the “savage mentality” of poor white Americans
handicapped blacks. In the same discussion, the Haitian embassy official and lawyer
Georges Sylvain deplored the Americans’ maintenance of segregated hotels even in New
York.
The atmosphere of the Dreyfus Affair produced several comments on the status of
the Jews. Duprat’s review mentioned some of the replies to the writer Henri Dagan’s
inquiry into the causes of anti-Semitism. Manouvrier, in particular, saw no inherent
“pretended flaws” in the “pretended” Jewish race. Clearly Worms himself, of Jewish
ancestry, at one time rejected the notion that the Jews were a race, but he still later
referred to the psychic transformations of Jews as representing one group “among white
races.” The Worms group, like the Durkheimians, had no wish to be associated with the
nationalist anti-Semitic views of Vacher de Lapouge or Le Bon.
Anti-Asian prejudice dominated the commentary of labour law expert Leon
Douarche. However, Novicow was strongly opposed to any notion of a “yellow peril”
because he was confident that Chinese labour competition could not easily undermine
European productivity. On the whole the editorial staff of the Revue, including Lambert
and Duprat, criticized the extremist anthroposociology of Lapouge and discarded
conventional anthropological assumptions. But the old prejudices survived in the more
casual contributors to sociological discussions on Asians or Africans.

In science there is no such this as the nature-nurture debate because for science
there is no such thing as nurture, in the sense of something distinct from nature. For
organicists the whole point of nature is to create an organism that is given its social
constitution by the mode of its nurture, the person is a blank slate upon which culture is
written. Any other idea is too infantile to bear consideration, and the appearance of this
absurd notion of culture, nurture, civilization and such like as seen in the above, that has
come to rule our world today, is simply the extension of religion into the secular domain.
The question of racial inferiority is interesting. We see in the above an argument
made out for the principled rejection of race based differentiation between people in
science, on a qualitative level. But nowhere does anyone achieve an argument based on
logic from beginning to end. When denouncing what we would call racism today :

He concluded, “the cultivation of hatred of races is criminal ; internally it would

be a seed of death for peoples that would let it take root ; externally, it would lead
to the worst sort of decline ; it is therefore a human and patriotic desire fulfilled
by Jean Finot in chasing from the scientific throne a disastrous usurper.”

Lambert makes an ethical appeal against racism. But is this necessary ? If black people
were a subspecies of human, of the kind we imagine Neanderthal might must of been,
then it is right that science should take note of the fact. But this is not the case, and the
only reason this idea ever entered into science is because of the religious logic centred on
the superiority of the person, so racism is a religious corruption of science denounced by
a religious declaration of the venality of such religious ideas. As ever religion takes hold
of both horns of an argument and sets about rotating about its midpoint, which is always
the same, the place of the free thinking individual in society.
We also have a very nice observation on the relative importance of racial and
social factors :

Schrader argued that the constantly changing nature of “races” robbed the
word of its meaning. The criminologist and magistrate Gabriel Tarde agreed, like
Durkheim and Worms, that as evolution continued, the ethnic factor decreased in
importance, while “continually operating causes” such as social life increased. He
concluded peremptorily, “the idea of exclusive or preponderant influence of race
leads, at bottom, only to a historical fatalism......a sociological mysticism.”
Moreover, the genius, not the average person, promoted social evolution, so that
differences in racial averages had relatively little significance for the
establishment of civilization.
 We see the bizarre separation of the social from the racial in this passage.
Nothing can be more social than race, the whole biological function of race is to give the
superorganism its identity ; it beggars belief that these people did not easily see this. It is
perfectly obvious that religion takes the place of race, so that genetic factors of identity
are replaced by religious factors of identity, and this is the holy grail of our search for the
evidence that people knew this, we want to find someone who recognises that religion
and race are to one another as the horse is to the heat engine. But nowhere does anyone
realise this idea, the only place we find anything evoking such a thought, and this kind of
material is near impossible to find, is in the anti-Semitic work of those who are associated
with the rise of the Nazis. And we can see how organicism led to Nazism, and so saved
the Jews from science, when we look at the feeble ideas put forth by the intellectuals in
the above piece.
This is a rather interesting snippet :

Moreover, the genius, not the average person, promoted social evolution, so that
differences in racial averages had relatively little significance for the
establishment of civilization

The inability of Africans to organise a decent society is painful to watch, they are
quite simply incapable of achieving what we Europeans achieve, Why ? Look at the
chaos that just broke out in Kenya leading to the first major bouts of ethnic cleansing in
my lifetime, and this in the model African society. Lame excuses would come readily to
mind as we all have an inbuilt capacity to pew form such excuses, we might say the
Africans have been trying to do in a century what we have done in a millennium, and the
superficial truth of the statement, combined with an ability to get at anything more
tangible makes it hard to go beyond such reasons. But the recurring theme in the life of
all non European societies that seem incapable of achieving the order societies we are so
proud of is corruption. Understanding corruption as a social mechanism, is the key to
understanding the contrast between European societies, and the third world copies of our
kind.
Informed by the knowledge that society is a superorganic form created by nature,
that is has a Jewish identity, and that the Christian and Islamic identities are second and
third order tiers of the organism’s physiology, which denote a hierarchical delineation of
social structure, we find ourselves in possession of a logical model that has no difficulty
accounting for the inability of non-European people to emulate our level of civilised
organisation. And, curiously, the sentence selected above, as trite and distasteful as it is,
not to mention religious and political, actually describes the true reason for the disparity
between Europeans and non-Europeans in terms of the ability to organize modern stable
societies. The problem is that Schrader caste his statement in religious terms, that is in
political terms, because he used language that makes the individual an end in themselves,
whereas we know there is no such thing as an individual as an end in themselves. So
what we need to do now is to translate his statement from the religious language of the
person into the abstract language of science. Instead of his focus of power or authority in
a coterie of leading individuals, all we need is an organ of social authority associated with
the success of the superorganism, and instead of the ‘average’ mass of irrelevant people,
we only need take notice of the biomass of the superorganism attached to the organ of
command. And this is how we make sense of the existence of the Jews as a specialised
organ of command, which we also see referred to in the above, and denounced by the
author, but that need not concern us, we are scientists concerned only with science.
So the problem for a country like Kenya is not so much that it is newly exposed to
the structural impact of Western, i.e. Jewish, social forces, but that it is on the periphery
of the core focus of Jewish influence in the established centres of Jewish power in the
host territories which have been attached to Judaism via the Christian slave identity. and
really, this is what is shown by the intractable problem of corruption, because, as we all
know from our own recent debates about corruption in parliament over expenses and
employing family members for doing nothing, paying them out of the public purse, our
society corrupt, but it is so highly organized that the corruption is channelled. Today,
20/03/08, it was announced that a Tory that employed his student son would not be
prosecuted because the laws on MP’s allowances was so lax it would be impossible to
know where to begin showing where this criminal had been at work. In a Kenya bribing
MP’s, police officers, tax collectors, you name it, is standard practice, it is how they get
their wages. And that is the difference, it is all about superorganic structure which can be
traced back to the foundation of the superorganism based on Judaism, which has
gradually extended the fibrils of its social structure as it has grown.
And so, the statement that genius makes for progress so racial inferiority is
irrelevant is perfectly correct in its logic, if not in its attribution of structural
responsibility for the effect noted. And this kind of slippage between the basically well
informed logic and the allocation of objects causing an effect is seen all through the
above essay regarding the difficulty of race. But the result of this slippage was highly
productive, for it shifted the bias from religion as a biological extension of superorganic
physiology taking the place of race, which would of been the obvious and simple
explanation of what these people were debating, instead of saying that race was defunct
because social activity had superseded it, what on earth does this mean, what is social
activity ? In so far as it replaces the effect of race social activity is religion, for this is the
real point emerging from Schrader’s logic, that intelligence is not really the issue in
relation to social advance, but rather organization, and this can be reduced to Bagehot’s
famous dictum that what matters is that there should be some kind of unity, some kind of
unifying identity, any kind will do, for any is better than none, but the better formulated
the more effective. And that is what religion represents, a better formulated mode of
identity implant able to unite across racial boundaries. However, racial boundaries are
basic, we all like to be with those who are like ourselves, generally speaking, and so a
variety of strategies are required to support the sophisticated religious, that is linguistic
identity, and these strategies are associated with force supported by power that derives
from the success of the unifying identity, and this is why Judaism is associated with war
and capitalism.

The subject matter of this essay is not the only matter of importance, because this
is a modern essay, and so we can also use the attitude of the author as a gauge of the
current status of the subject.
What kind of a social world would a people be living in where the search for
knowledge has totally succumb to the imposition of an absolute religious authority ?
There are two types of theocracy, an overt absolute theocracy and a covert absolute
theocracy, we live in the latter, so this question can be refined to ask what kind of world
people would find themselves subject to in a covert absolute theocracy ? The primary
quality of our experience of living in a covert absolute theocracy is that we would have
no conscious awareness of living in a theocracy whatever ! A very strange thought
indeed, and as such, since we are living in such a social dispensation we may wonder
how on earth we may give thought to our experience of something we are not aware of.
Modern sociologists love to belabour the fact that no one can step outside the
society in which they exists, this is a nice mental block to erect against any none
conformist ideas because it clears up a whole host of arguments that would otherwise
ceaselessly threaten the equanimity of the priests who have the job of keeping us
blissfully ignorant. But we have dealt with this logical proposition already in this work,
and elsewhere, we have noted that since it is possible for us to imagine an alien
intelligence, that is by definition not of any society on earth, visiting this earth and
observing us, then we can at least conceive of an intelligence detached from our society
that is nonetheless determined to understand our society. If we ask ourselves what such
an alien would see then we are automatically placing ourselves outside our society, albeit
that we may fail to achieve the desired state of detachment, we can at least, by this
means, demonstrate the absurdity of saying that no person can remove themselves from
the society within which they exist. To clarify this proposition, lets ask if I can remove
myself from the living room of my home where I am now, to somewhere far away. I can
think of the approach to my mother’s house where I lived for a decade, it has altered, a
porch has been built, but it is still much the same — I am there, if I described to someone
else what it is like I could send them there and they would recognise the place. This is
the power of linguistic force. Language evolved to create living structure and as a
consequence it has the power to shift individuals through time and space, this is
necessary because any creative force necessarily controls space and time, within its own
dimension. Thus, when the linguistic force builds a house in a field, the space occupied
by the house is taken over by the linguistic force, the social force of language does not
create the space it occupies, but it does transform that space into something linguistic,
something social, and as such the linguistic force is a natural force that by definition must
have power over space and, therefore, time. Building a house in a field is a time bound
action, and therefore when a force influences space, by building a house, it also defines
time, and therefore influences time, and therefore controls time/ From this it follows that
the power of language controls space and time, within its own dimension. The linguistic
dimension is that portion of universal existence controlled by language, when anything is
known, it is controlled, in the sense that language is reflecting it. Just now my linguistic
ability built into my body, was reflecting my knowledge of my old home, and this was a
linguistic act because I thought about it in words. I placed myself many miles away from
where I am, and in this very real sense, I moved my body to a different space, and
likewise, on this basis, we can transport ourselves outside the society in which we exist.
But this act of translocation cannot be performed upon a whim, if it is then we engage in
the creative act of creating fiction. What space are we occupying when we exist in places
that do not exist, such as other time dimensions that science fiction writers love to
fantasise about ? Well, it is obvious that we do not actually relocate ourselves in space
when we project our thoughts into another place, and this is the fact that the priest is
relying on when they say that sociologists recognise that it is not possible to exist the
society in which we live. But the power of conceptualisation is very real, and assuming
that a space exists in reality, then the linguistic force has the capacity to transport is to
that space, within the constraints of the powers of the linguistic force, which are
symbolic, that is representative of reality, and creative, which means linguistic force can
shape reality, that is what makes language a natural force : language can shape reality.
Note it is language that shapes reality, not people, we have no say over how we live, what
laws we pass, how we construct our buildings, anymore than we can decide how the cells
of our body are made, the form our society takes and how we live is decided exclusively
by the force of language. Thus language has created Judaism, and so we are forced to
fight wars in order to establish the state of Israel, we cannot decide not to support Israel,
or not to build institutions dedicated to the propaganda of the holocaust, language has
created Judaism and it creates everything associated with Judaism, the good and the bad,
we have to accept the result just as we accept the result of a tsunami ploughing into a
holiday resort on Boxing Day. If anyone thinks differently, then please tell me how we
can stop supporting Israel. There is no way, it cannot be done. Why ? Because we are
Jews, and it is language that has given us our Jewish identity, without language we could
not of become Jewish, we would be something else, something based on the racial
parameters that form some of the discussion contained in the above essay perhaps. There
is a flow and consistency to our social being, and this flow can only be known via the
application of science. What the above essay clearly shows is that no sociologists of any
hue were in any way shape or form promoting a scientific conception of humanity come
the final years of the age of the social organism. By the end of the nineteenth century
science was already dead, so if this is the case then the world war was not necessary to
remove the flux of anti-religious scientific thought that pervaded society ; but, this is not
right, science was evidently dad, it had been corrupted by the ingress of none
scientifically minded people like Worms into the field of organicism, with friends like the
Jew Worms who needs enemies ? You cannot be a Jew and a scientist, the idea is absurd,
anymore than you can be a Christian and a scientist (A Christian is of course a Jew, a
second order Jew). If you are a religious person and a scientist then you are a priest, for
your religion must always trump your status as a scientist, because being a scientist
requires a total commitment to the eradication of religion from society, science means the
eradication of religion, the words ‘science’ and ‘atheism’ are, in logical terms,
synonymous.
This essay helps give our thoughts on the way the fabric of society was remade
during the time in question to massage away rational ideas and implant myths was far
more complex than our usual thoughts on the matter can really indicate. But this is no
surprise, we must expect to find such detail if we can just happen upon the evidence of
the way in which ideas were transformed from being scientific to being religious. As we
are well aware, the process of transforming the linguistic flux pulsating through society
involves effort carried over the length of the generations, because it is only by persistent
effort carried on over the course of generations that cleansing of knowledge can take
place, ideas are carried in the minds of individuals and therefore the only way to rid
society of knowledge is to suppress the truth while imposing a myth for long enough to
ensure that no one with the true knowledge remains alive. This is why superorganic form
has evolved physiological structures we call social institutions, to preserve not only
religious identity and legislative programmes dictating structural activity, but in order to
enable knowledge destined to form the public consciousness to be controlled. This
control is effected by expunging scientific institutions of science, and replacing science
with a religious formula, then ensuring that all newcomers learn only the myth and are
shielded from the truth, while, because we live in a free society, that is a covert absolute
theocracy, everyone is allowed to publish their true ideas, in so far as they are able, but
eventually these ostracised truth tellers die out, and all that is left is the establishment and
the those trained within it.
So that when a fella like Staum comes along and takes an interest in the material
we are interested in, he does so from within the highly constrained bounds of the current
religious science of society, and he is incapable of thinking outside the box. Staum’s
interest is characteristic of the times we live in, it is inspired by the motive force of
political correctness which binds our collective conscious today, in this case Staum
examines his topic within the bands of permissible thought delineated by racism and
feminism, two pillars of political correctness dictating what people are allowed to think
today. In effect, although he does not know it, and no doubt would be horrified to hear it
suggested, Staum is really performing the role of the thought police in a real life 1984.
He does this by reinforcing the parameters of knowledge based on the laws laid down by
the politicians who base their actions on the demands made by the social activity
occurring in society at large. Politicians are pragmatists, and it is the job of the
academics to provide the intellectual justification for the pragmatic actions taken by law
makers.
Staum is doing exactly the same work that we are doing, the only difference is
that we are not paid to the work, while Staum is paid, and he is paid handsomely. I do
not know this for a fact, but I assume he is a professional academic. No professional
academic would be allowed to read the same subject matter that Staum has read, and then
to produce a piece of anti-Semitic, pro-Nazi, racist work such as we produce here. In
other words no one would be allowed to produce a piece of none bias science that
assessed human activity, otherwise known as history, in purely functional terms, we are
forced to produce bias accounts of human activity. Lines of linguistic force determine
these outcomes, Staum is responding to the linguistic force filed and adding his effort to
the effect of the lines of linguistic force that we know in their overarching form as bands
of political correctness. To tray and escape the effect of these lines of force is to draw
charge of linguistic force down upon yourself, in the shape of attacks from professional
activists, politicians, priests of all sorts. This is how society works. I found another
interesting snippet in the free local rag yesterday, to add to the one above

Students put Nazi leader “on trial”

High School students took part in a Hitler on Trial day at the Romiley Forum
Theatre in Stockport.
Following an exam skills workshop the 26 GCSE history students watched
a courtroom drama in which the Nazi leader is tried for his responsibility in
starting World War Two.
At the end of the play the students were asked to vote on Hitler’s
culpability for his actions, and he was found guilty.
 (Reported, March 21, 2008)

This kind of sick activity is what passes for education today, if this is not Orwell’s
worst nightmare come true I would like to know what would be !
It has to be said, that this form of ‘study’ is popularised on television, I think, it is
to the sort of thing I would ever watch, but there have been dramatised documentary style
‘what if’ scenarios presented in the form of courtroom dramas, which are perfectly
legitimate studies as far as normal TV propaganda goes, but to get students involved in
acting out such programmes as if this were an insightful guide to understanding human
history ...... well, is says it all, education is about inducting the slaves, not teaching the
men and women. And he was found guilty ; so that is alright then, at least we know this
propaganda method works.
It is from this physiological structure that the pupae are turned out, and from there
a few particularly keen to take up the ‘theology’ of their indoctrination, we get the new
priesthood, people producing more gush in the vein in which their minds have been
channelled, resulting in a person like Staum giving us nice pieces of work, nice because
they look at our period, which is simply perverted into conformity with the linguistic
band wrapped around the biomass of the Jewish superorganism.
An idiot, trying to ridicule our condemnation of this process of indoctrination,
would probably begin by ejecting the mindless thought, But was Hitler not responsible
for the second world war ? This kind of mindless thought is what our kids are being
taught to have, while engaged in the pretence of doing history, after all, how on earth can
putting a man on trial for such an offence amount to an historical examination of
circumstances leading up to the second world war ? A major theme in regard to the
origins of this war is the responsibility of the allies following the defeat of Germany in
1918, the swingeing terms exacted by the treaty of Versailles being often quoted in this
regard. A book title caught my attention in the Journal of Social Philosophy for 1939
that arrived the other day, Why Hitler Came into Power, by Theodore Abel, and it is
implicit in this book, pre-world war, that there was a historical process, a political process
that is, which created Hitler, and therefore it is simply no possible that Hitler could be
responsible for anything. I had a programme on Tsunamis on BBC 2 on while I worked
on the computer just the other day, and the Boxing Day Tsunami of a few years ago was
examined, geologists investigated the sea bed and found a massive cliff that had recently
been uplifted, and the presenter explained the mechanism whereby movement in the
earth’s crust built up tension until a breaking point was reached, the resulting uplift
occurring under the sea created the wall of water that came ashore as a Tsunami. All
very simple. But the point is then, that the Tsunami was not responsible for the
devastation it caused, even though, superficially speaking, the Tsunami was what we
experienced as being responsible, the wave hit people and drowned them, and smashed
the exoskeletal structure of the Jewish superorganism ranged along the edge of the land.
In this scenario the wall of water is the personal form that effects us, but in
reality, moving away from the personal impact, we find that it is the planet itself that
caused this damage. Likewise, Hitler is the face of the Nazi organization, delivering the
messages of war, for which he is then held responsible in a personal way, but a
meaningful examination of the dynamics that led to the world war would try to
depersonalise the deliberately personalising activity of political processes, whereas it is
obvious that the historical method taught to defenceless children, unable to think for
themselves, are being trained to think politically, in other words they are being trained to
be prone to political methods of addressing people in society in order to control society.
History in school is therefore part of the political process, which is funded by
government, so this is no surprise.

Is Bush responsible for the war in Iraq ? Is Blair responsible for the war in Iraq ?
I certainly believe Blair should be put on trial for war crimes, since he has to be held
politically accountable for leading us into a criminal war ; but how I feel about these
things is another issue, that has nothing to do with a scientific evaluation of what these
social events are. In reality, politics works by generating figureheads, and neither Bush
nor Blair had any choice in the stand they took in promoting the ongoing war in Iraq,
which reached its fifth anniversary this week, any politician in power would of taken the
same decision, this is because politicians never taken decisions of any kind, if they did
then government would be impossible. I often wonder where the policies come from that
are fronted by politicians, I can never make up my mind about this, it is obvious that the
politicians we see have no say whatever on the policies they present to us, it is clear that
all policies, and all laws, and all actions, are generated from a hidden substructure, but
where is it ? My answer is that it is the machinery of government run by the civil
servants, but there is a hidden influence that ultimately must be religious. The war in Iraq
can only ever of had the sole purpose of promoting Israeli interests in the Middle East,
vital in the early phase of its establishment, which is still on going ; after all, Israel will
still exist in ten thousand years time, and therefore the first five centuries will still
constitute the early phase of its existence. The early phase of Israel’s existence will be
defined by the period it takes for all local animosity toward Israel to of disappeared, and
this will only come to pass when the whole of the region has been reduced to the status of
vassal territories, or dependencies of Israel ; the war against Iraq is the first step in this
wider process of Israel’s formation. But of course, until the process reaches completion it
will not be possible to know this, we may profess to know it, but until it has come to pass
no one will credit our claim. Conceived of in terms of a natural process, based on the
conception of society as the material representation of a superorganic entity produced by
the evolved physiology of human form, we can justify our prediction on the basis of the
evidence already come to pass, that shows Judaism is the final realisation in the process
of producing such a superorganism on the basis of linguistic force realising its potential
through the generation of a uniform identity experienced in the shape of a religious
identity programme. Judaism overtly predicts its own destiny as it has come to pass, we
are only taking on board the logic of the process identified in Jewish myth, and decoding
that myth according to the logic of modern scientific ideas.
A few of days after writing the above I picked a volume of my shelves that I had
not looked at for some time, and I hit upon a definition of philosophy and religion which
I thought succinct and accurate, in a functional sense, and the definition of religion
reminded me of the preceding speculation about a hidden force directing all our upfront
political activities :
 In his later writings, however, Comte has come to see that both Theology and
Metaphysics are based upon perennial wants of man’s spiritual nature, wants
which, as man, he cannot but feel, and for which a real and not merely a fictitious
satisfaction can be provided. He teaches us, therefore, to regard the progress of
man as a true development, in which the passing away of the first forms of his
higher life is incidental to the further manifestation of the spirit which was once
expressed in them. Hence the last or “positive” stage of thought is conceived to be
a negation and abolition of the past, in which all that gave the past its value is
reaffirmed and maintained. It is a higher “positive,” which is reached through the
negation of the lower, but it is itself a great deal more than that negation.
Now, the ultimate interest of Comte’s philosophy lies in the success or
failure of this attempt of his to find a new satisfaction for those higher wants of
humanity, which Theology and Metaphysic, or, as I should prefer to say, Religion
and Philosophy, have so long been supposed to satisfy. It is not difficult to
describe, at least in general terms, what these wants are. Philosophy professes to
seek and to find the principle of unity which underlies all the manifold particular
truths of the separate sciences, and in reference to which they can be brought
together and organized as a system of knowledge. And Religion, while it also is
concerned with an absolute principle of reality, differs from Philosophy mainly in
this, that it is not merely or primarily theoretical. For Religion, what is required is
such a conviction as to the ultimate basis of our existence as shall enable us to
find therein at once an adequate object of affection and a sufficient aim for all our
practical endeavours. Now a scientific Agnosticism, such as is common at the
present day, means either that there are no such wants in man, or that, if they
exist, no provision is made for their satisfaction.

(The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte, Caird, Preface, 1893,

pages xiii – xiv)

Religion deals “with an absolute principle of reality”, boy !, you get this kind of
statement so frequently, but never any hint as to what aspect of reality it may be that
religion deals with ; so frustrating, but then this is a priest we are dealing with, so all their
efforts are set to deceive. But the next sentence is superb, for here we are told that
religion needs to be able to satisfy some inner need we have that depends upon the ability
religion has to satisfy our need for a sense of why we exist, and to connect us with this
reason for our existence, in effect Caird is saying that religion must project our ego onto
the plane of reality and make reality mirror our ego and emotional ideas. And then, and
this is the crucial bit in terms of the preceding discussion, we are motivated to act in
certain ways in our political activity.
While picking my way through this book, looking for interesting bits, I did notice
some discussion of Comte’s failure to follow the true course of his own ideas toward the
inevitable recognition that if man’s individuality must be dismissed because man could
only be understood in relation to his social world, then it follows that man’s existence in
its entirety, must be related to the existence of the universe, and thus to the existence of
God. While this is a ludicrous link to make that is merely contrived from words, and
obviously means nothing in scientific terms, it would indicate the kind of ideas which the
author would imagine justifies such bizarre statements as the one we condemn above
regarding the relationship of religion to reality. Certainly our existence must indeed
relate to the universe, but not in any sense different to the relationship between the flu
virus, or a worm or a peanut : so who cares !
All of this descriptive reasoning is more or less perfect, there could never be any
need to try and improve upon this description of the function of religion. However, this
tells us nothing about what religion is, why religion exists at all. It begs the question why
religion should be needed, why are we so formed as to need this comforting idea of a
personal relationship to reality, and why this model should form a basis for directing the
sum of our collective social being, and why we would find life futile and meaningless
without the delusions of religion.
The assertion that science, that takes no heed of whether God exists or not,
implies that humans have no needs that can only be satisfied by religion, or that humans
have these needs but there is no way to meet them, is more like it, here we get back to
inane religious drivel. But even this inanity helps us see how the debate must be carried
forward from a scientific point of view. We do not deny any aspect of reality, that is not
our business, we are scientists interested in human nature, and all that derives from it.
Why would we deny the need for religion in humans ? That would be like denying the
need for water in fish ! And why is it an alternative to a denial of this need to say that
this need has no means of being met ? No scientist could possibly deny the need for
religion.

@
 Chapter Fifteen

Daddy. Is there a God ?

How should we teach our children to understand the world in which they live,
given that when they are exposed to the wider world they will soon find the idea of God
presented to them by people who are trained to be believers, when any progeny of ours
will be free from this imprint ?
Teaching kids to believe in God is no more tricky than teaching kids to believe in
reading or playing football, religion is part of social life, all that needs to be done is to
introduce children to the ongoing activity of life in which religious activity is included.
On the other hand, if a child comes home asking questions about religion or God, and the
challenge is to explain what this means, there is challenge.
Irrespective of any challenge posed by slaves of religion emitting their identity so
that our free offspring are exposed to the linguistic force others are impregnated with,
that causes the enslaved to become linguistically magnetised, the linguistic force they
emit demands that others respond to them, become influenced by them, and become one
with them, attracted, or become repelled. So the linguistic force takes effect as a personal
identity that has the effect of a creative social force relative to others, exactly as we
would expect given our idea of language as the product of a linguistic force that creates
superorganic physiology.
How can we deliver to our young ones the power of a liberated mind without
causing them to be alienated within the body of an inevitably enslaved biomass to which
they unavoidably belong, and will need to feel they are a part of ?
The answer is not to make the rebuttal of religion the mainstay of the ideas
imparted, but rather to make the understanding of existence the positive account of atheist
science, which teaches us that we are part of the natural world, and we would include
within this account an explanation of why religion exists and why other people subscribe
to the idea that there is a divine being ; exactly as we do throughout our reasoning.
Therefore all we need to is to deliver the scientific account of existence at the level of a
child’s understanding. Accordingly, if we imagine being faced with a child’s question
“Is there a God ?”, we would answer thus :

People are part of the natural world which we see all around us, today we have a
power to understand things which is very special, and very different to the power people
had t know about life in times past. This planet is a very special world, if we look in the
sky we see other parts of the universe which relate to the place of this planet, we see a
moon at night, which shines by reflecting the light that comes from the sun which we see
in the day because the light of the day is sun light shining on us. This planet is special
because it has life on it, and we are life. When we try to understand ourselves then, we
must begin with an understanding that we are life, and this is the beginning of who, and
what, we are. We need ask nothing else about ourselves or the nature of existence than
this, knowing that we are part of life is the only thing we need know, and everything else
we know about ourselves must be understood in terms of the idea that we are a part of
life.
Knowing that we are a part of life, we look to all of life in order to understand
ourselves. Each part of life has its own special gifts that make that part distinct and give
it its place in the whole of life on the planet. Therefore we know that people must have
there own special gift too.
The first thing to know is that humans are animals, just like any other animal, and
people are not different to any other animal, anymore than any other animal is different.
This knowledge is the most important knowledge that anyone can ever possess, knowing
that you are an animal just like any other animal is the key to be free, when you think, as
most people do, that humans are special, or unique, and that humans make their own
world, and live the way they choose to live, then you are lost, and rendered powerless in
life, because you have no idea what is real.
Once you know and understand that you are an animal, you can begin to learn
what kind of animal you are, you can begin to learn what the special gifts are that nature
has given to humans. Gifts are presents, the sort of things treats we get on our birthday,
gifts are the talents that are the basis of our way of life as animals, they are not things we
choose, they make us the creatures that we are.
The gift of human being is language, this is our special gift, language makes us
the animal that we are, therefore knowing what language is, is the most important thing
we can ever know, both about ourselves, and about the nature of existence as it has any
meaning for us. All questions concerning life for people, concern language, what
language is, and what language means, both as a natural gift, and then we must apply this
knowledge to every idea we think about, because when we think we employ the gift of
language that makes us the animal that we are. So if we are going to ask a question about
an idea we have heard talked about, such as the idea of God, then the first thing we must
do is to think about this idea as a piece of language, and not as an idea itself. So we do
not ask what this God thing is, we ask what this piece of language that talks about this
God thing is. And this should make sense, because when a person talks about God they
do not show you this God, they only talk about it, so the talk about God is all we have to
go on in the first place. So when we hear people talking about God we do not ask what
this God is, we ask what is this talk about God about. and this is the first, and most
important thing about language, we never treat language as real, we always treat language
as representative.

Blimey, imagine a five year old coming home and asking what God is to be given
the answer above. This is why it is difficult to dismiss God from a child’s mind when
they are exposed to it. But the we have to have a clear sense of the full argument before
we can reduce it to simple bite sized chunks ready to be imbibed by the child. All you
would tell a child is that we are animals like any other and we have a special gift of
language which makes us what we are, and the magic of language is that its makes us
one. So, when people talk about a power that creates is they are really talking about the
special power of language, but because we live in a world that has changed in recent
times we still have the old way of knowing the power of language, and that old way is
through the religion which teaches us about being one with each other in the name of
God. This is why people believe in God, so there is no God really, but there is something
real that the word God refers to, and this is the force of our human nature that makes us
live for each other. So although we do not agree with people who believe in God,
because we are independent of this idea, we can still understand the reason why people
believe in God, and that is because believing in God makes people belong to a big family,
which feels good, and makes people strong in a way that is natural to people.
All the bigger issues, that we deal with here, and elsewhere, are not for a child’s
ear, as they get older that may begin to look at questions relating religion and the
explanation of the existence of religion which we have just summarised according to its
fundamentally constructive, that is positive, characteristic, and they may then want to
know why so much badness is associated with religion, and they may become aware of
the price we pay in terms of ignorance due to our dependency upon the force of language
drawn into the vortex of religious identity. As the questions come, so we can answer
them, but we all, always in an absolute theocracy, there is no other kind of world, and our
ability to exist in society and be happy and successful therefore requires an adjustment
that allows us to contend with the reality of religion. If we are not content to be a part of
the religious dupedom, and we are not prepared to accept the atheist identity specially
developed by the priesthood for us to wear with pride, and without being in conflict with
religion, then we have a responsibility to teach our offspring how to be part of a society
they must inevitably hate and despise at its very core, because it is a contemptible
society.
The cure for any passion we feel is our understanding. Knowing that nature
created our society, knowing how nature created our society, we realise that to hate
society passionately is like hating bad weather passionately, as if it were a person that
meant us harm. Society becomes just another feature of nature to be comprehended and
tackled. Because society is us, and we are society, there is an intimacy between ourselves
and society, and this is personalised by the fact that we must contend with individuals
who act as the voice of the social being that we hate, but even here we can see these
people either as mindless dupes, or understandable pragmatists, who behave as they do
because that is how people have been made to behave by nature. It would hardly make
sense to hate someone for being evil when nature made people to be evil, yes you still
want to destroy these people, but there is no point in hating them, with a passion. Besides
which, in a civilised society, the people we hate like to work on the basis of what we do
not know will not bother us, so they maintain a charade, and welcome our efforts to think
freely, so we can play the game as well as they.
 Chapter Sixteen

Why do we live ?

Recently there has been a sad story in the news, about an area in South Wales that
has seen a cluster of suicide amongst the young people living in Bridge End, I think it
was, seventeen dead in the last years or so, if I recall rightly, the story has not been in the
news lately. The last mention of it was a week or so ago, today being 23/03/08, a coroner
had given his verdict on four of the cases and said that only two were suicide, the other
two he could not be sure that they meant to take their own lives. Coroners are reluctant
to suicide as the cause of death, it is nasty business, it speaks ill of the society plagued
with this behaviour, therefore even if it is obvious that people killed themselves the
coroner, so I believe, may not give the cause of death as suicide, on the basis that the
person concerned may of been toying with the idea and not definitely of intended the
outcome they achieved. Rather artificial, but there it is.
And so we may come upon another question arising from the youthful mind
concerning our motives for living, what the point of life is, What do we live for ?
Especially if a strictly rationalist understanding of life means that we conclude that as
individuals we arrive, we live and we disappear, end of story.
There is one reason, and one reason alone, that we live for : we live for each
other. Everyone lives for others ; but this statement is not meant to be understood in a
nice way, it is meant to be understood in a functional sense, where we mean that the
motive force for our existence derives from our human nature, as created by evolution.
So that we are animals that evolved especially to value our personal existence through the
existence of others, this is what leads to the very peculiar quality of vicariousness, where
we live our lives through the experience of others, something we see dominating
television, where we endlessly watch other people doing all sorts of things, while we sit
on the couch and watch them. It is a very odd form of behaviour ; having sex by looking
at images of people having sex, how odd is that ! There is nothing on earth more
powerfully attractive than pornography, and the reason why is because we evolved to live
our lives through others, and our vicarious bent is the most obvious expression of this
impulse to live through others.

In a strange sense a cluster of suicides such as the one in the news currently
affirms the unity of collective being that is the ‘individual’ self. In the last cases a young
man hanged himself and a couple of days later his younger cousin, a girl, while away on
holiday complemented his act of self destruction with her own imitation. I dread to think
what this was like for the families of these tragic people. But no better example could be
had of the interdependence of the individual upon other individuals. Because we are not
allowed to know what human nature is this kind of thing is accounted by psychologists,
they talk about ‘permission’ being given by someone for another to kill themselves. Sick
bastards, priests, wouldn’t you like to hang the lot of ‘em ! But these are the ones
licensed by the theocracy to tell us who we are, and we have no other way of learning
about ourselves because the theocracy, as we have been seeing in the body of this work,
is so committed to the destruction of all true knowledge, and its replacement by the
fraudulent gush of Judaism, that forces us to understand ourselves as individuals, so that
we can be hooked by the collective forces of existence, in the name of religion, instead of
being attached to society in the name of our human nature.
Philosophers love to wax lyrical about intangible human qualities that are beyond
the realms of scientific comprehension, forcing us to meet this linguistic challenge head-
on, for it is only a verbal game, there is no meaning in the words of such degenerates.
The philosopher will say that science cannot account for moral behaviour, and we say he
can if he can reduce such activity to a mechanism within a broader physical context, such
as the physiology of a superorganic form. And the philosopher will question that mystery
of the human sense of duty to right by others and their society. To counter this verbal
trick we have employed the conceptual device whereby we speak of the duty a brick
would fell if it were conscious. A conscious brick would feel the urge to gather with
other bricks and form itself into structures, for this is what a brick is so formed to do, its
form dictates its sense of duty, and so it would, if ‘self’ directed spontaneously act with
other bricks to form walls, buildings and other edifices.
We continue to us this model of a conscious brick to illuminate the qualities of
our own nature, such a brick would know why it existed because of the proximity of its
fellow bricks in the structure where it had placed itself, and each of its neighbours in
brickdom would know themselves by virtue of the first brick we have considered. And
so it is for any individual, they know themselves by their closest neighbours in society,
this is why it is possible to organise a social structure wherein many people live utterly
miserable lives, working on mind numbing machines in factories, earning a pittance,
while others do rather better in some miserable job in an office or a shop, and others do
magnificently in some exalted game that is all show and no substance, making movies or
being a politician perhaps. Each person is isolated in their own part of the structure and
knows their place by way of their next fellow brick. This dynamic is identical for all
humans as it would be for all bricks, a brick buried in the ground as part of a foundation
pillar would be happy by seeing its fellow bricks alongside, and it would know nothing
else. While a brick placed in key position over a fine arch forming the entrance to a posh
building would know nothing other than the glory of its own place, where it would still
be nothing but a brick. And we see the signs of the frailty of the highest human units all
the time, the day before yesterday, today being 25/03/08, there was a gossip programme
talking about ultra skinny celebrities, they homed in on the Spice Girl cum footballer’s
wife, whose name escapes me, who was looking like she had anorexia, the starvation
disease. The other week there was a movie about the life of the Pink Panther actor,
whose name escapes me, and he was portrayed depending upon a fortune teller, he even
married his second wife as a direct consequence of the line he was fed on one occasion.
Leading politicians are famous for their need of fortune tellers, and this makes perfect
sense, because of their place at the pinnacle of a social structure which they have not the
remotest comprehension of, but which they lead because life has happened to select them,
they need some reassurance that they are placed where they are for a reason. The key
brick needs other special bricks alongside it making it feel secure in its place, and of
course they are their, in readiness, performing their duty in the structure.
 Chapter Seventeen

Boodin

I frequently assert that we live within an absolute theocracy, and I develop my

argument affirming this fact by contrasting the situation we all know we lived under in
past centuries, where we really did live under a direct religious authority, and present
situation, where religion is expunged from all sources of direct political power, by
describing the present situation as a covert theocracy contrasting with the former overt
theocracy.
A further development of this argument says that there is no such thing as science
in the world today, and we try and develop this self evidently insane idea by talking
about the status of science as it has been developed under the sway of a covert religious
authority. Accordingly we need to think about how science has been squeezed into a
tightly constricted box, where it is reduced by its own methodical definitions, applied to it
by the ruling authorities, such that it is nothing more than a technical exercise, left sterile
in terms of knowing, a mere appendage to that which does know ; left enslaved to religion
in other words.
It is appropriate when starting to discuss Boodin to repeat this simply stated, but
excruciatingly difficult idea to grasp, difficult because it so confounds the linguistic
meaning with which our minds are programmed, because we know we live in a world that
is science, so how can there be no science ! It is because science is only a technical
exercise, it is never allowed to act as a medium of knowledge that creates meaning about
the nature of life for humans, for us. And, it is because language is a natural force that
builds social structure by presenting a programme that is our mind, our consciousness, so
that language dictates how we think about our world, and hence we are deceived into
believing we are scientists living in a scientific age when science does no actually exist as
an autonomous field of activity generating its own world view. The problem is that
science is by definition detached from purpose, and this makes it difficult to be of service
in the social behaviour we are obliged to engage in within society, which is anything but
detached and unbiased.
We see in the piece by Dye —

Although he is of the opinion that “Idealistic systems have, one and all, been
romantic exaggerations,” he still subscribes to the necessity of doing metaphysics,
i.e. of providing a final integration and evaluation of the presuppositions and
consequences of our more specific truth-seeking activities. Metaphysics and the
special sciences stand in a sort of feedback relationship, inasmuch as the desire to
harmonize specialized bodies of information leads inevitably to the speculative
extension of principles which have yielded partial understanding in specific areas
of inquiry to the whole of experience, while the resulting world-view in turn
serves as a paradigm or “regulative ideal” which furnishes inspiration for the
further progress of science (RU, xxi).
that, despite the difficult language in which Dye expresses himself, Boodin expressly
believed that science could not provide knowledge of an all embracing kind, mythology
was required to make use of the technical knowledge provided by science, to give us real
knowledge of a kind that made sense of existence. It is as if knowledge could only be
real if it were produced by the thinking mind applying its magic to ingredients existing as
facts left at various degrees of detachment from one another ; and we see this idea
coming through in the couple of essays I took from the net yesterday. According to this
theory of knowledge science fashions pieces of reality into a representative universal
jigsaw puzzle, but even if all the pieces were in the box, they would still have to be
assembled, we would still need the magic ingredient of the untutored human mind to put
the pieces together in such a way as to make sense. Clearly such an idea suits a priest,
but it must be dismissed with contempt by anyone who loves science, as we do. And yet
the essay The Biological Basis of Society that brought Boodin to our attention just last
week opens thus :

The division of labour in modern science which has resulted in distinct

compartments has had its disadvantages as well as its advantages. It has
conduced to efficiency of research in the complexity of modern science, but it has
also been a curse in that it has tended to make the investigator blind to the relation
of his field of research to other fields of knowledge. It has made it well nigh
impossible to view nature as a whole.

(Journal of Social Philosophy, July 1936, p. 301)

When I studied these remarks the other day I liked them very much, although I
thought Boodin did not make as much use of this important observation as he should
have. But we can see how this sentiment, and the weak use he made of it, fits well with
the idea that only speculative effort can make use of hard facts about reality.
The most obvious issue to point out is that Boodin fails to take notice of the one
simple reason why science is so constrained : religion. How is it possible for anyone to
ignore the war between science and religion so completely ? Why should the
compartmentalisation of science lead inevitably to the result noticed here by Boodin ?
Yes, it does lead to this result, but there is no inevitability about this at all, and indeed
this difficulty is by no means the hindrance Boodin indicates in those areas where there
are no political implications. It can be no accident that Boodin, as a philosopher, turns to
the subject of sociology, which I assume he does when he wrote The Social Mind in
1939. The Biological Basis of Society is a sociological essay in a journal facilitating the
ingress of philosophers, magicians, into the field of sociology. This is indeed where the
difficulty comes into its own, but, for crying out loud, this difficulty was the product of a
relentless effort on the part of the academic priesthood to ensure that human studies were
detached from life studies, so that sociology became cleansed of any biological impetus.
It seems as though Boodin is in favour of the application of biology to sociology,
but I wonder whether, when push comes to shove, when we get down to seeing what this
man actually said, we will not find him taking the part of a decoupling agent separating
science from the study of humans. Why does he not take up the issue of religion ? This
is the crucial question. Does he really imagine that we are living in a world where people
are free to do science without any question of pressure subverting the emergence of a true
holistic product in the form of a scientific view of everything ? He was a Yank, he must
of heard of the famous trial over the teaching of evolution in school which took place in
192?
But whatever the truth of Boodin’s real place in the organicist argument of social
being, he does handle ideas in a way most pleasing to those who know that humans are a
superorganism. We find in an essay discussing mind :

Mind is essentially a system of intersubjective meanings or valuations and

of controls as resulting therefrom. We may speak of mind as a superorganic
system of relations as we may speak of life as a superchemical system. In any
case each is a unique type of energy system with characteristics of its own. In the
absence of expression, mind is inchoate and ineffective. It can at best be regarded
as potential from the spectator’s point of view. The formative idea is the soul
whether in the individual or in the group. And this is created in social relations
and can only be understood through social relations. Mind comprises, it is true,
relations to the physical world as well as to the social. But the former exist as
meanings only because they are selected and integrated into social patterns. The
physico-organic concept of mechanism employed by physiology is itself such a
socially constructed system of patterns and should be worked so far as it can be
worked. But it proves inadequate when we come to deal with social relations. I
may add in passing that it is not necessary that the formative idea or system of
ideas should be conscious at all times. It is at most only partly conscious at any
one time ; and at times, as in sleep, it may not be conscious at all. The mental
patterns are, no more than the neural patterns, dependent on consciousness for
their existence, though they cannot have significance without consciousness. [19]

19. I have dealt more fully with the relation of the concepts of consciousness and mind in
‘A Realistic Universe,’ Part II, Macmillan, 1916

(“Sensation, Imagination and Consciousness,” p. 447, Psychological

Review, 28 (1921) : 425-452. John E. Boodin)

In this essay we have talk of the mind as an expression of social patterns, the
section from which this quote is taken is subtitled Mind as a Social System of Patterns,
which is simply divine, nothing like this has ever been seen before, by me. Further on he
makes the point that it is useless to think of the individual as having any meaningful
existence. So all of this is good. He does however fail completely to get to grips with
human existence in any solid manner. He talks about how the way psychologists handle
their discussion of mind, or consciousness, is based upon their own sense of existence as
adult psychologists ! What we want is for human existence to be understood as a natural
phenomenon exactly as we would apply if we visited another planet and found ants six
feet long living in houses like ours and driving cars or flying planes, and reading books
impregnated with patterns of pheromones sensed with feelers rather then ink sense with
light sensing organs.
He talks about mind be represented in social forms, including institutions. This
relates nicely to the idea that mind is simply information, and information is synonymous
with energy, in that information delineates the flow of energy in living systems, and from
this we make sense of the idea that language is a force that creates superorganic structure.
So we can see that this man, who was apparently as committed to the idea of the
superorganism as we are, really did develop ideas about how the superorganism worked
that have a considerable affinity to those ideas we have settled upon ourselves. The
crucial difference is that for us the atheistic principle is the rock upon which all our
thinking is based, while Boodin seems oblivious of the existence of religion, in what we
have considered thus far, but he does have a work entitled God and Creation, 1934, the
examination of which we will obviously have to make a priority.

I have included a superb piece of the finest essay I have ever seen in the next
chapter on Pareto, it fitted nicely after a remark I was making on a passage taken from
Pareto’s work. Shortly after this fine paragraph stating that even society is made at the
behest of natural forces, we have a passage discussing the process of evolution as a
universal process responsible for social structure. This is disappointing, but its failure is
our inspiration to get the matter right, and it suggests a fuller explanation of the true
manner in which evolution occurs, as opposed to the absurd ideas imposed on the world
in the name of Darwin, which tell us nothing.

The constructive forward urge works largely in the silent womb of nature.
At best we see it only in retrospect. The impetus must come somehow from the
larger matrix of nature of which life is a part. In Einstein’s language the space-
time of nature is directional, though, owing to the plurality and indeterminism of
the individual energies of nature, the direction in the making must present
irregularities—blind alleys, recessions, as well as forward movement. It is in
retrospect, when the unsuccessful trials have been eliminated, that the
creativeness of nature in organic evolution, as in the psychological evolution we
see in retrospect in the patent office, presents a straight, continuous series of steps.
When we say that the environment furnishes the stimulus of the synthetic activity
of nature in the individual, we must not conceive the environment in merely
mechanical terms, but as the organic wholeness of which the individual is a
responsive part. We cannot account for the advance in nature merely in terms of
the Lamarckian conception of use or effort, though functioning is certainly
characteristic of nature and in some sense must be part of its advance. But the use
of habit structure could only reinforce habit, it could not account for the
emergence of memory. And the use of routine memory could not account for
constructive thought, with its analysis and synthesis. To say that the advance in
nature takes place because of mutations is merely a statement of a fact, viz. that
there must have been change in the germ plasm for the gain to be handed on in the
life stream of generations, but it does not explain the direction of change in the
progressive adaptation of life to its environment. To say that such fitness is due to
 a pre-established harmony is mere obscurantism. This is the impasse to which a
mechanist like Thomas Hunt Morgan is brought.

(Boodin, Journal of Social Philosophy, July 1936, p. 306)

My notes, from reading, day before yesterday, on 12/04/08 :

This wasteful experimentation, an exuberance of life, interpreted in terms of blind

alleys is a direct reflection of Darwin’s idea of evolution as a selective process, where
only the fittest survive. If only Boodin had read the previous sentences declaring a
unidirectional flow and made these the basis of his argument, then we would not of got
this stupid idea of free will expressed in the indeterminacy of individual parts. Better to
think of a shotgun round killing its target — the individual constituents of the blast are all
equally important, but only a few will do the deed, the rest will drop to the ground. With
hindsight Boodin would curse the wasted shot and call them useless — but this is insane,
the shot that hit the target only do so because they are part of the cloud, and with the
cloud — fired as single bullets they would more often miss their target. We may suppose
that the evolution of refined forms is also dependant upon the wasted profusion aimed at
the latent potential of life energy (which draws out evolving forms ) — without the
transient experiments, the stable result could never arise. Why might this be ? — that is
where your scientist comes in.
This idea suggests that there is a principle of cooperation operating between like
kinds — not competition ; each variation on a theme helps the others, as an evolving
paradigm, ascend the evolutionary scale of potential development. This could be due to a
rapid feedback loop feeding into the whole range, just as a variety of patents trying to
exploit one energy source in a specific way — electricity to make domestic light —
might impact on the whole process point by point — filament, glass, vacuum, etc., so that
eventually a refined product emerges that succeeds in exploiting the energy source so that
all the competitors fade away, leaving one model taking the field, which then diversifies
to fit all variations in which electric light is useful — bulb, torch, signs, fluorescent tube
etc.
And from this idea it follows that an impulse to evolve a social form of a basic
successful organic machine, such as mammalian physiology, would continue pitting like
and like against one another until a complex product is produced on the basis of
constructive, not destructive selection — resulting in a society where individuals are
reduced to component parts, in a process exactly the opposite of that touted by the
theocracy as Darwinism.

___

When talking about all parts of an evolutionary movement being equally valid,
this idea can be related to the observation scientists often make which warns us to bear in
mind that a life form is always valid and complete in its own right, a living creature or
plant cannot be an experiment, ever ! No matter how much we are inclined to see it as
such due to the heavy bias of our narrow conception of evolution as a competitive
process of selection, which is based on how we develop artificial structures through a
process of experimentation and deliberate development.

The whole of the essay in question is magnificent and we will place it in an

appendix. But here we must await some other works by Boodin, and see how else he
develops his ideas on biology in relation to sociology. Two further particularly important
points may be noted regarding this essay. On page 307 he says “It is in the light of the
desire for life that we must interpret religious practices”. By ‘desire for life’ he means
the urge to exist that is implicit in all life, and as such we may suppose that he means that
religion is functional, and this, as we will see in the next chapter, is very much in accord
with all that Pareto says about religion, and non-logical behaviour in general. This is all
very well, we too insist that religion is functional, and that is why religion exists. But we
interpret that function physiologically, as a medium of identity, related to a linguistic
programme that creates the specific form of the living superorganism ; if you like you
could finish this sentence by saying — as dictated by the urge for life, but such a
conclusion is superfluous and adds nothing but confusion.
The next specific point we must take notice of in considering Boodin’s organicist
ideas appears on page 313.

“When I say that the social group is in fact a part of biological evolution, I must
not be understood to advocate biological organicism. I am not reducing the
psychological group to the multicellular organism.”

This is most unfortunate, and it arises because of the utter failure to recognise that
if we would have free knowledge then we must wage war on religion. As long as religion
exists then we are indeed faced with an inexplicable problem regarding how we account
for the survival of religion as the sole means of knowing anything, no matter what
knowledge arises about the nature of reality. But, tragically, Boodin, and others, just do
not get this. They seem to think the problem is due to inherent difficulty, they just do not
see that the problem, as such, is none existent, it is fabricated by the nature of the organic
being we are all part of. To say that the psychological group is a new phenomenon that
has its own laws, is plain idiotic, it is simply to argue against God all the way, until the
last point at which we may save ourselves, and then, to leave the whole question an open
mystery, thus saving God, meaning that we might as well of said nothing in the first
place.

_______

Damn it, would you believe it ! The man is an out and out Jesus freak !
Horrendous. Here we have the one man in existence to come anywhere near grasping the
full nature of human society, of human beings therefore, as superorganisms, if we go by
the work we have perused so far, and now, or better still yesterday, 07/05/08, a short
popular piece written just after the last world war arrives Religion of Tomorrow, and in it
he declares that he wishes it to be known that if people want to see his efforts as
proclaiming the word of our Lord Jesus then this will be fine with him. Tragic. Quickly
diving into the material, forcing myself to overcome the urge to put it aside in disgust and
make an effort, it seems we can tease a little comfort out of a work professing so
revolting an intent. Such disappointment, will we never find an honest voice ?
We know that religion has adapted down the ages, in what I have always
considered the most farcical manner, it is like telling a lie as you go, and adapting it the
new facts presented to you that you had not been able to take account of previously. Well
here Boodin makes a philosophical principle of such a method of adaptive lying. He
opens this work with a monumentally pathetic piece of moronic gush of a kind we could
not hope to find a worse expression in any piece of religious literature from anywhere or
anytime.

Q – p 9.

Elsewhere he develops the idea that religion must develop and be part of the
intellectual and conceptual milieu of the present, and look to the future if it is to be a
good thing. Accordingly he tries to contribute to the adaptation of Christianity to the
modern scientific outlook. I mean, what is wrong with this man, he speaks as one who
had never heard of the idea of evolution, and the idea that humans evolved to form a
social organism, and yet he is the greatest ever exponent of the idea that society is a true
living organic being. In which case why does he insist on making every detail of this
religious gush conform to the notion that the individual is all ? Why does he not see
religion in the context of the social organism ? Maybe he is senile by the time he wrote
this piece, he may as well of been. Perhaps he was scared of dying by this time.

Q p. 78

But we do eventually come to something of interest, for Boodin actually takes the
position that the idea of God is created by humans, implicitly at least, How else can he
accommodate an adaptive religion ? And consequently he talks about finding new
metaphors for God. This is extraordinary, he is in effect telling us that God does not
exist, and all the notions of God are but metaphors for something that does exist. This is
perfect, this is all that we have ever said, God is a code word for the reality of the
superorganism of which people are a part.

Q – p 80.
 Chapter Eighteen

Pareto

I was smooching about the place today, 05/04/08, after writing the above in the
chapter on Boodin, about his views on the nature of the mind, when title The Mind and
Society caught my eye, as it often does, because its four large volumes sit on a shelf my
bedroom door.
I must of owned this set for a year or more, it was one of the most amazing
purchases, first edition, all four volumes, in fine condition, although heavily annotated in
pencil, in an unbelievably miniscule hand, and all for £15 as I recall. It was spoken of
highly, and what caught my attention was the statement that in this work Pareto made a
special study of non-logical thinking. Unfortunately the work its one millions words
worth, is fatally flawed, and worthless. But no such works, no matter how deceptive and
misanthropic and nasty, are really worthless.
Volume one is indeed entitled Non-Logical Conduct, and it does offer a rather
delightful discussion of the topic. Lets steal a nice bit :

276. Aristotle even has the concept of evolution. In the Politics, II, 5, 12
(Rackham, pp. 129-31), he remarks that the ancestors of the Greeks probably
resembled the vulgar and ignorant among his contemporaries.
277. Had Aristotle held to the course he in part so admirably followed, we
would have had a scientific sociology in his early day. Why did he not do so ?
There may have been many reasons ; but chief among them, probably, was that
eagerness for premature practical applications which is ever obstructing the
progress of science, along with a mania for preaching to people as to what they
ought to do—an exceedingly bootless occupation—instead of finding out what
they actually do. His History of Animals avoids those causes of error, and that
perhaps is why it is far superior to the Politics from the scientific point of view.
278. It might seem strange to find traces of the concept of non-logical
conduct in a dreamer like Plato ; yet there they are ! The notion transpires in the
reasons Plato gives for establishing his colony far from the sea. To be near the sea
begins by “being sweet” but ends by “being bitter” for a city : “for filling with
commerce and traffic it develops capricious, untrustworthy instincts, and a breed
of tricksters.” Non-logical conduct has its place also in the well-known apologue
of Plato on the races of mankind. The god who fashioned men mixed gold into the
composition of those fit to govern, silver in guardians of the state (the warriors),
iron in tillers of the soil and labourers. Plato also has a vague notion of what we
are to call class-circulation, or circulation of élites (§§ 2026 f.). He knows that
individuals of the silver race may chance to be born in the race of gold, or vice
versa, and so for the other races.

(Pareto, Vol. 1, 1935, p. 185. First pub. 1916)

 I only had in mind section 277, but I like 276. It seems to me that the unbiased
application of science to the study of animals, contrasted with the flawed, biased and
hence scientifically worthless sociology of humans in the Politics, is the telling
observation in this quote. And 277 gives us a bit more on non-logical behaviour,
although we need to look into what Pareto means by this in order to make sense of how
he uses this idea here, but I also like seeing this reference to Plato’s triadic hierarchical
division of the social organism ; I wonder why this arrangement is deemed non-logical ?
By turning to chapter three Rationalization of Non-Logical Conduct, page 171, we
immediately find a useful discussion of illogical argument in a highly acclaimed and
famous French author :

Suppose we ignore, for the moment, the simplest case of writers who
understand that the conduct of human beings depends, to some extent at least, on
the environment in which they live, on climate, race, occupation, “temperament.”
It is obvious that the behaviour resulting from such causes is not the product of
pure ratiocination, that it is non-logical behaviour. To be sure, that fact is often
overlooked by the very writers who have stressed it, and they therefore seem to be
contradicting themselves. But the inconsistency is now and again more apparent
than real ; for when a writer admits such causes he is usually dealing with what is
—and that is one thing. When he insists on having all conduct logical, he is
usually describing what, in his opinion, ought to be—and that is quite another
thing. From the scientific laboratory he steps over into the pulpit.
254. Let us begin with cases not quite so simple but where it is still easy to
perceive the experimental truth underneath imperfect and partly erroneous
descriptions of it.
Here, for instance, is The Ancient City of Fustel de Coulanges. In it we
read, p. 73 (Small, p. 89) : “From all these beliefs, all these customs, all these
laws, it clearly results that from the religion of the hearth human beings learned to
appropriate the soil and on it based their title to it.” But, really, is it not surprising
that domestic religion should have preceded ownership of land ? And Fustel
gives no proof whatever of such a thing ! The opposite may very well have been
the case—or religion and ownership of land may have developed side by side. It
is evident that Fustel has the preconceived notion that possession has to have a
“cause.” On that assumption, he seeks the cause and finds it in religion ; and so
the act of possession becomes a logical action derived from religion, which in its
turn can now be logically derived from some other cause. By a singular
coincidence it happens that in this instance Fustel himself supplies the necessary
rectification. A little earlier, p. 63 (Small, p. 78), he writes : “There are three
things which, from the most ancient times, one finds founded and solidly
established in these Greek and Italian communities : domestic religion, the family,
the right of property—three things which were obviously related in the beginning
and which seem to have been inseparable.”
 How did Fustel fail to see that his two passages were contradictory ? If
three things A, B, C are “inseparable,” one of them, for instance A, cannot have
produced another, for instance B : for if A produced B, that would mean that, at
the time, A was separate from B. We are therefore compelled to make a choice
between the two propositions. If we keep the first, we have to discard the second,
and vice versa. As a matter of fact, we have to adopt the second, discarding the
proposition that places religion and property in a relationship of cause and effect,
and keeping the one that puts them in a relationship of interdependence (§§ 138,
267). The very facts noted by Fustel himself force that choice upon us. He writes,
p. 64 (Small, p. 79) : “And the family, which by duty and religion remains
grouped around its altar, becomes fixed to the soil like the altar itself.” But the
criticism occurs to one of its own accord : “Yes, provided that be possible !” For
if we assume a social state in which the family cannot settle on the soil, it is the
religion that has to be modified. What obviously has happened is a series of
actions and reactions, and we are in no position to say just how things stood in the
beginning. The fact that certain people came to live in separate families fixed to
the soil had as one of its manifestations a certain kind of religion ; and that
religion, in its turn, contributed to keeping the families separate and fixed to the
soil (§ 1021).
255. In this we have an example of a very common error, which lies in
substituting relationships of cause and effect for relationships of interdependence
(§ 138) ; and that error gives rise to still another : the error of placing the alleged
effect, erroneously regarded as the logical product of the alleged cause, in the
class of logical actions.

(Pages 173 – 174)

So we get a fairly concrete sense of how Pareto is approaching this extraordinary

difficulty of accounting for illogical ideas. The beauty of Pareto’s handling of this issue
is that he treats of it so comprehensively, pointing out what a tremendous problem it is.
The futility of his resolution is that he explains everything in individualistic terms,
instead of in physiological terms that make sense of illogicality in its own terms, even
though he speaks about how useful illogical ideas are, I have not looked at where he
indicates he will talk about this, but there seems little point, although I am a bit curious. I
am much more interested in whether or not we find any indication of a will to study
humans scientifically. He tells as forthrightly as it is possible to tell anyone that he is
only interested in a scientific view of society, but this is rubbish, he begins by indicating
his method will anathema to science and the saving grace of religion ; as usual.

67. Whether the principle that replaces experience or observation be

theological, metaphysical, or pseudo-experimental may be of great importance
from certain points of view ; but it is of no importance whatever from the
standpoint of the logico-experimental sciences. St. Augustine denies the existence
of antipodes because Scripture makes no mention of them. In general, the Church
 Fathers find all their criteria of truths, even of experimental truths, in Holy Writ.
Metaphysicists make fun of them and replace their theological principles with
other principles just as remote from experience. Scientists who came after
Newton, forgetting that he had wisely halted at the dictum that celestial bodies
moved as if by mutual attraction according to a certain law, saw in that law an
absolute principle, divined by human intelligence, verified by experience, and
presumably governing all creation eternally. But the principles of mechanics have
of late been subjected to searching criticism, and the conclusion has been reached
that only facts and the equations that picture them can stand. Poincare judiciously
observes that from the very fact that certain phenomena admit of a mechanical ex-
planation, they admit also of an indefinite number of other explanations.
68. All the natural sciences to a greater or lesser extent are approximating
the logico-experimental type (IaI). We intend to study sociology in just that
fashion, trying, that is, to reduce it to the same type (§§ 6, 486, 514).
69. The course we elect to pursue in these volumes is therefore the
following :
1. We intend in no way to deal with the intrinsic “truth” of any religion or
faith, or of any belief, whether ethical, metaphysical, or otherwise, and we adopt
that resolve not in any scorn for such beliefs, but just because they lie beyond the
limits within which we have chosen to confine ourselves. Religions, beliefs, and
the like we consider strictly from the outside as social facts, and altogether apart
from their intrinsic merits. The proposition that “A must be equal to B” in virtue of
some higher superexperimental principle escapes our examination entirely (§ 46) ;
but we do want to know how that belief arose and developed and in what
relationships it stands to other social facts.
2. The field in which we move is therefore the field of experience and
observation strictly. We use those terms in the meanings they have in the natural
sciences such as astronomy, chemistry, physiology, and so on, and not to mean
those other things which it is the fashion to designate by the terms “inner” or
“Christian” experience, and which revive, under barely altered names, the
“introspection” of the older metaphysicists. Such introspection we consider as a
strictly objective fact, as a social fact, and not as otherwise concerning us.
3. Not intruding on the province of others, we cannot grant that others are
to intrude on ours. We deem it inept and idiotic to set up experience against
principles transcending experience ; but we likewise deny any sovereignty of such
principles over experience.

(Pages 32 – 33)

So he is effectively reducing science to the status of religion, all he asks is that

religion does not presume to tell science its own business ; as if the two can be
separated ! What lying priest could ask for more ! His argument sounds perfectly
reasonable on the face of it, but it fails to take into account fundamental forces inherent in
the operation of social processes, such as that which is acknowledged in the adage
“Possession is nine-tenths of the law.” Thus science appears on the scene where religion
has already taken possession of the territory that knowledge constitutes, as we have
already discussed previously. The principles that Pareto lays down here suggest that all
science has to do is to prove that which it has the potential to prove ; what could be more
reasonable than that ? But this is not the case. Science relies upon the academic
framework of social institutions, and these institutions are as open to religious zealots
committed to the preservation of religion at all costs as much as they are open to anyone
else. It is more than naive, it is more than utterly moronic, it is downright criminal to
deny the need to wage war on religion as part of an assertion that you intend to be
scientific, and especially so in the field of sociology, sociology should be synonymous
with all out war against religion.
Besides the strictures of the eternal war of religion against science, how on earth
can science examine the nature and origin of beliefs, especially structural social beliefs
such as those of religion, without tackling the fundamental truth of such believes. The
very idea is insane. We have to account for human existence by recognising that humans
are a superorganism, and we must account for religion as we know it, by showing that
God is the superorganism ; how can we do this without showing that religion is not true ?
It is like doing science in the ancient world, while, in astronomy, showing that the earth
goes around the sun while doing nothing to confute the religious principle that the earth is
the centre of the universe, about which the rest of the universe rotates !! It cannot be
done. Clearly then, despite all his protestations about illogicality in others, about the
supreme need for a science of sociology, the man is blatantly condemned to failure by all
of his own most forceful ideas about how to proceed in his great endeavour. He asks how
Coulanges could of been so blind to his own illogicality, he needed go no further in an
exploration of this matter than to look to himself. Incredible. Told you even this junk
would be good !

How cruel am I ! Yet I do love the substance of Pareto’s discussion, he says so

much that I love to say. Section 40 talks about how purpose becomes inevitably
intertwined with scientific ideas. Section 42 refers to proof, and he says that the
“indefiniteness of common everyday language” is utilised by the non-scientific person.
Because Pareto touches upon so many of the topics close to our heart, concerning the
fraudulent nature of knowledge in general, and the problems science faces simply
because of the relentless war waged against truth by the criminals who enjoy the benefits
of religion and care nothing for honesty or decency, he induces me to think of comparing
him, above all others, with the supreme item of comparison from the ancient world,
Ptolemy.
Astronomy stands as the mirror image to sociology in terms of indicating exactly
the same circumstances pertaining today as in former times, where we all know today
about the fraudulent position of past times, and can use this certain knowledge, informed
by the benefit of hindsight, to help us understand the exact same position in which we
endure in ignorance today. Within ancient astronomy the supreme exponent of the
science basing his work on the geocentric principle of earth’s centrality in the universe,
was Ptolemy, and in modern times the supreme exponent of science basing his argument
on the religious principle of individuality as an end in itself is Darwin. But Darwin was a
working within the field of biology, which underpins sociology, so that Darwin laid the
foundation for sociology to be entirely misdirected away from science, as the earth itself
formed a false point of view from which to observe reality, so the Origin of Species itself
formed the false point of view upon which sociologist stand to view society. So while
Darwin would seem to be our exact comparator with Ptolemy, really, the increased
complication of science adds complexity to the situation and Darwin has to act as a
precursor to the real mirror images of Ptolemy working within the truly relevant field of
sociology, and thus we find in Pareto a man who sees all the true details of life that are
relevance to any scientifically minded observer of humans, and he tackles these same
ideas exactly as he says he is determined to do, from a strictly scientific viewpoint. He
nonetheless does his mighty work for religion, not science, exactly as Ptolemy did,
because like Ptolemy, Pareto stands askew of a true point of view, and looks on society
from a political viewpoint, not a biological or scientific viewpoint, he treats all
observations as pertaining to the individual person, not the superorganism.
I noticed yesterday as I dipped into volume one that Pareto discusses Aristarchus,
who was accused of blasphemy over his naturalistic ideas about the nature of the sun, but
I am damned if I can find the page now, using the index is of now help because none of
the page numbers make any sense in terms of the subjects they are supposed to relate to,
and besides Aristarchus is no included in the index. Difficult.
Pareto was not saying anything very insightful about Aristarchus, otherwise I
would of marked the page for later commentary, he did however make an interesting
observation. He says that had Aristarchus made his remarks about the sun being a molten
mass a few centuries later, under the Roman authorities, he would not of been persecuted,
he could of said anything he liked about the sun, and everyone would just of ignored him.
It did not strike me at first how interesting this observation is, but reflecting upon it just
now it occurred to me that this is precisely the position I find myself in today. I can do
all I can to talk about the organic nature of human beings, but no, anywhere, pays the
slightest attention to me. The reason I can make no mark is because the church has
managed to develop science to the point where all options are taken, the wall of
ignorance is built, and outsiders like me can make no impression on the monument to
ignorance that is modern science. And given that Ptolemy was working in Egypt in the
“mid-second century A.D.” (A Biographical Dictionary of Scientists, Williams, 1982),
and, as we have noted, his work represents a major scientific effort on behalf of religion,
identical in this sense of purpose to the work of Darwin in the nineteenth century, which
has laid the foundations for the wall of ignorance to be built upon it today, we might
suppose that the sensitivity of the ancient Greeks as compared to the ancient Romans, is
due to precisely the same reason that we find atheism still illegal in early nineteenth
century England, but perfectly open and promoted by publishers and societies one
century later ; and now atheism has petered out, become irrelevant, and nothing anyone
says matters anymore, religion is back on track as the sole means of knowing anything.
I wrote the above yesterday, today I got a Collins Encyclopedia of the Universe,
2001, from the library for £1.50, and this puts the date of Ptolemy’s main work, the
Great Syntax, at AD 127-141, and describes it as representing the ‘peak of Greek
astronomical achievement’ (p.30). Ptolemy always spoken of in modern works as if he
were a real scientist, as if his efforts were genuine, just limited by the times in which he
lived. Yet his “theories of a geocentric Universe provided a basis for belief that went
unchallenged for 1,400 years.” (ibid.). We would not pretend that the subversion of
astronomy implicit in the statement that this work laid the foundation of ignorance, in
conformity to religious creeds, for one and half millennia was worked out and put in
place, anymore than we would say that Darwin’s fraudulent science was carefully
contrived. The idea of a social mind is on my mind today as I have just ordered a copy of
Boodin’s Social Mind and a copy of The Social Mind and Education by George Vincent,
1897, which I just happened to drop on while checking out the ‘social mind’ on the net.
The idea of a social mind, a collective consciousness, is tailor made to account for the
manner in which so-called rational or scientific ideas are caused to emerge in conformity
to self evidently non-rational ideas of a religious nature. There need be no one unified
conscious effort dictating such an outcome, each individual effort is dictated by a uniform
ruling programme, so that in the end only a model based on false ideas can emerge, and
this only happens if a true representation of reality would otherwise conflict with religion.
Such a process would be automatic, just as recovering our appetite is automatic after we
have eaten, so we can eat again. The social structures concerned with knowledge
management will of evolved to ensure the required outcome. This gives us some idea
how the social mind would operate as a product of linguistic force that creates social
structure ; and we will find much more to say about how logical versus non-logical ideas
interact in society in the next chapter on Pareto.
In this same Encyclopedia of the Universe we find religion being excused for its
destruction of science, instead of being attacked ; a typical example of how the social
structure created by linguistic force revolves around a common centre of ideology
preserved by way of an absolute political power. Page forty one has a piece entitled
Science and Christianity in which it is said that “Galileo’s trial and condemnation for
heresy before the Roman Inquisition in 1663 were more about the Catholic Church’s
political authority than about Christian belief”. Which is of course an absurd statement to
make, since the whole point of Christian belief is to impart political authority ! Idiots !!
If Christian belief did not deliver ultimate political authority to the Jews then Christianity
would not exist. Certainly if you take religion at face value, as everyone with a public
voice is obliged to do, then you cannot see this, but as scientists of human nature we see
religion for what it is : the binding and unifying agent of the human superorganism.
There can be only one.

This morning, 06/04/08, I have found another piece bearing on religion that ought
perhaps to be consecutive with the above passage on religion, but as I have continued my
writing in reference to what preceded, while shifting my topic from religion to a further
consideration of Pareto’s work in general, I see no reason to be so neat. Besides which,
although it is the religious element of what follows that first stopped me, I am taking
material before and after, because it is so good ; in so far as anyone reasoning on an
utterly false basis can do anything good.

5. Every inquiry of ours, therefore, is contingent, relative, yielding results

that are just more or less probable, and at best very highly probable. The space we
live in seems actually to be three-dimensional ; but if someone says that the Sun
and its planets are one day to sweep us into a space of four dimensions, we shall
neither agree nor disagree. When experimental proofs of that assertion are brought
to us, we shall examine them, but until they are, the problem does not interest us.
Every proposition that we state, not excluding propositions in pure logic, must be
understood as qualified by the restriction within the limits of the time and
experience known to us (§ 97).
6. We argue strictly on things and not on the sentiments that the names of
things awaken in us. Those sentiments we study as objective facts strictly. So, for
example, we refuse to consider whether an action be “just” or “unjust,” “moral”
or “immoral,” unless the things to which such terms refer have been clearly
specified. We shall, however, examine as an objective fact what people of a given
social class, in a given country, at a given time, meant when they said that A was a
“just” or a “moral” act. We shall see what their motives were, and how oftentimes
the more important motives have done their work unbeknown to the very people
who were inspired by them ; and we shall try to determine the relationships
between such facts and other social facts. We shall avoid arguments involving
terms lacking in exactness (§ 486), because from inexact premises only inexact
conclusions can be drawn. But such arguments we shall examine as social facts ;
indeed, we have in mind to solve a very curious problem as to how premises
altogether foreign to reality sometimes yield inferences that come fairly close to
reality (Chapter XI).
7. Proofs of our propositions we seek strictly in experience and
observation, along with th logical inferences they admit of, barring all proof by
accord of sentiments, “inner persuasion,” “dictate of conscience.”
8. For that reason in particular we shall keep strictly to terms
corresponding to things, using the utmost care and endeavour to have them as
definite as possible in meaning (§ 108).
9. We shall proceed by successive approximations. That is to say, we shall
first consider things as wholes, deliberately ignoring details. Of the latter we shall
then take account in successive approximations (§ 540).
70. We in no sense mean to imply that the course we follow is better than
others, for the reason, if for no other, that the term “better” in this case has no
meaning. No comparison is possible between theories altogether contingent and
theories recognizing an absolute. They are heterogeneous things and can never be
brought together (§ 16). If someone chooses to construct a system of sociology
starting with this or that theological or metaphysical principle or, following a
contemporary fashion, with the principles of “progressive democracy,” we shall
pick no quarrel with him, and his work we shall certainly not disparage. The
quarrel will not become inevitable until we are asked in the name of those
principles to accept some conclusion that falls within the domain of experience
and observation. To go back to the case of St. Augustine : When he asserts that
the Scriptures are inspired of God, we have no objection to the proposition, which
we do not comprehend very clearly to begin with. But when he sets out to prove
by the Scriptures that there are no antipodes (§ 485), we have no interest in his
arguments, since jurisdiction in the premises belongs to experience and
observation.
71. We move in a narrow field, the field, namely, of experience and
observation. We do not deny that there are other fields, but in these volumes we
elect not to enter them. Our purpose is to discover theories that picture facts of
 experience and observation (§ 486), and in these volumes we refuse to go beyond
that. If anyone is minded to do so, if anyone craves an excursion outside the
logico-experimental field, he should seek other company and drop ours, for he
will find us disappointing.
72. We differ radically from many people following courses similar to
ours in that we do not deny the social utility of theories unlike our own. On the
contrary we believe that in certain cases they may be very beneficial. Correlation
of the social utility of a theory with its experimental truth is, in fact, one of those
a priori principles which we reject (§ 14). Do the two things always go hand in
hand, or do they not ? Observation of facts alone can answer the question ; and
the pages which follow will furnish proofs that the two things can, in certain
cases, be altogether unrelated.
73. I ask the reader to bear in mind, accordingly, that when I call a
doctrine absurd, in no sense whatever do I mean to imply that it is detrimental to
society : on the contrary, it may be very beneficial. Conversely, when I assert that
a theory is beneficial to society, in no wise do I mean to imply that it is
experimentally true. In short, a doctrine may be ridiculed on its experimental side
and at the same time respected from the standpoint of its social utility. And vice
versa.
74. In general, when I call attention to some untoward consequence of a
thing A, indeed one very seriously so, in no way do I mean to imply that A on the
whole is detrimental to society ; for there may be good effects to overbalance the
bad. Conversely, when I call attention to a good effect of A, great though it be, I
do not at all imply that on the whole A is beneficial to society.
75. The warning I have just given I had to give, for in general people
writing on sociology for purposes of propaganda and with ideals to defend speak
in unfavourable terms alone of things they consider bad on the whole, and
favourably of things they consider good on the whole.

(Pages 35 – 38)

The above begins with some more of the specific points we saw above, thus : “69.
The course we elect to pursue in these volumes is therefore the following :”. These are
such curious arguments, they fail to grasp the fact that a sociologist is in the peculiar
position of being within that which they presume to study, this is the idea that is dealt
with by modern so-called sociologist who acknowledge that a person cannot be outside
the society they study, a point we dealt with earlier by noting that we can conceptualise
the position an alien from another planet would be in, and so there is no reason at all why
we cannot be outside our own society as long as we are not thinking of our physical
location, but rather of our idea. When we predict that an eclipse will occur the next year
we are actually located in that future space in conceptual terms, but this does not mean
we are existing in the future, however when I body catches up with our mind and we
arrive at the moment in time that we entered previously in our minds, we find that an
eclipse occurs. Thus we see that the mind can move through time and space, this is
because time and space are conceptualised representations of physical reality.
 There is a general theme in the above selection which is of the utmost importance
to our insistence upon making the war between religion and science primary to all
sociological enquiries. The irrelevance of truth to function is the critical point, and the
importance of this observation is illustrated in the above in various ways, as Pareto talks
about the need to dissociate science from other way so thinking. But in all of this he does
not recognise that fact that such a ubiquitous feature of human society, the flux of
knowledge that may be useful while being entirely erroneous, has to be accounted for by
science, so that science cannot dismiss anything. It appears that Pareto has
accommodated this need by indicating that while he will not think about justice or
morality on their own terms, he will think about justice and morality from a scientific
point of view. But what about taking ideas of justice and morality as attributes of human
nature and accounting for them in general terms. This he gives no indication of an
intention to do, he treats the subject as though these were modes of thought which were
essentially primitive, awaiting replacement by scientific reason, and as such something
which can be left to others, in the meantime. We however never adopt this view, we see
in this behaviour a commitment to supporting religion and undermining science, we have
no choice, because the plain fact is that the only reason science cannot progress is
because of the war waged against it by religion, and the force of religion which often take
on the appearance of the enemies of religion, which is why science is so often created, as
with Darwinism, in a form that destroys science in the name of preserving religion.
Then we have this :

616. Once experience is admitted (it matters little how) within the
theological edifice, the latter begins to crumble—such portion of it, of course, as
stands within the experimental domain, for the other wings are safe from any
attack by experience. And the dismantling would become root-and-branch
complete but for the interposition of a factor of great moment—the social utility
of certain theories that are experimentally false. 1 So great is the need of such
things which human beings feel that if one structure happens to collapse, another
is straightway reared of the same material. That was the case with Positivism,
which was, at bottom, just one of the numerous varieties of metaphysics : the old
metaphysics fell for a brief moment, and then at once came to life again in
positivistic form. Positivism is now threatening to crumble in its turn, and another
metaphysical structure is in process of erection to take its place. That happens
because people obstinately refuse to separate what is in accord with experience
from what is beneficial to individual or society, and obstinately insist on deifying
a certain entity to which they have given the name of Truth. Let A stand for one
such thing that is useful to society ; it is recommended to us, or required of us, by
a certain doctrine of faith P, which is not experimental and often cannot be if it is
to be accepted by a majority of the people in a given country. The doctrine holds
sway for a more or less extensive period of time. Then if experimental science has
or acquires some prestige, there will be people to step forward and assert—
inspired, though they do not always realize as much, by considerations of utility—
that the doctrine or faith in question must be in conformity with experience ; and
other people will come forward to combat and ridicule that view. But since
society cannot do without the thing A, some of the defenders of the old faith P
will merely replace it with a new faith Q, no less discordant with experience. So
years, centuries, go by; peoples, governments, manners and systems of living,
pass away ; and all along new theologies, new systems of metaphysics, keep
replacing the old, and each new one is reputed more “true” or much “better” than
its predecessors (§ 2340). And in certain cases they may really be better, if by
“better” we mean more helpful to society ; but more “true,” no, if by the term we
mean accord with experimental reality. One faith cannot be more scientific than
another (§ 16), and experimental reality is equally overreached by polytheism,
Islamism, and Christianity (whether Catholic, Protestant, Liberal, Modernist, or of
any other variety) ; by the innumerable metaphysical sects, including the Kantian,
the Hegelian, the Bergsonian, and not excluding the positivistic sects of Comte,
Spencer, and other eminent writers too numerous to mention ; by the faiths of
solidaristes, humanitarians, anti-clericals, and worshippers of Progress ; and by as
many other faiths as have existed, exist, or can be imagined. Equally remote from
the field of experience are Jupiter Optimus Maximus and the Jehovah of the
Bible ; the God of the Christians and Mohammedans and the abstractions of the
neo-Christians ; the categorical imperative, and the goddesses Truth, Justice,
Humanity, Majority ; the god People and the god Progress, and as many other
gods as people in such infinite numbers the pantheons of theologians,
metaphysicists, positivists, and humanitarians. That does not mean that belief in
some of them or even in all of them may not have been beneficial in its time, or
may not still be. As to that nothing can be said a priori—experience alone can
decide.

616 1 We shall deal with this matter thoroughly in Chapter XII. It is extraneous to
the subject at present in hand. But this passing allusion was in point to explain why it is
that the theological and metaphysical structure has collapsed completely, or virtually so,
within the natural sciences, while it has held together longer in social theory and may
perhaps never disappear in social practice.

The metaphysical ethics of the European bourgeoisie has of late been

assailed and weakened by the metaphysical ethics of Socialism, which in its turn
is now under fire from the metaphysical ethics of Syndicalism (§ 2002). Out of all
this battling one thing has developed to draw people closer to an experimental
attitude towards all such ethical systems : more or less distinctly people have
become aware of their contingent character. Bourgeois morality, in view
especially of the support it had in religion, was assuming a pose of absolute truth
and that pose it has lost in the course of the past century after its many brushes
with those fortunate rivals.
617. In the natural sciences the religious and metaphysical disintegration
is still going on, with mere oscillations backward or forward, due to the fact that
scientists too live in society and are more or less swayed by the opinions, beliefs,
and prejudices prevailing in it. Experience, which once began timidly to lift its
voice in the natural sciences, is now lord and master within them and ruthlessly
banishes any a priori principles that try to assert themselves against it. Such
scientific freedom seems to us an altogether natural thing because we are living in
an age in which it is almost everywhere unrestricted. But we must not forget that
down to two centuries ago, and less than that, a scientist could not discuss his
science without first protesting that he was using experience only on matters
irrelevant to faith. At that time it was wise on his part to take that subordinate
position, since it was the only way to get a foothold within the fortress that was
soon to fall.
618. The freedom enjoyed in the natural sciences is not yet enjoyed in
sciences that have any bearing on social life. Save in the case of the religion of
sex the secular arm no longer reaches the heretic and the unbeliever—at least
directly. But he is handed over to popular indignation and hostility, which ever
rise to safeguard this or that principle or prejudice—a thing oftentimes promotive
of the well-being of society. Indirectly public authority still makes the weight of
its hostility felt by those who depart from the dogmas of existing governments
even on strictly scientific matters.
619. The “historical” method opened the door for experience to make its
way into some of the sciences from which it had been barred, and so served as a
transition, beneficial from the strictly logico-experimental point of view, for
bringing sociology closer to the level already reached by the natural sciences.
Curious the confusion still obtaining in the minds of many people as to the
“historical” and “experimental” methods. 1 The historical method, when it is—as
it seldom is—genuinely historical and has no intermixture of metaphysical,
sentimental, patriotic, and other similar reflections, is just a part of the
experimental method. Its object is to study some of the relations arising in the
experimental domain ; in other words, it deals with “evolution,” with the manner
in which certain facts succeed other facts in time. But still to be discovered are the
relations obtaining at a given moment between simultaneous facts, and the
uniformities in those relations ; often also the relations between facts successive
in time and their uniformities ; and almost always, finally, the interdependences of
all the elements.

619 1 Maine, Ancient Law, pp. 2-3, asserts that the Homeric poems contain hints
as to the primitive forms of concepts of law (italics mine) : “If by any means we can
determine the early forms of jural conceptions, they will be invaluable to us [a]. These
rudimentary ideas are to the jurist what the primary crusts of the earth are to the geologist
[b]. They contain, potentially, all the forms in which law has subsequently exhibited itself
[c]. The haste or the prejudice which has generally refused them all but the most
superficial examination, must bear the blame of the unsatisfactory condition in which we
find the science of jurisprudence [d]. The inquiries of the jurist are in truth prosecuted
much as inquiry in physics and physiology was prosecuted before observation had taken
the place of assumption [e]. Theories, plausible and comprehensive [f], but absolutely
unverified, such as the Law of Nature or the Social Compact [g], enjoy a universal
preference over sober research into the primitive history of society and law [h] ; and they
obscure the truth not only by diverting attention from the only quarter in which it can be
found, but by that most real and most important influence which, when once entertained
and believed in, they are enabled to exercise on the later stages of jurisprudence [i].”

(Pages 371 – 375)

 There are some remarkable insights presented here. The discussion of the
situation in the natural sciences, along with the inevitable threat posed by scientific
methods to religion, and the remaining impasse in those areas relating to society itself.
But at the heart of Pareto’s reasoning we have this explanation for everything :

“That happens because people obstinately refuse to separate what is in accord

with experience from what is beneficial to individual or society, and obstinately
insist on deifying a certain entity to which they have given the name of Truth.”

Fine, yes, this is what we see too. What of it ? This statement suggests that people could
act otherwise, but why are all people, of all classes, with so many different interests,
living in a world fraught with so many problems and challenges, where people do not
mind killing and dying and suffering for a cause, why are all, to a man, always committed
to lying for the sake of what serves their own ends. It makes no sense on personal
grounds, the only possible explanation is that people genuinely believe in their idiotic
ideas, they are not corrupt, they are duped. And if it is normal for all people, at all times,
to be duped, then this condition has to be taken as the natural state of affairs for which
human nature evolved to produce, the historical method shows this, it shows that no
matter what, exactly as Pareto says, one idiotic idea follows relentlessly on the heals of
another. But it shows more than this, it also shows continuity in the core religious ideas,
in Judaism, and this continuity is the other side of the coin to relentless idiotic change.
Both the continuous and the passing are idiotic, and both serve the same end, that of
preserving the superorganic being. The stable needs the unstable in order to allow its
stability to contrast with all other alternative identities, and this is the reason why we find
eternal instability arising from any state of uncertainty impacting upon religious
authority. And it is from this process of institutionally fostered instability that anti-
Semitic fluxes arise, resulting in critical political behaviours such as that characterised by
the Nazis, to cleanse the flux of uncertainty and cause a collapse of ideas back upon the
base level of permanent authority, which is always Judaism.

We have seen that it is no use trying to get sense from Pareto, but at the same time
there is something to be gained from looking at his sociology, precisely because it is
sociology, and it is from an important period in the process of religion taking over
sociology. Even so, how much more is there worth taking notice of ?

358. Many statesmen, many historians, recognize non-logical actions without

giving them that name and without going to the trouble of finding their theory. Just a few
examples taken here and there from the works of Bayle, 1 implicit in which are several
theories of non-logical conduct—and it is indeed surprising to find in a writer who lived
two centuries and more ago certain truths that are unappreciated even today. Bayle
declares and repeats that “opinions are not the rule of conduct” ; and that “man does not
regulate his conduct by his opinions. . . . The Turks hold certain tenets of that doctrine of
the Stoics [fatalism], and they carry the business of predestination to extreme lengths.
Nevertheless they may be seen to flee danger as other men do, and they are far from
charging in battle with the courage of the French, who do not believe in predestination.”
The existence and importance of non-logical conduct could not be recognized in plainer
terms. Find a general form for this observation of particular fact, and we get the starting-
point for a theory of non-logical conduct.

358 l Pensées diverses, § 138.

359. Bayle further observes, Ibid., § 139 : “It cannot be said that people who fail
to live according to the precepts of their religion do not believe in a God” ; and he presses
the point, Ibid., § 136 : “Man does not act according to his principles. He may be as
rational a creature as you like, but it is none the less true that he almost never acts
according to his principles. [In other words his conduct is non-logical.] He has indeed
the strength, in speculative matters, not to draw wrong conclusions ; for in such
reflections he sins rather in his readiness to accept false principles than in drawing
mistaken conclusions from them. But it is quite another matter when good morals are in
question. [A particular remark that is true in general.] In morals he almost never hits on
false principles. Almost always the ideas of natural equity are present in his conscience.
Nevertheless he is always deciding in favour of his uncontrolled desires. [The usual
vague phraseology, but the substance accords with fact.] . . . The true principle of human
conduct ... is naught but temperament, the natural inclination to pleasure, the taste for
certain things, the desire to please, the habits acquired in intercourse with friends, or
some other disposition arising from the depths of human nature, whatever the country in
which one is born [This contradicts the preceding and is to be deleted.] and whatever the
knowledge that has been instilled in the mind.”
That comes very close to the facts. If we tried to give greater precision to Bayle’s
language, and establish a stricter classification, would we not have a theory of non-
logical actions—their great importance so becoming more and more apparent ?
360. Bayle quotes with approval a passage from Nicolle : “ ‘When the time comes
for human beings to pass from speculation to action, they do not follow consequences ;
and strange it is to see how the human mind can stop at certain speculative truths without
going on to their logical consequences in practice, which seem so bound up with those
truths as to be in no way separable from them.’ ” 1

360 1 Continuation des Pensées diverses, § 139.

361. Bayle soundly enough observes, Ibid., § 51, that “the pagan religion was
satisfied with an external rite” (§ 174) ; but he went wrong in believing, Ibid., § 122, that
it “had no influence on morals.” He failed to perceive that ritual practices intensified
sentiments (non-logical actions) and that such sentiments were in turn sources of
morality.
362. He goes to some pains to prove that atheism is preferable to idolatry. To
understand him aright we have to take account of the times in which he was living and
the perils to which he was exposed. Just as in our time there are persons who give
perpetual chase to “immoral” books, so in Bayle’s time there were those who kept open
season on books against Christianity. Unable to whip the horse, Bayle whips the saddle,
and belabours idolatry with criticisms that apply just as well to all religions. At bottom
his argument tends to show that since the majority of human actions are non-logical,
forms of belief are of no great importance.
363. Montesquieu did not get that point, and his reply to what he calls “Bayle’s
paradox” is of little or no value. He is solving the problem by restating it when he says :
“A prince who loves religion and fears it is a lion surrendering to the hand that caresses
it, or to the voice that quiets it ; the prince who fears religion and hates it is like the wild
beast biting at the chains that keep it from attacking passers-by ; the prince who has no
religion at all is the terrible beast that never feels his freedom till he is rending and
devouring.” 1 Underlying all this declamation, which is mere fustian, is the proposition,
evidently, that human beings act logically in accord with their beliefs. But that is the very
thing Bayle denies ; and proofs, not mere asseverations of the opposite, were required to
refute him (§ 368).

363 1 L’esprit des lois, XXIV, 2 : Paradoxe de Bayle. Montesquieu was right in saying
that “in order to attenuate the horrors of atheism” Bayle was “too severe on idolatry” ; but he
should have recognized Bayle’s artifice in doing that. It was a trick he used himself on other
occasions.

364. Taking his stand on logical conduct, Montesquieu says that “even if it were
useless for subjects to have religions it would not be useless for princes to have them.”
Starting with the premise of non-logical conduct, we are carried to a conclusion directly
opposite : the person in command needs rational combinations particularly, and the
person who obeys needs more particularly an unreasoned rule independent of his scant
knowledge.
365. The weakness in Bayle’s argument is not the one that Montesquieu criticizes.
It lies in an altogether different direction. After noting and amply demonstrating that
human beings do not act according to logical inferences from principles, from opinions,
and that a great many human actions of great importance are non-logical, Bayle should
have centred his attention upon such actions. Then he would have seen that they were of
many kinds ; and he would have had to decide whether they were independent or
influenced one another mutually. He would readily have seen that they do exert
reciprocal influences, and therefore that the social importance of religion lies not at all in
the logical value of its dogmas, its principles, its theology, but rather in the non-logical
actions that it promotes. He was actually on the road to that conclusion when he asserted
that “a religion has to be judged by the cult which it practises” ; and when he stated that
the pagan religion stopped at a purely external ritualism, he could hardly have been closer
to experimental truth. One step more and he would have had the truth entire. But
unfortunately he turns aside. Instead of judging religions, which are non-logical actions,
by their social influence, he loses his way in questions as to their moral value, or better,
as to their relation to what he is pleased to call “morality” ; and in that we have a counter-
attack by logic, which is again invading territory from which it had been expelled.
From that point of view one might repeat of Bayle what Sumner Maine says of
him in commenting on the writings of Rousseau : 1 “It [Rousseau’s] was the first attempt
to re-erect the edifice of human belief after the purely iconoclastic efforts commenced by
Bayle, and in part by our own Locke, and consummated by Voltaire.” But that goes to
show how, in view of the indefiniteness of ordinary language, utterly different concepts
may be expressed in the same words. Maine is thinking not of science or theory but of
practice, as is clearly apparent from what immediately follows : “and [Rousseau’s system
has], besides, the superiority which every constructive effort will always enjoy over one
that is merely destructive.” It is not the function of theory to create beliefs, but to explain
existing ones and discover their uniformities. Bayle took a great step forward in that
direction in exposing the vacuity of certain interpretations and opening the way for the
discovery of others more consistent with the facts. From the standpoint of theory, his
work, far from being inferior to Rousseau’s, is as superior to Rousseau’s as the
astronomy of Kepler is superior to the astronomy of Cosmas Indicopleustes. He may be
blamed only for stopping too soon on a road which he had so splendidly opened.

365 1 Ancient Law, p. 84.

366. Why he did so is hard to guess. The case is not rare. It would seem as though
in science it is often necessary to destroy before building can begin. It may also be that
Bayle was deterred from a complete expression of his ideas by the moral and religious
persecutions common in his time, that the atmosphere of persecution affected the thinker
not only materially but intellectually also, and constrained him to disguise his thought
under certain forms. Just so in our own time persecutions and annoyances of all sorts
emanating from votaries of the religion of sexual virtue have created an atmosphere of
hypocrisy in speech and thought that influences writing. And so, if in some future age the
expression of human thought comes to be liberated from sex “ties” just as it has already
been freed of the ties requiring deference to the Bible, people desiring to understand the
thought of writers of our day will have to take account of the masks with which it is
disguised in deference to contemporary prejudices. Another cause may have been the
scientific inadequacies of ordinary language. If Bayle had not had at his disposal such
terms as “religion” and “morality,” which seem to be exact but are not, he would have
been compelled to deal with things instead of with words, sentiments, fictions ; and in
that case perhaps he might not have lost his way (§ 114).
367. But his case is merely typical of a vastly populous class of cases where error
in argument is directly proportionate to defects in language. Anyone, therefore, desirous
of remaining in the logico-experimental field and concerned not to be led astray into the
domain of sentiment, must ever be on his watch against this the greatest enemy of science
(§ 119). In social matters, human beings as a rule use language that lures them away from
the logico-experimental domain. What does such language really mean ? We have to be
clear on that question before we can go farther, and to it we shall devote the chapter next
following.

(Pages 225 – 230)

I often think of the idea that there is life after death, so fundamental to Christian
myth, and the fact that Christians are so terrified of death and regard life as sacred ! Talk
about illogical, this is illogicality writ large, and then worshipped in its most extreme
obscenity.
The idea behind indicating such an exact example of non-logical behaviour, i.e.
refusing to act in accordance with what is said to be true, and seeking a general
explanation for this incongruous fact, is nice. Our idea that humans are superorganisms
and there is no such thing as a person existing as an end in themselves is the only possible
explanation for such contradictory behaviour where precious beliefs are contradicted by
telling actions that ought to be their test. And of course in Christianity, as in Islam, these
beliefs are validated by martyrs and suicide bombers, yet still, these extreme examples of
the type are the exception, not the rule. And the occurrence of their exceptional
behaviour is perfectly well accounted for in the idea that there is no such thing as an
individual, individuals are but cells serving the end of the organism according to the
linguistic programme that dictates the form that organism has.

Here we see a reference to atheism, atheism appears in the index and might be
worth looking up to see what Pareto has to say about it, if the numbers give us a clue
where to look ! But here we see the value judgment decrying the “horrors of atheism” to
be allowed to pass under favourable notice ; what chance science under such conditions ?
It may well be, to conform to the principles Pareto is extolling at length here, that humans
cannot exist without religion, but so what, no scientist would put the existence of the
human species above science, that makes no sense, it is a declaration that science cannot
exist. I am by no means sure that humans can exist without religion, but that is of no
interest to me, because I already accept that the promotion of scientific ideas is
impossible because we live in an absolute theocracy, so I have stated frequently and
bluntly enough that we engage in this search for real knowledge as a hobby, as one might
go fishing, we do not imagine that these ideas can be promulgated, but we cannot live
with the lunacy of a man like Pareto who is dedicated to existence in a world of non-
logical thoughts, a living hell fit for the insane only, for people who have no problem
living a lie.

Regarding 364, this is very telling as to Pareto’s position on the question of

individuality, for the line Montesquieu takes accords with the notion that there is a master
organ ruling society that would benefit from a medium of consciousness that will deliver
a perfect control of the masses owned by the master, very much in keeping with
principles which apply to salve-maker ants as much as they do to the Jews that rule our
world through the medium of Christianity. Pareto’s inversion of this true scientific
observation shows his fixation on the religious principle of the individual as an end in
themselves. He does not deny the structural arrangement, anymore than Ptolemy denies
the transit of a planet, Pareto merely makes sure he stands in a place where the individual
person is made supreme, so that the delusion of religion is made a comfort to the
individual, which is very much the manner in which religion is excused today by some
who have to put up with the kind of attacks I am wont to level against religion. What is
more, Pareto goes even further, degrading any sense of imposition, slavery, servitude or
abuse, by indicating that the low orders need a simple deception for their own good,
because they are incapable of appreciating any more sophisticated argument, which
requires education. This accords with a previous remark we saw him make, where he
said that scientific ideas could only be appreciated by those trained to be professional
scientists. This is in line with Plato on the need for a “Noble Lie” or Winston Churchill,
the great twentieth century war lover, who also considered the truth to be too good for the
people whom he ruled over in our great British democracy. There is of course a
justification for this notion of deception, but it can only be accounted for scientifically by
understanding that the human animal is a superorganism and the person is but a cell
within its body, or, to use Pareto’s phrase individuals are ‘molecules of the social system’
(Vol. 4, p. 1444)

365. Now we have Pareto affirming what we jut said, that it is not for science to
concern itself with the consequences of its knowledge, who cares that Bayle was
destructive and Rousseau constructive ; what we want it the truth as a statement of
scientifically verifiable, or justifiable, fact.
This discussion of the way people must labour under pressure from the priesthood
is nice, but it could almost be written by a priest. He is effectively saying that by 1916
Europeans, scientists, were free to write as they pleased in so far as what they had to say
was concerned with religion, something which was utterly untrue, today, in 2006, we are
no more free to say what we ought to say, than we were at any time in history. But the
overt imposition has turned into a covert control, the power of which is suggested by the
way Pareto talks of knowledge control here. Apart from that we do now live in the free
society he wishes to see, we can say anything we want about sex today, but it is
impossible to even begin to imagine what these masks are which he talks of, that we are
now supposed to be able to detect in the work of his time. His whole work is a mask, it is
pretending to be a science, but in the end it is pure unadulterated religion, just like all
science written right up until this very moment ; bar yours truly. Elsewhere I did notice
that he referred to sentiments and ideas as masks for underlying intentions, so what he
means by masks is not straightforward from this one example. I address his meaning as it
appears in this context only however, where science is obliged to mask itself due to
religious oppression.
It is also nice to see his reference to the difficulties of ordinary language, this is
highly pertinent to our own ideas on language as a programme dictating consciousness.
Pareto does not take our line but he does take a very interesting position where he says he
is always talking of ‘things’ and not the emotive connotations associated with the words
by means of which we talk about things. At one point he says they could substitute
letters of the alphabet for words without in any way altering the meaning of what his
statement had just said. I like the idea behind this thought, but what we want to know is
why the norm is that we are usually forced to think through the sentiments attached to
words. He says himself it is not normal to think in abstract terms of things as things only,
so why is this so ? It never occurs to him to deal with this question, he just wants to treat
it as a flawed intellectual approach that has to be corrected. But we have seen that it
cannot be corrected except by education, only the scientifically trained can comprehend
the language of science. So Pareto is laying the foundations for a scientific priesthood,
exactly as Comte did by erecting the religion of humanity in the name of Positivism,
except Pareto is doing this behind a mask that pretends t be science, and in doing so
Pareto shows the way forward for the so-called science of sociology that we endure to
this day.

I made notes as I proceeded to turn the above into text as it was such a large
selection. This is a fascinating piece of work, I love reading Pareto’s work despite my
total condemnation of it as a piece miscreant theological rubbish disguised as science.
The reason I love it nonetheless is because he takes this approach to reality that matches
our own, he sees the absurd perversion of all knowledge and makes tackling the problem
his primary challenge, exactly as Ptolemy saw the difficulty astronomy was having
accounting for the movement of the celestial features, and so he sort to answer the
difficulties. But, as we have noted, these people were merely fine mimics of scientists,
they applied a scientific method from a religious, that is from a biased political point of
view that took individual preferences as their starting point, instead of taking reality as
the pivotal determinant of reality.
There are four volumes, over one million words, and it can be seen from the
selections that I have made that Pareto has structured his work very precisely, breaking it
up into sections, and he mentions sections within sections in order to make his argument
most precise. In the last section taken above, 367, he discusses the problems of language,
which are of great interest to us, and he refers us to section 119, so that we can see where,
presumably, he has dealt with the matter at greater length. Superb ! Where, in he talks
about reducing language to a formula, I have not read the section, but the idea is
suggestive as to how we might proceed if we were attempting to produce a scientific
treatise according to our own principles of detachment. But, as with Ptolemy, what use is
all of this if we are standing at a tangent to reality from which everything we deduce is
distorted ? It is no use at all, except as a disguise for the real thing, a mask pretending to
be science, and thus protecting ignorance for the sake of social authority vested in
religion.

Alright, I have just quickly scanned the area around section 119, and pursued the
argument to section 868 at the beginning of volume two. You have got to love this guy,
not that I imagine I understand what he is saying, just yet, but reading Pareto is entirely
unlike reading anything else I have ever read. My immediate general impression arising
from what I have just read is that these ideas continue to bear on the central idea in our
work, that there is a linguistic force that creates the human superorganism of which we
are all a part, by generating social structure. I have already noticed his frequent reference
to ‘residues’ and ‘derivatives’, which is clearly a feature of his specific argument, his
own terminology, which we are obliged to understand if we are to read his work at any
length. Fortunately he tells us that 868 deals with this matter. A rapid perusal of the
opening of volume two seems to indicate that having divided social phenomenon into two
parts, the logical and non-logical, these two distinct features of social existence are than
categorised for the purposes of theoretical analysis as ‘residual’ and ‘derivative’. I have
no idea at the moment why this is or even which is which, but I get the picture in terms of
the terminology Pareto is laying down, and I rather like the idea. All of this feels highly
attuned to the central idea of language as the creative force behind the generation of all
social structure. Although certainly I see nothing to indicate that Pareto was thinking of
language in this detached dynamic manner. Rather he appears to think of activity arising
from these linguistic dynamics as psychological, and certainly I have long recognised that
the transformation of linguistic phenomena has been the primary mechanism by means of
which people have been detached from nature and made masters of their own world.
Recently, while checking out Comte and other authors I have come across a few
indications that some people rejected the idea of their being any such thing as
psychology, I think Comte is said to of been one, something which Spencer and Mill
condemned him for, if I remember rightly. But I am delighted to find these rare and
fleeting indications that people recognised that psychology is a mystical construct, a bit
like concocting the idea of ‘mind’ or ‘soul’. And yet as we say this we find some
resonance with our assertion in the general argument set out by Pareto, which we are
about to look at, to the effect that people continually generate such illusory arguments
crystallised into some verbal form, such as ‘psychology’, in the ceaseless effort to take
command of knowledge, whereby when one ruling myth fails, another quickly rises. It is
as if knowledge were a canopy covering all things, where society existed under the
canopy and all activity associated with the existence of the canopy gave the impression of
a social jungle, so that when one great tree fell, another arose, the tree of Positivism for
example, as we see indicated in something already taken from Pareto above.

109. People in the vast majority use common everyday language. A few scientists
use scientific language in their specialities, outside of which they reason as badly as the
plain man—and often worse. Human beings are prompted to acquire such knowledge as
they have from common speech by two sorts of motives : first, because they assume that
a word necessarily corresponds to a thing, whereby the name becomes everything and
sometimes even acquires mysterious properties ; and, second, because of the great ease
with which a “science” can be so constituted, each person carrying within himself all that
is required for that purpose, without going to the pains of long, difficult, and tedious
researches. It is much easier to talk about antipodes than to go out and see if they are
really there. To discuss the implication of a “principle of fire” or “damp” is much more
expeditious than to prosecute all the field studies that have made up the science of
geology. To ruminate on “natural law” is a much more comfortable profession than to dig
out the legal codes of the various countries in various periods of history. To prattle about
“value” and ask when and under what circumstances it is said that “a thing has value” is
much less difficult than to discover and comprehend the laws of the economic
equilibrium.
In view of all that, one readily understands how the history of the sciences down
to our time is substantially a history of the battles that the experimental method has had to
fight and still has to fight against the methods of introspection, etymology, analysis of
verbal expression. Defeated and put to rout in one place, the latter method bobs up in
another. If it cannot fight in the open it dissembles, flattening out like a snake in the
grass, and so succeeds in making its way into the very camp of the adversary under guise
of something else.
110. In our day the method has been largely banished from the physical sciences,
and the advances they have made are the fruit of that proscription. But it is still strutting
about in political economy and more blatantly still in sociology; whereas if those sciences
would progress, it is imperative that they should follow the example set by the physical
sciences (§ 118).
111. Belief that the facts of the universe and their relationships could be
discovered by introspection was general in a day gone by, and it still remains the
foundation of metaphysics, which seeks a criterion of truth outside experience. In our day
it found its complete expression in the lunacies of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. One
need hardly observe that mankind has never discovered the puniest uniformity in the facts
of nature in that fashion (§§ 50, 484).
112. The positivism of Herbert Spencer is nothing but a metaphysics. Though
Spencer asserts the relative nature of all knowledge, he still speaks of the relations of
knowledge to “absolute reality.” 1 He asserts the existence of an Unknowable, but claims,
by an amusing contradiction, to know at least something about it. 2

112 1 First Principles, § 46. “Thought being possible only under relation, the relative
reality can be conceived as such only in connexion with an absolute reality ;
and the connexion between the two being absolutely persistent in our consciousness, is real in the
same sense as the terms it unites are real.” All of Spencer’s writing is packed with such concepts.
112 2 Here is an example selected at random : Ibid., § 48 : “Such being our cognition of
the relative reality, what are we to say of the absolute reality ? We can only say that it is some
mode of the Unknowable, related to the Matter we know as cause to effect.” There are people
who will tell you they understand that.

113. In all the rustle and bustle of our daily lives we cannot of course speak in the
manner or with the severity of the logico-experimental sciences (§§ 108-09), and we are
therefore led to ascribe great importance to words. Whenever we are able to give a name
to a thing, it succeeds by that sole fact in finding a place in a class of objects of which the
properties are known, and its properties therefore also become known. Furthermore—and
it is the point that really matters—the thing is viewed in the light of the sentiments the
name arouses, and it is to its advantage, therefore, to have a name that awakens
favourable sentiments and to its disadvantage to have a name inspiring unfavourable
sentiments. 1

113 1 Of that we shall give many examples in the pages that follow.

In practical life it would be difficult, nay impossible, to do otherwise. We cannot

go to the bottom of all the multifarious questions that are at every moment arising—we
cannot test everything in the crucible of doubt. Once we admit that a man’s hat is his, that
is the end of it ; he puts it on his head and goes his way ; and we could not, before
permitting him to take it, debate the real nature of property, nor settle the problem of
individual or collective property or other problems of the kind.
In civilized countries civil and penal laws have an exact terminology ; and so in
order to pass judgment upon an act one must first know the name by which it can be
designated. Ordinary speech too has maxims in large numbers, which, save for exactness,
in which they are usually wanting, are like the articles in a code of law ; so for maxims
too the name to be given to an act or a thing is of great importance. The legislator uses
terms in the meanings they commonly have among the people for whom he is legislating.
He need not wait for scientists to agree upon a definition of the term “religion” before he
makes laws governing sacrilege, religious freedom, and the like. We talk of numberless
things offhand, never exactly defining their nature and traits. Practical life evolves in the
approximate. Science alone aims at the precise.
Within the sphere of that approximate we get theorems that correspond to facts so
long as they are not extended beyond the scope, at times very limited, within which they
are valid. Ordinary language crystallizes and preserves them, and it is there that we can
recover and use them, but always with the reservation that, roughly approximative and
true only within certain limits (which as a rule are unknown to us), they become false
outside those limits (Chapter XI). Such theorems are theorems of words rather than of
things ; and we can therefore conclude that in practical life, for purposes of influencing
others, and oftentimes in the early beginnings of the sciences, words are of great
importance, and that it is by no means a waste of time to quarrel over them.
114. But as regards investigations in experimental science our conclusion must be
precisely opposite. Such researches envisage things exclusively, and can therefore derive
no advantage from words. They can, however, incur great harm, whether because of the
sentiments that words arouse, or because the existence of a word may lead one astray as
to the reality of the thing that it is supposed to represent (§§ 366-67), and so introduce
into the experimental field imaginary entities such as the fictions of metaphysics or
theology ; or, finally, because reasonings based on words are as a rule woefully lacking in
exactness.
115. So the more advanced sciences develop languages of their own as a result
both of coining new terms and of giving special meanings to terms of ordinary parlance.
The “water” of chemistry, the “light” of physics, the “velocity” of mechanics, have
senses very different from the meanings of those identical words in everyday usage.
116. A simple device often serves to determine whether an argument is of the
variety that relies on sentiment or on the assistance of the more or less vague notions
stored up in the vernacular, or of the variety peculiar to experimental science. It is
sufficient to substitute plain letters of the alphabet, a, b, c . . . for the key-words in it. If
the argument loses cogency, it belongs to the first class ; if it retains its full vigor, it
belongs to the second (§ 642).
117. Like other sciences, political economy began by using terms from the
vernacular, trying merely to give them meanings somewhat more exact ; and so it became
enriched with the wealth of experience accumulated in everyday language—a capital by
no means inconspicuous, for economic operations make up a large fraction of human
activity. But then gradually, as political economy progressed, that advantage waned, and
the drawbacks involved in the use of such terms became more and more irksome. Jevons
in his day very wisely dispensed with the word “value,” which from being stretched in
this, that, and every direction, and from having countless meanings, ended by having no
meaning at all (§ 62 1) ; and he proposed a new term, “rate of exchange,” of which he
gave an exact definition (§ 387).
118. Literary economists did not follow him along that road ; and they are to this
day still dilly-dallying with speculations such as “What is value ?” “What is capital ?”
They cannot get it into their heads that things are everything and words nothing, and that
they may apply the terms “value” and “capital” to any blessed things they please, so only
they be kind enough—they never are—to tell one precisely what those things are. If their
arguments partook of experimental science, they would continue to hold even if blanks
were used for the terms “value” and “capital” ; for the name being taken away, the things
still stand, and it is in things alone that experimental science is interested. 1 But since
such arguments are primarily rhetorical, they are strictly dependent on words capable of
arousing the sentiments that are useful in convincing people ; and that is why literary
economists very properly are so much concerned about words and much less about
things. Anyone asking what value is, what capital is, what income is, and the like, shows
by that mere fact that he is concerned primarily with words and secondarily with things.
The word “capital” certainly exists for him. What he is in doubt about is what it means,
and he sets out to discover that. This procedure might be justifiable on a reasoning
developed as follows : “There is something unknown that acts upon language and gives
rise to the word ‘capital.’ Since ordinary words are exact copies of the things they
represent, we can understand the thing by studying the word. So by finding out what
capital is, we shall come to know the thing unknown.” The fallacy in the justification lies
in the proposition italicised. It is false. For more convincing proof one need simply
substitute for the term “capital” some scientific term such as “water,” and see whether the
most painstaking inquiry as to what it is that is called water will ever reveal the properties
of the chemically pure substance known by that name.

118 1 In my Manuale I showed that economic theories can just as well be elaborated
without mention of the terms “value,” “price,” “capital,” and the like. Literary economists cannot
see it that way; and to an extent they are right, since for them the term “capital,” let us say,
designates not a thing but a sum of sentiments, and naturally enough they want to keep a term to
designate that sum. To humour them, the thing might be called “objective capital,” and the
complex of sentiments “subjective capital.” Then one could say : “Economic theories concerned
exclusively with investigating relationships between economic facts have nothing to do with the
concept ‘subjective capital.’ They may or may not, as they choose, utilize the concept ‘objective
capital.’ ” And going on : “Economic theories that aim at making converts and thereby at
achieving some practical result can turn the concept of ‘subjective capital’ to good account,
converts being made by appeals to sentiment. For that reason it is the wiser part for them to create
a confusion between the notions of ‘objective capital’ and ‘subjective capital,’ so that the
scientific argument will not avail against the sentimental argument.” At some few points such
theories approximate the concrete more closely than the theories of pure economics, for they
inject into the concept of “subjective capital” sociological notions that have no place in scientific
economics. But they still have the fatal defect of being entirely devoid of exactness. If one would
get closer to the concrete, instead of introducing sociological concepts implicitly and as it were
by stealth, it would be better to advance them openly : that would make at least a certain amount
of definiteness unavoidable. All such things can be better seen from Sensini’s La teoria della
rendita.
The concept “subjective capital” becomes of prime importance to sociology, which is in
fact directly concerned with the sentiments expressed in such terms ; and since the concrete
phenomenon is both economic and sociological, anyone studying it in applied economics
inevitably encounters notions analogous to “subjective capital.” That is why, in my Manuale, I
examined concrete phenomena not only from the strictly economic standpoint, but also as regards
the manners in which they are conceived by the individuals involved in them (see the caption
Veduta soggettiva in the index to the Manuale).

In science the course followed is the exact opposite : first one examines the thing
and then hunts up a name to give it. First one considers the substance formed by
combining oxygen and hydrogen, and then a term is sought to designate it. Since the
substance in question is present in great quantities in the vaguely defined thing that the
ordinary vernacular designates as water, we call it water. But it might have been called
otherwise—“lavoisier,” for instance—and all of chemistry would stand exactly as it is.
We would simply say that the liquid present in rivers and in the sea contains great quan-
tities of lavoisier. Literary economists and sociologists do not understand such things, for
they are wanting in the mental attitude and the training required for understanding them.
 119. In these volumes we intend to keep strictly to the logico-experimental
method (§ 108) and deal exclusively with things. Words therefore are of no importance
whatever to us ; they are mere labels for keeping track of things. So we say, “Such and
such a thing we are going to call A” ; or, “We suggest calling it A.” We do not say—an
entirely different matter—“Such and such a thing is A.” The first proposition is a
definition, and we are free to word it as we choose. The second is a theorem, and requires
demonstration ; but before we can prove it we have to know exactly what A is (§ 963).
To avoid in these volumes the danger, ever threatening in the social sciences, that
meanings of words will be persistently sought not in the objective definitions supplied
but in common usage and etymology, we would gladly have replaced word-labels with
letters of the alphabet, such as a, b, c ... or with ordinal numbers ; and that we have done
for some parts of our exposition (§ 798). We have refrained from doing so more often in
fear lest our argument become altogether too tedious and obscure. So here we follow the
example of the chemist who continues using the term “water” but gives it an exact
meaning.
We too shall use terms of ordinary parlance, explaining exactly what they are to
represent. We accordingly urge the reader to keep strictly to such definitions and never to
try to guess from etymology or common usage the meanings of the technical terms that
he finds in these volumes. The reader will shortly be meeting the terms “residues” and
“derivations” (§ 868). If he desires to know what they mean, let him refer exclusively to
the definitions we furnish. If he were to seek their meaning in etymology or common
acceptation, he would be certain to find things very different from the things we label
with them. If anyone does not like them, he may feel quite free to replace them with
others—we shall never quarrel on that score. And he will see that with his own terms, or
better yet, using letters of the alphabet or numerals, all our arguments will stand just the
same.
Anyone finding these explanations superfluous must be patient. My excuse is that
similar explanations ever and anon repeated for my term “ophelimity” did not prevent
literary economists from seeking its meaning in etymology ; while others, who must truly
have had a deal of time to waste, began wondering whether “desirability” would not have
been a better name. 2 Nor could I silence such idle prattle by showing that we could very
well do without “ophelimity” and all other similar terms in developing economic
theories.

119 2 Pareto, Manuel, p. 556, note I.

120. In these volumes I shall use, for the reasons just stated, a number of terms
that are also used in mechanics. I must accordingly make clear the exact senses in which I
use them.
121. Let A, B, C . . . stand for certain things that have a capacity for influencing an
economic or social situation. We may consider the situation either at a moment when the
action of such things is not yet exhausted, or at a moment when it is entirely spent. Let A,
for instance, stand for an individual’s desire to drink wine, and B for a fear he has that it
may injure his health. The man drinks one glass of wine, then a second, and then he
stops, because after the second glass the fear effectively curbs the thirst. After the first
glass the movement is not complete : the thirst is still effective in spite of the fear. Not
even the fear has completed its work, because it has not yet quenched the individual’s
desire for drinking wine. It is evident that when we are considering a situation we have to
specify whether we are considering it at a time when the things A, B have not completed,
or at a time when they have completed, their action.
In mechanics there is an analogous situation—analogous, notice, not identical—
where two forces are acting upon a physical point. So instead of speaking of two things,
A, B, that have a capacity for influencing an economic or a social situation, we may for
the sake of brevity speak of two forces, A and B.
122. The intermediate stage in which the individual has drunk the first glass of
wine and is about to drink another, in which, that is, the work of A and B is not yet
completed, is described in mechanics by saying that an equilibrium has not yet been
attained. The stage in which both the thirst and the fear have completed their work, so
that the individual ceases drinking, is described in mechanics by saying that an
equilibrium has been attained. By analogy, not from identity, we may likewise use the
term equilibrium for an economic or a social situation.
123. But an analogy is not a definition ; and we should be deliberately exposing
ourselves to ready and frequent error were we satisfied with such an analogy to represent
the social or economic equilibrium. We are therefore called upon to give an exact
definition of the economic or social equilibrium in question ; and the reader will find it in
Chapter XII.
124. Keeping to the definition of the thing, we can change the term at will and the
arguments will stand just the same. For example, instead of calling A and B “forces,” we
might call them “influences” (“operative things”) or even “things I.” The state defined
above we might call τέλος, or even “state X,” instead of “equilibrium.” In which cases all
the arguments in which we have used the terms “forces” and “equilibrium” would still
hold.
125. It is therefore a monumental stupidity to say, as one critic said, that when I
speak of a state of equilibrium, I am thinking of a state which I consider better than
another state, equilibrium being better than lack of equilibrium !

(Pages 58 – 66)

OK, more comments on the nature of language as a flawed medium of true

knowledge. But the explanation, that people find it easy to pretend to a possession of
knowledge by mastering the linguistics in their own right, detached from the things that
words relate to, makes this frailty of linguistic power relative to knowledge production a
personal matter, rather than recognising an inherent attribute of the evolved, that is
biological power of speech as means of generating collective consciousness, not pure
knowledge.
Religion, when it cannot compete with religion transforms itself into a pseudo-
scientific form and appears within science itself ; he almost says, except he seems
oblivious of the fact that ‘non-logical’ in the pursuit of knowledge can be, and should be,
considered as synonymous with religion.

114 mentions that if science is not careful about words then the idiocy of religion
can poison science, but he fails to see that this is the very purpose for which words exist,
which in effect, is revealed in 113 where he notes that “for purposes of influencing
others, and oftentimes in the early beginnings of the sciences, words are of great
importance,”. If only he had read 113 before he wrote 114 he may of be on the road to
understanding reality instead of perverting its understanding.

118 gets into the nitty-gritty of how knowledge is manipulated via the force of
language, but Pareto is clearly oblivious of the significance of the observations he makes
because he takes these things personally, not scientifically. He sees these linguistic
dynamics as concerning individual political activities, instead of biological, superorganic
physiological factors. It is nice to see this kind of debate taking place however,
especially where it really belongs, in sociology.
The solution Pareto offers is of course useless because he fails to see that the
problem is not the frailty of language, language evolved to be frail, and is meant by
nature to be frail. The solution is for science to recognise it must be at war with religion
until religion is expunged from society, and in the meantime science must have its own
government, its own laws, its own tax system, all in order that it can have its own
schools, universities, publishing houses, all based upon an atheistic science, instead of the
science imposed by religion through the mechanism of linguistic frailty so well discussed
here. Of course the requirements are impossible, but if we know what the ideal is then
we can at least recognise that universities must be expunged of all who in anyway decline
to wage war on religion in the name of science. That would be a start.

119 - This notion of words as labels which can be interchanged to the hearts
content is surely implicit in the fact that languages can take an infinite variety of forms as
labelling systems, hence the original Italian can appear here in English while still
expressing all the same concrete ideas and the subtle thoughts associated with them.

This is a fair junk, but it is marvellous stuff, even if the man is located in another
universe as he observes the one he claims to study. Much of the latter part of the above
quote is not concerned with offering an opportunity for a critique of any kind, it is taken
to illustrate the attempt at a rational method of doing sociology, as I had said I so admired
in Pareto. The interesting thing is the way is seeks to overcome the difficulty of language
as we know it. We can say straight off that he fails to appreciate the crucial point, which
is that the nature of language is that the physiology of language evolved to allow social
structure to be created, and this is precisely why non-logical, or untrue knowledge, so
often prevails over that which is self evidently true. But since we have gone to the
trouble of taking a part of his explanation of how he would overcome the difficulty, we
might ask whether we can see any value in his method.
As I read it this business of labels abstracted, from ‘drink’ versus ‘fear’ into the
letters A and B for example, to denote forces effecting behaviour, I feel no immediate
response to this approach. The problem is that this is really doing science, and I do not
do science, I am a philosopher, I reason and develop ideas of reality. To work from my
correct ideas, namely that humans are a superorganism, and language is the force that
subducts us into the superorganic physiology at a level beyond any possibility of
knowing directly, I would say that we do not need to be so mechanistic about behaviour
as Pareto sets out to be. This method of abstracting linguistic labels into a pure form
turning symbols that have no inherent meaning into labels for things that can only be
identified linguistically by using abstract symbols to create labels with meanings for
things, seems to me to be highly suspect, once I get to analyse it as I am doing now. This
abstraction of labels from meaning into symbols seems to accord with the idea that
individuals are the objective target for language, but this is not our position, the objective
target for language is the social structure, so that meanings are not really meanings at all,
they are the triggers that control our consciousness. We would hardly expect Pareto to
see this because it is more and more obvious that, like Ptolemy, Pareto is dedicated to one
thing and one thing only, the defence of the idea of reality upon which religious authority
depends. He is able to think out such elaborately pseudo scientific ideas because he is so
firmly rooted at the bias point of individuality as the end of human nature, and this is so
even though he lives at the time when the idea of the superorganic nature of human
beings was rampant.
He says himself that it is not possible to communicate with one another through
the medium of abstract symbols alone, we need meaningful symbols in order to
communicate in any meaningful way, so he chooses not burden his argument with the
abstract method that he has so painstakingly contrived for the purpose. The only
conclusion we need derive from the recognition of the linguistic subversion of knowledge
is that if we are to have science then we must expunge the non-scientific from the domain
of knowledge creation. But, while dealing with religion all Pareto does is do what any
priest would beseech him to do, he grants to religion its own domain, and pleads for
religion to be dismissed from that aspect of knowledge, and that aspect only, that can be
fixed by experimental observation. There could be no worse enemy of science than
Pareto, but what a friend of religion, he is to sociology as Darwin was to biology, a true
enemy of science. However, Pareto is a footnote in history, Durkheim takes the
limelight, and this is because the elaboration of the argument for boxing science into its
own strictly confined compartment of knowledge is what Pareto is really dealing with
here, and this is only a minor aspect of the war of religion against science. In sociology it
is the big ideas, ideas communicated in verbose language that we can all understand, that
counts, and so it is to people like Durkheim that the crown of ‘Miscreant’ must go. Does
Durkheim so much as think about the problem of language in his Sociological Method ?
I doubt it, but I would have to check to be sure. Well, for the life of me I cannot find
Durkheim’s method, and I was just using it the other week ! Shit.

One thing remains that I feel inclined to look at, the ‘molecular theory of society’,
except I see no indication that there is one, other than the phrase noted above. But this is
of so much importance relative to the organicist conception of the person viewed as a unit
of the superorganic being, that it warrants being at least recorded properly.

2079. Organization of the social system. The economic system is made up

of certain molecules set in motion by tastes and subject to ties (checks) in the
form of obstacles to the acquisition of economic values. The social system is
much more complicated, and even if we try to simplify it as far as we possibly can
without falling into serious errors, we at least have to think of it as made up of
certain molecules harbouring residues, derivations, interests, and proclivities, and
which perform, subject to numerous ties, logical and non-logical actions. In the
economic system the non-logical element is relegated entirely to tastes and
disregarded, since tastes are taken as data of fact. One might wonder whether the
same thing might not be done for the social system, whether we might not
relegate the non-logical element to the residues, then take the residues as data of
fact and proceed to examine the logical conduct that originates in the residues.
That, indeed, would yield a science similar to pure, or even to applied, economics.
But unfortunately the similarity ceases when we come to the question of
correspondences with reality. The hypothesis that in satisfying their tastes human
beings perform economic actions which may on the whole be considered logical
is not too far removed from realities, and the inferences from those hypotheses
yield a general form of the economic phenomenon in which divergences from
reality are few and not very great, save in certain cases (most important among
them the matter of savings). Far removed from realities, instead, is the hypothesis
that human beings draw logical inferences from residues and then proceed to act
accordingly. In activity based on residues human beings use derivations more
frequently than strictly logical reasonings, and therefore to try to predict their
conduct by considering their manners of reasoning would be to lose all contacts
with the real. Residues are not, like tastes, merely sources of conduct ; they
function throughout the whole course of the conduct developing from the source,
a fact that becomes apparent in the substitution of derivations for logical rea-
sonings. A science, therefore, based on the hypothesis that logical inferences are
drawn from certain given residues would yield a general form of the social
phenomenon having little or no contact with reality—it would be a sociology
more or less like a non-Euclidean geometry or the geometry of a four-dimensional
space. If we would keep within realities, we have to ask experience to acquaint us
not only with certain fundamental residues, but with the various ways in which
they function in determining the conduct of human beings. 1
2080. Let us consider the molecules of the social system, in other words,
individuals, who are possessed of certain sentiments manifested by residues—
which, for the sake of brevity, we shall designate simply as residues. We may say
that present in individuals are mixtures of groups of residues that are analogous to
the mixtures of chemical compounds found in nature, the groups of residues
themselves being analogous to the chemical compounds. We have just examined
(Chapter XI) the character of such mixtures and groups, and we found that while
some of them appear to be virtually independent, others also are correlated in such
a manner that an accentuation in the one is offset by an attenuation in others, and
vice versa. 1 Such mixtures and groups, whether dependent or independent, are
now to be considered among the elements determining the social equilibrium.
2081. Residues manifest themselves through derivations. These are
indications of the forces operating upon the social molecules. We have divided
them into two categories (§ 1826) : derivations proper and the manifestations in
which they eventuate. Here, for the sake of a comprehensive view, we shall take
them both together.
2082. Common opinion attaches great importance to derivations and
among them to derivations proper, to theories, as determining social forms.
 Contrarily to that view, we have seen as the result of long and far-reaching
researches that their direct influence on such forms is slight—a fact that is not
perceived because there is a tendency to ascribe to derivations effects which really
are referable to the residues that they manifest. Before derivations can acquire any
considerable efficacy they have to be themselves transformed into sentiments (§
1746), and that does not happen so readily.
2083. In this matter of derivations, the capital fact is that they do not
correspond exactly to the residues in which they originate (§§ 1767 f., 1780 f.). In
that lie the chief obstacles to the constitution of a social science ; for derivations
only are known to us, and we are sometimes at a loss as to how to find our way
back from the derivations to the residues that underlie them. That would not be
the case if derivations were of the same nature as logico-experimental theories (§§
1768, 2007). Derivations, furthermore, contain many principles that are not
explicitly stated, which are taken for granted, and as a result they are gravely
lacking in definiteness (§ 2002). The uncertainty is greater in the case of
derivations proper than in the case of manifestations, but it is not wanting in the
latter also. To remedy that difficulty, we have to collect large numbers of
derivations associated with one same subject-matter, and then find in them a
constant element that can be distinguished from variable elements.
2084. Even when there is some rough correspondence between derivation
and residue, the derivation usually oversteps the terms of the residue and
oversteps reality (§ 1772). It indicates an extreme limit of which the residue falls
short, and very very often contains an imaginary element that states a goal far
beyond the goal which would be set if it expressed the residue exactly (§ 1869).
If, furthermore, the imaginary element expands and evolves, the results are myths,
religions, ethical systems, theologies, systems of metaphysics, ideals. That
happens more especially when the sentiments corresponding to derivations are
intense, and the more readily, the greater the intensity.
2085. So, using the sign of the thing for the thing itself, one may say that
human beings are spurred to a vigorous manner of action by derivations. But such
a proposition, taken literally, would be far from the truth, and has to give way to
the less foggy statement that human beings are spurred to a vigorous manner of
action by the sentiments that find expression in derivations (§ 1869).

(Pages 1442 – 1445)

Derivations come from residues. (§ 2083)

Pardon me, I just had to write that statement above to get it clear in my mind. The
words themselves do not indicate the relationship, indeed their meaning appears inverted
to me. As yet I do not know what either ‘derivations’ or ‘residues’ are. I resent being
obliged to learn the hidden code that this individual has devised in order to fabricate his
monumental sociology, hopefully, if my interest persists, I will eventually get around to
knowing what these two features of our world actually are. I know he said words do not
mean anything, and he will not be concerned with words, but for crying out loud ! No
need to go out of his way to be bloody minded about how he expresses himself just to
make the point.

This discussion of individuals as ‘molecules of the social system’ is delightful,

and the use of his theory of ‘derivations’ left over from ‘residues’, is variously annoying,
frustrating and irritating, because it begs to be followed up with a selection of the relevant
sections describing the thinking behind derivatives and their related residues. But this
means turning to the beginning of volume two, and from a quick look we cannot just take
the section 868 which pinpoints the discussion, we need to take pages preceding this
because in 868 he decides to give names to what have been called a, b, and c. So we
need to look at what he has been calling a, b, c, before we can make any sense of how the
words ‘derivatives’ and ‘residues’ fit into his scheme. Too much !
I would not mind if I thought performing this review would be of some benefit in
terms of suggesting a way of doing real sociology, that is to say, our alternative
sociology. As far as I can tell up to now, the idea is that basic features of our evolved
makeup, instincts and such like, give rise to the psychological aspects of our being, of
which we are conscious, and hence he says in section 2083 “derivations only are known
to us”, that is ‘conscious derivations’ are left over from the ‘subconscious residues’ of
our biological nature, the former, by definition, being all we can know.
Fact is this is too complicated to pick the bones out of by skipping through this
account because the words are so unfamiliar, and constitute a jargon specific to the work.
I would have to sit and read these sections carefully and make notes while doing so, and
then I am sure I could turn this model into plain language that anyone could understand at
first reading, including me.
But there are some pleasing ideas here, the idea of forces underlying behaviour,
which are manifested in social forms that coalesce the molecular elements into something
with qualities approximating to chemical elements that in turn make up material forms,
presumably social structures. This reference to chapter eleven is the first prompt I have
had to look at volume three, I wonder what these chemical analogs of social forms are ?
All in all though, a rather different sociology from the norm, and at least in the above we
have something approximating to the logic of the organicist model, albeit projected onto
a chemical, or bio-chemical basis.

Halleluya, the phrase ‘social organism’ appears on page 1120 in volume three.
We are told the subject will be dealt with in the next chapter, which means volume four,
which deals with the form of society. But there is no organicist language here, as such,
although it is just here, as we see above, that we find the molecular equivalence of social
individuality used.
It is so unusual to have such an extensive piece of work to play with, four
volumes, and it is certainly quite a job to dip into one volume and imagine you have any
real sense of what the work contains, because then, when you do get around to another
volume the whole nature of the discussion seems different, and interesting. Turning to
chapter eleven in volume three, Properties of Residues and Derivations, gives us some
fascinating arguments. He goes into a lengthy analysis of why the word ‘exist’ does not
mean the same thing when we speak of ‘natural law’ existing as compared to when we
speak of a chemical substance existing. What makes the discussion so fulsome is the fact
that he seeks to demonstrate that the non-existence of ‘natural law’ is qualified by the fact
that the idea of natural law does exist, in people’s minds. The argument is too long to
reproduce, or even to read ! But the thrust of the argument appears all the way through
this work, we have noticed it already, and recognised its affinity to our own strictly
scientific ideas. The subject is the usefulness of bullshit as compared to knowledge,
where, by knowledge we mean real knowledge, in other words, knowledge which is true.
This topic is beginning to take on the appearance of being the main idea of this whole
work. In volume four we have another entreaty on the same topic, and it is delightful, I
must say I love the subject as much as Pareto. Section 1684, page 1114, excuses the
preceding discussion on Gnosticism within a sociological treatise, on the basis that the
quality of deranged ideas involved in this sect still hold a powerful sway over people in
Pareto’s own day, as they do today, and as, we may be sure, they will do in ten thousand
years time ; as depressing as this certainty must be. So once again we are getting a
further commentary on the supreme importance of bullshit in human affairs, and there are
many such diverse examples of a like kind. And again Pareto is not shy of elaborating
upon so important a matter, the next page, section 1685, has a short critique of Renan’s
evasive style, one moment provoking religious antagonism, the next sucking up to the
priesthood. But really, this is all about the nature of language. Pareto often mentions
forces effecting people, but he never realises that language is a force, and all that he calls
forces are really expressions of this one universal human social force. Yet his obsession
with how ideas operate to produce sentiments which are really residues, he should realise
that behind all of this is, quite simply, the amazing power of language, which humans
clearly did not create. The problem, we may suppose, is the difficulty of obtaining a
clear sense of language as something detached from ourselves. But if we are impressed
by the importance of alien, idiotic ideas, ruling our world, then a detachment from
language, seen as a controlling device, should not be that impossible.

Where to next ?
In volume four there is a part devoted to the history of the Romans, which
attracted my interest because the Romans play such an important part in the growth of the
Jewish superorganism. How would Pareto handle this topic ? Without a fully organic
conception of a social structure it is impossible to grasp the crucial relevance of religion
to the structure, but aside from this a general attitude of organic unity involving the
concept of a life cycle can induce appropriate modes of reasoning.
When we contrast the likes of Darwin or Pareto with an ancient figure such as
Ptolemy we are taking advantage of an incredible resource, namely a body of detailed
knowledge about a social structure which is comparable to our own, antecedent to our
own in its form, and yet actually is our own in an earlier phase of existence. In terms of
information about social development the ancient world can be treated as if it were a
different world, despite the fact that it is one with ours. This is no different than saying
that England under a monarch with full royal powers was still England, even though the
deceased form of authority is radically different in appearances from the parliamentary
democracy we are ruled by today.
We can look at the detail of a past world with some detachment thanks to our
detailed history of Roman and Greek society. And Pareto is doing just this, according to
his own ideas of what society is. The Jews do not get a mention, but I glimpsed some
potential in his reasoning, Under the heading of the crystallisation of Roman society he
referred to the way Rome was become as society of castes. He talks about laws
restricting movement from one part of the social hierarchy to another. The movement of
people from one class to another seems to form a large part of his discussion in the whole
work. But while he has a chapter tackling social form, beginning with an intricate
discussion of how derivatives and so on effect social molecules, he does not have a
simple conception of social form and related physiology, and, as yet, I have seen no sign
of any thought as to the definition of the social being, no reference to social identity. It is
as if he is conduction dissections of organisms without ever thinking about which
organisms he has cut open.
By contrast we never perform any dissections, the task demands real, detailed
scientific knowledge, derived from long study and direct examination of the facts. This is
beyond our scope, this requires the work of professional academics. But we see the
relationship between our total conception of the human superorganism and the detailed
examination of social structure than Pareto offers. We both give thought to social
structure in terms of a hierarchical physiology. I have not read what Pareto says, but
presumably noting that Rome is becoming caste ridden is leading up to the idea of
negative crystallisation, where an old social structure becomes rigid, and, as we know
happened, dies. I had thought the term ‘crystallisation’ was going to be positive, how
Roman society came into being, but that is because I want to know how the Jews came to
be the masters of Rome, causing Rome to be the crucible in which the Jewish slave
identity Christianity was forged.
It is remarkable when we see how we may relate our thinking to that of an albeit
short sighted, would be scientist like Pareto, that he could not see that the developmental
process which leads to our social structure’s existence, begins before Rome, and
continues long after Rome. Suggesting, forcefully therefore, from a sociological point of
view, a sort of geological scale continuity, transcending our normal consciousness of
social processes. In any other science than sociology, or the study of humans, the worker
would expect to be carried beyond the obvious, beyond the limits of normal
consciousness. Consciousness in this sense is almost synonymous with time. We are
talking about the scale of things, and the scale of reality is measured in terms of time and
space, and both factors do come into the social equation, for it is not only the continuity
through time, from the ancient Sumerians through to the present, but also the expansion
through space from the Middle East throughout the entire global human biomass, and
across the entire surface of the globe, that we can see before us when we think about what
our society is and where it came from in terms of the idea that humans are a
superorganism. Pareto did not have the idea that humans were a superorganism in his
mind, but he lived in the age of the ‘social organism’ and he rendered this idea in terms
of individuals operating as molecular units of a social fabric formed under the influence
of forces acting like a programme that determined individual motivations, resulting in
patterns of social behaviour, and fixed social behaviour, that is social structure, such as
laws and conventions.

Looking for ‘Jews’ in Rome made me turn to the index ; where I finally figured
out that numbers referred to sections, not pages. There is nothing about Jews of any
moment in the whole work, but the entry led me to ‘anti-Semitism’ ; again nothing, but
this entry was adjacent to ‘ants’, and now we have something. Some of these references
were incidental, but one at least was delightful, and others led me to parts of the
discussion of some interest. I am beginning to think that hitting upon Mind and Society is
like coming upon the Burgess Shale of trans-organicist sociology—sociology transient
between organicism and modern pseudo sociology—a super abundance of rich deposits
lies in waiting for our enjoyment. So what have we ?
I have placed bookmarks in each volume and I will begin with volume one and
select passages accordingly.

Volume One

135. Of what conceivable use can the study of virtual movements be if they are
things foreign to the domain of reality and only real movements actually occur ? The
advantages are, in chief, two :
1. If we are considering virtual movements that have not been real because of the
presence of ties which have been found absent on other occasions—if, in other words, we
are considering movements that are virtual in some cases but are observable as real in
others—knowledge of the virtual movements may help to foresee what the real
movements are going to be like. Such, for instance, are forecasts as to the effects of a
certain piece of legislation or of some other practical measure.
2. Consideration of virtual movements may help towards isolating and
determining the character and peculiarities of a given social state.
136. The propositions “A determines B” and “If there were no A there would be
no B” state the same fact, in the one case as a function of A, in the other in terms of a
virtual movement. The propositions “In such and such a state society has a maximum of
A” and “If society departs from that state, there will be a diminution in A” express the
same fact, in the first case as a description of the state, in the second in terms of a virtual
movement.
137. In the social sciences, virtual movements are to be resorted to with great
caution, for very very often we have no means of knowing what the consequences of
suppressing some condition, some tie, would be. If a person says, “If the Emperor Julian
had continued very long on the throne, the Christian religion would not have survived,”
he is assuming that the death of Julian was alone responsible for the triumph of
Christianity. And if one answers, “If the Emperor Julian had continued longer on the
throne, he might have retarded, but could not have prevented, the triumph of
Christianity,” one is assuming that there were other conditions present which made that
triumph certain. In general, propositions of this second variety are more often verifiable
than are propositions of the first kind. In many cases, that is, social developments are
determined by the concurrent action of large numbers of conditions ; so that the removal
of any one of them disturbs the course of events but slightly.
138. Conditions, furthermore, are not independent. Many of them influence each
other. Nor is that all. The effects of conditions react in turn upon the conditions
themselves. In a word, social facts—that is to say, conditions and effects—are
interdependent, and modifications in one of them react upon larger or smaller numbers of
the others, and with greater or lesser intensities.
139. That is why attempts to remake history by conjecturing what would have
happened had a certain event never occurred are altogether fatuous. We have no way of
determining all the changes that would have taken place on a given hypothesis if the
hypothesis had come true. What would have happened had Napoleon won at Waterloo ?
Only one answer is possible—“We do not know.”
140. We can get something a little better by keeping to effects that are very
immediate in a very limited field, and progress in the social sciences will tend gradually
to enlarge those very restricted confines. Every time we succeed in discovering some
hitherto unknown relation between social facts, we are a little better prepared to know
what the effects of certain changes in the social situation will be ; and pushing on along
that road we make new advances, however slight, towards realizing the purpose of
determining the probable course of social developments in the future. Therefore no study
that aims at discovering some uniformity in the relations of social facts can be called
useless. It may be useless at the present time and continue to be so in any near future ; but
we cannot be sure that the day will not come when, taken in conjunction with other
discoveries, it will contribute towards forecasting probabilities in social evolution.
141. The difficulties in discovering social uniformities are great because of the
great complexity of social phenomena. They are immeasurably increased, and in fact
become insuperable, when uniformities are sought not with the one and undivided intent
of discovering them, but with the purpose, explicitly chosen or tacitly set by sentiment, of
justifying a preconception, a doctrine, a faith. Just such impediments account for the
present backward state of the social sciences.
142. The man entirely unaffected by sentiments and free from all bias, all faith,
does not exist ; and to regard that freedom as an essential prerequisite to profitable study
of the social sciences would amount to saying that such study is impossible. But
experience shows that a person can as it were divide himself in two and, to an extent at
least, lay aside his sentiments, preconceptions, and beliefs when engaged in a scientific
pursuit, resuming them afterwards. That was the case with Pasteur, who outside his
laboratory was a devout Catholic, but inside kept strictly to the experimental method.
And before Pasteur one might mention Newton, who certainly used one method in
discoursing on the Apocalypse and quite another in his Principia.
143. Such self-detachment is more readily achieved in the natural sciences than in
the social sciences. It is an easy matter to look at an ant with the sceptical
disinterestedness of experimental science. It is much more difficult to look at human
beings that way. But even if complete success in such an effort is impossible, we can at
least try to succeed in part, and reduce the power and influence of sentiments,
preconceptions, beliefs, to a minimum. Only at that price can progress in the social
sciences be achieved.
144. Social facts are the elements of our study. Our first effort will be to classify
them for the purpose of attaining the one and only objective we have in view : the
discovery, namely, of uniformities (laws) in the relations between them. When we have
so classified kindred facts, a certain number of uniformities will come to the surface by
induction ; and after going a good distance along that primarily inductive path, we shall
turn to another where more ample room will be found for deduction. So we shall verify
the uniformities to which induction has carried us, give them a less empirical, more
theoretical form, and see just what their implications are, just what picture they give of
society.
In general we have to deal with things that vary by imperceptible degrees, and our
picture of them approximates reality the more closely in proportion as it is drawn in
quantitative terms. That fact is often recognized by saying that as sciences progress, they
tend to become more and more quantitative. But that is much more difficult than to study
merely qualitative differences. In fact, the first forward step lies always in a rough
quantitative approximation. 1

144 ¹ The terms “quality,” “quantity,” “qualitative,” “quantitative,” will at all times be
used in these volumes not in any metaphysical sense but in the sense commonly used in
chemistry in contrasting qualitative with quantitative analysis. The one shows, for instance, that a
given substance is an alloy of gold and copper ; the other shows the weight of gold and the weight
of copper present in a given weight of the alloy. Whenever we note the presence of a certain
element in a sociological complex, we are stating a qualitative proposition. When we are in a
position to designate, however roughly, the intensity of that element, our proposition becomes
quantitative. Unfortunately no scales are available for weighing the things that are dealt with in
sociology, and we shall generally have to be satisfied with designating quantities by certain
indices that increase or diminish with the thing itself. An interesting example of that method
applied to political economy is provided in my use of indices of ophelimity (see my Manuale,
Appendix).

It is no difficult matter to distinguish day from night with tolerable accuracy.

Though there is no precise instant at which day ends and night begins, we can after all
roughly say that there is a qualitative difference between them. It is more difficult to
divide such periods of time into parts. We manage to do so approximately by saying
“shortly after sunrise,” “towards noon,” and the like ; and with more or less success—less
rather than more—the night used to be divided into “watches.” When clocks came to be
available, it was possible to get quantitative measurements of time, the exactness
increasing with improvements in clocks and becoming very considerable with the modern
chronometer.
For a long time people were satisfied with knowing that the death-rate was higher
among the aged than among the young, no one as usual knowing very definitely where
youth ended and old age began. Then something more was learned; statistics were made
available, very imperfect statistics at first, then better ones, now fairly good ones—and
they are steadily improving. For a long time there was very little of the quantitative about
political economy. Then it became quantitative in pure economics—in theory at least. For
sociology we shall try as far as we can to replace qualitative considerations with
considerations of quantity. Imperfect, very imperfect, as they may be, they will at any
rate be a little better than the qualitative. We shall do what we can, our successors will do
better—and so science advances !
In these volumes we shall confine ourselves to a very general picture—something
like a sphere offered as a model of the Earth. That is why I call this a general sociology.
Details will still be left for future study—much as oceans, continents, and mountains
have to be drawn in on the sphere of the Earth. Such studies would make up a special
sociology. Incidentally, however, we shall examine not a few special themes in the course
of these volumes ; for we shall be meeting them all along the path we shall have to
traverse in getting our picture of society in general.

(Pages 70 – 74)

I like this passage for its overall approach, or attitude, toward the study of society.
What is there here that we should highlight ?
Virtual movements : I have to set a limit on my quotations, but the style of Pareto
tends to mean that great swathes of material are needed either side of any particularly
interesting point. To look at ‘virtual movement’ we need to go back to §133, but then we
find ourselves getting embroiled in the tail end of a debate on the nature of determinism
in science ..... yikes ....... there is no end to this linkage. I have included the bit on virtual
movement because it appeared on the page where I wanted to begin with §137, but since
I have included this Paretoesque terminology in the selection I’d best explain it, briefly.
Virtual movements are those that have not taken place, they appear in two classes, (p. 69)
the possible and the impossible. In contrast with ‘virtual movements’ there are ‘real
movements’, which are actions that have taken place.
It seems awfully pedantic to bother teasing out fine definitions of nuances of
expression as this, especially in a general sociology, but the heading on page seventy one
is “Remaking History”, which we may assume inspired such a detailed discussion of the
logic underpinning this discussion of social factors, for it is undeniable that one way in
which science threatens religion, when science is applied to the study of society, is in the
promulgation of the history upon which the substance of Jewish mythological method
depends. Indeed today the relationship of history to sociology is of great importance,
reflecting the servile role of science in relation to religion in these areas. I only need
reach to the shelf beside me to view The Rise of Historical Sociology, by Dennis Smith,
1991, affirming this fact :

What is historical sociology ?

To oversimplify, historical sociology is the study of the past to find out how
societies work and change. Some sociologists are ‘non-historical’ : empirically,
they neglect the past; conceptually, they consider neither the time dimension of
social life, nor the historicity of social structure. Similarly, some historians are
‘non-sociological’ : empirically, they neglect the way processes and structures
vary between societies ; conceptually, they consider neither the general properties
of processes and structures, nor their relationships to acts and events. By contrast,
historical sociology is carried out by historians and sociologists who investigate
the mutual interpenetration of past and present, events and processes, acting and
structuration. They try to marry conceptual clarification, comparative
generalization and empirical exploration.
There is considerable internal specialization within this intellectual field.
However : ‘The important lines of difference all cross disciplines [and]... are
substantive : they lie in the arguments put forward, which are inescapably, if not
 always systematically, theoretical’ (Calhoun, 1987, p. 625). In fact, ‘there simply
are no logical or even methodological distinctions between the social sciences and
history — appropriately conceived’ (Giddens, 1979, p. 230). History and
sociology are ‘one single intellectual adventure’ (Braudel, 1980, p. 69). The two
disciplines may be integrated ‘as a single unified programme of analysis’
(Abrams, 1982, p. xviii).
There is a danger that these assertions might simply become empty
ideological slogans for a new academic vested interest. According to Charles
Tilly, the institutionalization of historical sociology — ‘fixing of a labelled
speciality in sections of learned societies, journals, courses, a share of the job
market’ — could have a stultifying effect : ‘first, because the “field” lacks
intellectual unity and, by its very nature, will forever lack it ; second, because
institutionalization may well impede the spread of historical thinking to other
parts of sociology. The other parts need that thinking badly’ (1988, p. 709).

(Dennis p. 3)

But do we have an Evolutionary Sociology ? Like hell we do. That would be

scientific, biological ; whereas, something Dennis does not point out, Historical
Sociology is by definition religious in its character, it is based on the idea that humans are
unique, self made, independent of the laws of nature, the individual is the human being, a
political animal, to be studied, and understood, in political terms. Hence sociologists
should mimic historians by looking at events as told by people, and make sense of how
social structures have developed accordingly. Thus we have two possibilities, scientific
sociology, based upon Evolutionary Sociology ; and religious sociology based upon
Historical Sociology. We live in an absolute theocracy, where there is no science, hence
we have Historical Sociology. These two alternatives are massively different. Pareto is
giving us an example of historical thinking when he uses the example of how one man’s
rule might of impacted upon the development of a world religion. Had he been inclined
to think scientifically, instead of religiously, he would of dealt with the question in an
evolutionary manner, which would of recognised that there is no such thing as an
individual, and that all individuals, be they a Julian or a Napoleon, are utterly irrelevant
to the outcome of superorganic development, it being the process of superorganic
development that determines the rise of a slave identity like Christianity. If we want to
know what the chances were of the neophyte Christian identity surviving, we must look
to the point of origin of this identity, and look to its biological function—i.e. apply the
logic of evolutionary sociology. We do not want to know about people—the politics, the
history, the stories told by people—we want to know about social structures, in this case,
we would want to ask about the vitality and prospects of Judaism, this being the only
question of relevance to the secondary question of what will determine the vitality of
Christianity, past or present. In the same way that if we were concerned about a person’s
long term health we would not ask if the person’s limbs would be healthy in some
decades hence, we would ask if he would be alive and healthy in that time period. So it
should be with human superorganisms ; clearly it is of primary importance, as we have
seen others take notice of, to know, first and foremost what the human superorganism is.
Benjamin Kidd answered this question, he said religion defined the extent of the social
organism, then the idiot made Christianity a religion in its own right ; such stupidity
beggars belief and defies credulity, why did Kidd no see that Christianity was a Jewish
religion and hence a Christian society was in reality a Jewish social organism ? Because
he applied the logic of historical instead of evolutionary sociology, how could he do
otherwise in the intellectual climate we must all endure ? We can see that it is the world
wars and the efforts of the Nazis focused on the Jews which has breathed new life in
Christianity following the rise of organicist sociology in the nineteenth century which,
left unchallenged would certainly of destroyed Judaism, and hence Christianity. Judaism
is the master identity, that is why any challenge to the religious order anywhere, always
results in an anti-Semitic backlash, which saves the Jews, and so saves religion.
To say we would not want to know about the “the politics, the history, the stories
told by people” is of course absurd, this is the substance of evolutionary sociology, we
have to have these details. But it is a question of the status we give to these details. And
the status of such details is fundamentally different according to whether we regard the
individual as an end in themselves, or whether we regard the superorganism as the end of
all political activity.
What was Napoleon really there for ? Why did Napoleon exist ? His role was to
reconstitute the French portion of the Jewish global biomass following the ructions of the
French Revolution. In other words the superorganic process that caused the revolution to
occur demanded that an autocratic authority would replace the absolute monarchy that
had been destroyed. And Napoleon was just as much an autocrat as any monarchist could
ever hope to be. He employed secret police on a scale that matches that of the Russians
after the superorganic process expunged the Russian portion of the Jewish global biomass
one hundred and twenty eight years after it had adjusted the French organ to the new
organic conditions needed for the whole organism to support its growth across the planet.
Napoleon was also a religious fascist, but he was not religious, as I recall he said that
religion was vital for the existence of society, but expressed no belief in this statement,
just a recognition that it is by means of religion that people are controlled. So Napoleon,
Bob, Judy or Zippy, it makes not one jot of difference, some jerk who knew how to kill
people on a grand scale, that was all that was necessary, and that was all that Napoleon
provided. What the hell else did the man do ? France was France when he began, France
was France when he ended. Exactly the same can be said of Hitler in respect to Germany
a century on. But these great leaders, or monsters, depending upon how our Jewish
masters need to portray them—history—to suit the current process of ongoing
superorganic growth, were vital at the time that they occurred ; just as the antigens arising
in our blood are vital at the time when we contract the flu. These antigens express
themselves in a detailed response to the form of the pathogen which calls them out of
their ‘hole’, a Napoleon or a Hitler is exactly the same ; the one unchanging continuity in
our superorganism is its Jewish identity that calls upon the social pathogens to rescue it
from disarray as the superorganism grows and adjusts its physiology to its continuing
expansion.

Well, there we have a bit on history, courtesy of a prompt from Pareto. We could
say more about history considered separately from sociology, but I am sure this has been
dealt with previously elsewhere. Basically the obvious fact that history is a fiction, not in
any way conforming to the strictures of science, is well recognised in the books that
proclaim the opposite, I have a few, but obviously it would not be possible to publish a
book denying the validity of history, makes you wonder how come so many are written
that claim history is valid ! A quick walk around the walls has only shown one book
defending religion from science in the name of history, Human Nature and History : A
Response to Sociobiology, by Kenneth Brock, 1980. I am sure I have a book entitled In
Defense of History, but it did not catch my eye ; no wonder it is not in my data base,
strange, must of dreamt it ! I bought Brock’s book after seeing him named on the dust
jacket of Maclay’s The Social Organism, seeing this self evidently committed enemy of
science being used as a ranking vouchsafe for Maclay is helpful in affirming that Maclay
too is an enemy of science ; but obviously Maclay would not be able to publish a modern
book on organicism if he were not committed to the war of religion against science. The
blurb on the inside front dust cover of Brock reads as follows :

In recent years a number of biologists—E. O. Wilson and Konrad Lorenz

among them—have expanded their theories to include explanations of human
social behaviour. A response to this sociobiological analysis of human societies,
Human Nature and History argues that an understanding of man’s social and
cultural differences is best sought in the pages of history, and not in biology or
comparative ethology.

And there we have it. When someone does come out with a scientific view of
humans no time is lost by the priesthood, who have no place even discussing such
matters, in producing a refutation of the argument suited to their own idiotic conception
of society, that just happens to rule our political world. We have already seen that Pareto
dealt with this problem by drawing a line between scientifically valid arguments based on
experiment and observation, and all other ideas. But, as we have said, this is a worthless
idealistic strategy when all academia is rife with malevolently minded miscreants like
Brock, along with allies like Maclay, all of whom have infinite resources at their
disposal, and in order to obtain reward and honour must only produce worthless lies from
the pit of their stomachs, based on nothing more than their love of their own ego and a
desire to serve their self interest. Science does not stand a cat in hell’s chance against
these people, hence there is no science in our society, our society is an absolute
theocracy.
How can we stop the likes of Brock commenting upon science ? It is not
possible. It is however an interesting question to think about, because it is exactly the
problem the church had to ask itself in the nineteenth century as science invaded its
territory by examining the nature of humans. How could people be prevented from
commenting upon humans according to a scientific conception of humanity as features of
the natural world ? The theocracy has succeeded in achieving the suppression of all
scientific discussion of human nature. It has achieved this through massive warfare
waged against its own people, and through the horrors of Nazis evil, making the
discussion of Judaism according to a natural model utterly taboo, without which it is
impossible to even begin to develop a meaningful science of society since all human
society extant on earth today is Jewish ; today it is impossible for any scientist to say
anything about humans whatsoever from a scientific perspective. Brock’s work asserts
that some scientists had dared to move in that direction, but the whole point is that their
efforts produced a massive upsurge in the war of religion and against science, the war is
unrelenting, but this outbreak of scientific reason attracted ‘anti-knowledgens’ en masse
to the wound in the academic defences against science. Lorenz is never heard of today,
he was no organicist to my knowledge anyway, and Wilson became the greatest enemy of
his own ideas, exactly as Spencer had been his own best detractor in the nineteenth
century, and as an enemy of science, who had become known for being an extreme
exponent of science, Wilson became a much valued and honoured priest within the
academic wing of the theocracy. No one else has ever come forward to develop Wilson’s
weak and faltering steps toward a rejuvenation of science in areas covered by the
humanities, and no one ever will.
If we want to know how to prevent misanthropic works of people like Brock we
only need look to how the church has managed these problems since the beginning of
time.

139. We can say with absolute certainty, thanks to our alternative sociology, that
had Napoleon won the battle of Waterloo nothing of any consequence would of changed
at all. Had Hitler won the Second World War and become the emperor of all Europe this
would of made not one single meaningful sociological difference to the form and nature
of our Jewish society. By now Hitler would be dead anyway, and it would be business as
usual, exactly as it is in Russia after the demise of Stalin, the Russian equivalent of
Germany’s Hitler and France’s Napoleon, all of whom restored the status quo to the
Jewish order following the revolutions that were necessary to modernise the basic social
structure. Making the old European territories fully ready for the industrially
empowered, capitalist global superorganism, in which Israel could be founded according
to the dictates of the Jewish identity programme that we have all been enslaved to by the
unfolding of human nature’s inherent potential. To prove this we need only look to
France and Russia, two major revolutions that have, by any reckoning, utterly
transformed these societies, yet, for all this, not one thing of any sociological significance
has changed, except for the fact that the Jewish master identity now rules in these
societies far more ferociously than it ever did before : remember, Judaism is capitalism.
When we have a society in which there is no religion, and only then, will we have
a meaningful sociological change. Any other changes have no more biological
significance than the changing of outer garments has relative to the biology of the person
who dresses in jeans one day, and pinstripe trousers the next. The biology of our society
is religious, and the identity of that religion is Jewish. Whether the Emperor’s clothes are
in the form of a tiara, a palace or a swastika, makes no odds, and never will. The same
applies closer to home. Right wing Conservatives are aggressively Christian, left wing
fanatics are aggressively Christian, if they are in power, as we see with New Labour.
And this is all that matters, affiliation to Judaism. Wherever power goes the Jew goes,
the Jew in our society appears in the shape of a Christian, in Iraq or Iran the Jew appears
in the form of a Muslim. These subidentities are clothes, or patinas of superficial
identity, skin patches forming blots on the surface of the Jewish superorganism, which is
always, and always will be Jewish, through and through. If this were not the case then
Jews could not exist, they have had no significant land of their own, ever, and still have
none, without the Jews stranglehold on America, through its Christian slave identity,
allowing Jews to funnel billions of dollars annually into Israeli coffers, taken directly
from the taxes paid by the American public, Israel would be gone in the twinkling of an
eye, Jews in the form of Muslims would see to that. But of course this would make no
odds either in sociological terms, it would just mean that the emergence of Israel would
have to wait another millennia or two. So what ? It is not as if humanity is doing
anything else.

141. He says that working toward understanding society through the intention of
promoting religion is doomed to failure, and yet he does this himself, presumably
unwittingly, because he just does not know that his brain is programmed by the language
he speaks, causing him to think in obedience to the Jewish identity that is the identity of
the superorganism created by the natural force of language. It could be said, and I think
we can assume it would be, by any critic of this argument, that we are taking a biased
view by assuming that religion is false and that God does not exist. This criticism cannot
get of the ground because we prove God does not exist by showing what God is, and all
our arguments about the need for science to make atheism its foundation stem from this
indisputable scientific fact. There is no excuse for Pareto not knowing what we know, so
although I assume unwitting obedience to the powers of the linguistic force, realised in
the Jewish identity, I see no reason for such unwitting stupidity. It should be obvious to
anyone who is really interested, and surely we cannot doubt Pareto’s interest, that
religion is the first and foremost problem for science to tackle if it would be free.
Religion is a political problem to be overcome by all who love true knowledge.
Religion is not a legitimate alternative way of thinking about life, or anything else,
religion is a way of controlling life. No one has the right to subscribe to any religion, and
in a civlized society anyone promoting any religion ought to be treated as a criminal,
because this is tantamount to promoting slavery. What the individual thinks of this is
irrelevant, this is an insight derived from science, from true knowledge of human nature.
To be religious is to be a slave. You cannot grant a person the right to choose to be slave,
that is absurd, because the whole point of the religious method of enslaving people is to
take control of all society. By granting the right to be a slave to anyone, you oblige
everyone to be subject to an authority formed on the basis of slavery, the consequence of
which we see all around us. We are all obliged to live in a society in which knowledge is
our most precious possession, but where the most precious elements of that knowledge,
concerning ourselves, have to subverted by war and terror and a concerted effort of an
academic priesthood.

142. We see all the crusty old sociological questions raised in Pareto. This one
we have already given some thought to in this work. For professional sociologists, doing
sociology is impossible, and they prove the point in all the work they do, and here we see
the excuse being made. So no one is pretending that it is possible to treat society as a
scientific subject, but hey, “we will give it a shot” they say. Why don’t they just fuck off
and leave it to those who are interested ! Ah yes, that would be nice. Then again, why
don’t burglars just piss off and keep out of other people’s houses ? or rapists, why don’t
they stop helping themselves ? Shit, why can’t we just live in a world that the good lord
Jesus gave his life to bequeath to us ............ ?
 We can wait till kingdom come for these sweet outcomes. But like the thief, the
murderer and the sex offender, the professional academic has to be treated like what they
are, a vicious criminal, a psychopath concerned with nothing but their own ego, who will
stop at nothing in pursuit of their goal, which is the possession of that oh so precious
treasure, our knowledge. The need for self serving arrogance in the elite is why the
psychopathic mentality, obsessed with itself, that seems so alien to the category ‘social
animal’—and indeed might be held up as proof of the fact that we did not evolve to form
harmonious social structures, and that we must fight to achieve what we have—evolved
as part of the array of human individualities. Arrogance means being presumptuous as an
individual, it is not possible to be arrogant in the cause of a popular idea, because then
you are agreeing with everyone else. So we misuse the word here, but our intention is to
invoke the meaning of the word in relation to the idea that it is the quality of a
psychopathic mind that allows an elite to rule on the assumption of knowing things that
they do not know, and indeed they have no intention of knowing, they intend only to
control knowledge. The meaning of the words ‘arrogance’ and ‘psychopath’, are perfect
for describing the normal state of the ruling elite, yet they only apply to individuals,
leaving no means of routinely describing our masters in malevolent terms. This indicates
how the form of language is developed by social authorities to isolate the individual and
protect the master, the master being one and the same thing as the identity of the
superorganism. This is how the force of language, which creates superorganic
physiology, should transpire in practice, by this means the force of language controls
what we can say, and hence what we are able to think.
It seems that the social elite condemn certain categories of psychopath, in the
form of certain categories of thief, or sex offender for example, while the social structure
they serve creates extreme inequality, and provides numerous specialists like lawyers to
ensure its maintenance, so that the elite can thieve all they like, within the law.
Prostitution has been long cultivated by the social structure, to allow rape to take place,
again, within the law. There is no qualitative difference between paying for sex, and
raping a women selected at random in the street, or mugging someone in the street, and
accepting a million of pounds a year in wages, where others earn ten thousand. As ever,
just as killing for oneself is a terrible crime, while killing as a solider, for the state, is a
great honour, the real distinction between the action of those we place upon a pedestal
and worship, and those we revile and seek to erase from our society, is a flip of a coin.
The same urges drive the psychopathic elite and the psychopathic outcast : a total,
ruthless selfishness, untouched by any consideration of others, except as a vehicle for
achieving self gratification ; which may involve, and seems to more often than not, to
judge by our elite, our politicians and our celebrities, the psychopath in actually
becoming an expert in the personification of altruistic love, and the art of expressing
genuine empathy for the poor and vulnerable, of the highest order. While causing
mayhem and poverty around the world the authorities turn another face towards us and
plead for charity, which they contribute toward most generously, using the money they
rob from us through the organization of the law. But the trick of their successful
manipulation is due to the fact that one realises their goal through serving the machinery
of superorganic being, while the other helps themselves without paying heed to that same
machinery, it is really but a flip of the coin. Therefore the elite itself, or the people it is
composed of are not responsible for anything, it is our superorganic nature that dictates
this social structure, of which particular individuals just happen to be a part. The
fascinating thing is the persona of the two types of psychopath, the social and outcast.
The one is a popular, revered and beautiful person, we can see this by looking at them,
the other a frightening, ugly, animal like creature, again we only need look at the mug
shots of criminals on TV, versus the images of our most famous, and we can see the
difference for ourselves. And the differences are not pure illusion, they can be real
enough. Nature lends her skill in supporting the illusion that we are individuals.
Returning to the point being made here, in 142, when we have a solid physical
conception of what human society is then we make any bias impossible. It does not
matter how bias anyone is regarding the place of the planet in the universe, all bias relies
upon the misrepresentation of the planet at the centre, once we dispel this fraud there is
little room for political bias to utilise astronomy to good effect. And the same applies in
sociology once we have a definite idea that humans share a common nature with
creatures like ants and bees, humans form a social organism. As we se, from this position
we start talking about Jews and Nazis on a par, no emotion, no politics, just science. And
of course this is the reason why this idea has been forced out of society. By running a
search for the ‘social organism’ on the net I just, 11/04/08, taped into a nice little supply
of free material. I was able to take a full copy of The Domain of Ideologies : A Study of
the Development of Ideologies, Harold Walsby, 1946, there was only one copy for sale
when I checked, it was signed and cost £48, expensive, in England. This does not sound
a very impressive title, but the subject is actually the application of science to society, to
politics. Chapter one is called The Paradox, which seems to concern the fact that
everyone agrees that they are now living in a scientific age, while science is excluded
from having anything to do with running society. The following selections are all taken
from the first chapter.

In taking general stock of the world as it exists today no intelligent being

could remain unimpressed by the unique and increasingly important position
occupied by science. Again, in making the most casual comparisons with the past,
nothing is more evident than that the direct influence of scientific activity upon
our everyday life is growing apace ; that, historically speaking, more and more of
the world around us is rapidly coming under its control ; that great changes in our
way of living are being effected by science in ever shorter periods of time. From
all sides we are continually being reminded that we live in a scientific age.
Furthermore, we are told, this is but a tithe of what is possible and what is
to come — and evidently with some truth, for there is not immediately apparent
any comprehensive limit (though we may feel there must be one) to the growth of
science on the one hand, or to the rapidity of its development and expansion, on
the other.
Yet, strangely enough, this great increase in the mastery of our
environment is attended by a most extraordinary and outstanding contradiction.
For the application by man of his new power largely results in making life less
secure and more hazardous for the great mass of the people.
 This is obviously written just after the world war, in which modern science got to
serve mankind in all its glory, fire bombing whole cities into oblivion, providing
underwater ships able to sink countless millions of tons of valuables with impunity along
with thousands of innocent women and children, enabling millions of people to be
systematically exterminated in industrial complexes built for the job, and so on and so
forth, truly science had given birth to a golden age, and on the back of this Israel was
founded and Judaism has reared its ugly head as never before, and as Jews we can but
give thanks for this nightmare. So, the paradox, is put in terms of how science has
proved to be a force that we cannot control, obviously we know why this is, because
humans are a superorganism and any notion of control is an illusion. Science was serving
the organism, which has nothing to do with what we think service should be. But while
this expression of a paradox does no lend itself to our sociological agenda, particularly,
the argument turns more toward our sociological leanings.

Moreover, the scientists themselves are not, on the whole, secluded from
this unintentional effect of the new forces they have produced ; and, in point of
fact, as a consequence of it, find their scientific labours in many ways frustrated.
The risks and uncertainties arising from the peculiar nature of life in modern
society are shared (if not equally, at least to some extent) by the overwhelming
majority, especially in wartime. Poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, industrial
disease, bodily injury and violent death — to mention some of the worst features
— are only too common and too well-known in this vaunted age of science to
need any description or emphasis. Those who are not either visited by or exposed
to any of these conditions are few indeed.
Are these social evils a necessary consequence of scientific development ?
Are they, as some suppose, the price we have to pay for too much science ?
When we consider the enormous and growing power that science is
placing at our disposal ; when we think of the innumerable ways, means and
methods given us by modern science, whereby we are enabled, with increasing
rapidity, to alter and adapt our material environment to our needs, i.e., to produce
abundant wealth ; when at the same time we realise that the practical use to which
these discoveries are put is left mainly to a class of private individuals whose
prime aim, in deciding whether to exploit or suppress an invention, is to make as
much money for themselves as possible ; when, in addition, we realise that the
administration of affairs arising out of these conditions is in the hands of men, no
doubt well-meaning but with relatively no scientific knowledge or understanding
of the real problems they are called upon to solve, and who have been elected to
office by largely ignorant, indiscriminating and unscientifically-minded masses
— when we reflect upon all this then I think we must conclude that the evil is not
too much science but rather too little.

The question going begging here is, What is science ? Here we see that science is
simply a technical activity, a tool in the hands of social authority, exactly as we know it
must be if the absolute theocracy is to continue to dictate every detail of our existence.
But this man does not know that this situation is all about the war between religion and
science, he thinks it is a political problem, he does not know that society is a social
organism, already he is too young to appreciate this obvious fact. He then quotes form a
psychologist, the exact professional fraudsters created by the theocracy to keep society
and evolution personal, focused on the individual, even thought the particular
psychologist produced a notable work called An Introduction to Social Psychology,
William McDougall, 1919, which is available via the same website, and I have taken a
copy today. But then of course McDougall, an Oxford professor, need we say more,
there are no bigger charlatans, wrote a book on social psychology, it is his job to fill the
void where science, based on the sociology of the superorganism should go, which would
not recognise psychology as having any more meaning than ‘history’ or ‘religion’, in
scientific terms. As we discuss these things separately, and then relate them to one
another, we put the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together and in so doing spontaneously
reveal how the social authorities, simply by having a permanent and leading place in the
institutions of knowledge, are able to relentlessly subvert language and the disciplines of
knowledge to continually conform to the principles upon Jewish mythology is based,
while simultaneously resisting all the best efforts of independent thinkers to develop an
unbiased mode of thought cleansed of all human purpose in social life. and thought his
manipulation of language, and of academic disciplines, the force of language is caused to
flow in a continually uniform direction, laying down material structures, social structures,
as it flows, like a river system laying down deposits and shaping the land though which it
flows, the land in this case is the biomass of the human population, where Judaism exists,
it lays down its own characteristic deposit, as would any dominant religious ideology.

Despite the fact that science is indissolubly bound up with the multifarious
techniques of civilised life, it cannot be denied that the organisation of civilised
life as a unified whole is more haphazard and governed by expediency than it is
scientific. By almost common consent it is ruled inadmissible that science,
applied so successfully in our control of material nature, should have anything to
say in our frantic efforts to control human nature. Why is it that science and
politics have, in practice, so little in common when, from a practical point of
view, they have complementary and mutually interpenetrating objects ? Politics
is the technique of government, of control of human society ; science, in its wider
sense, is the technique by which human beings master or control their
environment. Is not human society part of the human environment ? Why then do
we keep science and politics in two independent and watertight compartments ?
Have they really nothing whatever to say about each other ?
The widespread, almost universal, assumption is that the general
settlement of social problems is purely a question of political opinion or of
“practical” politics ; one in which science, as such, has and can have no direct part
and no say. In the past scientific and literary men have contributed in no small
measure to the maintenance of this attitude by a frequently expressed prejudice
that the subject-matter of politics is forever outside the scope of scientific method.
It is a long established idea among scientists that it is not the business of science
 to say how its results shall be socially applied ; that the limits of its social uses are
solely the responsibility of the layman. Science must not “meddle in politics”. For
instance, in his contribution to Science and the Changing World, Sir Oliver Lodge
says : “(Machines) are made possible by science, but the responsibility for their
use or abuse belongs not to science but to civilisation. If so-called civilisation
allows machinery to sap human freedom and enslave mankind, science washes its
hands of any such egregious folly.” In recent times, it is true, there has been some
awakening on the part of a number — a minority — of scientists and scientific
writers, who have urged that science cannot, consistent with its own aims and the
best interests of its development, stand by disinterested and aloof from politics.
Probably three main external influences have converged to help produce this
change. One was the rise of communism in Russia and another the rise of fascism.
The sharp contrast provided by Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany in their
respective treatments of science and scientists, undoubtedly did much to
undermine the conception of a “neutral” science aloof and untouched by political
struggles. It showed that, if science is disinterested in the trend of politics, at any
rate politics is not disinterested in the trend and fate of science. It showed, in
short, that science cannot remain always unaffected by what happens in the
political sphere. The third factor was the approach and onset of the Second World
War, when science was once again to be put in harness and exploited to the full
for the mass destruction of life and property.

And so the man is blinkered, only able to see politics, even believing that
communism and Nazism are examples of political regimes, unable to see that all there
is is religion, and that religion is eternal and unchanging, only changing its outer garb as
needs demand, so that Judaism becomes communism, becomes Nazism, and cruses on
relentlessly. Certainly, seeing this kind of hidden fact is impossible without the scientific
insight that humans are a true superorganism. If we actually look at what McDougall
wrote in his Social Psychology we find his work awash with contrived notions of
biological primers of human behaviour, instincts which men take control of. I ran a
search for the phrase ‘social organism’ and it was not in his nasty twisted work, designed
as it is with only one purpose in mind, to exclude science from the study of man and to
preserve our enslavement to Judaism, which is what Oxford and Cambridge were after all
founded to ensure. In effect, and I have only spent ten minutes skimming the index,
McDougall is actually presenting an alternative explanation of the inescapable scientific
insight arising from the fact that we are animals, evolved like any other. His work is
evidently intended to provided an explanation of human evolution to become so
exceptional a social animal in such a way that the political ideas vital to religion are still
valid. This is a leading work in the sterilization of human sciences, making science safe
for religion. And we need not be surprised that he says he wrote the book so that anyone
could understand it, and especially so that sociologists would have a minimal amount of
psychological knowledge from which to develop their ideas about what human society is.
And so we see how the religious poison oozes out of the organ of knowledge control and
seeps into the muscle and fibre of the superorganism to allow it to live and thrive as it has
done for thousand so years, allowing it to spread across the entire surface of the planet,
and to infect every particle of the human biomass extant on earth today.

Unfortunately, any implications of a practical kind, in most of the

literature dealing with the problem of science and society, appear to be either
somewhat obscure or entirely lacking. While most of these writers seem generally
agreed on the type of economic changes which are necessary for a more
scientifically organised society, they give no indication of how science can help in
bringing these economic changes about. That is to say, science can assist the
necessary economic and technological reorganisation but it must remain dumb on
practical political matters and political theory, on how this reorganisation can
actually be politically effected. The scientifically-minded are merely left to take
sides in the chaos of unscientific, controversial political theories, techniques and
tactics which characterise modern political life. Thus, in practice, science as such
is still effectively barred from participation in politics. There is certainly no
evidence of an organised and coherent political theory capable of general, or at
least wide, acceptance by men of science. Although there may be among them a
higher proportion which tends toward the Left, scientists and scientifically-
minded people are, on the whole, almost as divided as the layman when it comes
to political theory

This paragraph is taken because it says something about the nature of knowledge
control, that we are often remarking upon. He is indicating that science is fractured, it
contains every kind of person, including theists ! And this is the nub of the problem he is
concerned with here, although he has no idea this is so. Science, as a matter of principle,
has no identity, no bias over and above itself, so it is inherently disabled in the political
war with religion, because a scientific scientist is a double negative in terms of political
interests, whereas a religiously committed scientist is a positive-negative in terms of
political interests, assuming we say that the essence of a scientist is being neutral, and
being neutral in politics is rendered negative relative to someone who pursues political
interests. If then we make the scientific nature neutral, and we ask what political
character a scientist has combined with his professional interests, we should find a double
neutral, but life being what it is, given that we all have political interests, then it is not
surprising that many professional scientists are perfectly happy to make their professional
interests a servant of their political interests, and such scientists then combine neutral
with positive scientific outlooks ; where positive simply means bias, and hence carrying a
political motive force. So if we put the two types of scientist together, then, after we
have cancelled out a neutral on each side that means we have neutral scientists
committed to science, and positive scientists committed to religion. Real scientists stand
no chance because they can have no effect on science, all that is required to ensure this is
the case thereafter, is an academic establishment in the hands of the theocracy, then, year
by year, knowledge will be corrupted by positive effort working against neutral effort.
And that is how we came to live in a scientific age where there is no science, other than
technical science in the service of politics. Both kinds of scientists are just as much able
to do the science as a technical exercise, both can do the sum 2 + 2 and get 4, but no
scientist is able to produce all embracing scientific knowledge, whereby the principles
inherent in the practice of mathematics are developed into a description of existence
itself, because to do this would mean challenging the Jewish mythology which rules our
social world. Yet the fact is that maths is able to describe and model reality means that
the universe is ordered according to principles reflected in mathematical symbolism,
scientists know this, but still they do not tell us why this is so, the neutrals toy with the
implications, while the positives continue to make it all about God. Science is reduced to
nothing more than a technical exercise, with no identity over and above its organization
of the exoskeletal structure, so while science creates the exoskeletal structure it leaves the
question hanging in the air, Now we have the body, what are we going to do with it ?
And this is the question a communist or a Nazi, in other words a Jew, because no matter
what our political form, we are all, always, Jews, answers : Take power !

This reluctance to step boldly into the political scene, on the part of those
who reject the notion of a neutral science, only serves to underline the lack of
science in politics and the crying need for scientific political theory.
If the scientific taboo on politics and the political taboo on science can be
broken down at all, if this social barrier between the two can be removed and the
way paved towards a scientific control of human society, then — the present
writer is firmly convinced — it can only come from a sound theoretical
development and application of scientific method to the political subject-matter :
that is, to man’s social consciousness. On this view the penetration must be
mutual. Science can only become political in so far as politics becomes scientific.
It cannot be a one-sided affair ; science cannot enter politics with political theory
remaining in its present controversial and anarchical condition.
Here, then, when we contemplate the general dearth of scientific
understanding of political phenomena and the prevailing ignorance of the laws of
political development, we are approaching the main source of the present social
barrier between these two great fields of human activity — fields which, as I think
can clearly be shown, while formerly so distinct, contain per se no underlying,
irreconcilable difference, but rather, are so fundamentally and essentially the
same, they are truly but one field with two broad subdivisions.

And so, he is useless, he thinks we need to understand “man’s social

consciousness”. Idiot. Where does he imagine this social consciousness resides ? In the
person of the individual ? It exists in the body of the evolved superorganism, his own
work suggests this, to judge by the headings of the chapters, harping on about the
collective consciousness, as they do. We cannot have a concept of a social mind, a
collective consciousness, without also having the associated idea of a social physiology,
exactly as we use to have in the nineteenth century. This seems to indicate that the way
in which the idea of the social organism has been expunged from science has been
through a two part process, whereby, first the body was made to disappear, while the
social mind was preserved, and now this too is long gone, no one has spoken of a social
consciousness since the work of this man. I would have to check up on that a bit, but
although we do have books entitled ‘social psychology’, and lots of lovely experiments
show how people can be controlled by group pressures in the most amazing ways, I am
sure I have not seen this kind of evidence interpreted as implying the actual existence of a
social consciousness that is more than the sum of its parts, having significance that
cannot be attributed to the lives of the individuals of which society is composed. We
constantly give attributes to features of individual lives that have absolutely no such
meaning to the individuals concerned, we make homosexuality of vital significance to the
superorganism, but if anything it is a burden to many individuals. Likewise the
psychopathic mind set fixed on the self is vital to forming a ruling elite, but it has terrible
consequences for individuals not ensconced within elite structures where such
psychopathic tendencies can realises their potential. Although even here, the random
psychopath serves the superorganism by justifying global reigns of terror and oppression
that all people welcome and rejoice in, because it is the only way to sanction the renegade
psychopath whose alternative place in society is amongst the governing classes.

Shall we get back to Pareto ?

There a couple of final comments we could make on the above selection from
volume one, concerning his discussion on making sociology more scientific by making it
more qualitative. Sociologists and the like have done this, and it is valid, it reduces
sociology to a technical subject that makes it a true, because sterile, science. The fact
remains that the first thing to do has to be to recognise what society is, to know what
humans are, to rid sociology of all bias, to do what Pareto says cannot be done, but which
we have shown can be done, with perfect ease, simply by eradicating religion from the
science.
Lastly, he refers to the fact that his work is a treatise on general sociology. I do
not know why it has been called The Mind and Society, I suppose this is explained in a
translator’s introduction, but originally it was called Trattato di Sociologia generale and
many of the pages in volume one are headed Treatise on General Sociology.

219. Meanwhile, other inductions loom before us, not yet as assertions,
since they have been derived from too few facts, but rather as propositions that we
must verify as we extend the scope of our researches :
I. If for a moment we consider the facts strictly from the logico-
experimental standpoint, the policy of the Church with reference to magic is
simply insane, and all those stories of devils are ridiculously childish. That much
granted, there are people who infer from the premises that the religion of the
Church is equally unsound and is therefore detrimental to society. Can we accept
that inference ? It is to be noted, in the first place, that the argument avails not
only for Catholicism but for all religions, indeed for all systems of metaphysics—
for everything, in fact, that is not logico-experimental science. It is impossible to
concur in that opinion and regard as absurd the greater part of the lives of all
human societies that have existed down to our time. Furthermore, if everything
that is not logical is detrimental to society and therefore to the individual also, we
 ought not to find instances such as we have observed among animals (and are
going to observe among human beings) in which certain non-logical behaviour
proves beneficial, and even to a very high degree. Since the inferences are wrong,
the reasoning must also be wrong. Where is the error ?
The complete syllogisms would be : a. Any doctrine of which a part is
absurd is absurd ; that part of the Church’s doctrine which deals with magic is
absurd ; therefore, etc. b. Any doctrine that is not logico-experimental is
detrimental to society ; the doctrine of the Church is not logico-experimental ;
therefore, etc. The propositions that probably falsify these syllogisms are : a. Any
doctrine of which a part is absurd is absurd. b. Any doctrine that is not logico-
experimental is detrimental to society. We must therefore examine those
propositions closely and see whether they do, or do not, correspond to the facts.
But in order to do that, we must first have a theory of doctrines and of their
influence on individuals and society ; and that is something that we are to attend
to in the chapters next following (§ 14).
2. The questions just asked in connexion with doctrines also arise in
connexion with individual human beings. If we consider the conduct of
individuals from the logico-experimental standpoint, no name but “idiot”
describes the man who wrote the absurdities with which Bodin stuffs his
Démonomanie. And if we consider such conduct from the standpoint of the good
or evil done to others, dictionaries supply only synonyms of “murderer” and
“knave” for individuals who as a result of such idiocies have inflicted the crudest
sufferings upon many many human beings, and brought not a few of them to
death.
But we at once observe that reasoning in that way we are extending to the
whole what in reality applies only to the part. There are examples a-plenty to
show that a man may be unbalanced in some things, level-headed in others ;
dishonest in some of his dealings, upright in others. From that conflict two errors
arise, equivalent in origin, different in appearances. Both the following
propositions are false—equally false : “Bodin has talked like a fool and done
great harm to his fellow-men ; therefore Bodin is an idiot and a rascal” ; “Bodin
was an intelligent and honest man ; therefore the things he writes in his
Démonomanie are sound and his conduct is exemplary.” We see by that, that we
cannot judge the logico-experimental value and the utility of a doctrine by a facile
consideration of the reputability of its author ; that we must, instead, travel the
rough and thorny path of studying it directly on the facts. And there we are back
again at the conclusion that will be reached by an examination of doctrines
themselves (§§ 1434 f.). All that we shall go into thoroughly later on. For the
moment let us continue looking over the general field of non-logical conduct.

(Pages 145 – 146)

What is going on here ?

As you can imagine I love to see his unrestrained use of insulting words, of a kind
never used by professional academics, when speaking about treasured beliefs. The
church is ‘insane’, intellectuals writing books about the demons are ‘idiots’, and a
menace to humanity ! Incredible, I have never seen anything like this anywhere before,
outside my own work. This is how we should all talk about religion, at all times, religion
is facile. The more we read Pareto’s huge work the more we find his focus upon the
nature of reason. And yet, for all this, he seems to tell us nothing. His work is gorgeous
to examine because he is so comprehensive on illogicality, he covers every point, but he
does nothing with each point, he simply defends the church, he makes being an idiot
OK ! He never explains the vast terrain of stupidity in natural, functional terms, despite
the fact that so much of his effort is concerned with doing precisely that, as he tells us
when he says that non-rational behaviour is good, valuable.

“It is impossible to concur in that opinion and regard as absurd the greater part of
the lives of all human societies that have existed down to our time.”

Look at this sentence, if it gorgeous. He is of course defending the stupidity of

religion on the basis that this stupidity is the substance of human existence, which is not
too nice, but here he has the key to solving all his problems, here he sees that what human
intelligence, and the knowledge it produces, is all about, is producing something that is
‘idiotic’, and patently not true. So, fine, what then does this tell us, that is all we need to
know now.
But herein lies the problem, the fatal flaw in the whole work :

“there are people who infer from the premises that the religion of the Church is
equally unsound and is therefore detrimental to society”

Here : “is therefore detrimental to society”

Where does this come from, I mean, just what is this : “is therefore detrimental to
society”. “There are people who infer ........... is therefore detrimental to society” What
the hell is this ? So what ? There are people who think men never went to the moon,
there is a man, very much in the news at the minute, who thinks Princess Diana was
murdered by agents of the Queen, in a car crash staged to look like it was caused by a
drunken tosser speeding away from a pack of deranged madmen on motorbikes ! So
what, there are people who can be said to believe anything, who gives a toss about what
there is that people believe !!
And yet this man runs away with this idea, the whole argument, having been
started off on a will-o’-the-wisp, is then solidly constructed as if this assertion actually
meant something. It is so weird because much of what he says is concerned with
elucidating how non-logical ideas relate to logical ideas, he talks all the time about how
false ideas are dressed in a logical garb. And here he gives us a perfect demonstration of
how this happens in reality, in his own mind ! It is quite unbelievable.
Who ever said that religion was bad for society ? He does not name these people,
we cannot examine their argument. And who cares anyway. We might say religion, and
inherent stupidity in general, is bad for society too, at some points in our argument, but,
even so, as scientists we are forced to accept, exactly as Pareto says, that religion is
humanity, and as such, no matter what we think about it, we are obliged to examine
religion as an essential feature of human existence ; a positive, constructive feature. But
at what level is religion constructive ? that is the point ; and we find it is at the level of
biological existence, beyond the personal where truth means so much. What transforms
our attitude is actually knowing what humans are, and hence what religion is. I have
stated, here and there, that my life long passionate hatred for religion, my avowed
atheism, was pacified some years ago when I discovered what the solution to the problem
of religion was. It is not possible to feel emotional anger toward something that you
understand in a rational way, but, that does not mean the disgust and hatred is erased, it
just means it is moderated and rationalised. At a personal level religion is disgusting,
there is no escape from that.
What Pareto is doing here is taking the raw, uninformed hatred for religion, that is
natural to any good man or women of any intellectual calibre, and making this raw
objection the counterpoint to his argument, which is a futile way to proceed if you want
to understand your subject. He is deliberately selecting the worst and most flawed
objection, the weakest argument, to base his defence of religion upon. He is building a
defence against a foundation of ignorance, which means that whatever he says will be
worthless, because the counterpoint which informs his argument is worthless. This
infuriates me. But I still love the way he talks about the self evident stupidity of religion.
Look at the idiotic argument he proceeds to roll out though, about the alternative ways in
which we might seek to define the character of a man who writes about stupid subjects.
He bothers to explain that we all know that nasty people are not nasty in everything they
do, nor nice people nice in all they do. This is puerile, and gets us nowhere, it is a
commonplace, something we all think about, because it is a confusing feature of life,
given the explanation we have about the nature of humans, which comes from one source
only, religion. We are taught to think in terms of black and white, evil and good as
natural forces, God and the devil, heaven and hell. Frequently, especially when telling
about war and terrorism, we hear the American president declaring that there is such a
thing as good and evil, and he declares the enemies of America evil, and obviously the
Americans are the epitome of good. This is sick, and deranged ; at no time, or place in
history, could anyone ever of uttered a more ignorant and idiotic statement. Americans
are the supreme slaves of the Jews, the sole superpower on earth, talking to the world,
and we can do nothing but listen to these miscreants. But, and of great relevance to the
very point we are discussing now, American culture offers us the ultimate expression of
knowledge as a high art, it is the Americans that excel in all technology, and all that
stems from, and is associated with, such technology. Here we have the ultimate
unification of ignorance and genius, made real ; we have the body and the soul, the
exoskeleton and its identity, its colour. Colour or identity obviously have no rational
basis, the structure they are associated with is their reason for being, to a colour structure
is reason. It is the ‘black and white’ ideology of the slave identity programme that forces
us to have lame arguments with ourselves about the fact that the most evil men are, most
of the time, just like the rest of us, and here Pareto is reinforcing our slave programme by
affirming it, which, as a priest, that is a man with a public voice, it is his role to perform.
But we, who reject our slave status, for all the good it does us, do not need this from a
philosopher, or academic, my little explanation of the problem is all that is required, just
to clear the matter up, we do not need to examine the ins and outs of the problem, as if it
meant anything, we just need to know what is real, and get on with our examination of
the subject, What is irrational knowledge, where does it come from, why is false
knowledge the most valuable knowledge, why did humans evolve their astounding
capacity for knowledge just to realise the personification of this ability in the generation
of knowledge that is false ?
All this said, because Pareto makes such a project of examining this most
important question of false knowledge, he continues to fascinate and delight, just by
virtue of the fact that he even raises questions about non-logical knowledge, that mostly
go unnoticed, he therefore gives us a ready made spring board from which to launch
some of our own arguments, by developing the substance Pareto has set out, this time
according to a rational model of a human nature that evolved to give rise to a mammalian
superorganism, which has the same nature as all other superorganic species found in
nature, termites and ants, and the like.

The next selection from volume one continues a selection taken above, that
discussed the work of Coulanges.

256. When Polybius stresses religion as one of the causes of the power of
Rome (§ 313), we will accept the remark as very suggestive ; but we will reject
the logical explanation that he gives of the fact (§ 313 1).
In Sumner Maine’s Ancient Law, p. 122, we find another example like
Fustel’s. Maine observes that ancient societies were made up of families. That is a
question of fact which we choose not to go into— researches into origins are
largely hypothetical anyway. Let us accept Maine’s data for what they are worth
—just as hypotheses. From the fact he draws the conclusion that ancient law was
“adjusted to a system of small independent corporations.” That too is good :
institutions adjust themselves to states of fact ! But then suddenly we find the
notion of logical conduct creeping stealthily in, p. 177 : “Men are regarded and
treated, not as individuals, but always as members of a particular group.” It
would be more exact to say that men are that in reality, and law, accordingly,
develops as if men were regarded and treated as members of a particular group.
A little earlier, Maine’s intromission of logical conduct is more obtrusive.
Following his remark that ancient societies were made up of small independent
corporations, he adds, p. 122 : “Corporations never die, and accordingly primitive
law considers the entities with which it deals, i.e., patriarchal or family groups, as
perpetual and inextinguishable.” From that Maine derives as a consequence the
institution of transmission, upon decease, of the universitas iuris, which we find
in Roman law. Such a logical sequence may easily be compatible with a posterior
logical analysis of antecedent non-logical actions, but it does not picture the facts
accurately. To come nearer to them we have to invert some of the terms in
Maine’s previous remarks. The succession of the universitas iuris does not derive
from the concept of a continuous corporation : the latter concept derives from the
fact of succession. A family, or some other ethnic group, occupies a piece of land,
comes to own flocks, and so on. The fact of perpetuity of occupation, of
possession, is in all probability antecedent to any abstract concept, to any concept
of a law of inheritance. That is observable even in animals. The great felines
 occupy certain hunting-grounds and these remain properties of the various
families, unless human beings chance to interfere. 1 The ant-hill is perpetual, yet
one may doubt whether ants have any concept of the corporation or of inheritance.
In human beings, the fact gave rise to the concept. Then man, being a logical
animal, had to discover the “why” of the fact ; and among the many explanations
he imagined, he may well have hit upon the one suggested by Sumner Maine.

256 1 On the shores of the Lake of Geneva one may see flocks of swans each of
which occupies a certain area of the lake. If a swan of one flock tries to invade the
territory of another flock, it is attacked, beaten, driven off. The old swans die, young ones
are hatched and grow up, and the flock endures as a unit.

Maine is one of the writers who have best shown the difference between
customary law (law as fact) and positive law (law as theory) ; yet he forgets that
distinction time and again, so persuasive is the concept that posits logical conduct
everywhere. Customary law is made up of a complex of non-logical actions that
regularly recur. Positive law comprises two elements : first, a logical—or pseudo-
logical or even imaginary—analysis of the non-logical actions in question ;
second, implications of the principles resulting from that analysis. Customary law
is not merely primitive : it goes hand in hand with positive law, creeps
unobtrusively into jurisprudence, and modifies it. Then the day comes when the
theory of such modifications is formulated—the caterpillar becomes a butterfly—
and positive law opens a new chapter.

(Pages 174 – 176)

This is delightful, the central idea contained in the above passage is of the greatest
importance. Until every sociologist knows, and understands, what is being said here they
cannot even begin to do sociology, because this passage indicates the immense difficulty
people have in understanding cause and in effect in the creation of social structure, and it
explains how to get the cart before the horse, rather than, as is normal, placing the horse
before the cart, making the cart pull the horse. Obviously when we say that man makes
society we are basing our ideas on the principle that the cart pulls the horse, as if humans
invented the idea of social unity, but here we see, in the simple description of the Swans’
organically formed corporate being, all the evidence we could ever desire that humans
did not invent society, as our priests love to assert they did because they want to make us
believe that we choose to live as they force us to live, just as the cygnet chooses to be a
swan, and then decides it would like to be part of the society it has to be part of.
Here Pareto delightfully uses the work of a famous author on the origins of law,
who unwittingly bases his argument upon the religious principle that humans are divine
and create themselves, to show that nature creates human society, and as our capacity to
develop the principles inherent in nature’s creation increases, we extend the work nature
has begun, but only in so far as nature allows us to do so. We are only ever doing what
nature forces us to do, what nature created us to do, induced as we are to develop more
powerful societies due the supposed law of evolution that has been formulated by the
priesthood on the basis of how we are trained to think about our own behaviour, as
enunciated by Darwin, and then made to apply to all nature.

The forward-looking creative activity of nature is manifested as truly in

the more advanced stages of life, those of human society, as in physical nature
and in the more primitive forms of organic nature. The creating of a pattern of a
political state is as truly a manifestation of the genius of nature as the pattern of an
atom or of an organism. If the pattern of a possible atom is indicated in the genius
of nature, so is the structure of a viable social group. In this I agree with Plato.
When man reaches a certain development, he is able, to a small extent, to share
consciously and deliberately in the creativeness of nature. But this development is
also part of the genius of nature and it must work in accordance with nature—the
properties and laws of nature—to be fruitful. “It is not generally recognized,” says
Gregory, “that the human mind is, on the whole, such a successful device of
nature because it embodies to a high degree the anticipatory qualities which are
essential to life.” 1 It is part of the genius of nature to experiment, to strive, not
only to anticipate the future, in the uniform course of nature, but to create the
future through new forms of synthesis. Thus the genius of nature works
throughout and only becomes more conscious and therefore more economical in
the life of man. The Promethean fire is an emergent in man from the genius that is
in nature and which in man becomes, to a degree, conscious of itself—though still
working largely by instinctive feeling—so as to experiment ideally as well as
organically. Man’s invention of artificial tools is as much a manifestation of the
genius of nature and its urge for life as is the invention of organic tools. And so
the invention of patterns of marriage, of clan and of tribal control is the
expression of the genius of the stream of life of which man is a part.
1
William K. Gregory, Basic Patents in Nature, SCIENCE, vol. 78 p. 566.

(The Biological Basis of Society, Boodin, p. 304, in Journal of Social

Philosophy, July, 1936)

It is the elite, ultimately the Jews, as the organ of identity, in whom the
recognition of the directives of nature are made manifest, hence : the chosen people. And
this projection of knowledge of biological imperatives into a social formula, in the shape
of a religious mythology fixed in a religious identity that constitutes a programme for
creating social structure, is what gives rise to an elite who control us all, through their
mythological, legal, philosophical and scientific rendition of nature’s mechanisms. This
is what leads to the situation in which we have a world of non-logical knowledge ruling
over a world of logical knowledge. Thus we have a core message of control replicated
through differentiated layers of social structure. Layers of purely organic information,
are augmented by the layers of social information in the form of knowledge that reflects
and extends the underlying organic information : the genetic becomes the linguistic.
Finally coalescing in a level based on obedience which treats the preceding layer of social
knowledge as if it were biological, and obeys the authority of the established social
knowledge implicitly, just as the established social knowledge was created by obeying
the authority of the biological information which creates social life in humans.
This gives us an outer layer that is once again purely organic in its nature,
becoming mindless compared to the ideas it is based upon, even though the ideas it is
based upon had become semiconscious compared to the mindless information which
inspired its evolution. Thus we have a biological-social-biological superorganic
physiology, reflected in a mindless-semiconscious-mindless knowledge. Giving us a
triadic macro social physiology, a core of biologically inspired identity (Jews),
surrounded by a ring of knowledge empowered social structure based on the foundation
of biologically inspired identity (Christians), and finally a biomass founded upon
biologically based mechanisms informed by the already created biologically inspired
identity of the Jews (Muslims).
It is difficult to figure out how to describe this social physiology succinctly. Our
society is a compound of non-logical and logical knowledge, which causes Pareto to
struggle with the problem as he does, and this is what we have just sought to envisage
and summarise in a naturalistic fashion, inadequately I am sure. It is clear that the Jews
have an extraordinarily and very special place in the social body, just as the brain does in
the individual body. How would we describe the brain relative to the muscle and bone if
we had to do so in political terms ? It would be very difficult. Christians and Muslims
are so obviously Jews, but the social structure which has given rise to these two slave
identities of Judaism goes to great lengths to make the point that in no sense whatever can
Christians and Muslims be thought of as Jews. This leads to a minefield of
terminological confusion when we come to try and talk about this situation in ordinary
language. One minute we find ourselves declaring that we are all Jews, the next that the
Americans are the slaves of the Jews. Make up you mind, we can imagine the priests
who love all this confusion, would be bound to cry.
Such confusion never arises when we talk about our bodies because we have no
habit of talking about parts of our body as independent entities, so we would never think
of our limbs as being slaves of our brain. Likewise the confusion always arises in the
case of our place in society because we have no habit of talking of our society as a
product of nature in which the social whole forms one unified being. So we have two
opposite conditions, one recognising the individual as a unit, the other recognising the
whole of which the individual is a part, as a unit. We apply one idea to the person and
the other idea to the society, and because this logical possibility is applied illogically, we
thereby separate humans from nature and make our elite the voice of ourselves, rather
than the mediums of biological forces that can be understood in purely rational terms. To
understand our masters in rational terms would of course destroy their hold over us,
which is why they will do anything, wage all out war against us, create Nazis to terrify
and subdue us, anything to retain their hold over us, exactly as nature dictates they must.
This passage from Boodin is the most perfect statement I have ever come across
outside of my own work, it falls a long way short of being perfect because Boodin is a
philosopher, a professional philosopher, whose job is to uphold religion and to subvert
science, but still his reasoning is exquisite, and it fits in here just right.
 Priest : Anyone with a public voice ? This glib definition is always based on the
understanding that we live in an absolute theocracy.

Absolute theocracy : Any society in which religion still has a place. Religion
cannot exist in anything other than an absolute theocracy. Religion is not of the person,
religion is the expression of the linguistic force that creates the social physiology of the
superorganism. Given this assertion it is obvious that unless religion is informing the
shape of society, it cannot exist. In an avowedly communist society such as Soviet
Russia or contemporary China, we know these societies are still absolute theocracies
because religion is still practiced. It seems as though this persistence is because tradition
is preserved by the people, which is a valid statement, until we come to know that
humans are a superorganism and religion is the identity of the organism. In a real atheist
society the social authorities would release this knowledge, and thus destroy religion. No
society on earth has ever come remotely near releasing this knowledge, and it is difficult
to imagine one ever doing so. We are doomed to live in a slave society forever, and the
terrible thing is that this slavery is forever increasing, and as it does it takes us further and
further away from any possibility of ever knowing the truth about who and what we are.
So-called knowledge today is a ‘brick wall’, not the opening in our ignorance that it is
touted as.

If we imagine the ideas being presented here becoming part of public

consciousness, being taught at university as part of a philosophy course, would this mean
I was a priest defending the theocracy ? No.
I would have a public voice, and anyone with a public voice is a priest, but the
formula cannot be that simple, this is one lesson we learn from all that we are doing here.
The idea that humans are a superorganic species of mammal is a very simple idea, easily
put across in double quick time, if it does not have to go to war with all humanity in the
process. What requires years upon years of tireless work is discovering how such an
idea, once it has emerged, is suppressed. Because we live in a covert absolute theocracy
the appearance of being free has to be real, and this means the method of control can
involve periods of exposure on the part of the theocracy. It is at these moments of danger
that monstrous faces of theocracy, of Judaism indeed, show themselves, such as Nazism
and Communism. These faces of anger, as it were, are extremely short lived, in historical
terms, and appropriately brutal and ignorant, they are there to get a grip on the too
prominent emergence of real ideas, and this takes time. So while we are making
statements that are categorical, by saying such things as all those people with a public
voice are priests defending the absolute theocracy, this description has to be understood
in terms of a process that is dynamic, and continuous.
If, and it is a big if, anyone ever came along who had a public voice, who
explained that God does not exist, that God is the means by which we are made conscious
of the superorganism of which we form a part, and that the Jews are the master race, in
the same sense that a brain is the master organ, that person would be no priest. We were
on the brink of such ideas being the only place left to go when the two world wars broke
out, when Communism and Fascism became the official political regime in modern
European, and eventually Asian, Jewish territories. This cannot be a coincidence, it was
all that could save religion, save the Jews. And no one has ever come forward with an
organicist explanation of religion, and certainly not for Judaism. The closest we have is
Hitler, and he, by taking the approach he did, has silenced any one who would apply
science to Judaism thereafter, and thus threaten the hegemony of Judaism. Hitler is the
greatest ever saviour of the Jews.
It is impossible to refute the fact that Hitler has created a taboo against studying
Judaism in the way people were doing before Hitler reached his zenith. We say this is
because Hitler emerged to save the Jews from being destroyed by the advance in science
revealing the true nature of humans, and this idea is irrefutable. But those who rule our
world, the Jews, might be expected to produce an alternative idea, such as the idea that
there is good and evil, and Hitler was evil, so he attacked the poor weak Jew, just as a
juvenile coward attacks the spastic who cannot defend himself, out of sheer innate
malice. Such an idea is absurd, but we cannot compete with our masters’ power, so their
account overwhelms commonsense.
But how can we expand upon our assertion that communism is a collateral effect
arising jointly with fascism in the process of erasing freedom, and recovering Jewish
authority, this time from the opposite end of the political spectrum. Communists, like
fascists were also overtly anti-Semitic, and viciously autocratic. Marx, the renowned
creator of Communism was a Jew, which is highly significant regarding the creation of
such a religiously inspired philosophy of society. But it would be nice to add anything
we can to our assertions on this point. To that end I note with interest the way that
Christians have tried to make sense of communism in relation to their own Jewish slave
identity. To this end, on page eighty one of Communist Faith and Christian Faith, by
Donald Evans, 1965, we have a quote from Lenin indicating that communism has its
origins in capitalism, and we have elsewhere argued that it is well recognised that
Judaism is the source of capitalism, and Jews are the personification of the capitalist.
None of these leading political strains ever stray far from the core religious identity.

In making this argument we invert the significance normally given to events.

Inverting meanings is something we find ourselves having to do as a matter of course.
This is because the basic mechanism of knowledge control involves putting the horse
before the cart, making the superorganism exist to serve the person ! What is worth
taking notice of as we discuss these questions of how knowledge is suppressed by
generating inverted interpretations of reality is how Pareto, when he dealt with the
twisted logic of Maine, was obliged to say that we must invert the argument Maine
presented in his Ancient Law. Yes, this is always what must be done by those who would
have the truth. Yet, Pareto is ultimately no better, even though he is quite delightful from
time to time. Without the hard fact that humans are a superorganism just like ants,
guiding our interpretation, all such minor insights are useless, and can tell us nothing
worth knowing, it is as we were able to calculate the amount of water pouring in the hole
of our sinking boat, something to do, maybe, but it won’t do any good. We have found
no better example of this flaw in veil of academic works than Pareto, although Boodin is
up there with the best of them, and we have yet to see any of his works.

583. A-α I : Authority. Just here we are considering authority merely as

an instrument for logicalizing non-logical actions and the sentiments in which
 they originate. Divine revelation in so far as it is not considered a historical fact
(B-α), belongs to this subvariety, as do also the divine injunction and the divine
prophecy. After all, such things emanate strictly from human beings ; and if we
look closely we see that the point about divine will is made merely to justify the
concession of authority to the individual represented as an interpreter of that
will. 2 The Mohammedans accepted the authority of Mohammed just as educated
people at a certain period in our history accepted the authority of Aristotle. The
Mohammedans explained their acceptance on the basis of Mohammed’s divine
inspiration. The Christians pointed to the profound knowledge of the Stagirite.
The two explanations are of an identical character. So it is easy to understand how
they could be combined in periods of un-enlightenment, and how the Virgil
admired as a poet could become the wonder-working magician of the Middle
Ages (§§ 668 f.).
584. Authority is frequently presented as an adjunct to other
demonstrations. Its meaning, in such a case, is roughly as follows : “The facts we
mention are so well known, the arguments we put forward so convincing, that
they are accepted by everyone, or at least by all educated and intelligent people.”
That method of reasoning was widely used to prove the existence of witches,
ghosts, and the like.

583 2 St. Augustine does, it is true, make a distinction between divine and human
authority ; but he goes on to point out that divine authority is known to us only through
human beings and their writings. De ordine (Opera, Vol. I, p. 977), II, 9, 27 : “Authority
is partly divine, partly human ; but the true, the fixed, the supreme authority is the one
called divine.” But those infernal demons are always on hand to lead us astray ! “We
must always be on our guard against the wondrous deceptions of aerial creatures, which
are wont to deceive [human] souls—and very readily—by certain powers they have,
notably their ability to foresee things within reach of the senses of their [aerial]
bodies. . . . That authority, therefore, is to be called divine which not only transcends all
human faculties in its sensible signs, but by its influence upon man (ipsum hominem
agens) shows him how far it has deigned to stoop (quo usque se depresserit) on his
account. Human authority, however, is often mistaken.” But how are we to recognize the
authority that is divine ? De vera religione (Opera, Vol. III, p. 121), 25, 46 : “God has
seen fit that His intentions with the human race (quid agatur cum genere humano) should
be made known through history and prophecy. But the credibility (fides) of temporal
things past or future is a matter rather of faith than of knowledge ; and it is our affair to
decide to what individuals or what books we shall pin our faith for the proper worship of
God, in which alone salvation lies.”

(Pages 349 – 350)

Agggh ! I’m addicted to books ! Would you believe it ? 14/04/08 21:41:06, I am

watching-cum-listening to a BBC 2 programme Am I Normal ? I am a sex addict,
according to some of the contributors, I have always loved porn, but unfortunately I am
now too old to enjoy this activity as it is meant to be enjoyed. But I know what it is to be
compulsive. Now I am so desperate to spend any amount of money I can get my hands
on, on books, I have for the last year or so begun to feel addicted, obsessed with buying
books. The presenter has just been looking at brain scans showing that all sorts of
gratifying behaviours, like shopping or eating, stimulate the same brain centres as do
heroin, drink or gambling. I think my obsession with books is legitimate, but I certainly
feel the pull of my biological drives, and I often wish I had not so hastily bought the
books that I have, and instead waited to buy something more carefully. So the lesson is
that we have these drives for motivational purposes, but our strange social structures, rich
in material stimulants that can be obtained so easily, without any effort, leads to our
becoming over stimulated, wanting more and more of whatever it is that we have enjoyed
accessing. This is the one thing this women has not begun to consider yet, just as we
think about why religion exists despite its sick and depraved nature, this women should
be asking why these brain centres and their associated endorphins exist.
“A victim of her environment” she just said, quite ; she is talking about a women
living alone in the countryside who is addicted to a computer game, lacking stimulation,
company, and searching for something to fill the void. But still she is not taking this idea
toward its abstract limit, where we would see it as a feature of human nature as an
environment in which we live. Which means we evolved to be part of a living whole,
hence we have a physiology that forces us to need to be attached, through drugs,
behaviours, whatever, our compulsive need to be attached is the addictive hook we are all
prone to. We should ideally satisfy this need through the church, through moral
behaviour, as our masters always tell us, but in our diverse society the hook is attached in
many different ways. I often think TV is an addiction, I notice they do not raise this
question, I would love to stop using a TV, but I cannot, this is because the state has
deliberately sort to destroy our social environment in which we can interact with each
other, pubs closing and laws against drink driving force us into isolation, our masters
want us watching the TV, taking in the adverts, and the state propaganda, of which this
programme about our addictions is but one example.

Where were we ?
This piece on authority is a snippet of Pareto’s discussion, we cannot take a great
wedge of it, but I do like the idea he is trying to tackle here, the use of authority to
reinforce the acceptance of non-logical behaviour. This is close to our objective. But he
is very verbose. This selection draws our attention to an interesting feature of Pareto’s
work, the elaborate system indicated in the use of this ‘A-α I’ sort of thing. a few pages
back, page 345, we have an elaboration of “Types of Class 3” that indicates where this
symbol fits in his scheme. This begs the question what classes are, and on page 314 we
find each class defined. This is quite nice, but it is so much work to copy and study, and
we have enough to do just trying to expound upon atheist science, calling for the war to
be unleashed on religion. Until such times as this preliminary requirement is met it is
pointless to elaborate upon how to analyse types of knowledge to discern the scientific
from the corrupting religious influence. But there does seem to be some method in the
madness here.

586. A person interested in arguments only as regards their logico-

experimental force might suppose that when people are stocking up with such
[religious and political] postulates they would see to it that they be as exact as
 possible and lend themselves to strictly logical development. But experience has
shown that that is not the case, nor ought the fact seem surprising to anyone
mindful of the logic of sentiments (§ 514). For purposes of persuasion postulates
that may mean anything simply because they mean nothing exact are the best
imaginable. And it is a matter of observation that different and sometimes
opposite conclusions are often drawn from them. Oftentimes, besides, postulates
of our A-α I variety are combined and confused with postulates of our A-α2
variety. The logical element is often better in A-α I than in A-α2.

(p. 352)
And :
588. Lack of definiteness in the premises explains how different
conclusions may be drawn from them, but it does not explain why they are
drawn ; and in many cases we have no way of knowing whether the authority is
the source of belief, or the belief (or rather, the sentiments underlying it) is the
source of the authority. In many many other cases it is apparent that there has
been a sequence of actions and reactions. Certain sentiments lead to the
acceptance of a certain authority, and the latter in its turn reinforces the
sentiments or modifies them ; and so on over again.

(p. 354)

This is nice, we are revolving around the factors concerned in the biological
process induced by the force of language that creates social structure by generating the
sort of effects the Pareto discusses here at such length, and with such depth and
elaboration. But in all of this he never sees the nub of the matter, he never discerns the
nature of the organism and the actual reason why we evolved to produce knowledge.
In 588, when musing about which comes first, the mythology or the authority
based upon it, the obvious question to ask is, What is the nature of authority ? Why is
human existence characterised by elaborate authority structures associated with bodies of
knowledge, knowledge, what is more, that is self evidently false, but valued because it is
associated with authority ? The image this gives us is of ludicrous knowledge and
unjustifiable social power simultaneously levitated above reason, into a state of reality,
the link between false knowledge and social power is clear, but, Why should this
impossible system exist ? Clearly the question has to be, What is authority as a natural
phenomenon ? But Pareto gives not indication that he intends to examine this question,
he is too preoccupied with examining the hole in his boat to see how much water is
gushing in, so to speak. He discusses the issues amply, but tackles them not at all.
He is performing the usual ritual of treating all commentators as honourable, and
therefore treating the work they produce as flawed through no fault of the contributor. As
philosophical rules tell us, we must attack the work not the man. But the system of
knowledge production is driven by social forces, and the malevolence is built into the
system. Individuals are part of the system, so that their work is rendered malevolent
through no fault of their own. This malevolence, in terms of realising true knowledge, is
a direct product of the need for social authority to be based upon myth, which is realised
in the creation of a theocracy. So the last two selections from Pareto, put together, should
lead to the conclusion that there is a war between non-logical and logical knowledge,
induced by the fact that knowledge, as the culmination of linguistic force, creates the
social fabric of power, and this is the reason why we find these infuriating problems over
the discernment of true knowledge, which is forever struggling, not with reality, but with
a profusion of idiotic ideas that seek to prevent absolute knowledge from ever being
known, in certain particular areas where it conflicts with the myth upon which power is
based.

Here, from volume three now, we see a nice passage that I was led to by looking
up ‘ants’ in the index :

1503. That [prosecution of animals] all seems ridiculous to us ; yet who

can be sure that some few centuries hence the disquisitions of our day on the
subject of solidarity will not seem equally ridiculous, and that M. Léon
Bourgeois’s invention of a debt which is being forever cancelled and forever
revived will not occupy an honoured place beside Chassanée’s defence of the rats
of Autun ? There were jurists and theologians who thought that the procedures
used against rational beings could not be extended to brute creatures, and among
the theologians stood St. Thomas Aquinas, no less. But nothing of that sort could
put an end to such trials ; any more than in our time demonstrations of the utter
inanity of the “social contract,” of “solidarity,” “peace through law,” “Christian
Science,” and other such vagaries can put an end to the use of their respective
derivations. As usual, everyone sees the mote in his neighbour’s eye, never the
beam in his own.
1504. Derivations change in form to accommodate themselves to
circumstances, but the goal to which they are expected to lead remains
unchanged. Among the many theorists who have represented human society as
originating in some convention, pact, or contract, not a few have talked as though
they were describing a historical incident : certain human beings not as yet living
in society came together somewhere one fine day and organized human society,
very much as people in our day get together and organize a business corporation.
1505. That idea being obviously absurd, there came an effort to make it
seem a little more rational by deserting the field of history. It was now said that
the relationships that go to make up society exist not because such a constitution
was ever actually voted by men not as yet living in society, but because they
ought to be conceived as though such a constitution had been voted. “Rousseau,”
says M. Léon Bourgeois, “places the contract at the beginning of things ; we place
it at the end.” 1 That is the way Rousseau’s disciples are defending their master’s
theories today. But locate the social contract at the beginning of human society, in
the middle, or at the end, the fact still remains that the contracting parties are
disposing of things over which they have no control. Man is a social animal and
cannot live by himself, save perhaps in some case where he is reduced to extreme
poverty. From the standpoint of formal logic, therefore, the argument cannot stand
even in its new form.
 1505 1 Essai d’une philosophie de la solidarité, p. 46 : “Then, it will be said,
solidarity is the social contract ! I am willing ! I will keep the expression [He is right :
they are all variations on the same musical theme.], on condition, however, that our social
contract be not mistaken for Rousseau’s. Rousseau’s hypothesis—as he thought of it—
was merely that, and not a fact of history.”

1506. Nor is it easy to see why the contract should not hold just as well for
animal societies such as the ants and the bees. If we assume that nothing but
reasoning and logical thinking can hold human society together and prevent its
dissolution, how explain the fact that the societies of ants and bees hold together
and endure in time ? But we say that such societies are grounded on instinct.
How deny that that instinct plays its part in human societies as well ?
1507. Rousseau’s theory is essentially the theory of Hobbes. But, as
ordinarily happens with derivations, those two writers arrive at opposite
conclusions. Rousseau’s theory is in vogue today because we are living in a
democratic age. Hobbes’s theory might again prevail tomorrow if a period
favourable to absolutism should recur. And if times favourable to some other type
of social organization should some day come, no time would be lost in finding a
derivation that would still start with the premise of the social contract and reach
conclusions in harmony with that new system. The point of departure and the goal
are fixed because they correspond to certain residues that are the constant element
in the movement. Only a little imagination is required to find a derivation that will
bring the two points together. If one does not hit the mark, others will be devised ;
and so only they tickle certain residues in the people to whom they are addressed,
there can be no doubt of their favourable reception.

(Pages 959 – 961)

Can we imagine anyone expressing ideas such as this today ? Most definitely not.
No one would bring the subject of insect societies into a discussion of Rousseau’s
religiously inspired conception of human society as being made by divine human beings
acting independently of nature. Rousseau is famous, and much taught today, this is
because we live in an absolute theocracy, and it was Rousseau’s disgusting ideas that first
combated the rise of new knowledge about the nature of humans, that had been revealed
as new areas of the planet came to light and raised questions that were, at first, attacked
in the usual way, by means of direct religious oppression. Rousseau was in effect a
precursor of Darwin, as Darwin is the culmination of the likes of Rousseau. The general
point that Pareto is making here is that reason is irrelevant because the forces of
knowledge creation and dissemination are untouchable by reason, although he makes the
difficulty lie in the accumulated bias of each individual who seeks ideas that reinforce
their own sense of bias that serves their circumstances. So Pareto is putting the horse
before the cart, like everyone else, instead of seeing that people believe ideas fed to them
by the social authorities because they need to subscribe to the state dictated knowledge in
order to be acceptable members of society able to earn a living in society. It is from this
sort of dynamic that we find myth creates social power, which then sustains the myth that
creates it. This feedback loop exists because it is the force of language that creates social
structure, hence prevailing knowledge and authority sustain each other, i.e. the linguistic
force creates a structure that sustains the linguistic force that creates it. This is only the
same as saying that the genes that create an organic form sustain and preserve and
reproduce the genes that give them their form, obviously.

1930. B : Objective solutions. Rhetorical and philosophical divagations are

largely a luxury, and practical life demands something else. People want primarily to
know how they should conduct themselves in order to achieve “happiness” in the
ordinary sense of the word as material well-being. They need answers therefore to the
objective problems that arise in that connexion. The masses at large pay little attention to
the sources of their rules. They are satisfied so long as society has rules that are accepted
and obeyed. In the opposition that is aroused by any violation of them the sentiment
chiefly manifested is hostile to any disturbance of the social equilibrium (residue V-α).
That sentiment is prominent in our most ancient biblical texts, and in general in the
primitive periods of all civilizations. It appears in almost unmixed form in the feeling that
the violation of a taboo necessarily entails harmful consequences. It figures again in the
notion that anything that is legal is just, which, substantially, is another way of saying
that whatever is legal should voluntarily be respected, that an existing social equilibrium
should not be disturbed. Any intrusion on the part of reasoning is arrested by the strength
of the sentiment supporting existing norms and also by their social utility. Reasoning
therefore abandons logic and experience, turns to sophistry, and so manages to force
itself upon sentiment without too great offence to the latter. The mixture of sentiment and
sophistical explanation is essentially heterogeneous, and that accounts for the amazing
contradictions that are never lacking in such reasonings. Around the equilibrium residue
as a nucleus other residues cluster, and notably those of the II-ζ (sentiments taken as
objective realities) and of the II-η (personifications) varieties.
1931. These objective solutions, for the very reason that they are such, are easily
contradicted by the facts. The masses at large do not mind that, not attaching any great
importance to theories and accepting objective solutions that are visibly contradictory
without giving a thought to their inconsistency. Thinkers, theorists, and individuals
accustomed to logical meditation insist on knowing the sources of the norms that they are
told should be observed, and never rest till they have found origins for them, though these
exist, ordinarily, only in their own minds. Such people, moreover, are restless, annoyed,
pained, at certain apparent discords between theory and fact or between one theory and
another, and do everything in their power to attenuate, eliminate or dissemble them. In
general they do not altogether abandon objective solutions, especially solutions of an
optimistic trend, but strive by appropriate interpretations to explain away, or at least to
explain, the exceptions that undeniably are there. 1 So we get our B2, B3, and B4 types of
solutions, which, starting out from the experimental field, finally end by deserting it
altogether. The same grounds enable us safely to predict that in a given society of a
certain stability the residues that we find operative will for the most part be residues
favourable to its preservation ; and they also enable us to predict that in such a society
affirmative solutions to our problem will be the ones most widely current and most
readily accepted; while such of its individual members as feel a need for logical, or
pseudo-logical, developments will be using every means within reach and resorting to
every device of ingenious sophistry to eliminate very obtrusive contradictions between
solutions and experience. That, in fact, is actually the case. We have already seen how
derivations are used to create confusions between individual welfare and the welfare of
the community, and how that is done in order to encourage individuals to work for the
good of the community, believing, even when it is not true, that they are working for their
own good. In such cases that is as beneficial socially as it is false experimentally.

1931 ¹ That is a particular case of the use of derivations which we discussed above in
§§ 1737 f.

1932. In order at this point will be a few remarks on solutions to our problems 3
and 4, to which we alluded in general terms in § 1896. The larger and more effective
portion of the residues prevalent in a society cannot be altogether unfavourable to its
preservation ; for if that were the case, the society would break down and cease to exist.
Residues must, in part at least, be favourable to the preservation of society ; and it is in
fact observable that the residues operative in a given society are largely favourable to it.
It is to the advantage of that society, therefore, that neither such residues nor the precepts
(derivations) which express them should be impaired or minimized. But that is best
accomplished if the individual judges, believes, imagines, that in observing those
precepts, in accepting those derivations, he is working for his own welfare. Speaking,
then, in general and very roughly, disregarding possible and in fact numerous exceptions,
one may say that it is advantageous to a society that, at least in the minds of the majority
of individuals not belonging to the ruling class, problem 3 should be answered in the
sense that facts should be viewed not as they are in reality, but as they are transfigured in
the light of ideals. Therefore—passing from the general to the particular case here in
hand, the relations of moral conduct to happiness—it is advantageous to society that
individuals not of the ruling classes should spontaneously accept, observe, respect,
revere, love, the precepts current in their society, prominent among them the precepts
called—roughly, inadequately, to be sure —precepts of “morality” and precepts of
“religion”—or we might better say of “religions,” including under that term not only the
group-persistences commonly so named, but many other groups of similar character.
Hence the great power and the great effectiveness of the two forces, morality and
religion, for the good of society ; so much so that one may say that no society can exist
without them, and that a decadence in morals and religion ordinarily coincides with a
decadence of society. Human beings, therefore, from the remotest times from which their
thoughts have come down to us, have not gone wrong in solving problem 4 in the sense
that it is better for people to understand facts not as they are in reality, but as they are
pictured in the light of ideals ; and—using terms of ordinary parlance—in ascribing the
highest importance to “morality” and “religion,” meaning in general the moralities and
religions of their own particular times and countries ; while a very small number of
perspicacious and far-sighted persons were ascribing great importance to “moralities” and
“religions” in general, so coming closer to reality, where the importance actually belongs
to certain group-persistences and to the non-logical conduct that is their consequence,
implicit or explicit. But for the very reason that there has always been a gap more or less
wide between them and reality, it cannot be said that in passing that judgment on
“moralities” and on “religions” in general, and worse still, on particular moralities,
particular religions, they have not sometimes overreached the truth, so doing harm to
society though aiming only at its welfare. They have generally gone wrong in trying to
justify their adherence to their particular solutions of problem 4, almost always giving
reasons that were in some respect fallacious even when not imaginary and fantastic. But
that, after all, is a merely theoretical error, and therefore of little importance ; for,
whatever the reasons, effects remain. But seriously harmful, at all times then and now, is
the error of identifying morality and religion with some special morality and some special
religion, so giving to derivations an emphasis that belongs only to residues. So it has
come about that whenever the champions of such theories have had a clear field that
particular error has led to enormous wastage of energies in efforts to achieve results of
little or no consequence, and has occasioned untold and altogether futile sufferings for
many many human beings. And so also it has happened that when such champions have
met with resistance, their antagonists also have conceived the mistaken notion of
extending to all group-persistences, to non-logical conduct of all kinds, the objections
that could justly be urged against the enforcement of a specific derivation originating in
certain specific group-persistences. If a given group-persistence, Q, which is beneficial to
society, finds expression in the derivations A, B, C, D ... it is usually detrimental to a
society to try to enforce a specific derivation, A, to the exclusion of the others, B, C . . .
whereas it is beneficial to a society that individuals should adopt the derivations most
acceptable to them, thereby showing that they are harbouring the residue, Q, which alone
—or almost alone—is the important thing. 2

1932 2 We have frequently pointed to the logico-experimental weakness—the absurdity

even—of certain derivations ; but we have also given repeated warnings that in so doing we had
no intention of minimizing in the slightest the social utility of the residues of which they were
manifestations. That usefulness is likewise not affected when we point to the harm that is done by
trying to enforce certain derivations. What we have said as to the experimental ineptness of the
derivations of certain religions and the harm that is done in trying to force some of their
derivations upon a public must not be understood, as is commonly the case, in the sense that the
group-persistences functioning in those religions are not beneficial but harmful. Among such
religions we even include the sex religion, with which we have frequently had to deal because of
absurd and pernicious derivations connected with it.

1933. Negative solutions are not seldom capricious manifestations of pessimism,

outbursts on the part of individuals who have been hurt or vanquished in the battles of
life. They do not assume popular forms very readily. Scientific solutions, which are not
expressions of sentiment but arise from observations of fact, are very rare. When they are
put forward, they are correctly understood by very few people ; and that exactly was the
fate of the scientific portions of Machiavelli’s theories (§ 1975). Optimistic and
pessimistic solutions may exist side by side, for, as we have frequently seen,
contradictory residues may be active simultaneously or successively in the same
individual. The masses at large ignore such contradictions ; the educated try to eliminate
them, and the effort leads to one or another of our solutions.

(Pages 1342 – 1347)

 This passage on objective solutions is selected for its discussion of the manner in
which the biomass accepts the orders imposed by their masters. Pareto makes this a
further elaboration upon how people obey idiotic orders, but he still fails to explain why a
mammal would evolve this strategy of life organization. Why can we not achieve the
same ends achieved by deception, by straight talking ? The answer is obviously because
there is no such thing as an individual, there is only the superorganism which intelligence
evolved, based on language, to coordinate, so that individuals must follow a programme
obediently, not according to reason. As he says people are hoodwinked into doing that
which is good for society on the pretext that it is good for themselves, when the
behaviour in question self evidently is no good for anyone engaged in it, only for those
whose interests are associated with the ordering of society, the elite who benefit
inordinately from social organization, this indicates the need for a body of individual
who benefit to excess, in order to act as the agents of superorganic development.
Ultimately, while murder and slavery is a perfectly serviceable means of achieving the
required aim, and always in use, deception is far superior in terms of building a refined
social structure on a grand scale that will be more powerful than others not so coherently
integrated at the level of individual deception.

Thinkers, theorists, and individuals accustomed to logical meditation insist on

knowing the sources of the norms that they are told should be observed, and never
rest till they have found origins for them, though these exist, ordinarily, only in
their own minds. Such people, moreover, are restless, annoyed, pained, at certain
apparent discords between theory and fact or between one theory and another, and
do everything in their power to attenuate, eliminate or dissemble them. In general
they do not altogether abandon objective solutions, especially solutions of an
optimistic trend, but strive by appropriate interpretations to explain away, or at
least to explain, the exceptions that undeniably are there.

This passage opens by perfectly describing myself, and Pareto may well of said
the same of himself given the tenor of his work, its search for reason in the realm of
knowledge overrun with irrationality, that indeed leads him to this specific observation.
But here we are really being offered an explanation as to why there is a ceaseless struggle
by a myriad of brilliant authors devoting their lives to the search for truth, which
nonetheless always results in the same old failure, so that no matter how determined a
person is to be logical they only ever add to the mountain of non-logical works. This is a
bit like the observation made by Nietzsche to the effect that all philosophers simply offer
a view of the world that reflects their own personal bias, and tells us nothing about reality
per se, which certainly describes his own work.
 Chapter Nineteen

Retrospective

After looking at the way Pareto struggles to develop a modern interrogation of

human nature, published in 1916, I thought it would be fun to take a look at what was
being said by the most radical scientific thinkers in England, on precisely the same
subject, almost one century earlier.

CHAPTER VII.

Faculties of the Mind ; Speech ; Diseases ; Recapitulation.

_______

ALL philosophers refer with one accord to the enjoyment of reason, as the chief and most
important prerogative of the human species. If we inquire, however, more particularly
into the meaning of this word, we shall be surprised to find what various senses different
individuals affix to the same expression. According to some, reason is a peculiar faculty
of the mind, belonging exclusively to man : others consider it as a more enlarged and
complete development of a power which exists, in a less degree, in other animals : some
describe it as a combination of all the higher faculties of the mind ; while others assert
that it is only a peculiar direction of them. “Non nostrum inter hos tantas componere
lites.”
The subject may, perhaps, be more shortly and safely despatched by considering it
à posteriori. In order to acquire a clear and satisfactory notion of the mental nature of
man and animals, it would be necessary for us to have as complete a knowledge of their
internal movements, as we have of our own. But, as it is impossible to know what passes
within them, or how to rank and estimate their sensations, in relation to those of man, we
can only judge by comparing the effects which result from the natural operations of both.
Let us, therefore, consider these effects ; and, while we acknowledge all the
particular resemblances, we shall only examine some of the most general distinctions.
The most stupid man is able to manage the most alert and sagacious animal ; he governs
it, and makes it subservient to his purposes. This he effects, not so much by bodily
strength or address, as by the superiority of his intellectual nature. He compels the animal
to obey him, by his power of projecting and acting in a systematic manner. The strongest
and most sagacious animals have not the capacity of commanding the inferior tribes, or
of reducing them to a state of servitude. The stronger, indeed, devour the weaker : but
this action implies an urgent necessity only, and a voracious appetite ; qualities very
different from that which produces a train of actions all directed to one common design.
If animals be endowed with this faculty, why do not some of them assume the reins of
government over others, and force them to furnish their food, to watch for them, and to
relieve the sick or wounded ? But among animals there is no mark of subordination, nor
the least trace of any of them being able to recognise or feel a superiority in his nature
above that of other species. We should therefore conclude, that all animals are in this
respect of the same nature, and that the nature of man is not only far superior, but
likewise of a very different kind from that of the brute.
Thrown on the surface of the globe, weak, naked, and defenceless, man appeared
created for inevitable destruction. Evils assailed him on every side ; the remedies
remained hidden. But he had received from his Creator the gift of inventive genius, which
enabled him to discover them. His exertions were roused by the various wants of food,
clothing, and dwelling, by the infinite variety of climate, soil, and other circumstances.

Pater ipse colendi

Haud facilem esse viam voluit ; primusque per artem
Movit agros ; curis acuens mortalia corda.

This prerogative of invention seemed so important in the earlier periods of society, that it
has been honoured with divine worship, as the Thoth of the Egyptians, the Hermes of the
Greeks.
“The first savages collected in the forests a few nourishing fruits, a few salutary
roots, and thus supplied their most immediate wants. The first shepherds observed that
the stars move in a regular course, and made use of them to guide their journies across the
plains of the desert. Such was the origin of the mathematical and physical sciences.
“Once convinced that it could combat nature by the means which she herself
afforded, genius reposed no more ; it watched her without relaxation ; it incessantly made
new conquests over her, all of them distinguished by some improvement in the situation
of our race.
“From that time a succession of conducting minds, faithful depositaries of the
attainments already made, constantly occupied in connecting them, in vivifying them by
means of each other, have conducted us, in less than forty ages, from the first essays of
rude observers, to the profound calculations of NEWTON and LA PLACE, to the learned
classifications of LINNEUS and JUSSIEU. This precious inheritance, perpetually increasing,
brought from Chaldea into Egypt, from Egypt into Greece, concealed during ages of
disaster and of darkness, recovered in more fortunate times, unequally spread among the
nations of Europe, has every where been followed by wealth and power ; the nations
which have reaped it, are become the mistresses of the world ; such, as have neglected it,
are fallen into weakness and obscurity.”*

* CUVIER, Reflections on the Progress of the Sciences, &c. read at the Royal Institute of
France, April 24,1816.

Man has made tools for assisting his labour ; and hence FRANKLIN sagaciously
defined him a “tool-making animal :” he has formed arms and weapons, he has devised
various means of procuring fire. Lastly, “The most noble and profitable invention of all
others was that of speech ; whereby men declare their thoughts one to another for mutual
utility and conversation, without which there had been amongst men neither
commonwealth nor society, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves.”* This is a
most important characteristic of man, since it is not born with him, like the voices of
animals, but has been framed and brought into use by himself, as the arbitrary variety of
different languages incontestably proves.

* HOBBES ; Leviathan.

Man exhibits, by external signs, what passes within him ; he communicates his
sentiments by words, and this sign is universal. The savage and the civilized man have
the same powers of utterance ; both speak naturally, and are equally understood. It is not
owing, as some have imagined, to any defect in their organs, that animals are denied the
faculty of speech. The tongue of a monkey is as perfect as that of a man : CAMPER asserts
that the laryngeal pouch renders it impossible for the orang-outang to speak ; I do not
clearly understand how this is ascertained ; but, allowing its truth, there are other
monkeys, who have not this pouch, and yet cannot speak.
Several animals may be taught to pronounce words, and even to repeat sentences ;
which proves clearly that the want of speech is not owing to any defect in their organs ;
but to make them conceive the ideas, which these words express, is beyond the power of
art. They articulate and repeat like an echo or machine.
Language implies a train of thinking ; and for this reason brute animals are
incapable of speech ; for, though their external senses are not inferior to our own, and
though we should allow some of them to possess a faint dawning of comparison,
reflection, and judgment, it is certain that they are unable to form that association of
ideas, in which alone the essence of thought consists.
The possession of speech, therefore, corresponds to the more numerous,
diversified, and exalted intellectual and moral endowments of man, and is a necessary aid
to their exercise and full development. The ruder faculties and simple feelings of animals
do not require such assistance. The natural language of inarticulate sounds, gestures, and
actions, suffices far their purposes. The wonderful discovery of alphabetical writing, and
the invention of printing, complete the benefits derived from the noble prerogative of
speech.
With the operations of animals, who always perform the same work in the very
same manner ; the execution of any individual being neither better nor worse than that of
any other ; in whom the individual, at the end of some months, is what he will remain
through life, and the species, after a thousand years, just what it was in the first year ;—
contrast the results of human industry and invention, and the fruits of that perfectibility,
which characterizes both the species and the individual. By the intelligence of man the
animals have been subdued, tamed, and reduced to slavery : by his labours marshes have
been drained, rivers confined, their cataracts effaced, forests cleared, and the earth
cultivated. By his reflection, time has been computed, space measured, the celestial
motions recognized and represented, the heavens and the earth compared. He has not
merely executed, but has executed with the utmost accuracy, the apparently impracticable
tasks assigned by the poet,

Go wondrous creature ! mount where science guides ;

Weigh air, measure earth, and calculate the tides.
By human art, which is an emanation of science, mountains have been overcome, and the
seas have been traversed ; the pilot pursuing his course on the ocean, with as much
certainty, as if it had been traced for him by engineers, and finding at each moment the
exact point of the globe on which he is, by means of astronomical tables. Thus nations
have been united ; and a new world has been discovered, opening such a field for the
unfettered and uncorrupted energies of our race, that the senses are confused, the mind
dazzled, and judgment and calculation almost suspended by the grandeur and brightness
of the glorious and interminable prospects. The whole face of the earth at present exhibits
the works of human power, which, though subordinate to that of nature, often exceeds, at
least, so wonderfully, seconds her operations, that, by the aid of man, her whole extent is
unfolded, and she has gradually arrived at that point of perfection and magnificence in
which we now behold her.
In the point of view which I have just considered, man stands alone : his faculties,
and what he has effected by them, place him at a wide interval from all animals ; at an
interval which no animal hitherto known to us can fill up. The man-like monkey, the
almost reasonable elephant, the docile dog, the sagacious beaver, the industrious bee,
cannot be compared to him. In none of these instances is there any progress either in the
individuals or the species.
In most of the feelings, of which other individuals of the species are the objects,
and in all which come under the denomination of moral sentiments, there is a marked
difference between man and animals, and a decided inferiority of the latter. The
attachment of the mother to the offspring, so long as its wants and feebleness require her
aid and defence, seems as strong in the animal, as in the human being ; and bears equally
in both the characters of actions termed instinctive. Its duration is confined in the former
case, even in social animals, to the period of helplessness ; and the animal instinct is not
succeeded, as in man, by that continued intercourse of affection and kind offices, and
those endearing relations, which constitute the most exalted pleasures of human life.
Of courage the animal kingdom offers many examples ; and the moralists have
celebrated the attachment of the dog to his master. It may be doubted whether we can
find any instances of such feeling between animals themselves, excepting some cases of
sexual unions. In general, they seem entirely destitute of sympathy with each other,
indifferent to each other’s sufferings or joys, and unmoved by the worst usage or acutest
pangs of their fellows. Indeed, if we except some associated labours in the insect class,
principally referring to the continuation of the species, and securing a supply of food, and
some joint operations of the male and female in the higher classes, animals seem entirely
incapable of concert or co-operation for common purposes, of combining various
exertions for the attainment of a common end. This appears to arise from the limited
nature and extent of their knowing and reflecting powers ; to which probably we must
refer their incapability of conceiving moral relations.

(Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man, William

Lawrence, 1834, pages 147 – 151. First pub. 1819)

See how woefully primitive the words of the great French scientist Cuvier seem,
just one century prior to Pareto. It would be nice to be able to say we advanced over the
course of the century, but Pareto shows just how far from the truth this assertion would
be. We have not really advanced even now, for although, superficially speaking, we have
advanced greatly, it could be argued that we have sunk into a terrible pit of ignorance,
from which there is no hope of escape. A pit of ignorance constructed quite deliberately
by the theocratic establishment, to protect itself from these free and dangerous ideas that
are still naive and fresh in Lawrence’s time, so much so that, as a man training to be a
medical doctor, he was forced to recant on the radical approach he took towards the study
of man, in which he treated humans as a part of nature, which was taken to deny that man
had a soul. This was unacceptable, but the establishment knew it could not just go on
abusing people like Lawrence, and continue forcing them to retract from views that their
scientific training led them to hold. It was up to men of Lawrence’s time to find a
solution, it was up to Darwin, the saviour of the Jews, in conjunction with Hitler, with
whom he is so closely associated, in spirit, and rightly so, as a source of inspiration to the
great Nazi, the dark-hero of the Jews.
In Lawrence’s day, before people like Lawrence had shown a Darwin the way to
build a false science that could be incorporated into the academic pantheon of false
knowledge, sterilising the life sciences and annihilating the human sciences, the people
inclined to seek knowledge did so in a free world, before the shadow of religion was cast
over, a smothering blanket of ignorance. Now I talk to young scientists and they are
blind, they think I am a lunatic ; that is how sad science is now. Weep for our freedom, if
we could but of lived in a time when we would of been burned at the stake, and thus of
known what freedom was, even if we did no have it. Now we are so ignorant of what
freedom is we do not even know we do not have it. What the eye does not see the heart
does not grieve for ; oh to be a moron, how is it done ?
 Conclusion

What do all our ruminations tell us about the experience we have of being
human ?
Most of all they tell us that no on knows anything about what they are doing, or
why they do what they do. Which is a fairly remarkable conclusion to come to given the
global organization that rules our world with a sense of purpose fit for a god. But there is
no other conclusion we can come to, we are forced to realise this idea when we look to
our own, to those whom we have made the target of all our energies, those who held the
key in their hands and devoted their lives to unravelling the mysteries of society based on
the secret that humans are a species of superorganic mammals.
After experiencing the inspired idea that people were not individuals and they had
some sort of nature akin to social insects, it took me a couple of years to discover a thread
running back from the present time to the nineteenth century where this idea reigned
supreme. Principles of Social and Political Theory, by Ernest Barker, 1965, first
published 1951, had been in the bookcase in my living room for years, and one quite
evening I flipped through and discovered Gierke, this was the chink in the armour of the
theocracy that let the light flood in to me.
This is all some half a dozen years ago now, it cannot of been too long after this
that I found the one reference book that exists on the topic of the social organism,
Organismic Theories of the State, Francis Coker, 1910, a publication edited by the faculty
of political science at Columbia University. From this I had a clutch of names, and from
here my prime target became Lilienfeld because he was named as the sole advocate of
society as a true organism. It seems this categorization is derived from his persistent use
of the term ‘real organism’ in his discussions. But finding books by some of those named
is nye on impossible. Schäffle caught my attention, and the great stumbling block there
was that his work is printed in medieval script, and impossible to digitalise ; without
more effort than I can command. Another character was Worms, a Frenchman, and he
was a prolific author, and I took to buying odd bits and pieces that were hanging around,
cheap, and of no apparent interest to anyone, even though they are evidently rare. As a
consequence I have just turned La Science et L’art en Économie Politique, 1896, into
text, and I am currently, today being 26/03/08, turning Natalité et Régime Successoral,
1917, into text. These are not items I find naturally interesting, but the latter is proving to
be more interesting than I imagined it would, not that I have a clue what it is about, not
much of one anyway, I cannot even make up my mind what the title should be in
English ! But, it is from working on this last work by Worms over the last few days that I
find myself prompted to think of writing a conclusion, something I am not given to
because it hardly lends itself to the kind of ideas we are working on. It is difficult enough
to make a start, let alone to come to a conclusion.
Worms was a notorious promoter of the idea of the social organism, and it was a
sociologist, and what we have in this last work, which we may translate as Birth-rate and
the System of Succession, is an inquiry into the influence of the birth-rate and its
concomitant, the population, on the survival of the nation, of the social organism even.
The foreword seems to say that the question is of some relevance because of the ongoing
war, and the fact that the French, who have been attacked by the Germans have had a
declining population for many decades. What is of interest is that we have here a very
real situation to which a contemporary advocate whose ideas are steeped in the idea of
the social organism tries to make sense of the natural dynamics, as opposed to the
political dynamics of the situation.
But, needless to say, he gets nowhere, how can he, he is a virulent Jew, so he is
precluded from any possibility of understanding human existence from a scientific stance,
as anyone professing a religious identity of any kind must be. For Worms, as for all his
contemporaries, the nation is the social organism ; although there was never any absolute
certainty about this, and of course the very idea is absurd, as some pointed out, it must be
wrong because religion breaches the bounds of national identity. But to see the truth
means destroying religion, and for a man such a Worms, a Jew, this would mean
becoming Adolf Hitler before Hitler became the monster of anti-Semitism. In Hitler’s
hands anti-Semitism was a saving grace for the Jews, however painful, whereas in the
hands of an academic like Worms, anti-Semitism would of meant the end of Judaism and
the death of the global superorganism which is Jewish. But we cannot suggest that
Worms sat back and pondered this position, and decided to subvert sociology
accordingly. His personal identity would of led him to do what was right, for Judaism,
and so he subverted the science of sociology. There is a passage in one of his three
volume work on sociology where he discusses the question whether religion provide the
identity defining the limits of the social organism, and he decides this is no so, for what
reason I cannot recall now, but this snippet told me all I need to know about Worms, he
was a fraud like everyone else, but now I know he is a Jew, well, what can we expect.
What this has done is to make me realise that the people who worked during the
course of the nineteenth century, on the nature of human society, and had the benefit of
knowing that society had to be a social organism, and who failed to take this idea to its
natural end, letting it wither and die, instead, were actually performing the role of
conformists, despite my inclination to view them as the nineteenth century equivalent of
myself, the loose canons on board. Certainly these people were the challenge to the
theocracy, but they nonetheless an essential part of the theocracy, they were protagonist
driving the theocracy to realise a formula that everyone could live with in a scientific age
ruled by an absolute theocracy.
This puts a wholly different complexion on the main theme of all our ideas, in that
we can think of the feud between religion and science as always having been about
bringing knowledge to the point where peace could reign in a world where science would
be tamed, sterilised. And this is the natural process that has presumably gone on in all
times and places. From this position we cannot expect there to be rebels in the machinery
today, because the authorities have their formula, courtesy of Darwin, and all ideas, to be
within bounds, must acknowledge Darwin’s religiously informed conception of
evolution. So today no one is inclined to rock the boat, they all want the formula that
allows the world to proceed as it does. Knowledge poses no major difficulties for most
people, religion and science have been separated from each other. I may not think so,
and I may be right, but the fact is that scientists and atheists alike have no problem at all
with religion, they accept that this is the business of people who are religious, they do not
see, as I say they should, that religion is just as much their business as any behaviour that
we take an interest in even though it is not a personal interest of our own, such as drug
taking, robbery, the plunder of natural resources, and so on. The separation that
individual profess to accommodate is contrived, but not by the individuals so much, but
by the whole machinery of social philosophy, by education and all that teaches us what
is.

Something more can be said at this point, concerning the way my ideas are
developed. I love buying these old continental authors, even though they take a chunk of
my available funds, and I cannot make any real use of them because I only speak English.
I think of myself as taking the part of a collector, which I certainly do when I buy an old
Schäffle volume in Fraktur typeface. But that is OK, I like collecting old things, so why
not collect old books ? But I also feel as though just getting my hands on the rare items
produced by people who lived in the time when science was yet to be sterilised, people
who were creating ideas informed by the idea of the social organism, gives me a real
connection with the ideas of these people, however tenuous. And, by scanning pages,
and running the images through a text reader, and producing my own copies of these
works in text format, I get a nudge closer to what they wrote, I can recognise key phrases
like ‘social organism’ and names, I noticed the name Schäffle appear in Worms Natalité
yesterday, so I can glean little bits from these books just by owning them. And
occasionally I get a valuable nugget, such as the item noticed above, when I say that we
actually have evidence that someone thought about the possibility that religion might be
the basis of the social organism, the most dangerous idea any human could ever have,
and there it is, in Worms, rejected, of course, but recorded in black and white ;
magnificent ! Such an idea would be unthinkable in any English speaking work,
including any American work, no one would dare voice such an idea, or publish it, such
an idea, coming from an intellectual, makes anything Hitler said pale into insignificance ;
if developed, obviously if you are going to do what Worms did and mention it to dismiss
it, you may as well not bother, but English speaking intellectual would even dare to be so
unruly as to mention such a genuinely scientific idea. We English are the ultimate slaves,
the most powerful people on earth, as a linguistic group, we know our power depends
upon our subservience, it is a curious combination of opposite forces in the one unit,
positive and negative bound in one form ; sounds familiar, sounds like the basis of all
matter.
The idea that individuals know that their success depends upon their subservience
gives us a perfect description of the relationship between the insect and its organism.
Talking about how it is possible to pick up snippets of useful material while working our
way through a foreign book for the purposes of copying it into a modern text format, I
found this yesterday, 26/03/08 :

L’explication ultime de ce principe égalitaire ne se trouve sans doute pas

dans un raisonnement explicite et formel. Elle se doit chercher plutôt dans un
sentiment. C’est, en effet, dans la sphère de l’instinct que se placent les mobiles
profonds qui font agir les masses et déterminent la grande majorité des actions
humaines. Chaque nation a ainsi ses sentiments dominants, qui peuvent différer
de l’une à l’autre, mais qui varient peu dans l’intérieur de chacune. A cet égard, il
existe entre les deux grandes nations occidentales, l’Angleterre et la France, une
 distinction assez accentuée. L’Anglais a la passion de la liberté ; le Français a
celle de l’égalité. Le fait se constate dans tous les domaines de la vie publique et
privée. C’est un de ces faits premiers qu’il faut prendre comme une donnée de la
science sociale, où il explique bien des choses, sans pouvoir être lui-même
complètement expliqué. C’est une caractéristique des deux races, comme il y a
pour les espèces animales des caractères différentiels, que le zoologiste note sans
prétendre en rendre raison. Et de même que les caractères organiques, les traits de
la psychologie collective, tout en évoluant à la longue, ne sont guère modifiables
par notre action, du moins immédiatement. On doit les accepter comme
pratiquement fixes. La tendance égalitaire est un de ces traits constitutifs de
l’esprit français. Elle apparaît avec notre histoire nationale, elle subsiste sous les
régimes (pourtant si opposés à elle) de la féodalité et de la monarchie centraliste,
elle triomphe avec la Révolution. C’est elle qui inspire nos lois et nos mœurs
successorales. On ne l’en éliminera pas demain.

Translated by machine, without any modification :

The ultimate explanation of this principle égalitaire does not be located

doubtless in an explicit and definite reasoning. She must look for herself rather in
a feeling. This is, in fact, in the sphère of the instinct that place themselves the
movable deep one that do to act the masses and determine the big majority of the
human actions. Every nation has thus its feelings dominating, that can differ of
each other, but that vary little in the interior of each. In this respect, it exists
between the two big western nations, the England and France, a rather stressed
distinction. The English has the passion of liberty; the French has the one of
equality. The fact notes itself in all the domains of public and private life. This is
a therefore first one that it is necessary to take as a data of the social science,
where it explains several things, without being himself completely explained.
This is a characteristic of the two races, as there is for the animal types of the
differential characters, that the zoologiste notes without claiming some to return
reason. And just like the organic characters, the traits of collective psychology,
all while evolving to the long one, are not at all modifiables by our action, less
immediately. One must accept them as practically set up. The tendency égalitaire
is an of these constituent traits of the French spirit. She appears with our national
history, she exists under the systems (nevertheless if opposed to her) féodalité and
monarchy centraliste, she triumph with the Revolution. This is she that inspires
our laws and our of succession mœurs. One not some will eliminate it tomorrow.

(Natalité et Régime Successoral, Worms, 1917, pages 110 – 111)

Which caught my eye because of the bit saying “L’Anglais a la passion de la liberté ; le
Français a celle de l’égalité.” Today we so often here the question asked, What is it to be
English ? or Is there an English identity ? These questions are of course part of the
programme of ethnic cleansing mounted by the alien priesthood against the indigenous
portion of the biomass resident in this part of the territory it controls, it just so happens
that the superorganism has resided here for two millennia now and as part of its process
of growth it has formed an exoskeletal body part according to the nationalistic plan that
has served it well, but now needs adjusting as a new stage of growth advances, due to the
globalisation process reaching a new stage where Asian and European biomasses need to
be amalgamated. Hence it is nice to see someone take notice of the primary quality of
what it means to be English, the quality I was raised to cherish above all other things, a
love of freedom.
My problem, that has made me into the philosopher of alienation, is that I took
this profession of belief literally, or I was taught to take it literally, and did so. There was
no pragmatism in my upbringing in respect to this quality, I was taught an idealistic
model of this virtuous love of freedom. From the earliest time I knew, for whatever
reason, that the world did not conform to this ideal, and most especially our society did
not conform to this ideal, it was the early post war period and there was a mini rebellion.
I saw an interview with one of the cultural voices of that rebellion on TV the other day,
an actor from Monty Python, the satirical show that took the piss out of conformity. He
said that in those days we really felt we were changing things, we were ushering in a new
age .... then we got Thatcher. Well, I was a child coming into maturity as these people
were generating the sixties revolution, and I absorbed the essence of the rebellion into my
spirit, and my philosophy is a direct consequences of these influences, influences now so
long dead and buried I am but a fossil of the sixties at the tender age of fifty two. Today
no one gives a shit about freedom, no one knows what it means to be English, and the
idea of freedom has been perverted by the priests to serve their own religious ends, and
nothing more. Or that is how it feels, but this feeling must be a product of my narrow,
time bound perspective, the truth must be that the idea of freedom was always a priestly
imposition, like all the linguistic devices written into the linguistic programme. The
priests flick the switches in our programme by turning on an array of words in a sequence
that they vary to suit their needs.
So we continue to spout the language of freedom, but freedom means nothing
more to us than what the social powers that rule us tell us freedom means. And because
we are a great nation, powerful and wealthy, with a great tradition, we are able to accept
whatever we are told, so that our power is linked to our subservience to the programme,
we speak the words of the programme, which for an English person is ‘freedom’ and for
a French person is ‘equality’ ; how appropriate that we should delve into this topic as the
French president and his babe wife ponce about with our monarchy and discuss pumping
up the nuclear power output in these islands, at this very time.
Freedom is essentially an abstract idea, in order for freedom to mean anything
there must be a structure in place to which the word can be related. Given a social
structure, the word freedom can be applied, and this is the critical point concerning this
word, it is structural. We have discussed the dependence words like ‘freedom’ and
‘rights’ upon conditions of the opposite kind elsewhere, making freedom a an attribute of
slave societies. We have done this because we have argued that it is only after slavery
has become the norm that freedom can take its place, before the imposition of slavery
there can be no freedom. And this accords perfectly with the scientific analysis of
modern society that causes us to speak of ourselves as slaves, even though we live in a
society personified by freedom. The only way to make sense of these linguistic
contradictions is to understand that linguistic meaning is not what we take it to be, but
rather words are elements of a linguistic programme that denotes, and therefore creates,
social structure. This description is associated with the scientific conception of society as
an organic construct, therefore freedom can be understood as a progressive state of
slavery, or a highly evolved slave state ; which is exactly how we describe our condition
due to the advance of the Jewish identity throughout the planetary human biomass in the
form of two sub-Judaic identity implants. As long as we accept that Christianity is
Christianity, and we therefore think that Christianity is a quite distinct identity from
Judaism, then we have no call to speak of ourselves as slaves of anyone, we are obliged
to think of Christianity as the Christian organization tells us to think of Christianity, as a
distinct identity. But of course there is no reason whatever to pay any heed to what the
religious tell us about religion, quite the reverse, we must work out what religion means
in biological terms.
And this leads to the bizarre situation in which freedom is realised for Christians
in England because they are free to practice and promote their slave identity, while for an
atheist the exact opposite applies, it is precisely because Christians, and all other religious
denominations are free to rule our society in every detail, that we know we are slaves
living in a salve society. This result occurs because of the structural nature of language
relative to social structure. These ideas are incredibly potent, that get at the very fabric of
society and what it means to human, stripping all flesh from society just as genetics strips
the flesh from our bodies in its revelation of what the human body is and how the body is
formed.

The passage taken from Worms is actually rather a superb selection, we see
Worms applying the logic of the nation as the personification of the superorganism to
perfection. He is asserting that the French and English social organisms have, like any
discrete individual, their own personal nature. But we have seen that the idea of freedom
so precious to English people is a linguistic deception taking effect at the deepest level of
our individual being. And we have made it plane that religion defines the social
organism, and France and English being equally Christian slave states are merely
segments of the Jewish global superorganism. It follows that all that ‘equality’ is to the
French is the same as what ‘freedom’ is to the English, a mere linguistic mechanism, part
of the Jewish slave identity programme. As we said for ‘freedom’, so we may say for
‘equality’, the ideal conception of equality can only be conceived of after a state of
inequality has been made the norm. So ideals like that of ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’ have
the quality of being structural elaboration of societies made subject to alien identities. As
I write this, 27/03/08 13:21:09, BBC 1 news is in Tibet, monks are saying that all they
want it freedom, this is real, there has been riots over the last week because China is
hosting the Olympic games and making itself vulnerable to outside pressures, which are
fuelling internal rebellion amongst the satellite nations of the Chinese empire.
It can never make sense to deny the realities of life as we try to make sense of
humans as a product of nature. A primary concept of the scientific realisation that
humans are a superorganism is that, as often with science, this idea shows us things we
cannot see directly. So the call for freedom in Tibet is the product of China imposing its
rule on the formerly independent nation ; as we said, you cannot call for freedom, or even
conceive of freedom, unless you first know what slavery is, so freedom must be an
attribute of slavery. But what our scientific model shows is why these circumstances
arise in the first place, where social structures come into being in such a form as
independent territorial areas that encroach upon one another, and resist encroachment. all
aspect of the process are therefore normal and healthy, but this is not the impression we
either have naturally or we receive from those who inform us about these circumstances.
The imposition of slavery is normal and healthy within the social structure of the
human superorganism, and the moderation of slavery into supra organic national forms
whereby enslaved conglomerations become attuned to a new being, is also natural and
healthy. But as unitary elements within the processes involved in such large scale
transformations, the actual dynamics and events involved in these processes are
experienced differently to how our abstract superorganic model reveals them in
naturalistic terms. The initiation of our collective being into slavery to Judaism in
England two millennia ago was traumatic and unpleasant, and the various stages in the
transformation which culminated in the invasion of 1066, from which our modern
national identity can be traced, with significant readjustments along the way since then
too, such as the English Revolution of the seventeenth century, which ushered in the
modern period associated with a monarchical figurehead crowning a democratic face,
have continued to develop the sophistication of the superorganic structure which fits us,
the English, into the grand design of the global organism that we are a key part of.
And the exact same experience that characterises the British is repeated in every
spot on the planet, where all territory is inducted into the Jewish model. The induction
proceeds according to the method applied by the most perfect vanguard of Jewish
expansion, the Romans, whereby the local conditions are recognised, except that as the
means of advancing Judaism around the globe were perfected in the form of Roman
physiological structure, so new two new identities were generated to supplant local
identities, as far as possible. Accordingly, even as far as out closest geographical
neighbours are concerned, we find slight twists in the representation of the process
whereby our slave organization adjusted itself to make our slave identity our own
identity, so that where we English love ‘freedom’, even though we would not know
freedom if it pissed on us, the French adore ‘equality’, even as they could not tell equality
from frog’s legs if the two were served on one plate.
Yet, the core passions of our identity do have repercussions on our national
avocations, the English are driven in obedience to the dictates of their slave identity by
the mantra of freedom written into their local identity formula, and likewise the French.
The way the French fight for workers rights is something I much admire, but the French
are unable to resist the capitalist model at the heart of the Jewish superorganism, a model
exalted by the freedom loving British, so that, tragically, the French are coming under
ever greater pressure to lose their privileges, to match our blandness. There are
differences then, and this is an inherent feature of the human biomass, for although
human physiology evolved to form social structure, the process whereby social structure
is formed necessitates a free running dynamic as a base quality of the human form, which
then requires a formula able to organize that free dynamic into an organized whole. The
organization involves building localised blocks of stability that can be buttressed up
against further blocks of localised stability, whereby each block preserves localised
differences relative to its neighbouring blocks, and those further afield, but where all are
so structured that all blocks are riven within a common dynamic that causes them all to
come together to create one superorganic form, the Jewish superorganism.
 Saturday, 29 March 2008, BBC 2, Martin Luther King : American Prophet,
“secular icon of human rights” and “his mission as a Baptist pastor”. This is on TV now.
I am not watching it, but the virulent Christian slave dirge pouring from the mouth of this
man made me think. This brought to mind how the black ‘secular’ slaves of America
were turned into official slaves of Judaism, showing how beautifully the human
disposition to be a slave works. The blacks in America are the finest example of the
slave making process, applicable where we have just been discussing how freedom is a
quality of slavery because it is only by being made into a salve in the material sense that
we can know freedom in the spiritual sense. The spiritual sense is however a particularly
vicious form of slavery because it involves robbing our souls, or spirit, by giving us our
identity, imposed, exactly as with the pupae victims of slave making, from within by
taking control of society.
Goby Oona King, is spouting the sermon for our masters in my ear, about how
religion is not always a force for evil, but how, in our secular society, we forget that
religion can be a force for good. What can we expect form a politician, lying, sneaky,
nasty, nasty, creatures.
It is only because evil people who spout religion are promoting slavery to Judaism
that they ever had a voice, they are working for the slave masters, but they do not know,
the ugly ideas of man like King are the product of the unmitigated evil of religion as a
way of knowing who we are. Certainly we cannot blame people like King, nor even
mindless dupes like King for continuing to promote our servile existence, but it is sure
irritating to live in a world so powerful, so full of knowledge, and at the same time to
know that in terms of the flux of collective self knowledge we are forced to live by we
are no one jot further advanced or free than were any inhabitants of the ancient
civilizations of old. Tragic. Nice of King, and the Beebe, to bring these thoughts to our
attention though.
It sounds terrible to speak thus of a contemporary hero, someone so revered for
fighting against what is, perhaps, the only infamy that could outrank anti-Semitism for its
call upon our grovelling awe ; the modern trade in African slaves is on a par with the
Nazi holocaust as a device to cow the masses. No wonder it should be used as a tool by
the vile people who seek to command the earth. But, there is no reason to think any
particular individual is evil, neither King nor his namesake, no matter how disgusting
they appear to us, need know that there is no greater evil than Judaism, and as the slave
appendage of Judaism, Christianity is the supreme insult to decent humans. These
individuals, like all the rest of us, are, when they become public agents, but tools in a
creative linguistic process that makes the human superorganism.
The beauty of the American slave trade, and its history of supreme salvation
through an advocate of Christian slavery, who was in any case just the latest priest in a
long line of miscreant deceivers that exploited this Christian instituted evil, offering
freedom from slavery felt, through slavery unseen, is that modern American slavery so
nicely reveals the manner in which Judaism has taken over the world, and how Judaism
continues to act toward this objective of one perfect superorganic unity across the earth
by continually playing enclaves of unity off against one another in such a way that
religion, as in the case of Tibet always takes on the form of a saviour, even though it is
religion that is always the aggressor behind the mask of evil, against which religion’s
advocates protest. This is how humans act identically to ants that are made slaves by a
convoluted process of induction into the complex superorganic being, where over-folded
layers of differently constituted segments of biomass are wrapped up into one whole
being, via an all embracing identity programme.
The most perfect essay came into my possession the other day, today being
30/03/08, The Biological Basis of Society, by Boodin, in the Journal of Social
Philosophy, July 1936, is something we will have to append to this work and discuss in
detail, it is remarkable, quite the most perfect thing I have ever read, I could almost of
written it myself, almost. These journals are very impressive, maybe I should try and buy
them all, we shall see. I bought this copy for the essay by Kroeber, So-Called Social
Science, and this essay is not really what I thought it would be. I thought it would be an
attack on organicism, but it does not mention this genuine science of sociology at all,
which is an even better act of dismissal than an actual act of dismissal. Kroeber sticks
entirely within the confines of the pseudo sociology he has devoted himself, as an
anthropologist, to creating. This shows the maturity of the pseudo science which has
begun to emerge from the age of real science, now dead, in the 1930’s, but still to be
found hanging on in obscure journals, running alongside its replacement, hence we have
Boodin, then Kroeber, and then we get an essay on Social Science Methodology which is
pure, unmitigated pseudo science, carrying sentences such as this :

Sociology is still apparently in a preliminary stage of scientific

organization and will remain so until the basic factors of human nature are more
clearly known and until agreed-upon ethical norms are provided around which
man can fabricate the kind of society he wants.

(Mayer, pages 365 – 366)

Here we see the perfect simulation of purely religious sentiments transformed into
what is successfully passed of as a scientific form. In this same paragraph however we
have a sop to genuine science that all academia is moving towards eradicating as Mayer
continues thus :

Two important considerations are worthy of emphasis in this connection : first,

that, in the early stages of the development of a science, ‘raw’ empiricism and
‘raw’ analysis (as already noted) are to be expected ; and second, that, since
sociology depends to a large extent upon psychology and biology for its basic
concepts, there is no reason to grow impatient for scientific sociological results, in
that psychology itself is only now in the process of becoming scientifically
organized.

This is absolutely gorgeous stuff, we see here, in this professional booklet, how the new
priests employed to destroy sociology are still obliged to try and comfort and quell the
ardour of those who know all too well what a true sociology is, people like Boodin. And
this particular sick, paternalistic weep, is still the one given today when we ask why
science has not even begun to scratch the surface of what humans are as a part of nature,
“Oh, but my friend, the science of life is so fresh, so new, give it a chance to get started !”
 And in the previous essay exactly the same trick is performed :

Human nature is always the foundation of law as well as of economics.

The illuminating axiom of Vico is worth quoting—“this civil world was certainly
made by men, hence modifications can, because they must, be found within our
human minds themselves.”

(Law and Economics, p. Giorgio Vecchio, 361)

Here we see the most precious sociological phrase “human nature” used in vain
again, used in the religious sense of a personal attribute of a free willed person who has
come to exist independently of the laws of nature. Yet in the opening essay by Boodin
we have the rarest, and most precious statement, of the exact opposite kind, a true
scientific statement about what it means to be human, but sadly, he does not take the
trouble to condense his arguments into a simple formulaic expression of “human nature”
as biological phenomenon, whereby human nature is said to be corporate, and realised in
the evolution of the individual form, although he says as much, evolved to brig into being
a living organism at the level of social organization, a superorganism. Why does he not
say this, was Boodin just part of the game plan ? It certainly turns out that way.
But as I write a bit more about the classic case of the modus operandi by means of
which linguistic force generates social structure across a differentiated complex of
superorganic identities, it is the last essay I want to refer to, Will the West Decline to
Decline ?, by William Balch.

Sixth, between Spengler’s theory and the philosophical systems affiliated

with the Gestalt psychology there is a striking affinity. This type of philosophy,
otherwise designated Configurationism, sees every living being as an organic unit
in which the whole gives significance and even existence to the parts, rather than
the parts to the whole. In that sense everything, from electrons to galaxies, is to be
pronounced organic. Passing no judgment on this philosophy, we recognize that it
is already making an eventful impact on contemporary thought. Spengler declares
that every historic culture has this organismic nature. Its parts and processes are
what they are just because it is an organism and must fulfill its organic destiny.
Naturally the Configurationists may be over-eager to adopt Spengler as a
qualified ally. Such an adoption is premature. Configurationists have glimpsed the
infinite whole of history which Spengler has denied. Their distinguished
exponent, Raymond Holder Wheeler, writes : “The race is responding to its
future. . . An acceptance of the laws of energy logically necessitates belief in the
teleological character of man’s relation to that cosmic plan of which he is a
member.” In that view each culture is indeed organic, as Spengler holds. But
further, as Hegel held, each such culture derives its nature and its history from the
fact that it is a part of an organismic cosmos. For Hegel, every particular culture is
a member in the organic unit of the World History or Objective Mind. For
Spengler this organic unity is limited to each particular culture developing in
isolation from all others and neither enlivened nor environed by any cosmic plan.
 He declares : “There is no history in itself” (II, 26) ; there is only a multiple
severally of histories. Contrast Dr. Wheeler : “Thus parts, or ingredients . . .
become false atoms unless they are defined as having membership character in a
whole of some kind.” With reference to “a cosmic plan”, even a Spenglerian
culture could be exactly that sort of a “false atom”. Thus Spengler loses his clue
to the final organismic view of history and wanders into a fog of atomism at the
end.

(Balch, Journal of Social Philosophy, pages 390 – 391)

It is necessary to take a whole paragraph in order to select the bit I want, and have
anyone make sense of my selection :

For Hegel, every particular culture is a member in the organic unit of the World
History or Objective Mind. For Spengler this organic unity is limited to each
particular culture developing in isolation from all others and neither enlivened nor
environed by any cosmic plan.

It is nice to see just how pervasive this organicism had become, albeit tragic to see that
while it had infected the mystical realms of knowledge, because it was true and
irresistible, it had been expunged from science for precisely the same reason, and by the
same fact of pervasiveness we can understand why organicism gave rise to Nazism and
its anti-Semitic programme, which has been so vital to the suppression of this true
scientific outlook. But in the above snippet we see two contrasting mystical opposites
based on the logic of organicism, Hegel’s apparent belief in a universal society, and
Spengler, who I think was a Nazi, not sure on that at the minute though, who
compartmentalised each unit of the global human biomass, as we would expect a Nazi to
do. Why did it never occur to anyone to think of Judaism, replicated structurally in the
form of Christianity and Islam, as the essence of the emerging global being, its living
identity ? Why, why, why !!!! We could ask this a billion times, there is just no sane
way to understand how this obvious, undeniable fact, escaped everyone, when all were
living in a world so powerfully infused with organicism. And instead, all we do see is the
rise of a monumental anti-Semitism, which is a perfectly valid political representation of
the organicist nature of Judaism, designed to save Judaism by politicising the issue, but it
is not a holistic, scientific or even mystical representation of the meaning of Judaism seen
in the light of scientifically inspired organicism.
These journals are amazing, they are bang on subject. And they come at just the
right time, immediately preceding the outbreak of World War Two, at the peak of the
Judeo-Nazi movement, which delivered Israel, delivered the world.

Yesterday, 03/04/08, I ran a search for Boodin and it turns out he is a philosopher.
I had begun reading his essay and as perfect as it is in its general tenor, I was finding
highly flawed anthropomorphic expressions developing the primary scientific logic of
human superorganic nature, and I thought he must be a professional philosopher, and sure
enough, he was. He wrote a lot of books, and in the memoriam posted on the University
of California website, written in 1950, when he died, there is a list of his works, A
biography was published in 1987 John Elof Boodin, Philosopher-Poet, by Charles Nelson
wherein the title indicates that any hopes we had that this man might be of use are
dashed, who wants to look to a poet for a scientific description of the meaning of life !
However I was also able to acquire two essays from some website, “Sensation,
Imagination and Consciousness,” from the Psychological Review, 28 (1921) : 425-452,
and “The New Realism.” Journal of Philosophy Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4
(1907) : 533-542. While tidying up the text in a word document, to suit my taste, I
noticed some interesting remarks which retain the enthusiasm I had for this man when I
found his essay last week. All his works are available and affordable, so I will buy them
all when I get some money, beginning with the most important book, The Social Mind,
1939, there are three copies, even the mid-priced one, signed by the author, is only £22,
although the post is a hefty tenner, that will be mine on Tuesday when I get my benefit.
I took this off the net yesterday too :

Published in Southern Journal of Philosophy XII, 3 (1975), pp. 313-332.

JOHN ELOF BOODIN’S THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

James Wayne Dye

John Elof Boodin (1869-1950) began his systematic philosophical training

with the study of the German idealists under the tutelage of James Seth, and
subsequently he studied under Josiah Royce. Although this idealistic
indoctrination imprinted him with certain permanent habits of thought, its effect
was ameliorated by the influence of the British empiricists, Poincaré, the Anglo-
American neo-realists, and the pragmatists, especially James and Peirce. His own
philosophical work might be characterized as having wedded some of the form
and aim of idealism to a content derived from more empirical philosophies and
from the sciences. Although he is of the opinion that “Idealistic systems have, one
and all, been romantic exaggerations,” he still subscribes to the necessity of doing
metaphysics, i.e. of providing a final integration and evaluation of the
presuppositions and consequences of our more specific truth-seeking activities.
Metaphysics and the special sciences stand in a sort of feedback relationship,
inasmuch as the desire to harmonize specialized bodies of information leads
inevitably to the speculative extension of principles which have yielded partial
understanding in specific areas of inquiry to the whole of experience, while the
resulting world-view in turn serves as a paradigm or “regulative ideal” which
furnishes inspiration for the further progress of science (RU, xxi). Boodin
characterizes his own metaphysics as embodying the point of view of “pragmatic
realism,” the term ‘pragmatic’ bearing the signification first given to it by Peirce.
This avowed pragmatism means that those features of the universe are real which
we are forced to acknowledge in order to live successfully, rather than those
 which are deducible from a priori postulates. In Hegelian terminology “the
categories of thought must be tested by their success in actual use,” that use being
to further the practical, intellectual, artistic, and other values of human
experience. But our experience is peculiar to our place in history and its details
have been permeated by modern science. Therefore our metaphysics must be
similarly modern and culturally, even personally, relative if it is to be of use. The
movement of philosophical thought is from a basic intuition of the real to its
elaboration in conceptual form to the adaptation of those concepts to the
experienced world as revealed through the most advanced techniques of enquiry,
terminating in a comprehensive interpretation which gratifies all the fundamental
human desires, emotional and volitional as well as intellectual.
The conceptual elaboration of Boodin’s intuition begins with the positing
of five “ultimate and generic concepts, viz. energy, consciousness, space, time
and form.” Of these, Boodin’s treatment of time has received the most attention,
partly because it was the subject of his first book, Time and Reality (New York,
1905), partly because that treatment contains some novel features which antedate
similar notions subsequently promulgated by Bergson. It is also notable that he
replaces the traditional category of being with dynamic processes, “energy,”
demoting substance to the insecure status of “being precisely what we must take it
as in experience” (RU, 73) in order to further our own purposes. (A later article
says, “All our evidence deals with transactions . . . . Entities have meaning only in
encounters . . . . To ask what anything is when it does not act is meaningless.”)
Although not one of the detailed applications of these generic concepts is totally
devoid of novelty and philosophical interest, this paper will be restricted to the
consideration of just one-consciousness. Boodin’s account of consciousness is an
especially intriguing piece of philosophising which begins with the rejection of
some features of popular theories of consciousness which allegedly conflict with
the experiential facts, and ends by proposing, largely on grounds of conceptual
economy, a rather unconventional hypothesis as to the nature of consciousness. I
shall follow this order in presenting Boodin’s reasoning ; and subsequently I shall
consider some of the advantages, and disadvantages, of his proposal.

RU = A Realistic Universe (New York, 1916).

Which is worth reproducing because it gives us an introductory statement about the man
and his work. In it we find that he was supposedly set on adapting philosophy to the new
knowledge coming into being courtesy of science, as the nineteenth became the twentieth
century. This man is a great find, he holds a lot of promise, he will need a chapter to
himself I suspect, but it will be months before I can get hold of all of his books.
@

* look for a quote showing the use of hunting terms to generate sacred ideas.
* Look section in Mein Kampf where Hitler reviles any attempt to get people to change
their religion from that to which they are born with as this accords with the observation of
a fixed structure in a kin based society and tells us something about the continuity of
structural definition to be seen in tiny superorganic forms and super massive organisms.
Noticed in the Stackpole edition. This desire to retain pure identity within a compound
identity structure is seen in Jewish practice and in the news this week, today being
Friday, 15 February 2008, was the topic of high rates of infant deformity in Bradford
amongst the poor element of the Pakistani and Kashmiri ethnic enclaves due to their
preference for marriage between first cousins, which there was some talk of outlawing,
but the people in the street said that they liked the practice because it kept the family
together. So we see the continuance of behavioural dynamics related to social structure
at all levels of complexity, development and size ; exactly as we would expect to find in
any species.

* Note Tarde on the collective mind in Social Laws, p. 30, is suggestive of the social
structure produced by linguistic physiology and indicates in a deep biological sense how
individuals are made part of the superorganism. On this point I bring to mind an amazing
account of an Indian village group who worship the cobra that lives freely in the village
and often bites people, but no one has ever died of this deadly animal, and the impression
I got from the account was that somehow the collective believe of people focusing on the
victim kept them alive and empowered them to survive the venom, which is a remarkable
tale, a bit like the equally alien notion of oriental ways involving acupuncture and self
hypnosis as a way of overcoming pain and such like. These deep psychological
dynamics with a social dimension are similar to the idea Tarde puts forward and while
they clash with my natural frame of mind as a Westerner, I find my frame of mind
making sense of such phenomena when I make the superorganism the primary being
because as amazing as the idea of a collective psychology penetrating the physiology of
the individual in this material way, such effects make sense on the basis that there is no
such ting as an individual. Added to which I have my own recent experience of mental
induced lesions of the kind categorised as eczema and such like.
______________

* note I was going to put a section of the anthropology journal in to contrast with the bit
from Maclay asserting society is an organism, after taking the sections that say this.
Some discussion of Kroeber and crew in 1917 representing official propaganda for the
theocracy directed at the student class, not the masses, in other words this is how the
priesthood were being trained in ignorance, just as we usually train priests in a
theological creed, and by the same means, through the medium of an institution. This is
the sense in which Comte’s words can be filled out into a substantial and real form, and
this is what we would of expected Comte the ‘sociologist scientist’ to do, but no, not a bit
of it, he goes off and transforms himself into a high priest on the basis of his scientific
insights, he was, like all other great scientist and philosophers ever known, a total fraud
incapable of facing the truth he was supposedly touting.
Turner’s Ritual Process is full of nice illustration of Comte’s basic logic. The
essay on Biophysics and Language is also an item not to be forgotten.

___________________

This is for use above, see notes taken when reading. Presumably to do with war as an
expression of the ritual dynamic of remaking order.

The high must submit to being humbled ; the humble are exalted through the privilege of
plain speaking. But there is much more to the [Apo] ritual [of the Ashanti] than this.
Structural differentiation, both vertical and horizontal, is the foundation of strife and
factionalism, and of struggles in dyadic relations between incumbents of positions or
rivals for positions. In religious systems that are themselves structured—most commonly
by the intercalated segmentations of the solar and lunar year and by climatic nodal points
of change—quarrels and dissensions are not dealt with ad hoc as they emerge, but in
generic and omnibus fashion at some regularly recurrent point in the ritual cycle. The
Apo ceremony takes place, as the Ashanti say, “when the cycle of the year has come
round” or when “the edges of the year have met.” It provides, in effect, a discharge of all
the ill-feeling that has accumulated in structural relationships during the previous year.
To purge or purify structure by plain speaking is to reanimate the spirit of communitas.
Here the widespread sub-Saharan African belief that grudges nourished in the head or
heart physically harm both those who hold them and those against whom they are
directed operates to insure that wrongs are ventilated and wrongdoers refrain from taking
reprisals against those who proclaim their misdeeds. Since it is more probable that
persons of high rank wrong those of low rank than the reverse, it is not surprising that
chiefs and aristocrats are regarded as the typical targets for public accusation.
Paradoxically, the ritual reduction of structure to communitas through the
purifying power of mutual honesty has the effect of regenerating the principles of
classification and ordering on which social structure rests. On the last day of the Apo
ritual, for example, just before the new year begins, the shrines of all the local and some
of the national Ashanti gods are carried in procession from their local temples, each with
an entourage of priests, priestesses, and other religious officials, to the sacred Tano River.
There the shrines and the blackened stools of deceased priests are sprinkled and purified
with a mixture of water and powdered white clay. The political head of Tekiman, the
chief, is not personally present. The Queen Mother attends, however, for this is an affair
of gods and priests, representing the universal aspects of Ashanti culture and society
rather than of chieftainship in its more narrowly structural aspect. This universal quality
is expressed in the prayer of the priestly spokesman of one of the gods as he sprinkles the
shrine of Ta Kesi, the greatest of the local gods : “We beg you for life ; when hunters go
to the forest, permit them to kill meat ; may the bearers of children bear children : life to
Yao Kramo [the chief], life for all hunters, life to all priests, we have taken the apo of this
year and put it in the river” (pp. 164-166). Water is sprinkled upon all the stools and on
all those present, and after cleansing the shrines, everyone returns to the village while the
shrines are replaced in the temples that are their homes. This solemn observance, which
ends such a Saturnalian ritual, is in reality a most complex manifestation of Tekiman
Ashanti cosmology, for each of the gods represents a whole constellation of values and
ideas and is associated with a place in a cycle of myths. Moreover, the entourage of each
replicates that of a chief and bodies forth the Ashanti concept of structural hierarchy. It is
as though structure, scoured and purified by communitas, is displayed white and shining
again to begin a new cycle of structural time.
It is significant that the first ritual of the new year, performed on the following
day, is officiated over by the chief, and that no women, not even the Queen Mother, are
allowed to be present. The rites take place inside the temple of Ta Kesi, the local god ;
the chief prays to him alone and then sacrifices a sheep. This stands in marked contrast to
the rites of the previous day, which are attended by members of both sexes, held in the
open air by the waters of the Tano River (important for all Ashanti), involve no bloody
sacrifice, and entail the exclusion of the chief. Communitas is the solemn note on which
the old year ends ; structure, purified by communitas and nourished by the blood of
sacrifice, is reborn on the first day of the new year. Thus, what is in many ways a ritual of
reversal seems to have the effect, not only of temporarily inverting the “pecking order,”
but of first segregating the principle of group unity from the principles of hierarchy and
segmentation and then of dramatically indicating that the unity of Tekiman—and, more
than Tekiman, of the Ashanti state itself—is a hierarchical and segmentary unity.

(Turner, pages 179 – 181)

Link Turner on structure to Hitler on structure :

 This cleverness of the Jew in diverting the public attention from himself one can
study again today.
In the year 1918, it was impossible to speak of a systematic anti-Semitism. I can
still recall the difficulties one encountered simply in mentioning the word Jew. One was
either stared at or he encountered the most violent resistance. Our first attempts to point
out to the people the real enemy seemed at that time to be practically hopeless, and only
very slowly did things take a turn for the better. Although the Protective Society (Der
Schutz-und Trutzbund) was organized on a faulty plan it nevertheless deserved much
credit for having reopened the Jewish question. In any case there began to take root in the
winter of 1918 something approaching anti-Semitism. Later to be sure, the National-
Socialist movement brought the Jewish question to the fore in a much different manner. It
succeeded especially in raising this question out of the narrow circle of upper and lower
bourgeois classes and to change it into the leading motif of a great national movement.
Hardly had they succeeded in giving to the German people the great uniting idea of
combating this question, when the Jew already made a counter attack. He used his old
method. With remarkable speed he hurled the burning torch of contention into the
popular movement and sowed the seeds of dissention. In raising the ultramontane
question and in the mutual attack of Catholicism and Protestantism growing out of it
there lay, as things were then, the only possibility of occupying the public attention with
other problems in order to stave off the concentrated attack upon Jewry. The men who
cast this question among our people have sinned so grievously against it that they will
never be able to make restitution for their sin. The Jew, however, attained the goal he
wished ; Catholics and Protestants carried on a very nice war together and the arch-
enemy of Aryan humanity and of the whole Christendom laughs up his sleeve.
Just as he had once been able to occupy public opinion for years with the struggle
between federalism and Unitarianism, and to incite it to take sides in this struggle, while
the Jew was bartering away the freedom of the nation and betraying our Fatherland to
international high finance, he succeeds again in getting the two German confessions to
fight against each other, while the foundations of both are being destroyed and
undermined by the poison of the international Jew.
Let one keep in mind the destruction which the Jewish bastardisation commits
upon our people every day and consider that this poisoning of the blood can be removed
from the German people only after centuries, if at all ; and consider further how this
racial disintegration pulls down or even destroys the last Aryan values of our German
people, so that our national strength as a bearer of civilization is visibly on the decline,
and we run the danger, at least in our big cities, of reaching the point which Southern
Italy already has reached. This infection of our blood which hundreds of thousands of our
people seem to disregard is carried on by the Jew today according to a regular plan.
According to plan these black parasites of nations ravish our inexperienced blond young
girls and in so doing destroy something which in this world can never be replaced. Both,
yes, both Christian confessions observe with indifference this desecration and destruction
of a noble and unique creature given to this world by the grace of God. For the future of
the world it is not important whether the Protestants conquer the Catholics or vice versa,
but whether Aryans will be preserved or will die out. And yet the two confessions are not
fighting against the destroyer of this Aryan, but they try to destroy one another. It would
seem that the nationally minded person would have as his holy duty, each in his own
confession, to see to it that one does not always outwardly discuss the will of God but
actually also does the will of God, and does not let God’s work be desecrated. For the
Will of God once gave to mankind its form, its being, and its capacities. Whoever
destroys His work declares war upon that which God created, upon Divine Will.
Therefore, let everybody, really everybody, be active in his own confession, and let
everyone consider it his first and holiest duty to oppose him who in his actions, by word
or deed, steps out of the framework of his own church community and attempts to pry his
way into the other community. For to fight against the idiosyncrasies of a confession
within our once-existing religious split, will in Germany of necessity lead to a war of
destruction between the two confessions. We can not compare the conditions here with
say, those in France, Spain or, least of all, Italy. One can for instance in all three countries
promote a battle against clericalism or Ultramontanism without running the danger that in
so doing the French, Spanish or Italian people as such would disintegrate. In Germany,
however, this may not be done, for certainly here the Protestants would also take part.
Therefore the defense would in Germany at once assume the character of an attack of
Protestantism by Catholicism which elsewhere would only be carried on by Catholics
against attacks of a political nature upon their own leaders. That which is tolerated, even
though unjust, by members of one’s own confession is immediately most vigorously
rejected from the start, if the antagonist belongs to another confession. This is carried to
such extremes that even people who without ado would be ready to stop an apparent
grievance within their own religious community, at once go away from it and turn their
resistance outward when such a correction is recommended or even demanded by an
office not belonging to their community. They consider it an unjustifiable and
inadmissible, even indecent attempt to mix into affairs which do not concern them. Such
attempts are not even pardoned when they are justified according to the higher right of
the interests of the national community, because today religious feelings are still deeper
than all national and political expediency. Nor is this changed if the two confessions are
driven into a bitter war against each other. This could only be changed by giving to the
nation by means of mutual compatibility a future which in its greatness would have a
conciliatory effect in this domain also.
I do not hesitate to declare that I see in these men who today draw the populist
movement into the crisis of religious controversies worse enemies of my people than any
Communist on an international basis. For to convert this Communist is the mission of the
National-Socialist movement. He who, however, separates these people from their own
ranks, from their real mission, acts most outrageously. He is, whether consciously or
unconsciously—it makes no difference—a fighter for Jewish interests. For it is today the
interest of the Jews to let the populist movement drain away its blood in a religious
struggle in that moment when it begins to become dangerous for the Jew. And I
emphasize expressly the word, “let drain away its blood ;” for only a man completely
unversed in history can imagine himself capable of solving today with this movement a
question on which centuries and great statesmen have been shattered.
For the rest the facts speak for themselves. The gentlemen who in the year 1924
suddenly discovered that the supreme mission of the populist movement was the struggle
against Ultramontanism did not break Ultramontanism, but ripped to bits the populist
movement. I too must see to it, that in the ranks of the populist movement some immature
intelligence does not think himself capable of that which even a Bismarck could not do. It
will always be the supreme duty of the administration of the National-Socialist movement
to oppose most sharply every attempt to place the National-Socialist movement in the
service of such struggles, and to remove propagandists with such a purpose immediately
from the ranks of the movement. Actually it had succeeded without exception up to the
Fall of 1923. In the ranks of our movement the most pious Protestant could sit beside the
most pious Catholic without ever having to get into the least conflict of conscience with
his religious conviction. The mighty struggle which the two together carried on against
the destroyer of Aryan humanity had taught them on the contrary to respect and to
appreciate each other. And exactly at the same time in these years the movement fought
out its sharpest struggle against the Center, never, to be sure, on the basis of religion, but
exclusively on the national, racial and economic basis. Success spoke then in our favor
just as today it testifies against those “who know better.”
Often in the last years it went so far that populist circles in the God-forsaken
blindness of their confessional squabbles did not recognize the insanity of their action in
this point : that atheistic Marxist newspapers, according to need, suddenly became the
magistrates of religious congregations, in order through the mediation of statements,
often really too stupid, to defame the one or the other side, and in that way to make the
fire blaze.
Among a people like the Germans, in whose history it has so often been shown
capable of carrying on wars for phantoms until the very end, such a call to battle will be
mortally dangerous. Our people were always in that way diverted from the really true
questions of their existence. While we devastated ourselves in religious controversies, the
rest of the world was parcelled. And while the populist movement considers whether the
Ultramontane or the Jewish danger is the greater, or vice versa, the Jew destroys the
racial principles of our existence and annihilates thereby our people forever. Insofar as
this type of “popularise” fighter is concerned, I can only wish the National-Socialist
movement and with it the German people most sincerely : Lord guard it against such
friends and then it will certainly settle with its enemies.

(Mein Kampf, Trans. by Lore, 1939, pages 542 – 546)

The above section of Mein Kampf first caught my attention because of the way it
shows Hitler defending religion, especially Christianity, as he denounces those who
would seek to draw people away from their own particular Christian denomination. But
in seeking suitable limits for this quotation to be full and coherent we find something
much more telling about Hitler. In this passage Hitler attacks the way structural divisions
of the German people leave them prone to Jewish malevolence. And yet any truth in
such an assertion pales into insignificance compared with the fracturing of, not only
Germany, but the entire Christian world, through his projection of concern onto the
structural suture between Jews and Christians. And in making the line of demarcation
between Jews and Christians the point of conflict he well and truly trashed the Christian
world as a supremely independent entity and raised the Jews to an indomitable position,
with all the consequences we know since the end of the world war, the establishment of
Israel, Muslim ingress into Europe, and the new global war of Jewish terror.
 By making this quote from Hitler follow on directly from that of Turner, where
both are concerned with structural definition, we help stretch our imaginations to the
point where we can grasp in a meaningful sense why it is that warfare in Judaism is such
an important element of social activity that can be likened to a form of ritual. Warfare
seem too responsive to be ritual, ritual seems too organised to be a model for warfare.
But while the specific ritual spoken about by turner in the above passage is an annual
celebration, the first ritual he discussed from Ndembu society was not set in a fixed time
frame, and most ritual in primitive society are responses to events demanding the sting to
be taken out of a crisis which is beyond everyday understanding. In a sense Hitler’s
extraordinary emphasis upon the role of Jews in Christian society at the particular time
when he was alive, just when science had brought the idea of the social organism to the
limit of its comprehension, where the only place to go next was to a revelation as to what
religion was, what Jews and Christian were,, has the hallmark of a witch doctor bursting
the pustule of knowledge which was threatening certain eradication of Judaism.
But, the sutures along which social structure is organised in a super massive
superorganism are real to those living within it, and so reactions such as those seen in
Hitler’s focus upon the Jews, are spontaneous, and natural, just as the way primitive
people responded spontaneously and naturally to the crises in their lives by following the
dictates of the identity programme that lets them know who they are. It is odd that Hitler
should of attacked the Jews as a divisive factor when he himself should then become the
supreme divisive factor, but this just goes to show how social structure is organised along
lines of structural demarcation created by linguistic programmes which assign people to
the structural divisions which leaves individuals incapable of responding in any way
other than that dictated by the religious programme that creates the organism. What
alternative did Hitler have ? There was only one, to recognise, as we do, that his society
was a Jewish society and the Jews were the master identity. People simply do not
function in this way, I can think of no example of anyone anywhere ever accepting such a
proposition, it is unthinkable, or intolerable. People will accept such hierarchical
arrangements on a political basis, but not on a religious basis that gets at the core of their
being, and, most especially, where the social status inverts the political status, as science
indicates it must do in relation to this question, for the Christian and Muslim, or
American and roman, British and German authorities are the ostensible controllers of
power, and yet was are saying these same arbiters of political power are the slaves of the
Jews who, in direct terms have been powerless dependants of these authorities. But is it
obvious, when we think about this calmly, that there is something special about the
Jewish status, and it is obvious that this derives from their religious nature relative to the
sub-Judaic religious slave identities. Again we must think about what we were saying
when we discussed Driesch on the absence of a factual basis to identity. Identity is a free
flowing element of structure, necessarily, as it must embrace structure under an
homogenous embrace.
Anti-Semitism is a vital part of the physiological relationship between Judaism,
Christianity and Islam, it is the presence of anti-Semitism which makes the existence of
Judaism as a detached personification of the superorganic being possible. The detached
personification of the superorganic being that is Judaism is the equivalent of what we
would call ‘mind’ in ourselves. Mind is simply information, information of identity we
might say, it is focused in the brain, but it is obvious that the brain is rooted in the
physiology of our body as much as a tree is rooted in the earth. Likewise with the
superorganism, the mind is focused in the body of Jewish people, it is from the Jews that
we get all our motivation, the Jews as Jews, the Christians and Muslims, and Nazis too,
as physiological elements deriving their own identity from the Jewish identity. The
corporate ‘mind’ is the personification of Jewish being, the urge to rule the world, we this
motive expressed in the Jewish slave identities of Christianity, Islam and Nazism. It
there were no anti-Semitism then the Jews would suffer that fate that they have always
struggled against, they would integrate, and become as one with the host communities,
and if this happened then their host communities would cease to exist. It follows from
this fact that any slave body of Judaism must be so formed as to respond with anti-
Semitic vehemence if the occasion arises where tensions within the fabric of the
organism cause a threat to the Jewish identity, by which we mean the Christian identity in
a Christian slave territory, to exist. A bout of anti-Semitism cleanses the body of the
organism and re-establishes the balanced order between Jewish master and Christian
slave. However bouts of anti-Semitism are special rituals, special forms of the
militaristic ritual, which can take a variety of forms, inter-state conflict or revolution, for
example, and both these forms of ritual cleansing of the Jewish biomass are often made
the product of Jewish malevolence, because of the elite status of Jews, which tallies with
what Turner says about the levelling ritual in primitive society in which the underlings
get to berate their masters, since it is usually the masters that abuse the underlings and the
levelling ritual evolves as a superorganic behaviour designed to cleanse the biomass and
re-establish order.
Without anti-Semitism Jews would end up being absorbed into the host
populations they evolved to exploit, and because the Jews evolved to exploit slave
populations anti-Semitism is a logical physiological reaction in an organism whose fabric
is bound via a linguistic force which manifests itself in the form of a psychological
reactions.

__________________

Evans-Pritchard, page 5, discussing Comte’s views on psychology and the vileness of

making society the product of human need, and the status of the individual
This is brilliant.
Also, page 4, Condorcet as a precursor of Comte.

__________________________

Since we must compare ourselves to slave maker ant superorganisms when speaking of
the Jewish superorganism we may note that the objection that Christians cannot be the
salves of the Jews because the Jews are powerless in political terms since apart from the
newly created state of Israel Jews depend upon their host Christian, and Islamic societies,
for their existence. But if we think about the nature of the relationship between slave
maker ants and their salves then the masters in this setting are powerless in terms of the
basic practicalities of subsistence, for which they depend upon the labour of their slaves.
Thus the slaves have political power in the ant world just as they do in the human world,
once we look at things from a scientific point of view the motive emotive meaning of the
word ‘slave’ disappears and only the mechanical meaning remains valid.