The Grand Analogy Uncompromising Atheism, Real Science of Humanity

'The thought of the women and the swamp and the forest around them reawakened thoughts that had been tormenting me for years. Thoughts about our connection to nature. We seem to be wandering outside it, but how can that be? Aren't we made of the same coils of DNA as everything living? Aren't our closest relatives the other great apes (chimpanzee, bonobos, gorillas and orangutans)? Now only orangutans still live in the trees whence we came, wandering like nomads through the canopy, without permanent nests, the way we must have wandered once upon a time. Was it settlement that cut us off from nature? Are we human because we left paradise? (Linda Spalding, The Follow, Bloomsbury, 1998, Page 2.)

'we behave culturally because it is our nature to behave culturally, because natural selection has produced an animal that has to behave culturally, that has to invent rules, make myths, speak languages, and form men's clubs, in the same way that the hamadryas baboon has to form harems, adopt infants, and bite its wives on the neck.' (Lionel Tiger & Robin Fox, The Imperial Animal, Secker & Warburg, 1972, page 20)

To the memory of Parmenides

Contents Introduction Part I Some Ideas on the Idea of Super Being 1 2 Idea One Idea Two Science Mythology Spencer on the Social Organism Page 6 Page 3

Ouspensky's Esoteric Thoughts on Super Beings Page 31

Chapter II

The Evolution of the Idea of Individuality Page 52

3

Idea Three

Craft

Gierke on the Natural Law Theory of Society Page Part II The Grand Analogy

Stuff from Evolution from Molecules to Men Part III Superorganic Reality The Exoskeleton - An Idea Too Far The Idea of the Exoskeleton, using Coker re Spencer, Lilienfeld, Schaffle & Worms to guide my exposition from early artifacts of the intellectual deposit Part IV Sociobiology - The Modern Mirage

The debate since Wilson and 1976, how science continues to be perverted and the struggle to burst free of this priestly suffocation, use obvious books but also things like Newman by Ian Ker showing the ceaseless effort by theologians to mimic rationalists and to resist reality. Part V The Political Science of Biology Social Physics 1877, Biopolitics by Morley Roberts 1938. Somit, 1960's to the 1990's. We find the superorganic idea first being expressed in science of society in sociology toward the end of the nineteenth century, but as the twentieth century progresses the inheritance of ideas such as we see in Gierke associated with law and politics causes the study of society as a biological phenomenon to drift out of sociology into an obscure enclave of social studies which is called political science. Mackenzie discusses this area and is our portal into the later political science arena as Coker served as a portal into the earlier phases of the subject. Morgan on Humans as Ants 4 Idea Four Realism The Nail in God's Coffin

Introduction Super, as in superior, in this case refers to the being of an organism taking form at a level of organization above that of the individual. The idea of a higher state of being is perhaps a ubiquitous feature of our species. We may suppose that from the dawn of our evolution as an articulate species our possession of language made us aware of something beyond ourselves because the very act of such communication is the foundation of a being beyond ourselves, to whatever extent such super being may be supposed to exist. We may immediately realise that our idea of God is just such a being superior to ourselves, and people have recognised that the collective consciousness of human society created by means of language is itself a candidate for the being of God. Hegel, the early nineteenth century German philosopher, was keen on the idea of the German community, the Folk, and he made use of just such a representation of culture as God. There are a myriad of myths and books about myths, and this is most definitely not another in that vein. We will not be considering religious mythologies themselves, or the philosophical musings of the same kind, such as those of Hegel which mix and match modern thought with mythological ideas. We are only interested in ideas that seek to understand the state of super being by means of direct expression connected to everyday material reality. We want direct interpretation of myth as opposed to the codification of intuition serving functional purposes that is the essence of mythology. The need to write such a work of this is self evident since there quite simply are not works dealing with this subject, any work that did deal with this subject would demystify all knowledge and make it possible to know all things about ourselves. Two facts could be plainly stated, and we will state them, that no human being alive who has any kind of public voice, or who has ever lived, has ever stated. we will show it is easy to prove God does not exist by showing what God is, and we will state precisely what human nature is. In revealing human nature we will show how a thread of continuity can be connected between everything we are today and the whole chain of our kind's evolution going back millions of years to a time long before we were as much as a twinkle in Mother Nature's eye. What we are seeking here is to create a chain of reasoning, and thus knowledge, that will bring intuitive knowledge down to earth and make real knowledge take its place. In doing this we will not consider myths directly, we will not review the Bible, or any part of it, for example, but all our source will be intermediate between myth and science or between science and myth. Spencer offers science but cannot separate his consciousness from the grip of mythological conceptions about the nature of human beings. Ouspensky is a mythologist who is attempting to embrace the new knowledge of science and thus creates a most unusual and wonderful concoction of myth and knowledge. But the beauty of Ouspensky is that he thereby provides a very rare insight into the literal meaning of myth which is highly valuable to us and the nonsense he talks about science we can easily sort out for ourselves. My own interest in this subject came about because of my life long passion for atheism, and my consequent desire to understand theism, and thus my passion for science, and especially those sciences which shed light on the nature of humans, most

centrally in the academic field we would suppose anthropology, as the study of man, would best meet this requirement. It took me thirty of years of ceaseless curiosity, as an adult, to hit upon the idea of humans as something more than an individual being, in a literal sense, and then I had to find this idea all on my own for it was never presented anywhere to my recollection in any accounts of society or our species in any scientific work. The idea we humans were the mammalian equivalent of the ant to the insect fraternity struck me as a revelation, it offered itself up as a key to understanding all things about ourselves and I was simply amazed at my discovery. Naturally, the first thought after the initial realisation, was to wonder why no one else had ever thought of this idea, and acknowledged its value. Well, as you can imagine, in the light of my writing this book, the idea is not only not unique to me, it is, although scrupulously hidden from view, an idea that has informed our kind since the beginning of time, and is central to all out most precious beliefs. What is special then about the present time and my independent discovery of this idea of the super being, despite all efforts to eradicate it from all current discussion, is that I am a man of my time, I am a passionate atheist and an absolute and uncompromising devotee of science and nothing but science. Unfortunately, I am not a scientist, and it turns out that if anyone hates, loathes, and despises this idea that humans are a superorganic form of creature more than any other group of people, it is those who are practicing scientists. The branch of science that might be expected to exploit this idea even more deeply than anthropology appears to of been set up specifically to ensure that under no circumstances can this idea intrude upon the domain of a scientific understanding of ourselves. Sociology strives to expunge all attempts by sociologists to shift toward the logical end of the spectrum of understanding toward which we are driven by the notion that the human is a superorganism. So I cannot turn to academia for an expression of this idea in any direct form, the idea is simply not allowed to be voiced. My search for material on this subject has been relentless and unconstrained for the last three of four years. I am delighted to read any work of any kind in my efforts to find ideas that express the central idea in this work I am writing now, and as much as an atheist as I am I find so much in the work of theists about the notion of superbeing. Hardly surprising if God appears in this guise. As I am not an academic I simply have not the resources to present a comprehensive account of the idea of super being in all its forms down the ages I have selected a number of distinct accounts that offer a particularly valuable insight into the way this idea has informed people down the ages and especially in the modern period within which we currently live where I will finally offer my own account which I will say indicates how we should interpret this idea of super being in the light of modern science. It is my intention, where possible, to duplicate relevant passages of authors I refer to at length, I enjoy doing this, I think it is best to let people speak for themselves, if too small a selection of an authors work is given then it takes the ideas offered out of context. Laws of copyright preclude this method being adopted on works of more recent date, which is a pity because the fact is that some books can be very obscure and hard to find and even if available it is worth simply copying whole sections in order to provide the material for the discussion we are going to engage in here. The notion of a miner or a geologist digging into the intellectual record has been brought to mind and in this method of extensive rendition we come close to following this idea through to its practical application, something I think is

far better than the extensive use of name dropping and reference that is the normal mode of reasoning of the professional academic. This work is offered as a non-academic overview of the subject, the idea of the superorganic, from one who recognises that this is the key to understanding the secret of human being, revealing the true nature of human nature for the first time in an open account, seen through the wide open door of modern science.

Idea One - Science Spencer on the Social Organism The publication of Darwin's Origin of Species in 1859 might be said to of ushered in the age of the idea of evolution, certainly as we know and think it and think of it today, as it applies to living things, and most importantly, to ourselves. The touchstone for all our reasoning about our own nature and the way we live must be the fact that we are animals. It was Darwin that brought this idea, that we are animals, home to us with a force that simply could not be ignored, this was so because Darwin made man, literally, into a monkey, by making apes and humans members of the same family. This development came about as part of the general trend of scientific knowledge which was turning its attention to all aspects of the world, the idea that humans were animals was in the air. A French doctor, Julien Offray De La Mettrie, published a work entitled Man a Machine in 1748 in which he argued assertively that it was blindingly obvious that humans were animals and that only the sort of person dedicated to the dogma of the priest would resist this undeniable fact for one instant. Thus the idea that humans are animals was being brought to the fore in an unmistakable manner. As ever anything we moderns had been able to think of was recorded in some manner by the Ancients and they had left accounts of their ideas in which they recognised that the only thing separating humans from other animals was the fact that we had language. But, from the point of view of an atheist, who necessarily seeks to reject all former notions of reality as embodied in religion, it is this fact that they must refer back to, keep in touch with, at all times as they seek to find an understanding of the nature of existence which has no place for religious ideas. That we are animals is the base line, but on its own it is not enough, it recognises the physical reality staring us in the face but it offers no conception of the nature of the relationship that binds all animals together in the scheme of existence. This underlying coherence is given by the idea Darwin gave to the world, the idea of organic evolution by natural selection so that all living things were intimately linked to one another as one biosphere of the planet earth. So while out animal being is the touchstone, evolution is the key. This fact was not lost on the people of Darwin's generation who were the first to receive his ideas, and the shock they sent through the world is a matter of great interest and debate today. We are not here to look into Darwin's ideas, we are here to consider an aspect of their impact. It has offered occurred to me to wonder why no scientists ever thought to adopt Darwin's ideas as a means of trying to understand the human species. In other words why did no one try and account for humanity as an animal and nothing but an animal. We know that this would mean rejecting the idea of God out of hand, but you would think someone would of had a go. The answer is that the repercussions of Darwin's idea of evolution generating all organic form did make a major impact on every facet of society but the theocracy which had always ruled our world, and always will, soon stepped into the breach and over time the arguments have been suppressed and hidden and only by searching can you begin to uncover their lost traces. If you do uncover these traces and you start to apply the logic they reveal to the world today then you soon see why they were expunged from

science by a pseudo scientific movement acting on the principles of duality and individuality which are the essence of the Judaic mythology which rules out world. And if, regardless of this clash between the autocracy of religion and the liberality of science, you try and reveal your ideas to others then you simply find that the one hundred and fifty years of effort by the authority of society has made it nigh on impossible to voice the truth without being prepared to stand up to a vehement backlash. Herbert Spencer was one of the first great commentators on Darwinism, and his effort was directed at applying evolution to human society, so he should be our man. And indeed he is, although you would not know it from the sort of things that are said about him today. He is famous as the person to whom we owe the greatest distortion of Darwin's idea, for he gave us the phrase 'the survival of the fittest', which is incredibly misleading and totally misrepresents the process of evolution. However it only misrepresents this process if you understanding of the nature of existence is already totally misguided in the first place which it necessarily is if you are informed by the Western scientific tradition, which is founded strictly upon the Jewish mythological conception of duality that we find in the Bible and all associated works. The simple problem is this, while it may be correct to say that evolution creates forms on the basis of the survival of the fittest in a competition to live and reproduce, it is not much good having this fact at your fingertips if you are completely unable to recognise what constitutes a unified and integrated organism. To Spencer, and all commentators I have ever come upon right up to this very moment - 12/05/04 17:13:51 - the human individual is the object of their attention when they are applying this dictum. It follows from this that the existence of weird forms such as homosexuals which are self evidently dysfunctional, and the mentally retarded or physically handicapped, cannot possibly be a natural product of evolution. It was from this perversion of Darwin's idea by the likes of Spencer that the culmination of Nazi ideology and the ignorance of self congratulatory eugenics philosophies by such liberals as Julien Huxley, could be palmed off on the world as a product of science when in truth they were the product of our overarching theism which is Jewish in its form and nature. Following the idiocy of esoteric reasoning, such as creates religious mythology in the first place, the new post Darwinian scientific commentators have relentlessly assumed that humans are organisms in their own right. The fact that we preserve our unfortunates of course makes us uniquely altruistic and moral, and so even Thomas Huxley, renowned as Darwin's bulldog, could declare that human moral nature simply could not be accounted for within the remit of Darwinism and biological evolution. The touchstone, remember, is that humans are animals and this means that this fact comes before all other ideas and so if an idea contradicts this fact then the idea is necessarily wrong. But as we see here in the ideas of these strident evolutionists, evolution is made to pay homage to traditional religious ideas as written in the Bible and elsewhere. So much for the first scientists, they were in truth nothing but priests, and so the story has gone on and today we have the pleasure of being served by a well schooled body of scientific priests specialising in the perversion of evolutionary science in the service of God, Richard Dawkins in the most notorious of these defenders of the faith. He is the most famous atheist in British society. All this perversion of science comes about quite simply because of the failure to recognise the simple fact that is staring us in the face, the individual is not the organism with which the scientist must be concerned. The inversion of attention from

the true organism, the superorganism which takes shape at the social level, to focus upon the false organism of the individual person provides a satisfactory means of distorting reality because it has proven sufficient irrespective of whatever has come to pass down the decades since Darwin, but it does mean the relentless distortion and misrepresentation of religion has been required to continue to explain reality to this very day. But most amazing for our purposes is that the correct idea of human society as a true organic entity has been taken up by commentators during this period and, it is just this fact that I want to elucidate here. What is amazing is that despite taking up the idea no one has dropped the dualistic model of existence which for millennia has informed the human species of its identity and nature and this made religion a central element of our existence. We are inclined to think that these authors are all quite literally priests who know what they are doing but who are working their subject as the fulfilment of their task as priest dedicated to the preservation of the faith. But this is so hard to imagine, and during the course of our enquiry into the kind of things these people had to say during the modern era of scientific understanding about the superorganic nature of human beings and their society this should be one of the central things on our mind, just how did these people expound the one coherent scientific idea of society and human nature while not only never twigging the crucial implication, that there is no such thing as a human individual, but while steadfastly managing to maintain the one wholly unsubstantiated fact upon which religious myth and therefore priestly authority relies, namely that the individual is the beginning and the end of all things? We must now look at what Spencer had to say about the superorganic nature of humans. I will remind you that this is not a scholarly work and there is no attempt made to make an evaluation of Spencer as such. He wrote a great deal and while it might be interesting to read all his major works the point is not to evaluate his ideas as such but rather to capture the ideas expressed in some of his work where I have been fortunate enough to find references to guide me toward and then been able to obtain the works to make an extraction there from. The idea in then is simply to mine the literature of the past for the intellectual ore that consists of the mineral of superorganic insight, superorganisite we might say if wanted to pretend we were geologists of the mind, but we don't, so we won't! We just want to find the ideas expressed, firstly to show that the idea of superorganic form is theme running like a never ending rich seam of thought through the ages of recorded time, and secondly just to make a simple assessment of what these authors thought they were doing when they made these speculations. In the end the idea will be to support the argument that this theme of super being is one that will not die away and it is the theme that science needs to take up if it has any aspirations of becoming the arbiter of our human future as the spokesperson for all of us in the global world that is taking shape about us today in which we need the first ever true account of human nature based on what really makes us one being with one identity. It was in a book by the American anthropologist White that I found the reference to the crucial piece of Spencer's work and I immediately obtained an old copy from America via the internet. I will reproduce the opening part of the work below for our consideration CHAPTER I

WHAT IS A SOCIETY? §212. THIS question has to be asked and answered at the outset. Until we have decided whether or not to regard a society as an entity ; and until we have decided whether, if regarded as an entity, a society is to be classed as absolutely unlike all other entities or as like some others ; our conception of the subject-matter before us remains vague. It may be said that a society is but a collective name for a number of individuals. Carrying the controversy between nominalism and realism into another sphere, a nominalist might affirm that just as there exist only the members of a species, while the species considered apart from them has no existence; so the units of a society alone exist, while the existence of the society is but verbal. Instancing a lecturer's audience as an aggregate which by disappearing at the close of the lecture, proves itself to be not a thing but only a certain arrangement of persons, he might argue that the like holds of the citizens forming a nation. But without disputing the other steps of his argument, the last step may be denied. The arrangement, temporary in the one case, is permanent in the other; and it is the permanence of the relations among component parts which constitutes the individuality of a whole as distinguished from the individualities of its parts. A mass broken into fragments ceases to be a thing; while, conversely, the stones, bricks, and wood, previously separate, become the thing called a house if connected in fixed ways. Thus we consistently regard a society as an entity, because, though formed of discrete units, a certain concreteness in the aggregate of them is implied by the general persistence of the arrangements among them throughout the area occupied. And it is this trait which yields our idea of a society. For, withholding the name from an ever-changing cluster such as primitive men form, we apply it only where some constancy in the distribution of parts has resulted from settled life. § 213. But now, regarding a society as a thing, what kind of thing must we call it? It seems totally unlike every object with which our senses acquaint us. Any likeness it may possibly have to other objects, cannot be manifest to perception, but can he discerned only by reason. If the constant relations among its parts make it an entity; the question arises whether these constant relations among its parts are akin to the constant relations among the parts of other entities. Between a society and anything else, the only conceivable resemblance must be one due to parallelism of principle in the arrangement of components. There are two great classes of aggregates with which the social aggregate may be compared  inorganic and the organic. Are the attributes of a society in any the way like those of a not-living body? or are they in any way like those of a living body? or are they entirely unlike those of both? The first of these questions needs only to be asked to be answered in the negative. A whole of which the parts are alive, cannot, in its general characters, be like lifeless wholes. The second question, not to be thus promptly answered, is to be answered in the affirmative. The reasons for asserting that the permanent relations among the parts of a society, are analogous to the permanent relations among the parts of a living body, we have not to consider.

CHAPTER II. A SOCIETY IS AN ORGANISM. § 214. WHEN we say that growth is common to social aggregates and organic aggregates, we do not thus entirely exclude community with inorganic aggregates. Some of these, as crystals, grow in a visible manner ; and all of them, on the hypothesis of evolution, have arisen by integration at some time or other. Nevertheless, compared with things we call inanimate, living bodies and societies so conspicuously exhibit augmentation of mass, that we may fairly regard this as characterizing them both. Many organisms grow throughout their lives; and the rest grow throughout considerable parts of their lives. Social growth usually continues either up to times when the societies divide, or up to times when they are overwhelmed. Here, then, is the first trait by which societies ally themselves with the organic world and substantially distinguish themselves from the inorganic world. § 215. It is also a character of social bodies, as of living bodies, that while they increase in size they increase in structure. Like a low animal, the embryo of a high one has few distinguishable parts; but while it is acquiring greater mass, its parts multiply and differentiate. It is thus with a society. At first the unlikenesses among its groups of units are inconspicuous in number and degree; but as population augments, divisions and sub-divisions become more numerous and more decided. Further, in the social organism as in the individual organism, differentiations cease only with that completion of the type which marks maturity and precedes decay. Though in inorganic aggregates also, as in the entire Solar System and in each of its members, structural differentiations accompany the integrations; yet these are so relatively slow, and so relatively simple, that they may be disregarded. The multiplication of contrasted parts in bodies politic and in living bodies, is so great that it substantially constitutes another common character which marks them off from inorganic bodies. § 216. This community will be more fully appreciated on observing that progressive differentiation of structures is accompanied by progressive differentiation of functions. The divisions, primary, secondary, and tertiary, which arise in a developing animal, do not assume their major and minor unlikenesses to no purpose. Along with diversities in their shapes and compositions go diversities in the actions they perform: they grow into unlike organs having unlike duties. Assuming the entire function of absorbing nutriment at the same time that it takes on its structural characters, the alimentary system becomes gradually marked off into contrasted portions; each of which has a special function forming part of the general function. A limb, instrumental to locomotion or prehension, acquires divisions and sub-divisions which perform their leading and their subsidiary shares in this office. So is it with the parts into which a society divides. A dominant class arising does not simply become unlike the rest, but assumes control over the rest; and when this class separates into the more and the less dominant, these, again, begin to discharge distinct parts of the entire control. With the classes whose actions are controlled it is the same. The various groups into which they fall have various occupations: each of such groups also, within itself, acquiring minor contrasts of parts along with minor contrasts of duties.

And here we see more clearly how the two classes of things we are comparing, distinguish themselves from things of other classes; for such differences of structure as slowly arise in inorganic aggregates, are not accompanied by what we can fairly call differences of function. § 217. Why in a body politic and in a living body, these unlike actions of unlike parts are properly regarded by us as functions, while we cannot so regard the unlike actions of unlike parts in an inorganic body, we shall perceive on turning to the next and most distinctive common trait. Evolution establishes in them both, not differences simply, but definitelyconnected differences differences such that each makes the others possible. The parts of an inorganic aggregate are so related that one may change greatly without appreciably affecting the rest. It is otherwise with the parts of an organic aggregate or of a social aggregate. In either of these, the changes in the parts are mutually determined, and the changed actions of the parts are mutually dependent. In both, too, this mutuality increases as the evolution advances. The lowest type of animal is all stomach, all respiratory surface, all limb. Development of a type having appendages by which to move about or lay hold of food, can take place only if these appendages, losing power to absorb nutriment directly from surrounding bodies, are supplied with nutriment by parts which retain the power of absorption. A respiratory surface to which the circulating fluids are brought to be aerated, can be formed only on condition that the concomitant loss of ability to supply itself with materials for repair and growth, is made good by the development of a structure bringing these materials. Similarly in a society. What we call with perfect propriety its organization, necessarily implies traits of the same kind. While rudimentary, a society is all warrior, all hunter, all hut-builder, all tool-maker: every part fulfils for itself all needs. Progress to a stage characterized by a permanent army, can go on only as there arise arrangements for supplying that army with food, clothes, and munitions of war by the rest. If here the population occupies itself solely with agriculture and there with mining these manufacture goods while those distribute them, it must be on if condition that in exchange for a special kind of service rendered by each part to other parts, these other parts severally give due proportions of their services. This division of labour, first dwelt on by political economists as a social phenomenon, and thereupon recognized by biologists as a phenomenon of living bodies, which they called the "physiological division of labour," is that which in the society, as in the animal, makes it a living whole. Scarcely can I emphasize enough the truth that in respect of this fundamental trait, a social organism and an individual organism are entirely alike. When we see that in a mammal, arresting the lungs quickly brings the heart to a stand; that if the stomach fails absolutely in its office all other parts by-and-by cease to act; that paralysis of its limbs entails on the body at large death from want of food, or inability to escape ; that loss of even such small organs as the eyes, deprives the rest of a service essential to their preservation; we cannot but admit that mutual dependence of parts is an essential characteristic. And when, in a society, we see that the workers in iron stop if the miners do not supply materials; that makers of clothes cannot carry on their business in the absence of those who spin and weave textile fabrics ; that the manufacturing community will cease to act unless the food-producing and food-distributing agencies are acting; that the controlling powers, governments, bureaux, judicial officers, police, must fail to keep order when the necessaries of life are not supplied to them by the parts kept in order; we are obliged to say that this mutual dependence of parts is similarly rigorous.

Unlike as the two kinds of aggregates otherwise are, they are alike in respect of this fundamental character, and the characters implied by it, § 218. How the combined actions of mutually-dependent parts constitute life of the whole, and how there hence results a parallelism between social life and animal life, we see still more clearly on learning that the life of every visible organism is constituted by the lives of units too minute to be seen by the unaided eye. An undeniable illustration is furnished by the strange order Myxomycetes. The spores or germs produced by one of these forms, become ciliated monads, which, after a time of active locomotion, change into shapes like those of amoeba, move about, take in nutriment, grow, multiply by fission. Then these amoeba-form individuals swarm together, begin to coalesce into groups, and these groups to coalesce with one another: making a mass sometimes barely visible, sometimes as big as the hand. This plasmodium, irregular, mostly reticulated, and in substance gelatinous, itself exhibits movements of its parts like those of a gigantic rhizopod creeping slowly over surfaces of decaying matters, and even up the stems of plants. Here, then, union of many minute living individuals to form a relatively vast aggregate in which their individualities are apparently lost, but the life of which results from combination of their lives, is demonstrable. In other cases, instead of units which, originally discrete, lose their individualities by aggregation, we have units which, arising by multiplication from the same germ, do not part company, but nevertheless display their separate lives very clearly. A growing sponge has its horny fibres clothed with a gelatinous substance; and the microscope shows this to consist of moving monads. We cannot deny life to the sponge as a whole, for it shows us some corporate actions. The outer amoeba-form units partially lose their individualities by fusion into a protective layer or skin; the supporting framework of fibres is produced by the joint agency of the monads; and from their joint agency also result those currents of water which are drawn in through the smaller orifices and expelled through the larger. But while there is thus shown a feeble aggregate life, the lives of the myriads of component units are very little subordinated : these units form, as it were, a nation having scarcely any sub-division of functions. Or, in the words of Professor Huxley, "the sponge represents a kind of sub-aqueous city, where the people are arranged about the streets and roads, in such a manner, that each can easily appropriate his food from the water as it passes along." Again, in the hydroid polype Myriothela, "pseudopodial processes are being constantly projected from the walls of the alimentary canal into its cavity;" and these Dr. Allman regards as processes from the cells forming the walls, which lay hold of alimentary matter just as those of an amoeba do. The like may be seen in certain planarian worms. Even in the highest animals there remains traceable this relation between the aggregate life and the lives of components. Blood is a liquid in which, along with nutritive matters, circulate innumerable living unitsthe blood corpuscles. These have severally their life-histories. During its first stage each of them, then known as a white corpuscle, makes independent movements like those of an amoeba; it "may be fed with coloured food, which will then be seen to have accumulated in the interior;" "and in some cases the colourless blood-corpuscles have actually been seen to devour their more diminutive companions, the red ones." Nor is this individual life of the units provable only where flotation in a liquid allows its signs to be readily seen. Sundry mucous surfaces, as those of the air passages, are covered with what is called ciliated epithelium layer of minute elongated cells packed side by side, and each a

bearing on its exposed end several cilia continually in motion. The wavings of these cilia are essentially like those of the monads which live in the passages running through a sponge; and just as the joint action of these ciliated sponge-monads propels the current of water, so does the joint action of the ciliated epithelium-cells move forward the mucous secretion covering them. If there needs further proof that these epithelium-cells have independent lives, we have it in the fact that when detached and placed in a fit menstruum, they "move about with considerable rapidity for some time, by the continued vibrations of the cilia with which they are furnished." On thus seeing that an ordinary living organism may be regarded as a nation of units which live individually, and have many of them considerable degrees of independence, we shall have the less difficulty in regarding a nation of human beings as an organism. § 219. The relation between the lives of the units and the life of the aggregate, has a further character common to the two cases. By a catastrophe the life of the aggregate may be destroyed without immediately destroying the lives of all its units; while, on the other hand, if no catastrophe abridges it, the life of the aggregate is far longer than the lives of its units. In a cold-blooded animal, ciliated cells perform their motions with perfect regularity long after the creature they are part of has become motionless. Muscular fibres retain their power of contracting under stimulation. The cells of secreting organs go on pouring out their product if blood is artificially supplied to them. And the components of an entire organ, as the heart, continue their co-operation for hours after its detachment. Similarly, arrest of those commercial activities, governmental co-ordinations, etc., which constitute the corporate life of a nation, may be caused, say by an inroad of barbarians, without immediately stopping the actions of all the units. Certain classes of these, especially the widely-diffused ones engaged in foodproduction, may long survive and carry on their individual occupations. On the other hand, the minute living elements composing a developed animal, severally evolve, play their parts, decay, and are replaced, while the animal as a whole continues. In the deep layer of the skin, cells are formed by fission which, as they enlarge, are thrust outwards, and, becoming flattened to form the epidermis, eventually exfoliate, while the younger ones beneath take their places. Liver-cells, growing by imbibition of matters from which they separate the bile, presently die, and their vacant seats are occupied by another generation. Even bone, though so dense and seemingly inert, is permeated by blood-vessels carrying materials to replace old components by new ones. And the replacement, rapid in some tissues and in others slow, goes on at such rate that during the continued existence of the entire body, each portion of it has been many times over produced and destroyed. Thus it is also with a society and its units. Integrity of the whole as of each large division is perennially maintained, notwithstanding the deaths of component citizens. The fabric of living persons which, in a manufacturing town, produces some commodity for national use, remains after a century as large a fabric, though all the masters and workers who a century ago composed it have long since disappeared. Even with minor parts of this industrial structure the like holds. A firm that dates from past generations, still carrying on business in the name of its founder, has had all its members and employés changed one by one, perhaps several times over; while the firm has continued to occupy the same place and to maintain like relations with buyers and sellers. Throughout we find this. Governing bodies, general and local, ecclesiastical corporations, armies, institutions of all orders down to guilds, clubs, philanthropic

associations, etc., show us a continuity of life exceeding that of the persons constituting them. Nay, more. As part of the same law, we see that the existence of the society at large exceeds in duration that of some of these compound parts. Private unions, local public bodies, secondary national institutions, towns carrying on special industries, may decay, while the nation, maintaining its integrity, evolves in mass and structure. In both cases, too, the mutually-dependent functions of the various divisions, being severally made up of the actions of many units, it results that these units dying one by one, are replaced without the function in which they share being sensibly affected. In a muscle, each sarcous element wearing out in its turn, is removed and a substitution made while the rest carry on their combined contractions as usual; and the retirement of a public official or death of a shopman, perturbs inappreciably the business of the department, or activity of the industry, in which he had a share. Hence arises in the social organism, as in the individual organism, a life of the whole quite unlike the lives of the units; though it is a life produced by them. § 220. From these likenesses between the social organism and the individual organism, we must now turn to an extreme unlikeness. The parts of an animal form a concrete whole; but the parts of a society form a whole which is discrete. While the living units composing the one are bound together in close contact, the living units composing the other are free, are not in contact, and are more or less widely dispersed. How, then, can there be any parallelism? Though this difference is fundamental and apparently puts comparison out of the question, yet examination proves it to be less than it seems. Presently I shall have to point out that complete admission of it consists with maintenance of the alleged analogy; but we will first observe how one who thought it needful, might argue that even in this respect there is a smaller contrast than a cursory glance shows. He might urge that the physically-coherent body of an animal is not composed all through of living units ; but that it consists in large measure of differentiated parts which the vitally active parts have formed, and which thereafter become semi-vital and in some cases un-vital. Taking as an example the protoplasmic layer underlying the skin, he might say that while this consists of truly living units, the cells produced in it, changing into epithelium scales, become inert protective structures; and pointing to the insensitive nails, hair, horns, etc., arising from this layer, he might show that such parts, though components of the organism, are hardly living components. Carrying out the argument, he would contend that elsewhere in the body there exist such protoplasmic layers, from which grow the tissues composing the various organs layers which alone remain fully alive, while the structures evolved from them lose their vitality in proportion as they are specialized: instancing cartilage, tendon, and connective tissue, as showing this in conspicuous ways. From all which he would draw the inference that though the body forms a coherent whole, its essential units, taken by themselves, form a whole which is coherent only throughout the protoplasmic layers. And then would follow the facts showing that the social organism, rightly conceived, is much less discontinuous than it seems. He would contend that as, in the individual organism, we include with the fully living parts, the less living and not living parts which co-operate in the total activities; so, in the social organism, we must include not only those most highly vitalized units, the human beings, who chiefly determine its phenomena, but also the various kinds of domestic animals, lower in the scale of life, which, under the control of man, co-operate with him, and

even those far inferior structures, the plants, which, propagated by human agency, supply materials for animal and human activities. In defence of this view he would point out how largely these lower classes of organisms, co-existing with men in societies, affect the structures and activities of the societies how the traits of the pastoral type depend on the natures of the creatures reared; and how in settled societies the plants producing food, materials for textile fabrics etc., determine certain kinds of social arrangements and actions. After which he might insist that since the physical characters, mental natures, and daily doings, of the human units, are, in part, moulded by relations to these animals and vegetals, which, living by their aid and aiding them to live, enter so much into social life as even to be cared for by legislation, these lower forms cannot rightly be excluded from the conception of the social organism. Hence would come his conclusion that when, with human beings, are incorporated the less vitalized beings, animal and vegetal, covering the surface occupied by the society, there results an aggregate having a continuity of parts more nearly approaching to that of an individual organism; and which is also like it in being composed of local aggregations of vitalized units, imbedded in a vast aggregation of units of various lower degrees of vitality, which are, in a sense produced by, modified by, and arranged by, the higher units. But without accepting this view, and admitting that the discreteness of the social organism stands in marked contrast with the concreteness of the individual organism, the objection may still be adequately met. § 221. Though coherence among its parts is a prerequisite to that co-operation by which the life of an individual organism is carried on; and though the members of a social organism, not forming a concrete whole, cannot maintain co-operation by means of physical influences directly propagated from part to part; yet they can and do maintain co-operation by another agency. Not in contact, they nevertheless affect one another through intervening spaces, both by emotional language and by the language, oral and written, of the intellect. For carrying on mutually-dependent actions, it is requisite that impulses, adjusted in their kinds, amounts, and times, shall be conveyed from part to part. This requisite is fulfilled in living bodies by molecular waves, that are indefinitely diffused in low types, and in high types are carried along definite channels (the function of which has been significantly called inter-nuncial). It is fulfilled in societies by the signs of feelings and thoughts, conveyed from person to person; at first in vague ways and only through short distances, but afterwards more definitely and through greater distances. That is to say, the inter-nuncial function, not achievable by stimuli physically transferred, is nevertheless achieved by language emotional and intellectual. That mutual dependence of parts which constitutes organization is thus effectually established. Though discrete instead of concrete, the social aggregate is rendered a living whole. § 222. But now, on pursuing the course of thought opened by this objection and the answer to it, we arrive at an implied contrast of great significance contrast a fundamentally affecting our idea of the ends to be achieved by social life. Though the discreteness of a social organism does not prevent sub-division of functions and mutual dependence of parts, yet it does prevent that differentiation by which one part becomes an organ of feeling and thought, while other parts become insensitive. High animals of whatever class are distinguished from low ones by complex and well-integrated nervous systems. While in inferior types the minute

scattered ganglia may be said to exist for the benefit of other structures, the concentrated ganglia in superior types are the structures for the benefit of which the rest may be said to exist. Though a developed nervous system so directs the actions of the whole body as to preserve its integrity; yet the welfare of the nervous system is the ultimate object of all these actions: damage to any other organ being serious in proportion as it immediately or remotely entails that pain or loss of pleasure which the nervous system suffers. But the discreteness of a society negatives differentiations carried to this extreme. In an individual organism the minute living units, most of them permanently localized, growing up, working, reproducing, and dying away in their respective places, are in successive generations moulded to their respective functions; so that some become specially sentient and others entirely insentient. But it is otherwise in a social organism. The units of this, out of contact and much less rigidly held in their relative positions, cannot be so much differentiated as to become feelingless units and units which monopolize feeling. There are, indeed, traces of such a differentiation. Human beings are unlike in the amounts of sensation and emotion producible in them by like causes: here callousness, here susceptibility, is a characteristic. The mechanically-working and hard-working units are less sensitive than the mentally-working and more protected units. But while the regulative structures of the social organism tend, like those of the individual organism, to become specialized as seats of feeling, the tendency is checked by want of that physical cohesion which brings fixity of function; and it is also checked by the continued need for feeling in the mechanically-working units for the due discharge of their functions. Hence, then, a cardinal difference in the two kinds of organisms. In the one, consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate. In the other, it is diffused throughout the aggregate: all the units possess the capacities for happiness and misery, if not in equal degrees, still in degrees that approximate. As, then, there is no social sensorium, the welfare of the aggregate, considered apart from that of the units, is not an end to be sought. The society exists for the benefit of its members; not its members for the benefit of the society. It has ever to be remembered that great as may be the efforts made for the prosperity of the body politic, yet the claims of the body politic are nothing in themselves, and become something only in so far as they embody the claims of its component individuals. § 223. From this last consideration, which is a digression rather than a part of the argument, let us now return and sum up the reasons for regarding a society as an organism. It undergoes continuous growth. As it grows, its parts become unlike: it exhibits increase of structure. The unlike parts simultaneously assume activities of unlike kinds. These activities are not simply different, but their differences are so related as to make one another possible. The reciprocal aid thus given causes mutual dependence of the parts. And the mutually-dependent parts, living by and for one another, form an aggregate constituted on the same general principle as is an individual organism. The analogy of a society to an organism becomes still clearer on learning that every organism of appreciable size is a society; and on further learning that in both, the lives of the units continue for some time if the life of the aggregate is suddenly arrested, while if the aggregate is not destroyed by violence, its life greatly exceeds in duration the lives of its units. Though the two are contrasted as respectively discrete and concrete, and though there results a difference in the ends subserved by the organization, there docs not result a difference in the laws of the

organization: the required mutual influences of the parts, not transmissible in a direct way, being, in a society, transmitted in an indirect way. Having thus considered in their most general forms the reasons for regarding a society as an organism, we are prepared for following out the comparison in detail. (The Principles of Sociology, Vol. 12, Herbert Spencer, Published by D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1896. Pages 447-62) I regard this as a superb piece of work, one that I am quite incapable of doing because I just do not have the learning and would have no idea how to come by it. Even so, it falls at the last hurdle, and in this case this means that like someone who needs to jump ten feet to cross the chasm in one piece, Spencer jumps only nine feet eleven inches and fifteen sixteenths. A miss is as good as a mile and he simply misses the point of his own argument. This condemnation will not be apparent to anyone who reads only the above extract, and he proceeds, as promised to follow the course of his reasoning in more detail, but we have all we need for our purposes. Spencer has already revealed the fatal flaw that appears in all reasoning about this subject and it is the basic principle that allows the mythology which rules out world and keeps us locked into the ancient theocratic world view that is that flaw. So if you are simply going to allow yourself to fall at the same old same old hurdle, why bother doing the work? There are two obvious answers to this query, either you are quite simply oblivious to the flaw in your reasoning because it permeates your ideas so deeply you just cannot see past it, it reflects, like the silver of a mirror, all your own thoughts in its own image, or you are in your deepest of sentiments a committed priest of the social order. A third possibility might be entertained, and so may as well be noted here, although it has no bearing on why a person should bother to try and solve a riddle and then, as clever as they are in the end simply fail to free themselves of ancient bias, I might be wrong, there may be a God and everything in the Bible may be true, and everything in the Koran, and everything in any other religious book of myth. But clearly this last option is untenable. The challenges to our great intellectuals are real, they do not engage in completely meaningless exercises, and they display great knowledge and genius and make huge advances in the process. The above piece is a perfect example of the kind of good work that people do, but the point to be aware of is that all that is required in order to ensure that science does not take over and religion remains in command is that a small but all important rule be adhered to, the religious thinkers of old knew it well enough, they did not understand it, but they knew it. The rule was that there was an eternal duality to nature, this they took as a divine given and thus they did not seek to unravel the mystery, they had no need, all they needed to know was that this key had to applied to all their reasoning about society. The primary point at which this dualism is made real when considering the nature of human society and determining how it functions well is the point at which we separate the individual from the collective. The most familiar mode of expression for a priest addressing this issue would more likely of been the idea of spirit versus form, but the political and social repercussions demanded that the unity of human form being divided between the whole which was made up of individuals and the crucial point was to make that which was an illusion the primary reality, so the idea that individuals existed in their own right was the primary rule of the

religious thinkers who strove to show how, in order for the individual to be fulfilled, they must act collectively. And this is precisely the rule we see Spencer obeying here. He sets out a lengthy argument indicating that there is only unity in the human domain, virtually proving that there is, and can be, no such thing as an individual, only to conclude by noting that the one thing we must never to allow ourselves to forget is that in the end there is no such thing as the collective and only the individual actually exists! Why bother? Well that is how the priesthood manage knowledge, it is a ubiquitous expression of all intellectuals and we may suppose that it is understood to varying degrees by different people, and that some even know what I know and am stating here, but that none who know it would reveal it, or else, like me finding a public voice is nigh on impossible. But we do not have to assume a conspiracy backed by unwitting compliance, it is also possible that there is genuine ignorance and people just have been unable to see there way to the trees because of the darkness of the forest in which they are lost. There are difficulties in determining the real nature of society and human nature in a satisfactory manner that faced the likes of Spencer working in the immediate aftermath of Darwin's revelations, but there is no doubt that an immense amount of social effort has been poured relentlessly into ensuring this would be as hard as possible by the theocracy and its inducted units So lets just deal with the actual manner in which Spencer undermines the perfection of his own reasoning and ensures the theocratic authority remains untouchable. Society, he says exists for the benefit of its members, when all is said and done, the members do not exist for the sake of society. What is the nature of the linguistic ploy being used to win the argument here? It is a simple statement, but is it true? How does Spencer justify it? 'Hence, then, a cardinal difference in the two kinds of organisms. In the one, consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate. In the other, it is diffused throughout the aggregate: all the units possess the capacities for happiness and misery, if not in equal degrees, still in degrees that approximate. As, then, there is no social sensorium, the welfare of the aggregate, considered apart from that of the units, is not an end to be sought.' There is quite simply no justification for this assertion, indeed Spencer needed only read the words he has just written, and refers to here, to see that this is plainly idiotic. He makes this assertion by simply basing it on the individuality of individuals, essentially a sacred required. What is the point, we are driven to ask again, in even bothering with the whole comparison if you simply intend to bin it right away? After all his effort he dismisses the reality of his own argument by calling it an analogy, something we will see done so often; by scientist and serious academics, true mythologists alone may commit the sin of asserting this is a real reality, because those mythologists who would say such a thing are spreading knowledge that, like astrology say, is so utterly bizarre and unreal as to be irrelevant in any case. Everything pulls together to ensure that the truth is always hidden. If we dismiss Spencer's dismissal of the idea he is here making such an effort to promote, by calling it an analogy, and we insist that society is indeed an organic

entity through and through then we can proceed to elaborate where he leaves off. He makes many useful points about social structures developing specialised attributes and a longevity to match their status as functional structures within a whole organism. He breaks off from following the chain of logic beyond this organisational level. We see this in his falling back upon the affirmation of individual values such as happiness, and in his failure to even attempt to follow through on the logic of the argument thus far attained by trying to determine what higher superstructures a society might display and whether the crucial point of a nervous system running throughout the fibre of the organic body exited that became focused in some one small but all important part of the social biomass. The one thing Spencer does not discuss is religion and the nature of the church as a structure. This is of course the one thing that he needs to discuss. Furthermore it seems to beggar belief that anyone could engage in a deep consideration of this idea and not come to the conclusion that the organism was in fact the real thing that Judaic mythology called God. This was certainly the first thing that struck me when I first had the inspiration to recognise that human nature was corporate, and as a passionate atheist I saw instantly that this was the key I had sought all my life, the way to give an absolute and complete scientific account of human existence. How could anyone not see this? This is impossible. But, follow the idea, and the consequences are absolutely horrific, or simply fabulous if you loath and despise religion as I do, and love freedom and science even more, as I do. What is it then that Spencer is not considering here? We are going to look at some other authors who approached the question of society viewed as an organism from quite different perspectives and we will see that in the case of one of them, Gierke, the question of society as an organism takes an even more progressive form in that the idea that society is an organism leads this man to deal with the matter as if the organism was then a person! Once again then the spectre of the individual rears its ugly head over all things and blots out reason. But what no one, except me, will do, is recognise that the crux of the matter is identity. The point is not that if society is an organism then it must be a person, that is idiotic and simply same old same old mythology. The point is that all living things by virtue of being living need to have an identity. Without an identity there can be no coherence, no organic unity, no communication of common aims, no temporal integrity. Identity is everything. Thus the crucial point for Spencer to recognised and dealt with when he tackled the comparison of the nervous system was the function of the nervous system, to unite and to centralised all the disparate and differentiated units under one central state of being, which is what an identity is. Thus a nervous system is the organ of identity, and since Spencer recognised the centrality of language as the mediator of the social nervous system then he could then of linked the evolution of language to the evolution of the central nervous system and the brain and thus to the establishment of identity. The all he had to do was to locate that element of the social structure that best represented a seat of identity. This he would readily of recognised was the church, and the dissemination of religion throughout society, so closely associated with personal identity, would readily of revealed its true nature. From this position it is easy to see how the various religious structures also emulate the organic aspects of the individual body so that we can see that it is not a case of comparing individual capacities or lack of them in our search for a collective equivalent of the persona sentiments of individuals, but rather we need to look for the social structures associated with religious forms to see how this indicates different

sensitivities and values as organs committed to the structure of the social organism as a unit. Clearly the vested interest of religious groups is a vital force in the driving of social action and it is a force that the executive structures of government are very careful to work with and to nurture, and to use. The religious sentiment is also central in the core religious ideas of global unification under one God, promoted by stimulating joy on a global scale by international sporting extravaganzas or sadness by creating misery through famine in Africa of war in the Middle East. These global catastrophes act as pain and pleasure stimulants which are specially geared to induce a response that is attuned to the religious identities which huge numbers of people are attuned to. And the conflict set up between religious blocs obviously serve to stimulate the body as a body and so the focus on the Moslems as victims of the Christians is precisely what connects the world dominated Muslim population with the Christian power bloc. But what stands out above all else is the role of the Jews in relation to these two power blocs. The Jews are a minor element of the material biomass of the organism, yet they are of supreme importance, and quite unique, in the life history of the organism that dominates the earth today. Concentrated, ancient, and the source of the Christian and Moslem orders which constitute the nervous system of the organism which is extended throughout the human biomass covering the globe. It is inescapable but to see the Jews as the focus of interest in the globalising world organism which is growing today and has been growing for some thousands of years since its initial point of origin in the Middle East became established. The Jews then are the brain, they are especially sensitive to any threat to Western culture, they need this culture more than anyone, they are its core. By comparison the rest of us are but flesh and bone and some like me, gristle and cracked toe nail. It is delightful to see Spencer take note of a most obvious, yet not so obvious, element of the idea he is handling here. The notion that domesticated organisms, be they animal or plant, are part of the human organism is, I would suggest, bound to occur to anyone who spends some time working on the idea that humans are a part of the natural world, yet, that said, it is counter intuitive and, as such, not at all obvious, even once you have the idea before you. When first encountered, in the present age of scientific knowledge, we readily recognise that the relationship between organism of an unlike kind is such that the whole biomass of the earth forms a ecosystem of interdependence and every territorial environment is occupied by an interlocked series of ecological niches in which a hierarchy of organisms exploits that environment forming a chain of primary organisms leading toward an end product which we invariably view as a higher organism. Within this arrangement of organic hierarchies of interdependence there are further special arrangement between species such as that between the flowers and their pollinating insects. Such highly specialised organic relationships are termed symbiotic, and it is just such a relationship that Spencer has recognised exists between humans and their domesticated species. But, as delighted as I am to see him recognise this idea in an appropriate manner, he gives no indication in this second chapter of the magnitude and significance of the idea, and there is no reason to suspect he is likely to delve further into the matter later on since we can see that having forced the door ajar a fraction to peak beyond at the world of science in application to humans he seeks to jam the door shut immediately the first rays of light cut into the darkness of ancient mythologically constructed minds.

The evolution of human beings and other species of organisms has evidently been going on for millions of years, and we too have our own special organic relationships, just as, for example, insects do, although we do not recognise them as such. I am referring to what we call drugs, opium, cannabis, peyote, fly agaric and many more. That fact is that unless you have the key to understanding all things about human beings then you are just not going to be able to understand such subtle, profound and important aspects humans as the relationships between our most fundamental attributes, such as our consciousness, and very peculiar 'food' substances such as these aforementioned plants and fungi. Spencer opens the door of science because he is holding the key in his hand, but the door jams shut because the key to his understanding of reality is that which encodes the mythology of the Jews, as transposed into the sub-Judaic identity we call Christianity. In effect Spencer is drawn toward cutting a new key but only to enable him to fashion a key for the theocracy that rules and has ruled for millennia. The engraving of new notions onto the old key is the way Judaism has evolved as the identity preserving the central nervous system of the organism that has grown from small territorial occupier to planet sized organism in just a few dozen generations. The key to understanding all things about humans in accordance with biology, requires cutting a key that is brand new, cut according to scientific principles alone. This is a key I have been cutting for a few years now. The Jewish key is based on the idea of divinity, the body of the key is the assertion that God exists, all cuts must be made upon this body. The scientific key replaces this all embracing model of existence with the idea that the fundamental force that the Jews call God is in the organism that is the real human form that all individuals exist to bring into being. We can see that in making this statement I am reversing the claim Spencer made regarding the cardinal difference between an organism and society, I am saying that individuals exist solely for the purpose of creating society. This is a functional purpose, not a moral purpose, and there is no questions of happiness or any other abstract concept of purpose having any part in the determination of the significance of this function. Thus instead of God forming the backbone of our intellectual key we have a key that is Corporate all the way along its spinal core. Hence we say that human nature is corporate. Having determined what human nature is we know that all things we say about humans will be determined by this fact of corporate being, as opposed to being determined by the assumption of divine being. Picking up Spencer correct observation that an organism has a central nervous system uniting its myriad of differentiated but interdependent parts, we have already noted that society has a match for this structure in the religious forms and the identity they emit and sustain throughout the biomass of the organism. And when faced with the curious phenomenon of human drug taking, with all its peculiar influences upon our psyche, we are now in a position to understand why this feature of our being evolved. We recognise that since society is an organism, and that this social organisation has to have a centralised medium of co-ordination, then the evolution of the human psyche must of been enabled to take shape by means of the psychoactive substances found in certain plants. These plants did not feed the body of the organism, in any sense, but they did feed the mind, they induced a collective consciousness and they laid a foundation for the establishment of a priestly caste within the most simple and basic human superorganism even though it may consist of only a small number of people. It is not surprising that such substances have become known as the food of the gods, and that in modern times people like Aldous Huxley have written about their

experience of these organisms in terms of the Doors of Perception and such like. Thus we find the amazing fact that the human mind, in its earlier stages of evolution, was created by means of plants substances inducing a state of consciousness in the nervous system of each individual which then acted as a common sense of identification uniting the individuals into one organism according to their evolved capacity to have shared experiences. As humans have evolved beyond the most simple level of organisation the earlier aspects of corporate form have shrunk in their significance under the layers of new modes collective consciousness's creation, most specifically today, religious indoctrination, the product of organs of linguistic evolution, has taken the place of the ancient physiological mechanisms of corporate being. Thus these earlier features of corporate identity that evolved for millions of years, and are consequently deep rooted in our nature, now pose a degree of difficulty in the modern world where they compete with the current primary mode of corporate identity formation. And it is for this reason that race and drugs, two precursor modes of corporate identity formation, are circumscribed and yet intractable problems, impossible to get rid of. In effect the groups that still exploit these ancient modes of corporate identity formation, the nationalistic priest of racial purity and the drug cartel organiser, are competing centres of the body's central nervous system seeking to command the structure and so to draw resources toward themselves rather than toward the core religious identity, that is Judaism, which is the true identity of our organism. This quick dip into the physiological complexities of the social organisms psychological make up however, is not so easily summarised, and the apparent antagonism between the core theistic authority and the, would be core, criminal organs, is not so antagonistic as it would appear. But this I will have to leave hanging in the air rather mysteriously because anything I say will be conjectural, and so I only mean to draw your attention to the integrated nature of all aspects of society. It must be the case that if we are to take on board the full implications of the subject we are delving into here then at all times we must be thinking of structures, of all kinds, in terms of harmonious integration and we must suspect the sense of antagonism which ordinarily informs our understanding of society. In saying this I do not mean to lead us toward an assumption that all things, such as terrorism or war, are good things, they may be functionally necessary, like defecation in relation to eating, but that does not mean that two such opposites are functionally capable of being inverted; perish the thought! This realisation is expressed in Durkheim's sociology and we will take a peak at how he reasoned about these things and earned for himself the accolade of being sociology's first functionalist. But while we have just extended the insight of Spencer regarding the counter intuitive idea that humans have genuine symbiotic relationships with other species exactly as many other species do, so that we have not only included the artful products of human endeavour such as sheep and barely but also found that we must equally accept the ancient allies of human evolution like opium and mescaline which now constitute, in our collective consciousness extreme enemies, we can now go a stage further and attain the logical pinnacle of this line of reasoning, as befits our key to self knowledge, our realisation of human nature's true nature. Essentially what Spencer recognised, albeit in its most limited form, was the extension of the physical organic being of the human animal. He obtained the first phase of this realisation, he embraced the other biological forms which were self evidently dependant upon the existence of humans for their existence. But what he

did not do, and could not do given his severely limited conception of the nature of the idea he was handling, was to grasp the full extent of the meaning of the idea that society is an organism and that therefore the human organism is a Super Being. For Spencer the human animal still appeared in the form of the individual, he had not come to view it as literally an organism identical in its nature to that of the ant, bee or termite, and therefore bound to have comparable physical structures. But one other important element of the idea is covered by Spencer in the short piece quoted above, he recognises that the individual body is comparable with the social body even in so far as it consists of inanimate matter. This clue is absolutely central to the next major step in the progress of the idea of Super Being to the attainment of its climax. If you are going to assert that human society is an organism, a superorganism, and as such identical to the other organisms of a like kind such as the insect varieties mentioned and then to add the marine mollusc forms that build coral reefs and the bacterial forms that also create huge colonies of their own kind, then it is not long before you realise that not only do humans have to have similar divisions as the insects so that we must have comparative structures as that of a queen and comparative modes of behaviour such as that of the robotic drone, but that our whole society must be likened to a hive or a nest. Now this in itself is not so clever, the clever part comes when this causes us to redefine the nature of a hive and a nest so that in aligning society with these two forms of superorganic constructions we create one new conception for all forms of a similar kind and thus we recognise that all the artificial products of human effort, of whatever kind, constitute an exoskeleton. When we do this we see that the best comparative structure for the modern world in the none human domain is a coral reef, rather than a nest or a hive. And suddenly the whole picture falls nicely into place and the story is complete. This really is the culminating piece of the conceptual jigsaw, with this realisation of the true physical nature of the human being we have a final and complete picture of ourselves delivered via the scientific method. So now, all that is required is to explain how we should understand this culminating image of our own being, since I am sure just as it is the final piece of the jig-saw, I am equally certain it is the most counter intuitive element of the idea confronting us, which is why it comes last in the appearance of our understanding ourselves. All the mythology of the priesthood that rules our world, and all our self awareness is mediated through the idea that we create our own world, it seems obvious. When Edward Wilson became infamous for threatening to extend the Darwinian idea of organic evolution into the realm of society the scientific fraternity rose as one to crush this upstart, and he was buried in the avalanche of abuse of anger that was heaped upon him by the academic community. Since his ideas were simple and irrefutable, once battered into subservience and forced to eat humble pie and recant his effrontery in a manner the oppressors of Galileo would of been proud to see enacted, he was of course raised to a high status and courted as the brilliant academic he was. Sociobiology, the subject he gave rise to, has been, like functionalism in sociology a dangerous subject area that the theocracy and its vast army of confederates within the exoskeletal structures of the superorganism keep a close eye upon and are always ensuring only they get to write about what these subject mean. If anyone else ever seeks to write about ideas that promote functionalism or sociobiology I have never been able to discover the fact. The central device expressed by all academics of any kind, and by all theologians and politicians, lawyers and commentators of any kind, by all priests, in

other words, is the assertion that people make their own world. This is a simple logical extension of the primary element of the dualistic device of mythology which makes the human individual the primary body of human being. So, when Wilson made his incursion into the domain of the social, the superorganic, via the study of insects, ants, even he was committed to stick strictly to the notion that evolution was mediated via the genetic fabric which constituted the genome of the species. As long as we stick rigidly to this premise, that organic evolution is delivered via the transformation of the genome, then it is self evident that the products of human endeavour are safe from the clutches of the biologist since obviously human artifacts are not the direct product of genetic evolution; there are no genes for televisions to be found by the Human Genome Project! This then is the line drawn in the sand, the line we kick into the dust when we recognise that the totality of society is an organism body whose form is that of an exoskeleton, a reef like structure on land, occupied by mammals, individual creatures of major physical stature in their own right. It is the act of kicking this imaginary line into oblivion that we must now consider in bringing forth this final piece of the jigsaw which completes our picture of the human organism according to a scientific idea, by allowing us to see that the human organism is an entity that exists on a vast scale wherein social structure constitutes an exoskeleton, within which human individuals constitute the living organic tissue. So lets begin by addressing the basics. I have already noted that the crux of the mythology is the idea that the link between organic evolution is broken when the umbilical cord of the genome is made the sole medium of creative evolution, thus leaving the super-genetic evolution of human creativity to be circumscribed by the priesthood and owned by them in their role of social elite. As long as we allow this division between genetic creation and human creation to go unchallenged we commit ourselves to eternal subservience to the theocracy and their myth making machinery. It must be obvious to anyone interested in the scientific side of the story of human evolution that the notion that humans create themselves poses an obvious problem. At what point did this process of self generation take effect, and in what manner did its effect manifest itself? Naturally we cannot have a discrete break here so the priests who control all our knowledge will present a picture that blends the process of genetic evolution into the process of cultural evolution directed by conscious human effort. To some extent we see the first signs of this transition appearing in the piece of Spencer's work already quoted. He notes how increasing size brings about increasing complexity. Later on in the same volume he makes more use of this type of reasoning in developing the moral agenda which is central to his reasoning that Russell, as we will see below, says accounts for his love of evolution. He argues that as society becomes more advanced so the sacrifice of individuality to the benefit of the collective is increasingly moderated. The first point I want to make is that things are what they are irrespective of what we think they are, denial, as I like to say, does not alter the reality of anything. Except, of course, in some exasperating sense, for practical purposes this is not actually the case where humans are concerned. Why not, and what does this tell us about the nature of being human? My favourite illustration for this point is the story of the women who marries a man who abuses her daughter and then rejects the daughter as being responsible for her own abuse, preserving the fine image of the man whom she relies upon for her own sense of well being. The value of this story is that is a commonplace tale from the sad accounts of abused children when questioned in adulthood. The point is that the mother preserves her own happy world view but in

doing so nothing is changed by the act of denial, the man is still raping her daughter, and such he is still a monster. So does denial change nothing? Not quite, it is the nature of the human social world that reality is what people say it is, not what it actually is. Thus when people said the sun went about the earth then the sun did go about the earth, to all intents and purposes. What can this 'to all intents and purposes' possibly mean? What it means is that while reality is what it is, knowledge is always only what ever people believe it to be. Knowledge then is always a social phenomenon and to whatever extent knowledge is functional it is first and foremost therefore functional as an attribute of the social fabric. Denial then can alter the social reality, denial therefore can be a very useful behavioural response to knowledge. And it follows that while reality will always be what it is, denial may be the required response. And that is exactly what we see being enacted in Spencer's work, having recognised the logic of human organic status he proceeds to work out an elaborate account of denial that accommodates the requirement that human sacredness remains paramount in out world. He does by using the idea of evolution to deliver an ever increasing augmentation of individual identity, exactly in accord with the Judaic mythology that rules the world he lives in, and we live in. But we know that denial does, at least, not alter reality. Therefore we know that if there has been change in the form of the human organism resulting in a real increase in an expression of human individuality as an absolute quality of life, then what cannot of changed one iota is human nature, that is the meaning of human nature, it is a thread of unbroken quality running through the course of human evolution from the beginning of their origin, in the case of humans this is the coming into being of the mammals. Thus we do not necessarily have to dispute the observations Spencer bases his assertion of increasing individuality upon, we may concede that for a few the expression of individuality has become a feature of their life, and for whole sections of some societies the idea of individuality is a thing to be valued. But what does this really mean? My own interpretation, since I know there is no such thing as an individual, and never can be, is that the increasing mass of the human organism, which has been staggering in its increase in a very short space of time, has produced a degree of differentiation leading to the illusion of individuality as a universal characteristic. And yet of course when considered in any meaningful manner it is clear enough that no one has any real degree of individuality if by this we mean they are able to act freely of all others at all times. So lets get back to the main point, a consideration of the point of transition from genetic to human creativity. Once again, we can say, that no matter how it may appear, and in out fantastically sophisticated material world appearance is everything, appearance is, in reality countered entirely by knowledge that human nature is corporate. This means that no matter who much we think that we have evolved beyond the grip of biological evolution, as Richard Dawkins so likes to claim, this cannot be so, and is not so. So all we need do is understand what is real, not what denial makes into a social reality courtesy of the propaganda produced by priests like Dawkins. Clearly there has to be a biologically driven continuum at work. Spencer notes, rightly, that the bonding medium operating in the social fabric is linguistic, so we know that the transference of creativity from the immediately physical to the indirectly physical occurs by means of shifting the creative principle of human nature from the genetic to the linguistic. Now it has to be said that at this point in our reasoning we come truly into our times and find ourselves empowered by the ongoing revolution in the acquisition of scientific knowledge in a way that our forebears of a century or so ago were not so

fortunate. We are living in the age of genetic information, and this makes all the difference at this stage in our reasoning. We actually know for a fact that a simple base code, elaborately organized, acts as a medium for all organic form on the planet. This idea is a powerful on its own as the idea of evolution given to us by Darwin, and on this base alone we nay excuse the blindness of the priests of the recent past. But we cannot help suspecting their motives and intentions when we see the world dominated by experts today like Dawkins in Britain and Gould in America, who not only fail to make the logical inference concerning the revelation of a genetic code and the details of how it works, but instead act as experts in the popular transmission of this knowledge and in doing so continue to give the same message that Spencer did, that humans are exactly as described in the Bible, unique moral beings unlike all other things on earth in a an absolute way. The correct interpretation of reality, unaffected by denial, is that what genes constitute is a code, and as such they have a common nature to language, both are a medium of information. Thus what drives the creative process is information, whether it is carried by genes or speech, or writing, or art or form, is irrelevant. Thus the fact that there are no genes for televisions to be found on the human genome is completely irrelevant to the question of whether or not a television is an organic entity produced solely by the process of organic evolution. And the next obvious point to make is that of course the attribute of linguistic communication was created by means of genetic evolution and it is the foundation of our kinds form, but it is in keeping with our nature. The evolution of language undoubtedly brought into being a new kind of hominid, but it did not in any respect alter the nature of the hominid line which is the mammalian line that evolved to produce the ultimate expression of mammalian form, the superorganic form. We will pick up the thread of this reasoning in a very strange way when we look at the writings of the Russian mystic Ouspensky later on who recognised the idea of evolution leading to the creation of perfect forms, of which humans were but one, but who expressed this idea in a very odd manner indeed. But there is no doubt that this suggestion regarding the creation of material items by means of human activity being just as much an organic process as any other to which Darwinian evolution applies is most peculiar. So lets try and elaborate upon this subject and see how we can convince ourselves to follow the sign of the light sneaking through the cracks between the doors edge and the doorframe, in disobedience to out natural inclination to lean on the door and see only what that act of denial wants us to see. The assertion is that humans did not make televisions, or planes, Nature made them. And moreover the assertion is that this is so in just as real a sense as we recognise people did not make legs or kidneys, Nature made them too. The fact of the matter is that once you open yourself up to this mode of reasoning it becomes incredibly obvious. In effect what we are doing is altering our perspective, we are shifting from the immediate time frame to a deep time perspective, something we should of become good at in the modern scientific era which has taught us so much on the basis of this temporal shift. The problem is that we have no been permitted to apply this time shift to our own nature, mainly of course because the priests have not seen fit to allow us to have any true understanding of what our nature is that accords with the new insights based on the extended time frame of scientific method. Shifting our perspective then, instead of viewing evolution as a process led by random mutations occurring in a stable code that creates potential forms which are then selected according to the test imposed upon the form by the environment, we can

see the evolution of organisms in the light of their nature, as a complex array of parts that has evolved from a common origin by making differentiation subservient to a unified plan which results in a complex organic form. On this basis there is a target toward which evolution is directed and in the process of achieving greater complexity it can be said to discover solutions, rather than to spontaneously generate them by a process of trial and error. Now this is not an easy distinction to be clear about or to decide between in the rarefied context of abstract speculation because it evokes the problem of the chicken and the egg which is mechanism taken out of any temporal timeframe and this left disconnected from reality, ideal for the promulgators of ideologies of denial, but not what we seek. So lets come close to home and consider something substantial. Lets ask ourselves a simple enough question. Did people make the aeroplane? First up we must say yes, absolutely. OK. But we do not want a simple, self evident answer, we are trying to see beyond the obvious, beyond the interminably thick oak door guarding the castle in which the priesthood hide the lantern knowledge. This simple response is by its nature final and absolute. But taken in this simple form we are entitled to get pedantic and say that if people created the aeroplane then the aeroplane can take absolutely any form anyone cares to give it. Take a pile of bricks throw them in a pit and call it a plane and it will be a plane and it will do what a plane does, it will fly and carry passengers. This nonsense forces a little more precision upon our answer, and suddenly, in an instant, we find that people did not create the aeroplane, they discovered it. And suddenly we have a whole new perspective on the process of evolution. Now we can say that evolution did not produce lungs with which to breath the air, evolution discovered lungs! Just as humans discovered aeroplanes. In other words whether it is something we want to create, such as a starship, or something Nature wants to create such as a mode of living on dry land, the solution, however it is reached is constrained by the environment that induced the desire, or, in the case of Nature, offers an opportunity. This leaves us with the possible difference between ourselves and Nature hanging by the distinction I have left in place between Nature being drawn by a potential void and out being drawn by our own impulsive desire. But when we seek to exploit this distinction to repair the damage to a door of denial all we are doing is shifting back from the deep time frame of science to the immediate time frame of our everyday world. And when we make that shift then of course we no longer see the reality behind the door of denial than if we were to take our eye from the microscope or the telescope and then to claim, in the vein of some made eighteenth century philosopher like Berkeley, that things only exist when we look at them! Once we have the process fully described, as above, then we can apply it to all facets of our being. Soon we see that every aspect of life becomes prone to our new key of scientific understanding and the idea that we create society ourselves by making freely willed moral choices based on our reason goes down the pan, where it belongs. The law we may think we created in the pursuit of a better society. Nonsense. Law is just as much an artificial creation as anything else we produce and it too has to be discovered in the relentless evolutionary thrust to unleash the potential of our nature to form a Super Being. The laws we have found we have in our modern world of extraordinary size and complexity therefore were discovered, not created, or crafted, by anyone. And thus we live in a superorganic state of being, entirely evolved, and given to us by virtue of our ongoing efforts to exist in a universe that is not happening as we speak but unfolding as a continuum which is connected to its

past, a past that determines it future. So if we want to be creative then we need to be aware of what we want to create down the line and to take the steps now. That is what the Jews did when they wrote their mythology, they wanted to rule the world, and now they do. It does work, but of course this secret knowledge creates a priesthood that enslaves the rest of us to its purposes and while the purpose of the priesthood is always tested by the reality of existence and thus has to conform to that reality, which Judaism does, hence all the problems with it, there is at least the possibility of refining the way in which we hurtle through this weird space we call existence. Finally, lets just consider the nature of Spencer as a commentator. He was of the first generation that had to bear the full force of the idea of evolution, it was his job, as a priest of the theocracy, as all commentators, or people with any kind of civil power are, to ensure that the new knowledge was contained. Darwin had produced his knowledge in such a way that it was containable, he was a priest of the theocracy too after all, but in the initial phases of exploding his intellectual bombshell the force of that blast was bound to shatter all the age old myths. Not everyone is a priest, hence the new ideas shatter the illusions of the acolytes, the slaves. The priests set about repairing the damage, but they give themselves a head start by being in charge of the critical event of revelation in the first place. It was Darwin's central role in providing the means of diffusing the impact of the new scientific method on the Judaic mythology, which provided the bonding identity of the organism the priests ruled, and rule still, that made him an acknowledged national hero, buried in Westminster, and made the obverse of the monarch on today's ten pound notes. Even so, the damage from this 'controlled explosion' of knowledge had to be repaired. And it has been, well and truly, hence the need for someone like me to try and do the job properly. The key to containing knowledge is not to eradicate it, this is futile because knowledge is, in any case, vital to human existence. As I have pointed out already, it is a matter of containing knowledge within a vessel of a like kind, a vessel formed of ideas, the primary ideological fabric which contains the real nature of existence, as it pertains to human beings, consists of the notion of duality. Between the idea of two opposing, but interdependent forces, the truth that in reality there is only unity, can be contained. But it follows that this containment must occur in some material body, ideas and knowledge has to exist in a repository of some kind, and so it does, it occurs within the circumscribed organ that manages the containment, and so becomes the priesthood. The priesthood is the sum total of all the manipulators, of all kinds, within society. This totality forms the brain within the superorganism's mass, what we would call the social elite. So, if the job of containment is breached then what happens is that the knowledge that is possessed by the priests is loosed upon the world, and is no longer available to act as a source of centralising power upon which the organism depends. The question has to be then, is it possible to have a human society on a grand scale that is not organised about a priesthood whose form is created by controlling knowledge? I am not sure, I act as though it is possible, but the more I come to understand I wonder. I believe, however, in the idea that truth is all, knowledge is everything, and I have faith in the power of revelation, by which I mean openness and free understanding. I am repulsed by any notion of secret knowledge, I do not care whether all the evidence indicates that we have evolved to live in subservience to a priesthood who keep us in ignorance and farm us like sheep, looked after only on the basis that we are the livestock upon which the master class depends.

This physiological arrangement is undoubtedly a naturally evolved structure, but that does not mean it cannot be constituted in some higher form than that which Judaism is. Science is the knowledge that is able to fashion a key to open another doorway to the future beyond mythology, beyond religion as the medium of collective being. These ideas may seem strange so let me explain the most fundamental principle of existence in terms of the subject we are now discussing. I have just said that ideas and knowledge firstly need to be contained within a constraint of their own kind if they are to become a medium of power, or purposes, able to act as a means of giving advantage to some in relation to others. This is obvious because the alternative is that all knowledge, the moment it is discovered to be of value is immediately released to all and sundry, this latter situation is most definitely not the case. It may be asked why knowledge cannot simply be kept secret, without being contained within a field of a like kind, such as the idea of duality, or theism? The answer to this is perfectly obvious, we are not talking about the act of an individual who has stolen some property or murdered someone, we are discussing knowledge which is found to be of value. For knowledge to be of value it is necessary to share it, that is what knowledge, of any extensive sort amounts to. Essentially we are talking about knowledge of social significance, but that is the nature of most knowledge. Therefore we are immediately faced with an exercise of limited sharing, and that is the crucial point, that is why real knowledge accruing the secret of social power must be encoded if it is to be of any value. So we know why knowledge must be contained by a like form, knowledge contains knowledge. And it follows from this fact that the truth must be hidden within the outer form that cloaks it. This is what leads to the generation of encoded knowledge which has real meaning hidden within it. But we have noted that finally this knowledge must be reposited somewhere, and that somewhere is obviously within the brains of individuals. Now we come to a most important point in the evolution and growth of a priesthood. Referring back to our understanding that the fundamental nature of the creative force is information then we can note that when we discuss knowledge in this way and the evolution of mythological codes of reality we are discussing a form of information. We must now note that what applies to one species of knowledge, that is one kind of information, that it be reposited in some place, applies to information in general, information has to exist in material form. What follows from this is a realisation of the unity between form and the information that creates it. Thus Einstein's notion of energy being equivalent to mass can be seen to equally well describe the realisation that information and form are also equivalents. Which, incidentally, makes our awareness of information, the experience of energy. Our brains are effectively sense organs for sensing energy. What this means is that when a transformation in a mode of information occurs it must at one and the same time create a material expression of that transformation. Thus as humans began to create associations based on the accumulation of knowledge that empowered a social structure and then transposed this true knowledge into a code, this very act of codification created a new material form. That new material form in this context is a new social structure, and in the precise context with which we are concerned here that means the evolution of a priesthood with all that history records of such things in terms of social form. In short, what we are discussing here is the fact that information and form are at all times one and the same thing in some sense, and when we are dealing with the subject of information, which the evolution of human form is orientated toward in the pursuit of the objective of an ever more perfect mammalian form of Super Being, we are

looking at one face of reality distinguished from the other, hence the mechanism of duality which enables knowledge to be filtered out from the reality it is associated with and codified, thus creating an organ of superorganic identity. But of course, in reality, the information can never be separated from the form, it is only an act of evolutionary development that achieves this result by way of the process of specialised differentiation of parts, as discussed by Spencer, which brings about the situation where an organ of identity based on secret knowledge comes into being and acts as the mind, soul, personality, whatever you want to call it, of the Super Being. And so we can see that the act of living, in which humans seem to engage in a tug-of-war, with knowledge as the rope, is a process of discovery and competition for possession of that which is discovered, leading to a toing and froing of ideas. I contend that since the revelation of evolution by Darwin, the relentless battle for possession has gone on, and now science is all but eradicated from the collective consciousness, being contained between the two poles of the intellectual fabrication that insists existence is a dualistic structure. There is every reason to believe that this success on the part of the theocracy will increase decade on decade for centuries, or millennia to come, and ignorance, accordingly, will deepen to unimaginable depths, as we see it doing all the time. But in my efforts we see the chinks of light firing like lone photons trying to connect with the mind's eye of the Being that we are, trying to free us from this monstrous identity to which we are all so happily enslaved. I look at someone like Spencer, and today we have a whole array of Spencer's, call them Dawkins or Gould, just as they did a century ago, call them Spencer, Darwin or Huxley, and I wonder what these people are. I conclude they are priests because come what may, in the end they never tell the simple truth, and when it is presented to them, as I have tried to do, they do everything in their power to deny it, or, if they can, simply to ignore it. Bertrand Russell was another great priest dedicated to the preservation of the theocracy in the difficult times following the revelation of evolution that the theocracy was forced to bring on as scientific knowledge threatened to burst the fabric of the vessel moulded from dualism. Russell was the foremost rationalist philosopher of the twentieth century, a hero of the atheist, so we are told, but he was no atheist, like the other priests, during these difficult times, he only took on the mantel of atheist to ensure that no one else could, no one who might actually be an atheist, no one like me. This is how he served out his priesthood, as a mock enemy of the theocracy. And of course, like all good fraternal brothers, it is all for one and one for all. So Russell was a great admirer of Spencer and he spoke of him as the first scientific philosopher. 'Herbert Spencer, in whose honour we are assembled today, would naturally be classed among scientific philosophers: it was mainly from science that he drew his data, his formulation of problems, and his conception of method. But his strong religious sense is obvious in much of his writing, and his ethical preoccupations are what make him value the conception of evolution - that conception in which, as a whole generation has believed, science and morals are to be united in fruitful and indissoluble marriage.' (Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, Bertrand Russell, Penguin Books, 1954, Page 94. First published 1918)

Idea Two

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Mythology

Ouspensky's Esoteric Thoughts on Super Beings We have likened the endeavour we are engaged in here to the work of a geologist delving into the earth's crust, following a precious seam of some exotic mineral, one found to run on and on, but ever so hard to follow. The temporal relationship of such material is of vital concern to such an explorer of the material world. We might therefore think we should perhaps follow a chronological plan when considering the various exponents of the intellectual deposits of our kind. However, to take up the reality of our dualistic universe, as it is rendered by our very presence within it, we can say that here we are concerned to uncover the trail of one side of the duality, the seam of information which we have called the idea of Super Being. Thus we are concerned with the idea, the information first, and while the temporal proximity of the various thinkers we will consider is of great interest I am not sure that we need allow ourselves to be confined by a dictatorial time scale, as long as we are aware of the temporal relationships. We have our theme, it is the Super Being, we are considering this theme in the light of one conception, the light of science. Science is supposed to be a method of working in relation to knowledge fabrication that excludes bias but unfortunately life just does not work like that and as we have been observing throughout this work science is a slave to the theocracy. Naturally the scientific priesthood deny this and assert the scientific establishment is independent. This claim is simply too ridiculous to be worth even considering, and I cannot be bothered to argue with it. We might just note that it is clearly in conceivable that religion could of survived the Darwinian revolution if the whole fabric were not united under one authority that has allowed religion to not only survive but surge ahead as never before so that today a theistic account of evolution is now taught in school and protected by political patronage of the highest order. The point then, is that science, as defined by that which is affirmed by the scientific establishment, is powerless to deal with the question of what human nature is. The only alternative to a scientist discovering this knowledge is therefore that a layperson should do so, such a layperson, attaining such intellectual achievements would be classified by the theocracy as a philosopher. We are philosophers therefore, like it or not, and I for one most certainly do not like it one bit. Our method then makes certain assumptions of a scientific nature. Science is the only way to know anything about reality, if someone has some other way, that that is science by definition. We cannot approach the subject of Super Being directly from a scientific standpoint because this is precluded by the way the theocracy has control of society. But the subject is out there, and since the only way to know anything is science then the way for a philosopher to proceed to clear the path for scientists to follow is for the philosopher to exam the various ways in which people of all kinds have spoken about this phenomenon, the Super Being. By doing this we achieve two things, we provide evidence that this phenomenon has always impinged upon people's minds, and that therefore it must represent something real, and therefore something science can reveal. And since science is the only way to know anything, and science cannot investigate the subject directly under the present dispensation of social authority, then the expression of the ideas must themselves become the subject matter that is unearthed and examined and

interpreted to open the way for a proper scientific examination of what these ideas mean. For only science can say what religion is, what God is, what sacredness is, and so on. Things are what they are, but only science can say what anything is. And so we will not follow a chronological plan, because the nature of our material, being the ideas expressed by a range of commentators makes the perspective of the commentators of primary interest and while the time frame in which they lived will of influenced the way they approached the subject of Super Being, all our commentators are modern, and all are voicing ideas that lend themselves to an ultimately scientific conclusion because they are all seeking to embrace evolution and to accord with biology. Thus the mindset of the commentator is of great interest because what we will find is that a variety of people will be coming at the same idea from a critically different angle and as a consequence they will each discuss exactly the same phenomenon, but they will give it a slightly different interpretation. What this work is really doing then is performing a titration of the ideas against a uniform background of reality. The reality is that human beings are animals, they evolved and this reality is the only means by which we can understand anything about ourselves truly. By examining a variety of approaches which use this idea as a backdrop, but which colour the account with a slanted interpretation according to a predetermined point of view, we will discover what is held in common between all this commentators, and thus we can discard the rainbow of opinions and find ourselves left with the pure white light of truth, which is what science needs in order to perform its function as discoverer of reality. And so now we come to someone who simply could not be more antithetical to science and the scientific method, albeit he has plenty to say about science. Ouspensky was an advocate of esoteric ideas, and so he came to the subject of existence from a completely different angle to that we have already seen in Spencer who Russell tells us wore spectacles before his mind's eye tinged with moral rectitude. Both men are, to me, an absolute atheist, simply out and out theists dedicated to the Zionist cause, both are classic priests. Reading Ouspensky's work is most odd, I am not the least interested in esoteric ideas as a rule but in this case I am fascinated, the reason being that because Ouspensky actually discusses esoteric lore in a rational manner then he gives me an opportunity to evaluate it according to my supremely rational key that tells me that human nature is corporate. Esoteric ideas are founded upon the central notion that there is hidden knowledge, which strikes me as being somewhat arse about face, as so often when the priests get to work, for while there are things we do not know knowledge itself cannot be hidden unless it is in the manner above described when we discussed the organic process whereby the codification of knowledge occurs naturally, producing an elite social structure in the functional form of a priesthood. This physiological process that evolved in the course of human evolution is made more accessible by the straightforward manner in which Ouspensky discusses the ideas of his favourite subject, the fact that these ideas are, when not elucidating the modus operandi of esoteric lore itself, quite wacky! But now lets see exactly how he ends up joining that select group of moderns who have evinced a passion for the social reality of Super Being. But let us go back to the moment when the first man, " Adam and Eve ", was issued from the Laboratory and appeared on Earth. The first humanity could not begin any culture. There was as yet no inner circle to help them, to guide their first

steps. And man had to receive help from the powers which created him. These powers had to fill the part afterwards played by the inner circle. Culture began and, as the first man had not yet the habit of mistakes, nor the practice of misdeeds, nor the memory of barbarism, the culture developed with extraordinary speed. Moreover, this culture did not develop negative sides, but only positive sides. Man was living in full unity with Nature, he saw the inner properties in all things, in all beings, he understood these properties and he gave names to all things according to their properties. Animals obeyed him ; he was in constant converse with the higher powers which had created him. And man rose to great heights and rose with great rapidity because he made no mistakes in his ascent. But this incapacity to make mistakes and the absence of the practice of mistakes while on the one hand hastening his progress, on the other hand exposed him to great danger because it carried with it the incapacity to avoid the results of mistakes, which nevertheless remained possible. Eventually man did make a mistake. And he made this mistake when he had already risen to a great height. This mistake consisted in his beginning to regard himself as being still higher than he actually was. He thought that he already knew what was good and what was evil; he thought that by himself he could guide and direct his life without help from the outside. This mistake might possibly not have been so great, its results might have been corrected or altered, if man had known how to deal with the results of his mistakes. But having had no experience of mistakes he did not know how to combat the results of his mistakes. The mistake began to grow, began to assume gigantic proportions, until it began to manifest itself in all sides of man's life. Man began to fall. The wave went down. Man rapidly descended to the level from which he started, plus the acquired sin. And after a more or less long stationary period, the arduous ascent with the help of higher powers began again. The only difference was that this time man had the capacity for making mistakes, had a sin. And the second wave of culture began with fratricide, with the crime of Cain, which was placed as the corner-stone of the new culture. But apart from the " karma " of sin, man had acquired a certain experience through his former mistakes and when, therefore, the moment for the fatal mistake recurred, it was not the whole of humanity which made it. There happened to be a certain number of people who did not commit the crime of Cain, who did not associate with it in any way or profit by it in any respect. From that moment the paths of humanity diverged. Those who made the mistake began to fall until they again reached the lowest level. But the moment they began to need help, those who did not fall, that is, those who did not make the mistake, were now able to give the help. Such in short is the scheme of the earliest cultures. The myth of Adam and Eve is the history of the first culture. Life in the Garden of Eden was the form of civilisation which was reached by the first culture. The Fall of Man was the result of his attempt to rid himself of the higher powers who guided his evolution and start a life on his own, relying only on his own judgement. Every culture commits this fundamental mistake in its own way. Every new culture develops some new features, arrives at new results and then loses all. But everything that is really valuable is preserved by those who do not make mistakes, and it serves as material for the beginning of the succeeding culture.

In the first culture man had no experience of mistakes. His rise was very rapid, but it was not sufficiently complex, not sufficiently varied. Man did not develop in himself all the possibilities that were in him, because many things were attained by him too easily. But after a series of falls, with all his luggage of errors and crimes, man had to develop other possibilities inherent in him in order to counterbalance the results of those errors. Further, it will be shown that the development of all possibilities inherent in each point of creation forms the object of the progress of the Universe, and the life of mankind must be studied also in connection with this principle. In the later life of the human race and in its later cultures the development of these possibilities is effected with the help of the inner circle. From this point of view all the evolution possible to mankind consists in the evolution of a small number of individuals, spread possibly over a long period of time. The mass of humanity itself does not evolve ; it merely varies a little, adapting itself to the change of surrounding conditions. Mankind, like an organism, evolves by means of the evolution of a certain very small number of the cells of which it consists. The evolving cells pass, as it were, into the higher tissues in the organism, and thus these higher tissues receive nourishment by absorbing the evolving cells. The idea of the higher tissues is the idea of the inner circle. As I mentioned before, the idea of the inner circle contradicts all recognised sociological theories concerning the structure of human society, but this idea brings us to other theories which are forgotten now and which did not receive due attention in their time. Thus from time to time there arose in sociology the question as to whether humanity could be regarded as an organism and human communities as smaller organisms; that is, is a biological view of social phenomena possible ? Contemporary sociological thought adopts a negative attitude in relation to this idea, and it has long been considered unscientific to regard a community as an organism. The mistake lies however in the way the problem itself is formulated. The concept "organism" is taken in too narrow a sense and only in one preconceived idea. Namely, if a human community, nation, people, race, is taken as an organism, it is regarded as an organism either analogous to the human organism or higher than the human organism. Actually, however, this idea can be correct only in relation to the whole of mankind. Separate human groups, no matter how large they may be, can never be analogous to man, and still less can they ever be superior to him. Biology knows of and has established the existence of entirely different orders of organisms. And if in examining the phenomena of social life we bear in mind the difference between organisms on the different rungs of the biological ladder, the biological view of social phenomena becomes much more possible. But this only on condition that we realise that every human community, such as a race, a people, a tribe, is a lower organism as compared to an individual man. A race or a nation regarded as an organism has nothing in common with the highly developed and complex organism of individual man, which for every function has a special organ and has very great capacity for adaptation, possesses free movement, etc. In comparison with an individual man, a race or nation as an organism stands on a very low level, that of "animal plants". These organisms are amorphous, for the most part immobile, masses, beings which have no special organs for any of their functions and do not possess the capacity for free movement, but are fixed to a definite place. They put out something like feelers in different directions, and by means of these they seize other beings like themselves and eat them. The

whole life of these organisms consists in their eating one another. There are some organisms which possess the capacity for absorbing a quantity of smaller organisms, and so temporarily become very large and strong. Then two of these large organisms meet one another, and a struggle begins between them in which either one or both are destroyed or weakened. The whole external history of humanity, the history of the struggles between peoples and races, consists of nothing but the process, which has just been described, of "animal plants" eating one another. But in the midst of all this, underneath it all, as it were, proceed the life and activity of the individual man, that is, of the individual cells which form these organisms. The activity of these individual men produces what we call culture or civilisation. The activity of the masses is always hostile to this culture, it always destroys it. Peoples create nothing. They only destroy. It is individual men who create. All inventions, discoveries, improvements, all technical progress, the progress of science, art, architecture and engineering art, all philosophical systems, all religious teachings, all these are results of the activity of individual men. The destruction of the results of this activity, their distortion, annihilation, obliteration from the face of the earth is the activity of the human masses. this This does not mean that individual men do not serve destruction. On the contrary, the initiative of destruction on a large scale always belongs to individual men, and the masses are merely the executive agency. But masses can never create anything, although they can destroy on their own account. If we understand that the masses of humanity, that is, peoples and races, are lower beings as compared with individual man, we shall understand that peoples and races cannot evolve in the same measure as individual man. We have even no idea of the evolution possible to a people or to a race, though we often speak of such an evolution. As a matter of fact, all peoples and nations within the limits of our historical observation follow one and the same course. They grow, develop, reach a certain degree of size and power, and then begin to be divided up, decline and fall. Finally they disappear entirely and become component parts of some other being like themselves. Races and nations die in the same way as individual man. But individuals have certain other possibilities besides death, which the great organisms of the human masses have not; for the souls of these are as amorphous as their bodies. The tragedy of individual man lies in the fact that he lives, as it were, within the dense mass of such a lower being, and all his activity is in the service of the purely vegetable functions of this blind jelly-like organism. At the same time the conscious individual activity of man, his efforts in the domain of thought and creative work, run contrary to these big organisms, in spite of them and in defiance of them. But of course it would not be true to say that all the individual activity of man consists in a conscious struggle against these big organisms. Man is conquered and made a slave. And it often happens that man thinks he is serving and must serve these big beings by his individual activity. But the higher manifestations of the human spirit, the higher activities of man, are entirely unnecessary to the big organisms ; in most cases, indeed, they are unpleasant to them, hostile and even dangerous, since they divert to individual work forces which might otherwise have been absorbed into the vortex of the life of the big organism. In an unconscious, merely physiological way, the big organism endeavours to appropriate all the powers of the individual cells which are its components, using them in its own interests, that is to say, mainly for fighting other similar organisms. But when we remember that individual cells, that is, men, are far more highly organised beings than big organisms, and that the activities of the former

go far beyond the activities possible to the latter, we shall understand this perpetual conflict between man and human aggregates, we shall understand that what is called progress or evolution is that which is left over of individual activities after all the struggle between the amorphous masses and this individual activity has taken place. The blind organisms of the masses struggle with the manifestation of the evolutionary spirit, annihilate and stifle it and destroy what has been created by it. But even so they cannot entirely annihilate it. Something remains, and this is what we call progress or civilisation. The idea of evolution in the life both of individual man and of human communities, the idea of esotericism, the birth and growth of cultures and civilisations, the possibilities of individual man connected with periods of rise and fallall these and many other things are expressed in three Biblical myths. These three myths are not connected in the Bible and stand separately, but in reality they express one and the same idea and mutually complete one another. The first myth is the story of the Great Flood and of Noah's Ark ; the second is the story of the Tower of Babel, of its destruction and the confusion of tongues ; and the third is the story of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, of Abraham's vision and of the ten righteous men, for whose sake God agreed to spare Sodom and Gomorrah, but who could not be found there. The Great Flood is an allegory of the fall of civilisation, of the destruction of culture. Such a fall must be accompanied by the annihilation of the greater part of the human race, as a consequence of geological upheavals, or of wars, of the migration of human masses, epidemics, revolutions, and similar causes. Very often all these causes coincide. The idea of the allegory is that at the moment of the apparent destruction of everything, that which is really valuable is saved according to a plan previously prepared and thought out. A small group of men escapes from the general law and saves all the most important ideas and attainments of the given culture. The legend of Noah's Ark is a myth referring to esotericism. The building of the " Ark " is the " School", the preparation of men for initiation, for transition to a new life, for new birth. "Noah's Ark", which is saved from the Flood, is the inner circle of humanity. The second meaning of the allegory refers to individual man. The flood is death, unavoidable, inexorable. But man can build within himself an "Ark" and assemble in it specimens of everything that is valuable in him. In such a case these specimens will not perish. They will survive death and be born again. Just as mankind can be saved only through its connection with the inner circle, so an individual man can attain personal "salvation" only by means of a link with the inner circle in himself, that is, by connecting himself with the higher forms of consciousness. And this cannot be done without outside help, that is, without the help of the "inner circle". The second myth, that of the Tower of Babel, is another version of the first; but the first speaks of salvation, that is, of those who are saved, while the second speaks only of ruin, that is, of those who shall perish. The Tower of Babel represents culture. Men dream of building a tower of stone "whose top may reach unto heaven", of creating an ideal life on earth. They believe in intellectual methods, in technical means, in formal institutions. For a long time the tower rises higher and higher above the earth. But the moment infallibly arrives when men cease to understand each other, or rather, realise that they have never done so. Each of them understands in his own way the ideal life on earth. Each of them wants to carry out his own ideas. Each of them wants to fulfil his own ideal.

This is the moment when the confusion of tongues begins. Men cease to understand one another even in the simplest things ; lack of understanding provokes discord, hostility, struggle. The men who built the tower start killing one another and destroying what they have built. The tower falls in ruins. Precisely the same thing occurs in the life of the whole of humanity, in the life of peoples and nations, and in the life of individual man. Each man builds a Tower of Babel in his own life. His strivings, his aims in life, his attainments, these are his Tower of Babel. But the moment is inevitable when the tower will fall. A slight shock, an unfortunate accident, an illness, a small miscalculation, and of his tower nothing remains. Man sees it, but it is already too late to correct or alter it. Or a moment may come in the building of the tower when the different I's of a man's personality lose confidence in one another, see all the contradictions of their aims and desires, see that they have no common aim, cease to understand one another, or more exactly, cease to think that they understand. Then the tower must fall, the illusory aim must disappear, and the man must feel that everything that he has done was fruitless, that it has led to nothing and could lead to nothing, and that before him there is only one real factdeath. The whole life of man, the accumulation of riches, or power, or learning, is the building of a Tower of Babel, because it must end in catastrophe, namely in death, which is the fate of everything that cannot pass to a new plane of being. The third myth that of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah shows still more clearly than the first two the moment of the interference of the higher forces and the causes of this interference. God agreed to spare Sodom and Gomorrah for the sake of fifty righteous men, for the sake of forty-five, for the sake of thirty, for the sake of twenty, at last for the sake of ten. But ten righteous men could not be found and the two cities were destroyed. The possibility of evolution had been lost. The "Great Laboratory" ceased the unsuccessful experiment. But Lot and his family were saved. The idea is the same as in the other two myths, but it particularly emphasises the readiness of the guiding will to make all possible concessions so long as there is any hope of the realisation of the aim set for human beings. When this hope disappears, the guiding will must inevitably interfere, save what deserves salvation and destroy the rest. The expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden, the fall of the Tower of Babel, the Great Flood, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, are all legends and allegories relating to the history of mankind, to human evolution. Besides these legends and many others similar to them, almost all races have legends, tales and myths of strange non-human beings, who passed along the same road before man. The fall of the angels, of Titans, of gods who attempted to defy other more powerful gods, the fall of Lucifer, the demon or Satan, are all falls which preceded the fall of man. And it is an undoubted fact that the meaning of all these myths is deeply hidden from us. It is perfectly clear that the usual theological and theosophical interpretations do not explain anything, because they introduce the necessity of recognising the existence of invisible races or spirits, which at the same time are similar to man in their relation to higher forces. The inadequacy of such an explanation "by means of introducing five new unknown quantities for the definition of one unknown quantity" is evident. But at the same time it would be wrong to leave all these myths without any attempt at explanation, because by their very persistency

and repetition among different peoples and races they seem to draw our attention to certain phenomena, which we do not know but which we should know. The legends and epics of all countries contain much material relating to nonhuman beings, who preceded man or even existed at the same time as man, but differed from man in many ways. This material is so abundant and significant that not to make an attempt to explain these myths would mean shutting our eyes intentionally to something we ought to see. Such, for instance, are the legends of giants and the socalled "Cyclopean" structures which one involuntarily associates with these legends. Unless we wish to ignore many facts or believe in three-dimensional "spirits" capable of building stone edifices, we must suppose that pre-human races were as physical as man and came, just as man did, from the Great Laboratory of Nature, that Nature had made attempts at creating self-evolving beings before man. And further we must suppose that such beings were let out of the Great Laboratory into life, but that they failed to satisfy Nature in their further development and, instead of carrying out Nature's designs, turned against her. And then Nature abandoned her experiment with them and began a new experiment. Strictly speaking, we have no grounds for considering man as the first or the only experiment of a self-evolving being. On the contrary, the myths mentioned above give us the possibility of presuming the existence of such beings before man. If this is so, if we have grounds for supposing the existence of physical races of pre-human self-evolving beings, where then should we look for the descendants of these races, and are we in any way justified in supposing the existence of such descendants? We must start from the idea that in all her activity Nature aims at the creation of a self-evolving being. But can it be supposed that the whole of the animal kingdom is the by-product of one line of work creation of man? the This may be admitted in relation to mammals, we may even include in it all vertebrates, we may consider many lower forms as preparatory forms, and so on. But what place shall we give in this system to insects, which represent a world in themselves and a world not less complex than the world of vertebrates? May it not be supposed that insects represent another line in the work of Nature, a line not connected with the one which resulted in the creation of man, but perhaps preceding it? Passing to facts, we must admit that insects are in no way a stage preparatory to the formation of man. Nor could they be regarded as the by-product of human evolution. On the contrary, insects reveal, in their structure and in the structure of their separate parts and organs, forms which are often more perfect than those of man or animals. And we cannot help seeing that for certain forms of insect life which we observe there is no explanation without very complicated hypotheses, which necessitate the recognition of a very rich past behind them and compel us to regard the present forms we observe as degenerated forms. This last consideration relates mainly to the organised communities of ants and bees. It is impossible to become acquainted with their life without giving oneself up to emotional impressions of astonishment and bewilderment. Ants and bees alike both call for our admiration by the wonderful completeness of their organisation, and at the same time repel and frighten us, and provoke a feeling of undefinable aversion by the invariably cold reasoning which dominates their life and by the absolute impossibility for an individual to escape from the wheel of life of the ant-hill or the beehive. We are terrified at the thought that we may resemble them.

Indeed what place do the communities of ants and bees occupy in the general scheme of things on our earth? How could they come into being such as we observe them? All observations of their life and their organisation inevitably lead us to one conclusion. The original organisation of the "beehive" and the "ant-hill" in the remote past undoubtedly required reasoning and logical intelligence of great power, although at the same time the further existence of both the beehive and the ant-hill did not require any intelligence or reasoning at all. How could this have happened? It could only have happened in one way. If ants or bees, or both, of course at different periods, had been intelligent and evolving beings and then lost their intelligence and their ability to evolve, this could have happened only because their "intelligence" went against their "evolution", in other words, because in thinking that they were helping their evolution they managed somehow to arrest it. One may suppose that both ants and bees came from the Great Laboratory and were sent to earth with the privilege and the possibility of evolving. But after a long period of struggle and efforts both the one and the other renounced their privilege and ceased to evolve, or, to be more exact, ceased to send forth an evolving current. After this Nature had to take her own measures and, after isolating them in a certain way, to begin a new experiment. If we admit the possibility of this, may we not suppose that the old legends of falls which preceded the fall of man relate to ants and bees? We may find ourselves disconcerted by their small size as compared to our own. But the size of living beings is, first of all, a relative thing, and secondly it changes very easily in certain cases. In the case of certain classes of beings, for instance fishes, amphibious animals and insects, Nature holds in her hands the threads that regulate their size and never lets these threads go. In other words Nature possesses the power of changing the size of these living beings without altering anything in them, and can effect this change in one generation, that is, at once, simply by arresting their development at a certain stage. Everyone has seen small fishes exactly like large fishes, small frogs, etc. This is still more evident in the vegetable world. But of course it is not a universal rule, and some beings such as man and most of the higher mammals reach almost the largest size possible for them. As regards the insects, ants and bees most probably could be much larger than they are now, although this point may be argued ; and it is possible that the change of size of the ant or the bee would necessitate a considerable alteration in their inner organisation. It is interesting to note here the legions of gigantic ants in Tibet recorded by Herodotus and Pliny (Herodotus, History, Bk. XI; Pliny, Natural History, Bk. III). Of course it will be difficult at first to imagine Lucifer as a bee, or the Titans as ants. But if we renounce for the moment the idea of the necessity of a human form, the greater part of the difficulty disappears. The mistake of these non-human beings, that is, the cause of their downfall, must inevitably have been of the same nature as the mistake made by Adam. They must have become convinced that they knew what was good and what was evil, and must have believed that they themselves could act according to their understanding. They renounced the idea of higher knowledge and the inner circle of life and placed their faith in their own knowledge, their own powers and their own understanding of the aims and purposes of their existence. But their understanding was probably much more wrong and their mistake much less naive than the mistake of Adam, and the results of this mistake were probably so much more serious, that ants and bees not

only arrested their evolution in one cycle, but made it altogether impossible by altering their very being. The ordering of the life of both bees and ants, their ideal communistic organisation, indicate the character and the form of their downfall. It may be imagined that at different times both bees and ants had reached a very high, although a very one-sided culture, based entirely on intellectual considerations of profit and utility, without any scope for imagination, without any esotericism or mysticism. They organised the whole of their life on the principles of a kind of "marxism" which seemed to them very exact and scientific. They realised the socialistic order of things, entirely subjugating the individual to the interests of the community according to their understanding of those interests. And thus they destroyed every possibility for an individual to develop and separate himself from the general masses. And yet it was precisely this development of individuals and their separation from the general masses which constituted the aim of Nature and on which the possibility of evolution was based. Neither the bees nor the ants wished to acknowledge this. They saw their aim in something else, they strove to subjugate Nature. And in some way or other they altered Nature's plan, made the execution of this plan impossible. We must bear in mind that, as has been said before, every "experiment" of Nature, that is, every living being, every living organism, represents the expression of cosmic laws, a complex symbol or a complex hieroglyph. Having begun to alter their being, their life and their form, bees and ants, taken as individuals, severed their connection with the laws of Nature, ceased to express these laws individually and began to express them only collectively. And then Nature raised her magic wand, and they became small insects, incapable of doing Nature any harm. In the course of time their thinking capacities, absolutely unnecessary in a well-organised ant-hill or beehive, became atrophied, automatic habits began to be handed down automatically from generation to generation, and ants became "insects" as we know them; bees even became useful.1 Indeed, when observing an ant-hill or a beehive, we are always struck by two things, first by the amount of intelligence and calculation put into their primary organisation and, secondly, by the complete absence of intelligence in their activities. The intelligence put into this organisation was very narrow and rigidly utilitarian, it calculated correctly within the given conditions and it saw nothing outside these conditions. Yet even this intelligence was necessary only for the original calculation and estimation. Once started, the mechanism of a beehive or of an ant-hill did not require any intelligence; automatic habits and customs were automatically learned and handed down, and this ensured their being preserved unchanged. "Intelligence" is not only useless in a beehive or an ant-hill, it would even be dangerous and harmful. Intelligence could not hand down all the laws, rules and methods of work with the same exactness from generation to generation. Intelligence could forget, could distort, could add something new. Intelligence could again lead to "mysticism", to the idea of a higher intelligence, to the idea of esotericism. It was therefore necessary to banish intelligence from an ideal socialistic beehive or ant-hill, as an element harmful to the community which in fact it is. Of course there may have been a struggle, a period when the ancestors of ants or bees who had not yet lost the power of thinking saw the situation clearly, saw the inevitable beginning of degeneration and strove to fight against it, trying to free the individual from its unconditional submission to the community. But the struggle was hopeless and could have no result. The iron laws of the ant-hill and beehive very

soon dealt with the restless element and after a few generations such recalcitrants probably ceased to be born, and both the beehive and the ant-hill gradually became ideal communistic states.2 In his book The Life of the White Ant, Maurice Maeterlinck has collected much interesting material about the life of these insects, which are still more striking than ants and bees. At the very first attempts to study the life of white ants Maeterlinck experiences the same strange emotional feeling of which I spoke earlier. ... it makes them almost our brothers, and from certain points of view, causes these wretched insects, more than the bee or any other living creature on earth, to become the heralds, perhaps the precursors, of our own destiny. Further, Maeterlinck dwells upon the antiquity of the termites, which are much more ancient than man, and upon the number and great variety of their species. After this Maeterlinck passes to what he calls the " civilisation of the termites ". Their civilisation which is the earliest of any is the most curious, the most complex, the most intelligent, and in a sense, the most logical and best fitted to the difficulties of existence, which has ever appeared before our own on this globe. From several points of view this civilisation, although fierce, sinister and often repulsive, is superior to that of the bee, of the ant, and even of man himself. In the termitary the gods of communism become insatiable Molochs. The more they are given, the more they require; and they persist in their demands until the individual is annihilated and his misery complete. This appalling tyranny is unexampled among mankind; for while with us it at least benefits the few, in the termitary no one profits. The discipline is more ferocious than that of the Carmelites or Trappists; and the voluntary submission to laws or regulations proceeding one knows not whence is unparalleled in any human society. A new form of fatality, perhaps the cruellest of all, the social fatality to which we ourselves are drifting, has been added to those we have met already and thought quite enough. There is no rest except in the last sleep of all: illness is not tolerated, and feebleness carries with it its own sentence of death. Communism is pushed to the limits of cannibalism and coprophagy. . . . compelling the sacrifice and misery of the many for the advantage or happiness of none all this in order that a kind of universal despair may be and continued, renewed and multiplied so long as the world shall last. These cities of insects, that appeared before we did, might almost serve as a caricature of ourselves, as a travesty of the earthly paradise to which most civilised people are tending. Maeterlinck shows by what sacrifices this ideal regime is bought.

They used to have wings, they have them no more. They had eyes which they surrendered. They had a sex; they have sacrificed it.3 The only thing he omits to say is that before sacrificing wings, sight, and sex, the termites had to sacrifice their intelligence. In spite of this the process through which the termites passed is called by Maeterlinck evolution. This comes about because, as I have said before, every change of form taking place over a long period of time is called evolution by modern thought. The power of this obligatory stereotype of pseudo-scientific thinking is truly astounding. In the Middle Ages philosophers and scientists had to make all their theories and discussions agree with the dogmas of the Church, and in our day the role of those dogmas is played by evolution. It is quite clear that thought cannot develop freely in these conditions. The idea of esotericism has a particularly important significance at the present stage of the development of the thought of humanity, because it makes quite unnecessary the idea of evolution in the ordinary sense of this word. It has been said earlier what the word evolution may mean in the esoteric sense, namely, the transformation of individuals. And in this meaning alone evolution cannot be confused with degeneration as is constantly done by "scientific" thought, which regards even its own degeneration as evolution. The only way out of all the blind alleys created by both "positivist" and speculative thought lies in the psychological method. The psychological method is nothing other than the revaluation of all values from the point of view of their own psychological meaning and independently of the outer or accompanying facts on the basis of which they are generally judged. Facts may lie. The psychological meaning of a thing, or of an idea, cannot lie. Of course it also can be understood wrongly. But this can be struggled against by studying and observing the mind, that is our apparatus of cognition. Generally the mind is regarded much too simply, without taking into account that the limits of useful action of the mind, first, are very well known, and, second, are very restricted. The psychological method takes into consideration these limitations in the same way as we take into consideration, in all ordinary circumstances of life, limitations of machines or instruments with which we have to work. If we examine something under a microscope, we take into consideration the power of the microscope ; if we do some work with a particular instrument, we take into consideration properties and qualities of the instrument weight, sharpness, etc. The psychological method aims at doing the same in relation to our mind, that is, it aims at keeping the mind constantly in the field of view, and at regarding all conclusions and discoveries relatively to the mind. From the point of view of the psychological method there are no grounds for thinking that our mind, that is, our apparatus of cognition, is the only possible one or the best in existence. Equally there are no grounds for thinking that all discovered and established truths will always remain truths. On the contrary, from the point of view of the psychological method there can be no doubt that we shall have to discover many new truths, either entirely incomprehensible truths, the very existence of which we never suspected, or truths fundamentally contradicting those which we have recognised until now. Of course nothing is more terrifying and nothing is more inadmissible for all kinds of dogmatism. The psychological method destroys all old and new prejudices and superstitions ; it does not allow the thought to stop and remain contented with the attained results, no matter how tempting and pleasant these results may appear, and no

matter how symmetrical and smooth all deductions made from them may be. The psychological method gives the possibility of re-examining many principles which have been considered as finally and firmly established, and it finds in them entirely new and unexpected meaning. The psychological method makes it possible in many cases to disregard facts or what are taken for facts, and allows us to see beyond facts. Although it is only a method, the psychological method nevertheless leads us in a very definite direction, namely towards the esoteric method, which is in reality an enlarged psychological method, though enlarged in that sense in which we cannot enlarge it by our own efforts. 1912-1929.

1 The nature of the automatism that governs the life of a beehive or an ant-hill cannot be explained with the psychological conceptions existent in Western literature. And I will speak of it in another book in connection with the exposition of the principles of the teaching which was mentioned in the introduction. 2 I cannot refrain from mentioning an article by Obitatel "On Ants" in the Paris newspaper, Vozrojdenie, of the 10th February, 1930 (in Russian). The author comes very near the ideas set out above. I should have liked to quote some of his remarks, but my book was already finished and was in the translator's hands. 3 The Life of the White Ant, by Maurice Maeterlinck, translated by Alfred Sutro (George Alien and Unwin, London, 1927, pp. 17, 152, 163). (A New Model of the Universe: Principles of the Psychological Method in its Application to Problems of Science, Religion and Art. P. D. Ouspensky. Published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1931. Page 52-66) This is a very bizarre piece of writing. I felt while reading it that it was so good in certain ways and yet always deeply disturbing because of its obscene stupidity, it is, in total everything I so loath and hate. But at the same time it delights me. It is an odd business this existence thing, and from time to time this is pointed out to me by those who do not care for my rational take on life. But it is next to impossible to any such person to elaborate on their perspective to any degree that amounts to anything more than a montage of self congratulatory nonsense. Of course the above is nothing more than this, but it is so complete that it niggles me, it is an uncompromising exposition of exactly the idea that am trying to expound that goes way beyond my exposition for the demands it makes upon our credulity and it contains within it threads of correct logic which are perfect for the argument being presented. All very exasperating when all is said and done. Imagine if the world were in some sense as Ouspensky describes it here. This piece of writing is my best ever opportunity to try and examine the thinking that is involved in this kind of reasoning. I am prepared to dismiss it out of hand, just as he dismissed science and the real world of material causality that we consider science

mediates for us. But this effort at elaboration by Ouspensky, perhaps because he is presenting an idea scientists would revile, which I know is correct from a scientific point of view, and which I know why it is correct, makes it possible for me to try and get closer to an understanding of the mind set of a mythologist. At first you may think that I should make my mind up, am I interested in science or religion? But the fact is that things being what they are, while I wish to eradicate religion from existence, that is not the current state of play and the fact is that I live in a theocracy, as do we all, and so dealing with this fac is a precondition of breaching the limitation on thought imposed by the authority that creates out world. This is what Ouspensky, in this piece gives me a chance to do more effectively than I have been able to do thus far. Thus far I have recognised that there is an intimate link between the manner in which information creates social structure and then as information evolves that creates social structure it necessarily creates a counterpart to the structural form which is an identity bonding that form into a unified whole, an organism. Thus religion comes into being along with the advance of practical knowledge, of all kinds, from law to hydraulics, and as a canal system is built so a priesthood is developed. The two elements are intrinsically linked. This is all very well, many people have recognised the link between knowledge and social power, but as I am attempting to assert that this is because human nature is corporate then I am trying to take the explanation for this link into a new area of understanding. With a thinker of Ouspensky's kind we have an intellectual who is attuned to the mythological in preference to all else. The argument I have just been making about the interdependence of the two social structures formed by the technical and the mythical interpretations of reality justifies the belief in the power of mythological, or esoteric knowledge. However, Ouspensky is in the end trying to assert the primacy of esoteric knowledge, on good grounds, the grounds that it is esoteric knowledge that creates the elite, or inner circle, as he calls it, which I too recognise is the central product of the evolution of human nature to form a body at the level of social coherence where an elite is vital to the growth of a dominant organic form. My argument is that Ouspensky, and his ilk, the theists, are wrong in principle, mythology does not explain reality, it encodes reality and thus empowers a priesthood and forms a social elite that then have control of society, this is what has made the Jews the master race and why the world functions as it does with Israel and the three Jewish identity hierarchies making so much of the news. But the fact is, and this fact does not lie, it is science that interprets this aspect of reality correctly. But that said, and not wishing to be out and out arrogant, there is undoubtedly some odd aspect to existence, and I have not only no idea what it is, but no idea how to even think about what it might be. Ouspensky does not impress me when it comes to this point in his argument anymore than any theological priest because in the end what does he tell us? I have no tread any other part of his work, and I am not inclined to, this much is bad enough. But the fact is that these exponents of special knowledge always make out they know something but they will not say what. In other words you are either in, and an acolyte, or you are out. And that is the whole point of such knowledge systems, that is how they create a priestly structure as I indicated above when I discussed the manner in which real knowledge about social organisation had to give rise to coded forms of itself in order to create an organ of authority to give coherence to the corporate organism that is a human animal.

And so, this said, what about the actual encroachment upon our central theme by this mythologist? Just as no archaeologist would not want to be seen dead in the company of Von Daniken, nor any history professor would want to be placed side by side with David Ike, so I have no desire to likened to an Ouspensky, although I have already discovered that this is the kind of reaction you get from scientist when you attempt to offer this purely scientific idea within their places of communication. With this example from Ouspensky to go by I can see how the mere mention of human corporate being would annoy scientists, it would be as if someone were to suddenly say they knew the Egyptians were in fact from planet Mars. Except it is not like that at all. There is no human being alive that is revolted more by such perversions of science as this. But the fact is that science is utterly perverted. I went to college to take a degree in Anthropology and Psychology when I was nineteen years old and as a passionate atheist I had one thing on my mind, to discover how out society could possibly function with the retention of religion woven into its fabric. Today our society is so much more imbued with the religion of the Jews which was so obviously crashing out of existence to all intents and purposes when I was a youth. Why? I have discovered the answer, and the answer is that science is perverted by the theocracy, it is the slave of the theocracy. And thus in Ouspensky we just get one more nice example of the theocracy's priesthood protecting itself. And lets face it Ouspensky is committed to the Jewish mythology as well as anyone could be and the Russians are just as much imbued with the Jewish slave implant as anyone else. I love that line where he says a few of the ants may of protested when they saw the way the wind was blowing, but their efforts were futile, and they died out. Scary. So, I do not want to be associated with any kind of mythologist, I am the purest of scientific thinkers, in intent if not in the entirety of my expression. Because of the corruption of science by theists the only way that the way toward the truth can be opened to science once again is if that long dead breed, the philosopher, raises their head again, and as such, as much as I despise philosophy as we know it, it falls to me to adopt the speculative disposition of the philosopher, but in the name of the scientist who will not and cannot do this job of thinking for themselves. As a philosopher, although my only interest is in science and what scientist can show by hard evidence and repeatable demonstration and demonstrable ideas, I can include in my investigation that actual intellectual material of none scientists and even those who are antithetical to science. And that is precisely what I am doing here when I consider the ideas of a mystic just because he has tackled science and given it an advanced interpretation which happens to be correct, but by doing so he has made the truth even more out of bounds than ever it were. Quite remarkable really. Can this of been conspiratorial on the part of Ouspensky? I just do not know what to think about that kind of thing, it is an obvious thought, but one to be resisted as too complicated an explanation that is in any case conducive to the theistic mythology of individual responsibility and antagonistic to the biological explanation of automaton disposition created by way of the human physiology which inducts individuals into a scheme of understanding which make them unwittingly complicit without having the least notion why that do what they do. This robotic behaviour applies to the most actively intelligent and well informed, as appears to be the case concerning Tony Blair's behaviour over Iraq where he has simple obeyed the instructions of his Jewish slave implant.

The Inner Circle What we have in Ouspensky's work is another facet of the intellectual world of humans, to add to that of Spencer whom we started with, that is convinced of the corporate nature of our species, but, as I say, from an alternative point of view, which gives the description of this second vision of human nature, another hue. Within this alternative view new facts come to light about the conditions implicit in the form of human societies. Lets select these facts and number them by way of a discussion of the relevance of Ouspensky's argument to science's understanding of the true answer to the question of human nature. 1) Central to Ouspensky's discussion in the above section quoted is the idea of the inner circle. Originally there was no inner circle, he tells us, and this simple social state of organisation we may say equates to the manner of life of 'wild' human beings living in a state of nature, living directly off Nature's bounty with imparting any distinct control of over nature as it appeared of its own accord. Domestication changed the nature of the relationship that people had with the rest of nature, and we may wonder just how we should view this change. It seems that we are discussing some radical new mode of living, and, once fully established, we are. But in truth the extension of human control over nature began millions of years before humans came into being. Simply manufacturing an artifact is a measure of control, and in saying this we may stick to the distinction between making a nest, and making a tool, a tool being an extension of functional purpose, and as such an extension of the physiological being of an organism beyond the limits defined by their own individual being. Pre-human species were making such anatomical extensions of themselves, extending their individuality out into the extra-individual world, the social world, long before humans, that is fully articulate mammals, came into being. Thus, we can say that what became a distinct new way of life, based on the domestication of other species, and, in the process, the domestication of our own kind too, can be said to of begun with the making of the first tools, which means the evolution of the first culture. With this deep-time perspective giving us a true sense of what domestication really is as an organic phenomenon, not a somehow distinct activity that we choose to call a cultural phenomenon, we can redefine domestication accordingly, as a specific stage in an ongoing symbiotic process occurring between a prime species and those which are drawn into its orbit of genetic influence. In a complex of symbiotic species it follows that the base line of the interwoven relationships can be drawn by identifying a linked relationship between the genes of the various species. Thus if bees see infrared and flowering plants come to reflect infrared wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum then there must, at heart, be a direct relationship between the genes controlling vision in insects, and colouring in plants, in these circumstances. With the evolution of a symbiotic ecosystem centred upon mammalian physiology, a logical and inevitable outcome of evolution, some form of appropriately adapted mammal had to come into being in which the links between its genes and those of its satellite species were suitably aligned, an alignment that would be revealed by their forms, forms which we see directly. It is an inherent feature of such a core organism in a symbiotic niche, that vastly increasing mass will be characteristic. In effect the core species is drawing other suitably related species into the influence of its own physical being, or energy. By related I therefore do not mean

genetically related in the usual sense, but rather energetically related because the satellite species represent the sources of energy upon which the core species can draw it own sustenance, or conversely we can note there will be those which act as competitors for the same resources, or those of more favourable species, and so as we see the process of domestication positively selecting species such as the horse or sheep, we see the process of elimination negatively selecting species such as the mammoth and the bear, wolf or larger feline. So the core species in the unfolding superorganic form of the mammalian kind will become supermassive. At all stages in this organic process there are developments and consequences. The simple fact of massively increasing mass, like that of domestication of species, has repercussions for the primary species acting as the fulcrum of change. In life when mass increases complexity necessarily has to increase too. It follows that as part of the evolving features of the evolving superorganic form the ability to develop complexity of structure must be assumed. Hence a mammalian form developed its cultural attributes that extended its individuality into the social domain it evolved adaptive features to support these changes. Thus the coming of the stage when the organism was fully formed, that is formed with the potential to be truly superorganic, would involve the massive increase in the biomass of the organism as this potential was realised and at the same time the release of the potential to increase in structural complexity. Ouspensky has picked upon on the central idea of an emerging structure giving rise to an elite organ of authority, an inner circle, if we hark back to Spencer we can use his terminology to place this idea in an organic conception of the process whereby we come to speak of the potential to differentiate. It is this potential that we see in the social structure to which Spencer refers. This differentiation gives rise to specialised parts, that is organs of superorganic physiology, one of which Ouspensky, as a mythologist interested in secret knowledge, is preoccupied with. The primary organ in this process of differentiation brought on as the process of symbiosis realises its potential increase the biomass of the primary species in the niche system, is the primary species organ of authority. In insects the form this process of differentiation takes results in the evolution of a queen individual within which acts as the repository of all the information, or knowledge, of organic form. The queen's form is the product of genetic instructions but those instructions include blueprints that create organs of communication which act as transmitters of identity tuned to the organs of reception which constitute elements of the mass of individuals physical form. Communication via hormones is just as much a linguistic means of communication as any mode of communication we have, it just does not look that way to our severely limited ability to be conscious of consciousnesses other than our own. Out priests of course tell us that our language is unique because it has meaning. Well religion may have meaning for 99.99999999999% of the population, but I am just as capable of understanding the pheromones, of which I have no knowledge, that are passed between two ants, as I do of understanding the meaning of the messages passed between two members of a religion. I do understand the human messages, just as I do understand the insect messages, by various intellectual means, which allow me to interpret the resulting behaviour, and that is of course why I am writing this natural history of humans now, so that others might also be let into this mystery, in so far as that is possible. What Ouspensky is discussing here then is the evolution of the mammalian equivalent of the ant queen, though he obviously has not the least idea that this is so. The queen acts as the motive force for the colony and the source of identity, an

identity in which it is itself included, of course. This last remark may seem unnecessary but when we come to consider how the queen organ has evolved in humans, what form their queen identity has taken, without losing sight of their presumed uniquely none organic form, we will see that via the linguistic, that is intellectual, mechanism of duality, they have contrived to create a social organ that has all the attributes of a queen body but nonetheless remains a tool of the individuals it serves! The state and the individual cannot be divided, they are part of an organism, and the true solution to the riddle is to know that it is identity, hence the power of religion, that unites, and that all structures are organs of the organism united by religion. The state is an organ of the church, the church come to that is an organ of the true being, the true being is the living biomass that is the Jewish people. The Jewish people are the carriers of the identity of our organism, they are the queen body. This means we are all Jews of course, but because of the necessary process of delimitation of consciousness, necessary to the process of creating structure, we are prevented from knowing this, as far as possible. Communication between individuals is the foundation of a symbiotic process, bees and flowers obviously communicate with one another, although our ordinary understanding of this word might seem to make the use of it in this context somewhat poetic and unscientific, but is it? Bees of course have their own highly elaborate language. We may think bee communication is not comparable to our language, and so it is not in terms of its power, but then we are considerably different creatures to bees by virtue of our primary form and it is the nature of the comparison I am interested in. And if we are inclined to get cocky about our cleverness then I but remind us again of the mind numbing stupidity of most of what we do and say, whether it is the idiocy of religious myth that we take so seriously or the artificiality of the life we like to engage in through recreational activities from cinema to sport. When I assert, as is my way, that religious ideas are meaningless I am of course intending to be scientifically consistent, but I am also allowing my passion for atheism to colour my expression. This will not help people understand the logic behind this assertion even if they agree that all religious myth is by definition nonsense, if taken at face value. The crucial point about communication between the members of a superorganic organism is that all should be induced to share a common sense of belonging, they should feel they have the same identity. Communication has material elements, what we might call factual, delivering information about the real material world. But most communication is about community, in other words about identity. The best way to think about this kind of communication is in terms of colour. Religion is a colour for this reason. If I were to ask you what a colour means, assuming it was not a colour which had a clear meaning, such as that of a flag, then you would consider the question meaningless. If, for example, I pointed to your skin and asked "What does that mean?" You would think was an idiot. If I indicated two people, one black and one white and asked if you could see any difference between them, and you noted their respective colours and then I pointed to one person's skin and asked what that means, you would gather that I meant the colour of their skin and you would still think I was an idiot because the colour of a persons skin does not have meaning, it simply is, it is a functional attribute of their physiology evolved by virtue of their historical origins. That, at any rate, is the story the priests tout. It is of course complete and utter nonsense. Racial identity imparts identity. If a superorganism occupies a territory that requires some physiological fine tuning then this will occur, but it will also carry some incidental exaggeration lending itself to the special role of identifying the local

population to the territory they occupy. This racial differentiation is a prehuman feature of the series of species that have evolved along the lines of an ever more empowered superorganic mammalian form. But race is still a highly potent symbol of identity and what skin means is "This is who are you are." Now this is a racist fact, not welcome therefore amongst the people who rule us today by means of another device, language. Language has a functional component to it but like physiology it also carries imbued within it the indicators of identity, the colours in other words. Religion is the linguistic colour that imbues itself into a population. It is because the linguistic colour has superseded the racial colour that the theist now makes a point of decrying racism while still extolling the virtues of their identity mantra. Thus, just as we think it is mad to say that a colour has meaning, although we are completely wrong about this, so we think it is mad to say religion is as meaningless as the pheromones of an ants life, and we are equally wrong about this. Neither skin pigmentation nor mythology has meaning in the literal sense of the word, both have meaning as social markers, both have exactly the same meaning. Religion is simply an advanced form of racism, and this is what we all know when we see the consequences of religion in its overtly negative guise. Developing our understanding of how we can be a true superorganism from this discussion of the real nature of identity as it pertains to individuals within small superorganic bodies and as it pertains to fully realised superorganic entities such as we live as part of today we can see that what Ouspensky is giving us in this account is a slight insight, a conceptual bridges, between the nature of myth and the real knowledge we have mastered by way of what we now call science. It is not surprising that identity markers are carried on the outer surface of the body, and as hominids evolved to be ever more attuned to a corporate form nakedness will of come into being in order to provide, amongst other supporting features, a platform upon which to stamp a communal identity. It may seem daft then to say that the skin that covers our bodies is the skin of the superorganism, but it is far from daft, this is the crucial point, we all carry the skin of the organism to which we belong. With the coming of language and the arts of culture which are so intimately associated with it we find we eventually get to the point where we recognise our true nature and so we recognise that all the things that we produce are exoskeleton and the means by which we produce this outer shell within which we all live is through knowledge delivered via the medium of language. So, recognising that language is to the superorganism as genes are to individual organism that constitutes one of its units we recognise that as genes produce functional form in the shape of upright posture, opposable thumbs and an ability to transmit useful information to create a corporate body so language, simultaneously as it produces the knowledge that delivers functional cultural forms produces none functional knowledge of identity to give colour to the functional structure it causes individuals to generate. Thus language produces a skin, an exoskeleton, and at the same time it produces a symbolic pigment imbued into it, whether this takes the form of art, music or modern sophisticated religion. Religion then, we can say, is the symbolic pigmentation imbued into the exoskeleton of the organism. The myth Ouspensky renders for us here in a form of modern code, that is to say his attempt to account for the newly arrived scientific insights in a manner that accords with ancient esoteric knowledge means he retains the coded nature of the argument over and above the actual science. Ouspensky seeks to reduce evolution to esoteric myth just as in more recent times the Children of Abraham have sort to

reduce Darwinism itself to a form of Biblical myth in their fabrication of Creationism. We of course, with the benefit of science have no problem decoding the esoteric myth that Ouspensky has partially decoded as it reduces the Biblical story into a rational description of social evolution; rational in that we do not have boats standing in for societies or priestly institutions. There was a programme on the BBC's history channel today, 21/05/04, I have seen it before, but even so, about the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah in which lots of scientist were working hard on the idea that these cities were stood on the shore of the Dead Sea and were destroyed by an earthquake because the Biblical account gives a description that matches what we now call liquefaction. In other words these people are still milking this ancient nonsense, which if we follow the extremely intelligent sounding interpretation of Ouspensky, was always nonsense, for it was always meant to be a coded form of knowledge about the fate awaiting people who did not learn the importance of the inner circle, a lesson always only intended for the initiates of the inner circle but given out to the masses as divine wisdom which they believed on faith and now in the age of science is used to pervert science by pretending that these idiotic stories were ever anything other than functional knowledge pigmented with linguistic markers of identity to imbue a corporate organism that was created by the inner circle who preserved the knowledge in question. Thus, we can say that an inner circle definitely did evolve routinely in human social organisms as a matter of necessity, as dictated by the human nature that human physiology must obey. The evolution of the myths Ouspensky recounts that he associates with this organic process demonstrates the function of language in its role of creative medium of the corporate physiology. It is not surprising that there should be an endless supply of mythologists like Ouspensky who are driven to think in accord with this type of idea and to take up the role of communicators thereof. Likewise it follows that as there is one sort of person given over to adore such illusion and to want to preach it, there must be a far greater number waiting to be preached to in the simplistic manner of this kind of thinking. People need to receive a colour for the content of their mind. If make colour synonymous with identity for the purposes of our discussion here then we can say that it is not possible for an organism to exist without a colour, without an identity. I only sink to using similes because I trying to drag people into a place where they can see the logic of what I am saying and make the simple connections between racial identity and religious identity that need to come out of this understanding. But the practice of using similes gives us a sense of how our mode of communication lends itself naturally to the creation of elaborate representative mythologies encoding functional elements of reality into conceptual images. A functional element of reality is the immortality of the human organism that we are part of, we cannot embrace this knowledge head on, or have no been able to thus far, but we do sense it and it is in fact real, by thinking, as the Druids did of a place beyond death within the earth and watery places, or as the Jews did of a place beyond the earth, in the opposite direction, naturally, in heaven, then the notion of immortality is invoked and we are put in intimate contact with a real idea that we simply cannot know, but most certainly can feel. From this basic strategy the detail of how we behave in recognition of this sense of immortality can be developed and the Romans tell us that the Druid were particularly challenging warriors because of the deeply felt conviction that they had that there was an afterlife. Thus this connection with an important feature of the real nature of the human form, its life beyond that of the individual, was made manifest in the behaviour of the individuals of which the

organism was composed. Today, with the Moslem, we see the idea being turned to the same good effect as this third wing of the Jewish organism gets into its stride in the last stages of realising the Zionist dream of one world ruled by the Jewish inner circle, the preservers of our identity, and thus invokes the insurgency of the Moslem to induce the world to sink into the quagmire of uniformity of identity by exerting resistance. All that is discussed here is an organic process and, as partially implied by Ouspensky, humans have absolutely no conscious role in the enactment of the process in the social forms and activities that we see and record. He speaks of people not being aware of their need for outside help, and then when they have they must accept it on faith, so they still have no idea why they do what they do, they just know they must do as they are advised by the priests. If you accept, for one moment, that what I am telling you about the nature of the Jews as the master race, and thus the role of the Romans, the British and the Americans, as slaves of the Jews is correct, which it is, then you will recognise that we do indeed have not the slightest idea what we are doing and why we are doing it. And the reason for this is that we do not know the nature of our own identities, and, just as for the queen ant, the same goes for the Jews, they know no more about what Judaism is than the rest of us, they are just more intimately attached to the identity than the rest of us and they carry certain functional elements of identity that makes them operate as motivational organs within the fabric of the organism; otherwise they are just as oblivious to reality as the rest of us.

Chapter II The Evolution of the Idea of Individuality

'The Vanity of Absolute difference One's first impulse is to withdraw into oneself, where one finds nothing but words.  ALAIN Hegel believed that in each of us there resides some absolute difference, which can be objectivized as such. For my part, I have rejected superficial logic in an attempt to break with the commonly held idea that a person is a pole of individual qualities, or even a unified center of choice and action. This means that the person is no longer a self, the center of whose existence is rooted in a sovereign power of thought. Instead of an I that realizes itself through reflection and likes to objectivize it essential difference, what have we found? A writer, a fake Orpheus, erecting an image of him or herself in the mirror of a fictitious other of his or her own invention; an autobiographer prepared to manipulate the apparatus of utterance in an attempt to establish his or her absolute difference.' (Difference and Subjectivity: Dialogue and Personal Identity, Francis Jacques, Yale University Press, 1991. Page 183)

The symbiotic revolution led directly to the evolution of civilisation. Civilisation, involved simple superorganic forms uniting with one another to produce ever more complex superorganic forms, ever larger, ever more powerful human beings, by means of the re-orientation of fauna and faunal species into an array of dependence about a massively augmented human organism, which was itself subjected to a concomitant differentiation of its internal structure resulting in the evolution of specialised groups segregated from one another by means of an intricate combination of genetically and linguistically driven attributes, that is, by way of physiological and cultural attributes such as race and language. And the resulting deposit of material existence, in all its forms, from mud huts to motorways, is simple the material accretion of an exoskeleton befitting the growth of the new, complex superorganic form. History is the record of this biological process of evolution. There is no such thing as history as distinct from biology. History as we understand it is part of the priestcraft that keeps us imbued with our implanted identity, by reinforcing our focus upon the self and the individual. Our impulse to create a self image is an evolved disposition, one that is reinforced by the priesthood because that is the function of this blind spot created by linguistic imagery, to keep us focused on the self centred role while we respond to the programme delivered by corporate nature. We have seen the case for interdependent differentiation leading to the formation of social structure made by Spencer, and Ouspensky has focused our attention upon the central act of differentiation into a bilateral division of society to create a minor, all powerful elite, and a major, all submissive mass. I have indicated that the evolution of the linguistic information which has driven the process of human evolution since the coming of our kind, leading to the evolution of a true superorganic form of human being, has relied upon a mechanism of duality which has, essentially, been oriented about this fundamental split between the authority within the social being and the mass of the being that is subject to command. The ever increasing sophistication of the linguistic formula accounting for this split has produced the modern mythologies, we which actually think of as ancient in many respect because to us thousands of years is a vast length of time while to evolution it is a mere heartbeat. But it is the evolution of highly complex models of society such as we find in the Jewish mythology that rules our world, that has made the evolution of the spectacular organic form that we are today, possible. It follows that there is an intimate relationship between the idea of the individual and the segregation of the elite caste organ of authority from the main biomass within which it nonetheless remains as an integral organic part, as an organ, a brain. From what has just been said we may think that this link is a matter of contrivance, authority needed to invoke individuality to hide its true nature otherwise if everyone knew the secret of the real nature of human nature then authority would be undermined. This is certainly the case, but this mode of understanding assumes that there is such a thing as a purposeful individual making such self serving decisions, and this is exactly what we are saying is not the case, the whole process is driven by purely organic means without the interplay of any genuinely conscious human awareness. What we need to understand is that the act of substantial differentiation of a united body of individuals who form one organic being, into a differentiated association of interdependent parts is, of itself, a process that defines individuals as distinct from one another. In other words, the evolution of differentiation is the evolution of individuality. This is necessarily so because it involves the attribution of

status to a distinct set of individuals from the rest, and the moment one such distinction makes itself felt it carries with it a degree of complexity in this regard for we find a supreme figure, a royal being, and a close inner circle of courtly being, and so on. Thus the definition of individuality is made manifest to the consciousness of all because it is set into a material or substantial form, it becomes structural. Above, when we first mentioned the evolution of the symbiotic process as evidenced by means of the coming of true extensions of the individual body to form tools that manipulated the social world and beyond, we sort to understand the nature of the process of domestication in terms of deep-time process. Rather than thinking that humanity suddenly stepped out of the wilderness and became human we recognised that the process of symbiosis, that we call domestication, really began with the making of the first tools, millions of years before our fully superorganic form of hominid came into being. We are now in a position to apply the same logic to the latest subject of our attention, the coming of substantial interdependent differentiation leading to the foundation of social structure and the rise of civilisation, what we are equated to the evolution of individuality. Previously we placed the domestication process into a biological scheme by recognising that as sophisticated as the transformation of a wild species into a domesticated species seems, what with all the major consequences for the human mode of subsistence and living, this simple fact of domestication is just one more notch on the arrow of symbiosis that is witnessed by the coming of the first stone tools or the coming of fire and so on, all these cultural developments are symbiotic in their nature because they are about the extension of the human form into the fabric of the nonhuman world in such a way that the genetic makeup of both parties, the human and the nonhuman are effected in an interdependent fashion. Now we can do the same with respect to the ever increasing appearance of individuality in human consciousness and culture. We have just recognised that as with the coming of domesticated species so there was a moment of transition from one simple state of being where there was one unified social being to another state of social organisation, related to the settlement of communities founded on the basis of the symbiotic process of domestication. And that this moment of distinct structural differentiation also denotes the moment when individuality begins to come into being as a distinct feature of our species. Once again then we must extend out conception of this singular event fixed in a narrow time fame that makes it appear like a discontinuous leap from a state of genetically driven evolution into a unique mode of culturally driven self-evolution, as Ouspensky and the modern scientist of human behaviour would have it. Nothing could be more ridiculous than this modern conception of human evolution. The fact is that individuality existed in the simple superorganic form before our species blossomed when the symbiotic process reached a critical point of interaction with the none human environment. Simple societies had a range of individuals displaying a variety of human traits that we are familiar with today, some of which lend themselves to the role of respected elder, others which tend to the less well respected role of a dependant personality. So there was genetically induced differentiation before linguistically induced differentiation superseded in the new environment of the complex superorganism that came into being on the back of the symbiotic process which produced domesticated species and resulted in a settled lifestyle evolving. Individuality is found in other species, indeed it has even been reported in ants, where some ants in the slave making symbiosis operating in some species are

found to be rebellious against their slave implant which is received due their masters having taken them from their own nest as pupae and raised them in their slave quarters where they have received the alternative identity in exactly the same way people receive their Jewish slave identities in the form of Christianity and Islam in those territories where the Jewish overlordship has been imposed by military conquest. Thus it is not correct to say that individuality evolved at a specific moment in time anymore than it is correct to say that domestication evolved at a specific moment in time because both these attributes of the human organism are features of far deeper process that have to do with the integration of the mammalian form into the extended environment and the internal structuring of the human organic fabric itself. Thus we should not speak of the evolution of individuality at this moment when individuality appears to come into our consciousness, but rather we should speak of the evolution of the idea of individuality, which of course has go on increasing in intensity over the intervening millennia ever since. Wherever differentiation into a distinct organic structure occurs we can invoke the idea of individuality. Thus we can say that the evolution of the elite caste organ created a super-individual, if we so choose to use this nomenclature to make plain the link between the various elements of the superorganic form and the process creating it. It should be plain that it is essential that at all times each individual, whoever they are should be highly focused upon their own self and their own self interest. This may seem to be antagonistic to the unification of a united organ from many interdependent parts since we know that when we have periods of political ideology such as the Thatcherite nightmare in 1980's and 90' Britain we produce an generation of dog-eat-dog and each for themselves individualists. But the effect was to produce a highly organised and thoroughly enslaved society in which the organisation of individuals in the form of trade unions which were effectively competing with the state for power was eradicated in favour of traditional centralised power which delivered immense wealth to the few a good standard of living to an extensive minority. Thus the overall effect of encouraging people to be ruthlessly selfish, in the context of an overarching state power was to reconstitute the unified centrality of the organic body of society. The result was so dramatic that the socialist party, Labour, was destroyed outright and was obliged to reinvent itself under the figurehead of a Christian priest-like person in Tony Blair and to name itself New Labour, but to become a mirror image of the Conservative party, as has been perfectly well recognised since then by anyone interested in the subject. The only thing New Labour can think to do to make itself radically socialist now is to play on the sentiment of moralistic sentimentality so central in socialist circles by fighting for the rights of animals by calling for the abolition of hunting, and even this it cannot bring itself to do! So individualism is never what it seems to be to us. The key point it to capture blocs of people within identity brackets, thus, to stick with the recent political history of our times, Thatcher very cleverly, and effectively, extended the catchments of a central structural element of British society by giving away the council housing stock in a thoroughly cynical attempt to destroy the foundation of socialists sentiment which was the basis of working class support for trade union style radicalism. It worked. But, like so much that this women did, the after affects are only now beginning to emerge from the social fabric. The talk is of doubling interest rates this week, today is 26/05/04, simply in order to try and stop the rampant rise in house prices and it is simply impossible to think how a young person can ever hope to buy a house unless they are exceptionally privileged. So the selfish impulse of individuality that

Thatcher tapped into in order to retain authority vested in the traditional bulwark of the state, capitalist wealth, has meant that the last generation sold their children's future down the river for what was to them a life long gain but which in social terms was a very short-sighted gain indeed. Of course Thatcher did not work these very clever tactics out herself, she was just a figurehead, but what we have here is some very knowledgeable manipulation of the structure of society. It is clearly essential that people can see no further than their noses when they are being driven to respond to the constraints of their structural location, what sociologists might refer to as the role and class position. Thus we have discrete levels of awareness concerning our identity, we know our self, and we know our location in the macro-structure of society. But each item of self conception is bounded by the overt characteristics of these limits of awareness. Thus we know we live in a council house and if the government in going to sell us these properties at half price we know we must buy them just as surely as we know we must get out of the way of an oncoming vehicle if we happen to possess the identity of a pedestrian stood in the middle of the road when there is such a vehicle coming in our direction. The discreteness of individual self awareness is therefore the foundation of all social superstructure, without it it would not be possible to create enclaves of identity composed of individuals who identify themselves with the enclave and act accordingly in a manner that allows the enclave so defined to act as a structural organ within the matrix of the living body as if it were itself one individual 'person'; we will see in our next section just how prominent this idea of the group as person has been during important periods in the intellectual and practical history of our own superorganism. Science, because it looks beyond the usual limits of perception can breech these naturally occurring boundaries of group integrity, or, as we might say, to make a point of the contradiction, of group individuality. But people will simply continue to perceive their world in terms of their own self centred needs according to their role and class position in the exoskeletal structure. Tell a person that a motorway is evolved in the same was as lungs are evolved, and, if they are clever and on the ball, they will correct you by saying this is not so, because we build motorways to overcome a particular problem. This is perfectly reasonable, but in terms of trying to comprehend human nature, and how we come to do the things we do, it is useless, it carries no deep time perspective, it is the wisdom of the person who sees only their self identity and the extension of the self into the being of group identity, hence the 'we' bit in the rebuff to this superorganic idea. Via the insight of science we acquire the amazing notion that all the things we create are biologically driven so that we come to describe all artificial products as exoskeletal phenomenon. Consider the nature of a motorway in this light and you get a very different conception of what a motorway is, and why it evolves as part of the territorial environment of the human superorganism. And this latter idea makes sense in the grander scheme of evolutionary understanding than the original notion of a solution to a problem. What is more, the scientific idea embraces all creativity right back through time, so that when ape-men were making stone tools we can see that they too would only of conceived of their craft as problem solving solutions that worked, just as chimpanzees must do that fashion twigs to catch termites upon. But we know that these stone tools were extensions of the individual into the environment, and as such that had the special quality of invoking a superorganic form because of the extreme density of the information that was being passed culturally between individuals to bring about the sophisticated manufacture of stone tools. Thus the stone axe, millions of years old, is put in the same bracket as the modern

superhighway, exactly as it should be if we claim to of solved the problem of human nature and thus to of determined a thread of unchanging continuity in the evolution of our kind. But how do our famous philosophers tackle this problem when they face it head on? 'Where does this powerful urge to be unique come from? Valéry puts forward the hypothesis that our terror of death produces from within its shadows some frantic wish to be different from everyone else. Perhaps. I note simply that it comes from a disastrous confusion between individual and personal difference. In which case, we refuse to be like others in the same way that we refuse to accept that others are people like ourselves.' (Ibid. Page 184) This tells us nothing, as is so often the case when a question concerning the nature of something, that is to say when we want an answer that tells us what a thing is for, how it makes sense in the context we are considering, is asked, all we get is a renaming of the thing. The 'urge to be unique' is renamed the 'confusion between individual and personal difference'. Well, so what, where does the confusion between individual and personal difference come from? "Drrrrrrrrrr! Dunno mate. Could it be the urge to be unique?" How thick is it possible for exceedingly clever people to get? Incredibly thick, believe me. But this philosopher is not attempting to enlighten us, he has an agenda, to be a priest supporting the latest idea of the priesthood in their endless pursuit of the Zionist ideal of one world under one authority. What he does gives us here is the clear message that we should respect differences in others, such a black people or Muslims, but not seek to invoke the irrelevant differences in ourselves, such as our whiteness or our Atheism. So the work of such a philosopher is simply embroiled in the functional impetus of the subject matter he pretends to shed light upon. He is not giving knowledge, he is manipulating knowledge to suit his own individual ends as a priest within the establishment. I have not read anymore than is quoted here and so he may well go to some length to develop the idea of individual and personal difference and how we conflate the two where they should be distinct. But I cannot imagine how such an argument could be made, and given the trite manner in which this phrase is used and certainly cannot imagine that the argument would not simply show how the priest worked his words to achieve his objective so I am not about to waste half an hour studying writing that cannot possibly be anything other than priestcraft. This priestcraft is all very well, it is natural, its expression is the reason that language evolved. But here we only want to know what is, we have no axe to grind, and we value no values because we recognise the validity of this misrepresentation of human nature as being in perfect keeping with the self centred focus of human individuals. Individuality comes from the need to create difference, hence the intimate association between these two ideas which Jacques work does make plain enough, and this is why we have him quoted here. The importance of delimiting the sense of identity even as individuals are raised from their personal position of identity as an individual to their higher positions of identity as members of groups, is that this limitation of awareness of self is the exact means by which by which a super-individual is brought into being by making a compound of personal individuals coalesce under one conceptual limit which they can

then see as belonging to them. The more diffuse the conceptual limit, the more difficult it is for the personal individual to disentangle the sense of personal self from that of group self. Diffuse concepts are those that are integrated most uniformly through a biomass, so much so that they are simply taken for granted and so not noticed, race, language, religion, occupation, nationality and such like macro limits of identity. But the failure to recognise the loss of self to the unification of selves into one super-individual is precisely what turns the group into an effective organ, and this is what lays the foundation for a super-organ amongst such super-individuals to evolve. Such a super organ is in effect a brain for it has the motive power that all relatively inferior groups are obliged to obey. But this superstructure of identification relies upon concentric levels of ever broadening limits of identity, and at each stage the various levels in each category must lose their ability for full consciousness of their own self if the system is to be functional as a structural basis for an organic form. This is precisely what makes the triadic religious identity a standard mode of evolution in the formation of super-massive superorganic forms, the Judeo-ChristianMoslem triad is the best example of this structure and we see in it how the same common identity that makes it possible to speak of these three distinct groups as Children of Abraham, also ensures structural differentiation. And differentiation means individuality, so by ensuring these three groups remain distinct in the consciousness of each the groups they constitute equate to individuals. But by having at their core one common thread of motivation they shift in the same direction in their behaviour, this makes them operate as one organism but, crucially, the delineation of the identities ensures that their must be one senior group, one super-group, super-individual, super-organ, all of which means one brain, always struggling to the death for the survival of the common core because it is itself all core, and nothing else and the elimination of its identity would mean the elimination of all three identities. And this dynamic, the dynamic of the super-organ explains everything about Jewish history. The super-organ defined by an identity that makes it into a super-brain is the product of an evolutionary process of elevation that endlessly drives knowledge into an enclave of power where it is associated with an identity and comes to form a priesthood, a group with a personality that whose acts are focused upon the growth of the organism. The Jewish identity evolved about a core of real knowledge which had the purpose that equates to human nature infused into it as the sacred knowledge of identity. This simple core urge, to rule the world, which obeys the impulse to form a superorganism that is the product of human nature being corporate, is what makes motorways a desirable solution to a problem, as the women said to me in the pub last night, 25/05/04. Motorways are not just a solution to a problem, they are a solution to the problem. The problem of how to rule the world by evolving one unified organism, how to extend your exoskeleton outward ever further to give form to the motive force of identity that prompts you to rule the world under one identity, to form one planetary organism, with one super-organ, one brain. And we are all familiar with how central the dead straight Roman road was to these great disseminators of Judaism, and these people were not the first to make roads the backbone of their super-massive superorganic being, and that is because such extensions of the self are the most obvious first foundation of plant-animal such as human organisms can appear to be according to the thinking of advocates of real Super Beings. Individuality, the Inner Circle, and the Idea of Freedom

Interdependent differentiation in the evolution of mammalian physiology into a superorganism unfolded as the creation of the human form with all the attributes we know we have today. Ever increasing complexity in the process of differentiation split the superorganic form into two fundamentally distinct forms, a corporate organ of authority and a concomitant highly self cantered individual separated from the corporate body in their own consciousness by way of the ever increasing distinctness of certain individuals from other distinct individuals and from the majority of the more amorphous mass of individuals, in the, so called, historical process, of role specialisation. The sophistication of society arising from these developments in social structure with their associated sophistication of ideas about life and the nature of existence has come down to our own time in a very distinct sense of the idea of freedom, and idea that is intimately linked to the idea of the individual. It is implicit in the idea of a superorganic form that there cannot in any real sense be such a thing as an individual, I have said that the illusion is made manifest by virtue of the extension of the mass of the superorganism to such an extent that a whole swathe of humanity can make the idea of individuality the corner stone of its sense of being, built essentially on the vast power at its disposal and the even greater mass of people who have become drawn into the gravitational field of the core identity and who thus make the excessive power of the minority sustainable, in the usual manner that applies to the formation and maintenance of a core body in the human form. Thus, if there is no such thing as an individual in any absolute sense, then there is likewise no such thing as freedom in any absolute sense either, for we are saying that the idea of freedom comes from the idea of the individual, and the latter is none real and so the former is likewise none real. But, relatively speaking, as opposed to speaking in absolute terms, then the difference between individuals does mean that both these nonexistent attributes of human superorganic physiology can be experienced as real by the individuals cocooned within the organic physiology of the exoskeleton which appears to them as an artificial environment self created by them as individuals working together toward the end of increasing individual freedom. But the real goal of freedom is to serve the ends of the superorganism by extending its reach to draw in more and more of the world human biomass under one identity and to thereby access as much of the planets energy as possible under one authority. As the energy drawn under the control of one identity increases so the mass of the core body increases and the reach of the sense of individuality, along with its associated sense of freedom, increases in proportion. On this scale, the macro scale of the entire mass of the superorganic being, the structure of the identity must differentiate into appropriately broad stages f differentiation, this requires that the core identity must split into subidentities leading to the evolution of a hierarchical identity structure. Observation of human superorganisms down the ages indicates that the naturally occurring division on this macro level, applying to the identity of the entire organism, is into three, leading to the evolution of a triadic identity structure. It transpires that the evolution of the impending global identity, and its global superorganism, fits this observation nicely, the Jewish core, or master identity, has divided into one Western variation, we know as Christianity, and an Eastern variation we know as Islam. This triad forms one identity package and it has laid the foundation of a global organism, as we are well aware from the daily experience of our lives today. The identity of this global organism is, simply put, Judaic.

So as differentiation led to the evolution of individuality, as a real experience, if not as a reality in itself, then it also led to the loss of freedom that is implicit in the primary division of the organic fabric of the superorganism into those individuals closer to the focus of authority, and those whose sole experience of authority is their obedience to its dictates. By concentrating upon this aspect of the evolution of the human organism we can gain important insights into the detailed means by which the process of human evolution unfolds. We know that language is the fluid-genetic medium of the social body. That is to say, that it is linguistic information that creates social form by directing individual behaviour, and by forming the linguistic equivalent of a genome in the form of cultural knowledge. And we have already noted that as the linguistic genome evolves a functional aspect that creates substantial, material forms, the information genome is imbued with social information routines which, in turn, imbue the material and otherwise substantial, that is behavioural, aspects of individual life, with identity. Thus we get things like religion which although self evidently ridiculous in terms of the information they deliver concerning material representations of reality, they encode intuitive knowledge that the priesthood, the inner circle, have found functional in their role as master authority directing the organisation of the sum total of the organism's being. It is all very well to assert these conditions concerning the function of language in relation to the creation of social form, but it is immensely difficult to give expression to these ideas in a manner that people can read and understand. The main difficulty is the lack of will to understand, the natural inclination is to resist understanding because unearthing the scientific understanding of this ancient knowledge is a destructive process. The reason that the application of scientific logic to the understanding of human nature is destructive is that it involves delving into the fabric of our living social being. Thinking about this rather reminds me of the point sometimes made by archaeologists regarding their own field of knowledge acquisition, theirs is an inherently destructive science. Archaeologists do unearth artifacts that can be preserved, but as the art of this craft has developed into a more scientific search for knowledge the real substance a good, professional, modern archaeologist unearths as they destroy their once only material deposit, is information, information that can be accumulated to provide remarkable knowledge about the lives of bygone superorganisms. Obviously if we reveal to our consciousness precisely how the linguistic formulas work that programme our behaviour then a similar effect will occur as that which is implicit in the work of the archaeologist. At first thought this might not be obvious, but if I tell you that by this means the more upfront codification of knowledge into an elaborate identity matrix, such as that which we call a religion, can be decoded, so that for example, we can prove God does not exist by showing what God is, 'God' in Judaic mythology being the priestcraft's code word for the superorganism. Then it is immediately obvious that you cannot have science and religion both extant in one society, either there is religion with science as its slave, or there is science and no religion. Hence "Uncompromising Atheism, Real Science of Humanity". So we can see that by revealing the code's true meaning, somewhat as Ouspensky partially does, but by going all the way, we necessarily destroy the knowledge that is constructed by means of that specific code, in this case a code which is founded upon the idea of one God as the key, that is the touchstone, to which we always refer all our reasoning about human existence.

What we are proposing to do now however is to go much further than this superficial reduction of Biblical mythology to allegory, something that has been done often enough, we are set on reducing our very language to its base meaning, its machine code that reveals each fragment of the underpinnings of the mythical code upon which religion is based. We can do this because we have the key to human nature and we have been able to pursue the evolution of human form and recognise the role of language in the generation of that exoskeletal form and the role of the primary linguistic mechanism of duality that splits the organism into two conceptual entities, Super Being and Self Being, which in reality are only structural divisions of one physical Being. The maintenance of our sense of this structural division as a real division is reliant upon the language we speak, and this means that it is the evolution of our language which preserves out blindness to our own true nature and our ability to be convincingly focused upon the false mythology of our religious identity. Furthermore, because the focus of our consciousness upon our identity is dependant upon the words we learn as we acquire our identity through speech there is a power of diffusion of understanding inherent language which makes codification possible. This power of diffusion means that ideas which have proved central to the evolution of the cultural knowledge which is the information programming the units of which an organism is formed can devolve away from their core idea and still preserve the same functional meaning. Preserving the same functional meaning is a reference to the function of a code. Thus as our society has become ever so complex it has proved necessary for the theocracy which is at its core to differentiate its knowledge in a most remarkable manner so that the overtly mythological code that was always preserved at the core of social authority has been obliged to strip itself of the mythological image and yet to preserve the meaning of its coded authority in the language that all people speak. And so, to try and make, at least some element of what I am trying to explain here simple to grasp, it follows that the central theme of the mythology has to be preserved in the none mythological everyday language of ordinary people's speech. In fact, the effect of this infusion of mythological meaning into ordinary, none mythological speech, is to turn the ordinary into the mythological. Somewhat amazingly, but not really, when you think about it, this transformation of the secular into the mythological is understood by us as the exact opposite, as the transference of the theological into the political. New words are woven, and new structures formed to carry the image they deliver to our consciousness, but the mythological meaning is thus simply carried by a new linguistic formula, this may not have to be so, but because the priesthood remains as an established and all powerful force in society and the religion they sustain continues to be imprinted upon the identity of the organic biomass of the organism then the result is that we find overtly theistic priests like Tony Blair, George Bush and Margaret Thatcher retaining power in the supposedly secularised structures of the political domain. This clearly cannot be possible, the words tell us it is so, the church has been separated from the state and made independent of the theocracy, but our eyes tell us this is not so. And indeed with events such as the Zionist war on Iraq carried out purely in the interests of Israel, we see the manifest effect of the continuing command of the theocracy, by the Jewish priesthood, consisting of the biomass of the Jewish people, being as powerful as it ever was in the days of the British or Roman empires. We call this process secularisation, only we do not normally hear the actual language we speak being included in the progress of this process of transformation, naturally, to reveal that kind of information would tend to defeat the object, as I have

said when I said that revealing how language actually functions to programme our behaviour must necessarily jeopardise the programme that sustains our society as we know it. No bad thing in my opinion, eradicating the priesthood of Judaism, which is why I have devoted my life to working this stuff out for myself. What we find then is that the sentiments of the theology which rules our lives via the core organ that is devoted to its preservation, are encoded into the very language that we speak, and this is why we speak so freely of individuality, freedom, rights and so on. This is what I call a theistic language, and it is the sum of this theistic language which I consider to be the 'substance' of the of the collective mind which is imprinted into each of our minds as we learn to speak. This is how we acquire our identity, a slave identity in the case of Christians and Moslems, and a master identity in the case of Jews. Although in saying this I will invoke anger in many because the word slave, as an artificial word, a theistic word, is a word grounded in the idea of an individual as a free agent, which we know our biological understanding of our society does not permit us to accept has any real meaning, but only a relative meaning. Thus we are only allocated a hierarchically differentiated position in the physiology of the organism when we note these slave master distinctions. But, there are real consequences for us arising from these organic differentiations, the war on terror, the distribution of wealth, and the exploitation of resources are central to this issue, and it may be that we now need to become collectively aware of just what our true nature is, for being driven by the core organ retained within the organic fabric of the Jewish people is not necessarily a viable option for many more millennia, or weeks even, one sometimes thinks! Freedom The idea of freedom is a result of the transition from a simple superorganic being where the concept of the individual distinct from the group is inconceivable, and the notion of freedom is likewise beyond conception because everyone is equally free in so far as anyone is free, to the situation where the concept of unity is broken by foundation of structural division. This brings into being the idea of one individual as distinct from another, and, as a consequence of the structural realignment in which the creation of an organ of authority is the primary function, the establishment of isolated authority over separated others creating servility hand in hand with superiority invokes automatically the possibility of conceiving of being free. Hence it is easy to see how a language giving expression to such ideas could evolve and build a mythology accordingly, all of which cultural accumulation would be related to the material developments occurring in the social environment at one and the same time. Cultural and material evolution would feed of one another exactly as we would expect, exactly as genetic and physiological evolution must likewise maintain a feedback loop between them at all times. We have now interpreted the word 'artificial' that we use to describe items like a plastic cup that exist only because we make them, to include other social phenomena that we act as though we believe are real and not created by us, such as freedom. Artificial really applies to the internal physiology of the superorganism and it comes into being when the process of symbiosis starts to take substantial effect by producing positive attributes of physical extension that in our species take the form of tools. Hence it is not surprising that the very things that we call artificial are the tools that we make and the products they make it possible for us to produce.

I have persisted in mentioning the pivotal event when human nature went critical, in terms of the realisation of our potential in the culmination of the process of symbiotic association which began its overt expression with the making of the first tools. Tools which extended the simple group body of a species, outward into a exocorporeal space, which eventually gave rise to our elaborate exoskeletal structure that we call society, and especially civilisation. It cannot be overemphasised how important it is to understand the true nature of this transformation. To emphasise this point I will quote a pertinent paragraph from Fox and Tiger who recognise the criticality of the event, but who are entirely blinded by the linguistic programming that forms their conceptual minds, into thinking of the issue in terms of individuals as the end in themselves, and this despite their being supreme examples of the evolutionary type of intellectual. 'We have overtaken ourselves with those fantasy structures called civilizations, and with the sheer overpowering growth of our numbers. For most of our hunting past ninety-nine percent of our history for the population of the species stayed steady at about one million. With the dawn of agriculture it leaped to one hundred million. Since the advent of industry it has reached 3,700 million, and by the year 2000 it will be 7,000 million. A creature evolved for living in bands of 50 or so cannot but have problems with such a series of population explosions and their consequences. Most of what we take for granted in human nature is in fact an end product of the pathological events attendant on the incarceration of our hunting selves. We are all in this together, treading on one another's toes' (The Imperial Animal, page 21-22.) One cannot help but feel that when writing page twenty one, these highly knowledgeable and intelligent professors of anthropology, did not think to refer to their own crucial ideas expressed on page twenty. If they had they would never of made such arses of themselves as they do here, by failing to recognise that humans are evolved creatures, the end product of a long evolutionary process that is almost beyond the grasp of our imagination. If the product is pathological then so is the process, and it is an arrogant presumption of the highest order for a scientist to suggest that the process of organic evolution, that is the essence of life itself, is pathological. Of course the explanation for this effrontery is that these scientists are priests of the theocracy, unwittingly no doubt, dedicated, like good robots, to the promulgation of the idea that humans have evolved beyond the grip of nature, as Ouspensky says, to become self-evolving creatures that make themselves. If you want to look at, and comprehend, human nature by observing human behaviour, then you do not look at the ephemeral actions of people in the short term, such as there aggressive behaviour made grotesque by the pressure of population dynamics. You look at their underlying physiological structures, such as their highly complex and elaborate capacity for fully symbolic speech. Freedom is an artificial creation just as much as a plastic cup is an artificial creation. Indeed, once we have reached this point in our reasoning we can recognise that language itself qualifies as an artificial product of nature, the supreme artificial product of nature one might say. It clearly is not accurate to say that a plastic cup

does not exist, or that it is an illusion, so we may suppose that in the intangible field of ideas it must be equally erroneous to try and express the more complex sense of what freedom is, by asserting freedom is an illusion, and that it does not really exist. In truth we know perfectly well what the answer to this riddle is, and we know that the idea of freedom as a real experience is limited, but we also know that we would die for our freedom, sometimes, and so it must be real in some sense. And so it is shown to be by our analysis of society according to a true scientific model, such ideas of freedom are born of the relative position we may occupy as individual units within the physiology of the organism of which we form a part. Freedom then is not as Russell tells us in his History of Western Philosophy Hobbes first defined it in an accurate manner, as freedom to act unhindered by any obstacle, as when water flows freely down a slope unimpeded. Hobbes, in his Leviathan, was presenting a model of human being that was the personification of artificiality, he was claiming society was like a machine, so he followed the principle of mechanics. It is clear that this is a theistic model, otherwise we would not use words like artificial to support the illusion of the individual as the end of all ends. Russell's support for this logic shows that he was a fully inducted priest of the theocracy which exists by virtue of this language of individuality. There is however no need to suppose that Russell had the least idea of what he was doing, or that anyone else who emits such a linguistic message, or who receives it, does either. This sounds fanciful but the ideas are consistent, their consistency is retained by logical integrity of the meaning carried by each word, this is why models of society as a machine, which are self evidently ridiculous, are able to constructed as a coherent intellectual image by sticking to a mechanistic principle and then simply applying all phenomena to. Hobbes can say freedom is unconstrained liberty to move, but that does not mean it is, it just means someone has said it is. Russell can approve of the clear sighted logic of Hobbes definition, but he knows that that is all there is to commend it, detached logic that is self consistent. Freedom is the ability to act unconstrained by authority, we have seen how the very idea of freedom was only brought into being by the creation of substantial structures of authority, prior to this the idea itself was inconceivable. Thus freedom is not first and foremost a physical phenomenon pertaining to inert matter subject to energetic forces, it is a conceptual impression of organic entities subject to the impulses directed at them by others of their own kind or by structural features of their own extended being which means the forces exerted upon the individual by the place within the superorganism which all individuals are part off. We may be more precise, a bit more subtle, and say freedom, as a real attribute of existence, is the ability to act, or not to act, in obedience to any human authority other than that authority which constitutes genuine self determination. We could have a fine time working out when we are determining our own motives and behaviours, as is evident from this whole discussion which is asserting that we are unwitting cogs in a machine, or rather, unwitting cells in a body. I would argue that in the first place you need to have direct access to the information which is encoded into the language you speak and which serves to magnetise your personality in such a way as to orient individuals on mass toward the central pole of authority which directs, by this means, the actions of the corporate being toward such purposes as the Zionist goals that form the information core of the Jewish identity. Thus you cannot have a real democracy that tolerates religious belief on an official basis, but this only goes to show that democracy is an artificial product of human evolution because it does exist and yet religion is the overriding authority in our world, overriding meaning that it is the

ultimate medium of identity, extended beyond the boundaries of any other defining attribute of identity such as race, national language or nation. We have found ourselves contrasting an organic model with a mechanistic model and found that as we do this so we dislodge the meaning of underlying meanings such as the very idea of artificiality. We find that the notion of artificiality serves the ends of the priesthood that can be developed into a mirror image of reality and presented as a model of reality by someone like Hobbes who is dedicated to the cause of authority, as Russell tells us, he was a committed monarchist. So it is clear that Hobbes, like all other thinkers who have ever had the freedom to express themselves in print, is never going to present a serious model of human society based upon true human nature, for this reality reveals the true nature of such things as authority and freedom, and Hobbes would certainly not want to of presented the idea that freedom was the ability to act unconstrained by any authority, quite the reverse. So he makes this self evident attribute of social order into a mechanistic image by likening its operation to an easily observed physical event, the flow of water down a slope, and he builds a social theory of society on the notion of the machine to ensure that the true nature of humans is hidden behind a veil of clever words. At one stage in the above passage Ouspensky remarks that the psychological method works by recognising the presence of the mind as a tool through which reality is viewed. I liked the sound of that, but what on earth did it mean? I could never bring myself to read his work with a desire to understand it because it is self evident rubbish, I am interested in picking out features however for the purpose of investigating the human species nature. He gives us a clue to his meaning when he says we would not use a tool that extends our perception without being conscious of its material presence. The idea is odd because the suggestion seems to be that the mind distorts what we see and hides reality from us, but tools that extend our sight do not pervert reality, they simply bring us closer to it. But there is no such thing as the mind. That which we call the mind is an information entity, and that information entity does not reside in the brain of each individual so that each individual has their own mind. The mind, such as it is, as an information entity, is the sum of information that is extant in the organism, each individual is infused with this information entity, but differentially according to the physical location they occupy within the exoskeleton. With this true conception of the mind we can understand that from an individual perspective that which we call our mind is a medium given to us that enables us to see the world. The mind is, like so much else, largely an artificial product, in that is a feature of the extended organic body, the exoskeleton, and as such it is experienced by individuals like any other so called artificial product, be it a hammer or a motorway, as a tool serving a specific purpose. The mind is a tool that consists of words, a code, delivering an image of the world beyond our immediate sense, just as a pair of binoculars does. However, unlike the glass aid to sight, words provide a representation of reality in the form of a codified image, and as such, as Ouspensky indicates, the mind acts as an intermediary between the personal self and reality. In this sense, we can be aware of the true nature of the mind, a linguistic product that gives us an image of reality via the mode of language it consists of, and as such we can defend ourselves from being given a false image of reality by always being aware of the meaning of words. Since Ouspensky is the supreme example of a perverter of words and their meanings it is fascinating that he sees this ploy and warns against it. He is like the ultimate double glazing salesmen who makes the revelation of the most corrupt tricks

of the salesmen part of his patter as he proceeds to weave a web of deceit about the victims he abuses via his command of linguistic imagery. Freedom then is not as Russell tells us Hobbes first defined it accurately, as a freedom to act unhindered by any obstacle. Freedom is the ability to act, or not to act, in obedience to any human mediated authority, other than that which constitutes selfdetermination. Self-determination would become the inevitable focus of the knowledge-pervert priest's attention in this argument as they try to show that a slave wants to be a slave, and so on. But I have in mind something more simple concerning the decision to do things simply because you want to do them, and I accept that since there is no such thing as an individual that there are invisible pathways guiding the decision making process that any individual can engage in in life, so that there is no real freedom of choice, and when I discuss this question of freedom I am not meaning to imply that there is any such thing as freedom in any absolute sense, but only a relative state of freedom to act, or not to act. To take up Hobbes' mechanistic model the true relationship of the individual to the force of motivation in their lives is not to be likened to that of the unimpeded water flowing toward its naturally determined level, but to that of a pipe in which the water flows, where the individual constitutes one ring segment of pipe which is obliged to allow to water to flow through it, to do otherwise it to leak, and to leak is to impair the life of the individual as well as that which they exist to serve. That is freedom in reality, no freedom. But I must confess freedom means more to me than anything, it is the mark of my English culture, and I am the ultimate individualist. But that still does not mean there is anything such as an individual, it just means we live in an immense superorganism and I am near to the core of its being where sufficient energy exists to support the complexity of individual form to the degree that an extreme individualist can live as if they do exist as an individual, in other words I live in a very wealthy nation capable of supporting an immense elite of none productive individuals, but true self sustaining individuality that warrants the notion of the individual being an end in themselves, is a supreme illusion. _________________ 2) All cultures make the same mistake and suffer a fall. Ouspensky does not make much of this but from a scientific point of view there is an important train of thinking present here. All scientists of all kinds accept that we do not know what human nature is and it is recognised that to do so would mean we could recognise a common thread of evolutionary development. The scientists writing on issues such as race work hard to ensure that it is not possible to argue for continuity even though evolution makes continuity compulsory. We know that human nature is corporate and that there is a thread of evolutionary development running right through human evolution that it is the job of the scientist-priests to pervert by finding all sorts of ways to assert otherwise. Here then, although Ouspensky is an overt priests, being devoted to mystical knowledge, he actually invokes this primary feature of a true determination of human nature, a core force working through all human organisms. Human nature being corporate means that the nature of individuals is so evolved as to create a body, a body that takes shape at the social level of organization, and this reduces the individual to the status of a cell within that body. This means that there should be unchanging features that are

common to all human organisms and Ouspensky's, albeit, bizarre observation, conforms to this requirement, which says something about the coherence of his logic that leads him to see the true nature of the human organism in accordance with a scientific understanding of existence, even though he insists on adhering to a religious notion of reality. All human societies that ever existed, or will ever exist, must have the same physiological features dictated by human nature. One of those features, the most significant, is that humans, as they express their linguistically driven capacity to fabricate superorganic structure, differentiate into a complex body which has at the centre of its being a specialised organ of authority. The formation of this super-brain is precisely what Ouspensky is concerned with here, even though he has not the least inkling of what it is he is talking about, he is still, nonetheless, correct regarding this point of universality regarding the need for an inner circle. This demonstrates clearly that while the key to his argument is fallacious and contrived, being based on the fiction of a divine being, the logic arising from this fictitious key can still be based upon accurate observations that creates functional knowledge pertinent to the concern of the moment and thus delivering knowledge that conforms to reality and it functional. This link between reality and knowledge via a false idea is what makes mystical knowledge exist, via the medium of the linguistic information that creates images of reality. 3) The release of potential. This is a supremely important idea in relation to the evolutionary process leading to the formation of superorganic life forms such as humans are. The idea of unfolding potential is so vital to a proper conception of human evolution that it has been completely erased from the scientific model of evolution bequeathed to us by Darwin, and erased with the utmost vigour, thus fulfilling a primary requirement of the theocracy which must at all cost prevent a scientific notion of human form from taking shape in our consciousness of reality. This particular idea is dangerous because it is so simple to grasp, it accords with our intuition, and is so obvious, and consequently it intimately contradicts the theological account of human existence at a crucial point where the idea of purpose and human will is spun out of the thin air by the priests to make this natural phenomenon their own tool with which to wield power over the living being that is society. This close fit between the scientific logic and the Jewish mythological account is revealed by this present examination of a mythological expression of the idea of human corporate nature at this very moment. The idea that there is purpose or foresight in the natural process of evolution robs the mythical being of God of a central platform for his existence, and it likewise robs the priests, God's representatives on earth of their ability to claim legitimacy for their claims about human purposes, all of which feeds down into the sub-hierarchy of politicians and other social manipulators. Purpose in nature is itself as deadly to theism as the entire idea it forms part of, that humans are superorganic, it is so fatal to the Jewish myth of human divinity that it just cannot be permitted to find a voice, and scientists are adamant that there is no purpose in nature because there is no planning and there is no forethought. But who said that there is planning or forethought anywhere? We think there is, but the whole point of the idea of unwittingness where people act according to a linguistic programme that they do not know the meaning of, is that we have no idea of why we do what we do. Ouspensky introduces the idea of latent potential inherent in human form, which is perfectly correct, but he then use the idea to elaborate his own grotesque

conception of what human social form is. He talks utter nonsense when he says that only the elite evolve in the unfolding process while the mass simply adapt to change. This sad misconception is the product of a total lack of theory beyond the possession of a simple key idea, and the desire to promote the interests of the priesthood who exist by virtue of the key Ouspensky uses, the key being a belief in divinity, a priesthood who exist by maintaining this gross idea of God by any means conceivable, as Ouspensky's clever and well informed hard work demonstrates as well as anything ever could, except perhaps the work of the scientists whose efforts to built castles in the sky in defence of theocracy are near impossible to believe possible. Because he has extracted the correct portion of reality that supports his argument, and then misapplied it by using the idea of divinity as the touchstone of this thought process to which all further reasoning it referred, we can say that his focus upon the evolution of humanity via the creative power of an elite is understandable. But because this aspect of the human superorganism is all he is concerned to address the product of his reasoning is errant rubbish. As authority is focused in the elite by means of their management of all forms of knowledge, since it is knowledge that creates superorganic form, then the creative power that advances society is necessarily concentrated in the elite organ of the social structure. But this generation of information that creates social structure requires something more than behavioural adaptation on the part of the biomass exterior to the limits of the elite organ. The evolution of people who are ever more dependant upon the support of the social structure advances the cause of the an authority able to extend its reach to those that in less developed organisms would perish. So while there is adaptability changing the receptivity of the biomass, so that a Druidic organism can be transformed into a Jewish slave appendage by means of the extermination of the incumbent elite organ and its substitution by an appropriately adjusted Jewish identity, namely that of Christianity, it must be the case that at a deeper level, and over time, genetic changes in the makeup of populations beyond these cultural influences will be rightly classed as evolutionary. And besides, the elite organ had to evolve itself at some point, that fact that an elite caste organ like that of the Jews evolved to form a transferable biomass capable of inserting itself into suitably transformed captive territories does not mean that an interdependent relationship requiring harmonious evolution in both alien and host structure is not required. But, even here, as critical as I am of Ouspensky, we can see how his primitive reasoning on this matter does bring to the surface central issues in the process of evolving a superorganic species of humans. It certainly must be true that in so far as the elite organ constitutes a nucleus within which information is replicated and transformed according to need, the idea of a cell's protoplasm carrying the genetic information within its nucleus comes to mind and we would certainly say that it is only in the nucleus that genetic evolution takes place, except that here it is only the specialised sex cells, in the act of recombination, that permit evolution to occur. The fact is that we should not be too literal in our comparison of the organic structure of solid organic forms and fluid organic forms. Evolution in the fluid domain of linguistic information occurs by means of new ideas coming forth, and then radical new evolutionary changes only occur very rarely, and when they do they generate a whole new identity. As we see it is far more likely that a structural elaboration of an existing identity will evolve, such as Christianity or Islam from Judaism, so the evolution of completely new identities must be a very rare thing indeed, and Judaism is probably traceable back well beyond the six thousand years it grants to its own origins, but, that said, one can only be awe struck by the magnificence of the Jewish identity and what

it has given rise to, even though I have to pause in my usual sense of antagonism to this identity structure that I have devoted my life to destroying, unwittingly, because I did not know what it was until I knew. Because of the interdependence of the elite upon the well being of the biomass it commands and the consequent evolution of individuals who are ever more dependant upon the social structure managed by the elite, whose dependence thereby advances the cause of authority, the so called civilizing influence has evolved, resulting in all sorts of human forms being viable that otherwise would not be able to exist in less complex superorganic bodies. Such is the extent of this evolutionary process, one that is proceeding at a great pace in modern times as science extends the ability of people to live so dramatically and most especially at the level of birth, and conception, that people with the most disabling handicaps such as that of the Home Secretary David Blunkett, who is blind, having major positions of power in a society where many able people, thinking of myself as a fine example of the type, are virtually ousted as alien simply because of their extreme sense of independence makes them feel alien, so they become what they feel they are. Of course while I am a passionate atheist, Blunkett is a passionate Christian; but it is easy to see why such a man should find such a repugnant and offensive ideology beautiful and endearing. Dependence, it is a feature of robust differentiation of the kind that is required to create the interdependent differentiation that Spencer spoke of. The survival of people who would otherwise not survive means the genome of the organism is different to what it otherwise would be and this means that evolution is taking place now as much as it ever was in the past, something which most people think is not so. How many scientist-priests do we hear displaying their cleverness by saying that the trouble with us today is that we have the brain of a being evolved to live in the stone age conditions of hunter gatherer groups; see Tiger and Fox quoted above who express this kind of sentiment? Idiocy, idiocy which is all part of the theocratic ploy to hide the reality from the dependant biomass. And the priests go on and on, telling us how wonderful we are supporting such extreme dependants, and how this so obviously conflicts with the Darwinian process of evolution that requires that only the fittest survive. Such dependants only survive because it is functional that they should survive, even if people appear as an unmitigated burden upon society they still perform the function of enhancing the integrity of dependence by virtue of the intense interdependence of individuals. Thus we only need have a few utterly distressed individuals per thousand of the population and the whole mass of the population is galvanised by their plight into a state of intensely shared dependence. And this is why charity is such an importance device in the mythology of identity, it impels us all to connect strongly with these most important members of the community whose lives are in various ways a sacrifice to the moral sanction of life's sacredness which is the prime behavioural mechanism in the Jewish identity implant. The survival of less independent individuals is part of the organic evolutionary process, mediated via the linguistic code that delivers social structure, that occurs because it is functional in relation to the process of individuation that defines the differentiation of the human organism. 3) The nature of an organism. Ouspensky is all in knots when he raises this point. One moment it feels as if we are about to read something coherent, then, in an instant, that hope has vanished, and we are left with some, not hopelessly

ridiculous statement, but one that emits confusion and a vacant sense of nothingness, like grasping a glass full cold lively beer on a warm sunny day only to get it to your lips to find the glass empty, a complete tease. The first point he raises concerns what an organism is. But how does he address this question? In terms of higher and lower entities, this is maddeningly useless. Yet, there is an interesting connection with correct reasoning when he asserts that the idea of an organism applied to humans can only apply to the species as a whole, and to any subdivision thereof. He is, of course, hopelessly mistaken, but the key to understanding the proposition is a piece of knowledge that does indeed apply to all humanity as defined by their species status which embraces all humans regardless of whatever subspecies identity they have in addition to their species identity which defines them as distinct human organisms in a population of superorganisms, such as a tribe would constitute in human fauna composed of only simple physiology, prior to the evolution of complex superorganic form which combined tribal identities under one master identity. And so we see that this man, this priest, delivering formulated ideas derived from an authoritative source, has a mind split in two. He knows form, and he knows nature, but ne'er the twain shall meet in his consciousness. He simply cannot comprehend that the nature of a form, while it is something entirely different from the physical being of a form, is nonetheless an integral part of the entire form. So, the nature of humans is corporate, this necessarily applies to all humanity, in all places, and at all times, past, present, and future, for as long as our kind exists. But the resulting living forms that arise in obedience to the dictates of this corporate nature are highly varied due to the fact that a species necessarily forms discrete populations of individual organisms. The issue here is one of properly defining an organism that takes shape at the level of social organization which incorporates the individual and which stands in contrast to other such collective bodies of individuals so that we have discrete populations where members of one social entity are not members of another, and indeed these distinct organism then stand in competitive opposition to one another. Such organisms are always social in their form, and the identities they display are always a combination of the physical, that is the racial and territorial attributes, and the cultural, that is the linguistic, artistic and technological, or craft attributes. So, somehow Ouspensky makes the most important point that is central to the idea he is expounding in this passage without having the faintest idea what that point is. This result, this unwitting wisdom, is exactly what our fully developed understanding of this organic idea of human nature predicts should happen. Functional knowledge about the mechanism of human nature, about reality, that is, should be drawn out of experience and transformed into the secret knowledge of the elite-caste organ by a process involving the intuitive acquisition of information and the transformation of that acquired information into a codified formulation, a compound of mythology and practical knowledge, which is then made to do work by being the plan directing the actions of individuals. By acting in obedience to the mythology individuals act unwittingly toward the objectives of human nature, about which they know absolutely nothing, but toward which they are encouraged to shift themselves because of the reward they receive as organic forms acting in obedience to the dictates of the organic programming which is their human nature. Grasping, never mind explaining, this hierarchy of codification, that knits together a structural hierarchy, is tricky. If I were a computer freak maybe I could relate the idea to the way the material of which a computer's hardware is made is

organised that by a series of codes, from machine, to binary, to programming to language, to make a machine into a brain tool, but I am not, and so I have no idea how this works, it is however, obviously, in its nature, an identical process. What finding someone like Ouspensky allows us to do therefore, is to locate evidence of the transformation of information at a particular level in the organic structure of the human organism, and by this means we are enabled to find conceptual handles with which to grasp the idea of knowledge as an organic phenomenon, and knowledge acquisition and formation works in the living structure of a human exoskeleton. The reason information works in the way it does, in its generation of structure, is the same in the case of the computer and society. It is a matter of linking hierarchical structures together by allowing the information which binds one level of organization to be transformed into a mode that will bind a further level of organization together in a manner that links the latter to the former intimately. It is the information at the core of the code that links the distinct structural hierarchies in a structural compound. And, we must note at this point, for this too is a hard point to grasp, this evolution of hierarchical structures by means of information transformation by way of a series of codes, each with their own associated physical structure, is the process that gives rise to the triadic hierarchy that is characteristic of supermassive human superorganisms, and which we see has occurred in the case of our Judaic organism which evolved two linguistic sub-identity codes to extend itself into a full blown superorganic being capable of operating by virtue of one core elite organ directing the action of the two substructures which grew up on the basis of the Christian and Muslim programmes operating in obedience to the Jewish programme. Why the universe works in this way, creating structure by generating material forms in a series of discrete hierarchical structures that are linked to one another by a common thread of information that is rendered into a series of discrete codes, is obviously the next logical question, but one I have not the least interest in asking seriously. All I can say on this point, that has occurred to me so far, is that just as Einstein's reasoning reduced energy and matter to one and the same thing in different guises, so the same can be said of information. Which means that information is the mode in which we sense energy, energy and information are one and the same thing, so our brains are in effect energy sensing organs. Energy is clearly a uniform base medium of universal existence. Energy is the common thread that is spun out to create the material universe, so the transformation of information into a series of codes, that we, as a superorganic being, can discern, such as the electromagnetic spectrum, the periodic table of elements, and the genetic code of organic being, is the means by which energy acts as the creative principle making the material universe. And it just so happens that if it is to make matter then energy must do so by differentiating itself in a manner that relates to the material forms it creates, and if it must differentiate itself then it must differentiate information into a series of discrete codes. The result is what we have been discussing in this section, but it still leaves the question what on earth this experience of existence is, and why it is as it is. However all we are concerned with here is working out what humans are, and what our existence is on this planet. Can you see past the mind-blind? Damned if I can, but I sense the presence of the mind as an obstacle when I make the effort, in this closing paragraph, to embrace all modern knowledge and link it to the prehistoric mode of understanding that is mythology. No doubt the mystics have made use of this idea of trying to lose the mind altogether to connect with what is beyond, but I would like to have a scientific explanation for any claims made on behalf of such modes of behaviour before I can

take them seriously, and in I know what science will reveal, another nice track way leading to yet another fine house built out of priestcraft. 4) Animal Plant! Now there's an idea. Unfortunately Ouspensky's ability to describe well the nature of the social organism continues to be blighted by his complete lack of understanding of the subject he is dealing with, of evolution that is. The idea of an animal plant is most peculiar, my equivalent realization when applying a fully scientific mode of reasoning to the same idea that human society was an organism, led me to that the corporate organism had an amorphous form, it is after all a relatively fluid structure compared to the body of an individual, hence my use of the terms solid and fluid to refer to these two physiological forms. Consequently when I thought about a comparative organism with which we are familiar I made the comparison between the human superorganism and an amoeba. Amoeba are classed as animals, not plants. What is lacking in Ouspensky's account at this point, hardly surprisingly, given the point of origin of his logic, is an appreciation of the implications we might expect when an organism the size of a mammal attains the status of a superorganism, a self evolving form, as he has it, which means that the common nature between all superorganic species will undoubtedly produce common features, but will certainly also produce difference related to the sheer mass of the unitary forms being driven toward superorganic status by the pressure of evolution acting to maximise the efficiency of a broad physiological model such as mammalian physiology is. Clearly one feature of superorganic form arising from the constitution of any superorganism, being composed of already discrete units with some mass and complexity already established, which defines the units individuality, is that a degree of amorphous shape will be bound to arise from a combination of such units because they are preformed structures, not elemental construction materials. However, these relatively amorphous boundaries of the superorganism are not as flexible as first impressions make them appear; but clearly you can hardly even begin to assess this attribute of total form until you have a reasonable sense of what the organism is that you are attempting to comprehend. In the case of superorganic forms environment tends to define their shape as the organism necessarily defines a territorial zone of occupation by virtue of their extended mass, and along with this consideration is the inevitability of an exoskeleton, located at some, presumably focal point, within the territory, upon which structural constraints are bound to be imposed. Hence termites and ants have nest-like architecture defining their exoskeletal form, and a territorial zone surrounding the physical structure which effectively defines their superorganic limit, clearly in a somewhat amorphous, yet nonetheless well defined manner. Coral molluscs are famously constrained in their reach, being limited to water of a narrow temperature band, making them form their communities about the coastal zone of tropical land features. Bacteria that form superorganic colonies also exist and they are what they are, I have not looked into it, but their shapes will conform to the general principles I am outlining here, the fossil remnants of the earliest life forms consists of such bacterial colonies, these were the superorganism that gave complex life a chance by first creating the oxygen rich atmosphere, and examples of this type of bacterial superorganism still exist in Australian coastal waters today. And humans, we know perfectly well, have a nest-like architecture suited to their form. When simple superorganic forms dominated, the whole organism would tend to occupy one nest, or communal hut. The first town like dwellings, that arose due to shifts in behavioural

responses induced by the evolutionary symbiotic process reaching its culmination in the production of settled life styles based upon symbiotic relationships between the dominant human and the dependant none human species, dating back some ten thousand years, and found in Turkey, consisted of a warren like arrangement of interconnecting rooms, very reminiscent of a termite, or ant nest, I dare say. And of course the human organism's full extent was demarcated by the territorial zone surrounding their nest sites, zones which were extended massively when the new behavioural strategies evolved by way of the symbiotic process that is represented in agricultural lifestyles. Today things are no different, except simple superorganic forms have been overwhelmed by the global organism which has the evolved form of city architecture in which termite like structure, such as tower blocks, are mixed with coral reef like expanses of concreted nest-boxes strung together in immense masses to form knots of occupation embedded within the territorial zones that define the extent of the superorganism. The difficulty for the erstwhile student of science trying to apply biological science to their human subject is that the huge mass of the human being relative to any other species which we know of that has attained full blown superorganic status, does tend to obscure the ability of any observer to perceive the true form of the human organism because from an individuals point of view they, like everyone else, are highly discrete animals in their own right. We must accordingly look for appropriate ways to understand human society as a physiological entity. But before continuing our own attempt to do just that, lets just enjoy a peak at the eloquent description of our superorganic form from one who has witnessed, although he undoubtedly was not aware of its literal significance at the time, the similarity between ourselves and our true brothers and sisters in life. THE HAPPY ANT-HEAP 'The first, but enduring impression of Kerala is of multitudes: people streaming in all directions, filling every street, besieging every shop, forming instant crowds at the scene of any happening - an elephant bogged down in a ditch, two auto-rickshaws after collision, a boy on a hobbyhorse beating a drum. Privacy is unknown, nor does there appear to be any desire for it. Twenty-nine million Keralans are crammed into a 580-mile-long strip of land between the high mountains and the sea on the Indian south-west coast. This state has been described as a continuous village. Its population is packed three times more densely than the Indian average. A wonderful combination of geographical and climatic factors has spared it from the misery so often coexistent with a high level of the human presence. The soil is superbly fertile, the waters of the Arabian Sea bordering the state teem with fish, the mountains have kept out all but the most determined invaders, and two infallible monsoons renew the rivers and water the crops. Kerala experiences neither famines nor floods, and somehow or other the multitudes are fed. Apart from the sheer weight of numbers, the Keralan scene is one of antlike activity. It is the homeland of cottage industry, with people busying themselves in public on all sides with an assortment of small-scale enterprises. To the newcomer an arresting sight is that of the female members of whole families settled for mile after mile at the side of main roads to break stones:

the seven-year-olds tapping away with their toy hammers, stylish teenagers wielding four-pounders with accuracy and effect, aged and toothless grandmothers sorting out the chippings into piles according to size. The onlooker may object that stone-breaking machines could easily replace this human labour. To this the reply is, what in that case would all these people do with their spare time? (The Happy Ant Heap, Norman Lewis, Jonathan Cape, 1998, page 129-130) Happy! This is the main thread to pull form this little fluffy ball of literary ephemera. Think back to the illustration from the work of Fox and Tiger, to their remark telling us that whatever humans do, as a matter of established behaviour, they do in response to their evolved nature, even though they then contradicted this by saying the rise in population was pathological and had induced a predominance of pathological behaviours in humankind. As we can see from the above, this image of squalor, is cast as one of happy contentment in squalor. The point being that it is not population density that amounts to squalor, but the consequent pressure on basic necessities. Thus, as long as we have food and shelter we are content to form a biomass as dense as we possibly can. This is the ultimate demonstration of our human nature, and here we see that it exudes an image of happiness to those who witness it. But such happiness is rare, and this is why the author makes a point of noting it is a product of exceptional circumstances, the population density and consequent squalor is an endemic feature of human life and much about our existence is in fact not characterised by happiness, but still we go on. And we have another fine piece of illustrative writing to insert in this section to make our point. Selecting and inserting quotes from authors willy-nilly into a work seems bad form, so lets remind ourselves of the peculiar nature of the effort we are about in this work. We have noted that an archaeology of the mind, or if you prefer, an archaeology of knowledge, it is pretty much the same thing, is a legitimate way of understanding our mode of investigation of human nature. Knowledge is a cultural deposit like any other cultural deposit in that it can be unearthed and examined, related to it chronological place in the history of the society of interest, and used to give a modern interpretation of what human nature is. Thus intellectual mediums are artifacts, and as such they can be selected and displayed as such. If this work be considered to be a work of philosophy, which I reluctantly confess it must be, then we might consider it to be the world's first ever fully illustrated work of philosophy and in this block just here we have the illustrations, extracts from literary works selected for their rich use of linguistic imagery, making them perfect for the purpose of illustration, being light hearted, colourful, thought provoking in a way pertinent to the subject, as such something to just skim over and delight in, before returning to the made body of the text which demands fuller attention.
ON THE SUFFERINGS OF THE WORLD

Unless suffering is the direct and immediate object of life, our existence must entirely fail of its aim. It is absurd to look upon the enormous amount of pain that abounds everywhere in the world, and originates in needs and necessities

inseparable from life itself, as serving no purpose at all and the result of mere chance. Each separate misfortune, as it comes, seems, no doubt, to be something exceptional; but misfortune in general is the rule. I know of no greater absurdity than that propounded by most systems of philosophy in declaring evil to be negative in character. Evil is just what is positive; it makes its own existence felt. Leibnitz is particularly concerned to defend this absurdity; and he seeks to strengthen his position by using a palpable and paltry sophism.(1) It is the good which is negative; in other words, happiness and satisfaction always imply some desire fulfilled, some state of pain brought to an end. This explains the fact that we generally find pleasure to be not nearly so pleasant as we expected, and pain very much more painful. The pleasure in this world, it has been said, outweighs the pain; or at any rate, there is an even balance between the two. If the reader wishes to see shortly whether this statement is true, let him compare the respective feelings of two animals, one of which is engaged in eating the other. The best consolation in misfortune or affliction of any kind will be the thought of other people who are in a still worse plight than yourself; and this is a form of consolation open to everyone. But what an awful fate this means for mankind as a whole! We are like lambs in a field, disporting themselves under the eye of the butcher, who chooses out first one and then another for his prey. So it is that in our good days we are all unconscious of the evil Fate may have presently in store for us sickness, poverty, mutilation, loss of sight or reason. No little part of the torment of existence lies in this, that Time is continually pressing upon us, never letting us take breath, but always coming after us like a taskmaster with a whip. If at any moment Time stays his hand, it is only when we are delivered over to the misery of boredom. But misfortune has its uses; for, as our bodily frame would burst asunder if the pressure of the atmosphere were removed, so, if the lives of men were relieved of all need, hardship and adversity; if everything they took in hand were successful, they would be so swollen with arrogance that, though they might not burst, they would present the spectacle of unbridled follynay, they would go mad. And I may say, further, that a certain amount of care or pain or trouble is necessary for every man at all times. A ship without ballast is unstable and will not go straight. Certain it is that work, worry, labour and trouble, form the lot of almost all men their whole life long. But if all wishes were fulfilled as soon as they arose, how would men occupy their lives? If the world were a paradise of luxury and ease, a land flowing with milk and honey, where every Jack obtained his Jill at once and without any difficulty, men would either die of boredom or hang themselves; or there would be wars, massacres, and murders; so that in the end mankind would inflict more suffering on itself than it has now to accept at the hands of Nature. In early youth, as we contemplate our coming life, we are like children in a theatre before the curtain is raised, sitting there in high spirits and eagerly waiting for the play to begin. It is a blessing that we do not know what is really going to happen. Could we foresee it, there are times when children might seem like innocent prisoners, condemned, not to death, but to life, and as yet all unconscious of what their sentence means. Nevertheless every man

desires to reach old age; in other words, a state of life of which it may be said: "It is bad to-day, and it will be worse to-morrow; and so on till the worst of all." 1) Translators Note, cf. Théod: § 153. Leibnitz argued that evil is a negative quality i.e., the absence of good; and that its active and seemingly positive character is an incidental and not an essential part of its nature. Cold, he said, is only the absence of heat, and the active power of expansion in freezing water is an incidental and not an essential part of the nature of cold. The fact is that the power of expansion in freezing water is really an increase of repulsion amongst its molecules; and Schopenhauer is quite right in calling the whole argument a sophism. (Studies in Pessimism: A Series of Essays, Arthur Schopenhauer, translated by Thomas Bailey Saunders, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1908. Pages 11 - 13) Boy, now that is what I call philosophy where's the rope! Imagine being so inclined as to write like that. It is Marvin the paranoid android from The Hitch Hikers Guide to the Galaxy in the flesh. Apparently, if I remember rightly, he was an aristocrat who lived in a castle, so what the hell he had to be so down-the-gob about I cannot imagine, he should of been on the Happy ant-hill smashing rocks, as he says, I suppose, boredom is a nightmare. Actually, although I see this is so for most people, I would rather be bored to death than worked to death by the enforced boredom of work. I hate work unreservedly. Work is not living, work is hell seeping through to the wrong side of death. Life is not work, life is just living. Such off-the-cuff remarks are the way I am inclined to rebuff the above notions about life, misery, work, boredom and such like. He should of gone the pub more often, I would myself, but there enough days in the week. But this philosopher gives us another view of the scene painted by the last artist of human life. This emphasises the point that we do not live the way that we do because we choose to, however you cut it, we live the way we do because we live the way we do, and that is that. This week, today is 29/05/04, a prominent item in the news has been flash floods in the Caribbean neck of the woods. 1500 or so were drowned. But it turns out that where whole villages were washed away the people who lived in them were the rock bottom of the social structure, they eked out a living by cutting down the trees amongst which they lived and making charcoal to sell. Without the trees the land was turned to mud when the rain came, as I presume it was bound to do, and they were, in effect, making a living by digging their own watery graves. This is Schopenhauer's image of life made real, and there is no need for it since we know better, but we cannot help behaving like this, for complicated reasons to do with our nature, which imposes the structure upon society that we must work with, like the innocent children eagerly awaiting their future, completely oblivious of its meaning. And finally, since I have one nice and handy, we might select a further piece, from another author, who notes this oft noted likeness between the human social scene and that of the busy ant, but this time our object will be to observe how the scientific establishment regards any such comparison.

On Societies as Organisms Viewed from a suitable height, the aggregating clusters of medical scientists in the bright sunlight of the boardwalk at Atlantic City, swarmed there from everywhere for the annual meetings, have the look of assemblages of social insects. There is the same vibrating, ionic movement, interrupted by the darting back and forth of jerky individuals to touch antennae and exchange small bits of information; periodically, the mass casts out, like a trout-line, a long single file unerringly toward Childs's. If the boards were not fastened down, it would not be a surprise to see them put together a nest of sorts. It is permissible to say this sort of thing about humans. They do resemble, in their most compulsively social behavior, ants at a distance. It is, however, quite bad form in biological circles to put it the other way round, to imply that the operation of insect societies has any relation at all to human affairs. The writers of books on insect behavior generally take pains, in their prefaces, to caution that insects are like creatures from another planet, that their behavior is absolutely foreign, totally unhuman, unearthly, almost unbiological. They are more like perfectly tooled but crazy little machines, and we violate science when we try to read human meanings in their arrangements. It is hard for a bystander not to do so. Ants are so much like human beings as to be an embarrassment. They farm fungi, raise aphids as livestock, launch armies into wars, use chemical sprays to alarm and confuse enemies, capture slaves. The families of weaver ants engage in child labor, holding their larvae like shuttles to spin out the thread that sews the leaves together for their fungus gardens. They exchange information ceaselessly. They do everything but watch television. What makes us most uncomfortable is that they, and the bees and termites and social wasps, seem to live two kinds of lives: they are individuals, going about the day's business without much evidence of thought for tomorrow, and they are at the same time component parts, cellular elements, in the huge, writhing, ruminating organism of the Hill, the nest, the hive. It is because of this aspect, I think, that we most wish for them to be something foreign. We do not like the notion that there can be collective societies with the capacity to behave like organisms. If such things exist, they can have nothing to do with us. Still, there it is. A solitary ant, afield, cannot be considered to have much of anything on his mind; indeed, with only a few neurons strung together by fibers, he can't be imagined to have a mind at all, much less a thought. He is more like a ganglion on legs. Four ants together, or ten, encircling a dead moth on a path, begin to look more like an idea. They fumble and shove, gradually moving the food toward the Hill, but as though by blind chance. It is only when you watch the dense mass of thousands of ants, crowded together around the Hill, blackening the ground, that you begin to see the whole beast, and now you observe it thinking, planning, calculating. It is an intelligence, a kind of live computer, with crawling bits for its wits. At a stage in the construction, twigs of a certain size are needed, and all the members forage obsessively for twigs of just this size. Later, when outer walls are to be finished, thatched, the size must change, and as though given new orders by telephone, all the workers shift the search to the new twigs. If you disturb the arrangement of a part of the Hill, hundreds of ants will set it vibrating, shifting, until it is put right again. Distant sources of food are somehow sensed, and long lines, like tentacles, reach out over the ground, up over walls, behind boulders, to fetch it in.

Termites are even more extraordinary in the way they seem to accumulate intelligence as they gather together. Two or three termites in a chamber will begin to pick up pellets and move them from place to place, but nothing comes of it; nothing is built. As more join in, they seem to reach a critical mass, a quorum, and the thinking begins. They place pellets atop pellets, then throw up columns and beautiful, curving, symmetrical arches, and the crystalline architecture of vaulted chambers is created. It is not known how they communicate with each other, how the chains of termites building one column know when to turn toward the crew on the adjacent column, or how, when the time comes, they manage the flawless joining of the arches. The stimuli that set them off at the outset, building collectively instead of shifting things about, may be pheromones released when they reach committee size. They react as if alarmed. They become agitated, excited, and then they begin working, like artists. Bees live lives of organisms, tissues, cells, organelles, all at the same time. The single bee, out of the hive retrieving sugar (instructed by the dancer: "southsoutheast for seven hundred meters, clover-mind you make corrections for the sundrift") is still as much a part of the hive as if attached by a filament. Building the hive, the workers have the look of embryonic cells organizing a developing tissue; from a distance they are like the viruses inside a cell, running off row after row of symmetrical polygons as though laying down crystals. When the time for swarming comes, and the old queen prepares to leave with her part of the population, it is as though the hive were involved in mitosis. There is an agitated moving of bees back and forth, like granules in cell sap. They distribute themselves in almost precisely equal parts, half to the departing queen, half to the new one. Thus, like an egg, the great, hairy, black and golden creature splits in two, each with an equal share of the family genome. The phenomenon of separate animals joining up to form an organism is not unique in insects. Slime-mold cells do it all the time, of course, in each life cycle. At first they are single amebocytes swimming around, eating bacteria, aloof from each other, untouching, voting straight Republican. Then, a bell sounds, and acrasin is released by special cells toward which the others converge in stellate ranks, touch, fuse together, and construct the slug, solid as a trout. A splendid stalk is raised, with a fruiting body on top, and out of this comes the next generation of amebocytes, ready to swim across the same moist ground, solitary and ambitious. Herring and other fish in schools are at times so closely integrated, their actions so coordinated, that they seem to be functionally a great multi-fish organism. Flocking birds, especially the seabirds nesting on the slopes of offshore islands in Newfoundland, are similarly attached, connected, synchronized. Although we are by all odds the most social of all social animalsmore interdependent, more attached to each other, more inseparable in our behavior than bees do not often feel our conjoined intelligence. Perhaps, however, we are we linked in circuits for the storage, processing, and retrieval of information, since this appears to be the most basic and universal of all human enterprises. It may be our biological function to build a certain kind of Hill. We have access to all the information of the biosphere, arriving as elementary units in the stream of solar photons. When we have learned how these are rearranged against randomness, to make, say, springtails, quantum mechanics, and the late quartets, we may have a clearer notion how to proceed. The circuitry seems to be there, even if the current is not always on. The system of communications used in science should provide a neat, workable model for studying mechanisms of information-building in human society.

Ziman, in a recent Nature essay, points out, "the invention of a mechanism for the systematic publication of fragments of scientific work may well have been the key event in the history of modern science.". He continues: A regular journal carries from one research worker to another the various . . . observations which are of common interest. . . . A typical scientific paper has never pretended to be more than another little piece in a larger jigsaw significant in not itself but as an element in a grander scheme. This technique, of soliciting many modest contributions to the store of human knowledge, has been the secret of Western science since the seventeenth century, for it achieves a corporate, collective power that is far greater than any one individual can exert [italics mine]. With some alternation of terms, some toning down, the passage could describe the building of a termite nest. It is fascinating that the word "explore" does not apply to the searching aspect of the activity, but has its origins in the sounds we make while engaged in it. We like to think of exploring in science as a lonely, meditative business, and so it is in the first stages, but always, sooner or later, before the enterprise reaches completion, as we explore, we call to each other, communicate, publish, send letters to the editor, present papers, cry out on finding. (Page 11 - 15) (The Lives of a Cell: Notes of a Biology Watcher, Lewis Thomas, published by Allen Lane 1980.) And so there we have it in a nutshell, but on we go, trying to do something to allow us to break free from these priestly constraints. We need to coin a new phrase for the scientific study of corporate behaviour, Hillism. The result of reasoning, as many have over the centuries, and indeed millennia, that various social structures mimic specialised body parts is to bring this whole idea of corporate being occurring at the social level together by recognising that human society appears in the physical form of an exoskeleton, a highly elaborate structural exoskeleton within which the living cells exist differentiated functionally according to their location within the organism's body. Ouspensky fails completely to even begin to approach this kind of logical culmination to his supposedly organic reasoning. He offers no formulation of the human superorganism as a living organism comparative in real terms to a familiar organic structure such as science deals with ordinarily. Consequently he uses the intuitively realizable implications of the idea to inspire an elaboration upon the age old mythology of Judaism to which his life is devoted via the medium of esoteric knowledge. He grasps the implications of certain collective behaviours, such as war, without having a clue how to account for them. But as he does this, maddeningly, he raises exactly the issues that attract my attention and in exactly the right context. War is, in the context of the complex superorganism the most natural and healthy activity, it is the personification of growth. As long as a society can find victims to attack by engaging in war it is in good fettle, and this is why war is the hallmark of Jewish society, by which I means more explicitly the Christian society whose history I am more familiar with, but of course now the Jews have their own territory to play with as well as manipulating 'ours' we see the only occupation that really fills them with joy is the slaughter of defenceless civilians. And Islam is the same. I do mean to be critical in a political sense, I cannot help it, I

am an individual, but in truth this behaviour is simply the inevitable product of human Hillistic behaviour, the human organism has to expand its territory, that is what it does, and there can be only one. And this process of expansion takes exactly the form that Ouspensky notes, one of an amorphous expansion involving the eradication and incorporation of organisms by one another according to the outcome of their meetings. Outcomes that are determined by the physiological structure of the competing organisms. Physiology which is empowered structurally by dint of the intensity of information that is at the disposal of the Queen body directing its growth. Which is just another way of saying that knowledge is power. 5) The relationship between individual and corporate form. This subject is the source of so much intellectual gush and argument, Do we need more!! It cannot be avoided. Ouspensky offers us a rare, if not completely unique, opportunity to consider the question of individuality within the context of an argument that extols the reality of Super Being, and so we must note his comments on this subject. We have already seen that the process of evolving a superorganic being composed of individually defined organism requires an extension of the process of increasing structural complexity by means of generating foci of interdependent differentiation amongst the individual units of which the superorganism is to be formed. The realisation of this process of interdependent differentiation demands that the units themselves have a severely limited sense of self. For a sense of self to be limited it must impose a sense that although an individual cannot see further than the end of their nose they feel certain that they see everything there is to see. Human consciousness, as experienced by individuals must be severely limited if a true superorganic form is to be a real outcome of human nature. Thus the idea of the individual is the most essential feature of the human superorganism within which there is no such thing as a human individual. Maddening to think about isn't it. How is this balance to be struck between a sense of self consciousness that feels all embracing, and the reality of a consciousness that it virtually nonexistent? The answer to this question involves the nature of linguistic physiology and the mode of information it relays, which is so perfectly evolved that a linguistic image replaces all other images derived from sensory information in the final summation that forms the conscious sense of self and existence. Language is a looking glass, and it evolved to be so, precisely in order to deliver this full blown sense of consciousness that is utterly artificial in its result, making it the exact opposite of self consciousness. This linguistic hardware is all very well, but the linguistic images themselves are not self generating, just as legs for locomotion are all very well but journeys do not just happen because legs exist, the legs have to do the walking that makes the journeys legs are capable of real. Likewise with mirrors of self deception that linguistic physiology evolved to make possible, the linguistic images still have to be fabricated and beamed out into the world where they can function as images of self awareness by stimulating the sensory organs of information reception, the brains of individuals. It follows in a manner logically consistent with the physiology of a superorganism that if the evolution of a highly defined organ of authority ensures the evolution of highly defined individuals then the evolution of a strong sense of self, the crucial attribute of consciousness that makes a socially functional individual possible, is likely to be a feature of humans. Making a strong sense of self a feature of an argument in which the major challenge to conventional wisdom is that there is no

such thing as self seems, at first, to be contradictory, to say the least. This apparent contradiction has all the appearance of being self serving, fulfilling a desire to have ones cake and eat it, in exactly the manner of all the usual self serving mythologists who make a habit of asserting whatever it pleases them to assert by means of an artful distortion of meaning in their use of familiar words. But we are talking here of a contradiction born of an attribute of misconception fabricated by the knowledge perverts who gave us our sacred knowledge in the first place. The priest produces the image of reality that linguistic physiology intended should be produced in order that a priesthood could exist. Therefore the contradiction was created by evolution, and the apparent contradiction which appears when science notes the real situation is only apparent, and results from the fact that nature has produced an animal that believes it is self conscious when it is not because its self consciousness is an illusion. Thus science, as rendered here, is not saying that there is a superorganism and individuals, it is saying there is a superorganism composed of units which it unites into itself by means of a corporate image that each unit experiences, due to their corporate nature in the form of their linguistic physiology, as a self image. We are dealing with a contradiction born of a misconception that amounts to a highly circumscribed sense of awareness that enables an individual to be highly self conscious, with an intimate and rich sense of self, but otherwise, is completely blind. And even this self awareness is an illusion. The corporate mind overcomes this barrier of self centred awareness that focuses the individual upon themselves and their own interests by acting as the source of the illusion which it radiates in the form of culture and thus implants into the brain of each individual to which it has access. The primary medium of corporate self consciousness is religion, superimposed on the prior main medium of corporate identity which was racial physiology. And obviously the primary requirement for this facility of linguistic physiology, the production of an image of self consciousness that is corporate in origin, is the evolution of a core organ of authority from which the artificial image of identity can be derived. So linguistic physiology is the hardware of consciousness, as legs are the hardware of locomotion. Hardware of consciousness produces images, as hardware of locomotion produces journey which in a sense can be said to map a terrain just as linguistic images do. But both the products of these physiological attributes have an extended purpose and overtime they make their mark on the environment so that journeys result in trails which dictate the route the legs will take, and linguistic images result in the coalescence of centres of culture where cultural forms are preserved and which dictate the images that people will experience as their consciousness of reality. Evolutionary physiology is externalised in this way. And the evolution of an elite caste organ is the consequence of linguistic physiology just much as track ways are a result of locomotive physiology. Physiology lays down structure in the human world in a most elaborate fashion and this is because humans are a superorganism and their physiology is extended in so elaborate a fashion that it constitutes exoskeleton and the living units become entirely dependant upon the extended physiology they, due to their received artificial images of reality, believe they are responsible for creating! Ouspensky's interpretation of the three relevant, according to him, Biblical myths, is delightful, and in terms of the creation of an organ of authority, quite convincing. His conclusion that the three myths are about human evolution is important in terms of teasing out the connective threads between his mythological

reasoning and the science he is trying to embrace by extending the esoteric mode of understanding to cover the new dominant idea of his day, which was evolution. The reality of mythology's central position in human affairs means that myths must deliver true power. Consequently, within the dominant cultural heritage of our time, that of Jewish culture, we should find the functional component of myth that emulates reality. These functional information components will be encoded in such a way that they enable the organism whose biomass is imbued with the resulting artificial image of reality, a linguistic image which constitutes the organism's corporate identity, an identity that is infused intimately into each individual in the form of their self consciousness, to comply with the dictates of human nature. And this conformity between reality and myth is what Ouspensky brings out of the three Biblical myths for us by way of his matter of fact interpretation of their meaning. He indicates how these myths each deliver a message to those who know how to interpret it of a deep understanding of the mechanisms operating in relation to the existence of the inner circle which is our organ of authority, or super-organ, the brain which delivers identity, motivation, and direct action to the biomass within which it exists. These myths instruct the 'chosen', the priests, how to retain their status as the core of an ascendant superorganic being, and thus to be its identity and the focus of the purpose that the same identity necessarily imparts to the biomass implanted with it. The Jews as a cultural body evolved about this priesthood that arose from within the melting pot of Mesopotamian civilizations, to form a superorganic being that became so defined as to become a hierarchical structure, and, as a result of the continuing expansion of the superorganic being that Judaism gave rise to. I see no other way of understanding the history of Western civilisation than to see the Jews as being the motive force behind the rise of Greek and Roman culture since this is what eventually delivered the world to the Christian and Moslem dominion of today. Precisely how this relationship was borne out is not clear to me since I am not a scholar of the ancient world but we do have to think of Judaism as some sort of social being which is special and which supports at its core some kind of priesthood that is just as operative in the world today as ever it was in Ancient Greece two and a half thousand years ago. But trying to be precise about this question is very tricky, it is of never ending interest to me and I could discuss the matter, but it is a detail of the argument and not central to the idea of Super Being, although in political terms, it is of the greatest importance for our world today since the ruling force in society still relies upon the hidden aspect of this knowledge and this is precisely why science has been so perverted to prevent us from knowing our own true nature as we might if we were free of theocratic authority. 6) The self-evolving being. This is perhaps Ouspensky's most marvellous flight of fancy. Once again, at the heart of this particular expression, we find the true thread of reasoning that interprets human society in a manner appropriate to the central idea of human society as a living organism. The unique quality of humans, what Ouspensky calls the characteristic of being self-evolving, is an attribute of life forms toward which Nature is driven, no matter what base structure She has to work with. The idea that humans are unique, within the context of scientific reasoning, is so insane as to be downright offensive to any scientist. That said, it is true that all scientists recognise the absolute uniqueness of human beings. This sounds like a contradiction, but it is only a linguistic contradiction, the reality is so. The best

analogy I can offer to explain how these contradictory conditions can exist at one and the same time is to offer you the idea of a corrupt police force. A police officer prevents crime, therefore it is impossible for a police officer to commit crime. But we all know all police officers are 'flexible', and some are downright criminal, and some police forces are rooted in crime. The West's scientific establishment was set up by the theocracy, and it is of the order of an institution like a police force based on crime, set up to serve the needs of an autocratic dictator. All scientists are by definition the absolute enemies of science, where they are required to be, which is in this one crucial area concerning human nature, and the requirement to guarantee that the duality of theistic mythology will always dictate the development of science in the field of human self knowledge. This is so obvious that the scientist-priests even write books which present arguments that are folded in upon their own distortions, such as Another Unique Species: Patterns in Human Evolutionary Ecology, Robert Foley, first published 1987. This book opens with a chapter entitled The Problem of Human Uniqueness. We can compare this title, in our imagination, with a religious treatise that a theist may well see fit to pen entitled The Problem of Christ's Resurrection from Death. The theist sets up the fiction, absurdity supreme, and then writes books to try and figure out how these 'self evident facts', that are manifestly stupid, can be accounted for. It is utter obscenity. But, this is stupidity with a purpose, like the obscenity of setting up a police force to combat crime which is itself the source of all crime. Following the terrible Moslem attack on Madrid a couple of months ago, the terrorists responsible were found to be of Moroccan extraction, at least in part, and this brought the Moroccan trade in cannabis under scrutiny as a source of revenue funding the terrorist. Visiting a hill farmer to see how the trade was conducted it turned out that although it was illegal to grow marijuana, the Chief of Police in the local district sent his officers round annually to the farms to collect the tithe from the hashish crop. This is an endemically corrupt police force, it is in effect an institution of state, and it is a perfectly common model, one found in less sophisticated societies than our own where wealth is less plentiful than we are use to, and a more traditional hierarchical authority is the cultural norm. But in our fabulous society, the ancient mythology reigns supreme in its own way. Just as, when all is said and done, Ancient Greek society can be seen to of been an absolute theocracy, despite its great intellectual achievements as a culture, in that when thinkers challenged the idea that the earth was at the centre of the universe, the geocentric model, by proposing that the earth travelled about the sun, the heliocentric model, these intellectuals were threatened with death, ousted from their societies for the threat the posed to the theocratic edifice of knowledge which was the foundation of authority, and their works have not come down to us so we do not know how good, or how bad, their arguments were. Today the system is not so blunt, control is managed by a swamping effect, and mighty effective it is. But we have, at the core of the idea of human uniqueness a homocentric world view, upon which theocracy depends for its authority. The alternative, that I call a biocentric world view, in which humans are recognised to be a part of nature, and perfectly in accord with that status, so that no alternative account is required for the location of humanity in the biosphere of life than that which we would seek to apply to any other organism on earth. And so, how does Ouspensky deal with this difficulty? Well, the beauty of his thinking is that he effectively takes his logic to the most superb conclusion, he recognises, in effect, that humans have a nature in common with other species, such as the ant. I find this so delightful I cannot help but smile at this. But then, of all

things, how does the man escape from the rigour of his own logic? It beggars belief. He uses the logic of the mystical ideas he has been developing for us that account for the evolution of human society by way of wisdom focused in an inner circle which is sifted into a concentration of wisdom at a focal point by way of a series of inevitable calamities, a bit like that experienced in the Caribbean this week, as noted above, no doubt, brought on by the nastiness of the inner circle which allows people to live in squalor without doing anything about it. The result is he comes up with the most amazing idea. It seems that any though is permissible to these damned priests, any though but that which is true. By saying that ants are, in common with humans, a species that has the attribute of being 'self-evolving', he is saying that human nature and ant nature are the same. Both humans and ants are superorganic beings with a corporate nature. He very nicely recognises that this quality must apply to different body plans that are differentiated at a fundamental level, and this is excellent, it is a most important point to grasp from a scientific point of view for this is what loads the mammalian physiology with the potential to unfold into a superorganic form and this therefore establishes the quality we would call purpose in nature that all theists, and their scientist kind, tell us does not exist in nature; it is a unique attribute of humans. Ouspensky however, despite all this wonderful reasoning on the subject in hand, then comes up with the most extraordinary way of preserving the attribute of being self-evolving as unique to humans by saying that these species which, by virtue of their social systems reveal their common nature with humans, must of been earlier experiments in the same vein as that being conducted upon human kind today, and therefore logic, esoteric logic that is, tells us they too must of had rounds of calamity causing a centrifugal effect sifting knowledge into an inner circle of authority but that in the end they had one fall too far and descended into the living hell of being absolute automatons that we see ants are today. It is quite remarkable, but I guess in the broad scheme of the gush these people come out with it is pretty much par for the course, it is only exceptional because of the subject that is being dealt with on this occasion. Nice, I love it. So humans get to remain unique despite their common nature with other species. The scientists would approve, and with the likes of Foley and Ouspensky on the team it is little wonder that the obscenity of Judaism has been able to survive for so long, and continue to be in the ascendant at all times. Here then, we see Ouspensky and modern science united as one, the esoteric mythologist and the scientist have one mind. And yet you should of seen how reviled I was when I encroached upon a BBC maintained website purporting to be for scientists and offered my superorganic interpretations of questions regarding race and such like. Nasty, nasty. When I discovered this piece by Ouspensky recently, in a book I ad bought a few years ago, I felt I knew why the scientists should be so outraged by someone expressing the idea of human superorganic form, if people like Ouspensky had given it such a bad name, but upon closer examination we see the story is far from being so straightforward and it just makes me wonder who the hell these dammed scientists are, and just what they really know. When you think of the avowed work of the secret societies such as the Freemasons who have no shame about combining all ideas in their effort to aid in the theistic control of society it is perfectly possible that people in these establishments know the truth as I have discovered it, and are always on guard against it. But that is another story, we can only hope to find the means to circumvent the control of these knowledge perverts and thus to help bring them to their end.

Both Ouspensky and the modern scientist agree on the central attribute of human nature, humans are self-evolving in their eyes. Man makes himself, so the intellectuals from all walks of life never tire of telling us. The difference between them is that whereas the scientist displays all the idiocy of the priest in asserting this attribute to be a unique feature of the human species, at least Ouspensky's logic in this one respect, as insane as his reasoning is that follows from its application, is far superior to that of the modern priest of human nature who exists in the guise of the anthropologist, sociologist, historian, evolutionary scientist and so on. For Ouspensky sees the existence of a central idea and recognises it must be inclusive of all life, and as such he is actuated by the logic of the biocentric model of life, rather than the homocentric model, even though, as we know, he is soon pulled back into the force field of false, self centred reasoning, that makes the inner circle appear as an organ within the biomass of society. But while he allows himself to be influenced by the true scientific logic he allows the idea of inclusivity to flow unimpeded by arrogant assumptions about what existence is, and what humanity is. The only trouble is that he then channels the flow of scientific logic in-between the walls of his esoteric channel and so toward the depths of the lake of stupidity built up behind the damn built by modern science on the foundations of Darwin's work on evolution which focused out attention on our form, and which disregarded our nature. Ouspensky did not simply refuse to address the idea of human organic being, but it is only because he wanted to impose a mystical interpretation on the dominant idea of evolution that he let his imagination go in this direction, and of course the scientists are not trying to assert a mythological idea of existence, they are trying to accommodate one by allowing science and religion to exist side by side. It is fascinating to consider how Ouspensky applied himself to this idea of human society as an organism. The detail I have mentioned that is so well considered. He recognises that the thrust of any broad sweep of Nature toward the perfection of a being in the social domain must be constrained by physiological limits. Consequently he reasons that the path leading to humans is in the guise of mammalian physiology, and that outside this specific physiological constraint other true paths to the same end must be considered possible. I think this is a most remarkable conclusion to draw for a man who is approaching the matter as he is, as a mythologist, and this is so because he is so right in drawing this conclusion. Why has this simple idea never occurred to any scientist, of any kind? Plenty of scientist have headed in this direction, the American anthropologist Leslie A. White, whose last work The Concept of Cultural Systems: A Key to Understanding Tribes and Nations, Columbia University Press, 1975, was published posthumously in the year he died, talked the talk, but he never even began to walk the walk toward this correct interpretation that Ouspensky makes here. Ouspensky is the only writer I have ever found that goes the whole hog and asserts human society is a living being, and Ouspensky is an out and out nutter that I would not want to be seen dead with. Isn't life strange ........ Although Ouspensky's consideration of this idea is oddly expressed, like the oddness of the myth of Noah's Ark as a way of accounting for the evolution of superorganic super-organ of authority, the inner circle, is essentially correct in terms of illuminating the broad sweep of the process he is considering here. His expression tallies so well with my purely scientifically inspired interpretation of what we know about ourselves at the turn of the twenty-first century that we cannot help but be impressed by Ouspensky's account and the effort he made to create it. I guess that like the path toward true love, the route toward true knowledge can be a long, and sometimes, a very winding road.

The potted social history of the corporate insects, the bees and the ants, provided by Ouspensky is remarkable, what a fella! The part of this social history delights me most of all where I find my insect counterpart engaged in precisely the same activity, of raising the alarm, as I am engaged in now. But, likewise, no doubt, to no avail. I see, occurring all around me, a major transformation of an English society into the base homogeneity of a global culture, and I weep inside. A small example can be plucked from this weeks media flow, today is 20-5-04, and a couple of night ago on the regional news there was a piece about deckchairs in Blackpool. A local councillor, a women, of course. Women have no sense of quality, their physiology, it seems to me, causes women to always want renewal. That sounds sexist, but hell, if I had to have a human grow inside me, and to give birth, I would want to have some bloody good reason to go through the process of such biological renewal, and I think the idea of a better future, expressed in material renewal is buried deep in the female psyche, we see all the time women despising the rich quality of age, such as we find on an old piece of brass, and preferring the bright shine of a polished piece of metal that makes all look nice and new. I have a battered old copper teapot, probably from some Hindu region of the Asian subcontinent, I grasped from a table where a crowd was fishing for bargains and I paid £5, it has never been cleaned and it age and genuineness reeks delightfully. One whisk of polish and all that would be gone, but because it was dirty and looked just like the later twentieth century imports in style no one had the least interest in it. Their is no depth to the appreciation of old things, no sense of the culture that such things contain within then by means of their preservation of style. This is typical of the female psyche and because we live in a world where men must please women in order to get the only thing that matters to them in life, the love of a women, then powerful men make the eradication of culture and its replacement with polish the be all and all of their art. All of which, conforms perfectly to the requirement of the ever growing superorganism which wants old to be decayed and replaced by new, like a jungle recycling itself. But the deckchairs, I suppose I had better tell you about the deckchairs, I just know you're dying to know about them. This lady councillor was calling for the deckchairs to be removed from the sea front. She wanted a continental format to be adopted. "What is wrong with the continental style, they have it everywhere in the world, why should we not have it in Blackpool?" she said. Quite, I rest my case, she answers her own question even as she asks it. Yesterday, today is, now, 01/06/04, the government announced a programme of measures to deal with the possible threat from Nile disease. In America last year some two hundred and eighty people were killed by this, hitherto, African disease. More people, travelling more quickly, about the globe meant these viruses could make the leap into as yet uncharted territories. This is the global superorganism for real. But this homogenisation that we try to stop is no different in kind than the homogenisation that we try to encourage, in terms of homogenising culture. There is nothing we can do to stop genetic viruses from existing and there is nothing we can do to stop linguistic-genes existing, such as the linguistic gene called 'continental style'. It would be nice to be able to stop all these diseases from invading out world, but we cannot, we have to accept that the priests, the councillors, have a biological role to play in the organism and what they do always meets with approval. She is right that the young have no sentimentality about crappy old furniture, they do have a craving to have whatever anyone else has that is new. All of this is part of the process of organic

growth, growth involves decay, recycling. If human society is an organism, and it is, then we should be able to follow the patterns of material recycling and growth in the record of social transformation, what we call, that is what the priests call, history. Society operates systematically, that is to say according to systems which generate their own dominance by virtue of a number of naturally occurring dynamics, such as we see in the case of the continental style called for by this councillor who recognises such moves are the way the money is going. Money is the blood in the system, it carries the energy toward the formation of structure. The continental style is a way of doing, things, of manufacturing in modern materials, and of presenting social structure in modern styles. Once a system is moving it will tend to drain the blood from remnants of old structure, such as deckchairs, toward the new glass and plastic of modern industrial design. The consequence is that to stand up as an advocate of the past in any determined manner is to much like the stand of Cnut, or seating of Cnut, before the incoming tide. In effect taking this kind of stance in the face of material culture is futile, all that is likely to happen is that, in time, the parts you wish to preserve will decay. The reason is that as trends develop they attract all sorts of social transformations to be drawn toward their general direction so that laws are altered to accommodate changes and eventually the whole fabric of the exoskeleton is shifted into a new phase of material expression. Today they announced that the second country in Europe, Norway, following Ireland's example, had imposed a nationwide ban on smoking in bars and restaurants. They think this will now ricochet round all Europe, as an unstoppable virus transforming the social structure overnight. These are purely organic phenomenon, no different to the spread of Nile virus, we can challenge these things, but we cannot stop them. We might protest that the comparison is ludicrous because there are people fighting to stop smoking, this has not just come about because of some mechanistic relationship between the human physiology and some alternative parasitic species. But the point is that human society is an organism and everything that occurs is society is organic in nature and as such mechanistic. Why should it be possible for a tiny elite to ban a massive minority from doing what they want to do? How come the only smokers one ever sees in the media are all for the ban on smoking in public, it is as if burglars, if ever they were interviewed were all to say that though the idea of more prisons to keep them off the streets were a brilliant idea! If all these smokers want to stop smoking why don't they damn well stop? As I say, society works systematically and these trends has a dynamic to them that is certainly well beyond the control of any individual or collection of individuals. Ouspensky's remarks on the on the fall of social insects into a state of uniform automaton suggests there may be a mechanism for delivering the evolutionary process toward this mechanistic climax that may one day turn humans into the monstrous Borg of the Stark Trek stories fame. But to someone like me we seem to be already there. Religion, and religious belief, is the personification of an intellect reduced to the status of an automaton's brain. Religion even has the principle of mindless obedience to its dictates as the supreme expression of the individuals intellect, that is the principle of unquestioning belief in religious authority which is at the core of all religions. And when stressful times are upon us, in the most oppressive religions of this automaton kind, such as the Jewish slave identity we call Islam, we find then the most perfect expression of this automata of the ant-hill, the suicide bomber.

As a general point on this strange piece of work by a mythologist, we might just pause to wonder why he should of been inspired to engage so thoroughly in a consideration of this subject of superorganic being. It delights me to of found such an account, an account I found quite by accident in a volume already on my bookshelf, when prompted to look at after seeing Ouspensky mentioned in an encyclopaedia of secret knowledge I had just bought along with a pile of other books at sale in my local library. The New Model of the Universe I has acquired several years ago as a curiosity, but from where I just do not know, quite possibly my local Oxfam charity shop. But why did Ouspensky write this, when, however you cut it, what he ends up by concluding is stark raving mad? I am only driven to ask this question because I already have an answer in mind. As we have seen he manages to tease out a lot of ideas which I have also found to be valid by following a strictly logical line of reasoning where my only guide has been that of scientific understanding. So he has been extending the reach of secret knowledge, making science accord with the message about the inner circle. And in our own time, with the rise of the Biblical account of evolution called Creationism which makes the science of evolution accord with the Bible we see that this practice is not so much surprising, as an inevitable outcome of the advance of knowledge of reality which overlaps with the foundations of social knowledge that creates power by dispersing an identity upon which the power of an inner circle relies, as is the case with the Biblical knowledge which enslaves the Christians to the Jews. As a student of esoteric arts Ouspensky will of been familiar with the central place occupied by social insects in the thoughts of esoteric thinkers down the ages. The view Ouspensky gives us here of the social milieu of the ant and the bee is only a version of an age old conception of these nonhuman communities as counterparts of human society, updated for the requirements of the Darwinian age. From the point of view of the scientist exposed to such transfigurations of their hard won ideas, the product is grotesque, and it seems worthless. But there are two points to bear in mind here. First, the work of the scientist is itself a grotesque piece of theistic propaganda, all more vile I would suggest for the fact that it is expunged of all appearance of theistic reasoning while nonetheless being nothing but theistic reasoning. Thus at least esoteric knowledge might be exactly what it claims to be, an account of existence which offers insight to the willing pupil, whereas science is a total lie, follow it with sincerity in your heart and all you will find is emptiness. But, secondly, and this is what is so amazing, the result in both cases, in that of the Darwinist and the Creationist, is to provide a perverted conception of reality which totally satisfies those who come the respective portals of wisdom in search of understanding. And this is exactly what these knowledge forms are meant to do, except in the case of the mythologist the objective of their efforts are circumscribed in one direction, toward social power, and in the case of the scientist their efforts are directed toward social power too, but, as we have just noted, by an excruciating clever deception. It is only by working out for yourself the real outcome of scientific endeavour in this department that you can look upon the work of Ouspensky and understand it, and indeed see how very clever it was. He must of made a considerable effort to think about this subject and he was no doubt guided in his reasoning by his already developed understanding of the way in which a superorganic human society must function because of his knowledge of secret lore on this subject. But what scientist would think to look at such a piece as I have quoted here in order to help them learn what science should really be saying on this subject? None, because in accordance

with the dictates of the theocracy that founded the remit of the scientific establishment each element of the intellectual arts must be kept separate and the scientist must only work with the material world which necessarily forces them only to consider the genetic foundation of biological evolution and precludes the possibility of language acting as an extension of the genetic information package into the social world in a strictly deterministic fashion. But this determinism is what is revealed by the obtuse manner in which Ouspensky gets to the right place by an utterly wrong method. The professors of esoteric knowledge were always driven to find hidden messages, hieroglyphs, as Ouspensky says, encoding the rules of social power in the world about them. These hieroglyphs only need to serve as vehicles for their secret knowledge. And they were better suited to this purpose than the priest could possibly know because, as science can now reveal, all these social agglomerations, including bacteria and marine molluscs, and others no doubt, do share a common nature with humans. White ants, I should make plain, are termites, not ants at all. The fact is that as evocative of human society as Maeterlinck's description of life in a termitary is, he is being unremittingly anthropomorphic. This is not the best way to present a scientific parallel for human society and termite society, it has a similar result to that Ouspensky's ideas have, that of bringing the truth into disrepute by contaminating it with precisely those elements of unrefined human reasoning that science exists to expunge from its own attempts to comprehend reality. As far as I am concerned humans, for the most part, do live out their lives exactly as Maeterlinck says termites do, where the misery and sacrifice of the many is the overall picture, it being for the sake of, in the case of the termites Maeterlinck says none, but in the case of humans we can say, to go with Spencer, misery and sacrifice is for the sake of the few. But the people I know who lead such appalling lives full of misery and sacrifice, getting pleasure out of such drivel as TV soaps and mass spectacle games like football, where they take part by being anonymous spectators, are utterly oblivious to the meaninglessness of their activities. And when I confront those of them who are intelligent and educated with this analysis of their lives they simply fail to see the point, and they say that they themselves enjoy their occupations. Quite! Of course you do! But why? Why do you enjoy such mindless participation in life, by way of total inactivity on your own part, and, more to the point, why do so many find fulfilment this collective mindlessness, which, furthermore, tends invariably to take place about an activity which is itself a total fabrication? By total fabrication I mean we might see the sense in a community being enthralled and involved in the young men bringing home the heads of the local tribe, that is pretty real. But football, which is noted to be a tribal activity in its nature, is a parody, at best of this kind of activity, so that the real force of internecine conflict over territory is extracted and used to give expression to people whose lives could not be more removed from any necessity to be occupied with such affairs. And so, why is this so? Why should the impulse to be tribal in our behaviour linger after all necessity for this behaviour has long since vanished? Do we go around breaking up rocks just for the hell of it even though we no longer farm the land? No, we do go to the gym to work out because our physique benefits from physical exertion, and this is a clue to the reason why we engage in tribal activities, because our psyche, like our physique, evolved to perform certain tasks and this has left it mark on us, when we engage in mindless social activates that have their sole strength in being mass communal activities we are exercising out corporate instinct which is the expression and fulfilment of our corporate nature.

And the point is then that of course we enjoy mindless, meaningless activity just so long as it is communal, because being communal is its meaning. And so, if we extract the ludicrous, judgmental observations of Maeterlinck from the evaluation of termite lives we may say that in so far are we may equate our inherent pleasure in communal tasks we engage in, so we may say the termite is fulfilled by its obedience to the demands of its communal programme, and of course when the queen is killed, as Maeterlinck describes in his book, the termitary dies, it no longer has any will to live. And in human communities exterminated by slaves programmed by Judaic identity implants we know that with the loss of their cultural identity many of them lost the will to live. Only when a society is already delineated into a complex structure so that there is an elite and an attached biomass is it possible simply to exterminate the priesthood and supplant the identity of the priests, as the Spanish Jews did in South America, with a new slave implant thus allowing the indigenous population to survive in a new guise, under a new master. We recently passed the centennial date for the showing of the first motion pictures, I think that was the occasion, and a television commentator noted that when movies first appeared a French critic noted the lack of involvement on the part of the audience, effectively saying that the coming of the movies represented the coming of the Zombie. But not, this commentator went on, we live in a world where all we do is live via a 'screen' of one sort or another, proving how wrong this early critic was, as no one today would even think to make the same observation. Well, I often make the observation that television is the Zombification of the person, and this example of social change in the wake of technological development, that is evolution in the form of the exoskeleton, nicely illustrates how we sink imperceptibly ever more into uniformity, conformity, and orientation toward one centralised source of information while still preserving our own sense of self intact, the illusion of self, I should say. The whole social system - think deck chairs - has evolved to see that this happens, and our individual psychology evolved to be receptive to this process so that we are only happy to the extent to which we are free to conform. We already are those white ants, we just do not know it yet, anymore than the termites do. 7) It must be conceded that, as discussed in point ? , earlier, there does actually have to be a point toward which evolution is headed for the concept of progress to be real, and simply an effect of partiality. Ouspensky has already there is latent potential, only he has no idea what this potential is in scientific terms. But we know it is the attainment of 'self-evolving' status, as Ouspensky would have it, the attainment of superorganic being, as I would have it. The reason this is so is perfectly straightforward, a new body plan comes into being on the planet in response to the broadest possible environmental conditions, such as the attainment of a mammalian form characterised by warm blooded physiology. This contrasts sharply with the cold blooded form that has hitherto been the dominant, and as such as expanded into all niches of the earth. To the new body plan the ecosystems of the earth appear vacant, and it proceeds to elaborate its expression to fill this void. As a consequence the air receives its mammalian form, the sea its own kind, and in the social domain which comes into being by virtue of the physiology's own existence, a form of itself evolves to give full expression of its own physiological potential. This folding in upon the self of a physiological form leads to the evolution of Super Beings. With the evolution of the Jewish identity and its associated culture, we have the continuation of the evolutionary unfolding, and we see the same realisation of the

perfect corporate social form in the insects that we have been discussing, only, as noted, more perfect, because more, apparently, automated. Ouspensky does not so much see beyond facts, as right through them, truth is certainly no obstacle to the understanding and exposition of the priest. And we may note, although again I have broached this topic, when Ouspensky says the mind is an instrument through which reality is perceived, this naturally raises the question of what the mind is. The mind in this sense is literally language. The mind is not a substantial entity, material in form, it is an informational entity, energetic in form. Forms which are energetic have the capacity to invoke response, this is the nature of information, action is a form of response as implied in one of Newton's laws of motion which make it plain that to any action there is always an opposite and equal reaction. But living forms constitute complex information handling systems and in humans linguistic physiology is such a system and the mind is its product so that linguistic information acts as the medium of motivation in this physiological system where it exists to invoke, or to mediate, action. Information, in this case in the form of language, is therefore energy, or the manifestation of energy. But, obviously, this capacity for expressing energy is only operative when the appropriate physical systems are engaged. In the same way a cars fuel tank may be full but unless the ignition has been engaged and all things are in order the fuel will not deliver motive power to the system and cause a reaction. Thus I may of written the greatest work the world has ever known, but until the world has read it, it does not know that it has been written. Damn! As so much of our consciousness is made possible via the medium of language, so this medium can act as a blind, or distortion. The implication is that we need to keep in our consciousness the presence of the medium of language through which we are enabled to see so much. We need to be aware of the actual language we use to communicate, and this is extremely hard to accomplish for we tend to think that words mean what they mean, and if they do not then what use are they. But languages are complex and they are created via general perspectives that act as interpreters of reality, and this is exactly what we have been seeing as we have seen that there is not such thing as an individual, there are single persons, with their own unique identities, but while the word 'individual' purports to say this and nothing more, it says much more, it says that this individuality is not just something, but everything. And thus it is this point of view which acts as an interpreter of reality and thus imparts meaning to the words we take for granted and are obliged to use in our acts of communication and in our internal thought processes about matters of social significance about which we want to think. Ouspensky then, is not trying to be true to reality, he is trying to impart a shade that is to his liking, to colour meaning according to the filter that is implanted into his brain. This he does not, presumably see, for if he did he would either give us a better picture of reality, or, as I would have it, he would of recognised the true picture that science offers us and he would of seen what I see. Conclusion The demise of the wise, those who see where the wind is blowing, toward the eradication of freewill, self-consciousness and the power to act purposefully which is supposed to rely upon this qualities of individual personality is the main moral threat

to come from Ouspensky's account which implicitly, if not overtly, sets out to justify the existence of an elite, and secret, priesthood. This mode of expression is a typical piece of mythologizing, but it could be said that such a concern is the mainspring of all my motive energy throughout my life, and this concern for individual freedom is a recurrent theme throughout many centuries leading up to recent times. The flaw in this mythological expression, as ever with religious ideology, is its extreme expression, so extreme, in this case, as to be farcical. It appears to me that the arrival of the civilised mode of corporate existence indicates the transformation of the human species that occurred with the unleashing of the genetically evolved potential that speech has to form a corporate organism. The freedom of that all individuals experienced in the pre-civilised being was lost as the process of specialised differentiation evolved, as intimated by Spencer. As Spencer said, the rigour of the ant-hill was visited upon humanity, but with one obvious proviso, at least the slavery of most freed the few who were masters. Taking this descriptive model of hierarchical structure as the starting point, I suggest that as the sheer mass of the organism increases the access to the privileged expression of freewill is expanded accordingly. We do not have to degenerate into the sentimentality of the priest in order to appreciate this fact by supposing this is the progress of the human ideal. All we need acknowledge is that there is in this process a relationship between the increasing mass of the core body seeking to expand the total mass upon which a core depends in order to increase it own inner power. Hence a core philosophy evolves that eulogises the creation of one world under one authority and benefits due to all by the realisation of this process. So we find we have a philosophy that just happens to be in accord with the requirements of Darwinian evolution, the total eradication of all identities bar one, Judaism, as it turns out. In the process a liberal and humanitarian ideology makes sense within the ever expanding central domain where there is a maximum degree of wealth and hence power to act in a manner that appears to vindicate the sense and the idea of freewill. Liberal ideas, such as those of Rousseau, perhaps, help to bring about the expansion of the organism as much as authoritarian ideas such as those of Hitler do. Each plays its part at the right time and in the right place and all moves along smoothly exactly as it should by way of finely tuned guillotine blades and humanitarian philosophies and nuclear bombs and international codes of human rights. Its wonderful. And so we come to the period of the global superorganism, where wars are carried on all around the world in the name of Zionism, otherwise called freedom. As president Bush currently likes to tell us America does not wage war in order to bring the gift of American freedom to the world, it is God's gift of freedom he gives to us lucky people. Today the whole of first world is free, riding on the slavery of the third world. Hence, we, as a society, make freedom the foundation of our cultural ethics, and we say how we just want to deliver freedom to all the world, but of course this is biologically impossible, and therefore as such it is just our way of making our use of these powerless territories of the world sound inclusive. But, not to be cynical about it, it is because we find, courtesy of evolutionary dynamics, that this ideology of inclusiveness is the most constructive to follow once the job of extermination of none Jewish identities has been achieved, that civilisation does progress, as we call it. It becomes easy to anticipate Natures outcome regarding our species as we follow the inevitable course of this process of physical expansion, identity extermination, unification and diversification. We see there is still someway to go before the whole world is united under a global authority based in Jerusalem, where all lands answer to one law just as all states in America answer to one law. We can

see the broad outlines of the model, and with wars like the one we are fighting in Iraq now, and many many more still to be fought, we can see how things will pan out. But even if this process takes another five centuries, and it may another ten, in the end it will mean one global civilization under Judaism, there is no other possible outcome as long as out kind exist, the Jewish culture is way to ascendant ever to be outpaced. The only hope of a more human identity emerging is to be found in ideas such as mine, only knowledge can destroy knowledge and offer a replacement, but that is another story. In the end there must come a time when the world's population of outsiders is used up, there are, tragically, no more aliens for the Jews to exterminate, no more ways to progress by means of war. What mode of development is there left? It is at this point that we get to the good bit, the bit we have all been waiting for, Utopia! The way forward is already in sight, but the destination toward which it leads is still over the horizon, and may never be realised, I am not sure. The answer I am heading toward is that in the end if there is to be a human species in which there is no slavery, real or virtual, then we have to reach the point where all the world is a priesthood, where all are equal, where there is no secret knowledge, where there is no privilege. This can only come about if technology advances so far that the third order consists entirely of machines, and this can only come about if the environment is turned entirely into an artificial environment, such as a space ship. Of course since all such artificial forms are really living forms composed of exoskeleton within which is housed the living organic fabric in effect if we created craft like those starships we see on Star Trek we would of transformed ourselves into living creatures whose natural environment was the vacuum of space. In this circumstance it is possible to conceive of all people onboard such a craft being of uniform intelligence, appearance and education, one homogenised elite, created by means of bioengineering and living within a tailor made suit of exoskeleton. It does not sound very human but that is where the notion of human nature as corporate nature leads us. Returning to Ouspensky we have the vision of humanity being reduced to automatons of an insect kind, and it seems likely if we take up my idea that we are a superorganic species. But as you can see from what I have just said this insect model is not correct at all, it completely misjudges the situation because of course it never sets out to judge the situation correctly according to real knowledge about anything. And in so far as we continue to live on this planet in a familiar manner the process of homogenisation is happening around us all the time, we have seen cycles of it many times over and it is not only produced by great powers such as that of Europe invading lesser enclaves of humanity such as that of Africa or Australia some two centuries ago. The same process continues to impinge upon the first order because society is a living organism. The process evoked in Ouspensky's 'death of the wise' is not centred on one boundary of supreme wisdom that is lost, resulting in a 'fall' of the society concerned, from which it must recover by means of the fortuitous survival of a remnant of the wise, a theme of lost cultural heritage, if we wish to leave Jewish myth aside for a moment, that it seems to me we can find in the ancient myth of Atlantis, told by a Greek, but reputedly recovered from the priestly knowledge of the Ancient Egyptians. The process which invokes the idea of cultural loss and rebirth is about the gradual attrition of one culture by another, a resident population overwhelmed by an invading population carrying with it another culture. The essence of the process is a cultural change and it is irrelevant how this occurs, by war, by immigration, or a combination of both. We in Europe, a first world power we may be, but we are being exterminated by the influx of Islam into out world now and we are powerless to do anything about because the people who run our society are doing everything in their

power to ensure European culture is exterminated, it means nothing to them, they are not European, they are Jewish, they may call themselves Christian, or Jewish, but in real terms there is no difference between them. Only the mast identity remains unchanged because it has not territorial attachment, you can plant Judaism anywhere, it will always be Judaism, that is the whole point of Judaism, that is what makes it a super-identity, the identity of the global superorganism. And before the Jews it is evident from the evidence of European culture left to us in the likes of such monuments as Stonehenge that a continental wide culture has laid the foundations of the superorganism that was to be taken over by Judaism, the Druids had obviously swept across the continent bringing with them the tools of a civilised lifestyle supporting an elaborate priesthood and based upon farming, they must exterminated the resident populations of hunter gathers, wild humans superorganism who had yet to reach that critical stage in their evolutionary potential where their linguistic physiology ignited and burst into the symbiotic mode of superorganic growth. The inner circle at the centre of Ouspensky's account, and it is at the centre of my scientifically inspired account too.

Idea Three Gierke on Natural Law and the Organic Nature of Society

"I was never made by that fool of a workman, I who divide time, who mark so exactly the course of the sun, who repeat aloud the hours which I mark! No! that is impossible." Man a Machine, Julien Offray de la Mettrie. Page 145. Unfortunately, being an American printing, I cannot date this copy, it is dated 1912, but looks like a 70s or 80s paperback. First pub. 1748. The two previous authors that have provided the kernel for our thinking about the reality of Super Being as a real solution to the mystery of our existence as animals on this planet, represent the thoughts of two thinkers working in the immediate, and post-immediate, aftermath of the presentations of Darwin on the subject of biological evolution, which included humans in its remit. As such these two pieces have been explorative for us, they have presented overt statements of the idea that we seek to profess ourselves, they therefore lend support to our efforts, these works show that we are not alone in appealing to this idea, and in finding this idea appealing to ourselves. And the fact is that humanity has not moved on one jot since the days of Darwin, nor one jot since the coming of the scientific age some five centuries ago, in terms of solving the mystery of human nature. A year or so ago I saw a book on evolution in a charity shop, which unfortunately I considered too costly just for the few lines that fascinated me in the closing pages, but this book, an Oxford University publication, stated quite matter-of-factly that we may not be one jot closer to understanding human nature by the end of the next century, that is the one we are now in. No doubt there were some reasons given, but as we are endeavouring to discover here, the problem is not breaking the code of nature, but bursting the constraints on knowledge imposed by the priests who manage knowledge in such places as Oxford. What wonders just what these mythologists say to one another behind closed doors. In themselves then, these two preceding authors do not give us any substance, now we need something more if we are to advance our idea into the more substantial terrain of the scientist. How do you prove that human beings are a superorganic species with a nature common to, and specific to, other superorganic forms, over and above providing a lengthy argument concerning conceptual similarities based on behavioural observations that anyone can make? Darwin performed the same operation of convincing by argument for the most part, but he backed up his argument by many detailed examples of inherited characteristics that he related to the environment which became a vital part of his explanation for organic evolution. Darwin's famous account of the Galapagos Island finches is the best example of this search for hard facts to back up a general thesis.

What might we do that equates to the presentation of evidence of a like kind as that provided by these finches? Well I am not quite sure, it seems to me that proving that people have language, showing that people live in cities, that there are naturally occurring sterile members of the community, as in those who remain celibate or who settle into same sex partnerships, each of these things proves conclusively, on their own, that humans have to be a superorganic species, for there is no other scientific way to account for these organically evolved attributes. But everyone knows all about these attributes, and the whole point of a mythology is to ensure that these things are accounted for in a none real manner. So, providing physical evidence of our superorganic status is not the issue, it is all around us. Our task is more akin to the story of the Emperor's New Clothes, where the effort on our part has to be to snap everyone out of their fixation on a finely woven fabric of linguistic illusion by forcing them to see past the mental image created by the priestcraft of articulate artists of knowledge formation. But this will not quite answer our need either, for how do you force people to give up being idiots when they are devoted to being idiots, they like being idiots, and everything they value derives from their idiocy? And what is more, like the spectators viewing the naked king's fine suit of new clothes, they know that in truth, all that they believe is utter rubbish, but they also know that believing what they believe, works for them. In other words, idiocy is the highest expression of intelligence; exactly as you might logically reason it would be in a superorganic form such as ourselves where the brain evolved to link individuals together to form one corporate mind. You cannot tackle this issue head on, the answer is not to try. Our interest is simply our interest. We shall merely trace the relevant subject matter for our own fascination, as the antiquarians of old engaged in their pursuits for the mere gratification of the pursuit of knowledge, in the days before such activity developed an official status and became a professional study, an established part of the exoskeleton's institutional structure dedicated to the preservation of the theocracy; before antiquarians became archaeologists. We have already likened our mode of enquiry to the work of archaeologists because of the way we delve into the intellectual deposits of our past. There is much to be said for this conception of our activity, and in this chapter we are going to turn to some very different archaeological material derived from the mental deposition of past times, than that which we have perused so far in the two preceding authors. The post-modernist French philosopher Michel Foucault had a delightful way of thinking about our intellectual cultural heritage as an accumulated material, the investigation of whose past equated to the investigation of material debris left behind by past peoples. This is indicated by the titles of some of his works, such as The Archaeology of Knowledge. This mode of description is delightful to me because it is the sort of idea that emerges from my ruminations on human nature from time to time, and I do not recall seeing this thought put into writing anywhere else. However, if there is any deeper similitude between the train of the thoughts expressed here and those of Foucault, then I hope that at least I come across as more down to earth and accessible than my first ocular lick of Foucault's intellectual corpse indicated his deposit was to me. Intellectual deposits are real entities, knowledge is a real entity. Knowledge exists. Everything that exists by way of human existence, although we segregate these products of our own being from the rest of nature by calling things natural as opposed to artificial, or man-made, exist in reality, just as much as any so-called

natural product of the universe exists in reality. This artifice of language, regarding the idea of the artificial, is one of the primary ways in which we are programmed to perceive the world according to an image created by priestcraft. Knowledge is a linguistic product, much of knowledge, as we take it for granted, is the product of this artifice. And as a linguistic product knowledge has a nature that is distinct from other artificial products of human activity. But once we accept that knowledge exists as a linguistic product we thereafter can apply the same common standards of investigation to its form as we do to any other material entity. That is to say, the deposition of linguistic material leading to the formation of a body of knowledge, will follow the same principles as the deposition of any other uniform product of a consistent process. This conception of knowledge as a natural product, subject to the natural laws of physics, and biology, is at the heart of Foucault's thinking; whether he considered this point of not. Language is not used arbitrarily, it has a very definite function, and the accumulation of linguistic knowledge likewise must be directed by functional determinants. In a large deposit therefore, we should be able to trace the process of creativity from the origin of random speculation to the crystallisation of even conformity. And in the process of investigating our knowledge deposits we should also be able to relate the different attributes of creative flourish, or creative stability, with the social conditions that relate to the knowledge band, or subject area, that we are investigating at any given time. Knowledge, in short, is functional, and it exists in an environment, a social environment which is the product of an organic being, and the state of the social environment will be reflected in the mode of information deposited in the intellectual record of any given society, be it Sumerian, Chinese, Greek, Minoan, Inca, or whatever. Unfortunately intellectual deposits are a highly specialised product of nature and not always to be found even in sophisticated societies. The Druids apparently made a point of not developing a literature in order to protect the secret law of their priesthood. But they of course were exterminated by the supreme inheritors of a literate culture, the Jews. It just does not pay to bury your head in the sand as the likes of the fascist tries to do when the Jewish priesthood of lawmakers start on the ethnic cleansing by stealth warpath. But, in any case, we are, happily, in a position to acts as archaeologists of the intellect, for we live in an age rich in information, where books abound from all times and all periods, and this is the most glorious thing about our world today. Yes there are great piles of sludge covering everything in a seemingly interminable blanket of opaqueness, but, as we can see from our examination of Ouspensky's bizarre work, even the most bleakly opaque sludge can reveal gems of wisdom when properly investigated according to a strictly scientific mode of understanding. From this abstract discussion of the nature of knowledge we can return to the previous statement regarding a shift from the speculative flourish of our two prior authors, to the much thicker deposits that are the subject matter of our next author. Our third person is of a completely different kind to Spencer and Ouspensky, in terms of the nature of the deposit he left us to examine, for he was himself not an original depositor, he was, like us, an investigator, an antiquarian of the past intellectual seams of wisdom. He was in fact an applicator of knowledge, or he sort to be so, rather than a creator of new ideas. And this distinction is most important, it is one that our discussion of knowledge, above, makes an implicit feature of behaviour relevant to the process of knowledge, and, social evolution. There must be a period of

information creation, followed by an ensuing period of material creativity, arising directly from this creative process, if knowledge is a functional entity, which it is. Thus, from our primary premise, that language is the fluid-genetic medium of the superorganic form, we must expect to be able to discover a material deposit of knowledge in the records of our social evolution which can be shown to be directly responsible for the evolution of the social structure that we live with today, and directly responsible for the history that is recorded in our history books. This logical proposition follows from our early realisation of how the superorganic human form must evolve, via the medium of language. All forms in the universe are the product of energetic processes, and in life forms the energetic pathways in which they are involved are tapped into by sensory acuities that experience these energy pathways as information. We have already seen how this creates religion when we noted that religion was the identity component infused into the physiological aspect of the exoskeleton of the organism as it evolved. Or, if we confine this thought to the physical being of an individual the same thing applies, as the organism evolves its outer form takes on attributes of a non-physical functional kind, of an informational kind, of identity, attributes of communication, attributes which are both positive and negative, in relation to their own nature, for sometimes they are intended to reveal, and at others times to disguise the form underneath, the informational appearance. What we really need to do, is to find the remains of the linguistic genome that created our social being. Logic tells us, without difficulty, that the place to look, the band in the broad deposit of knowledge, is in that band which we call law. And so we come to Otto Gierke, a most remarkable man, and the most precious author we could ever hope to meet with. As native English speakers we do not have free access to the works of this, primarily nineteenth century, German professor of law, we are indebted to two English professors of law working some decades apart, in the first half of the twentieth century. And we can see straightaway that as we shift from the realms of direct access to a thinker's work, to an area where a full comprehension of knowledge is sort, deposits of an institutional character emerge naturally out of our efforts because of the sheer volume of material that needs to be encompassed, and the period of investigation that is embraced, covering many human lifetimes, and the combination of life-efforts that is thereby required. Institutions grow spontaneously out of the fabrication of knowledge, they create themselves; a university is an organic entity, a part of an exoskeleton of a living animal, no wonder libraries were the targets of past warriors, tragically, and they no doubt will be again. Our selected author however, although not quite, himself, an exponent of the idea that human society was literally an organism, as far as I can tell, remains a central figure in the argument that human society is an organic being in its own right. This is because it is the centrality of this idea in the investigations of past ideas, that interested him, and he very nearly seems to think, in real terms, of human society as a living being, but I am not satisfied that he says society is a living creature in a manner that meets my truly detached scientific requirements. He does not say as much directly, in either of the two English translations of his work that are available, but the lengthy introductions to his works provided by his translators do say this of him, that he thought of society as being living and having the attributes of something more than just a temporary collection of co-operating individuals. His subject matter is wholly concerned with the nature of society in terms of its organic form, only his subject is law. In other words, Gierke investigated the evolution of modern law based on the centuries of creative intellectual effort that sort to understand society as a living organism, as a person, which eventually led to the form of the modern state, and a

new World order. This is quite simply a gift from the annals of our intellectual past, it is precisely what we need to prosecute our claim that human nature is indeed corporate, and that human society is an organic phenomenon that can be accounted for in strictly organic terms. This is our evidence, Gierke's work is the anthropologist's Grail or Galapagos, my Galapagos. As there are no pieces of work written by Gierke himself comparative to the two sections I have taken from Spencer and Ouspensky, the problem is what segments of his work to look at, to suit our purpose of levering open the door to reality, which will aid our effort to force people to take notice, and relinquish their fixation on the myth of divinity that preserves their Jewish identity programme, and prevents us from obtaining the intellectual freedom we are capable of possessing today? Let us begin by considering the works with which we are concerned. Gierke wrote a work about the idea of German fellowship, 'The German Law of Associations' (Das deutsche Genossensckaftsrecht), published in 1881, which is essentially about the intimate social unity that is indicative of a human superorganism. This work was extensive and appeared in a number of volumes, in 1900 Frederic Maitland published a translation of a section from volume three of this work which he says, in his introduction, amounted to only one twentieth part of the whole. Maitland called his translation Political Theories of the Middle Age. I discovered Gierke via another author, Ernest Barker. As with A New Model of the Universe by Ouspensky, Barker's book, Principles of Social and Political Theory, first published by Clarendon Press in 1951, had been silent upon my shelves for some years, waiting to be discovered. The discovery came one restless evening this last winter when I thought about trying to dump some books and began by looking at the top shelf of the small bookcase in my living room. I glanced through a dozen books before I found myself amazed to be confronted by a passage in a sixties paperback published by Oxford University Press, dealing with society as an organism! This led me to Maitland, and to another book by Barker, called Natural Law and the Theory of Society. The latter book, being a continuation of Maitland's effort to reveal Gierke's work to the English speaking world, offered a translation of a subsequent section of the work Maitland had selected a section from for his translation. Barker's book, he tells us, concerns the political theories of the modern age, from 1500 to 1800, and is a translation of five subsections in Gierke's fourth volume, which was first published in 1913. Here then we have an extensive body of material that has required a considerable effort to produce, an effort involving the dedication of a number of intelligent men, over a fair span of time. This is an impressive, and I must say, as such, a most delightful piece of work to study. Since it deals directly with my subject I simply cannot quite believe it exists, or that, given its existence, I have had the good fortune to find my way to it. Books, books, books. All you can do is keep poking your nose into to them, and hope, that each time you do, you'll find something nice and sticky on the end of it. But you cannot just peer in, you have to buy them, chuck 'em in a corner, and leave for your receptacle of information to mature enough to be able to know the aroma of right wisdom when it wafts from the page; it is not as if I had not looked at Barker or Ouspensky before. With knowledge, it seems to me, it is easy to look, but not to see. So these are our two seams of knowledge, into which we want to sink a pit or two. As it happens I read Maitland a month ago before beginning this book, before finding Ouspensky, which made me realise had the foundation for this approach to

this subject. So while I made notes I did not select illustrative passages for consideration as I have done with Spencer and Ouspensky. I did do this with Barker's translation and it has to be said that the real recommendation has to be to read the whole volume! But we do not need to do that, we only need select appropriate passages. I will begin then by seeing what there is in Maitland's translation, as it comes first, that might serve to kick us off on this exploration of the real substance of the superorganic genome that created our modern exoskeleton, and then we can take some fine artifacts directly from Barker's introduction and Gierke's volume four. Maitland INTRODUCTION. HAD what is here translated, namely, a brief account of the political theories of the Middle Ages, appeared as a whole book, it would hardly have stood in need of that distorting medium, an English translation. Englishmen who were approaching the study of medieval politics, either from the practical or from the theoretical side, would have known that there was a book which they would do well to master, and many who were not professed students or whose interests lay altogether in modern times would have heard of it and have found it profitable. The elaborate notes would have shewn that its writer had read widely and deeply; they would also have guided explorers into a region where sign-posts are too few. As to the text, the last charge which could be made against it would be that of insufficient courage in generalization, unless indeed it were that of aimless medievalism. The outlines are large, the strokes are firm, and medieval appears as an introduction to modern thought. The ideas that are to possess and divide mankind from the sixteenth until the nineteenth century Sovereignty, the Sovereign Ruler, the Sovereign People, the Representation of the People, the Social Contract, the Natural Rights of Man, the Divine Rights of Kings, the Positive Law that stands below the State, the Natural Law that stands above the State these are the ideas whose early history is to be detected, and they are set before us as thoughts which, under the influence of Classical Antiquity, necessarily shaped themselves in the course of medieval debate. And if the thoughts are interesting, so too are the thinkers. In Dr Gierke's list of medieval publicists, beside the divines and schoolmen, stand great popes, great lawyers, great reformers, men who were clothing concrete projects in abstract vesture, men who fashioned the facts as well as the theories of their time. Moreover, Englishmen should be especially grateful to a guide who is perhaps at his strongest just where they must needs be weak: that is, among the books of the legists and canonists. An educated Englishman may read and enjoy what Dante or Marsiglio has written. An English scholar may face Aquinas or Ockham or even the repellent Wyclif. But Baldus and Bartolus, Innocentius and Johannes Andreae, them he has never been taught to tackle, and they are not to be tackled by the untaught. And yet they are important people, for political philosophy in its youth is apt to look like a sublimated jurisprudence, and, even when it has grown in vigour and stature, is often compelled or content to work with toolsa social contract for example which have been sharpened, if not forged, in the legal smithy. In that smithy Dr Gierke is at home. With perfect modesty he could say to a learned German public 'It is not

probable that for some time to come anyone will tread exactly the same road that I have trodden in long years of fatiguing toil.' But then what is here translated is only a small, a twentieth, part of a large and as yet unfinished book bearing a title which can hardly attract many readers in this country and for which an English equivalent cannot easily be found, namely Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. Of that work the third volume contains a section entitled Die publicistischen Lehren des Mittelalters, and that is the section which is here done into English. Now though this section can be detached and still bear a high value, and though the author's permission for its detachment has been graciously given, still it would be untrue to say that this amputating process does no harm. The organism which is a whole with a life of its own, but is also a member of a larger and higher organism whose life it shares, this, so Dr Gierke will teach us, is an idea which we must keep before our minds when we are studying the political thought of the Middle Ages, and it is an idea which we may apply to his and to every good book. The section has a life of its own, but it also shares the life of the whole treatise. Nor only so; it is membrum de membro. It is a section in a chapter entitled 'The Medieval Doctrine of State and Corporation,' which stands in a volume entitled 'The Antique and Medieval Doctrine of State and Corporation and its Reception in Germany'; and this again is part of Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. Indeed our section is a member of a highly organized system, and in that section are sentences and paragraphs which will not yield their full meaning except to those who know something of the residue of the book and something also of the controversial atmosphere in which a certain Genossenschaftstheorie has been unfolding itself. This being so, the intervention of a translator who has read the whole book, who has read many parts of it many times, who deeply admires it, may be of service. In a short introduction, even if his own steps are none too sure, he may be able to conduct some of his fellow-countrymen towards a point of view which commands a wide prospect of history and human affairs. Staats- und Korporationslehre Doctrine of State and Corporation. Such a the title may be to some a stumbling-block set before the threshold. A theory of the State, so it might be said, may be very interesting to the philosophic few and fairly interesting to the intelligent many, but a doctrine of Corporations, which probably speaks of fictitious personality and similar artifices, can only concern some juristic speculators, of whom there are none or next to none in this country. On second thoughts, however, we may be persuaded to see here no rock of offence but rather a stepping-stone which our thoughts should sometimes traverse. For, when all is said, there seems to be a genus of which State and Corporation are species. They seem to be permanently organized groups of men ; they seem to be group-units ; we seem to attribute acts and intents, rights and wrongs to these groups, to these units. Let it be allowed that the State is a highly peculiar group-unit; still it may be asked whether we ourselves are not the slaves of a jurist's theory and a little behind the age of Darwin if between the State and all other groups we fix an immeasurable gulf and ask ourselves no questions about the origin of species. Certain it is that our medieval history will go astray, our history of Italy and Germany will go far astray, unless we can suffer communities to acquire and lose the character of States somewhat easily, somewhat insensibly, or rather unless we both know and feel that we must not thrust our modern 'State-concept,' as a German would call it, upon the reluctant material. Englishmen in particular should sometimes give themselves this warning, and not only for the sake of the Middle Ages. Fortunate in littleness and insularity, England could soon exhibit as a difference in kind what elsewhere was a difference in

degree, namely, to use medieval terms, the difference between a community or corporation (universitas) which does and one which does not 'recognize a superior.' There was no likelihood that the England which the Norman duke had subdued and surveyed would be either Staatenbund or Bundesstaat, and the aspiration of Londoners to have 'no king but the mayor' was fleeting. This, if it diminished our expenditure of blood and treasurean expenditure that impoverishesdiminished also our expenditure of thought expenditure that enrichesand facilitated (might this an not be said ?) a certain thoughtlessness or poverty of ideas. The State that Englishmen knew was a singularly unicellular State, and at a critical time they were not too well equipped with tried and traditional thoughts which would meet the case of Ireland or of some communities, commonwealths, corporations in America which seemed to have wills hardly fictitious wills their own, and which became and of States and United States¹. The medieval Empire laboured under the weight of an incongruously simple theory so soon as lawyers were teaching that the Kaiser was the Princeps of Justinian's law-books. The modern and multicellular British Stateoften and perhaps harmlessly called an Empiremay prosper without a theory, but does not suggest and, were we serious in our talk of sovereignty, would hardly tolerate, a theory that is simple enough and insular enough, and yet withal imperially Roman enough, to deny an essentially state-like character to those 'self-governing colonies,' communities, commonwealths, which are knit and welded into a larger sovereign whole. The adventures of an English joint-stock company which happed into a rulership of the Indies, the adventures of another English company which while its charter was still very new had become the puritan commonwealth of Massachusett's Bay should be enough to shew that our popular English Staatslehre if, instead of analyzing the contents of a speculative jurist's mind, it seriously grasped the facts of English history, would shew some inclination to become a Korporationslehre also. Even as it is, such a tendency is plainly to be seen in many zones. Standing on the solid ground of positive law and legal orthodoxy we confess the king of this country to be a 'corporation sole,' and, if we have any curiosity, ought to wonder why in the sixteenth century the old idea that the king is the head of a 'corporation aggregate of many²' gave way before a thought which classed him along with the parish parson of decadent ecclesiastical law under one uncomfortable rubric. Deeply convinced though our lawyers may be that individual men are the only 'real' and ' natural' persons, they are compelled to find some phrase which places State and Man upon one level. 'The greatest of artificial persons, politically speaking, is the State': so we may read in an excellent First Book of Jurisprudence³. Ascending from the legal plain, we are in a middle region where a sociology emulous of the physical sciences discourses of organs and organisms and social tissue, and cannot sever by sharp lines the natural history of the state-group from the natural history of other groups. Finally, we are among the summits of philosophy and observe how a doctrine, which makes some way in England, ascribes to the State, or, more vaguely, the Community, not only a real will, but even 'the' real will, and it must occur to us to ask whether what is thus affirmed in the case of the State can be denied in the case of other organized groups: for example, that considerable group the Roman Catholic Church. It seems possible to one who can only guess, that even now-a-days a Jesuit may think that the will of the Company to which he belongs is no less real than the will of any State, and, if the reality of this will be granted by the philosopher, can he pause until even the so-called one-man-company has a real will really distinct from the several wills of the one man and his six humble associates? If we pursue that thought, not only will our philosophic Staatslehre be merging itself in a wider doctrine, but we shall already

be deep in the Genossenschaftstheorie. In any case, however, the law's old habit of co-ordinating men and 'bodies politic' as two kinds of Persons seems to deserve the close attention of the modern philosopher, for, though it be an old habit, it has become vastly more important in these last years than it ever was before. In the second half of the nineteenth century corporate groups of the most various sorts have been multiplying all the world over at a rate that far outstrips the increase of 'natural persons,' and a large share of all our newest law is law concerning corporations°. Something not unworthy of philosophic discussion would seem to lie in this quarter: either some deep-set truth which is always bearing fresh fruit, or else a surprisingly stable product of mankind's propensity to feign. Howbeit, this rare atmosphere we do not easily breathe and therefore will for a while follow a lower road. ¹ See the remarks of Sir C. Ilbert, The Government of India, p. 55: 'Both the theory and the experience were lacking which are requisite for adapting English institutions to new and foreign circumstances. For want of such experience England was destined to lose her colonies in the Western hemisphere. For want of it mistakes were committed which imperilled the empire she was building up in the East.' The want of a theory about Ireland which would have mediated between absolute dependence and absolute independence was the origin of many evils. ² A late instance of this old concept occurs in Plowden's Commentaries, 234. ³ Pollock, First Book of Jurisprudence, 113. ° In 1857 an American judge went the length of saying 'It is probably true that more corporations were created by the legislature of Illinois at its last session than existed in the whole civilized world at the commencement of the present century.' Dillon, Municipal Corporations, § 37 a. (Political Theories of the Middle Age, Otto Gierke, translated by F. W. Maitland. Cambridge, 1927. Pages vii - xii) Reproduced here in full is the opening section to the introduction Maitland wrote for his translation of Gierke's work. It must be clear to all that we are still dealing with the very same subject as that which we set out to consider when we took a fragment of Spencer's work and a piece of Ouspensky's art; namely, the corporate being of human society. That said, it is equally obvious that we have shifted into a radically different sphere of intellectual endeavour. Maitland's style is somewhat archaic, but rich and pleasing, worth a little effort to understand, and this even as he offers to be the mediator of another author whom we could not hope to understand without the translator's guidance, even after translation he means. Method of Investigations Regarding the Search for Artifacts of Knowledge We might pause to consider the activity we are engaged in here, it may not be sufficiently rigorous to qualify as science, and it is without any established back up, the work of one lone individual. But that individual is repulsed by the notion that it is

in any sense mere philosophy, a subject, which while delightful to rummage through, is not something to be a part of. I am sticking to the idea of an archaeology of knowledge. In the opening to this chapter on Gierke I included a little personal history of the manner in which I became aware of this author's work. This is the sort of human interest angle that I believe is pleasing to read in any work since we like to feel we know something of a person who is creating a work that interests us. But the plain fact is that what I describe is quite literally what happened, and as such it is a record of the method by which my knowledge was vastly increased in my effort to understand, and relate, the true nature of human nature. We have spoken of the accumulated knowledge being a deposit, we have spoken of the seams of material running through that deposit, and of the mass of material available today from all periods. I have stated what the nature of knowledge is and made it the basis of my assertion that human society is an organic entity produced by Nature independently of human consciousness. Knowledge, I have said, is deposited in accordance with the laws of physics and biology, this is necessarily so if my prior claims are correct. But many scientists reading this will not be in the least bit impressed by such claims and they will simply dismiss them as the ignorant speculation of a naive layman. It is important therefore to try and give a well considered idea of just how I think my efforts qualify as something on the way towards being science, and not just idle speculation. Discovering Barker's work on a bookshelf in my living room is akin to an archaeologist who has been filling his storeroom with finds over a period of years of searching suddenly turning his attention to a find and to his amazement discovering that he has a treasure in his hand. Early science always works in some such manner, it has no other way to work. Science as we understand it is a refined activity that involves well established ideas and directed investigation, but anthropology has not even begun yet because it is encased within the theocratic ideology of dualism which will not permit scientists to investigate the real nature of human nature because of the inevitability that this means the total annihilation of religious authority which our social structure does rely on for its integrity. There are questions about whether the human species could survive the total eradication of all religion given the fact of the centrality of religion within the human organism's being, but, as it is, this concern aside, the fact remains that it is of immense self interest for the powerful, the elite who actually run the world, not to even think of finding out. We want to find out, and so we are living on the boundary of knowledge, trying to push ourselves where no one has ever been before, or ever made the slightest attempt to go. The annals of science are replete with stories of great adventures drawn from the common stock of humanity who have simply had a burning passion to know the truth of a question which pervades their culture, and who, as a result of this passion they followed a course no one else did, and especially no authorities on the subjects in question did, and thus they discovered something no one else had ever known. In the case of archaeology as we ordinarily think of there is the most famous case of the German entrepreneur Heinrich Schliemann who was possessed from childhood with the tale of Troy and who, in adulthood, having made his fortune in business, set off to find the real site of Troy, a place no one was even sure really existed. He succeeded, and dramatically. With even more pertinence to our situation we may invoke the name of Michael Ventris. His name has come down to posterity as a result of his translation of a language found on clay tablets in Greece. Ventris was an architect, but, like Schliemann, his fire had been set alight as a child when he first heard of the tablets

bearing an unknown script. He had a gift as a linguist and as an amateur he set about working on the ancient script in his own manner. Finally he cracked the code by discovering the script to be an early form of Greek. But the reaction from the elite archaeologists was dismissive, and scornful, they were not about to concede that a mere amateur could do what the elite of their profession had failed to do. However further finds proved to be amenable to Ventris' formula and the case was proven. The next question to ask was how this could be, how could an amateur achieve what the professionals were not able to do? One commentator on a documentary about this fascinating tale offered the insight that Ventris had not gone to university, he was trained, and so he approached the subject without any sense of authoritarian constraint on what it was proper to think and he simply accepted freely any and all possible leads that he thought might prove fruitful in his search for a solution. I was sent to church as a child, and very early on I became an atheist, I decided God did not exist, and from the time on I developed an absolutely burning passion to comprehend what this God business was all about. Thus from the earliest possible age I had a single minded goal in life, to prove God did not exist. As time went on I naturally sought to discover what religion meant by conventional means, I attended college, briefly, to see what was there, and there was nothing there, so I returned to the open waters of life. In the end I discovered what I had searched for all my life, the proof that God does not exist, by discovering what God is. But upon discovering the key I find that the real answer to the conundrum is that everybody knows this answer, and knew it all along, they know the 'king is in the altogether'. They just do not know they know it. Now what on earth can this mean, they just do not know they know what they know? Well, it is a bugger to tease out and explain, and it turns out that in terms of trying to communicate to people something very simple and very obvious, something everyone already knows, but no one knows they know, is exceedingly difficult, but is the trick that needs to be performed if the stake is actually to be driven through the core of the idea of God, and for this terrible, primitive notion of existence, to be destroyed. And so here we are examining the artifacts of intellectual expression that are rich in the subject matter of God's being, but in either an none theistic form, or an indirectly theistic form. As I have just said we prove that God does not exist by showing what God is, and so this is exactly what we are doing now, we are showing what the idea of God simulates in the real world by showing how the idea of God is used in the real world. And it is when we come to Gierke that we get close to this possibility for here we find the evidence of the use of the idea of God in a detailed and direct manner to create the linguistic genes, the laws, that are actually responsible for the creation and ordering of society. As we examine the artifacts extracted from Maitland's and Barker's translations we are therefore looking to see how the real form of what is called God actually existed, and exists, in the living being of the human superorganism. We can see that Maitland is discussing this very issue here, and trying to open up our minds to a consideration of how the social structure acts like an organism. He tells us of the English reluctance to consider the theory of corporations because of the association of fictitious ideas, such as the idea of society forming a body with a personality, which comes with this theory. Corporations, that is human social bodies, are a species which, seen in the light of Darwin's biological theory. And we should seek to aid our understanding of social structures in terms of their

origins in a manner that shows we are learning from the insights science has made into the understanding of life. This is interesting, and it is delightful to see this reference to evolutionary theory, but we must be careful about how we respond to this argument. We know that all of society is dead set against a scientific account of human society, and so at all times we know the best of work will fail utterly to take a proper scientific approach to these questions, no matter how close it seems they are to correct reasoning by way of the terminology they use. We know, furthermore, that the problem revolves around the differentiation into collective and individual bodies, where a true account would dismiss entirely the notion of the individual as an independent entity. This delightful reference to social bodies as species, is a perfect example of the kind of trap that awaits us when reading academic accounts of all kinds. Although this mode of reasoning appears to pay homage to science, and the organic status of humans, it actually carries the mark of individuality within its expression, for it makes structural elements of the superorganic physiology, social groups that is, into independent and discrete, competing, individual bodies, called here, species. They are not species. Corporations are structural elements of a superorganic physiology which compose one organic entity. But it is somewhat difficult to recognise this fact clearly, and to make the appropriate distinction because in fact it is appropriate to think of human corporate, that is institutional, or organisational, bodies as species that are in a state of competition. By appropriate I mean practical, this way of thinking does enable a functional understanding to emerge from an examination of social structure, it simply is not correct. This degree of functionality obtained by a false means of understanding may be likened to the elaborate models of the motion of celestial bodies that could be contrived, by those determined to so, even when it was insisted that the earth was the focus of rotation; Ptolemy being the dude we may think off regarding this particular acrobatic performance of intellectual agility. In other words the human social domain is an ecological environment in its own right, in which individuals form corporate bodies. As the complexity of corporate bodies increases they develop internal structure such that one corporate body is composed of a number of groups that might also be described as corporate bodies. It is this cross over between the use of nomenclature to describe groups making up components of corporate bodies, and truly independent corporate bodies, that is blurring the distinction and leaving the impression that subunits are independent units, and so we have individuals identified by linguistic misuse, when there are in truth no such individuals present. Maitland is suggesting we stop refusing to consider deeper structural levels of connectivity between these social bodies, but he certainly cannot mean that we should recognise that human are living beings that are as much a part of the biomass of the earth as any other living beings and are, as such, subject to precisely the same laws as all life, and in no sense free from those laws; which most certainly is what I insist is the case. We find the same evolutionary dynamics operating in the social domain between groups, giving rise to structure, as we see operating in the physical domain to produce different organisms. Except, in the social domain the medium of information is different, being language instead of genes, and the product is different, being exoskeleton, instead of skeleton and other bodily tissue. This makes the distinction difficult because we are correct to see a species like quality applying to corporations that certainly does not apply to organs of a body, this is because of the way they compete for ascendancy within the exoskeletal structure of the superorganism. The point to realise is that corporations of the kind Maitland is referring to are only in

existence because of an overarching identity delivered via the authority of the state, indeed this line of reasoning comes out in the discussion, the dependence of the corporation upon the prior existence of the state. The group becomes a distinct species like entity when it is truly at odds with the competition, this obviously never happens within the state, although much of the effort to sustain a state's coherence is concerned with just this problem, and this is precisely where law comes in, and this the subject Gierke is concerned with. Thus when a culture opposes another culture, with which it has no common roots, it is like one species attacking another, and one must become the prey of the other. Ouspensky referred to this human activity in terms of amorphous plant-animals consuming one another. Although it has to be said that as humans have a common animal identity this process tends to involve absorption rather than simple extermination, although in the process cultures become extinct. This is how the process occurs up until now, it did not occur in this way when societies where in a simple state of superorganic being, then tribal organisms will of occupied territories which remained largely stable over great lengths of time. It was only the coming of the new mode of symbiotic relationship to the environment which induced the human superorganism to go complex by evolving internal structure and thus opening up the possibility of absorption rather than extermination of competing racial identities. With the approaching culmination of the process of unification under one cultural identity leading to one global superorganism the process of deadly competition must come to an end and there must then be a return to a process that seeks to ensure balance and stability. The picture is somewhat complicated therefore and the idea of the corporation as 'species' confuses the picture when we want a true biological account of human society, it does not help determine the true nature of the organic process involved in the evolution of human social form, quite the reverse it helps people act according to the true nature of human beings without acknowledging what that nature truly is. But this is exactly the condition that we are looking for, we want to find evidence of how humans act as unwitting agents of Nature in their creative involvement in the formation of social structures. Unwittingness This phenomenon is by far and away the most important mechanism we find in Nature's armoury when creating superorganic form, but, perhaps surprisingly, it has been observed to be a mechanism underpinning structure in another context, but in a mode that is not true unwittingness such as we find in the human animal. It could well be scoffed at as farcical, my description of the act of finding a book on my bookshelf as akin to an adventurer-cum-archaeologist rooting out King Priam's gold from a pit in Greece. The question is to what extent you are convinced by the notion of an archaeology of knowledge. For me personally my way of discovering the truth from books is exactly like that of a person digging in a vast open space where they must learn to find what they seeking, that being knowledge in the best of cases, and not just treasure. But the protest may be made that Gierke's work was never lost, not even misplaced, it is well known and much admired by those who have an interest in the relevant branches of knowledge.

Well quite - in the relevant branches of knowledge - and this is the critical point. For in making this kind of observation it is being admitted that while the work is known, and not lost, it is only known to a certain restricted section of the intellectual structure. And what have we already become very familiar with in our investigation of the nature of a social organism, the attribute of differentiation. Differentiation is the means by which an organism comes into being because it is by this means that structure is evolved. But in saying this we must at the condition that the differentiation produced is independent. Now it just so happens that in academia the one thing you absolutely must never do is to cross the divide that separates one authority from another. If you do this you negate the whole basis of academic authority and the whole edifice of academia as an authoritative entity is undermined. And this principle is often overtly paid homage to by those who accredited experts when they encroach in some manner upon the specialist fields of others. Indeed Maitland himself sort of hints at this kind of logic when he presumes to speak for a Jesuit priest when he is himself not such a one; although in this case the caution is proper. But in the institutional world of the academic the invisible membrane separating each department of knowledge from all others, with varying degrees of permeability where one specialist subject is part of an array of related specialist subjects, or one broad discipline, such as history, is taken as fundamental to another which seems quite distinct, such as sociology, is respected and adhered to with great tenacity. Thus we see the superorganism has a brain structure that is highly differentiated into compartments that helped preserve the primary condition that the true nature of the superorganic being shall not become known. The result is that academics like anthropologists who are inducted into a discipline that is oriented along strictly theistic lines that strictly adhere to the priestly requirement that dualism is taken for granted and thus humanity must not, and indeed cannot, be considered to be a part of nature, never gets to look at the domain of political science as a facet of behavioural physiology determining the operation and form of society because this mode of reasoning is absolutely forbidden by the induction process that leads to an anthropologist gaining the qualification they require to be granted a highly privileged position in society as a teacher of knowledge to others. We have seen that some erstwhile explorers of the outer limits of the permitted zone of anthropology, such as Leslie White, who made much of the idea that culture was a system independent of human will, and who said many superb things along these lines, was always careful never to say anything that contradicted the fundamental principle that humans are in no sense a part of nature, when all is said and done. He takes a giant leap across a ten foot gap, and where others fail miserably by only jumping nine feet he managed nine feet, eleven inches and sixty three sixty fourths of an inch, and he falls into the bottomless pit of ignorance along with the rest of the priesthood. But hell, he had a damned good life as a professor in the meantime, and that is all that matters, seemingly. What this professional conspiracy of expertise amounts to then is a complex academic institution which is defined by a closed shop principle that all adhere to as a matter of absolute, sacred duty. And then within this vast edifice of theistically controlled knowledge, the whole is differentiated into a myriad of interdependent parts. The interdependence arises because of the primary act of compliance with the authority of the theocracy, the act of agreeing to acknowledge the expert is the only true voice in any field, no matter how stupid the things the expert says. But what follows is that the overall nature of the subject matter, the nature of academic

material, the nature of knowledge, is never open to debate on one uniform level, each distinct enclave is free to discuss it according to their own specialised competence, be that psychology, philosophy, or even physics. And so, what do we find, surprise surprise, we find the unity of knowledge is fragmented into a host of 'species' to use Maitland's phrase, a collection of independent corporations, or, as we would have it, the unity of all knowledge has been divided into a host of individual competencies each of which is as valid in its own way as any other, which, like a host of religions all claiming to the one true religion, means that none can actually be true in itself. It may each be a valid account of the portion of its remit, so that a neuroscientist like Susan Greenfield might be given freedom to preach her nonsense about what the mind is on television as a person seemingly most qualified to say what the mind is, but of course it is out of the question that she can answer the question truly as she is confined to only one individual segment of the superorganic brain structure. And so we come back to myself, my free roaming status as a seeker after truth unconstrained by any authority and free to pass through all academic membranes delineating the structure of the superorganic brain in my quest for relevant knowledge. Acting as an anthropologist, one who seeks to understand the human animal, I can study law as a facet of corporate physiology. I can speculate on the real structure of the academic institutions, as I just have, and interpret that structure in physiological terms, as I just have. Thus I discuss the individual and the roles they play in the social structure pretty much as a sociologist might but I negate the individual as an individual in the process because I indicate how they are reduced to the status of unwitting agents of a unified organic structure by the process of interdependent differentiation which creates the social structures which people then give themselves up to in the course of following a profession that requires them to be inducted into a fixed account of reality which is limited by the dualistic principle of theocracy which ensures that the true nature of human nature simply can never be known and that conversely the fragmentation of knowledge will always be able to cope with any amount of knowledge by simple fracturing new ideas away from the one body and isolating them in a specialist forum where they cannot, by definition, presume to speak for the whole intellect of the being, only the church can do this by speaking in the name of God. So as much as it may be true to say that books are not lost as such, they are most assuredly out of bounds of the people who most need to see them and to know them if they are to give a true account of human society, as I mean to do. It follows from what has just been said that I cannot give myself up to the academic structure which would teach me what I want to know, so I must act alone. I cannot follow the course set out by any single academic or any one branch of academia, it is implicit in what I have just been saying that I must be prepared to shift freely from one field to another, with restraint, if I am develop the full picture I seek. And thus for me books do indeed represent artifacts in which I search out the knowledge I require to pursue what I know to be the correct interpretation of all knowledge. Today is Saturday, 05 June 2004. Two books have just arrived for me from America. Maitland's book, and one by Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method. I went to the trouble of buying a new copy of The Elementary Forms of Religious Life by Durkheim after discovering that he asserted that people worshiped society when they worshipped God, only to find myself not in the least bit impressed by the feel I got for his ideas. I naturally hoped to find some sort of explanation of what God was, along the lines I have provided where I say that society is an organism

and, in Judaic mythology, this organism has come to be known by the code word God. This I did not think Durkheim was doing and life is not long enough for me to actually read a book unless it looks like it is following a theme in a manner I think will be useful. But Durkheim is the founder of functionalist sociology and as such he must remain a figure of great interest to me, and recently I found a reference to the work that arrived today which said he claims in this book that there is no such thing as an individual. This pricked my ears up and I decided I must take a look at this work. I have only had a few minutes to glance at it, it is an American printing, 1964, with an introduction by George E. G. Catlin. I like to get hold of as old a copy of a book as possible, but the advantage of later copies is that they often have appraisals of this kind which are of immense interest in themselves, this introduction is no exception. Catlin praises Durkheim, naturally, but, much to my delight he says that Durkheim is obsessed with the idea of society as some kind of, what I would call, superorganism. 'Durkheim's method, most suggestive in itself, yet involves, it so happens, the use of the hypothesis of a collective consciousness; it results in a deplorable effort to interpret social phenomena in terms of this alleged consciousness. In this Durkheim is at one with a series of writers theorists of the "social organism"excellently discussed by Professor Coker of Yale. Durkheim, however, is not singular among men of science in being more valuable in respect of the by-products of his theory than in his main contention.' (The Rules of Sociological Method, Emile Durkheim, The Free Press, 1964. Page xiv) Thus my search goes on and I constantly delighted by such finds as the above. Here I have the first suggestion that someone other than myself might have tried to argue that humans are a superorganism. All other such promises have proven to be deceptive, White is in the lineage of a superorganist, others before him like Kroeber wrote about the superorganism but they always stuck strictly to the theistic premise that humans were in no sense a part of nature, as indeed all scientists of all kinds do at all times when they venture beyond the realms of mere physicality and a few cursory remarks about psychology and behaviour. And now I have a name of someone who wrote a book about these seekers after the truth, Coker, so I can try and find this book and gain a list of authors whose ideas I can try and track down. I used a reference in a book by White to find the book by Spencer, of course I knew of Spencer but I had no idea he had actually written a piece on society as an organism and since this subject is so reviled, as we can see from the above remarks by Catlin, it is simply not possible to find works freely available that discuss these ideas. Coker will of course be seeking to crush the scientific idea of human nature in order to defend Judaism as the master identity, but in doing so he must reveal the former friends of scientific freedom who must of lived in time before the servant of the church got their act together and developed their expertise in the eradication of sane thinking and replaced it with ideas that are comparable in their idiocy only with that most hated, by scientists, example of anti-scientific reasoning known as Creationism. Scientists hate Creationism, theists hate Darwinism, of which Creationism is the theists misrepresentation, and between the two of them they keep the illusion aloft and prevent the truth from being known.

Let me just state then, a simple summation of just what unwittingness is. Above I referred to the oppositional mechanism of authority we can call the good-cop bad-cop mechanism as a facet of nature that taught life forms how to favour or flee from stimuli and this perfectly natural mechanism gave rise to the more complex modes of expression that we see in the social world of many creatures including ourselves. Unwittingness is another such mechanism that has its roots in life itself where sentience involves responses. The mechanism of unwittingness is the mechanism that connects the interdependent structures which evolve in the process of differentiation, it is merely a different perspective on precisely the same phenomena. The only thing we need to know about unwittingness is that it actually refers to states of awareness such as we associate with consciousness, it need not be the highest degree of consciousness that we recognise in ourselves. Thus we can misapply the idea of unwittingness in a general sense by applying it to the manner in which species that often appear to be antagonistic to one another all act together in an interdependent fashion that gives rise to an ecosystem where the prey requires the hunter to keep its numbers in check and the hunter requires the prey to remain healthy, and so on. Thus an interdependent superorganic confederation of species comes into being in the form of an ecosystem. On this basis we can call a human society an ecosystem, but just as it would be inappropriate to call an ecosystem a living organism, because it is made up of a complex array of interacting species, it would be equally wrong to call a human society an ecosystem because it is composed of one core species, and a narrow array of associated species. But in both cases the positive nature of the links between the various independent structures are unknown to them, deer do not know that the wolf is their friend. It is clear that any other state of awareness would amount to a breech of the state independence. Indeed the process of symbiotic intertwining of interests involves a relaxation of this state of conscious antagonism, so the wolf evolved into a dog as it came to feel its dependence on the human and the human lost its sense of alienation from the wolf as the world was transformed into an extension of the human superorganic form by becoming a dog. But within the intimate confines of the human social domain where we have all the structure we find ourselves speaking of in this work, the same condition of unwittingness exists in various states of intensity. So the police may regard their duty to be the eradication of the criminal, the criminal may loath the law, but it is obvious enough that, as with the deer and wolf, the one cannot exist without the other. The dynamics may not seem reversible, but, as just noted, if the deer is not predated then it gets diseased, and if there were no criminals then there would be no authority, if there were no authority then there would be no society, and hence there would be no police, or anything like them. It is not so much that criminals are essential to form a society, as that authority is essential and authority implies criminality, and so in the end the one cannot exist without the other and the real object of the existence of these two interdependent structures of social organisation is that a superorganic form should exist to fulfil the potential of the mammalian physiology which evolve some seventy million years ago. The final barrier to a grasp of the true nature of human nature does come down to our personal limitation in terms of unwittingness, the idea of the individual is not just a result of the fabrication of the theist. Clearly individuals must be subject to an intense degree of unwittingness where even their most cherished ideas are no more than a piece of software programming that runs them like a machine. But how on

earth can we get past this barrier if this is the case given the powerful sense of self that all individuals have? The department within the institutional structure which deals with this facet of the corporate mind is psychology. The theocracy, with the guiding light of the likes of Freud, has made the subject matter of unwittingness a highly personal and individual matter, subject to general impulses it may be said to be, such as the Oedipus complex, but it is nonetheless an intensely personal thing all about the individual and their personality. The unwitting relationship that exists between the servant of a large corporation or a advocate of an ideology created by some preacher is not hard to appreciate. Unwittingness becomes very tricky when we approach close to the personal interests of people. When people express a political viewpoint, whose viewpoint is it, and while they obviously have a view that makes sense in terms of their circumstances, does this means that there are no implications for the way they think that are beyond their awareness but which are nonetheless determined by social factors and of the greatest significance? In other words although people may broadly agree about issues to do with tax and work, are these ideas about the way to live not structural forms that are way beyond the comprehension of all individuals, in some degree? Sociology makes a point of vindicating the personal opinions of people and tells us that the beauty of studying the human animal is that we do not need to rely upon observation to discover why these creatures behave the way we do because we can ask them! This is pure, unadulterated mythology, and having imposed this twisted mode of reasoning upon the subject sociologists go on to pervert their science with glee. They devise theories that circumscribe the inner contents of the individual and set them out of bounds to science, making the inner thought sacrosanct, only knowable to the individual who has them. I call this the delinquent mechanism since it is a licence for someone confronted by authority to make denials on safe grounds, knowing the inquisitor is forbidden to say what they think. The experimental side of psychology does however reveal the malleability of people's ideas, and dismissed the notion of a private inner world that is a sovereign state belonging to each individual. It appears that while we have inner thought processes, the rendering of these into communication, which is the only way anyone else can have access to them, is filtered through an evaluative process guided by the audience we are amongst. We try to accommodate our hearers. The degree to which this is so will vary according to the circumstances but when the issues are important to us then the manner in which we manage what we think will be incredibly subtle so that we will aggressively defend a position to the death, but, if we suddenly find ourselves in a social situation where those we care about no longer support the position, we may drop it in an instant. In this setting unwittingness is a highly dynamic mechanism, but this dynamism does not enable flexibility, quite the reverse, it guarantees a highly fixed degree of attachment to what an individual needs to think in order to be successful and happy in society. And so it follows that a theocracy is not just about creating a corporate identity and imposing authority, it is about providing for the well being of the individual, and this is why the link exists between the state as the provider and the individual as a dependant citizen who tends to be concerned only with the provision of life's necessities and not at all concerned with the moral ideas of society in terms of intellectual truth and such like. The individual is only concerned with moral issues like crime because this is what they are told to be concerned about as a moral issue.

In all of this we must remember the influence of language upon our consciousness, our consciousness is filled with words at all times and this means we are faced an image, and we meet the image with a linguistic contribution of our own, and we are strictly controlled in what we can say, so all the time we are up against the illusion of a finely woven cloak of ideas which we see, we see it, even though it is not there. Material Proof Deeply convinced though our lawyers may be that individual men are the only 'real' and ' natural' persons, they are compelled to find some phrase which places State and Man upon one level. Having recognised that humans are a superorganism where the organism proper takes shape at the social level and the individual is reduced to the status of a cells within a body, or an organ we might say in smaller human organisms, we easily recognise that language is the information medium taking over from the genetic information in the delivery of social structure. It follows that there must be a link between language and social structure just as real as the link between genes and their expression in material form. The most obvious linguistic structures to reveal such a link will be laws. The question is then, how do we prove the link? I cannot do that literally, on my own, that requires real research which is way beyond my capacity. What I intend to do is to show circumstantial evidence that makes the case beyond any reasonable doubt, to use a legalistic turn of phrase. And so this sentence I have selected from the above passage taken from Maitland's introduction to Gierke's work, is intended to highlight the gist of the issue. Although the law makers who have devised the schemes according to which our societies have been constructed have been devoted to the idea of God as the divine source of existence, in seeking to apply God's will they have been obliged to work with the dualistic idea of a unifying force uniting individuals into one body. Why? Why if the rhetoric says that humans are individuals, is it, that in managing humans, firstly accepting that humans have to be managed, they have to be managed as if they were not individuals but the depersonalised components of collective entities? Well, we have our answer, it is because there is no God, the use of this idea is just priestcraft, and the real nature of humans is that they are just components of a collective being, and that is why those who act as the managers are obliged to think in the way they do as suggested here by Maitland. And so for proof of the validity of this assertion I am going to quote passages from Gierke which reveal just how intensely the law makers adopted the idea that human society was an organism, how they did this for many centuries, even for millennia, and that eventually by this means they worked out how to create the global organism we know today. But lets just consider an issue concerning creativity before we take any selections. I am saying that there is no such thing as an artificial product as distinct from a natural product, in any absolute sense, both artificial and natural products are made equally by Nature. All that artificial means is that a natural product was made by means of human agency to serve as a natural attribute, an appendage of human form. The impulse to act as an agent in this manner was created by our genetic evolution. So lets consider an artificial item, an aeroplane, for example. Did humans

make the aeroplane or did Nature make it? We accept that Nature made the plane via the agency of human activity, just as Nature makes the nest via the agency of a bird, or a howl via the agency of a wolf. The proof of this assertion is that in order to fly humans had to discover what requirements had to be met, so the aeroplane already existed as a possibility, it was just a matter of discovering what was required. Humans discover, they do not create. In order to make my point I will let another's words speak for me. 'The River of Discovery This century has been so rich in discovery and so packed with technical innovation that it is tempting to believe that there can never be another like it. That conceit betrays a poverty of our collective imagination. One purpose of this book is to take up some of the questions now crying out for attention, but which cannot yet be answered. The record of previous centuries suggests that the excitement in the years ahead will spring from the answers to the questions we do not yet know enough to ask. It is an abiding difficulty in science that perspective is distorted because the structure of scientific knowledge makes its own history seem irrelevant. We forget that modern science in the European tradition is already 500 years old, dating from the time of the Polish astronomer Copernicus. The Copernican revolution was a century-long and, ultimately, successful struggle to establish that the Sun, not Earth, is at the center of the solar system.' (What Remains To Be Discovered: Mapping the Secrets of the Universe, the Origins of Life, and the Future of the Human Race, John Maddox. Papermac, 1999. Page 1) Now all we need do is to bring the Darwinian revolution to its climax by establishing that humans are organisms, and not divine beings. And we trying! But this idea of discovery makes all the difference. We freely speak of the discovery of America, without imaging that it was not there until Columbus sailed upon it, and so reported its presence to the modern world. But the fact is that since the discovery of this continent America has been made by the Europeans, just as, since the discovery of the materials to enable flight the aeroplane has been made, also by Europeans, if we include Americans in the category of Europeans, which for the sake of a discussion of this kind we most definitely should do; have no desire to pamper to the theistic habit of interdependent differentiation, this organic process is real enough but we want to see past the parts and so to discover the whole; only then will we be able to discover some of the questions we do not yet know how to ask, and so we may answer the one about the future of our species. And so, what applies to one artifact, applies to all. Laws are not made by people, resulting in a social structure of their own making. Laws are discovered that induce the formation of social structure that is functional, so, via human agency, Nature makes society by exercising the various branches of the state machinery. Here then, courtesy of Gierke, we are going to see how the lawyers were obliged to think of society as an organism in order to produce the modern society, even as they stalwartly denied that this was the case because of the desire to preserve their authority based on the idea of a divine authority.

Maitland's Introduction, Second Extract Pausing here for a moment, we may notice that an Englishman will miss a point in the history of political theory unless he knows that in a strictly legal context the Roman societas, the French société, and the German Gesellschaft should be rendered by the English partnership and by no other word. Also he should know that, just as the English lawyer maintains that our English 'firm' is a mere collective name for the partners and displays no 'artificial personality,' so also he will be taught in Germany that the Roman societas and the German Gesellschaft are not 'juristic persons.' Now-a-days it will perhaps be added that the German Gesellschaft the and same would be said of the English partnershipshews a tendency to develop towards corporate organization, from which tendency the extremely 'individualistic' societas of the Romans was wholly free. That is a small matter; but it is a great matter that before the end of the Middle Ages the Roman word for partnership was assuming a vastly wide meaning and, under the patronage of Ciceronian comparisons, was entering the field of politics. 'Human Society' should be the partnership of mankind; 'Civil Society' should be the partnership of citizens; 'the Origin of Civil Society' should be a Social Contract or contract of partnership. If Rousseau writes of le Contrat Social and Pothier of le Contrat de Société, there should be, and there is, a link between their dissimilar books, and a German can say that both discussed the Gesellschaftsvertrag, the one with passion, the other with erudition. Here then we face one of the historical problems that Dr Gierke raises. How came it about that political theory, which went to the lawyers for most of its ideas, borrowed the contract of partnership rather than the apparently far more appropriate act of incorporation? In brief the answer is that the current doctrine of corporations, the classical and Innocentian doctrine, stood beneath the level of philosophic thought. A merely fictitious personality, created by the State and shut up within the limits of Private Law, was not what the philosopher wanted when he went about to construct the State itself. And then political philosophy reacted upon legal theory. When the State itself had become a merely collective unita sum of presently existing individuals bound together by the operation of their own willsit was not likely that any other group would seem capable of withstanding similar analysis. Where philosophy and jurisprudence met in such systems of Natural Law as were fashionable in the eighteenth century, the universitas was lowered to the rank of the societas, or (but this was the same process) the societas was raised to the rank of the universitas. Both alike exhibited a certain unity in plurality; both alike might be called 'moral persons'; but in the one case as in the other this personality was to be thought of as a mere labour-saving device, like stenography or the mathematician's symbols. What we may call the Bracket Theory or Expansible Symbol Theory of the Corporation really stands in sharp contrast with the Fiction Theory as Savigny conceived it, though sometimes English writers seem to be speaking of the one and thinking of the other. The existing corporators, who in the one scheme are mere guardians for a somewhat that the State has instituted, become in the other scheme the real 'subjects' of those rights and duties that are ascribed to the corporation, though legal art usually keeps these 'subjects' enclosed within a bracket. However, despite this tendency of a 'natural' jurisprudence tendency which seems to have left an abiding mark in the a legal terminology of Scotland Romanists of Germany had been holding fast the the doctrine that the universitas is, while the societas is not, a person, when the jointstock company, a new power in the theoretic as in the economic world, began to give

trouble. That the Aktiengesellschaft was a corporation was generally admitted; but of all corporations a joint-stock company is that which seems to offer itself most kindly to the individualistic analyst. When all is said and done, and all due praise has been awarded to the inventors of a beautiful logarithm, are not these shareholders, these men of flesh and blood, the real and only sustainers of the company's rights and duties? So great a Romanist as Ihering trod this 'individualistic' or 'collectivistic' path, and in America where law schools flourish, where supreme courts are many and the need for theory is more urgent than it is in England, highly interesting attempts have been made to dispel the Fiction, or rather to open the Bracket and find therein nothing but contract-bound men. Contract, that greediest of legal categories, which once wanted to devour the State, resents being told that it cannot painlessly digest even a joint-stock company. Maine's famous sentence about Contract and Status might indeed be boldly questioned by anyone who remembered that, at least for the philologian, the Roman Status became that modern State, Etat, Staat which refused to be explained by Contract into a mere 'Civil Society.' Few words have had histories more adventurous than that of the word which is the State of public and the estate of our private law, and which admirably illustrates the interdependence that exists between all parts of a healthily growing body of jurisprudence. Still, though the analytic powers of Contract are by no means what they once seemed to be, many will think them equal to the task of expanding what they might call the Corporation Symbol. (Pages xxii - xxv) Quite a slice of Maitland here, but I like large portions, even though the depth of the subject being presented is such as to make it tricky for anyone who has not got the feel of the subject, somewhat difficult to catch on to, I imagine. This however is not necessary, we are not students of law, we are here looking for evidence of the necessity for those men who made out modern world to take account of human corporate biology. Just as we might look to the necessity of the architects, engineers or astronomers, who built our exoskeleton and knowledge into the form we have today by paying close attention to the mathematics pertaining to materials and structure. Running through this verbiage we see the steady presence of Gierke's corporate theme. And in this piece we also see how it informed the Romans whose laws came down to us in large measure. It is impossible for complex laws directing the organization of society not to focus emphatically upon the notion of society as an organism. Dear me, I wonder why that might? Humans are animals, we evolved, and in no sense can we be distinguished from any other living thing on the planet in this respect, but this could not possibly have anything to do with the fact that society has to be treated as an organism could it!! What does come forcefully out of this section is the tireless effort that is put into denying the obvious, denying that society is an organic phenomenon, a product of natural processes, and nothing more. Unity in plurality, this has a nice ring to it. What does it mean? It is a reference to the idea of society versus brotherhood, the difference being that society is here meant to be considered a naturally occurring physical entity while society conceived as a brotherhood is a man made phenomenon. And in this case it is, of course, intending to bolster the illusion of brotherhood consciously, of coming together to establish a strong position for each individual.

Individuals coming together to form a group lose their individuality, they are homogenised by virtue of their acquiring a group identity which invokes a group will. The resulting collective unity is then represented as if it were itself a living person with a will of its own, it is called a moral person. The reason this tack is taken is that the people pursuing the line of reasoning are lawyers and they are striving to find a way of validating law, in order to do this they must have a logical process to follow and the law they already know dealing with the moral code imposed on individuals is their causal connection, thus in order to devise laws that encompass the state they must define the state as a moral being with rights and responsibilities that can be expressed in law. The result of this approach is to preserve the language of individuality, and we know that preserving the idea of the individual is the basis of theistic mysticism, and the exact inversion of reality, in reality there is no such thing as an individual human being in the form of a single physical living being, a person. There is only the social unit, the superorganism. A scientific analysis, turning to a biological account of the same subject matter, with no agenda such as that which the lawyer/philosopher/theist/politician/ monarch/dictator/capitalist readily submits to, gives up the language of individuality which the term moral is central to, and rather than seek to make the corporate body composed of individual into a super-conscious person or personality, the scientist instead shifts in the opposite direction to dismiss all talk of individual persons and therefore to the dismissal of morality as a behavioural facet of the human social organism. I am not massively impressed by Durkheim. He is another example of someone who talks the talk wonderfully but does not walk the walk at all, still we could just sample a bit of his talk concerning the scientific nature of sociology which bears on the issue in hand, the failure, even of sociology to break through the constraint imposed by the theocracy, which is what all these medieval lawyers, philosophers, and commentators in general, were so concerned with.
'Our principle, then, implies no metaphysical conception, no speculation about the fundamental nature of beings. What it demands is that the sociologist put himself in the same state of mind as the physicist, chemist, or physiologist when he probes into a still unexplored region of the scientific domain. When he penetrates the social world, he must be aware that he is penetrating the unknown; he must feel himself in the presence of facts whose laws are as unsuspected as were those of life before the era of biology; he must be prepared for discoveries which will surprise and disturb him. Sociology is far from having arrived at this degree of intellectual maturity. While the scientist who studies physical nature is very keenly aware of the resistance it offers him, and which he has so much difficulty in overcoming, the sociologist seems to move in a sphere perfectly transparent to his view, so great is the ease with which the most obscure questions are resolved. In the present state of the science we really do not even know what are the principal social institutions, such as the state, or the family; what is the right of property or contract, of punishment and responsibility. We are almost completely ignorant of the factors on which they depend, the functions they fulfil, the laws of their development; we are scarcely beginning to shed even a glimmer of light on some of these points. Yet one has only to glance through the works on sociology to see how rare is the appreciation of this ignorance and these

difficulties. Not only do social theorists consider themselves at once obliged to dogmatize on all problems, but they find themselves able to set forth in a few pages or phrases the very essence of the most complex phenomena. Theorizing of this sort cannot have its source in facts, for facts could not be so quickly disposed of; it springs from the prejudices which the author held prior to his research. To be sure, each man's individual conception of what our social customs are, or what they ought to be, is itself a factor in their development. But these conceptions in turn are additional facts which must be properly identified and studied objectively. The important thing to know is not the way in which a certain thinker individually conceives a certain institution but the group's conception of it; this conception alone is socially significant. Nor can this conception be arrived at by simple introspection, since it does not exist in its entirety in any one individual; we must find external objective signs that will make it perceptible. Further, even a product of spontaneous generation is in itself an effect of external causes which must also be determined in order to estimate its role in the future. Ultimately, we must always return to the same method.' (The Rules of Sociological Method, Emile Durkheim. Page xlv - xlix) Not massively impressed! Blimey, this man is a dream. I have started reading this book properly since I wrote this comment a couple of days ago, and while it is still, tragically, true that Durkheim misses a fundamental trick, he sure has a powerful sense of what is important. Unfortunately it does remain the case that in this business you either jump the gap from pure ignorance to pure knowledge, or you do not; Durkheim definitely does not. But he is good, and if sociologists, at some time in the future, could only learn to think like him, and apply his method, then the abysmal state of social science which is infinitely more backward today than it was in Durkheim's day, having had a whole century in which to devise perverted ways of interpreting the facts sociologists have observed, might yet achieve what I have achieved all on my lonesome and reach the other side of the chasm of ignorance and thus discover that human nature is corporate and that all else follows from this point. While I like the idea of functionalism, it is only now I get my mitts on the relevant piece of Durkheim's thinking that I can see the reason he was no more a scientist than anyone else I ever heard of - bit harsh. His functionalism is useless because it is not connected to reality anymore than anyone else's mysticism -Ouch! Functionalism implies structure, but not to Durkheim, apparently, who thinks that individual and social dynamics are two utterly distinct things. This makes a nonsense of his functionalism, and explains why he tells us nothing of any real use in the long run, and the appearance of doing so acts as a hindrance to knowledge, in exactly the same way we see the modern obstacle imposed by Dawkins who talks a good talk but never walks the walk, except toward the sacred font of theocracy and mysticism. Yes, well. I have been enjoying The Rules of Sociological Method during the last two days, but it does have serious problems. The primary one, where I think Durkheim let himself down, and the rest of humanity, concerns his concept of the nature of language. 'It follows that sociological phenomena cannot be defined by their universality. A thought which we find in every individual consciousness, a movement repeated by all individuals, is not thereby a social fact. If

sociologists have been satisfied with defining them by this characteristic, it is because they confused them with what one might call their reincarnation in the individual. It is, however, the collective aspects of the beliefs, tendencies, and practices of a group that characterize truly social phenomena. As for the forms that the collective states assume when refracted in the individual, these are things of another sort. This duality is clearly demonstrated by the fact that these two orders of phenomena are frequently found dissociated from one another. Indeed, certain of these social manners of acting and thinking acquire, by reason of their repetition, a certain rigidity which on its own account crystallizes them, so to speak, and isolates them from the particular events which reflect them. They thus acquire a body, a tangible form, and constitute a reality in their own right, quite distinct from the individual facts which produce it. Collective habits are inherent not only in the successive acts which they determine but, by a privilege of which we find no example in the biological realm, they are given permanent expression in a formula which is repeated from mouth to mouth, transmitted by education, and fixed even in writing. Such is the origin and nature of legal and moral rules, popular aphorisms and proverbs, articles of faith wherein religious or political groups condense their beliefs, standards of taste established by literary schools, etc. None of these can be found entirely reproduced in the applications made of them by individuals, since they can exist even without being actually applied.' (Ibid. page 7) I have italicised the relevant sentence. Granted that in relation to the subject of human kind, anthropology, humanity was at an early stage when Durkheim wrote this book in 1895. Even so you would think he might of grasped something more of the organic nature of society than he appears to of done, and in this reference to the unique attributes of linguistic information, being preserved in a manner not known in nature, we see his crucial failure to grasp the nature of the process of social formation. Darwin did not know about genetics, but his theory anticipated it because he saw that there was some system, some process, at work directing the evolution of forms. Durkheim should of recognised the same, he has all the right attitudes in place to do so, and yet despite all he says in the end he falls in line with everyone else and apologises for causing offence by seeming to belittle the individual and here he makes the fatal flaw and assumes humans are unique, in some absolute sense, in nature, this is the one thing no scientist could possibly tolerate. Today we know that the genetic code is a perfect analogue of the linguistic codes Durkheim refers to here, and of course we know that language is simply the extension of the continuum of information from the organic domain to the social. But this is obvious, why did he not see it? I thought in taking this passage for the purpose of revealing Durkheim's fatal flaw I was drifting away from the theme of this work, but in fact I see that this is not really so. Here we see Durkheim is discussing the ever pressing problem of the individual versus the collective. Even though he is endeavouring to assert a scientific programme and thereby to dismiss all other modes of thought, he nonetheless does not realise that the crucial mechanism in the creation of functional mythology generating social form and therefore social power is the mechanism of duality. Had he seen this was the ultimate problem which can be boiled down to the mythology of dualism and the science of unity, he would not of been so keen to insist upon the distinction

between the individual and the group and the genuine existence of a duality composed of the two distinct realities. I am still waiting to come upon the point where he actually denies the existence of the individual, although I did read a passage yesterday in which the idea that there was no such thing as an individual was implicit. But we must return to the core of our work here, the observation of the manner in which the people who acted as the agents creating our superorganic form of today, modelled their work on the idea that society was a living organism composed of a host of differentiated organs forming a complex state of interdependence brought together under one unifying Whole. Returning then to our real quest, seeking evidence that the fabricators of our present social structure were obliged to deal with the superorganic nature of society, we may consider this point, extracted from the last passage from Maitland's introduction quoted above; it is the sort of idea that comes up repeatedly in relation to Gierke's work on Natural Law. 'When all is said and done, and all due praise has been awarded to the inventors of a beautiful logarithm, are not these shareholders, these men of flesh and blood, the real and only sustainers of the company's rights and duties?' The joint-stock company is used as the perfect example proving that all that makes this social organ, the joint-stock company, real, are the flesh and blood individuals that own the stock. On the face of it this may be so. When I imagine debating the fact that there is no such thing as an individual with someone I think like this. If we look at the world about us, it is perfectly clear that the earth is flat. We know the earth is some sort of solid object and that it is fixed and stationary. There is no doubt, we can prove it by looking, that the sun, moon and stars rotate about the earth, the earth is self evidently, at the centre of all things. These wholly erroneous facts are obviously true, on the face of it, it is only by means of accumulating knowledge over many generations that we have learnt to appreciate the real, and quite amazing truth, which know it as we may well do, still seams quite impossible. The earth rotates at 22,000 miles per hour! Ludicrous. Impossible. The earth is round, a globe - insane, we would all fall off. And so on. Yes, on the face of it, of course all there is, is individuals. Certainly at the end of the day the proceeds of the company can only go to the owners of the company. But this is not a scientific observation, it is an observation that comes from a purely local effect where we take things to be as they appear to be from where we are standing, and we look no further. The people who are concerned with law making are dedicated to the preservation of social order, and its enhancement. There were forces tearing at the seams of the social structure so that the likes of Rousseau came up with radical ideas focusing on the existence of the individual which fed the transformation that came about in French society when the revolution kicked off in 1789. But, notice, Rousseau uses the sovereignty of the individual as a basis for his reasoning. He had an agenda, a purpose, just as the law makers did. The Nullification Mechanism

A scientist, of the sociological persuasion at any rate, has no agenda, or has no right to have an agenda. To do so would nullify their claim to be a valid sociologist; just as being a criminal would nullify a police officer's right to claim to be a valid police officer. Of course this null status does not negate the possibility of the status it nullifies existing in the same space, at one and the same time, it just nullifies it! In other words the null status is a naturally occurring sub-status of a valid, or ideal, status. In the same way that an answer to a question is no less a genuine answer to a question for being a lie, it is simple a null answer. Nullification simply corrupts the ideal, or true, status. Professional status is always conferred by authority, this in effect makes authority the personification of the ideal, the determinant of the ideal, which means status is conferred via an institutional structure. It is therefore up to the institution that grants an acknowledgement of status to ensure that contradiction between the ideal vested in its authority, and the expression of its authority, is ruled out by the process of induction and qualification. However it soon becomes evident from the above chain of reasoning that authority assumes the status of ideal for the express purpose of having the privilege of determining what the expression of the ideal will be. If authority did not pervert the ideal there would be no point in there being an authority to guarantee that the ideal was not perverted, since no authority means no ideal, means no perversion. Nullification is therefore the institutional perversion of the ideal that establishes the authority of the institution. We can say, on this basis, that an institution has total authority over the determination of the ideal, the ideal is what the institution says it is. This is not a rationally determined state of affairs, it is an evolved state of being. If an institution no longer has the control of determining what the ideal is it no longer has authority. It goes without saying that the institution, which is an organic aspect of the exoskeleton of the superorganism, cannot evolve just anyway it please, just as the aeroplane could not evolve just anyway it pleased. People do not make institutions, nor aeroplanes, Nature makes these physiological structures according to predetermined rules of nature. And it just this need to discover what the laws of nature are pertaining to the fabrication of an institution that has brought us to Gierke's door. This is why religious authority, the most supreme authority, is so inherently perverse a representation of reality, but a ideal expression of authoritarian values; because it is evolved to carry a partisan identity, the Jewish identity, which thereby owns the shares in the corporate being that is formed by the exercise of the authority which is expressed in the ideal, the identity. These ideals being belief in God, being the chosen, belief in law, in authority, etc. etc. As it happens then, because science is subject to theocratic oversight, by virtue of the ancient structure of academia which founded the scientific establishment, science insists that in order to be a bona fide scientist a person must have a nullified status that guarantees they will not present scientific ideas that conflict with theology in a fundamental manner that would destroy theocratic authority. A perfectly understandable position. If we try to imagine how this situation could ever be changed by consent we need to think of more simple comparative social structures that show a similar authoritarian dynamic at work which sets up an ideal, then automatically negates it. Such as the system of democratic representation in Britain which has been dominated by a two party system since the foundation of the parliamentary system several centuries ago. The only way to alter the two party system is to change the method of voting from first past the post to proportional representation. The only way to do this is to get the party in power to decide to give up having power ever again, and to do so voluntarily, needless to say

this cannot happen. And neither can the theocracy, which determines what science is, be expected to allow science to adopt a scientific method that will destroy the theocratic authority that allows it to rule the entire world under one identity, Judaism; it cannot happen. Not voluntarily anyway, but revolutions do occur, and I hope we have the makings of a scientific revolution in our sights here. A world without religion is a world worth working for, a world worth living for, a world worth dying for. Horror It is an express condition of being a scientists that you are against all agendas, by definition. It is this fact that makes it impossible to be a scientist of human life without being a passionate and proactive atheist, one who demands the complete obliteration of all religious thought from their subject. A religious ideology constitutes, by definition, an agenda. The scientist wants only to know what is real, this is not an agenda, it is the antithesis of an agenda. And it is the antithesis of science to the purpose of social life that makes science so exceedingly difficult to do in the context of human affairs. Durkheim discusses this matter of science's usefulness under this kind of circumstance, but to me truth is self evidently useful and needs no justification beyond its own existence. Had a sociobiological account of society been applied to the question of the nature of a commercial company constituted from a number of individuals by virtue of a legal contract, it would of started from the premise that humans are organisms that share a common ancestry with apes, and who diverged in the course of evolution in accord with the direction in which their own simultaneously evolving nature took them. For an analogy, to make clear what may seem obscure, we may think of the evolution of the aeroplane as having progressed in the direction in which its own simultaneously evolving nature took it. Thus the aeroplane was always defined by its aerodynamic form, this is its nature. As its nature evolved by virtue of the information that it acquired from related facets of the organism of which it is a part, such as developments in engineering and materials, so its form evolved, and so the biplane became a monoplane, an aircraft, a jet. Its nature, continuously evolved, while always remaining the same, and this evolution along a common thread of being was expressed in a continuous expression of new forms. The aeroplane is not a living thing, it is a facet of a living thing, and so this description is an analogy in order to show how the process that applies to the whole organism can be seen to work at the structural level. The same description therefore applies equally to the human superorganism as a whole being. From the period of its first stone tool cultures, to that of the first the fire bearing cultures, to that of the first townships and so to the first industrial society. It is necessary to make the proviso that we discuss this progression in terms of first origins, otherwise we are liable to encounter considerable confusion in terms of the overlap of these various cultural forms at one and the same time, but in different places. We need to be aware that our species' evolution involves evolution proper, which may be duplicated, and then dispersal, which definitely predominates as a mode of expressing evolutionary development. It would then of followed that as society was an organism, based on the logic that humans were evolved organisms, so its structure constituted that of a living entity, an exoskeleton. In relation to the joint-stock company the flesh and blood individuals were but the temporary elements of its living tissue, occupying the structures created in the form of fiscal and trading institutions, which evolved as part of the organic structure of the

superorganism to serve the superbeing that mythology denotes by speaking of divinity. But of course these artificers of the law were seeking to extend the authority of theocracy, not to destroy it, they wanted to determine the ideal, so that they could fabricate a representation of it that would deliver the reward of understanding that ideal to the institutional entities which they served. Thus they worked with the ideal, the truth, that human society was an organism, but the fabricated a null representation of that ideal by asserting that there was only the individual and as such it was necessary to conceive of society as a moral being in order to preserve this null representation of the ideal upon which the authority they shared in relied. The idea that individuals are specifically the be all and end all of the reason for the existence of such vast structures as those that dominate our world in modern times, is quite absurd once you know the truth, just as the idea that the earth is the centre of the universe seems absurd and small minded when you know that the stars are suns, the sun has its own solar system, and that system is one item in a huge galaxy, and so on, and on. And so we may refer back to a sentence taken from Durkheim, quoted above. 'When he penetrates the social world, he must be aware that he is penetrating the unknown; he must feel himself in the presence of facts whose laws are as unsuspected as were those of life before the era of biology; he must be prepared for discoveries which will surprise and disturb him.' And we can see just how disturbing these various advances in scientific knowledge are, the world is not flat - horror, it is not stationary - horror, it is not the focus of all things - horror, humanity is not divine - horror, humanity is organic horror, there is no such thing as an individual person - horror, there is no such thing as a divine being - horror, human society is a living being - HORROR!! The expression of abhorrence, in relation to new knowledge of the most fabulous kind, What is it? Why should there be this endless cycle of dismay involved in the advance of real knowledge, and the process of growing self realisation that comes from this process of enlightenment? Why do people hate the truth so much? Why is that the people who hate and fear the truth more than anyone else, except perhaps the theologians themselves, are the professionals whose lives are devoted to the discovery and exposition of the truth? Durkheim discusses this problem, somewhat less provocatively than me, but then he had reason to be more patient than me since he feels that he is in the position of being one of the pioneers in a new science of sociology. I know that in fact he is one just one founding father of a line of more knowledge perverts specialising in the distortion of the truth. I do not care to be patient, or gracious, toward these people. I found myself being critical of Durkheim's discussion because he failed to take an objective view of the expression of dismay that he gives some thought to. He allows the antagonism show toward those who would take a scientific view of humans to stand on its own reconnaissance, instead of applying a scientific evaluation to the

meaning of this phenomenon. As such he left this attack upon scientific method to an individualistic interpretation, thus it had subjective validity, and his criticism of it was of a kind that rebuked it for being the ignorance and failure of a narrow minded individuals. This despite the development of a method that is supposed to be addressing just this issue, and he says sociologists should look for trends in social behaviour, which, once observed can be scrutinised for their common properties and interpreted according to a conviction that they must have some common origin due the principle of causality which underpins all science. When I refer to the breakdown of sacred boundaries limiting knowledge such as that which outlawed, for as long as possible, the idea that the earth was anything but the centre of the universe, I mention a number specific points that ignorance insisted upon that advanced knowledge had to refute. Boundaries were eventually overcome. We saw in the passage taken from Maddox above, that it took a century or so for the Copernican revolution, which is considered to mark the beginning of the scientific age, to become triumphant by assuming an ascendant position in our understanding of the universe and thereby silencing all official opposition. Having breached the null boundary set by the idealists who have the authority to determine what is true and what is false, humanity is then free to enjoy the magnificent new knowledge, and so modern astronomy came forward in leaps and bounds, and a truly beautiful thing it is today. Now even the Vatican has its own institutions celebrating the work of Galileo whom they persecuted so piously in defence of the fascistic authority. The truth is that century of struggle with religious authority that Maddox mentions was no about the struggle to establish the idea of a heliocentric universe, it was about the theocracy's need for sufficient time to realign it null interpretation of the ideal, of the real, so that it had a new kernel of false knowledge about which to focus, and thus a new boundary to set on what we would be permitted to know. This was what took the time, and it was evidently time well spent. The theocracy relinquished it fixation on the celestial mystery, since the cover was blown due to the telescope, it authority could not rest on that illusion, the divinity of its sacred authority could no longer be heavenly in character. A new myth was required, and so the divinity of theocratic identity took on a more organic form. I confess I do not know quite whether this process occurred in exactly this manner, but when Darwin came up with the notion of evolution embracing all life, including humanity, there is no doubt that the edifice began to shake once again, which proves that theocratic authority was based upon an investment in human nature and form being something entangled with their true, organic nature. However, Darwin, quite possibly because he simply knew no better, created a model of evolution that conformed to the dualistic mechanism of knowledge perversion that creates mythology such as that of Judaism which rules our world by splitting asunder form and nature, thus all we learn from Darwin is that we have the form of apes, isn't that a revelation? No. And that with the solution to the mystery cracked, heavens above, we are left with an impossible task of accounting for humans, who are simply like nothing else on earth, yeah, yeah, yeah, yawn, yawn, yawn. Its like being back in Sunday school listening to these priests of evolution crooning about our nearest relatives the chimpanzee and the stone age brain evolved to split rocks in a jungle and no able to cope with the pressure of modern living, everyone is a story teller. But not me, I don't like stories, I don't tell stories, and I know better, and I had theocracy, and I love science. And I know the solution to the problem, and this is the

nail in God's coffin, at last: Halleluya. I have the key to unlock the organic constraint on self knowledge created by Darwin's dualistically based idea of human evolution which failed to account for human nature and only accounted for human form. So, horror, is not intrinsic in the knowledge that actually induces the horrified reaction that is expressed in resistance to the truth, or attempts to discover truth pertaining to that which is deemed sacred at any given time. The situation is quite the reverse in fact, once the horror is overcome and people are left to their own devices to enjoy life and knowledge in peace, they generally relish the new ideas, truth is stranger than fiction, and always more exciting and liberating. The horror is an artifice, it appears at any time that new knowledge poses a threat to the established authority of the theocracy. Put in biological terms public expressions of horror are not the reactions of individuals acting as individuals, they are a physiological reaction induced in the organic substance of the superorganism whose exoskeletal structure has evolved about an identity and authority structure which has woven into it aspects of the unknown as a means of nullifying the known, by this means mythology is created under the auspices of the institution which manages the null ideas of reality. The superorganism has an organ of authority and it is the officials whose place in the organism lies within this part of the physiology and whose personal well being is intimately linked to the preservation of the illusion which authority relies upon to weave its special identity which helps secure for it the status of an organ of authority. So the needs of the few elite become synonymous with the needs of the superorganism, which is the society itself, and so to a significant extent the needs of society are drawn together, and as such a threat to the sacred identity of the elite is a threat against society. There can be no doubt that my revelation of an organic nature for humans does absolutely threaten the complete destruction of society as we know it. Something I have been longing for all my life, so I am delighted by the prospect of success. The horror is a physical reaction of the organ of authority which is always focused on the theocracy and belief in God, because it is religion that constitutes the identity and makes the superorganic being exist as one organic whole sharing one common identity. Those who express this horror as individuals, like the person Durkheim mentions, are the flesh and blood representatives who find themselves reacting in defence of their own interests because they carry a share in the corporate identity, identified by religion, and other significant attachments to the establishment. You get your voice heard in any meaningful fashion it is necessary to have a high status of some authoritative sort. These vocal proclaimers of abhorrence against the truth, for the null truth, are the shareholders in the corporate beings existence, they are the elite. They are the only ones who will suffer deeply if the identity of the organism is killed, the mass of the being just continue as before, only the core dies, it is only the elite who are hurt by the destruction of mythology due to new knowledge. This elite react in horror against all new knowledge which threatens theocratic authority upon which their status depends due their position in the physiology of the superorganism, and it is the privilege of being a scientist that is granted like a sinecure by the academic establishment which ensures the people who wince and rail in horror most intense when the scientific truth is revealed, are the scientists. Continuing directly from the quote ending on page 116 above, we find the following important material.

'It was in a Germany that was full of new ideas and new hopes that a theory was launched which styled itself 'the German Genossenschaftstheorie! Even the hastiest sketch of its environment, if it notices the appearance of the joint-stock company, should give one word to the persistence in Germany of agrarian communities with world-old histories, to the intricate problems that their dissolution presented, and to the current complaint that Roman law had no equitable solution for these questions and had done scant justice to the peasant. Nor should the triumphs of biological science be forgotten. A name was wanted which would unite many groups of men, simple and complex, modern and archaic; and Genossenschaft was chosen. The English translator must carefully avoid Partnership; perhaps in our modern usage Company has become too specific and technical; Society also is dangerous; Fellowship with its slight flavour of an old England may be our least inadequate word. Beginning with Beseler's criticism of Savigny, the theory gradually took shape, especially in Dr Gierke's hands, and a great deal of thought, learning and controversy collected round it. Battles had to be fought in many fields. The new theory was to be philosophically true, scientifically sound, morally righteous, legally implicit in codes and decisions, practically convenient, historically destined, genuinely German, and perhaps exclusively Germanistic. No, it seems to say, whatever the Roman universitas may have been Dr and Gierke is for pinning the Roman jurists to Savignianism German our Fellowship is no fiction, no symbol, no piece of the State's machinery, no collective name for individuals, but a living organism and a real person, with body and members and a will of its own. Itself can will, itself can act; it wills and acts by the men who are its organs as a man wills and acts by brain, mouth and hand. It is not a fictitious person; it is a Gesammtperson, and its will is a Gesammtwille; it is a group-person, and its will is a group-will. This theory, which we might call Realism, may seem to carry its head among the clouds, though no higher perhaps than the Fiction Theory; but a serious effort has been made to give it feet that walk upon the earth. In one long book Dr Gierke has in great detail argued his case throughout the whole domain of practicable modern law, contending, not indeed that all German 'authority' (as an English lawyer would say) is on his side, but that he has the support of a highly respectable body of authority, express and implied, and that legislatures and tribunals fall into self-contradiction or plain injustice when they allow themselves to be governed by other theories. Nothing could be more concrete than the argument, and, though it will sometimes shew an affection for 'the German middle age' and a distrust of ancient Rome, it claims distinctively modern virtues: for instance, that of giving of the shareholder's 'share' the only lawyerly explanation that will stand severe strain. Then in another book our author has been telling the history of German Fellowship Law.' (Page xxv - xxvi) Here we have then, a categorical statement that, for the German school of thought, society was literally an organism. And this is our theme, finding examples of the idea of society as a living being, this is the idea of Super Being, a animal that takes shape only at the social level beyond the level of the individual creature, be it

bacterium, mollusc, insect, or mammal. Finding this theme repeated in a variety of places is evidence of something real, and in this section, where we are dealing with the evolution of the laws which created our social structure, we have entitled to consider this serious endeavour to understand society as a living creature as hard evidence of its being exactly that. But how will this professional elite work this idea out? Unfortunately these people are lawyers, not scientists, not biologists, nor even anthropologists or sociologists. So we do not get the right kind of interpretation for our purposes. These people were the real fabricators of social structure, so they are the people to whom we scientist should turn, just as the anthropologists of times past looked to the medicine men and the tribal rights for the nitty-gritty of social life from which they could try and construct some idea of human nature. These medieval lawyers and legal theorists and theologians, plus the nineteenth century academics and lawyers who were allied to their ideas, are our subjects, the proper subjects for those of us who are interested in founding a science of human sociobiology in which humanity is finally reduced to a uniform status with the rest of the universe. Needless to say this is a first step, an attempt to grab the attention of the academic world and force them to stop rejecting the scientific idea of human nature, and instead to give the idea that science has something to contribute to human self understanding serious consideration. From that point we can imagine that it would be fitting for the detailed relationship between theories and practice to be studied more closely, but the fact is that in these two extracts from Gierke's work there are references to the application of ideas, such as the influence of the philosopher Rousseau on the practices of the revolutionaries, and the whole point of the arguments people were coming up with was to decided how to justify, in a legal framework, the balance of power between the state and the individual. The problem with the interpretation of the idea that human society is a living being, as expressed in the section quoted above, is that, as ever, it uses the language of individuality, transferred from the individual to the social entity. We just cannot get away from this position, we have just seen that Durkheim, despite his ruthlessly logical functionalism made this solid form stand on the soft foundations of a structureless individualism. These German advocates of the corporate being were doing the same thing, they speak of society having a personal will, like that of an individual. I do not really want to try and put myself in their conceptual position, but I suppose I should. Yes, the whole point is that society has an apparent will, but it is equally obvious that this cannot be understood by thinking in terms of a personal will akin to that of an individual. I found a book in a charity shop this week which I was delighted to find had an interesting contribution to make to this subject. 'Elitism At the core of the elitist doctrine lies the belief that the history of politics is the history of elite domination. Elitists theory therefore challenges the key premises of most Western liberal assumptions about politics, the organisation of government and the 'proper' relationship between the state and civil society. As Gaetano Mosca (1939, p 50) puts it: In all societies - from societies that are very meagrely developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilisation, down to the most advanced and powerful societies - two classes of people

appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolises power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first. Hence, the nature of any society - whether it is consensual or authoritarian, dynamic or static, pacifist of totalitarian, legitimate or illegitimate - is determined by the nature of its elite. Moreover, the goals of every society are both established and manipulated by its elite (Prewitt and Stone, 1973, p. 3).' (Theory and Methods in Political Science, Elitism, Mark Evans, Macmillan, 1997, p. 228) Here we see how the erroneous thinking of these medieval priests has evolved into a full blown academic science where their modern day counterpart continue to elaborate on the idea of a social being in the guise of a wilful individual. All Christian and Moslem states are Jewish, this is the point, this point can only be realised by recognising the biological nature of the human species and thereby recognising that the social form is a natural product of the individual from. Hence the apparent contradiction which is made plain here where all societies of whatever political hue are shown to be dictatorial, an obvious absurdity on this basis, being a self contradictory statement, is resolved by recognising the unifying identity of the state be it Nazi, conservative, socialist, communist, is determined by the religious denomination which prevails. And the this sentence is the cream Moreover, the goals of every society are both established and manipulated by its elite. Precisely, and the master identity is Judaism. But once you have determined this you recognise that the core of Judaism, which unites all states, of all kinds, at all times, that are subject to the Jewish identity code, is the ideology which is best called Zionism. The Nazis, for example, were supreme Zionists, if we understand the meaning of this term to be, not the foundation of a Jewish state, but the goal of all Jewish ideology, to bring into being a world state under one God, the Jewish God. The Nazis were as Jewish as it was possible to be on this understanding, hence, the clash between the German Zionists, who in effect felt the idea but instead of their conscious focus being upon the Jewish God, they wanted it to be upon the German Jewish God, that is to say the Jewish God, unbeknown to them, because it would be known under a German name. The veil of language is stunningly powerful, but language did after all evolve to fulfil precisely this purpose of creating a social conscious that was the be all and the end all of consciousness. The apparent confusion here arises because of the delimitation of self awareness which is curtailed in each elite body by virtue of their own circumscribed identity, be it a state nationality, a racial identity, or a religious denomination or creed. But Zionism informs all these societies, and the Jews are the master race by virtue of their being the source of the ideas which have created these societies. So all these apparently disparate types of society all end up by being subject to the same core elite, exactly as these theorists rightly observe. What they do not observe is the scientific truth underlying this sensory observation that any idiot could make for themselves

given a little effort. The Western assumption, as they call it, is an individualistic interpretation of social realities, a facet of Jewish mythology, Western civilisation is simply Jewish civilisation by another name. As we have seen throughout our study this grounding of the consciousness in the fictional reality of the individual is the primary mechanism of deception which makes mythological representations of reality functional. The purpose of having authority is to invoke an ideal, that of freewill expressed in liberal traditions, for example, that is automatically nullified by virtue of the secretion the eternal autocracy hidden under the veil of linguistic imagery that is provided by the ideal cloak of democracy and liberal traditions. The cloak is in effect the process of domestication by the master identity, it takes different forms at different times, it can e fascistic, or liberal, capitalist or communist, it is irrelevant to the organism, the veil is simple a change of clothes according to the clime of the time, the purpose and direction is given by human nature, it is forever toward one unified superorganism. An identity is required to give direction and form to this natural imperative and that identity is Judaism. The truth of the matter concerning the nature of the organism's motivational qualities which we see confused with human conscious willpower, is the nature of the beast changes as we shift from the robotic purposefulness of the individual, superimposed upon the individual's sense of self-consciousness by the organism of which the individual is a part, and arrive at the full realisation of the organism from whence individual expressions of will and motivation are drawn, unbeknown to the individual. Hence Hitler did not know he was the personification of Judaism and doing the Jews bidding when he set out to eradicate Jews from Europe, in order to make himself the first master of the master race in the guise of German nationality. Or at any rate, we must assume he did not know this; although it has to be said that quite what this man thought he was doing is a puzzle to try and think about, since he was obviously going nowhere with his approach to world domination. Hitler's mad dash for power has the appearance of a man trying to win a formula one race by pressing his accelerator pedal to the floor, gripping the wheel with all his might, while shutting his eyes tight. What on earth could he possibly of thought he was going to achieve. The same applies to any great military individual acting alone, or according to a lone agenda. Hannibal's efforts were meaningless as an effort in purposeful achievement, beyond mindless destruction. Napoleon's efforts were likewise masturbatory, all self glory and military escapade without reason. But the actions of these individuals must be subject to reason in some sense, and they must of served some purpose or they simply could not of taken place. Ghengis Khan, another lone madman who simply enjoyed mass slaughter as a lifestyle, Alex the Great tit, was another. These people litter the behavioural record of the superorganism like sporadic bouts of drunken madness litter my personal record of existence. What purpose do these patterns of corporate behaviour represent, the individuals who happen to acts as the figureheads of these enterprises are clearly no more relevant than the poison that happens to swill down my gullet on any given evening, Burton's Best or Somerset Scrumpy, the direction I head in, and the reason why, is always the same. And we can safely say that this is the case whether it is, Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Ghengis, Napoleon, Hitler, Thatcher or Bush. Except, individuals such as Caesar, Thatcher and Bush, are working for an establishment toward the obvious goal of world domination, either proactively, as with Caesar and Bush, or defensively in Thatcher's case, the proactive bit having been accomplished some time before by one her predecessors. Zionism, this is always the call of the war maker, however it appears, however it is hidden. Unless, as with Ghengis, you are

outside the Jewish fold, and so you are dancing to another master identity, but then you are still strung by the same master tune, because that master tune is human corporate identity and everything humans do, or have ever done, must dance to this tune. To be less evocative, and more academic, the point is that the will of the corporate being is the force of evolution. Zionism, is the superorganic expression of Darwinian evolution. We do not expect any species other than humans to have a will, but we recognise in our ideas of evolution a progressive effort to survive in the context of a dynamic environment, we do not call this will because it clearly is not what we mean by will. Well this dynamic we see by way of the evolutionary process is manifested in the will that Gierke is seeing in the real living form of society, it is no more will than the action of a plant turning to the sun or a finch evolving to suit a niche on a recently occupied island. By always reducing the extent our focus we invoke circumscribed purpose that never tallies with an organic phenomenon such as that of evolutionary process, hence we get leaders, we get national interests, we get ethnic identities and we religious blocs. This is the mechanism of individuality central to the preservation of mythology, but natural in the manner in which evolution has produced the human superorganism. So far I have dipped into the opening pages of Maitland's introduction to his translation of Gierke's work. Already I have dragged pages of content out and rattled on about my own thoughts on the content of the ideas expressed. The fact is that the whole of Gierke's work is relevant, all we want, however, is to dip in and find evidence of the real relevance of the idea of society as an organism and the fact that in order to devise laws to create a social structure that would deliver social order on a grand scale, it was necessary to think in terms of organic form. As I read Barker's contribution to the English language version of Gierke's work I was already writing this work, and as a result I marked a couple of large junks that seemed to be jam packed with the stuff we were in need of. Consequently, I have decided to go straight to these pieces of work and present them here, and to go from there.

Barker 'Political science has thus for many centuries largely spoken the language of law, and mainly of Roman law. (Natural Law, as we shall presently see, is the term which theorists often used to grace their measure; but Natural Law, as we shall also see, is itself a conception of the Roman lawyers.) But what, we may ask, is the conception which we may properly form to-day, in our present state of experience and opinion, about the relation between political science and law? We may begin our enquiry by drawing a distinction between Society and the State. Society, or community, which in our modern life takes the form of national society or community, is a naturally given fact of historical experience. Each national society is a unity; and each expresses its unity in a common way of looking at life in the light of a common tradition, and in the development of a common culture, or way of life, in all its various forms. But each society is also a plurality. It is a rich web of contained groupsreligious and educational; professional and occupational; some for pleasure and some for profit; some based on neighbourhood and some on some other affinity; all dyed by the national colour, and yet all (or most of them) with the capacity, and the instinct, for associating themselves with similar groups in other national societies, and thus entering into some form of international connection. Such is society, at once one and many, but always, in itself, the play of a voluntary life and the operation of the voluntary activity of man. This is the material on which there is stamped the form of the State. The State, we may say, is a national society which has turned itself into a legal association, or a juridical organisation, by virtue of a legal act and deed called a constitution, which is henceforth the norm and standard (and therefore the 'Sovereign') of such association or organisation. This constitution need not be a single document: it may be a set of historical documents; and over and above that it may also be a set of unwritten constitutional conventions, backing and reinforcing whatever documents there be. Constituted by and under this constitution, and thus created by a legal act (or series of acts), the State exists to perform the legal or juridical purpose for which it was constituted. It declares and enforces, subject to the primary rule of the constitution, a body of secondary rules, or system of ordinary law, which regulates the relations of its members as 'legal persons' (a term to which we must recur in a later section), and assigns these 'persons' the rights and duties which form their 'legal personality'. It creates a scheme of working relations, in such areas of life as are susceptible of uniform and compulsory regulation, and it calls this scheme by the name of law: it creates a position for each member under the scheme, and it calls that position by the name of rights and duties. Law is the method of its operation: the rights and duties of 'persons' (which, as we shall see later, may be individuals or groups) are the objects of its operation. But though the State, and with it law, and with law the compulsory regulation of human relations in certain areas, has supervened, as it were, upon Society, Society still remains. If Society has turned itself into a legal association, it has not turned the whole of itself into that form; nor has it perished in producing the State. It still remains, with its common way of looking at life, engaged in the development of its common

culture: it still includes its rich web of groups, which may still pursue their voluntary activities in the social area not regulated by law. Behind the organised legal State there runs the life of national society; and there is thus a rich country stretching outside the four walls of State-regulated life. Before we seek to study the relation between law and political theory on the basis of these ideas, we may pause to enquire, for a moment, into Gierke's own conception of the relation between Society and the State. Gesellschaft, in his vocabulary, is the sum total of human groupings, and the general and comprehensive expression of human associations. It ranges from the universal society of all humanity down to the village and the family in the village. From this point of view the State is one of the forms of Gesellschaft; and you may thus have a general theory of Gesellschaft which colours and determines your view of the State. So far as this goes, the State is just a circle in a series of concentric circles. But Gierke seems also to have another point of view; and this point of view appears to be dominant. From this point of view, the State shifts into the centre. All other groups are arranged according to the relation in which they stand to it. There are some groups which are in the State; there are others which are side by side with it (the Church being the only example): there are others (such as federations and the general international society of States) which are above it though it is not made very clear whether this means simply that they are larger, or whether it means that they are superior. So far as this goes, the State seems to hold the interior lines. But there is still another point of view which also has to be taken into account. We have to remember Gierke's fundamental belief in the reality of the Groupperson. On this basis the State becomes a real person; but so also do those groups in the State which are more than mere partnerships or simple collections of individual persons; and so, again, does the Church, as a group which stands side by side with the State. One real Group-person may somehow be greater and more authoritative than another; but so far as they are all 'real', they all seem to be on a level. It is hardly clear how Gierke really conceives the relation of State and Society. But on the whole he seems to regard the State as a force controlling and regulating society and its various groups; and he is anxious that it should do its shaping liberally, recognising, in its regulation of groups, that it is regulating 'real persons'.' (Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800, Otto Gierke, translated by Ernest Barker, Cambridge University Press 1934, page xxii - xxiv) This section shows the organic idea of human nature trying to burst through the veil of linguistic perception which creates political authority. The authority so created by a veil of linguistic perception acts as a constraint laid upon a true interpretation of what is perceived. This authority is ultimately that which constitutes the theocracy, for it is always ultimately religious in nature, and feeds back to the preservation of the sanctity of divine knowledge. This veil must disappear, causing the authority to evaporate which makes the theocracy exist, if a true and proper account, a sociological account, that is genuinely scientific in its nature, is to be given of the nature of the relationship that is here being dealt with, that between the state and society. Despite the confusion surrounding the manner in which the matter is discussed it is still nice to see the notion of circles within circles, a concentric arrangement,

arising naturally from an attempt to comprehend social structure in the above passage. The confused presentation nonetheless represents the true state of affairs that we find in nature. Thus using the concentric model of social groups to guide our thinking it follows that the group, or circle, with the most power forms the widest circle, and this makes this elite group the most exclusive group, which means it must be the circle containing the smallest number of individuals. In any organisation this model applies, the cabinet in government comprises sixteen people in an assembly of some six hundred. The board of directors in a multinational corporation comprises a small number of people who are nonetheless, as employees, just one member of staff out of tens of thousands. Thus the widest circle of influence, that of the reach of authority, is always focused upon a central core, an inner circle. The Analogy Excuse Barker is ridiculing Gierke here by pointing out this contradiction and then saying we cannot imagine how Gierke really conceived the relationship between the state and society. It may well be that Gierke did not give a proper account, but apart from me no one ever has. It is obvious enough from this description that we are on the right track and if Barker, or anyone else, cared to make the correct conclusions, and state them, they could do it. But at the same time Gierke should indeed of made the matter plain, but as Barker explains the crucial piece of the jigsaw, the relationship between the state and the church, was never published. It appears that the impulse to use an organic model to describe social forms does not constitute enough of an impetus to oblige people to think coherently on this matter. The problem is linguistic mechanism of analogy. This mechanism involves calling things that are real, that apply to humans, and would therefore reduce humans to a level status with all living things, analogies. From this it follows that the meaning of the word artificial is artificially applied to the analogy by substituting the meaning of artificial for the meaning of the word analogy. There are legitimate analogies, humans may be considered to be machines, since the invention of the machine, and insects like ants can be likened to robots, since the invention of the idea of a robot in the 1920's. But living things are not machines, and machines are not organisms. Thus when we swap between the two it is for purposes of illustration to get an idea across. But this kind of linguistic fabrication is a gift for the person who wants to weave a false image of reality by making a double back on the application of their example. Thus we see that society is like an organism, we describe it as such, because we simply cannot comprehend it in any other way, and then, since we do not want to say society is an organism, we say that this true picture of society as being an organism is an analogy; which it patently is not. In this case something natural, the idea that society is an organism, is being described as something artificial, something that only exists because people have made it. We have already seen that there is no such thing as an artificial thing, all things are made by nature. When we use the term artificial we are merely recognising a genuine category of things and giving them a special name that suits out theological identity programme that dictates how we will think about existence. Artificial things are merely things that constitute part of the inner being of the superorganism but the exoskeletal structure relative to our status as individual beings. All ideas are artificial therefore, they constitute the mind of the organism, only some ideas are true, about physical reality, others are false, about corporate identity. The collective mind has a

conception of itself which is imbued into us and provides us with our personal sense of self consciousness. Thus I know things about myself such as my name, and my address, and who my family is and where they live. The corporate being knows things about itself such as its divine status and the uniqueness of its being. When the collective mind considers the problem of who it is in the world it learns to see itself as distinct and whenever the issue arises it works out ways of expressing this idea, the word individual, artificial, analogy, are just three simple, but powerful units of linguistic image fabrication that define the corporate self which we individuals then see, and can only see, by using according to the dictates of the priests who weave the fabric from the language that has evolved over time to create the organic form that is the superorganism which we all belong to. This notion of the corporate being having a mind, consciousness, and a sense of self has just come to me as I wrote the above, I like the sound of it, but I had better not leave it there. For a start it smacks of the poor thinking we see all the time in those who have favoured the idea of society as an organism and it is central to the account we are presently dealing with where the lawyers were keen to play with the idea of the group-person. I do not have in mind anything remotely like this, I am not trying to impose our sense of self on the superorganism. I am pleased with this idea, as I have expressed it, because it recognises the fact that all living entities have a sense of self integral to their living nature, this is perhaps the best attribute of life, self sensing, awareness of self. It might be argued that inanimate matter is self sensing in the sense that it forms bonds so that water molecules, for example, unite to form water. But if we assume a degree of complex structure, just enough to be a bacterium say, then we have something quite different to the attractive forces present in water, we have something which must be able to identify itself in order to feed or reproduce. And it is some such kind of self awareness that I am asserting must be present in the superorganism, just by virtue of its existence. Since the human organism as we know it today is the product of linguistic information in the most immediate aspects in which we are aware of it, the only way the human organism can know itself is via the flux of linguistic information ceaselessly pulsing through every fibre of its fabric. The linguistic fabric is a skin covering the underlying physiology which has substructures of the same nature of language, that exist to create the superorganic form, this is the genetic inheritance which makes for racial form, and such like mediums of identity. Individuals must be imbued with the linguistic impulse which automatically defines them as simultaneously both receptors and mediators of the message of identity which constitutes the superorganism self knowledge. Individuals then think their possession of corporate identity in the form of the corporate being's self knowledge is their own personal self knowledge, but this is clearly not the case. And that it is not the case is all too evident when we look at the nature of the corporate identity that is imbued into individuals, by which I mean the extraordinarily bizarre religious formulas people sustain as identity programmes. But the real subtlety in this argument comes from recognising the detail of the linguistic code which is the real medium of identity. It is easy to see that all religious ideas are complete and utter nonsense, and it is possible to discuss this, and while some people are liable to become obsessed with religion, many just accept it as a necessary aspect of life and do not get carried away with the idiocy of the ideas. On this basis, the ability to be detached and pragmatic about the bizarre knowledge of religion, it is easy to dismiss the idea that we are all controlled in our thinking by a collective mind, but the point is that if this were so, it goes without saying the

corporate mind and our own mind would be seamlessly united into one and we would have no way to recognise it. This is in fact the case, and the means by which this harmonisation is achieved by evolution is the physiology of language which gives us a form that is imbued with the corporate mind as we become integrated into the corporate being during our acquisition of language and the linguistic product, culture. But how are we to recognise this fact? The answer has already been given. We decoded the words that control the way we think. Words like artificial are shown to be completely fraudulent once we know the truth about our own nature. We begin to gain this insight once we start by decoding the easier mythological words like God, which we know is the code word for superorganism. But now we see that the game gets so much more complex, words like analogy, are perfectly valid, but having been established as part of a developed intellectual tradition, they transform into perfect mediums of the idea of artificiality, which we have just recognised is a false word in the first place! Thus the new words with real meaning come into being and play a role of distancing our ability to past the linguistic veil that our language imposes upon us. Thus the veil develops depth, opacity, and colour. It becomes a beautiful thing, we love it, we know it, it is us. Except, it isn't, it is the superbeing imposing itself upon our consciousness, and in doing this the superorganism knows itself, it knows itself because it makes each of us a part of itself, this is what makes the Super Being real. And religious mythology carries this image, passes it to us, and this is why religion becomes the all powerful medium of identity that it is. And while we may recognise the obscene silliness of religious ideology easily enough if we care to, we do not see that the words we use are equally silly. Now I have explained the matter however, we can ask of the most sensible words, such as artificial, why do we use this word when there are no such things as artificial things, all things are made by Nature? Of course if you insist upon adhering to the strictly theistic line that there is such a thing as an individual and these individuals, what is more, are the be all and end all of existence, so that society exists only to serve the requirements of the individuals who choose that society exists in a form which fulfils them, then you will refuse to accept the premise on which I am arguing. But it follows that if there is no such thing as an individual, if the human animal is a superorganism and all their creations are just exoskeletal material produced according to rules that run from the genetic foundations through the linguistic extension of information, then it follows that these misleading words, which are in truth nonsensical, exist for exactly the same reason that the mythologies they support and sustain exist, to create a collective consciousness. We can then ask why we use stupid words like 'artificial' with as much disdain as we ask why must sustain such stupid ideologies as those of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and the social structures which go along with them. If the message changes the identity changes. A change of identity represents the death of the superorganism. The Druidic organism is dead, killed by the Romans. The Ancient Egyptian, possibly the most long lived superorganism, the Inca, the identity of these beings, in linguistic terms is dead, their identity message is therefore deceased, no longer being broadcast. Only Judaism is emitted in each of the territories occupied by these dead organisms, some them once vast superorganisms. There is an interesting paragraph in Durkheim's work on methodology which concerns this matter, but we will look at this in a little while. This issue, the nature of life that is at the heart of the science of biology, came to the fore during the nineteenth century, because of the advance of science, this is why we see the rise of the organic idea in the consciousness of people. As is made

plain by Darwin's publication of The Origin of Species in 1859, by the work of Spencer used in this present work, by that of Ouspensky who is driven to construct an elaborate model of organic analogies to extend the organic logic of his mythological mind set which uses analogies, or linguistic programmes, that go back to some of the earliest known records of civilisation. We even find in Durkheim's first work on The Division of Labour in Society, a discussion that uses the idea of society as an organic structure, something we will consider briefly, shortly. Despite the organic nature of the model Gierke is providing, and the whole philosophy of Super Being with which Gierke is concerned, it appears he had no actually organic conception of society. It is for this reason, the failure to grasp that humans are a superorganic organism, just as ants are, where the relationship of the core to the outer limit is one of the queen to the nest, where the core forms a physical concentration of identity that is disseminated outward to embrace all under the same authority, that he failed to meet the confusion Barker complains of, and so fails to give us the solution we need when seeking to understand how society can be a true living organism as Gierke, according to Barker, insisted it was. Groups are in effect organs of a body, this fact does find expression in the way Gierke presents his idea. But if we get to grips with this idea properly we should recognise that while linear models are the way we work in order to develop our models of society, giving us a two dimensional conception of concentric organisation according to a hierarchy of power, the must be a real form which must be three dimensional. This real form should be understood in terms of distinct groups constituting physical units in structural arrangement such as Spencer describes where we have differentiation based on interlocking dependence. This interdependence being united under an authority that arises from one focal organ, or group, wherefrom arises identity toward which obedience is offered in acceptance of authority. With the conception of society as an organism like any other, rather than an organism like a unique individual person, it becomes self evident that we are seeking an ultimate identity resident at the core of the model which motivates the outer rings all the way from the centre to the edge. We are not therefore looking for an ultimate physical entity such as the State. This is the same in the case of a physical body such as that which we each constitute as individuals. The body has a structural arrangement of parts which can be described on a hierarchical basis according to the centrality of their role in the maintenance of the life of the body as a whole. Such a scheme could then be described as a concentric model with the highest value organs being located at the centre. But we would look to the one core centre of command that informed the whole hierarchical structure, and, coming back to the social context, we would see that the reason the state cannot shake of the existence of the church as an apparently competing structural entity is because in truth it is the church that stands alone as the 'soul', or identity, or mind, or consciousness, of the organism. Whereas, at best, the state, as a physical entity, can only be considered a brain plus nervous system, an organ in other words. Obviously our minds cannot be separated from our brains, although amazingly enough this very idea is a tenet of Jewish belief that gives rise to all the nonsense about a soul, a spiritual force, a life beyond death! It is the act not the being that makes a thing what it is. A pen is just an inert piece of matter until it writes at the behest of an intelligence. A brain is just a piece of grey organic matter unless it is alive. We must suppose then, that a state is simple an institutional structure unless it is used by a motivating force, by Zionism, to achieve a purpose, such as world domination. That is the way Nature made the deal, it is

nothing else. People do not carry a state or national identity constituting the ultimate circle it is, bounded by the physical limit of territory, and the language and culture, contained within inside their beings as the ultimate expression of identity. National identity, like racial, or tribal identity, is an important attribute of corporate identity, but these structures are just that, structural elements, they act more as means of limiting the extension of identity and thus aiding in the cementation of the living tissue into the structure of the exoskeleton. In an age of global theism only religious identity has no territorial limit. Physical boundaries are impervious to religion and this is why we see the Diaspora of Judaism acting as the organic carriers of the core identity, the neural network of the command structure, enabled to disperse through the exoskeleton of the extended reaches of the organism that the Jewish identity has given rise to by creating two subidentity programmes which create their own characteristic exoskeletal structures within which Jews are able to exist in small numbers, while preserving microcosms of their own essential exoskeletal structures too, such as their synagogue and law courts and so on. Within the Christian and Moslem tissue of the Jewish superorganism that Jewish tissue forms a nervous tissue network, and where the Jewish tissue concentrates, as in America, here the focus of this nervous tissue becomes especially dense and functions like a brain centre, which is exactly what we see in actual fact with the American continent, despite the modern age of knowledge being the most debased and degraded of al societies in the world today for its passionate expression of religious fervour which makes the people the most abject tool of the Jewish core organ that is ensconced within the centre of global power, from which it draws wealth to achieve its goal of world domination under Jerusalem. All these features of the human social world are thus easily accounted for by a purely biological model of human nature once we know that human nature is corporate, evolved to form an organism at the social level. The Major Exposition of Barker on the State of Super Being Here we must pause to draw a distinction. It is one thing to plead the cause of liberty of associations: it is another thing at any rate it is a further thing, and an or added consideration plead that associations are beings or minds or real persons. If to we confine ourselves to the simple ground of liberty of association, there is much that we shall admit, or rather claim, even on that simple ground. We can argue that liberty of association was impeded in Germany by the law of imperialist Rome, especially in the expanded (or should we say tightened?) form in which it had come to be interpreted by the Romanist lawyers, who turned the scattered dicta to be found in Roman law into a body of doctrine that might sometimes have amazed Justinian's advisers. We can argue that the modern State should lay a cool and easy hand on the formation and action of associations limiting their formation by making a not specific concession necessary in each case, and not tying their action down within the limits of such concession. We can admit that our English State, in a casual and haphazard way, and largely owing to the growth of our 'equitable' law of trusts, which has enabled associations to form themselves and to act behind the screen of trustees, has been generally easy-handed, though it has sometimes taken away with the right hand of the common law much of what it had conceded with the left hand of equity. We can equally admit that the various States of Germany afforded no such shelter;

that associations here had to face the inquisitive eye of government unsheltered by any screen; and that a general theory which would protect liberty of association was a more urgent necessity in Germany than it has ever been in England. What was that general theory to be? Was it possible to find a theoretical basis for liberty of association, without recourse to a doctrine of the real personality of groups? In imagination we may frame for ourselves an answer to the first of these questions, which will enable us also to answer the second, and to answer it in the affirmative. We may say that the modern State, which is based on the consent of the governed and respects the liberty of individuals, is bound by its very nature to acknowledge the liberty of individuals to associate with one another, provided that the purpose of such association is compatible with its own purpose and well-being as the general and comprehensive association of all individuals. We may go further, and we may say that the acknowledgment of liberty of association should be expressed in a general law of associations, which translates the principle into detail and formulates its consequences. The historical State, as it has grown in time, has scattered its rules about associations under different heads, according to the accidents of its growth: it may even have deposited discrepant rules in different branches of its law Germanist rules which conflict with Romanist; rules of equity which diverge from the rules of common law. The modern State, as it stands to-day, may well unify these rules, and unify them in view of its own developed character as a free association of free individuals. Such an answer to the problem of associations may be accused of doctrinaire and individualistic liberalism. Associations, it may be said, are something more than a liberty of individuals to associate: they are entities in themselves, or at any rate they become such entities in the course of their development. To explain their freedom by the freedom of individuals to associate with one another is to leave them without either body or animating soul: it is to dissolve their life into a lifeless nexus of contractual relations between the associated members, and to forget the pulsation of a common purpose which surges, as it were from above, into the mind and behaviour of the members of any true group. Whether or no we pin our own faith to such a view, we may recognise that it was natural to a German thinker in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 'You who live to the west of the Rhine', he might say, 'with your democratic States which themselves seem to rest on a basis of contract, may talk of groups in general only your State, but also your churches and colleges and all not sorts of unions the products of freedom of contract. We live to the east of the as Rhine, and we live in our own German world. Our State is interpreted to us as a mind and a personality; and if we do not ascribe to our groups some mind and personality, where will they be, in the face of this great spiritual Leviathan? We have no protecting screen of trustees to shelter our groups; and the heat of the State is a fiery heat. Unless we make them real in the same sort of way as our State is interpreted as being real, they will hardly survive at all. Our German form of liberalism must be the vindication of the reality of the group: that is our one way of saving some sort of liberty, other than the liberty of the State to be what it likes and to do what it will. For this reason we can claim the sympathy, and expect the support, of you who are western Liberals. Surely you will recognise that our groups must have real personality if they are to have any real libertyany power of owning funds and pursuing policies and moving at large as free agents in the general world of action?' The problem of liberty of association thus carries us forward, after all, into the problem of the real personality of associations. Is an association, then, a 'reality', an 'organism', a 'personality'? Reality, we may reply, is a term of high metaphysics; and

it lies beyond our scope. Organism is a term of biology, or, at the most, of biological metaphor; but our business is with human society, and before we seek to walk by the uncertain and lunar light of biological metaphor, we must study the essential language which is proper to such society. Personality is a term which belongs to that essential language. It is a term of psychology, of ethics, and of law; and since political science is vitally connected with those studies, it is also a term of political science. We may therefore address ourselves to that term: we may seek to define its exact connotation; and in the light of such definition we may then be able to suggest in what sense a Group State, a Church, a Trade Union, a college, a club a may properly be described as a person. There are three main senses in which we use the term ' personality'; and they correspond to the three studies of psychology, ethics and law. In the first place, there is psychological personality. By this we mean, primarily, the power or capacity of self-consciousness which belongs to a sentient being aware of its own sensations. We also mean, secondarily, a power or capacity of self-determination, by considerations of pleasure and pain, which arises from such self-consciousness, and turns it into a higher activity than its primary activity of awareness. Psychological personality, by its nature, is resident in an individual being who is a focus and centre of sentiency. In the second place, there is moral personality. Here we come upon a term which has had two historic usages, and by which we are therefore apt to be perplexed. In its first and intrinsic usage, it signifies the power or capacity of a self-conscious and rational being to determine himself, not by temporary and particular considerations of pleasure and pain, but by permanent and universal considerations of a right way of conducting life which is common to all such beings. Moral personality, in this sense, is built upon psychological personality; but it transcends that upon which it is built. Like psychological personality, it is resident in the individual being; but it is only resident in him in so far as he recognises that he is not unique, but shares with his fellows a common life and common rules of life. But besides this first and intrinsic usage, there has been another usage of the term 'moral personality'. It has been used, by many legal writers, as a term of law. It has been used, without any ethical implication, to signify the legal power or capacity of a group, which, without being a 'natural' or 'physical' person, acts in the same sort of way as such a person in the sphere of legal action. Here the word moral is used in much the same sense as when we speak of a moral certainty or a moral victory. We need not quarrel with the usage, provided that we are clear that it is peculiar, and that it belongs exclusively to the sphere of law; but in our own argument the term moral personality will be confined to what we have called its first and intrinsic usage. It will be a term of ethics, and of ethics only. It will denote the power or capacity of moral action. There is a third use of the term personality, which belongs to the sphere of law. Legal personality, as distinct from psychological and ethical personality, is a power or capacity for legal actiona capacity recognised by law (and only existing when recognised by law) for originating such action as belongs to the scheme of law. From this point of view the existence of legal personality not only presupposes, as that of moral personality does, the presence of human society: it also presupposes the presence of an organised legal association. It is a thing bound up with rights; in fact it is a capacity for rights; and rights, in the full sense of the word, are only possible in such an association. Now rights may belong, and obviously do belong, to groups as well as to individuals. In the field of the organised legal association we must therefore assign legal personality to groups as well as to individuals, and here we have

to admit that there are Group-persons as well as individual persons. Legal personality differs from psychological and moral personality: it is not only resident in individual beings: it is also resident in any group of such beings which serves, in the legal sphere, as a single entity. To discover the exact nature, or being, or essence, of this entity may be difficult; but the fact of its existence is obvious. The organised legal association itself other words, the State an entity which possesses and in is exercises rights, and to which we must therefore ascribe a legal personality. In brief, the State is a legal person, or, as the Germans say, a 'Subject'. Similarly many of the groups contained in the State are legal persons. They have a capacity for rights; and a capacity for rights means a legal personality. In the area of the organised legal association, and under the category of legal personality which belongs to that area, we have thus to reckon with the fact that there are Group-persons as well as individual persons. The association itself, as the great and inclusive group, is a Group-person: contained groups, in so far as they own and exercise rights, are group-persons; and both these 'clusters' or constellations of personality, the one great and the many lesser, exist by the side of the innumerable 'points' of individual personality. How are we to conceive the being and the essence of these Group-persons? The individual himself, as a 'point' of personality, is simple. He is essentially one single psychological and moral person who also acts as a a single legal person. But the 'cluster' or group is complex, or at any rate twofold. It is both 'itself' (whatever that may be) and all the individuals of which it is composed. How can it be both, at one and the same time? How does its unity stand related to its multiplicity? We may note some three different answers to this question which recur, like different and dissonant notes, in the pages of Gierke's argument. The first answer takes the form of the Fiction theory. According to this theory, the real fact behind the existence of a legal group is the fact of the many individuals of which it is composed, and the unity of such a group is only a pretence or fiction. When the group acts as one, and enjoys rights as a single person, that person is only a persona ficta; and if it be asked who it is that pretends or feigns this person into its fictitious existence, the answer will be that the State, or, more exactly, the sovereign of the State, is the great and magnificent maker of fictions. The Fiction theory may also be termed the Concession theory; or at any rate we may say that it leads, by a natural descent, to the idea that the unity of a legal group is due to an act of concession by the authority of the State. We may also note a further variant of the Fiction theory. This is the theory of the 'Moral' person, which has already been mentioned incidentally. According to this theory a group which acts as one, and enjoys rights as a single person, should properly be described as a persona moralis. But it is far from clear that the change of adjective, from ficta to moralis, imports any change of tense, or gives us any new light. The adjective 'moral' is only used in a negative sense, as the antithesis of 'natural' or 'physical'. It only suggests that a legal group is something which is somehow different from the natural and physical fact of a corporeal human being. And the danger of the adjective is twofold. On the one hand it blurs the old (though possibly erroneous) distinction between real and fictitious persons by the suggestion of a dim interlunar person which is neither. On the other hand it encourages a confusion of thought which turns the 'moral person' into something ethical and good; and Rousseau, in his theory of the personne morale whose general will is always right, seems to fall into this confusion.

A second answer to our problem is provided by the Collective theory. According to this theory we need not concern ourselves to discover the unity of a Group-person, whether in the pretence of a persona ficta or in the semi-pretence of a persona moralis. Such a thing as a single Group-person does not exist at all, even in a fictitious or semi-fictitious form. The one fact is a number of persons; and this number of persons (let us say, exempli gratia, 100) are not united in any genuine unity when they act as a group they are simply collected in an aggregate, as when we collect arithmetical figures in a sum, or algebraical symbols in a bracket. A group of 100 is 1 + 1 + 1, until we reach the sum 100. The legal instrument of manipulation, for the purpose of collecting a number of individuals in a single aggregate, is contract. It is contract which unites the first individual to the second, the second to the third, and so on to the hundredth individual. We may therefore call this theory a theory of the Collective contract, or again we may call it, as Maitland has done, in the language of mathematical metaphor, the Bracket theory. There is a variant of this theory which at first sight seems not merely a variant, but something totally different, and yet, in reality, rests on the same fundamental basis. This is what Gierke calls the Representative theory. According to this theory a group of 100 persons is something more than 100 persons collected together by contract. It is really 99 represented persons plus a hundredth person who is then: representative, and who has been appointed to his position by the act and deed of each of the 99. This representative person carries in himself the persons of the 99: in his person they become one person; and unity thus supervenes, or seems to supervene, on multiplicity. In reality, however, the Representative theory is simply the Collective theory taken at two bites. Contract, and addition of units achieved by process of contract, is still its basis. The 99 first contract, by one sort of contract, with one another; and they then contract, by another sort, with a hundredth person. The whole group of 100 persons remains a contractual group; and although Hobbes, the great apostle of this Representative theory, may argue that his Leviathan is a creative essence of unity, transcending the sphere of contract, Leviathan is himself, after all, included in a contractual bracket, and it is this including bracket of contract which really creates such unity as Leviathan himself appears, but only appears, to provide. We come to the third of the theories which seek to explain the inner core of legal Group-persons. This is Gierke's own theorythe theory of the reality of the Group-person. When we seek to discover what lies behind the legal Group-person, and constitutes its inner core, we must not talk of 'fictions' which hover in a shadowy and unreal existence above a number of real individuals; we must not talk of 'collections' or 'brackets' or contractual nets, flung over so many individuals to bind them one to another in the bonds of an impersonal nexus. We must purge our eyes to see something which is real and not fictitious something which has living personality, and is not an impersonal nexus. We must believe that there really exists, in the nature of things itself, such a thing as a real Group-person, with a real being or essence which is the same in kind as that of the individuals who are its members. 'Itself can will, itself can act', in the same way that they will and act. When 100 persons unite to form a group which wills and acts as one, we must say that there is a real new person presentthe hundred and first person, the super-person which in these 100 individuals live and have their being, at the same time that they also continue to live and have their being as so many separate persons. Behind the legal Group-person there is therefore a real Group-being, just as there is a real individual human being behind the individual legal person. Legal group-personality is the shadow cast by real group-personality: it is the reflection of reality in the mirror of

law. The law does not write fiction, and it does not do sums in addition, when it introduces its legal Group-persons; it simply paints, to the best of its power, a legal portrait of a real being. This was the view which Gierke sought to express in his rectorial address of 1902 on the 'Nature of Human Groups'. It is best expressed in his own words; and we may therefore quote some essential paragraphs from that address. 'Do social life-unities actually exist? No direct proof of their existence can be given; but it is equally impossible to prove directly the existence of any individual life-unity. We can furnish, however, an indirect argument for the existence of such unities by pointing to their effects. The cogency of such a method of argument will not be the same for all. Its weight will depend in part on our general attitude to life. But even the foundations of scientific investigation which seem to be fixed most firmly are only, in the last resort, well-grounded hypotheses. 'Primarily, it is our external experience which impels us to assume the existence of active and effective group-unities. We find from our observation of the social processes among which our life is spent and, above all, from any profound study of the history of humanitythat nations and other communities determine by their activities the balance of forces in our world, and produce our material and spiritual civilisation. Now just because communities are composed of individuals, we must admit that it is in individuals, and through individuals, that these results are produced. But since the contributions of individuals are involved in the social nexus in which they live and move, we must equally acknowledge that individuals are affected by bodily and mental influences which arise from the fact of their connection. We observe, it is true, that certain outstanding individuals intervene creatively, and modify society by something unique which is derived from them and them only. But an achievement of this nature is only possible when the community, at the very least, co-operates receptively, by appropriating as its own the individual element which has been imported into it. It is possible to hold very different opinions about the extent to which the active force, which has been operative in great transformations of the common life, proceeds from groups or from individuals. But whether we prostrate ourselves in a one-sided worship of "Heroes", or abandon ourselves to an equally onesided "collective" view of history, we can never be blind to the fact that there is a constant interaction between the two factors. In any case, therefore, the community is something active and effective. Now the effects which we are obliged to ascribe to the community are so constituted, that they cannot be explained as the result of a mere aggregation of individual elements. They cannot be produced separately by separate human beings, in such a way that the total contribution can be regarded as a sum which is similar in kind to the partial contributions, and only greater in degree: they are sui generis. We have only to consider phenomena such as the organisation of power, or law, or the social code (Sitte), or national economy (Volkswirthschaft), or language, in order to realise this fact at once. If this is true of the effects, then it follows that the community which produces them must also be something different from the sum of the individuals who constitute it. It must be a Whole, with a lifeunity which is itself super-individual. We do not, therefore, transcend in any way the limits of our external experience, if we argue from the facts of the history of civilisation to the existence of real group-unities. The abstract conception of real group-unity, which we attain by emphasising the efficient cause we have thus discovered, is a conception which we are justified in applying, as an axiomatic scientific conception, in the whole range of the social sciences. ' Our internal experience corroborates the truth which we learn from external experience. We discover the reality of the community in our own inner consciousness,

as well as in the world of external fact. The incorporation of our Ego in a social Being of a higher order is a matter of our own inner life. We are conscious of our self as a being enclosed in itself; but we are also conscious of our self as a part of a living whole which is operative in us. If we abstract our membership of our particular nation and State, our religious community and Church, our family and a variety of other groups and associations, we cannot recognise ourselves in the pitiable residue. But if we reflect on all these factors, we see that there is here no question of merely external bonds and fetters by which we are chained. It is a matter of psychical connections which extend down into our inmost being, and constitute integral parts of our spiritual existence. We feel that a part of the impulses which determine our activity proceeds from the communities by which we are permeated. We are conscious that we share in a life of community. If we derive from our internal experience a certainty of the reality of our Ego, this certainty is not limited to the fact of our being an individual life-unity: it also extends to the fact of our being a partunity within the higher life-unities. It is true that we cannot discover these higher lifeunities themselves within our consciousness. The Whole cannot be within us, because we are only parts of the Whole. We can only learn directly from our internal experience the simple fact that group-unities exist: we cannot learn from it directly anything about their character. Indirectly, however, we can deduce, from the effects of communities upon us, the conclusion that social Wholes are of a corporeal-spiritual nature. We can do so because these effects consist of spiritual processes which are corporeally mediated. This is the reason why we speak, not only of social "bodies" and their "members", but also of the folk-soul, folk-feeling, folk-opinion and folkwill class-spirit (Standesgeist), esprit de corps, family-feeling and the like. We of use these terms to denote psychical forces with an active life and a reality which are not least present to our consciousness in the very moment when, calling our individuality into play, we rise in revolt against them. In our ordinary daily life any effort of attentive introspection will suffice to convince us of the existence of these spiritual forces. But there are times when the spirit of the community reveals itself to us with an elemental power, in an almost visible shape, filling and mastering our inward being to such an extent that we are hardly any longer conscious of our individual existence, as such. Here, in Berlin, in the Unter den Linden, I lived through such an hour of consecration on the 15th of July, in the year 1870.' ¹ (¹ On July 13th, William I of Prussia had interviewed the French envoy, Benedetti, at Ems. He sent a telegram describing the events of the 13th to Bismarck. Bismarck published the telegram, in a condensed form which he had prepared for the press. The effect of the publication on German opinion was instantaneous, and produced a profound emotion. It is this emotion which Gierke describes. It is also this emotion which serves for him as evidence of the existence of a spiritual reality, or personality, which transcends the individual.) We have now traversed three territories in our study of the different theories of the Group-person territory of the Fiction; the territory of the contractual the Collection; the territory of Real Group-personality. Shall we settle down in any of the three, or may we explore still further? Gierke has spoken, in a passage of some irony, of 'the eye resolved upon "reality" which refuses to recognise, in the living and permanent unity of the existence of a People, anything more than an unsubstantial shadow'. But perhaps the eye which is resolved upon realitywhich seeks, in other words, to face the really perceived facts of actual life, and to square its theories with

these facts may discover something which is more than an unsubstantial shadow, and yet less than real Group-personality; something above a fiction or a collection, and yet less than a super-person. If we seek to explore new territory in this spirit, we may begin our argument from a distinction which has already been assumed in a previous passage distinction between Society and the State. A Society is a the community of human beings who seek to fulfil the general purposes of human life in all its aspects. A State is an association of the same beings, in legal form, for the specific purpose of regulating human life, in the sphere of external action, by rules designed to secure the minimum of friction between its members and the maximum of their development. The State is a sphere of legal action: we may even call it the scene of a legal drama (a ????? involving a common and concerted performance of parts). It is a place of legal actors, all of whom play a role, and each of whom may be called a dramatis persona. There is a sense in which we may say that all the State is a stage, and all the agents within it are actors. In this sense it may be called artificial, like the stage itself (and yet, like the stage, it holds a mirror up to nature); and in the same sense those who walk across its boards may be called artificial persons. In order to understand this sense, we must examine the term persona. In its original meaning, the word was a term of the theatre. It signified a mask, appropriate to the part performed by him, which was worn by an actor in a play. The usage of the theatre was carried into the law. The agents who played an active part under its scheme, or possessed a capacity for playing such a part, were regarded as having personae, and came, by a natural transference, to be called personae themselves. Now just as the parts in a play are created and assigned by the dramatist and the producer, so we may hold that personae in law are created and assigned by similar agencies us say, for the moment, by the legislator and the judge. And just as let there is an element of feigning, or even if artificiality, about the parts of a play, so there is also an element of feigning, or even of artificiality, about personae in law. They are, in a sense, juridical creations, or artifices, or fictions. The term persona ficta is not altogether wrong (though, as we shall see, it is far from being the whole of the truth), if we apply it to all forms of legal personalitynot only to the legal person of the group, but also to the legal person of the individual. Pufendorf held this doctrine, as we may see from the account which Gierke gives of his views. One of his disciples, Titius, puts the matter simply, when he says that jurisprudence deals almost exclusively with 'moral persons' (that is to say, artificial persons), whether they are singular or compound other words, whether they are individuals or groups. It is in not the natural Ego which enters a court of law. It is a right-and-duty-bearing person, created by the law, which appears before the law. Legal personality, therefore, is a mask, or as Pufendorf says a modus, which is created by an agency, and attached by that agency to an object. Two questions thus arise. What is the creating and attaching agency, and by what processes does it act? What are the objects to which the mask is attached? In general terms, the creating agency which attaches personae to objects (or, as a German writer would say, to 'Subjects') is the whole legal association. Every person who is a person in the eye of the law is made such, in the last resort, by that general body. In actual detail, the process of recognition will proceed along various channels. Normally, the regular process will be that of legislation, accompanied and applied by judicial interpretation. But the judge will not necessarily stop at an exact interpretation of the mere letter of existing law. He may recognise legal personality (at any rate when he is dealing with the matter of group-personality) on the ground of analogy, assigning personae to bodies which are in an analogous position to those

already recognised under existing law. He may give recognition, again, on the ground of custom and usage, arguing, like Julianus in the Digest, that inveterata consuetudo pro lege non immerito custoditur, and acting on the principle that where a group has been allowed by custom to act as a legal person, it may properly be treated as such by law. One State will differ from another in the degree of liberality with which the gift of legal personality is made. States will also differ (when the question is one of Group-personality) in the number of masks or personae which they keep, as it were, in stock. One State may only be able to provide the mask of full corporate personality. It may only keep in stock the persona of the universitas; and since that mask is hard to fit, and not suited for all, such a State may be chary in giving it. Another State may be in the position of a Clarkson's shop: it may be a general repertory of masks; and here Group-persons may abound because there are different forms which they are able to assume. The English State, we may say, has been a State of this latter character. It has not only supplied the mask of the Corporation: it has also furnished the mask (we may even call it, with Maitland, the 'screen', because it conceals a group so thoroughly) of the Trust and its body of trustees. In Germany, when Gierke began to write, the State was less richly equipped: it was thus more chary in giving; and it was also more rigorous in superintending what it had given. We have dealt with the giving of masks: we have now to deal with the objects to which they are given. So far, we may seem to have simply adopted the Concession theory, which explains Group-personality as the grant of the State, and to have made it even worse by making it cover individual persons as well as the persons of groups. But just as we have argued that there is some truth, though by no means all, in the Fiction theory, so we may also argue that there is some truth (though again it is not the whole of the truth) in the cognate theory of Concession. There is a sense in which all legal personality is a concession made by the State. But having said this we must instantly ask ourselves whether the State is free to choose, at its own discretion, the objects to which it concedes that personality; or whether it is not rather bound, by its own very nature, to concede such personality to certain objects, in virtue of their nature. After all, if masks are to fit and be worn and used, there must be appropriate objects behind them. What is the nature of these objects? And which of them are entitled, in virtue of their proper nature, to claim the award of legal personality? Historically the State, in dealing with this problem, would seem to have acted with no little arbitrariness. It has been chary of giving legal personality to individuals, as well as to groups. For many centuries slaves had no legal personality. For many centuries women had an inferior grade of personality. Even to-day the State seems to pick and choose, within certain limits, the persons whom it consents to vest with full legal personality. In France the penalty of 'civil death' may deprive an offender of civil rights, and prevent him from being a person at all in the eye of the law. In other countries the members of a racial minority may be visited with partial deprivation of rights and the partial loss of legal personality. If individuals have thus been treated with some latitude of discretion, we can hardly be astonished if the State has claimed an even greater latitude in the award of legal personality to groups. Far from granting such personality to all groups, it has often been tempted to limit it to a few. It has judged the issue of giving or withholding the grant not by the inherent nature or the just claims of the group, but by the prospect of advantage or menace to itself which would follow on the giving or the withholding. But if history seems to show that the State has exercised a power of selection in the award of legal personality, we need not conclude that the power of selection has been guided by mere discretion, or by mere calculations of self-interest. There has

been a principle of selection, determined by the very nature of the State; and this principle has been progressively clarified and extended. The State, we have said, is by its nature an association designed to secure the minimum of friction, and the maximum of development, among all the moral personalities which are members of that association. From this point of view, it will necessarily be guided by a definite principle in selecting the recipients of the guaranteed capacity of action within the scheme of its life which constitutes legal personality. Primarily, it will award legal personality to every individual who possesses moral personality, in the primary and intrinsic sense of that word. Secondly, it will award legal personality to every organising idea, every common purpose, which permanently unites a number of individuals as the common content of their minds and the common intention of their wills, provided that such idea and purpose are compatible, or to the extent that they are compatible, with the free action and development of all members of the State. In the first case, the recipient of legal personality is the individual moral person. In the second, it is not a moral person who is vested with a guaranteed capacity of legal action. Neither is it, strictly speaking, a number of such persons. It is a common and continuing purpose, continuously entertained by a continuing body of persons, which owns the capacity and constitutes the legal person. The 'person' which owns the property of an Oxford or Cambridge college is neither the founder, now gone, nor the body of his living successors. It is the purpose which animated the founder and which continues (it may be, as we shall see, in a new and modified form) to animate his successors. In order to develop and explain this view, it will be well to go back to what has already been said about the different kinds of personality (psychological, moral and legal), and to show the bearing of that distinction upon our present argument. Psychological personality, we have said, is a spring of self-consciousness and a fountain of self-determination by immediate considerations of sense. In the words of Leibniz, which really apply to this species of personality, 'Persona est cujus aliqua voluntas est, seu cujus datur cogitatio, affectus, voluptas, dolor'. Such personality is resident only in an individual. He alone is a spring of self-consciousness and a fountain of self-determination. No group has personality in this sense; and if it is this personality which is 'real' personality, no group is a 'real' person. But there is also moral personality. This is the personality of a moral agent, who acts under a self-imposed moral rule, and who is morally responsible for any offence against that rule. This personality, again, is resident only in an individual. A group is not a moral being in the moral sphere. It is a number of individual moral beings, all acting together for a purpose. That purpose may well be a factor, and a factor of profound influence, in the moral sphere; but the group itself is not a moral person, acting as such in the moral sphere. From the moral point of view we may again say what we said from the psychological group has personality in this 'no sense, and if it be this personality which is "real" personality, no group is a "real" person'. This may seem a hard saying, and a saying which contradicts the life and speech of mankind. We speak of the munificence of groups: we find one group recording its gratitude for the munificence of another; and are not munificence, and its sister gratitude, moral attributes, which presuppose the presence of a moral personality? Again, as we award praise, so we also award blame: we award it, as Maitland has said, 'to group-units of all sorts and kinds'; we may even speak of 'national sin'. Do not our awards of praise and blame imply that we attach moral

responsibility to groups, and that we treat them as responsible persons in the usual sense of the word? It is difficult to give any brief answer to such searching questions; but this may be said. Responsibility is a word which is used both in a legal and a moral sense. We have to distinguish carefully between the two senses. Legal responsibility may be fully and absolutely incurred by all groups which act as legal persons fully and as absolutely as it is incurred by an individual legal person. It is as true that it is not always fully incurred by all such groups under our English system of law. The State itself, when it acts as a legal person, incurs only a modified responsibility if it breaks its contracts, and little if any responsibility if it inflicts a tort or injury. But apart from such exceptions, which it is difficult to defend, we may lay it down that all groups, when acting as legal persons, incur full legal responsibility. It is a very different matter to say that a group incurs, or ever can incur, a moral responsibility. There is no moral being of the group which can be visited with our praise or blame. There is no moral personality of the group which does good, or is responsible for evil. But this is not to say that there is no moral responsibility anywhere. On the contrary, when the action of a group runs contrary to a recognised moral rule, there will be a large area of such responsibility. Those who advised and promoted the action will be morally responsible. Those who supported the action will be morally responsible. Even those who accepted the action, as consenting parties, will also be morally responsible. Moral responsibility falls only on the individual moral agent. But it falls on him in full measure, alike when he is acting with others and when he is acting alone. It is a dangerous doctrine which would avert it from him, and make it fall on any transcendent being. From the personality which is psychological, and the personality which is moral, we now turn to that which is legal. This is a personality of a different order. Psychological personality is a datum of immediate perception. Moral personality is a datum of moral consciousness. Legal personality is something which is not a datum. It is a mental construction, or juristic creation. It has, as we have seen, a certain character of artificiality; and it has this character both when it is ascribed, as it is in the vast majority of cases, to an individual, and when it is ascribed, as it is in other cases, to the purpose in pursuing which a number of individuals are joined. We cannot say that legal personality in the one sort of case is an artifice, and in the other not. There is no difference of kind between them though there may be a difference of degree, and one sort of case may present more of artifice than the other. But we must not unduly labour the notion of artifice. Legal personality is a mental construction; but it is not therefore a fiction. It is a juristic creation a legally created capacity of sustaining rights and duties, which are also legal creations themselves; but it does not follow that it is not something real. In one sense it is artificial, as all things thought into being by us are artificial. In another and deeper sense it is real, as all things thought into permanent being by us are real. If we ascribe reality to the general body of law, which itself has been thought and willed into permanent being by the mind of man, we must equally ascribe it to the essential elements of law, which have been similarly thought and willed into permanent being by the same agency. Legal personality is thus a mental construction a mental construction but which is a fact in our human world, and a real part of our human experience. Being a mental construction, and not an immediate datum of perception or consciousness, it can be imputed by the mind not only to the visible being of an individual, but also to the invisible being of a purpose in the pursuit of which a body of individuals are permanently united. Such a purpose may have property attached to it, and own that property: it may have duties attached to it, and owe those duties; it may be a party to

legal action in order to vindicate its property or to suffer vindication of its duties. In all these ways it acts as a, persona juris; and for all these reasons we may call it a persona juris. The essence of the unity of a group is its expressed purpose; and legal personality belongs to that essence. With the individual it is different. The essence of his life-unity is a continuing spring or power of purpose; and that is the essence to which his legal personality belongs. It may be objected that paradox is running to an extreme when an impersonal purpose is vested with personality. But the purpose is not impersonal. When we say that a purpose may be a legal person, a 'Subject' or owner of rights, we are not saying that the impersonal may put on personality. We are only saying that a purpose which is continuously entertained by many individual persons may enter the legal sphere as a bearer of legal rights and duties in the same way, and on the same sort of ground, as individuals do. But the purpose must always be entertained by living minds. Otherwise it will be a dead purpose; and a dead purpose is incapable of bearing anything, or of doing anything whatsoever. The Fellows of a College must always continue to entertain the purpose of a college if that purpose is to be a bearer of rights and duties according to the intention of the founder. Of course it is tempting to say that the Fellows themselves, as a body, are the real bearer. But not to speak of the ambiguity of the word 'body' (does it mean a collection of individuals, or something which is somehow more than a collection of individuals?), we should have to qualify this saying at once by adding that the Fellows only constitute a single person, and act as a single bearer of rights and duties, with a part of themselvesthat is to say, with the part which entertains and serves the purpose of the College. A person so constituted would be a somewhat abstract person; for it would have to be constituted by abstracting part of the personality of each Fellow and then adding the parts together in some way which was more than simple addition or mere collection. It is really simpler, and it expresses the truth more exactly, to say that the essence of the College consists, and the legal personality of the College resides, in its purpose. The purpose is something total, and something permanent; the Fellows who entertain the purpose only entertain it partially, as one among other guests which are present in their minds, and they only entertain it temporarily, during the days of their fellowship. Upon this view the life-unity of a group, which may continue from century to century, will involve no idea of an unaging real person which lives that continuous life: it will simply involve the idea of a real purpose, or rather a common purpose, which continuously moves and animates the members of a group, because it is continuously entertained by their minds. Upon such a view, again, we shall not speak of organisms; we shall speak of organisations of men, created and sustained by organising ideas, and continuing to survive so long as these ideas survive. ² ² Gierke often confronts the reader with the dilemma, 'Organism or mechanism which will you take?' But is there not a tertitum quid the organisation of men created and sustained by a common human purpose? But ideas, if they are to live, must also change, since change is part of life. Here we encounter a new difficulty, and enter upon a new stage of our argument. Not only must the organising idea, or common purpose, which constitutes the unity of a group, be entertained by living minds in order that it may live at all: it must also be capable of being modified and developed by those minds, in order that it may live and grow. The purpose, in the process of time, will necessarily enter into new conjunctures of

circumstance; and unless there is room and space for its being varied to meet such conjunctures, it may lie like a heavy encumbrance on the general life of the present, and it may even strain to breaking-point the allegiance of many of its own particular votaries. The Scottish Church case, finally decided by the House of Lords in 1904, has often been cited in illustration of this danger. Here a purpose of the Free Church of Scotland, formulated some sixty years before, was decided to be fundamental and unalterable under the constitution of that Church; and this decision, so long as it stood, not only encumbered the general movement of the time towards the union of the Free Church with another of the churches of Scotland on the basis of a developing purpose, but it also split the members of the Free Church into opposing camps the camp of the few who clung to the original purpose formulated in 1843, and the camp of the many who were anxious to see a development of that purpose. Much was said, in this connection, against 'impersonal immutable purpose'; much was said in favour of the 'personal living group', competent by its nature, as a real personality with a real power of purpose, to develop freely according to the needs of its life. But there is another and simpler moral which we may draw from the case. The real danger is not the conception of purpose: it is the conception of original purpose as fundamental and invariable. The danger partly proceeds from courts of law, which are naturally prone, and indeed are bound, to attach great weight to any original formulation of purpose; but it proceeds far more from the original founders and formulators, who wish to make the purpose, as they see it, permanently valid. There is a passion of men, in making wills, to tie up the future. There is a similar passion of founders, in formulating purposes, to do the like.³ Wise founders, desiring that the purpose they formulate shall live, and recognising that change is part of life, will leave latitude of variation to their successors, who continue to entertain and serve the purpose. Similarly the Courts, in interpreting purpose, may well allow some latitude of development, even if it be not expressly warranted in the original deed. We can hardly expect the State to prohibit the rigid definition of purpose ab initio. But the State always stands in reserve to provide a remedy for rigidity, after the event, by its power of legislation. This was the way in which Parliament acted, in its final solution of the Scottish Church case, by the Churches (Scotland) Act of 1905. ³ 'A voluntary society may so fix its articles of faith and conditions of government as to deprive itself of any power of development or change. This has been done by the Free Church of Scotland.... It has also been done more precisely by the Primitive Wesleyan Methodist Society of Ireland, which has put its doctrine, discipline and rules into an Act of Parliament, with a provision that the discipline and rules may be altered in a manner prescribed by the Act, but that the doctrine is not to be altered' (Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution Vol. ii, c. ii, §v). On this basis we may say that the Scottish Church case does not demonstrate the need for a conception of the real personality of the group. It rather demonstrates the weakness of a group which tries to prevent the purpose by which it is constituted from being capable of growth with the growth of the minds of its members. We are thus brought to consider, once more, the general relation of the State to the purposes which constitute the being and the unity of groups, and serve as legal persons owning rights and owing duties. We have argued that purposes must necessarily be entertained by individual minds which accept and serve them. We have argued that they must necessarily be variable, in order to suit new conjunctures

of circumstance, by the minds which are pledged to their support and think they can support them best by adapting them to new needs. We have now to add that the minds of all the members of the general community, represented in and by the operative criticism of the State, are always playing upon the purposes of groups and the working of these purposes. No common purpose is accepted, and awarded a legal position and a legal personality, simply because it is a common purpose. A common purpose must be weighed and measured, and found to possess some degree of quality. There are some common purposes, such as that of the Mafia, which no State will tolerate. Each common purpose must be compared with other common purposes, and all must be capable of adjustment to one another and of living amicably side by side. All partial common purposes must be set alongside the general common purpose of the State, and must be compatible with the attainment of that sovereign common purpose. This is not to say that the State should, or can, exercise a ubiquitous supervision of groups. It is only to say that it can never abrogate a duty of constructive criticism and sympathetic adjustment. We may well pray that groups should abound, each dedicated to its own specific common purpose. The life of man is manifold; and the specific group, dedicated to specific purpose, is an essential element in the development of man's variety. The one State which is also one race, one Church, one party, one economic organisation, is a lonely wilderness. But a State which was a home of real Group-persons, if such a State could be, would also have its defects. It would be far from being a wilderness; but it might well be a chaos. If we desire to escape both wilderness and chaos, we must leave room both for the free clustering of groups round freely formed purposes, and for the criticism and adjustment of such purposes by the State. The view which has thus been suggested in regard to the inner core of the legal personality of groups is based neither on the ideas of Fiction and Concession, nor on the idea of a Collection or Bracket of individuals, nor on the idea of the Real Personality of the Group. On the other hand it contains elements of all these ideas, and it may help to explain how all these ideas have come to be held. We have allowed some element of fiction, and some element of concession by the State, in the legal personality ascribed to the purpose of a group; but we have also allowed the same elements in the legal personality ascribed to the individual. We have admitted that a sum or collection of individuals must entertain the common purpose, and must also have the power of developing that purpose; but we have also admitted that the common purpose is a permanent unity which transcends the collection of individuals who are united in its service. We have denied that there is a real Group-person, in any way parallel to a real individual person, behind the legal personality of a group; but we have argued that a real purpose, analogous to the individual's real power of purpose, must underlie such personality in that sense we too may claim to be and 'Realists'. At the end of our argument we are left with a legal world in which there move two sorts of legal persons individual legal person, with a legal personality the based on the power of purpose which constitutes the essence of an individual; and the group legal person, with a legal personality based on the permanent purpose which constitutes the essence of a group. The two sorts of person differ, in as far as the basis of the one is a power of indeterminate purpose, and the basis of the other is a declared and determinate purpose. But it is not an absolute difference, and both sorts of persons can move easily in the same world. The power of indeterminate purpose in the individual is limited by his previous declarations of purpose; and the determinate

purpose of the group must always, as we have seen, be compatible with its further growth and development. All this might seem mere logomachy, a contention about words and a tilting at windmills, if it were not the case that the theory of the real personality of groups ran outside the domain of doctrine, and spilled into the general life and thought of the world outside. So far as Gierke's own theory stands, considered in itself, it is as if he had said to the world of scholars, 'Eureka: I have found the hidden reality which lies behind this puzzling Group-person of the law; and the reality is that of a real person, who is real in the same sort of way as you and I are real'. That saying, in itself, is a matter of high doctrine: it is a philosophical explanation of a legal fact, intended for those who study the philosophy of law. But the world outside, hearing the reverberations of legal philosophy, adopts the term 'real Group-personality' into its own language; it gives it a new and positive sense; and it proceeds to draw practical conclusions from the positive sense which it gives to the term. Adapting to our purposes a saying of Luther, we may say that 'the doctrine comes to the ordinary man ghostly' (and we may also add, for reasons which we shall presently see, that it comes to him qualified), 'and he makes it fleshly'. In other words, men apply the conception of real Group-personality to their own particular group their Church, their profession, Trade Union, whatever the society be that engages their immediate ardour; and then, feeling that real persons must enjoy rights, but forgetting (or tending to forget) that they must also owe obligations, they become the prophets of the rights, and not only of the rights, but also of the autonomy, and even, in the last resort, of the sovereignty, of their own particular group. This is the way of syndicalism; and Gierke's doctrine any rate in our own country, and since Maitland first gave it at vogue in 1900 been drawn into that way. We must not be pragmatical, nor judge has the truth of a doctrine by the uses to which it is subsequently put. But at any rate we may examine the company which it keeps, and if we are already inclined to question its truth on fundamental and essential grounds, we may perhaps find that the results of such examination serve to corroborate our doubts. Syndicalism is a theory of French parentage. In its more extreme form, it is a theory which would eliminate the State in favour of groupseconomic groups the on ground that economic groups are anterior, and should be superior, to political organisation, and that droit economique is similarly anterior, and should be similarly superior, to droit politique. In its more moderate form, it is a theory of condominium between the State and groups, on the basis of some system of 'plural' sovereignty which will divide its attributes between both. Neither in its more extreme nor in its more moderate form has it found acceptance in England. But there has been some approximation to it; and we find such an approximation in the writings of Dr Figgis, and particularly perhaps in his Churches in the Modern State, published in 1913. Here the authority of Gierke is invoked to support a line of theory which runs counter to the idea of the unitary State and the unity of its sovereignty. Starting from a deep conviction of the spiritual independence of the Church, Dr Figgis proceeds to a general doctrine of the 'inherent, self-developing life' of all societies. He regards the general community as 'a vast hierarchy of interrelated societies, each alive, each personal'; and he seeks to vindicate for each of these societies 'the necessary independence of a self-developing personality'. The Church is foremost in his thought; but he seeks to link the cause of the Church with the cause of groups in general groups economic and national as well as ecclesiastical. He rejects what he calls 'the old conception of the position of corporate groups in the State', because in his view it is false to the general facts of the world. 'It makes the world consist of a

mass of self-existing individuals on the one hand and an absolute State on the other; whereas it is perfectly plain to anybody who truly sees the world that the real world is composed of several communities, large and small, and that a community is something more than the sum of persons composing it other words, it has a real in personality, not a fictitious one. This is the essence of what is true in modern nationalism, and in the claims for the rights of Churches and of Trade Unions.' Now it is only just to Gierke to begin by admitting that such an interpretation of his views (which, by the way, is by no means peculiar to Dr Figgis) is really alien to the logic of his general theory. He was a good German and a thorough Germanist, whose thought had already been fixed in all its main lines by 1880. Syndicalism in any form, whether moderate or extreme, was a thing beyond his ken. He accepted the German system of territorial churches, as it stood in his day; he accepted the economic organisation of contemporary German society. He was anxious, as a lawyer, that corporate bodies in Germany should be based on the Germanist tradition of law, and not on the Romanist; but the bodies of which he thought belonged to a traditional past, and not to a revolutionary future. They were Gemeinde and Genossenschaften, steeped in the national history of the German people, and therefore belonging by right of descent to the national law of the German State. The affinities of Gierke are not with Duguit, the legal philosopher of French syndicalism: they are with Herder, the harbinger of German Romanticism. The figure of the Volk remains in the background of his thought; and the majority of the Volk is incarnate in a State which remains sovereign, even if it recognises that there are other group-realities besides itself. Are not these other beings parts of the Folk-whole; and must they not find their life in the higher life in which they are necessarily included? The State, to Gierke, is 'elevated above all groups by its sovereign plenitude of power' (seine souveräne Machtvollkommenheit). The authority of the State is 'the highest right upon earth' The law of the State exerts a far greater control over the legal group than over the individual. 'The legal scheme, in dealing with groups, does not stop, as it does in dealing with individuals, at rules of external conduct. It also controls and penetrates their inner life....The group, in contrast to the individual, must necessarily be a form of life in which the relation of the unity of the whole to the multiplicity of the parts is amenable to regulation by external norms for human wills.' It is easy to realise, from passages such as these, that Gierke's doctrine of the real personality of groups is, as we have already observed, a ratified and a qualified doctrine. But it is also easy to see how the rarity and the qualifications may be forgotten. Men sometimes think and write to other consequences than those which they have themselves intended. A fate of this order seems to have befallen the theory and writings of Gierke. He himself insisted on the need for the articulation of contained groups in the containing State; he regarded the life of the lower groups as necessarily integrated in that of the higher. Yet if he thus believed in the necessity of a higher Whole, which included all lesser wholes as its parts and members, he taught after all a doctrine of the real and inherent personality of groups in general. Now if we concentrate our attention on that doctrine in itself, and if, in addition, we proceed to confine its benefits to groups other than the State, we can easily glide into a form of syndicalism. It will not be true to the mind of the master; but it will have a sort of rough verisimilitude. We can then say that we have quitted an abstract and unreal world of self-existing individuals and the absolute State; we can then proclaim our entry into a concrete and real world of real groups, with a real State conditioned by their inherent rights; and we can then plead that Gierke's writings provide an historico-philosophical justification of this new world.

But this is not the whole of the matter. The theory of the real personality of groups may not only trend towards syndicalism. It may also keep other company; and it may trend towards that very doctrine of the absolute State from which it is supposed to be our rescue. We can only make the theory a defence and buttress against the State if we suppose that it does not apply to the State, and if we say that there is no real person standing behind the State, as there is behind other groups. But are we justified in making that supposition? We can hardly say that we are. On the contrary, if we once accept the theory of the real personality of groups, we are bound to see behind the State the figure of the greatest and the most real of all groups figure the of the nation and Folk itself. The theory presents us, after all, with two sorts of real Group-persons. One of these is the real person of the Volk, with its own Volksseele and its own Volksleben. The other is the real person of the contained group.° Gierke himself may seek to comprehend both sorts of real persons in a synthesis which does justice to both. But the two sorts will always tend to break apart, and each of them will then seek to claim a separate and sovereign existence. If the claim, of groups other than the State is heard and accepted, the result will be some form of syndicalist philosophy. If the claim of the great national group, incarnate in the national State, calls aloud with a greater and more resonant voice, the result will be some form of absolutist or dictatorial politics. And of the two results it is the latter which is the more to be apprehended. (° It will be noticed that Dr Figgis, in the passage quoted above, speaks of the theory of real Group-personality as 'the essence of what is true in modern nationalism, and in the claims for the rights of Churches and of Trade Unions'. Perhaps he was thinking of the claims of national minorities when he used the phrase 'modern nationalism'. But the phrase may equally apply to the claims of a national majority to control the whole of life.) It often seems as if the theory of the real personality of groups were advocated with a sort of tacit exception though it did not apply to the State; as though it were as something external to it, which served to limit and tame it. But if the theory be true at all, must it not be true of the State  true of the State above all? Is it not the and peculiar danger of the theory that it may tend, in the last resort, to attach itself to the figure of the State with a particular fascination? The Nation, at any rate when it is organised and expressed in a national State, is a great and obvious group. If we make groups real persons, we shall make the national State a real person. If we make the State a real person, with a real will, we make it indeed a Leviathan Leviathan a which is not an automaton, like the Leviathan of Hobbes, but a living reality. When its will collides with other wills, it may claim that, being the greatest, it must and shall carry the day; and its supreme will may thus become a supreme force. If and when that happens, not only may the State become the one real person and the one true group, which eliminates or assimilates others: it may also become a mere personal power which eliminates its own true nature as a specific purpose directed to Law or Right. If personal power should thus shed purpose, an old saying of Luther may be repeated, with a new application, 'Die Person wird euch nichts helfen, wenn euch das Recht verdampt'. The experience of our own day goes to corroborate such hypothetical fears. Italy has embraced the theory of real Group-personality, 'the organism superior to the individuals of whom it is composed'. The Corporative State is a structure of many

elements. It is not always clear which of them are intended to act, and which are intended to be the simulacrum of action. But there seems to be little personality, and no autonomy, in the corporate groups contained in the Italian State; and if we read La Dottrina del Fascismo we can hardly doubt that the one Group-person which is really intended to act is the Italian nation as 'integrally realised' in the Fascist State of Italy. 'The higher personality (personalità superiore) is that of the Nation. . .The Fascist State, synthesis and unity of all values, interprets, develops and actuates the whole of the life of the People.... For Fascism the State is an absolute, in whose presence individuals and groups are the relative....It is anima dell' anima. . .realta etica. . .voluntà etica universale.'± (± Benito Mussolini, La Dottrina del Fascismo, 1932 (reprinted from the article in the Enciclopedia Italiana}. The quotations are mainly taken from the more philosophic Part I.) Of the new Germany which came into existence in 1933 it is perhaps premature to write. Incedimus per ignes. But this may be said. The home of groups and Genossenschaften is going through a great process of Gleichschaltunga process by which they are all being 'assimilated' to the new character now assumed by the person of the Volk, as organised and incarnate to-day in the National Socialist State. The assimilation of groups to this person has touched and transformed churches and trade unions: it has swept like a deluge over the old territorial communities and the political parties of Germany; it has modified, where it has not abolished, the whole of what Gierke would call the corporate articulation of the State. It would be wrong to draw permanent conclusions from what may be only a temporary phase of revolutionary ardour. But so far as the evidence goes, it suggests a simple reflection. When the idea of the real person of the Nation, organised in a national State, obtains the victory, in an hour of revolution, the groups in the State are abolished or altered with the alteration of the times. The ideas on which they rest, and the purposes which are their essence, are swept away or refashioned. We may deprecate the victorious idea of the State: we may say that it means a sacrifice of Recht on the altar of Volkstum and the personal Volk: we may urge that it means a surrender of fixed purpose to oscillating personality; but we have to admit, in one respect, the vigour and sweep of its action. Germany herself, the ancient mother of groups, has demonstrated to the world any rate for the time being at that the groups contained in the State are simply purposes, and not real persons, and that these purposes can be re-fashioned, or even abrogated, when the hour of revolution strikes, by the State in which they are contained. All revolutions have something of a similar character. They shake and test men's common purposes. Some, like leaves, come fluttering to the ground; some remain, but change their colour and their nature. It is not that real Group-persons have died, or changed the nature of their personality. It is simply that common purposes have been shaken in the minds of those who held them; and some have changed, and some because they have ceased to be held with the tenacity which alone will suffice to preserve their existencehave disappeared. But do we then leave the State surviving as the one omnipotent real person, which shakes all the trees but stands itself unmoved? The whole of our argument forbids. The State, on our general theory of purpose, is not an ultimate or absolute person, which can do or omit to do what it chooses at its will. It is a group or association ; and it stands on the same footing as other groups or associations. Its essence or being consists in its purpose, just as the essence or being of all other

groups consists in their purpose. Not only is purpose the essence of the groups contained in the State: it is also the essence of the State itself. When we are speaking of the relation of the State to groups, we are speaking of the relation of one common purpose to a number of other such purposes. The characteristic of the purpose of the State is that it is a specific purpose of Law. Other purposes, so far as they concern or affect this purpose, must necessarily be squared with it. This is the same as to say that other groups, so far as they hold or assume a legal position, must necessarily be adjusted to the legal group which we call the State. They are not thereby adjusted to its will: they are adjusted to its purpose, which is Law. The State would be failing to attain its purpose, and thereby to discharge its duty, if it failed to secure such adjustment. But the adjustment is not a matter of discretion, and it is not absolute: it is controlled by the purpose of the State, and it is relative to that purpose. To reject the theory of the real personality of groups is not to fall into any worship of the omnicompetent or absolute State. It is to find the essence of the State in its purpose of Law, and to subject it to its purpose, just as we find the essence of other groups also in their particular purpose, and just as we make them too the servants and ministers of their purpose. Only if we make the State, like every other group, a common purpose, and not a real Group-person, shall we escape the tyranny of mere will. Purpose is something specific; and if we are face to face with a State which is specific purpose, we are face to face with the finite. In a word, we see and accept the sovereignty of Law both the law of the Constitution, which expresses the fundamental purpose on which the State is based, and the ordinary law of the courts, duly made in accordance with the Constitution, which expresses that purpose in detail, through the various ranges of human life, in all the area of external conduct amenable to its control. (Pages lx - lxxxvii) I have decided to make two presentations covering the above passage. I began at page sixty, and simply found myself unable to stop until I reached the end of the introduction, at page eighty two. The whole section was so relevant to our subject of the idea of Super Being, as it pertains to our own species. Below is a section, entitled Hard Notes, that is already written, written in response to my reading of the above in order to make the transfer from print to computer for insertion in this work. I also have my notes written as I sat and read the book while sunbathing in the summer heat of my greenhouse recently. I do not like to lose insights into such an important piece of material since the only means we have of studying our subject is by digging up the remnants of other people's ideas and running them through the interpreter that is my brain, I am going to offer both responses to this passage. The first, soft, the second hard, so called because I already know what I have just written during the process of transcribing into digital form, and this is decidedly more searching, and thus hard, going deeper into what Barker wrote, than the initial thoughts I put down in long hand as I read the book. The reason my responses are more searching when I am at the computer is a product of the technology at my fingertips which allows me to freely express myself without any sense of a need to keep my ideas brief, because I am going directly into the finished form of presentation and the medium is so fluid and flexible, and readable; in the sensory sense, if not in the intellectual sense. Don't you just love these brain tools, Nature is wonderful. The soft notes will be transformed into long thought, so to speak, as I usually do, and marked by the page numbers I used while making them, in order to provide some guide as to my progress through this lengthy passage, although I do not intend

to mark the extract itself, for that you will have to obtain a copy of the book, in the flesh, so to speak. Soft Notes lxi This is a useful summation of the conflict between groups with the tendency for fragmentation induced by the focus of a group upon the definition of its own identity and interests which means all groups tend toward seeking the maximum expression of their own autonomous status. This urge toward autonomy is rendered as personality in the work we are considering and Barker explains why the urge toward this sense of individuality amongst groups cannot be allowed to go unchecked, and yet how tricky it is to create law to manage the balance in such a way that there is structure, but flexibility. All this effort in the legal domain is evidence of the organic nature of society because what this effort amounts to is a search for the correct way to organise authority in order to create a viable living structure. This behaviour then is identical to that which involved in any creative endeavour humans engage in, where what is really happening is that people are faced with a challenge and they must discover, discover, not invent, the appropriate response. Just as people do not invent aeroplanes, they discover them, so people do not create social structures, they discover them too. What we have here, in Barker's account, is a description of that process of discovery aimed at working out how to create manageable social structures by inventing laws that meet the need to organise society as a unified whole, but a whole composed of Spencer's differentiated but interdependent organs, or groups. lxiii This is a discussion of then idea of Super Being in the field of law. Note the division of the word 'personality' into three distinct meanings conforms to the basic principle we see operating in the mythological practice of imposing a dualistic interpretation of reality on all things pertaining to human existence, the mechanism of duality is a linguistic tool that allows knowledge to be divided in order that society can be ruled by a separation of hidden knowledge of identity, from the overt knowledge of form. Thus nature and form are split asunder making the determination of reality impossible. Darwin is the best example of a thinker whose work conforms to this mechanism of duality, for he so obviously split human form from human nature by making our animal relatives the obvious source of our material being, while failing to reveal anything about the source of our behavioural being. Thus all of our attention has been wilfully misdirected ever since by the priesthood that hold Darwin as their senior, people like the present day knowledge perverts, Richard Dawkins of Oxford and Stephen Gould of Harvard. The whole idea of personalities is pure mythology from beginning to end, just as the associated idea of morality, one of the personality triads, is mythological, as also is the key idea of God, upon which these fictitious notions of vacuous meaning are cut. The Making lxiv How to have your cake and eat it. That should be the lesson drawn from this piece of mythological reasoning. Standard priestly rhetoric this. First we deny personality to groups, then we allow groups to exist by virtue of law, so they have rights, so they have personality!! But only because law, that is to say because

language, made this possible. Therefore this is not an organic personality, a real personality, but an artificial device created by humans, not discovered by humans. This shows us exactly how language works to weave an image of reality that is simply an impression taken from reality and rendered into a communicable form and then made the product of human intelligence in order to make this image, this knowledge, into a possession that can be owned by an elite, who claim of course to of created it. It is surprising these people do claim to of made the earth on which we walk. What has been done is that people have discovered attributes, and thereby learnt to master the forms that the attributes relate to. This is no different than discovering that certain rocks, when heated, produce shiny material, and so, by means of proactive experimentation and concerted effort, amongst people acting together, over time extending across generations, a specialised group naturally evolves on the basis of learning to mine ore and extract metal. A process of group evolution that was only possible because of the linguistic physiology which is the prime feature of these creatures. Learning to refine ore does not mean that the finally accomplished group of artisans, make the ore they use, or that having extracted the metal so expertly, they actually made the metal. Likewise, learning that society naturally coalesces into an array of groups as it becomes ever more massive and complex, and as knowledge, such as that involved in the specialised art of mining, accumulates, so that, by a process of learning from experience, finding out how to provide a central, overarching authority that is able to manage the array of groups, and thus to provide a unified social form that is new and exceptional, does not mean that people actually make the groups that they learn to recognise and to manipulate, or that they make the finished product when they have discovered the proper techniques for the use of language to enable them to fashion a social order that is functional. What we can see though, is that groups evolve naturally out of a burgeoning population that is able to support them, according to the accumulation of information that is of a nature that causes it to form a body of knowledge. Such a body of knowledge is an accumulated product, that means there is an accumulation of a related series of individual life experiences that requires a repository of accumulated information that is able to act as a carrier of information across generations. The requirement for such a repository is what causes a group to coalesce into a permanent form with an identity defined by the knowledge it secrets within itself, but the capacity for this mode of information accumulation is not an invention of human animals. Group formation is the means by which this mode of information accumulation is able to take place, and so the formation of groups is the reason that human form evolved as it did, for the express purpose of forming groups. Humans form groups because humans evolved to form groups, this is another way of saying that human nature is corporate. Humans form groups by accumulating knowledge, whether they like it or not, just as birds travel by flying whether they like it or not. And once we have the model of group formation provided by a consideration of the way a specialised group such a metal workers might come into being, by accumulating information on the material and methods involved in mining, we can see that once an elaborate social structure had evolved which had a specialised legalistic authority at its core, then a group of specialists was bound to evolve as information on the use of law accumulated, and so crystallised an identity about the knowledge of law, which this process of social

management by means of law gave rise to. And thus we got the Jews, and the rest is history, or biology, if, like me, you do not happen to subscribe to the theistic notion of history, and you only recognise the organic processes of life which make history into a mythological representation of growth. This discussion of human social forms as if they were features of a landscape, as if they were themselves an environment that we learn to know, is very telling. At the root of the evolution of a corporate form we are saying there is the living environment brought into being by the basic physiological form of the organism in question. Thus with the evolution of mammal physiology the life environment consisting of mammalian fauna came into being. Mammals had to disperse and differentiate to fill the vacuum of space represented by the earth's potential niches relative to the newly arrived attributes of the mammal. Thus the potential of mammalian form was drawn toward out of the early mammals and into the vacuum of the air and the sea, producing bats and whales, for example. Eventually a balance was struck and all the niches of the earth were occupied by creatures bearing the unique attributes of mammals, the earth was full of mammals. Thus a new global fauna was established and mammals found themselves living in a mammalian environment where mammalian potential could be drawn out by the pressures of a mammalian environment. In this setting mammal adaptability is tested by its ability to adapt to mammal adaptability, but in the special sense that there was the potential for a mammal to evolve that exploited the attributes of mammals relative to mammals in general. What sort of attributes would be drawn out of the mammalian physiological package by an environment dominated by a variety of mammalian forms? The answer is the attributes of awareness pertaining to the recognition of self, because that is really what we are saying, the mammal is required to recognise and respond to the mammal. Mammalian physiology becomes its own feedback loop in the evolution of mammalian physiology, but only in one specialised form that comes to be the ideal form to fulfil the role of specialised mammalian mammal. And in our description of the manner in which humans learn to respond to the existence of the social environment they themselves compose, just as much as they learn to respond to the environment that exists independently of them, we have a detailed view of this specialised trait of a mammal responding to mammalian physiology, only in this case the mammal we are concerned with is so evolved for the purpose that it is not just dragging itself out of the grip of genetic evolution which makes a mammal adapt to its physical environment, it is being drawn ever further into that social environment in which a creature becomes an environment unto itself and evolves in response to itself, this is not just physiology evolving in response to physiology but species responding to species, not just, in other words mammalian physiology evolving in response to mammalian physiology, but humans evolving in response to humans. Individual humans come into a world that is loaded with potential that has already been realised, and a continuation of that realised potential that awaits release. That latent potential might consist of the materials deposited in the earth by geological and celestial processes which have been made available by the realisation of their potential in preceding generations of individuals, or it might equally well consist of the practices carried on by their own kind, the already released potential of farming or of social gathering. In each case the new round of individuals appears in an established setting and the process of learning what that setting is, and so

developing what that setting is, continues, whether the task involves iron smelting or social administration. I think it is easy to follow my meaning when I say that when people obtain ore they do not make ore, and even when they extract metal from the ore they do not make metal. But in actual fact this is not how we speak, indeed we say that people do make metal when they refine ore. I think there is the potential for a lengthy philosophical discussion surrounding this linguistic contortion of conceptual understanding, but I want to avoid philosophical meanderings at all cost. We must nonetheless try and tease out the central points of confusion involved in this most important of ideas concerning the act of making. If people do not make the ore, and they do not make the metal, what do they do, for they certainly do something? Wrong! People do nothing, what happens is done to them. When you catch a fish, do you make the fish? When you build the fire to cook the fish, do you make the wood? When you eat the fish do you make the flesh that becomes you? When you deposit the remains do you make the turd? No, in all cases people make nothing, the process is something that is ongoing and in which the person is part of. After all, can a person refuse to obtain food, refuse to engage in the process of eating? No, this is a process that their being involves them in. But still, we feel it must be possible to say that people do something? Yet, I am afraid the answer is that they do not, this is the inevitable conclusion of the idea that humans evolved, right down to the finest detail of their existence. For what this means is that energy, that we experience as information, when we are aware of it, acts through us, by making us! Thus people who extract metal, like the famous bronze age Ice Man found in the border region of the Alps lying between Italy and Austria several years ago, are the living inheritors of many generations of highly specialised knowledge. For knowledge of this kind to exist it cannot be optional, it must be compulsory, in exactly the same way that food gathering practices, once they have established the ability to occupy a niche environment, become compulsory. If a group of people, a single undifferentiated superorganism of the simple kind, migrate into a vacant territory and learn to exist there by specialised techniques, then thereafter there is no going back for the later generations who come after them. And this conception of enforced continuity of occupation complies with the conditions attributable to a single superorganic being, and contradicts entirely the notion of each individual being a free and independent being. As evolution has progressed and humans have evolved to be ever more adapted to their own form more complex superorganic forms have come into being containing vastly more complex information routines. The coming of truly massive superorganisms which we call civlized societies led the people specialising in the management of the organic structure of society to conceive of society and individuals in ways that imputed to the individual ever more freedom of action. This was simply the evolution of the method of controlling the process of social management that these people, whom we call priests, specialised in. We do not make anything, Nature makes things through us. As we learn information builds and the number of steps in a process is elaborated toward an ever greater perfection of technique. As this process of increasing sophistication continues the ever increasing number of steps develops until the specialist is born in the true sense of the word. It is not surprising that individuals who find themselves in the line of descent of the information that produces the specialised products such as a golden metal axe head in a world of stone, should think of the knowledge coming to them in

terms of a mystery emanating from some sacred mystery. And likewise art involves learning how to manage ceremonies and build temples that create a central authority able to hold huge numbers of people together in harmony. But, each step in a process that involves the making of something involved in that process is an imposition demanded of the process, it is not something made by any human, or group of humans acting in unison. When it is it learnt that making charcoal for use in smelting will allow better refining of ore to be achieved the individuals responsible are discovering attributes in the environment, not making attributes that they then put into the environment. When it is learnt that by invoking a spiritual being and speaking in terms of life in another place beyond death imparts a unifying power over the social group as a whole the people who find this result are not making a social practice that they then give to the society in the form of a cultural behaviour, they are discovering the resonance that exists within the human psyche that evolved to serve this very purpose, they are unleashing the potential of linguistic communication, in the same way the metal working is releasing the potential of wood by driving of volatile elements before using the condensed remnant to achieve higher temperatures. When it is discovered that putting people in prison is a far more effective way of controlling populations that you want to put to work, than simply trying to terrorise them by killing the men, you learn something about social management. Men who are not already yoked by civilised techniques die gladly, accepting death as a facet of life, an honourable end to existence. They do not, however, like being shut in a cage, something completely unknown to them, being a civilised practice, and left wondering about their wives, and who is having free access to them. People do not make prisons, anymore than they make charcoal, or make fish. Neither do people make the laws that create and service the penal institutions which form part of the modern superorganism's exoskeletal physiology. The impulse to make the penal code and its associated system of application, is derived from the material being worked with by those who were instrumental in the evolution of the system. The material in case is basically the human male, we might even say in terms of the current popular discussion about the criminal nature of the male that the material that artists are working with when they discover laws, and build courts and prisons, is testosterone. Thus the priests who exist within the organ of authority which seeks to organise constructive activity according to its own sense of purpose, which is to sustain the organ of authority, and to extend its remit, are working with testosterone in exactly the same way as we might say the metal workers who employ charcoal makers are practicing their craft by extending their authority derived from their production of a rare material of high value. The creation of laws engendering the State is no more a clever art created by people than the preparation of charcoal from wood is a clever art created by people, in both cases these creative behaviours are induced by the qualities inherent in the materials being worked, wood and humans males. But it is clear that at the heart of this naturally evolved organic system of human social behaviour there are central attributes dictating the way we understand these things. At the centre of the whole process of cultural action is the acquisition and preservation of knowledge. The centrality of knowledge in this process leads to the evolution of organic structures within the superorganic body which possess authority. To possess knowledge is to possess authority, it may only be authority over wood, or metal, but it might be authority over people, people as a material. It is only the latter form of authority that we really include in the idea of possessing authority.

However this may be, by recognising that it is knowledge that underpins authority, and the evolution of bodies possessing authority, we are able to develop our understanding of human society, and its evolution in accordance to our recognition that humans are evolved animals. More than this, we can see that while we might be able to freely discuss the nature of authority derived from special knowledge concerning technology and know how in general, we are placed in a different position when it comes to discussing the nature of authority in our society today because we do not admit that authority is about the manipulation of people as materials in a system controlled by a priesthood. The lie is developed by the priesthood of individual free will to force us to be slaves voluntarily, and the art of developing this model of free slavery to a master class is what is developed in the idea of democracy. This conflict is revealed in the ideas of elitists which we have seen can be interpreted as a denial of the very idea that there can be democracy because the nature of human beings means there must be an elite group. In saying the above we get closer to the actual mechanics of elite power, how it evolves, and why we cannot discuss this matter freely in a scientific manner. It is not just that the survival of the Jewish master identity comes under threat, or the survival of religious authority across the board. The extension of the mythology which has been woven, by the theocracy, to form what they have come to term the secular world, and especially the democratic or free world, relies upon the acquisition of knowledge about how to work the naturally occurring materials that are human, and thus to obtain, and maintain, authority over the superorganism by fashioning the superorganism according to the knowledge that has been accumulated, and thus directing the purpose of the superorganism according to the mythological objectives that keep power focused upon the core identity. This is a circular process that includes the elite within the superorganism elite make the superorganism, of the which they are a part, the superorganism sustains the elite, which is the embodiment of itself. And so, to reiterate, it is a necessary fact arising from the nature of the penal system, that it is described in personal terms, focusing on the behaviour of the testosterone driven tendencies of males, natural born criminals, as the priests like to make us see ourselves, and it is absolutely imperative that under no circumstances is it made possible for anyone to develop an analytical model of the authority structure that will reveal that the prison system is to testosterone, as the suffocating pile of smouldering vegetation is to the volatile constituents of wood. Prison of course does not drive testosterone from the body of the individual male in the way heat drives volatiles from wood. Prison functions as, literally is in fact, a super-organ, performing a function within the superorganic being that manages the animals hormone content. The organ we call prison, extracts young men, that is cellular units rich in testosterone, from the main tissue of the body. Prison thus acts as a hormone suppressant within the context of the total physiology of the organism. This has an effect upon the entire population of young males who form an important active element of the organism's tissue, the role of suppressant we can assume is by far and away the main role of this organ of superorganic physiology. The court system is part of the machinery of hormone control, the increasing sanctions directed at wilful individuals bucking the authority of the priesthood, acts as a filtering system trying to keep sufficiently dynamic individuals in the free space of the exoskeleton where their energy is required for healthy functioning, while still having the ability to extract a portion of that necessary, testosterone rich, cellular tissue. In this way courts apply pressure upon the organic constituents of the exoskeletal frame of the

superorganism Vital to the application of this pressure is the feedback delivered by the exoskeletal media structures which keep everyone informed of the interplay of crime and punishment, this engenders a state of high tension throughout the living tissue. The role of what is called entertainment, is heavily involved in boosting this role of generating tension in the organism's living tissues without the traumatic requirements of actually supporting a massive proportion of actively aggressive testosterone rich units, which are constantly having to be dealt with by other testosterone rich cells backed by a rigid organisational structure coordinated by the organ of authority. Lets face it, who would make, deliberately, either prisons, or the sad bastards that end up in them? The word 'make' is truly a fiendish piece of linguistic priestcraft, and the best of all examples of how language distorts reality and earths our sense of self in the self, and makes our true nature so hard to know. It occurs to me that in making this comparison between the practice of charcoal burning and the management of social behaviour by selecting the inner qualities of the two prime materials, wood and human males, and thus making a comparison between volatile substances and behavioural hormones, I am setting up an analogy, for it is certain that I cannot be serious in making this comparison if it is my intention to say that the two activities can be said to be identical in terms that relate to the processing of wood and the management of males. The object of this description is not to make a comparison between the physiological processes taking place in the human animal when people are incarcerated by the organs controlling behaviour, and the chemical changes taking place in wood subjected to burning in an oxygen poor atmosphere. The point of comparison concerns the manner in which activities evolve by means of knowledge evolving, as knowledge evolves by means of information accumulation, so techniques evolve and structures based on those techniques evolve. And thus the comparison is not between the chemical and the biochemical processes at the centre of the behaviours we are thinking about here. The comparison is between the manner in which the two behaviours come about, charcoal burning and prison keeping. The process bringing about the evolution of these two distinct behaviours, in both cases, is identical. The point of the comparison is to indicate that humans are elements of the environment that are managed by humans, just as much as any other material features of the environment are. lxv This idea of a fictitious person of a fictitious person created by an authority for purposes of social management is useful because it indicates why an inner circle must evolve as a core feature of the organism that can act literally as a brain which empowers the evolution of the differentiated parts acting in accord with the central authority a brain brings to an organism. The linguistic fabric of law extending from the theological core of identity acts as the network constituting the nervous system instructing behaviour which creates sustains structure in a dynamic manner that causes the whole organism to act in the name of the core identity. lxix Gierke's words compliment Spencer's more earthly account perfectly, albeit

they do not invoke the same sense of corporate physiology. Gierke is giving expression to the psychological experience of the physical reality of being an individual in society. It is the psychological experience that is everything in terms of our consciousness of Super Being, while it is the physical reality that we just do not, cannot, see, not as an organic form, because we are so conscious of our own consciously creative and constructive role in the physical being of the Super Being. lxx Barker's halfway compromise between Gierke's insistence upon an organic social being, and a society perceived to be merely a collection of autonomous individuals, is more of the same working of the dualistic mechanism of fragmentation. Anything to escape from the possibility of seeing reality. Why distinguish between a community and a State? Why not ask why States evolved, what function they serve? And then note, as he just did when discussing the differences between the meaning of fictitious and moral persons, that the difference between any social group and the State is nil. Law is just a more rigorous, sophisticated, and structured form of culture, and as such represents an evolutionary development that Spencer noted was a feature of the social organism as it increased in size, as it was of the individual organism. lxxvi There is a nice description of the transition of ideas into a real form via a stage of artificial creativity which acts through the individual. This includes law, and it reveals how the exoskeleton of the human superorganism evolves and grows by means of a process that can equally well be called discovery, whether we are referring to genetic, or linguistically induced forms. lxxvii Here Barker's argument reduces group personality to the exact equivalent of identity, as long as the purpose, that is the identity, of a college is preserved by its members then the college continues to exist. This implies you cannot have a purpose without an identity, or an identity without a purpose. And I would argue that you cannot have life without identity since the primary requirement of life is that it knows itself, thus life means identity, thus life, by virtue of its existence, brings into being purpose. And life cannot escape this purely mechanistic relationship between these two facets of its existence. If we were to apply this reasoning to Barker's account we would be obliged to say that since the law is the purpose of the State then the law was the identity of the State, but the state has no identity, this is the whole point of Barker's argument, there is no such thing as a personality of the State because it is not a living thing. No, indeed, it is a part of the exoskeleton of a living thing, that thing has an identity, and that identity is religious, in fact, in our case, it is Jewish. The argument concerning the continuity of the existence of the college is correct, and applied to religious identity we can see that Judaism is the core of the global organism. As the sole preserved identity, so preserved that its identity is even preserved in the Jewish subidentities of Christianity and Islam, even though these Children of Abraham do not know it, inherits the status of master identity, and the sole inspiration for all action in the human world within which we live. Barker does not make this observation concerning identity, he wants to hide from organic ideas by using mythological words like personality. Individuals have identities that are unique to themselves, but this notion of personality is a theistic device fabricated by the priesthood down the ages, this is so even though we all find it perfectly natural to think like this. lxxix Lets note that individuals do not have any choice in the rights and privileges

they are granted, the positive and negative nature of the social constraints they are put under possess the individual, the individual does not possess the constraints! This goes for the positive constraints as much as the negative, so that the life of a person is directed like the flow of river, saying they will not do certain things, while they will fight to do other things, such as seeking to make money. Making money is just as much an imposition as the sanctions that, when breached, can cause a person to be sucked into the hormone suppressant organ of the judicial system. However money is a different facet of the exoskeletal physiognomy, money, rather than managing the levels of behavioural energy present in the living tissue contained within the structure of the exoskeleton, serves to pump energy into the same organic tissue. Thus money would be analogous to the blood carrying oxygen around the body. But, as with the comparison between specialised behaviours, dependant upon highly evolved knowledge routines, fluid-genes, as we might appropriately call them since they direct the formation of superorganic tissue, such as we find in the processing of wood and the management of males, the point of comparison between blood and money is not the physical material but the information that directs the creation of these materials. Materials is created by the flow of energy, and it is information that directs the flow of energy. Therefore where genes direct the stem cells within the body to create the appropriate fabric according to their location in the body knowledge routines direct the individuals to create the appropriate fabric for their location in the body. It transpires, now that I have obtained the book whose existence I was so delighted to find hinted at in the introduction to Durkheim's 'Rules', that is the Organismic Theories of the State : Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the State as Organism or as Person, by F. W. Coker, that Gierke said some very direct things about the superorganic nature of society, including in his reasoning religion and even race. And we find a host of other argument dealing with this subject where people try to make this kind of analysis involving the fabric and structure of society as being like that of an organism. I do not want to leave myself open to the simplistic attack by the scientist-priests whose sole purpose in society is to defend the theocracy that would allow them to compare what I am saying to what this first period of freethinkers had to say following the beginning of the scientific revolution before Darwin came forward and stopped all discussion with his theistic doctrine of human evolution as ape, rather human evolution as human. So, lets be quite clear, analogy is a theistic word that relates physical form to physical form, but we are not concerned with the physicality of form, we know that apes have arms and humans have arms, but the nature of the arms on these two animals are is completely different, and it is this nature that we are interested in. It is not the physical likeness of blood carrying oxygen around the body and money carrying energy about the exoskeleton that is of prime concern to us, it is an appropriate analogy, but we do not want it to be just a pretty idea that is easily ignored, we want to get at the underlying reality behind the comparison between the two systems. In order to do this we need to recognise what it is that these two physical systems have in common and we do this first of all by recognising what kind of systems they are, what is their nature. The nature of the first system, carrying oxygen around the body in the blood is genetic, the nature of the second system carrying energy around the exoskeleton is linguistic. From this comparison of the nature of the two systems all the detail of the analogous function in the two distinct levels of organic organisation can be developed. lxxxi Eureka! Gierke's revelation, and mine too, almost. The ever present flaw in

Gierke is the notion of individuality as expressed through the idea of personality, which fragments the organism, as Barker makes plain here, rather than uniting the organism as the idea of personality is pretending to do. This is because personality is an attribute of individuality, and what we really need is not for personality, but for identity to be focused upon. The only way to validate the notion of real group-personality is to deny individual personality, which it appears from this introduction Gierke does not do. What is apparent, referring to the last note, is that here the direct comparison of the person and the society is an analogy of purely physical entities, it is not a true comparison based on the nature of the two distinct entities, the person and the superorganism. The appropriate word to accommodate both systems under one heading, that takes account of their respective mediums of information, one genetic the other linguistic, is to use the word identity in place of personality in both cases. Thus we should not speak of an individual as having a personality, but an identity, this makes what an individual has impersonal, functional, given to them, not theirs as a possession. This puts the individual on a par with the State as a functional entity exiting to serve an organic purpose, and as such this is a proper description, as opposed to the usual method we see being used where words are concocted to give a false impression of the nature of an individual and then the State is compared to this false linguistic construction and amazingly we find that it makes no sense to think of the State in this false manner! What is apparent from my first look at Coker's book is that we are heavily dependant upon our translators in our estimation of Gierke's work and so we should bear this in mind. But we are not actually here to make an analysis of Gierke's work, we are looking at this work because he did believe that society was a true living organism and we want to find evidence of these ideas in the development of society. lxxxiv The danger of group-personality. And sure enough we got Hitler. But the fact is that the Nazi ideology is a product of the perverse way of reasoning that depends upon theistic dualism, which insists upon splitting reality in two. If we recognised that the Jews are the core of a global organism and this explains all Western and Islamic history, then this allows us to see the true nature of our position as slaves of Judaism. Then we can see how this danger has been realised more fully time and time again under the hegemony of the priesthood, in its various guises, but always under one identity, than anything Hitler ever did, and that, in truth, the Nazis were a Zionist phenomenon, exactly as Al Qaeda is today, that these two terror machines are just two more guises of the Jewish priesthood. Thus the danger we face by allowing the idea of group-personality is in fact the situation we live with now, and have always lived with under the yoke of Judaism because Judaism is the personification of group-personality. lxxv No. The State is an organ of the church, obviously, for the form of the organism is defined by the identity which defines it, and it is perfectly obvious that States of all kinds carry the same identity. In Europe that is Christian, but as a documentary last Sunday on Channel Four, Children of Abraham, recognised, in fact Judaism, Christianity and Islam are one organic identity, and they therefore define one organism, the global organism.

Hard Notes What we have here is a closely argued refutation, by Barker, of Gierke's assertion that there is a real biological phenomenon extant in the social entity. We know Gierke was perfectly correct, we know Barker could not be more mistaken. We also know that all of academia, especially the scientific elements concerned with human society, exactly those people who should be interested in other words, rejects without a moments consideration, ordinarily, Gierke's idea, and accepts without question, Barker's. It is for precisely this reason that we are here doing this job that should, in theory, according to their own estimation of themselves, be being done by the academics, and not be getting left to the laymen who have the job of living to get on with. What Barker is offering us here is a philosophy of analogy, expressed in its natural domain of law. We have already discussed the way in which the mechanism of analogy works in its role of image fabrication by acting as a substitute meaning for the word artificial in a manner that backs up the meaning of artificial in a deeper mode of application. Thus where artificial describes something physical that is created at the behest of humans, the word analogy describes something behavioural that is created by man. Behavioural in this context refers to structural forms which naturally involve animated actions, such as the actions taking place in a theatre which offer an artificial representation of ideas of various kinds. Thus from this simple artifice of language, the word analogy, arises a whole philosophy of analogy, so powerful is the idea. Barker exerts himself to insist that we recognise the meaning of words and distinguish between them accordingly and make these meanings the be all and end all of our investigations. But this is precisely how language weaves an image which can then be beamed across the social biomass and form a collective sense of what is, and thus a collective mind. Lets consider this important point. The fact is that it is about the issue of the nature of language that the scientific fraternity are able to create confusion and deny reality and impose theism on their explanations of reality. The nature of language is the key to our whole argument, language is the essence of human being that arises from our human nature. Any linguistic image must woven in an orderly manner if it is to be coherent, it must be constructed along the lines of a spider's web, with strands of reasoning emanating from a central idea by means of linguistic elements, words, whose meaning is in harmony with the core word, or queen wordkey word, as we might say more usually. We can give a very good example of this. The word God denotes a divine being, the creator of all things, and above all else, in our Jewish mythology, a being that is concerned with human beings, concerned about how we live, and upon whom we are reliant, as individuals and as collections of individuals, or societies, for all our needs. Of course there is no such thing as God, but there most definitely is a thing that has the qualities that this fictitious God has. By establishing a word that carries the attributes of something real it is possible for all pertinent real forms related to that something real hidden in the code word, God in this case, can be spun from this central idea by making the meaning of the words strung together to form the linguistic image conform to the logic of the meaning invented in the code word God. And in the legalistic philosophy Barker extols for us here we see the same mode of linguistic image formation in operation where the code word is 'analogy'. But what is interesting for us to see is how the decodification of the queen word, the identity word upon which the identity of the image coalesces, affects the

image, and thus all the real, material and behavioural, structures that have been constructed in response to the image formed under the influence of the queen word. Thus the word God has given rise to all religious identities with which we are commonly familiar today. Associated with these identities, Jew, Christian, Moslem, we have a whole host of structural forms, synagogues, churches, mosques. All of these things are produced by virtue of the existence of the word God, as a functioning queen word in the image of the self that creates the superorganism of which we are a part. Change that one word, God, decode it, substitute for the word God another word with an entirely different meaning, but which claims to be the focus of the same attributes that are attached to the queen word God, and what do we think will be the consequence? The death of the superorganism whose very fabric is woven from an extension of the ideas emanating from the word at the centre of the image which tells us who we are. Change the word code word God for the scientific word Superorganism, and God is dead, everything associated with the word God is left without a functioning anchor to keep its image strings taught and thus to motivate the biomass programmed with its identity to act in a coordinated fashion. Religion dies, the fabric of religious form dies too. But, all we are doing here is discussing law! How on earth to we end up considering religion? Because there is only religion, the idea of the word God is the queen word in the image that creates the superbeing that is the organism of which we form a part. The point is that all words are so developed in their meaning that extend the linguistic web further and further but always sustain the image according to the same core values imposed on the original keyword, God. The major word 'analogy', like the major word 'artificial', is a nodal code word in the web that allows new threads to be extended across conceptual space that consists of the image woven by words which is then represented in the social world in the form of structure. In this particular case we are concerned with the legal institution, here then the word analogy, in conjunction with the linked word artificial, acts as a nodal code word acting as a substructure to the word God draws in the consciousness upon the divine conception of the individual subject to God's authority, and in so doing allows a legislative framework of ideas to be woven that conforms to the linguistic constraint imposed on the prime word at the centre of the linguistic image. In this way the theistic idea is extended throughout the real social structure and gives rise to highly complex ideas, that is linguistic images, developed on the basis of religion, but applied to the ordering of social affairs. Hence Barker makes out that in all of this the meaning of the words we use is all that need concern us and so he tells us that there are several different meanings that apply to the word personality, one of which is the artificial meaning associated with the artificial construction which is law. But this is just his interpretation, an interpretation that is delivered by a professor working in Oxford university, and thus not delivering a personal evaluation, but an official line of reasoning which of course relies upon such techniques as establishing the meaning of words and maintaining the integrity of those meanings. Barker is just a priest of law, delivering the authoritative line. Meanwhile Gierke is trying to formulate a very clear idea of the real physical existence of a living social being that is far more than the sum of individuals within a group. Gierke unfortunately is locked into the linguistic web that is language and obliged to the theistic mode of expression that forces all ideas to link back to the

queen idea of God. He therefore invokes an image of superhuman being, but he does so in the language of ordinary human being. He simply does not have the core word and a set of sub-structural words from which to build a proper image of the reality he so clearly perceives. He has a sense of the organic, but he no knowledge of its real nature and form. Consequently Barker can toy with him, repeat his words, play at respecting his ideas, and gently put him down to run and play in the woods while, he, Barker, and his cronies, get on with the serious job of running the world according to their own determined and wholly wilful conception of how the world should be. Language we must remember creates social form directly, just as genes create physiological form directly. Language is our prime subject in the understanding of human society, language is the missing link between the biological and the social. And this fact comes out forcefully in the above passage on the nature of law, legal ideas, and the institutions that create these ideas and the institutions associated with them. Hence we see Barker describing how a judge will assign personae. 'He may recognise legal personality (at any rate when he is dealing with the matter of group-personality) on the ground of analogy, assigning personae to bodies which are in an analogous position to those already recognised under existing law.' (p. lxxi) And in this manner a legal framework evolves according to an established structural foundation, a foundation which is itself the law and associated institutions. Thus the linguistic formula grows and spreads like the fungal growth of a mushroom, but with the skeleton of a more robust spider's web running thought it. What is more however, is that these laws which the judge may weave in the course of performing his duties according to the dictates of the structure within which the part of his life from which he draws his sustenance is spent, creates thereby, real social structure. So the matter is not just one of artificiality, in the sense of a complete fiction, the law courts, the businesses, the prisons, the enforcing agencies, all exist and are very real. But, via the mechanism of analogy, these products of the law are all rendered the artificial creations of human will and ingenuity. But Gierke is asserting there is more to it than this, and Gierke is right, much more. And a little further on Barker makes this telling observation. 'we must instantly ask ourselves whether the State is free to choose, at its own discretion, the objects to which it concedes that personality; or whether it is not rather bound, by its own very nature, to concede such personality to certain objects, in virtue of their nature.' (p. lxxii) This says it all, after all the contrivance about artificial this and analogical that, we have the plain and simple truth, social form is dictated by some force. That force is human nature, a nature which is corporate and which evolved to create social structure, something that is achieved primarily, today, by means of the mode of communication that we call language.

Barker then goes on to harp on about the moral person and the inappropriateness of thinking about the existence of moral responsibility attached to a group. This is perfectly correct, you cannot make a group morally responsible for an action for which it is responsible because then all individuals who were part of the group would be equally responsible, this would amount to a complete negation of the individual. But what Barker fails to point out is that the term moral is a theological artifice, there is no such thing as moral and immoral acts. This would be like, to use an analogy, saying that there were nice and not nice colours. Well so there are, but only ins so far we evaluate them to be so. In other words morality is a value judgment and so it is not surprising that you cannot make moral character an attribute of a group and then infer the application of the meaning of the word and so make all people who are members of the group responsible for all actions taken by the group as a group. Morality does not exist just as God does not exist, there is something real behind the fictitious meaning attached to the word moral, just as there is concerning the fictitious meaning attached to the word God. Moral behaviour, in short, is simply behaviour that conforms to the prevalent social norms, raping slaves is moral behaviour, in some times, and places; if not today, at the moment, here. 'Now are the true believers happy : who humble themselves in their prayer, and who eschew all vain discourse, and who are doers of alms-deeds ; and who keep themselves from carnal knowledge of any women except their wives, or the captives which their right hands possess ; (for as to them they shall be blameless : but whoever coveteth any women beyond these, they are transgressors : and who acquit themselves faithfully of their trust, and justly perform covenant ; and who observe their appointed time of prayer:) these shall be the heirs, who shall inherit paradise ; they shall continue therein for ever.' (The Koran, Pub. Frederick Warne, 1893 [approximately] Page 257.) Its not all bad that there Mohammedan branch of Judaism then, maybe the new European superstate won't be such a bad place to live in the centuries to come after all. 'Psychological personality is a datum of immediate perception. Moral personality is a datum of moral consciousness. Legal personality is something which is not a datum. It is a mental construction, or juristic creation.' Here we have a blatant attempt to make the philosophy of analogy stand on its own as a matter of fact. Interpreting this offering we can say that psychological and moral concepts have a reality that is self existing and independent of human agency in their creation, while law is a product of language and we have to use language to fabricate law before law comes into being. This is complete rubbish, but he earns the right to talk such rubbish in the same way a Jew earns the right to talk of divine retribution or divine selection as principles in the life of humanity, these priests earn this right of artful presentation by being members of an institution which has created a body of knowledge in the form of a linguistic image which has a core idea that lets threads of this kind be woven to extend the reach of the image and so the reach of the authority embodied in the institution these priests serve.

'Legal personality is thus a mental constructionbut a mental construction which is a fact in our human world, and a real part of our human experience. Being a mental construction, and not an immediate datum of perception or consciousness, it can be imputed by the mind not only to the visible being of an individual, but also to the invisible being of a purpose in the pursuit of which a body of individuals are permanently united. Such a purpose may have property attached to it, and own that property: it may have duties attached to it, and owe those duties; it may be a party to legal action in order to vindicate its property or to suffer vindication of its duties. In all these ways it acts as a, persona juris; and for all these reasons we may call it a persona juris. The essence of the unity of a group is its expressed purpose; and legal personality belongs to that essence. With the individual it is different. The essence of his life-unity is a continuing spring or power of purpose; and that is the essence to which his legal personality belongs.' This is really such an important paragraph in the above that I have pulled it out and recast it for our focused attention. The point about this section is that it is in fact describing quite precisely the actual means by which Nature creates the material structure of the superorganism via the activities of the human individual. Barker tells us law is real, even though it is a mental construct. He then tells us that this legal reality is just as real a collective phenomenon as it is as an attribute of individual being. But as a collective phenomenon the law constitutes a real purpose. This purpose, made actual in the shape of law, can then be made substantial, in effect, for it can have property attached to it. Thus the law is a motivational strategy with a structural form, it is a life force with a body, a being with an exoskeleton. 'The essence of the unity of a group is its expressed purpose; and legal personality belongs to that essence.' And now this is the really explosive sentence, for here we have the embodiment of the master race's identity, as revealed in Judaism. The express purpose of Judaism is to rule the world under one God, as the Chosen People, and legal personality belongs to that essence! The essence of Jewish identity is the law. The Jewish identity evolved about the evolving form of the law, this is what makes the Jewish culture take the form that it does, and what has caused Jewish history to take the form that it has. It is implicit in the idea of human nature being corporate, that it gives rise to a master organ in which authority and identity are united as one, therefore whether it is the Jews, the Sumerians, the Incas or whoever, this attribute of combined authority and identity will be the hallmark of the master organ of superorganic structure. We next come to some discussion of the fixity of social from and how this is to be avoided if social growth is to be enabled. Thinking about this gives us some insight into the nature of Judaism and its two subidentities, Christianity and Islam. These two churches, the Scottish and the Irish named here, are seeking to make themselves universal entities with absolute authority and identity. This is an illusion, they are only structural elements of a much vaster being, in this case they form part of the differentiated, but interdependent, Christian hierarchy of the Jewish organism. It is because they are structural elements, and minor structural elements at that, that they have to face this kind of problem concerning the erroneous use of law to form their

structure. Individuals, in their use of law, make this kind of error because they have no conception of the nature of their own identity, nor the nature of the law which they use to define their identity. The interesting issue that attracts our attention is just want the nature of Judaism is that it escapes these constraints experienced by minor identity structures. The answer to understanding this question is that the social morphology, to use a Durkheimian phrase, like any living physiology must carry features of identity imbued into the structural elements of its form, and these features of identity must be so placed as to be able to serve their purpose of communicating identity appropriately. These minor structural elements do not have the physical extent to impose an external form of identity component in their linguistic fabric of creation. Whereas the Jewish culture is so evolved as to allow it to be fixed in a very special manner indeed, which is what allows the Jews to exist without a territory of their own by being ensconced within the territory of others whose legal construction is amenable to such infusion of alien identities that carry a legalistic identity evolved to accommodate itself to legislative frameworks. The Christian and the Muslim identities are merely mirror images of the Jewish identity imbued with crucial patterns of identity to invoke differentiation into the exoskeletal structures they give rise to. The crucial point in all of this is that the scripture, the written body of linguistic material, defines the broad identity bands, and no matter what you become in the process of differentiation you will always find your identity is attached via the fibre of the web created by the linguistic image that has at its centre the queen word God which is the core of the Jewish superorganism. The issue concerning the constraints imposed on themselves by the minor theistic structures is one of identity. Identity is a purely fluid form, thus a colour is a perfect medium of identity as it can appear in any person, of any age, gender, ability or position. A linguistic identity, to be universal must have the attributes of a colour that mean it can be imbued into any individual without having any structural consequences in itself. The more minor structural elements are necessarily bound to be imbued with attributes of identity that fix them to substructures of the organism, thus localising them and constraining them, we see in Barker's examples that we are dealing with national identities in conjunction with Jewish slave identity. The more detached from structure a subject becomes the more it takes on the pure attributes of identity, and it is this that we have just been discussing that defines the Jewish identity. The Jewish identity evolved to attach itself to the pure unattached purpose of a superorganic being as an abstract being, that is to say the Jewish identity evolved an identity that crystallised about the detached purpose of law, and then attached itself to an ideology of that purpose expressed as an abstract idea. Thus the Zionist ideology of the Chosen People voices the evolutionary directive written into the genetic inheritance of our species to form an elite organ of authority. This evolutionary development, culminating in the Jewish identity, has then gone on to create structure in the form of the civilizations associated with the course of Jewish history, and in the process the living superorganism at the centre of which the Jewish identity resides, has given rise to two mirror images of itself which in turn replicate the pattern in a potentially infinite degree of variation, but always according to the same purely abstract ideal embodied in the Jewish legalistic identity programme. Simply being Jewish, Christian of Moslem therefore attaches an individual to a common identity, but the specific attachments that exist in addition, which must always exist, even for Jews themselves, the more fixed to underlying structures, like nation or race, and the more constrained the individual becomes and the more the

reveal their exoskeletal identity as the they reveal their structural location in the organism. The special quality of the Jew as an identity without a nation or race, befits the organ they constitute for their special role as master organ of identity and purpose and means they do tend not to be fixed in any structural location, although the propaganda of Judaism naturally refutes this since the whole point of the various ideologies is to prevent precisely the exercise we are engaging in now from being engaged in, that is to say to prevent people from knowing the nature of their 'own' identities. 'No common purpose is accepted, and awarded a legal position and a legal personality, simply because it is a common purpose. A common purpose must be weighed and measured, and found to possess some degree of quality. There are some common purposes, such as that of the Mafia, which no State will tolerate. Each common purpose must be compared with other common purposes, and all must be capable of adjustment to one another and of living amicably side by side. All partial common purposes must be set alongside the general common purpose of the State, and must be compatible with the attainment of that sovereign common purpose. This is not to say that the State should, or can, exercise a ubiquitous supervision of groups. It is only to say that it can never abrogate a duty of constructive criticism and sympathetic adjustment. We may well pray that groups should abound, each dedicated to its own specific common purpose. The life of man is manifold; and the specific group, dedicated to specific purpose, is an essential element in the development of man's variety. The one State which is also one race, one Church, one party, one economic organisation, is a lonely wilderness. But a State which was a home of real Group-persons, if such a State could be, would also have its defects. It would be far from being a wilderness; but it might well be a chaos. If we desire to escape both wilderness and chaos, we must leave room both for the free clustering of groups round freely formed purposes, and for the criticism and adjustment of such purposes by the State.' (Pages lxxix - lxxx) On top of inserting large junks of other people's work I am now being repeatedly repetitious, I know, but I hope I am being of service to my readers whom I am asking to focus upon a very challenging idea, I want to make that grasp as easy as possible. This passage from Barker's introduction to his translation of Gierke's work is so jam packed with a rich discussion of our topic that we must take full advantage of the material, it is quite possibly the only such material ever to of been created, if there is any more like it then I can only that chance might bring it into my view. What is on my mind as I repeat the presentation of the above selection is the control of science by the church. This is something which most people would simply dismiss as ludicrous, and quite impossible, and simply not true. But it is true, it is real, and I intend to prove it. This is an aid in that demonstration of proof, later, in the last section of this work where I develop my own modern account of the idea of Super Being according to a strictly scientific notion of what existence is, in terms of human existence, which means discovering what human nature is, it does not mean discovering what it means to exist in a sense that accounts for the existence of the universe, and our presence in it.

In the above passage then Barker makes it plan that the central authority in society has a primary role in coordinating the organisation of the state in such a manner that only those collective activities which contribute to the well being of the whole, as one body, can be actively permitted to exist. It is also implicit in the above that antagonistic organisations, such as crime syndicates, are bound to come into being. I am not too sure that such syndicates are as aberrant as we might imagine, but that is another issue. I only want here, to make the general point that in so far as authority is subject to influence it assumes a right to manage all forms of collective enterprise. It is perfectly obvious from an historical perspective that one of the primary focuses of attention for the state was the management of knowledge, this from ancient times to the early modern, and in many ways this practice of controlling knowledge has still been quite overt in modern times. But science has supposedly become a free standing enterprise, licensed by the state to say anything it likes. Well, not quite. The point is that science must police itself, rather like the British Medical Council polices doctors, or the police police the police, or corporate enterprise polices corporate enterprise. It turns out that it is the scientist that is appalled by the suggestion that humans are animals, that humans might not be exactly as they are said to be in the Bible. It is science that asserts that discovering anything about humans is impossible, not the state, not the church, oh no. The scientific establishment has been unleashed, it polices itself. And a damned fine job it does, not arch enemy of true knowledge could ever hope to match the ruthless efficiency with which science polices science. 'If we desire to escape both wilderness and chaos, we must leave room both for the free clustering of groups round freely formed purposes, and for the criticism and adjustment of such purposes by the State.' Talk about having your cake and eating it, here this man contrives to describe a situation where we have an utterly rigid structure which is perfectly flexible. OK, that is not unreasonable, a house is an utterly rigid structure which, in terms of the variety of designs possible, is perfectly flexible. But, what he is really seeking to eradicate from the discussion is any sense that there are forces dictating the form that social structure should take, other than the purely idiosyncratic forms which arise from whatever humans may decide to create. This is complete and utter nonsense. Humans do not build bridges where there are no obstacles to cross, when there are obstacles they do not just build a bridge and cross it. We want to take materials into space and maybe visit mars, according to Barker's reasoning this can be done the moment we decide we want to do it, to think of doing something is to do it. Of course he would be disgusted at this defamation of his reasoning, but it is tantamount to what he is saying. It is like saying we invent aeroplanes, nothing could be more wrong. We do not create air, we do not invent the idea of flying, we do not create the need for flight, we do not invent planes. All of the facets of the subject of flight are either contextual and due to environmental factors beyond our conscious control, or they involve humans in a long process of discovering how to do a massive array of highly specialised tasks that allows us to reach the point where we have discovered how to fly, so that Nature is able to produce flight as an extension of the human superorganism's exoskeleton via the agency of human physiology which is dependant entirely upon its genetic foundations for its ability to generate corporate extension by means of cooperative enterprise.

Eureka! I have found the solution to the ultimate philosophical question, I know what human nature is, and it is corporate. Now if Gierke had said this he would of been right. But, unfortunately, although he was on the right tracks, he simply was living in an age where the depth of scientific knowledge, in terms of physical anthropology revealing the antiquity of humanity, and the science of biology revealing the basis of genetic inheritance, simply had not advanced to the point where the letting his intuitive grasp of reality, arising from his professional understanding of society as a professor of law, spill over into the wider world could meet with a sympathetic reception and find an echo in other academic disciplines like anthropology, sociology and biology. And yet if we read work by people like Durkheim, Spencer, Kroeber, and such like, we can see that this organic idea of human society was all pervasive, it really should of had a positive echo from all around the house. The problem was, also revealed by the work of these same authors, each of them was as committed to the idea of theistic reasoning that asserts the human individual is the be all and end all of everything, even as they extolled the superorganic idea of society, or the basic notions that should of come under that head. Of course much work has been done since Gierke's day to ensure that there never would be any possibility of anyone finding out what reality was until the Zionist purpose written into the laws which makes our society what it is had developed to the point where, by way of the legal expression that says possession is nine tenths of the law, the argument became merely academic because all there was left of human culture on earth was one identity, under one God. But life is not subject to human will, and I am here to remind people of that. I am saying Eureka! And I confirm that Gierke was entitled do likewise, but he did not, because he could not quite get there; but we can. We can kill theism, destroy Judaism, and set ourselves free by liberating the truth, in order to see a future that is bright, instead of one that is blighted by the blind sight of Zion. This question of syndicalism, which Barker makes much of and others seem to of made something of too in a more substantial manner is supposed to be due to the dangerous aspects of reasoning that the social body is a real being. This rather reminds me of the problem created by the interpretation of Darwin's idea of evolution encapsulated by Spencer's phrase 'the survival of the fittest' which is credited with having inspired ideas about purity if form leading to eugenic ideologies about the purification of the race and thus to the rise of the Nazi ideology of pure Arian breeds, and so on to the anti-Semitism which culminated in the horrific extermination camps of which we are all too well aware. But I have wear a wry smile when I think of this devious and twisted reasoning. I realise that my own reasoning could be deemed equally devious and twisted for I would tend to argue that if the Jews did not maintain their identity in the face of all challenges then they would not exist to face a continual round of pogroms. This then raises the question of the right of the Jews to exist, and self evidently since I am an atheist dedicated to the cause of advancing the truth and thus the elimination of religion I have been brought to the inevitable conclusion that no religion should be tolerated in a civilised society and that therefore a civlized society would not tolerate Judaism. But, there is more to this argument than this perfectly valid logic. The fact of the matter is that it is not the idea of evolution as presented by Darwin that led inevitably to eugenics and the Nazi interpretation of life, or the notions of Gierke concerning the nature of groups that leads to the vindication of syndicalist interpretations of society. It is the perversion of these ideas by Judaism

that leads to the Nazis and the communists. The Nazis were supreme Zionists, as the Al Qaida terrorists are, both want to take the place of the Jews as the master race. The reason they are able to create such perverse interpretations of essentially correct but incomplete ideas about human existence is purely because the authority of the Jewish ideology over our world prevents the correct interpretation from coming forward. And as we see when I provide a correct interpretation of Darwin's thinking or that Gierke, what we get is not fracturing of the social body but its harmonious unification, especially in all those places where the would be fascists like to insert the knife, and twist. We see that the homosexual or the blind person or the congenitally deformed or inadequate are the highest expression of our human form in so far as they represent highly specialised structural developments in the physiology of the organism by virtue of their existence. Of course the Jewish slave implant teaches us to honour life as sacred in order that this special advantage can be realised, but by doing so in this way it focuses the resulting power on the priesthood instead of revealing the true nature of the biological mechanisms that are at work and this sets up tension between the myth and the truth that science is bound to uncover. The consequence of this tension is that ideologies such as those of the Nazis will be engendered, but they are engendered by power of Judaism itself to survive! Not by the scientific ideas that would destroy Judaism. And thus we see that my notion that it is the survival of Judaism, and religion in general, that is responsible for the evils that it decries so much, is supported by a rational and scientific appraisal of the facts of existence. Barker then goes on from the problems of syndicalism to that of racism, discussing the manner in which group identities of a nationalistic form may take centre stage in their effort to capture power in their own name. Fine, this is certainly what happened, but I have dealt with matter by indicating what the true nature of race is, and I have shown that religion is the extension of race into the social domain via the means of linguistic replication of form where religious identity simply becomes the new means of forming groups, and this is why Judaism has become the new master identity which invokes the purpose of unification under one identity by means of ethnic cleansing of all other identities that are not subject to its will. And of course this process has been going on in the name of Judaism for thousands of years, and is still going on, never mind the poxy effort of the Nazis, which in truth was simply a major push on behalf of Zionism, and it has caused the spread of Islam into the fabric of the Western world and made it the front line in the war to knit the world together under the authority of Jerusalem. So you do not escape, as Barker seems to want us to do, by hiding from reality, as he is determined to do. Quite what kind of world we would find ourselves faced with if these ideas could be made public and earn their place as the new knowledge of self informing our world and thus bringing to an end 6,000 years of Judaism, but it is so hard to envisage this greatest of all acts of liberation that it scarcely seems worth considering and it is my intention to say that I am here for one reason only and that has nothing to do with any political agenda of any kind, I only want to defend, by liberating, and therefore advancing science. 'The State, on our general theory of purpose, is not an ultimate or absolute person, which can do or omit to do what it chooses at its will. It is a group or association ; and it stands on the same footing as other groups or associations. Its essence or being consists in its purpose, just as the essence or

being of all other groups consists in their purpose. Not only is purpose the essence of the groups contained in the State: it is also the essence of the State itself. When we are speaking of the relation of the State to groups, we are speaking of the relation of one common purpose to a number of other such purposes. The characteristic of the purpose of the State is that it is a specific purpose of Law. Other purposes, so far as they concern or affect this purpose, must necessarily be squared with it. This is the same as to say that other groups, so far as they hold or assume a legal position, must necessarily be adjusted to the legal group which we call the State. They are not thereby adjusted to its will: they are adjusted to its purpose, which is Law. The State would be failing to attain its purpose, and thereby to discharge its duty, if it failed to secure such adjustment. But the adjustment is not a matter of discretion, and it is not absolute: it is controlled by the purpose of the State, and it is relative to that purpose. To reject the theory of the real personality of groups is not to fall into any worship of the omni-competent or absolute State. It is to find the essence of the State in its purpose of Law, and to subject it to its purpose, just as we find the essence of other groups also in their particular purpose, and just as we make them too the servants and ministers of their purpose. Only if we make the State, like every other group, a common purpose, and not a real Group-person, shall we escape the tyranny of mere will. Purpose is something specific; and if we are face to face with a State which is specific purpose, we are face to face with the finite. In a word, we see and accept the sovereignty of Law both the law of the Constitution, which expresses the fundamental purpose on which the State is based, and the ordinary law of the courts, duly made in accordance with the Constitution, which expresses that purpose in detail, through the various ranges of human life, in all the area of external conduct amenable to its control.' (Pages lxxxvi - lxxxvii) The essence of the State is its purpose, and its purpose is the fulfilment of the law. But as we have already seen, Zionism is the purpose of the superorganism, a purpose derived from human corporate nature which dictates that there can only be one superorganism, occupying the planet as one territorial zone. The State is simply the brain within the exoskeleton of the superorganism, and the law, which exists as the programming within that brain, is formed in such a way that its purpose is the fulfilment of the idea of Zionism which has made the Jewish identity the defining identity of the living tissue of the superbrain. The cultural identity that is Judaism is woven from the law which has evolved over thousands of years. The fact that it is not actually Jews who rule us, and who farm us, is meaningless for we are all Jews by default, and when we look at our British and American political elite it is perfectly obvious that the passionate Christians who rule us are as close to being dedicated Jews as makes no odds. And so the purpose of Zionism reverberates through every single move the slave nations of Judaism make. The war on Iraq is a perfect example. It was a Zionist war, long in the planning, as part of the programme for the establishment of Israel on a firm footing. You do not think that after some one thousand nine hundred years without a Jewish State, that now our masters have re-established their hold on their symbolic territorial heartland, they are not perfectly sure of how the next thousand years is going to go, all being well, in terms of the securing of their plan for world

domination do you? Get real. And so we see that this description that Barker gives of a State that must act to fulfil the purpose it exists to fulfil, is exactly what the State did when it completely ignored its fictitious master, the people, whom it supposedly exists to serve. Tony Blair simply insisted that what people wanted had absolutely nothing to do with what he was going to do, and nor, presumably, should it have, in his mind. He had to do what he believed was right, that was to serve the purpose for which he became a politician, to serve Zionism. Consequently 'our' State ignored the law, and followed its purpose, the purpose for which the law exists, to give life and vigour to the superorganism which bears the Jewish identity. Blair applies the same simple minded reasoning to everything he does, that is why he became a lawyer, and is content to be a Christian slave of ignorance. Today, 15/06/04, following the disastrous results for him in the local and European elections, in response to a question about the success of the United Kingdom Independence Party, he exuded his now familiar air of self righteous contempt for the people of this nation when he used the same tired line we heard time again when he stood on his podium looking smug as he forced us to go to war with Iraq. He said he respected the views of the two point six million people voting for the party seeking withdrawal from Europe, but he had to do what he believed was right. To obey, in other words, the purpose for which he, and all humanity exists, as far as his programming is concerned, to serve the Jewish masters. The Jews need Islam to become the foundation of their mastery of the earth, their laws are bringing this into being, knitting the fabric of the exoskeleton accordingly. Europe has to be reduced to one nation in order to facilitate this process, and it has to become a Moslem Superstate for this to happen; or at least, that is how it looks like this story is panning out to me. I guess I could envisage some more subtle and complex end game to this phase of the human species ascent to the lowest possible level of human dignity, but that would only be to tweak with the possibilities as we must face them in their current form. It really is an abomination to think that in this day and age we have to be presented with religious idolatry as a high minded piece of human expression, the girl in the high court today, still 15/06/04, fighting for her right to display the fact that she is an abject slave of Islam, itself a Jewish slave identity, is an absolute affront to the dignity of humanity and that the law tolerates this kind of religious expression is an offence against our humanity. I, as a Christian slave, by origin, have next to know real knowledge of Islam, obviously it is too vile for words, I hate to think of the kind of language I would be driven to use if I were to try and give expression to the disgust I feel for this appalling religion. Needless to say I hate religion without let, and the absolute horror in which any civilised person must hold Islam only comes from the power of this force in our world today. It is a bit like asking whether we would rather be shot through the head with a bullet or de-atomised in the blast from a nuclear weapon, naturally we would all be horrified at the latter prospect and, relatively speaking, delighted by the former alternative; which is a strange kind of delight but when it comes to choosing between Islam and Christianity, that is the effect the choice has on me. Since finding the key to understanding all questions pertaining to human existence from a strictly scientific viewpoint I have been able to state exactly what Judaism is and to recognise the nature of its two subidentities and to work out approximately how these structures work. It is perfectly clear that Christianity is a Jewish slave identity since the Christian worships the mythical figure of a Jew as a god. But the Jewish nature of Islam has certainly not been at all clear to me at times.

However I began to catch onto the manner in which the Jews fabricated a slave identity befitting the eastern branch of their territorial range as I picked up bits of the idiocy which constitutes Islamic idolatry, such things as the focus of the Moslems on Jerusalem as the Holy centre of their world, which is a cause of so much aggro in Palestine today. Then there are the daft stories about the prophet being carted off to Jerusalem by the archangel Gabby, and so on. Too much yuk, for me to bear really. But I was just flicking through my nice Victorian copy of the Koran yesterday, when I found a whole page of stuff that just reeked of Judaism, I was amazed. This selection, intended to demonstrate my point about the Jewish nature of the Moslem identity, is entitled The Ant, and I thought it particularly appropriate for our investigation of the form of the superorganism we are stuck in the arse end of just now. CHAPTER XXVII. ENTITLED, THE ANT; REVEALED AT MECCA.
IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD

These are the signs of the Koran, and of the perspicuous book: a direction, and good tidings unto the true believers; who regularly perform their prayer, and give alms, and firmly believe in the life to come. As to those who believe not in the life to come, we have prepared their works for them; and they shall be struck with astonishment at their disappointment, when they shall be raised again; these are they whom an evil punishment awaiteth in this life; and in that which is to come they shall be the greatest losers. Thou hast certainly received the Koran from the presence of a wise, a knowing God. Remember when Moses said unto his family, Verily I perceive fire: I will bring you tidings thereof, or I will bring you a lighted brand, that ye may be warmed. And when he was come near unto it, a voice cried unto him, saying, Blessed be he who is in the fire, and whoever is about it; and praise be unto GOD, the LORD of all creatures! O Moses, verily I am GOD, the mighty, the wise : cast down now thy rod. And when he saw it, that it moved, as though it had been a serpent, he retreated and fled, and returned not. And GOD said, O Moses, fear not; for my messengers are not disturbed with fear in my sight: except he who shall have done amiss, and shall have afterwards substituted good in lieu of evil; for I am gracious and merciful. Moreover put thy hand into thy bosom; it shall come forth white, without hurt: this shall be one among the nine signs unto Pharaoh and his people; for they are a wicked people. And when our visible signs had come unto them, they said, This is manifest sorcery. And they denied them, although their souls certainly knew them to be from God, out of iniquity and pride, but behold what was the end of the corrupt doers. We heretofore bestowed knowledge on David and Solomon; and they said, Praise be unto GOD, who hath made us more excellent than many of his faithful servants! And Solomon was David's heir ; and he said, O men, we have been taught the speech of birds,¹ and have had all things bestowed on us; this is manifest excellence. And his armies were gathered together unto Solomon, consisting of genii and men, and birds; and they were led in distinct bands, until they came unto the valley of ants. And an ant, seeing the hosts approaching said, O ants, enter ye into your habitations,

lest Solomon and his army tread you underfoot, and perceive it not. And Solomon smiled, laughing at her words, and said, O LORD, excite me that I may be thankful for thy favour, wherewith thou hast favoured me, and my parents; and that I may do that which is right, and well-pleasing unto thee: and introduce me, through thy mercy, into paradise among thy servants, the righteous. And he viewed the birds, and said, What is the reason that I see not the lapwing? Is she absent? Verily I will chastise her with a severe chastisement, or I will put her to death, unless she bring me a just excuse. And she tarried not long before she presented herself unto Solomon and said, I have viewed a country which thou hast not viewed; and I come unto thee from Saba, with a certain piece of news. ¹ That is, the meaning of their several voices, though not articulate ; of Solomon's interpretation whereof the commentators give several instances. (Pages 283-4) This sliver of mental coprolite serves the purpose for which it was extracted, in my view, for Moses, David, Solomon, and aggro with the Egyptians, all sound like stuff dragged straight from Jewish mythology as per the Bible. What on earth we may wonder had it to do with the Arabs for whom this particular version of the Jewish identity was intended to provide a corporate identity thus attaching them to the Jewish identity and thus rendering them as slaves unto the Jews, just as Christianity has done for the rest of us. I have no idea what the drivel presented here is supposed to be about and unless someone who knows wants to tell me in plain language I do not care, I have nothing but contempt for this kind of arrant garbage, to have it passed of as some kind of sacred teaching is enough to make any human beings blood boil. But my attention was caught by the reference to the language of the birds and this is why I left the footnote referring to this phrase, although the footnote leaves me none the wiser on its meaning I do have an insight into this, and a little birdie tells me that if Ouspensky were alive and kicking here and now he would have a twitter to contribute to our understanding of this matter. I have noted how the fans of esoteric knowledge have long been fascinated with the superorganic species like ants and bees as mirrors to hold up to ourselves. Freemasons would apparently know what this reference to the language of birds means for it is a reference to their esoteric knowledge in their pantheon of fiendishly cunning codes. 'The thirteenth-century occultist Michael Scot once insisted that honey falls from the air into flowers, whence it is collected by the bees. To us, the idea is fanciful, yet Scot was versed in the secret arts, and he knew that the bee is an ancient symbol for the human soul, while honey is the thing which feeds the soul. Scot was writing in what used to be called the LANGUAGE OF THE BIRDS  the secret speech of the occultists. The Language of the Birds, sometimes called the GREEN LANGUAGE, was not one of mere arbitrary symbolism. The symbols it used were derived from cosmic truths: it was no accident that the bee was chosen to represent the soul. The occultists recognised that the temperature of the hive was always the same, and that, by a curious coincidence, this corresponded to the temperature of the human body. Since bees live in the hive, and human

souls from time to time live in bodies, it was therefore cosmically appropriate to use the bee as a symbol of the other "hive-dwellers", the human soul.' (The Encyclopedia of Secret Knowledge, Charles Walker, Rider, 1995, pages 7-8) As atheists, committed to the eradication of all forms of religion from the earth to make possible the creation of a civlized social environment in which all human beings can be fulfilled in their own name and not in the name of some fictitious identity that is that of 'slave' in any true human language, we are astounded by the mind numbing idiocy of religious documents like that of the Koran quoted above. We are therefore pleasantly enlightened to find interpretations of this deceitful treatise which let is know they are simply the work of deviants and criminals whose sole aim is the self serving search for power and personal gratification. If only that were all these annoying pieces of scribble were. But of course we, as scientists, are obliged to put aside our annoyance at being obliged to refrain from doing science in order not to dethrone the criminals and deviants who honour these religious codes, for we have to interpret these mythologies in purely biological terms, in terms of their function. We recognise that religion delivers a corporate identity based upon the evolved capacity for speech, in extension of the racial physiology which relied upon the genetic factors shaping the members of a superorganism prior to the coming of speech as we know it where fully abstract conceptions of reality are communicable by means of words, this allowing conceptions of the self to be formed and shared that are pure identity, and independent of any fixed aspect of reality, thus making the ideas themselves there own fixed reference point. And that is what a religious identity is, it is its own fixed reference point. and it is some such function that we must attribute to the actual body of texts that constitute the Jewish family of identities. The fact is that no Jew, Moslem or Christian is likely to any deep grasp of the content of their mythological identity programme, it is a source delivered to them by various means, but the existence of the texts must act as an embodiment of the superorganic beings identity. What the text says is largely therefore meaningless, hence the utter drivel we find when we actually look at these things, but that there should be a text to which people can relate is vital. The only other condition is that the text should deliver a Jewish identity, exactly as we see the Koran does. We may think that pulling off this creation of new version of Judaism was a trick that belongs to a bygone age, but we would be very much mistaken, nothing has changed in respect to human nature in the last two thousand years and the ability of the priests to churn out new mythologies suited to the audience of the moment is shown to be endless. The best example of this that I am aware of is the creation of the Mormon Jewish creed especially formulated for the new slave territories of America, we may think the Koran, like the Bible, is an appalling piece of rubbish spewed from the minds of criminals, and we would be right, but with the fabrication of the American slave identity so fresh, in historical terms, it is as a plain as day how this trick proceeded, but none of that makes the least difference to the power and influence of this Jewish slave implant.

An Analogical World It was my intention to continue with a selection from Gierke's work, it would easy to find appropriate passages to quote and comment upon. However, the sole object of the exercise engaged in so far was to demonstrate that the idea that society was a true living organism had been pervasive during extensive periods of time during the historical period that provides us with the necessary written evidence of the ideas people have been possessed by in the past. As a passionate atheist living in the opening years of the twenty first century when science has truly come of age and the knowledge we have about the world we live in is staggering, I have often asked myself why it never occurred to anyone to think of the possibility that humans might be animals, and might of evolved. Pardon! You may think, is he serious? Yes, definitely, but not, not exactly. Would be my answer. It is a question of degree, as we saw from a brief quote taken earlier, all the best efforts of science today leave us unable to answer the first question about our own nature, it is 'as if we live outside nature'. But, it is not just a question of how can that be, it is a matter of fact that it cannot be. I spoken throughout of the dualistic mechanism of mythological fabrication that splits the understanding of reality we have in two, and it is this that leads to the sense arising from talking nonsense. Thus we can know that all people accept humans are animals that evolved, why still asking why it has never occurred to anyone to think of the idea that humans are animals that evolved, and we are making perfect sense? In the insane world of theology, where the nature of a form is split from the form itself, we have two worlds existing in the same space and time, and this ludicrous question I am asking make sense in our resulting Alice in Wonderland world. As it happens, while writing this work I received a copy of Durkheim's 'Rules' from America, and, as I noted in real time, in it I found the briefest reference to a work on the very ideas we are concerned with here, about society as a living organism from the period I really have in mind when I ask my dualistically sane, otherwise insane, question. When the idea of evolution appeared, why did the first people faced with the idea not apply a biological mode of reasoning to humans as we know them? The first thought a person must have when they turn the whole of their culture upside down, as I have done, is to ask How come? What about all the experts devoting their lives to the very task you have devoted your life to between pints of beer and spliffs, you are the one who has got the answer? It makes no sense. It immediately follows that the major thesis the establishment rely in suspect, one you have the dualistic mechanism firmly in mind you easily see where the problem lies. Hence Darwin's work came under suspicion, did he fabricate it in order to stem the tide of science that was rising in a tidal wave against Judaism? The question could only go unanswered, but begging to be answered. But here, at last, is the hard evidence that there was indeed a rising tide coming crashing toward the master race who ruled, and who rule, our society. It had to be stopped, and it was Darwinism that stuck a plug in the hole, and prevented all future speculation upon the nature of society from a rationally directed biological perspective. Darwin made the evolution of humans a matter of their physical origins and to this day we look to the apes to understand ourselves, that would be like looking at dinosaurs to understand the power of flight in bats, or deer to understand the power of swimming in whales. If we want to understand the social power imbued into our kind we must look at other animals that have the same social power, and that means ants,

termites, and the like. It does not mean looking at chimpanzees. But that is exactly what we do, we look at chimps, and meantime we know nothing about ourselves. But what is even more amazing is that the scientists specialising in finding out about ourselves are no only the most horrified when a scientific notion is suggested, such as the idea that humans are a superorganism and they have a queen body, the Jews, and their artificial world is really the exoskeletal fabric of their corporate being, and meantime, they just look at stupid idea such as the practice of incest in extinct human societies, wiped of the face of the earth by the tide of Judaism. Why not ask what the tide of Judaism is, ever thought of that? If so, I have no idea where the evidence of that intellectual exercise is. But as we can see the solution to the problem is easy to come by and if we do apply science to society we destroy the priesthood that owns society and farms society. And where would that leave us, apart from free? In need of a new master. And so lets look at some modern discussions on the nature of human beings and see what the scientist-priests have to say today. Between two and one million years ago in Africa, specimens of both species [Australopithecus robustus & A. boisei] are often found in the same layers, but thereafter the ultra megadont form disappears from the record. The discovery of the existence of two species of hominid in the time range 2.2 to 1.2 mya is one of the exciting, original contributions of palaeontology. It could not have been predicted from any other class of evidence. Dating from two million years to the present, fossil specimens have been found which are usually classified into three successive species of the genus Homo. If cranial capacities are plotted against time they show a tendency to increase until a levelling off occurs in the last few hundred thousand years. If cheek-tooth size is plotted in the same way, it shows a decrease until in the recent past a size range equivalent to that of both Dryopithecine and chimpanzee cheek teeth is reached. A final anatomical shift occurs which is much less well known but which may be of fairly profound importance. Between about 50000 or so and 30000 years ago, with precise timing varying from region to region, all surviving human populations show a marked reduction in skeletal robusticity. Virtually all previous hominid fossils show a thickness of bone, plus muscular ridging that is outside the range that can be induced in modern humans even by extreme muscular training and stresses. There are also some subtle changes in skull architecture and pelvic form (Trinkaus & Howells, 1979). These are the major contrasts separating modern humans from neanderthals, neanderthaloids and 'archaic Homo sapiens'. The biological meaning of this loss of robusticity is as yet poorly understood (J. D. Clark, 1982). One of the specific characteristics of the human evolutionary lineage has been the propensity to make tools - and to discard them. This has created a trail of litter that can be traced back some two to two and a half million years. Archaeological study of this trail of refuse represents a major contribution to our knowledge of what has happened during the final two million years or so of the co-evolution of the brain and culture. Stone tools comprise the most widespread and persistent element of this record. The oldest known sets from sites such as Olduvai, Omo, Koobi Fora, Hadar, Melka Kunture and Swartkrans are all in East and South Africa. They are simple in terms of technology and design. Rocks were broken by conchoidal fracture so as to generate a varied set of sharp-edged forms. Experiment shows that these forms can be used effectively to cut off branches and to sharpen them as digging sticks or spears,

or to cut up animal carcasses, ranging in size from gazelles to elephants. Newly developed techniques for determining use patterns from microscopically detectable polishes on the edges join other lines of evidence to show that some early examples were indeed used for cutting up carcasses, others for whittling wood and others for cutting plant tissue (Keeley & Toth, 1981; Bunn, 1981; Potts & Shipman, 1981). Thus, we begin to see that in spite of their simplicity these early artefacts had considerable importance in effecting novel adaptations. They are to be understood mainly as meat-cutting tools and as tools for making tools. From the first appearance of stone artefacts, these occur both scattered over the landscape and in conspicuous localized concentrations which archaeologists call sites. These concentrations are often found to involve quantities of broken animal bones among the artefacts. This has led archaeologists to write into their narratives the early beginning of hunting (or at least, meat eating) and the early adoption of a socio-economic pattern involving 'camps' or 'home bases' and food sharing (e.g. Leakey, 1971; Isaac, 1978). The validity of these interpretations is currently subject to testing and debate (Binford, 1981; Bunn et al, 1980; Isaac, 1981) (see below). In Fig. 25.8, notice that the antiquity of control over fire is currently highly uncertain. It goes back at least half a million years, but may go back to one and a half or two million years or more (Gowlett, Harris, Walton & Wood, 1981). Notice also that many material culture attributes of humans appear only in the last 1 % to 5 % of the record. This wave of innovation occurs in the same time range as the loss of robusticity. This could be taken to mean that many of the familiar accoutrements of being human came only towards the very end of the narrative. Hominoid fossils of the early and maybe the middle Miocene all come from some sort of tropical forest context. The late Miocene is more complex - some hominoids continued to live in forests, but others, including the ramapithecines which had somewhat hominid-like teeth, seem often to have lived in more open, varied woodland habitats (see Behrensmeyer, 1982 for review with references and Butzer, 1976, 1977). This is interesting, but as we have seen it is quite uncertain whether or not this ramapithecine adaptive radiation is in any way ancestral to the Hominidae. However this may be, faunal analysis and fossil pollen analyses combine to show that the earliest known fossil specimens of hominids between 4 and 2 mya all derive from strata that were laid down under non-forest conditions. The environments represented are very varied and range from open thorn-veldt grassland (Laetoli and some Transvaal layers) to complex mosaics of grassland, marsh, riverine gallery woods and lake margins (e.g. Hadar, Olduvai, Omo and Koobi Fora, see Jolly, 1978; Bishop, 1978). This association of hominid fossils with relatively open country has commonly been taken as vindication of Darwin's narrative propositions that our early ancestors left the trees, an idea which has also become enshrined in our folk sense of human evolution. However, one of the surprising twists of discovery in recent years has been the recognition (1) that the hands, feet and shoulders of the early hominids may have been highly adapted for tree climbing (Susman & Creel, 1979; Vrba, 1979) and (2) that early archaeological sites commonly occur where groves of trees would have grown (Isaac, I972b, 1976). Perhaps bipedalism is yet another example of changing so as to remain the same with the new locomotor pattern being extensively used initially to move between widely spaced patches of trees. Maybe we left the forest a while ago but the trees only much more recently (cf. Romer, 1959; Rodman & McHenry. 1980).

After two million years ago, available evidence allows us to believe in the kind of success story we clearly love for ourselves - expanding geographic distribution, and expanding range of habitats used. Notice though, that the occupation of really extreme environments such as unbroken forests, deserts or tundra can only be documented inside the last 100000 years. Whether it had any influence or not, the last two and a half million years of geologic time has witnessed global climatic oscillations of increasing amplitude. These involve the so-called ice ages. Following relatively stable, equable conditions in the Miocene and early Pliocene, there have been some 16 or 17 ice ages since the emergence of the genus Homo two million years ago (cf. Butzer, 1976; Shackleton, 1982). Dynamics Thus it can be seen that over the past decade the outlines of a four million year narrative of human evolution has emerged, and curiosity has begun to switch over to questions about the evolutionary mechanisms involved. Here, I can only touch hastily on aspects of a few selected topics. One such is the question as to whether human evolution over the past several million years has proceeded by a process of cumulative genetic changes that pervaded populations over wide areas so that all went through evolutionary transformation, or whether successive species of hominids all exhibit stasis, with widespread change being accomplished by species replacement events (Gould & Eldredge, 1977). It should be noted in advance that these alternative models do not seem to me to be entirely mutually exclusive. Figs 25.9 and 25.10 show data for two relatively simple measurable attributes of hominid fossils plotted against time. Contrary to the view of Cronin, Boaz, Stringer & Rak (1981), Fig. 25.9b suggests that both gradualist models and punctuated equilibrium models can equally well be fitted to the available data. The best case for stasis in the record is the taxon Homo erectus. It can be argued that the first appearance of this taxon looks like a punctuation event and the taxon lasts a million years. However, at its later end many investigators seem to be reporting mosaic patterns of transition into 'archaic Homo sapiens' and this would not be compatible with a clear-cut punctuation event. Numbers of workers, myself included, have tended to think of the loss of robusticity transition of 30000-50000 years ago as a possible example of a punctuation/genetic replacement event. But this view would seem to be falsified by the new mitochondrial DNA data (Ferris, Wilson & Brown, 1981; Cann, Brown & Wilson, 1982). Fig. 25.10 also illustrates a possible example within the hominid fossil record of the effects of the breakdown of barriers which had separated trivially differentiated allopatric species. According to one interpretation two species of Australopithecus came to have overlapping ranges, and responded by undergoing niche separation and character displacement (Schaffer, 1968; Swedlund, 1974). One of the resultant species or (species complex) is Australopithecus robustus/boisei which underwent selection for enlarged body size, and perhaps, following the Jarman-Bell principle, a coarsening of diet. The other became Homo habilis and retained moderate body size and took to higher quality foods perhaps acquired in part through the aid of tools. Maybe this is indeed a fairy story, but it is fun and it may turn out to be at least partly true.

The peculiarities of the early hominid megadont phase presumably relates to diet, but what this was continues to baffle us. Scanning electron microscope (SEM) studies of tooth wear by Alan Walker (1981) and others suggest that non-siliceous plant tissues were being consumed - presumably fruits (sensu lato) or seeds. But what fruits or seeds? And why such large teeth? These questions call for studies of floristic communities and the feeding opportunities they offer as well as scrutiny of fossils. A battery of new techniques for palaeodietary studies are being developed, including SEM studies and the analysis for the strontium and ¹³C composition of old bones. A major onslaught on this fundamental problem seems to be getting underway (Walker, 1981). As the outlines of the narrative of human evolution have emerged, two particularly intriguing puzzles have emerged with it. Under what selection pressures did, firstly, the two-legged gait and, secondly, the enlarged brain become adaptive? The first of these can be rephrased as: Why did ancestral hominids become bipedal when all other primate species which have come to the ground have adopted some or other form of quadrupedal locomotion? Many thinkers on these topics, starting with Darwin, have tended to opt for an all-purpose explanation which might explain both bipedalism and brain enlargement, for instance, tool and weapon carrying. However, since specific evidence for the two evolutionary shifts are separated by at least two million years, it may be wise to uncouple the searches for explanations. Fig. 2 5.11 playfully indicates some of the competing explanations which have been or are being discussed in relation to bipedalism. More fossils, more palaeoenvironmental, and palaeodietary data will certainly help to advance understanding on this question, but it should also be clear that intelligent neontological /ecological work is called for. For instance, do potential feeding niches really exist that would make bipedalism adaptive ? The brain-culture system We all share in some degree the conviction that our words, our intellect, our consciousness, our aesthetic and moral sense, constitute the quintessential characteristics of being human. Further we associate these qualities directly with the evolutionary enlargement and reorganization of our brains. The issue can be put like this: 'The brain is the organ of culture, and culture is the function of the brain'. The term culture refers to the intricate body of language, craft skills, social custom, traditions and information which humans learn while growing up and living in any human society. (For a good discussion of this, see Geertz, 1973.) Cultural complexity and flexibility of this kind is unknown in any other organism and would be impossible without the hypertrophied brain. It is also hard to make sense of the intricacy of the brain without supposing that the adaptive advantages that have brought it into existence have long involved culture of increasing complexity. However, to keep our topic from becoming dull and predeterministic perhaps we should allow for the possibility that the enlarged brain, like bipedalism, might have been a pre-adaptive development that was favoured by selection for reasons other than culture. This point notwithstanding, for the time being I shall treat the brain and the culture it sustains as likely to have evolved as a single adaptive complex, that is to say as a co-evolution (see Wilson, this volume). We are rightly impressed with the biological success that seems to have followed from the development of the brain through some critical thresholds, but it

must be remembered that enlarged brains require prolonged infant dependency and high quality nutrition (Sacher & Staffeldt, 1974; Martin in Lewin, 1982). Both of these are expensive commodities in the economy of nature. No other lineage has experienced selection producing such an extreme development. The central puzzle to understanding our origins, therefore, remains the problem of figuring out under what novel selective circumstances this trend was initiated, and under what conditions the selection was sustained. Set out below is a list of some of the distinctive innovations which have been suggested and discussed as prime movers in the initiation of the trend towards elaboration of the brain-culture system. (1) The use of tools and weapons (e.g. Darwin, 1871; Washburn, 1960; Tobias, 1967, 1981); (2) Hunting (e.g. Darwin, 1871; Dart, 1925, 1953; Ardrey, 1961; Washburn & Lancaster, 1968); (3) Gathering (e.g. Zihlman & Tanner, 1979; Tanner, 1981); (4) Generalized social cooperation with 'autocatalytic' feedback (e.g. Darwin, 1871; Lovejoy, 1981); (5) Adoption by small-brained hominids of a socio-reproductive system involving food sharing, provisioning and central place foraging (e.g. Hewes, 1961; Washburn, 1965; Isaac, 1978; Lancaster, 1978). It should be noted that these competing explanations are not mutually exclusive, and future research will have to involve subtle assessment of their relative importance at different stages rather than simple Popperian falsification. It should also be noted that the study of the fossil and archaeological record will not suffice by themselves to distinguish among hypotheses. It is all very well arguing that tool-use was a pivotal development that imposed novel selection pressure, but under what circumstances would tools be adaptive? As I argued in the paper Casting the Net Wide (Isaac, 1980) answering this kind of question calls for problem-oriented quantitative field studies of feeding possibilities and foraging strategies. Over the past 12 years my own research has been focussed first on developing and then on testing the predictions of the so-called 'Food-sharing hypothesis' and its possible bearing on the initiation of selection for larger brain size. I shall briefly indulge myself by discussing aspects of this model and this work. The first point to be made is that major changes have occurred in human ranging patterns and feeding behaviour. These changes involve the collective acquisition of food, postponement of consumption, transport, and communal consumption at a home base or central place. These features are so basic in our lives that we take them for granted and very often they do not even appear on lists of contrasts between humans and non-human primates. However, if we could interview a chimpanzee about the behavioural differences separating us, this might well be the item that it found most impressive  'These humans get food and instead of eating it promptly like any sensible ape, they haul it off and share it with others'.

The food-sharing hypothesis should be renamed the central place foraging hypothesis. It incorporates tools and meat eating. It postulates that at some time before two million years ago, the behaviour of at least one kind of small-brained hominid was modified to include the elements shown in Fig. 25.13, namely the use of tools, the acquisition of meat, perhaps preferentially by males, the transport of portions of that meat to central places where it would be apt to be collectively consumed by members of a social group some of whom, especially females and young, had not participated in its acquisition. At the beginning or at some subsequent stage, female gathering was surely included in the system. Conscious motivation for 'sharing' need not have been involved. The model works provided that radiative ranging patterns developed with transport of some food back to the foci of social aggregation. For me, the interest of the model is not that 'humans' existed 2 mya but that it promises to help explain how the non-human hominids of that time began to be modified into humans. Once food transport was initiated, novel selection pressures would come to bear on (1) ability to communicate about the past, future, and the spatially remote and (2) enhanced abilities to plan complex chains of eventualities and to play what one might call 'social chess' in one's mind. That is, the adoption of foodsharing would have favoured the development of language, social reciprocity and the intellect. Evolutionary strategy models should now be developed to explore the conditions under which food sharing might become an ESS (see Maynard Smith, this volume). Clearly, part of the nutritional cost of brain enlargement and the costs of prolonged dependency during brain growth with extended learning would be taken care of by the provisioning/nurturing characteristics which in this scenario would already be part of the system. The model arose as a post-hoc explanation of the existence of concentrated patches of discarded artefacts and of broken-up bones in layers between 1.5 and 2 mya. Having set it up, we have turned around and have been enjoying the sport of trying to knock it down, with the help of fierce critics (e.g. Binford, 1981). The technicalities of this debate and this research go beyond the scope of this review (see Isaac, 1981, 1982; Bunn et al., 1980; Bunn, 1981; Potts & Shipman, 1981). Suffice it to say that in my view, we have obtained ample confirmation that hominids were indeed acquiring meat through the use of tools and were transporting this to favoured localities where the observed concentrated patches of bones and tools formed. Whether these places were 'home bases' or whether provisioning and/or active food sharing were going on, is harder to judge. My guess now is that in various ways, the behaviour system was less human than I originally envisaged, but that it did involve food transport and de facto, if not purposive, food sharing and provisioning. The food-sharing model has been widely misunderstood as implying that by two million years ago there existed friendly, cuddly, cooperative human-like hominids. This need not be so. The attractiveness of this model is that it seems entirely feasible for such a behavioural system to come into existence among non human hominids that had brains no larger than those of living apes, and it is my strong suspicion that if we had these hominids alive today, we would have to put them in zoos, not in academies. Clearly, this initial configuration can very readily be plugged into models involving kin-selection, and/or tit-for-tat selection patterns that would provide plausible, if hard-to-test models of the subsequent elaboration of brain-speech-culturesociety systems. Amongst other things, the provisioning and division of labour

implied by the system would make bonded male-female reproductive modules highly adaptive, if they did not already exist at the outset. In conclusion No two people who undertook to review this topic would have tackled it in the same way. I have chosen to stress enquiries focussed on stratified evidence from the past, while other writers would equally legitimately have emphasized the contributions made by studies of biochemistry, ecological dynamics or by comparative behaviour and sociobiology. Following the pioneer descriptive phases of primate studies, various workers have begun to search out generalizations among non-human primates concerning relationships between food choice, ranging patterns, reproductive strategies and social format (e.g. Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1977; Wrangham, 1979, 1980; Milton, 1981). The results have not yet been fully assimilated into thinking about human evolution, but already it emerges that humans have distinctive ecological relationships and social configurations that are outside the range of other primate patterns. My hunch would be that this will prove to be connected with the colonization of habitats where potential foods were more patchy and more widely dispersed than is normal for primates. This in turn involved altered diets which focus on two distinctive and quite different things: first on plant foods that yield large numbers of calories per item (e.g. tubers and nuts) and second, significant feeding on the meat of large animals and/or fish. Acquisition of all of these is facilitated by tool use. It is at present uncertain when and by what stages these shifts occurred. Finding out is one of the major challenges that confronts palaeoanthropology. Relative to other primates, humans have highly distinctive social patterns. In spite of tremendous variation this almost always includes reproductive units involving direct male investment in child rearing, and comprising one male and one or more females. These units are almost invariably integrated as modules into highly variable larger scale social entities. I can see no way of predicting the human pattern from the primate patterns without introducing some novel elements into the mix of variables. One candidate for an influential novelty may well be the significant incorporation of dietary components to which one sex rather than the other had preferential access. Clearly, meat is one such commodity, though it may not be the only one. Lovejoy (1981) has argued that monogamous pair bonding and food transport preceded meat eating and the formation of bands. However, we need to retain as the alternative hypothesis that pair bonding occurred within multi-male, multi-female social groups and was associated with division of food acquisition labour. Recent examination of relations between mating system, body size and testis size in primates does not support a multi-male social group for Homo (Harcourt, Harvey, Larson & Short, 1981; Martin & May, 1981). However, if early ancestral hominids already had mated pair modules within the troop this objection might not apply. Relating studies of the present to studies of the past will require changes of emphasis. Much of the literature on the stratified record of human evolution is devoted to the taxonomy of individual fossils and to arguments about whether particular ones are on the line or not. The topic is in its own way important, but with major taxa reasonably clearly established the younger generation of scientists is becoming more and more involved in enquiring into relationships between shifts in anatomical configurations and shifts in modes of adaptation. This line of research can be pursued profitably even if we do not know which particular fossils are indeed on

the line and which are off it. I would go on to predict that progress with this topic will involve much less narrow focus on fossils. Hominid palaeontologists and archaeologists will need to collaborate in assessing the adaptive significance of technology, subsistence patterns and socio-economic arrangements. For this, the archaeologists will have to give up the artefact typology fixation that has been their equivalent of fossil-philia. Both archaeologists and hominid palaeontologists are also going to have to work closely with ecologists. This has started, e.g. Schaller & Lowther. 1969, Peters & O'Brien, 1981, and J. Sept and A. Vincent (personal communication). In summary, improvements in knowledge about human evolution require the acquisition of richly diverse classes of information. This includes both stratified evidence from the past and the elucidation of the intricate features of living behavioural and ecological systems. As is normal in science, hypotheses regarding both narrative and mechanisms need to be restlessly formulated, tested and revised. However, as indicated in the introduction, and as amply illustrated in Darwin's own treatment of the topic, the meaning that each of us finds in the growing corpus of secure, tested information, nonetheless remains a humanistic abstraction. My being in a position to undertake this review stems from an appointment in East Africa, given me in 1961 by the late Louis Leakey. Since then my wife and I have been part of a goodly company of researchers in East Africa during a period of exciting discoveries. Many of my ideas surely derive from this participation. I recognize particularly strong influence from discussions with S. L. Washburn., D. R. Pilbeam, J. D. Clark, Vince Sarich and A. C. Walker. Also from the team that has worked with Richard Leakey and me at Koobi Fora. My wife is a part of the talking, the fieldwork and the laboratory work, and she draws the figures. For this paper, Jeanne Sept has done the light-hearted sketches (Figs. 25.1, 25.3, 25.11, 25.13). Stanley Ambrose encouraged me to think about the material in Fig. 25.10 and he is preparing a paper on character displacement in hominids. I wish to pay tribute to three great scientists, recently deceased, who did much to foster the study of biological and cultural co-evolutionKenneth Oakley, Francois Hordes and Charles McBurney. The last-named especially was my mentor during my student days and after. (Evolution from Molecules to Men, D. S. Bendall Ed., Cambridge 1985, Pages 521 - 539) A Latter-Day Case of an Evolving Priesthood Wow! There is a junk-load of stuff. And what do we first want to say about it? Never could you have a better, living example, of how the human struggles to keep their eyes focused upon the, fictional, dress worn by the naked king. Look at this stuff would you! It is amazing, the effort, the struggle, the hard work, years and years of dedication by hordes of brilliant, dedicated individuals, and to what? Nothing, nothing but mindless drivel. Harsh! You think that is harsh? Oh, not harsh. You think it is damned arrogant? I know what I am talking about. This latter day example of the Hans Christian Andersen mechanism of collective deceit to a purpose is not without earlier comparisons from another age when the barrier to ignorance set by dualism was focused not on human nature but the nature of the earth.

Despite the revelation that the earth went around the sun people went on devoting their lives to the 'fact' that the sun went around the earth, it was not just the supreme idiot Ptolemy who devoted his genius to working out how the geocentric model of the universe could present an accurate model of the heavenly motions. If we take a look at the Roman Cicero's work, from the first century after the Jewish god Jesus was sanctified, On the Nature of the Gods, we find lengthy argument concerning the idiocy of beliefs which today are only matched by those touted by scientist-priests like Isacc. How many tens of thousands of people were duped into leading the life of an elite member of society with privileges and honours heaped upon them for the rubbish they churned out in the name of the geocentric model of the universe that was already know to be utterly false, it is impossible to say, but we may be sure that this misery was inflicted upon many people. Today there are, once more, tens of thousand of highly gifted people, holding lucrative positions of authority in universities around the world where they are feted as geniuses by adoring young people and honoured by society, while all the time, these poor, sad, deluded people have no idea that all there efforts are in vein, and the in ten thousand years time, when it is too late to make any difference because the Jews will rule the entire solar system, the fact that the universe does not exist in order to revolve about humans is not true, humans are in fact just a part of the universe like any other feature of the same. Doesn't it make you want to weep as you get up a six in the morning to slog your way to the factory, or drag you worn out body to the bank, or to the fields to do a days hard graft for a pittance, to think of this rich, mollycoddled professors who live in total luxury all the while not have the faintest notion that all their words, all their fancy ideas, are complete and utter shit? Unless, could it be that they know this, or, that they do not care? Gosh, surely not. I bothered to include the closing credits in the above because Isacc says he got to be a member of the priesthood by way of an opportunity put his way by the most renowned and famous palaeontologist of my youth, Louis Leakey. But the most amazing thing about Leakey is that he was a professional priest, a vicar of some kind. Did you ever hear anything more amazing than that. I dip into the Koran in order to discover what the degenerates of this world are up to so I can try and destroy their truly revolting practices, it sickens me, it would interest me vaguely if it were a document from a dead age, like The Egyptian Book of the Dead. But the Koran is no such fossil, it is a living evil that is a menace to all humanity, and especially to science and the advance of anthropology, as we can see all too well from this appalling piece I have quoted above. But here we find a priest devoting his life to the search for the very knowledge that must prove God, whom he is devoted to, supposedly, does not exist. What is going on? This is the question I use to ask myself as a youth, but of course now I know the answer all too well. And he is not the only one, another great impostor upon the science of humanity taking advantage of the great fraud imposed upon the world by Darwin's dualistic mythology of apeness, was the Frenchman Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a Jesuit priest of all things who devoted his life to the search for the missing link. 'Pierre Teilhard de Chardin was born in Auvergne in France in 1881 and died in 1955. He fits into no familiar categories as he was at once a biologist and a palaeontologist of world renown, and also a Jesuit father. Long before his work was published his name was a byword in scientific circles both in France and elsewhere. He himself spent a good deal of his life

outside his native country, in China (where he played a major role in the discovery of Peking Man in 1929).' (Dust jacket, The Phenomenon of Man, Chardin, Collins, 1960) Of course you cannot be a scientist without being a passionate atheist dedicated to the complete eradication of religion, and belief in God, from the face of the planet, or at least from your society, anymore than you can be a criminal and be a police officer. The only difference between the two cases, as we can see from this quote above, is that while we know reality can conflict with the ideal, in the case of the scientist, in our society, this is a glorious thing, whereas in the case of the police officer it is accepted as only being natural. We discussed in a previous section how information filtered out of the environment by human individuals, upon being preserved, formed knowledge; as in the case of the evolution of the metal workers craft. We recognised that this kind of highly specialised and elaborate knowledge, knowledge not pertaining to everyday matters of life that all members of a small tribal superorganism could share in the acquisition of equally, such as that concerning animal and plant qualities, was bound to act as a germinal medium of novel behaviour that would necessarily produce a group distinct from the main body of the superorganism, by default, as it acted to preserve the knowledge that pertained to the specialist, and highly valued, craft. Thus knowledge acts as the fluid-genetic medium of organic form in the living tissue of the superorganism, which in turn has consequences for the non-living structures that form the exoskeletal structure of the superorganism as specialised bodies have an ever increasing impact upon the social being that is the superorganism to which they belong. Language is the basic information medium, knowledge is the basic product, law is a highly evolved form of knowledge, highly evolved simply because it pertains to the stage of organic evolution that presupposes the rise of what we call civilization, which relates to the complex form of supermassive superorganism. This said, law is still simply the product of the specialised craft, necessarily infused into a group identity, the group identity, in this case. We should always bear in mind that there is no difference between seeking to insist on the value of Nation as an exclusive identity, as the Nazis famously did, than there is in asserting race as an exclusive identity as the South African whites notoriously did, nor is there a difference between these two claims to exclusive identity and that practiced by Jews, of all kinds, meaning Christians and Moslems, of all kinds, meaning Mormons and Al Qaeda. This is all about group identity, but in these specific cases, the battle is for domination of society as master identity. In all cases, Jew, Christian, Moslem, Mormon, Al Qaeda, Catholic, Protestant, Wesleyan, and so on ad infinitum, all these identities are Jewish, and so we all have a Jewish identity, and we all live in a Zionist world. The apparent tension is only the same as the tension we find in our own bodies that is necessary for good health. In the above passage we find detailed evidence of the process of group formation focused upon individuals by virtue of their privileged position, due to kin ties, but also due to fellowship links related to already established group identities and structures. Furthermore, we can also note the position of privilege initially allowing the prime individual to establish a new dynastic group. Leakey, like Darwin, like most, if not all, leading evangelists of the theocracy, are sponsored, they are not self

made, or self motivated individuals, unless by self motivation we mean motivated to be sponsored by the elite in order to obtain the good things in life that all individuals naturally crave, either out of ordinary levels of necessity, or perfectly natural greed. Leakey's son, Richard, followed in daddy's footsteps, not to mention his mothers, who also earned herself a reputation in the field of human origins, discovering what must be the most fabulous find in all the world, the Laetoli footprints, consisting of two adult australopithecine and their sprog strolling across a fresh layer of volcanic ash, one bright day a couple a million years ago. And Richard, like his father, is an appalling enemy of evolutionary science as applied to humans. His works, Origins : What New Discoveries Reveal About the Emergence of Our Species and Its Possible Future, 1977 and Origins Reconsidered : In Search of What Makes Us Human, 1992, endeavour to ensure that no one imagines, in any realistic way, that humans are part of the natural world, while nonetheless speaking of them as if they were, in a manner seemingly most sincerely profound, and deep. This subject, physical anthropology is the absolute love of my life, in terms of the kind of delight I get from reading about anything magnificent about reality. I acquired a love of it when I went to college to study anthropology, and despite the lack of point in the course offered, the pleasure I get from just reading the work of people like Isaac is the best. It really is a tragedy to think of this knowledge in the hands of these supreme knowledge perverts, dedicated, as they are, by way of their profession, to its obscuration by means of perversion. And all to serve their one true god, Judaism. However this tragedy may be, the earth went around the sun despite the silencing death threats against those who declared this to be so; reality remained reality; no matter what the knowledge perverts declared it to be. Popes may be able to pervert reality, but they cannot alter it. It may be tragic that these charlatans, whose sole concern appears to be the masturbation of their own egos, should be in control of the knowledge they are authorised to pontificate upon, but the facts, mercifully, remain the same. I say mercifully, because they could simply of been destroyed, leaving no evidence, and then we would have considerable difficulties piecing the story of human evolution together. But of course we now know that Darwin provided the escape route from the incessant searching of the freethinkers who were driven to make sense of the human place in the real world that science was opening up to their eyes as knowledge of biology and anthropology came to their attention, even as the Jews spread out across the unknown world, exterminating, or subverting, all cultures, to leave none but their own, mind numbingly stupid, and nasty ideology of priest-craft law. And we can see Isaac's concern in his opening passage to placate the theocracy, because he is one of them, he would not have his job if he were not, he would not of been tolerated by the devoutly religious Leakey, he would not be anyone. Apart from the general adherence to the idea of physical origins licensed by Darwin's slanted account that said nothing about human nature, one thing that comes out of a consideration of the benefit accruing to people like Leakey and Chardin, and their corrupt dynasties of incubated academics, supporting an extended lineage of priests and their acolytes following in the train of their linguistic threads of drivel, is that by being the ones to do the digging and the finding, they get to do the telling, and so then they are licensed to do any explaining that has to be done too. And this, dear people, is why they do such a good job of finding genuine evidence. The evidence is their source of authority, and, to a great extent, they are able to give a perfect account of the subject matter of concern, just as an ancient Babylonian, or an Inca priest,

might of given a beautiful description of the motions of Venus and enthralled us by their predictions of heavenly events to come, that then proved to be true. This is why I love to read the brilliant work of the knowledge perverts, such as that of Isaac presented above, the ability to find the remains, to interpret them, and to analyse them with electron microscopes and such like, this is divine, I love it. But they then become experts and so they are wheeled out to provide the perversion that supports the idea of God. It is the same in all fields pertaining to human nature. Susan Greenfield, the famous neuroscientist who has made a name for her perverse presentation of science on television and who is the present president of the Royal Society. She is a brilliant neuroscientist, so she gets to say what the mind is! Fine, but what does she say, she says what the Bible says, she would not be on television if she did not. She says that we cannot know what human nature is, and she could not be more wrong, as I told her in an email, for which she, generously, I thought, thanked me. A Latter-Day Priest Dissected While we are on the subject there is one other area of expertise concerning human nature where the theocracy's high priests make their presence felt, in a most important fashion, by this method of doing sterling work in the practical field and then going on to ensure that the same old perverted notion of theistic reality is laid over the whole body of real knowledge, that they genuinely elucidate, like a skin containing all the detail of real form, without revealing the implications of that form for the resulting identity that we must experience as a result. These scientists are part of the organ of generation of that skin, but that skin is one derived from Jewish myth, not science. This subject area is linguistics. Linguistics is of course fundamental to our whole conception of human nature once we know that language evolved precisely as a means of fulfilling the potential of human corporate nature, it is clearly of the utmost importance to ensure that this knowledge most definitely can never be known. You cannot control knowledge by failing to seek it, or by destroying it, not in any extensive manner, knowledge must be controlled by possessing it, this can only be done by making an authority, establishing a body of experts who have genuine knowledge, but he themselves have not the slightest idea what it is that they have so that they act as thought they have knowledge, being authorised to do so, while they actually have less than they think. The threads pull together; expertise is not authority itself, authority sanctions expertise, expertise is therefore, in reality, like the ideal of a police officer's vocation, an all too vaporous thing. Ask anyone whose child has been taken away on the say so of a doctor, or look at the court case last week, today is 21/06/04, of the doctor, employed as an expert witness, who wrote to the police stating that a man had killed his two children on the basis of a television documentary that he had watched. This doctor, in court, still insisted that he was right, and the prosecution lawyer, wisely pointed out, it was because he could not see what was wrong with his behaviour that he was in court. Now the State is obliged to launch an enquiry into the practice of employing experts. There is a joke if ever there was one, which experts will they get to do that, not those practiced in being the victims of institutional abuse I don't suppose? Linguistics is a big subject, it is complex, and there are major theories about how it works. The experts, as in the two previous fields just considered, palaeontology and neurophysiology, have devoted themselves to uncovering the hard

facts of their subject, and written popular accounts to establish their priestly qualifications with the masses. Steven Pinker is the latter-day personification of this class of priest, in my youth Noam Chomsky was a famous priest of this class but he was not a populariser in the same sense of Pinker, he was just a chief priest within the establishment known to the academic fraternity, as he still is. Pinker looks great, he, just like his counterpart in the evolutionary department of scientific mythology, Richard Dawkins, extols the virtue of rationalism and rejects in the strongest possible terms the theistic model. What finer title could a person like me hope to find than The Blank Slate : The Modern Denial of Human Nature, Steven Pinker, Allen Lane, 2002. I wasted a huge sum of money on this book, perhaps the most I have ever spent, £25, and six months later I could of had it for a quid, which would be about the right price. There are some choice bits in it, I actually cannot remember any of it, or what the problem was specifically, but it obviously fell to my usual scrutiny because of its complete failure to take a scientific line on what human nature is, otherwise I would not have the recollection I am recounting here associated with Pinker's name. I certainly never read any of the book, dipping in was enough to reveal all. Scrub that, I just found some notes I wrote on 23rd March last year tucked in the back of Pinker's Blank Slate. He accepts the nature versus nurture dichotomy spoken of in terms of genes and heredity, versus environment and culture. He says his book is about the history of human nature, and, in the Preface, page eight, he notes that if culture is all important then it only exists because of the physiology which supports it. 'culture is crucial, but culture could not exist without mental faculties that allow humans to create and learn to begin with.' (Page viii) I presume this is what inspired me to right the last sentence, there is nothing else along these lines. Actually looking at his words again is inspiring, they are fantastic, I see now why I bought the book, at such great expense, on the spur of the moment. Recognising the same old sameness of a book can take a little bit more studious examination than standing in a book shop, albeit a nice fancy book shop, affords. I see this on page nine. 'Nor does acknowledging human nature have the political implications so many fear. It does not, for example, require one to abandon feminism, or to accept current levels of inequality or violence, or to treat morality as a fiction.' This is a dead give away, but it is only suspicious, his aggressive assertion of human nature demands a deeper look from me, this is my subject he is dealing with! Accepting human nature, assuming you get what human nature is right, totally destroys the world as we know it. This is the problem, clearly anyone saying otherwise is simply trying to stymie enquiry by making out that we know what human nature is, and there is no problem. Thus forestalling the coming of someone like me who responds by contradicting the broadcast of someone like Susan Greenfield, who asserts that we do not know what human nature is. Pinker appears to be taking his definition of 'nature', in the term 'human nature', from the word 'nature' as used in the phrase 'nature versus nurture'. Thus he is finding the theistic escape mechanism provided by the dualistic model which allows

anything to be said of physical nature as long as the nature of physical nature is left out of the equation. What human nature is has nothing to do with what genes do. Genes do what human nature tells them to do. Genes evolve to discover ways of creating a corporate being via their construction of individual form, which is so constructed by genes to make the cultural environment into the realisation of that corporate form. Nature and nurture are not therefore alternative sides of a coin, they are the blank, undifferentiated, surfaces of the same form, the human form, a coin with two blank surfaces. The blank slate does not have two alternative faces, it has two, if you must use such a dualistic, two dimensional, mode of thinking, equally blank faces. The real meaning of the nature versus nurture debate can be stated once you know what human nature is. This phrase, nature v nurture can be decoded from theistic-speak, dualisticspeak, priest-lore, whatever we feel like calling this mumbo-jumbo, to nature versus nature, in which phrase the two terms cancel each other out, leaving us with nothing, exactly as it should be in this case because the whole business is pure fabrication. And therein we get a sense of just how traumatic the discovery of what human nature is must be for our world. How on earth can something so momentous as the nature v nurture debate simply vanish in a puff of thin air, it must mean something more than that? No, no it does not. It is a product of the Jewish myth of individual being, and it is not only the detail of the myth that goes up in vapour, it is God, and all that relies upon the notion of God. It is Judaism, eradicated at last from our being, just by virtue of discovering one simple thing, what human nature is. This is not surprising because these features of existence are as colours, they exist to give an identity in the form of a linguistic covering to the superorganic form that is created by means of language. No, there is nothing surprising in all of this, except the sheer idiocy and arrogance of people like Pinker, that never fails to amaze me. Continuing the Pinker notes; On page nine he says no one believes genes are everything and culture is nothing. This is the fatal flaw that shows that Pinker nothing. He does not see that the reach of causality is not broken by a chasm of freewill dividing the physiology created by the genes from the culture created by language. The issue he adds to is a none issue, nature and nurture are one continuum  the ripples in the wheat field and the wind in the air are one and the same thing (Final section of To What Purpose?, which I just finished reading.). Even so, the book is maximally pertinent and brand new so lets check it out. If he recognised the reality that human are a corporate species he would see why science is overwhelmed by the theological premise that makes human divine and this exasperation with the bias toward the extreme position and away from the moderate, would be understood for what it is, as a natural perversion of science by religion, as epitomised by his fellow American scholar, the knowledge-pervert scholar Gould who resides as a mimic-theist within the theological institution of Harvard. Guided by the plan in the introduction to Part I, I am jumping to Pat II. This bit looks fascinating, it discusses Sociobiology, but life is short and virtually nonexistent when you're working, so off I go to Part III. Not sure any of this book's worth reading when I could be having a wank. As long as he fails to see the simple truth all his efforts support the enemies of reason he is pretending to despise, making him one of the most subtle mimics of all, and of course he went to Harvard, the theist bastion of the Jews American slave territory.

He talks the talk, but does not walk the walk. Well I apologise for some of the terminology in the above, I think it is quite disgusting, but that's what the notes said so I thought you would like an accurate rendition of the all important first impressions. There is a cracking paragraph on page nine of the preface. 'Why is it important to sort all this out? The refusal to acknowledge human nature is like the Victorians' embarrassment about sex, only worse: it distorts our science and scholarship, our public discourse, and our day-to-day lives. Logicians tell us that a single contradiction can corrupt a set of statements and allow falsehoods to proliferate through it. The dogma that human nature does not exist, in the face of evidence from science and common sense that it does, is just a corrupting influence.' (My italics) Boy, are those logicians, smart or what? They must be the fiends that wrote the Bible in the first place, after they arrived here following their long journey from the planet Logg. There is a God, they mistakenly told us, in error, and the rest is history, as they say. But in the field of reality, the trick is the false imputation of duality, which we see expressed loud and clear in the idea of nature versus nurture. It is a pity Pinker did not twig to this most fundamental of all contradictions before he sat down and began pinking the keys. Page 141 This is naive, pathetic and childish. By rejecting the objections to human nature Pinker validates them on their own terms. He explicitly accepts that innate inequality is a bad thing, this is illogical and facile. If humans are in any way innately different then that is an end to the matter, and it shows us why we live in the vile world we do where the moralists are the real villains. Justifying inequality is what frees us, in accordance with the dictum 'The truth shall set you free'. The only people who suffer directly from the revelation of human nature is the elite class, the Jews especially, because this indicates their true nature, which, in the case of the Jews, is always hidden behind the sham of their inferiority, as mentioned by Pinker when he says Hitler regarded the Jews as inferior  wrong  Hitler knew the Jews were the true masters and as such he took the role of usurper, which made him the perfect would-be Jew. By this means Hitler released the latent potential of the Jewish biomass, via an act of sacrifice, which cowed the slave population of Christians into obedience and subservience to the Jews. Hence their recovery of Israel, long developed by the then greatest Jewish slave state on earth, Britain, now supplanted in this leading role by the new Jewish power, America. I let myself go when I am making notes, I would never dare say anything like that in a published book, the Jews, their master slaves that is, have imposed laws on us against such truth telling. I swear this man is a master of perverting ideas. I just read page 141 after copying my notes and in it he says, 'if differences among groups in their station in life their income, status, and crime rate, for examplecome from their innate constitutions, the

differences cannot be blamed on discrimination, and that makes it easy to blame the victim and tolerate inequality.' The man is insane. The one argument that makes it wholly impossible to blame the individual, he uses to say provides a means of the exact opposite. And yet in the preface he says that people who argued that rape was down to human nature were condemned for saying, by this means, that the individual could not be blamed for their violent behaviour. I hate this buffoon. I was about to say I had had enough of this rubbish, when I read my notes for page 142, look at this! Definition of human nature  cognitive and emotional faculties are universal to all healthy people. Another facile theistic idea. This focuses on form not nature. He is saying that a platform of individually definable attributes, one by one, constitute human nature. Thus being in any way abnormal is not healthy and not part of human nature, such as being sterile, blind or deaf. This means our society is unnatural since it supports such people gladly. So humans are uniquely distinct from nature and so there is no such thing as, simply put, human nature. So this huge work, dedicated to the defence of human nature asserts, time and again, that there is no such thing as human nature, but then of course if this book did not set out to prove there was no such thing as human nature he would not of been able to publish it. Page 142 'Modern biology tells us that the forces that make people alike are not the same as the forces that make people different.' Wrong! This asserts there is a dualism between two forces acting on one form, the basis of myth and the perversion of knowledge that goes hand in hand with myth. So on what does he base this stupid assertion? 143 Race is about climate and has no biological meaning to justify the significance we instinctively see in it. This is so sickeningly fascistic that I just cannot read any more of this man's Jewish garbage. So, lets look at the book and see what it was that so annoyed me. 'This book is primarily about human nature endowment of an cognitive and emotional faculties that is universal to healthy members of Homo sapiens.' Human nature is corporate, there is nothing else that needs to be said about it. Being corporate means the human form, and all that is associated with it, is the product of an impulse to form a superorganic being, whereby the human animal takes shape at the social level, and whereby the individual components of this corporate organism possess the status of cells within that Super Being. This common endowment Pinker makes the definition of human nature, is meaningless as a definition of human nature, it merely selects a number of attributes and makes their common possession the definition of human nature. You may as well say a set of attributes such as wheels, engine, seats, are the nature of a car. But the

nature of a car is that it is a vehicle, as simple as that, all else, these various mechanical attributes, follow from this one defining quality. The attributes do not define the nature of a thing, that is arse about face, it is the nature of a thing that accounts for all of its attributes, the process is not reversible as a mode of defining, one lead to many, many do not lead to one. If this were not the case then we would find it impossible to categorise anything, we would be looking for an infinite amount of detail and then trying to ensure that only fragments of detail applied in certain cases. Thus we would begin by recognising that trying to tell a badger from a human was nearly impossible, as both have eyes, limbs, teeth, hair, noses, and so on. How could we tackle this impossible problem? Well we could begin by taking photographs and asking little Mary, sitting on the lawn, to see if she could see a difference. No scientist of Pinker's persuasion would be able to solve the riddle for he would be consumed by all the minutia. Obviously, it is only when it comes to humans this problem arises, ordinarily scientists make an art of categorisation and they know the idea is to put things into their most simple categories first and to bifurcate from there. So a proper assessment of human nature would begin by recognising one common feature, the corporate nature of human form, demonstrated, incontrovertibly, by the possession of speech, for example, and then all the varieties of form and behaviour would be drawn out from this one common factor. Susan Greenfield, in a recent interview on BBC 4, stated that we did not know what human nature was, because if we did that would mean we would be able to say what was common to all humans, at all times, and in all places, but that, as humans varied so much, and no common factor could be found, this showed human nature was beyond our grasp at present. In saying this Greenfield rightly defined human nature, it is a common thread acting as a feature of our kind toward which all our kind could be related. If we were birds and we wanted to know what bird nature was we might home in on the power of flight, but birds come in many different species, so the comparison is not meant to be complete, the point being there are exceptions to this rule, some birds do not fly. This comparison is only indicative in respect to the way one broad sweeping feature is definitive of the nature of a thing. In humans that one broad sweeping feature is the existence of a superorganic form, and every single attribute of humans, good, bad or indifferent, can be accounted for by taking this into consideration. No human being anywhere, at anytime, or in any way, fails to conform to this quality, that the human animal is a corporate form and the individual is a unit within its corporate composition; there are, in other words, no other species of human, and when we go back in time to prehuman species we even find they conform to this eternal quality of human nature, the organism takes shape at the level of social interaction, and there is no such thing as a human individual as an end in their own right. Even if we go back two million years to a time long before anything even approximating to our kind had come into being, we find exactly the same common nature directing the acquisition of bipedal walking and encephalization, as discussed by Isaac in his piece of theistic mythologizing, that he extrapolated from facts sequestered for the cause of maintaining the Jewish slave identity implant. What tool making, camp sites, upright posture, and later, gracile forms, all indicate, is a seamless transition toward an ever more perfect form of individual evolved to constitute a superorganic being.

Unless we eradicate religion from the face of the earth there is no chance of a free understanding of ourselves, it is as simple as that. This man is a perfect example of how difficult it is to beat the theocracy. Returning to Isaac, The Creative Vortex of Sociality It is then, just the one small matter of the theory, the idea, the thinking, behind all the facts, that is of interest to us right now. And so we have unearthed this, not too old, piece of anthropological science from a book that was part of an anthology of work presented by way of a conference held at Cambridge to honour the memory of the chief priest of evolutionary theory in the theocracy, Darwin, upon the centenary of his death in 1882. Lets take a closer look at this artifact of modern mentality and see what sort of things there are in it to which we find ourselves especially drawn, both by way of criticism, and by way of opportunity to indicate how our scientific notion of Homo sapiens would address the questions being dealt with. There is official science based on myth, Biblical myth, Koranic myth, Jewish myth, and there is science based on fact, we want the latter, which will vaporise the former, we hope. Firstly, first paragraph quoted above from Isaac, concerning the palaeontological evidence. It is vital that we recognise the nature of this evidence and are clear about it. We can usefully remind ourselves of the position we are in today as scientists. We live in a world ruled by priests, exactly as the ancient Greeks did, we can search for knowledge freely as long as we do not in away tread on the toes of these priests. There is a core of special knowledge at the heart of their mythology today just as there was two thousand years ago, but the actual substance of that core has changed, just the world has changed, as knowledge itself has changed. We can remind ourselves of our comparative terms which apply to these two identical conditions of intellectual life, in ancient Greece the skies were the zone of mystery beyond knowing, but not beyond our perception, thus the myth constituted a geocentric world view in which the earth was the centre of all things and intimately connected with the heavens. The counter knowledge vaporising this myth was the revelation of reality leading to a heliocentric understanding of the heavens based on a detached analysis of what was observed. Today, the same civilization, the Jewish civilization, ruled by the same priesthood, uses a new area of knowledge to formulate its myth, this concerns the nature of humans themselves. This gives us a homocentric account of what we know about ourselves in which humans are the determining factor in their own existence, humans in others words brought themselves into being. The alternative account of observations regarding human nature sees humans as part of the biosphere of the planet just as the alternative account of the earth's position relative to the heavens saw the planet as part of the universe, not its centre and reason for being. Thus we have the biocentric model of reality. And so, in short, we have ancient Greece with its geocentric versus heliocentric models of reality and we have our own age with its homocentric and biocentric models of reality. Thus, in real terms, in the intellectual domain, nothing has changed since the days of ancient Greece, we still live in a theocracy today just as much as we ever did, all of which conforms to the

reality of human nature, a thread of continual influence directing our evolution whether we like it, or know it, or not. Just as the mythologists and the scientists observed the same planets and the same motions thereof, so the mythologists and ourselves seek to admire, treasure, and delight in the same real sources of information. Thus as Isaac rejoices in the fabulous evidence of fossil remains millions of years old revealing hard facts that could not be known by any other means, so we rejoice too in the exact same truth. We have no quarrel with the scientist-priests on this point. Isaac describes the story revealed by the evidence and notes a crucial event, the coming of a new form of human some 100,000 years ago, associated with a loss of toughness and the acquisition of our delicate form. He says the biological meaning of this is not known. Anthropologists have no means of speculating upon why such a transformation should of occurred because they precluded by the remit imposed by the theocracy upon science which demands science only consider the physical aspects of evidence before it when determining its facts. Thus we cannot make assumptions about the meaning of this major transformation, not if we are dependant upon the establishment for our status as professors of science. And yet this condition only really applies to humans, if we were looking at birds and we found evidence of hollow bones appearing in early specimens that were closely related to solid boned creatures we would say this transformation occurred because of the obvious advantage for perfecting an avian form. As we are true scientists, not locked into the protection of the Jewish theocracy, we are free to recognise that just as birds fly, and their evolution is directed toward a better avian form suited to environmental conditions, so humans are socially defined and their evolution directs them toward an ever more perfect superorganic form. With this in mind we can try and relate the disappearance of robust features, to be replaced by delicate features, to the notion of shifting away from small, pack like superorganic kernels based on primordial human qualities such as bipedal gate, tool making, intricate social communication, largely dependant upon uniquely naked mammalian skin, supported by complex vocalisation including, some symbolic content, toward larger, better organised, tribal superorganisms, with true linguistic communication acting as a creative medium of exoskeletal formation, leading to a social unit providing much better protection for the living units of which it was composed, allowing these units to evolve more neotinous forms drawing out the qualities of childlike dependence and delicacy as the corporate being becomes an ever more viable cocoon of permanent protection, where qualities of individuals can turn away from the ferocity of the none human domain and toward integration in the comfort of the social domain that was becoming, ever more intensely, by this means of organic evolution revealed in the skeletal remains of individuals, the living being, the true body, of the species. What we must not do then, is to allow ourselves to be deceived by the pretence of possession that is craftily foisted upon us by the establishment in respect of the evidence of methodical investigation which is made the be all and end all of science itself. Methods of investigation are only the beginning of science, not its end. To be beguiled by the illusion that the people who dig the evidence out of the ground, and accurately record and interpret the pattern of evidence revealed thereby, somehow own that evidence, and are thereby empowered by it to pontificate on the meaning of the picture revealed, is a mistake. When we consider the story of Darwin and the Beagle we see that this was the greatest scam ever foisted upon humanity, a scam realised by this very means of great exertion in the act of discovering facts, followed

by a supreme presumption in their interpretation, which yet, involved nothing but an interpretation of a pattern of physical evidence, and resulted in a product that, from a scientific point of view, tells us virtually nothing, in the final analysis, as we will see admitted when we come to the final author contributing to this anthology examining the legacy of Darwin one century on. These so-called scientists do not own the evidence they have taken from the ground. Indeed one could more accurately say they have robbed it. For they have misappropriated it in the name of civil authority, and the protection of the myth that gives people their corporate identity in conformity to the identity that is central to the social world we live in, a world which is focused upon Jewish identity, and as such imbued with the essence of Jewish identity even when that identity is not manifested in an overt form. Before us lies an exciting prospect, a means of discovering a pattern of evidence regarding the actual unfolding of the potential of mammalian physiology leading to the human form. I say this because despite the glorious efforts of Thor Heyerdahl, in search of the truth behind the populating of Polynesia, involving a life long quest to understand the evidence he found of cultural links between Polynesia and South America, and the adventurous, and unscientific, approach he took to proving his point, the biological evidence finally came down against him. Still the books remain as great stories to read, well told, and full of fantastic romance. A fine testament to the age in which he lived, in which I was born, an age that could still sustain such mystery, an age that is no more. It only needed blood lines to indicate the movement of peoples from Indonesia toward the Pacific. But more recently the genetic evidence of matrilineal descent has fixed the origin of modern humans, not just their ancient forebears, in Africa. And it seems these clever scientific technicians are able to determine the relative antiquity of features of the genome so that, with the completion of the Human Genome Project, we may have before us the prospect of pinpointing gene sequences for attributes relating to language acquisition, naked skin, and all the other fine detail of our form, and the precise time scale on which these attributes came into being. And I predict that the attributes, like nakedness, that the priests have no way of making assumptions about, but which we can make reasoned assumptions about based on the knowledge that there must of been some intensely convincing means of communicating corporate identity between hominids who were tool users, and the fact that we know racial identity evolved to serve exactly this purpose, but was superseded in the prime role of identity imposition by the evolution of language some 100,000 years ago. Our assumptions, based upon our discovery of human nature will, in time, be vindicated by the evidence arising from the human genome's decoding. In saying, this, and making this matter central to the retention of Jewish authority over all of humanity we do of course have to note that there is the problem, as ever, of who controls the evidence. To which the priests will say that we would say that, so that if the evidence goes against us we can say it was because it was perverted. And why should we say that, just because evidence always has been perverted by the priesthood who are so careful to see that they get their filthy mitts on all evidence; is that any reason to suppose that it will be perverted in the future? 'One of the specific characteristics of the human evolutionary lineage has been the propensity to make tools'

Indeed ........ 'Thus, we begin to see that in spite of their simplicity these early artefacts had considerable importance in effecting novel adaptations. They are to be understood mainly as meat-cutting tools and as tools for making tools.' What we must bear in mind when we think about this most beautiful of all evidence of our kind's evolution is that when Isaac says this about humans, he is not talking about humans, he is talking about the link between humans and animals as we know them today, aside from ourselves. As he says, we could not put these creatures in academies, but rather in zoos. And so what on earth were these creatures doing with, not tools, but a full blown culture identical in its nature to the same culture we have today? It is an amazing question, but far more amazing is the fact that no one has ever bothered to ask it in these terms, recognising that what is being said here is that these creatures were already doing, millions of years before humans evolved, everything, everything, that we do today. They had culture. Taken on the face of it people may want to cry out in ridicule at this assertion. This is because they think culture is something unique to us modern human types, and that is what makes us special. But from our biocentric point of view that is not the case at all. There is a superorganism that is composed of an exoskeleton, that describes the situation today, and it is what Isaac is describing in the passage clipped from the quote above. All that culture is is exoskeleton, nothing more, nothing less, it never has been, and it never will be. These tools are not to be understood in the limp manner suggested here by Isaac, they are to be understood as a product of nature realised in its creation of the human form by the release of the potential of mammalian physiology in the vacuum of the social environment this physiology itself brought into being. Tools are to be understood as the skeletal remains of a superorganic animal, just as the cars on our roads, and the roads, and the planes in our skies, but not the skies, are to be understood today; except not yet as remains, still as part of the living tissue, the product of our activities, our tools. The knowledge perverts who steal the items of evidence and then weave their myths about them are stuck with an eternal problem, their inability to solve the logical impasse created by their myth, how did the human animal evolve beyond the grasp of evolution? Naturally they do not want to solve this problem, the idea is to preserve the problem, not to remove it. But we do remove the problem, we make a seamless explanation span the ages from the present to the deepest past, embracing all evidence under one conception and one plan and one terminology. The camps where the tools were found that indicate the extensive use of materials to build nests and eat communally are the evidence of an exoskeleton, as are the skyscraper of New York. We need no fancy contortions in the language we use to understand this evidence and what it tells us, and we no longer have dilemma of wondering how humanity can be outside nature, something we might think, if we are bordering on being pathologically insane, can only be understood by reading the Bible, which tells us about the fall of man. This new found ability to live in harsh environments mentioned by Isaac can be easily understood in relation to an interpretation of the evidence which indicates the existence of a far more complex superorganic being coming on the scene 100,000 years ago, where the individual can even acquire the extraordinary ability to live in either arctic conditions, or blazing hot, arid desert. Racial physiology took its imprint

from the territory in which the specific organisms evolved their particular adaptive form, racial identity was relative to the territory they occupied. So Eskimos were white, short and stocky, Australian aborigines were black as black can be, wiry, and sleek. This linked, adaptive transformation, can easily be simplistically misrepresented as being meaningless, other than being a shallow reflection of adaptive variation. But that is so lame compared to what we know about our own kind, the importance of identity to us, it is infuriating to see this theistic propaganda being pumped out relentlessly by all forms of the media. What makes the issue of this propaganda so devious is that on the face of it the motivation, although twisted, could be seen as innocent in that it is, apparently, seeking to suppress the innate racism of the human species. But that facet of appearances is just a fold in the elaboration of the cloth of illusion that binds our eyes against seeing the true nature of things. If we know what race means then we know what religion means, the two go together because they are of the same nature. This is why the theist rants and raves about the vileness of racism, and the need for coming together in love and peace irrespective of our race or nationality, all that matters is that we honour the Jewish God of law. Because they are racists of another kind, religious racists, people who make religious identity something to be fought for, to die for, to kill for. Now, just let me say at this point, that in the grand scheme of things, this theistic interpretation, whether racist or not in its inherent nature, is an advance on the physiologically racist foundation of priestcraft, such as we saw extolled by Hitler, or that we see broached by the likes of the British National Party. But that is of no concern to us. Our point is not essentially political; besides which this fact is really biological since it conforms to the evolutionary imperative to form an ever more perfect superorganic being. We are concerned to liberate science from the grip of the priesthood, and thereby to set knowledge free. We cannot do this without destroying Judaism, that is the way it is, it is not our first thought to be anti-Semitic, it is the end result of seeking the truth as determined by a biocentric examination of reality. The lawmakers will just have to find the next point of mystery, which must be the origin of the universe, to weave their myth about that will enslave those that come after us to the yoke of Judaism, in another form presumably, and its laws. Despite the divergence of superficial form the theists rightly say that race has no depth in the genetic makeup of individuals as revealed by the genome, the species remained the same, an Eskimo could breed with an aborigine. This is so because the racial divergence is not about form, in depth, it is about appearance, corporate identity. If we imagine that such a corporate identity was required, then how else could we envisage its coming into being, by each group deciding to play football, or baseball, or tennis? OK, but that subtle behavioural variation comes a little later on. This question presents a great puzzle. The extent of separation between the two races mentioned is considerable, the imposition of their respective physical environments upon their forms is likewise maximal in terms of the divergence between the two environments in question. Yet still only one species remain, this simply flies in the face of everything a Darwinian scheme of evolution predicts. But the answer is perfectly simple once you have relinquished your slavery to Jewish myth. The individual is not the unit of evolutionary advance. The superorganism is the unit upon which evolution acts, this superorganic transformation is reflected in the most superficial aspects of the individual's physiology, in their racial features, as we recognise them, and the cultural features. At the level of individual being these things do indeed seem utterly trivial when all is said and done, since even a girl from the New Guinea jungle, whose mother knew only the stone age,

can be happy in an office playing away on a typewriter, given the chance. And you cannot get more superficial than that. But taken at the superorganic level the superficiality disappears, the racial and cultural form become all important. When the hidden tribes of the New Guinea interior were discovered, just before the outbreak of the second world war, they represented the last large populations of human beings to be discovered by the modern Jewish world. Immediately, as a superorganism, they were exterminated, as evidenced by the fact that from one generation men went from carrying stone axes to carrying steel axes. These accoutrements were prime features of their superorganic form. The stone axe was the most valuable thing in these people's lives. The men worked hard in the quarries cutting out stone from which to make their axes, and as such these implements were to them as, lets say, while under the influence of football madness during the present European championships, I assume that is what it is anyway, as central in their tribal lives as football is in ours. And overnight they were presented with boxes of steel axes! Wow! Blown away, they just dropped a central plank of their culture in an instant; sod that rock bashing for a lark. It is as if a race of extraterrestrial aliens were to arrive and trot off to the football stadium where Beckham and Rooney were playing ball with each other, and to start handing out personal spacecraft capable of travelling at the speed of light, and inviting everyone to the moon for a lesson in planet hopping, how would the football fan base stand up to that competition? But there was a price to be paid for the inevitable acceptance of outside gifts, whether individuals recognised it or not. The dead superorganism gave up its biomass to the new encroaching superorganism as steel replaced stone, and Judaism replaced head hunting. Bring back the good old days I say  Oh I see the Jews have, Al Qaeda lopped another head off yesterday, 22/06/04, in Iraq, a South Korean businessman this time. You just can't keep a good thing down. There is no need for adaptation of a superorganism to go any deeper than the superficial aspects of the individual, and indeed to do so must be counter productive since the more focused upon the individual evolutionary change is the less it must be directed toward the superorganic form of the species. Focusing upon the individual in adaptation to the physical environment is precisely what would lead to divergence into a variety of species as a means of adapting to niche environments, exactly what has not happened in the case of humans. The nature of the human animal therefore, is such that each superorganism represents only one individual in a population of superorganic individuals, so that a fauna exists that is composed of a population of superorganisms which relies, for it viability as a superorganic species, upon just such a population, requiring the ability of these Super Beings to interact competitively, producing the balanced tension necessary to the healthy existence of all evolved species. This means there is an evolutionary imperative in the superorganic being acting against divergence that would allow races to evolve into distinct species. As usual the homocentric ideas of the theists mount up impossible problems to form a barricade against the doorway leading to an understanding of human nature, while a scientific, biocentric idea of humanity, lets the answers flow smoothly, consistently, and readily into our easy grasp, in total conformity to all evidence, of all kinds, including the evidence of elite intransigence mounted against the truth which is provided by the geocentric and homocentric mythmaking models of reality. 'Maybe this is indeed a fairy story, but it is fun and it may turn out to be at least partly true.'

Fairy story says it all where these people are concerned. The speculation under the heading of 'dynamics' is hopeless because they are trying to accommodate science to the Biblical conception of humanity as a divine being, created separately from the evolutionary process which they are trying to make fit the evidence. They are like a corrupt police department trying to fit up an innocent person. The problem of punctuated versus progressive, or a combination of the two, is dealt with automatically by a scientific model of human evolution, because scientists are empowered to look at the animal they are trying to understand, and as such they can see there is indeed an inevitable pattern of point origination followed by dispersion leading to various degrees of assimilation or extermination, depending upon localised factors. The Sumerian exoskeletal structure represents a point origination event that occurred in the Middle East five thousand years ago, which has eventually reverberated around the planet transforming the entire biomass of the species. This involved a constantly repeated cycle of regeneration, always adhering to the original plan, embodied in the core identity preserved in the elite, who have become the Jews, followed by a dispersion phase. In the detail of this process we find differential modes of change occurring between individual superorganisms according to their nature and form upon the initialisation of contact. Thus when the Jews invaded Britain and exterminated the ruling Druidic elite they could simply insert themselves as the new masters, and establish the newly formed Jewish slave identity, Christianity, as the source of power for the new elite who were put in place in exactly the same way the Jews are selecting the new authorities to run Iraq following their invasion last year. Of course the Iraqis, as a population, are already slaves of Judaism, so, like the Druidic peoples of ancient Britain, they are already accustomed to a yoke that fits the Jewish superorganic physiology. However, when the Jews invaded the American territories, in North America especially, they found still primitive superorganic forms, just as they did in Australia, and these had no cultural identity implant that accustomed them to the role of slave in a highly structured hierarchical exoskeletal being. Hence the Indians were simple exterminated and a new biomass of already implanted slaves were imported from Europe, and provided with a new version of the slave implant adapted to the local territory. Hence Mormonism was fabricated and it is now a major religious force that is finding its way back to these shores where the effort is being made to withdraw Britain from European integration to allow the American slave colony to try and retain some influence in our region. We might note that the importation of negroes into the Americas was carried out precisely because the Indians were such useless slaves, and this was really a stop gap until a proper Jewish slave population could found. As it turns out the blacks are proving to be amongst the most promising Jewish slaves in the world today, they are at the forefront of a passion for slavery in America, where their genetic temperament seems to lend them to an intense love of affiliation in a strong spiritual body. Africa, meanwhile, is experiencing a surge in the take up of the Christian slave implant. Black Christians are the most passionate fascists in the Christian slave hierarchy of Judaism, being vehemently against homosexuals being allowed to become priests and, would you believe, these people are sending missionaries to Britain to try and bring us back to God! Eh, what about that then, far out or what? makes you think the whole world is on acid, and if it ain't, then it obviously should be. I actually agree with the blacks on this point concerning homosexuality, it does adhere to the creed, and to that extent I think we should respect their sick attitude, as it demonstrates far and away more integrity, and therefore

honour, than the squirming, sycophantic manoeuvres, of our degenerate slave priesthood  degenerate relative to the doctrine that makes them who they are, Christians. No wonder, when you think about it, that from their point of view, the Africans feel the need to come and preach over here. The evolutionary battle, always focused upon corporate identity goes on. But it does involve a process of point origination followed by dispersal, involving eradication to create uniformity, leading to an overall impression of bursts of energy followed by a ripple, occurring in a series of broad cycles, which we must expect to occur more frequently as the evolutionary process releases more of the pent up potential of mammalian physiology directed at the realisation of a more perfect form of superorganic being. The reason for this simply has to do with the laws of physics and the relationship of energy to mass, as the mass increases the dynamics operating within it create a more dynamic internal environment and this must induce more rapid change, and that is exactly what we experience living in the modern world. Our social structures, that is to say our exoskeleton, appears to be, from an individual perspective, in a state of flux. I do not know about you, but I think that this scientific account, emanating directly from the discovery of precisely what human nature is, is totally devastating for our world view, and must have a massive impact upon our society if it becomes ascendant. Not in the fallacious and misleading ways in which Pinker says the theists argue it must have, by undermining the slave implant that makes people obey the laws imposed by the elite, but in simply revealing what the nature of the elite is, and thereby jeopardising all law as we know it. 'As the outlines of the narrative of human evolution have emerged, two particularly intriguing puzzles have emerged with it. Under what selection pressures did, firstly, the two-legged gait and, secondly, the enlarged brain become adaptive? The first of these can be rephrased as: Why did ancestral hominids become bipedal when all other primate species which have come to the ground have adopted some or other form of quadrupedal locomotion? Many thinkers on these topics, starting with Darwin, have tended to opt for an all-purpose explanation which might explain both bipedalism and brain enlargement, for instance, tool and weapon carrying. However, since specific evidence for the two evolutionary shifts are separated by at least two million years, it may be wise to uncouple the searches for explanations.' This section is perhaps the most telling. What do we say about this? It is quite appalling. Here, the priest is playing with his evidence in a sickening manner, like a kitten toying with a mouse. This passage reeks of arrogance and contempt for knowledge, for science, for humanity. We can treat this paragraph as one integral question. Within the question the proper mode of reply is given, the extraordinary and unique features of humanity should be treated as being related to one another, the high priest of evolutionary theory, Darwin, himself recognised this must be so. However, evidence has proven that if this is correct then there must be a thread of continuity running through the evolution of hominids which must extend right down to the present time. If this is so then we have proven that there is such a thing as human nature, and all we need do is recognise what it is. Clearly, the answer is to think of a smart arse way of saying the evidence must be wrong, otherwise the Jewish mythology in the Bible and the Koran can not be defended, and this is a situation the

scientist-priest is dedicated to ensuring cannot happen. Thus we have the mythological requirement that the two unique features of humanity be uncoupled. Uncoupled! Just like that. Who do these arseholes think they are!! The scientists are worse than the Creationists whom they feign to hate, while in reality they are colleagues of theirs in the control of knowledge, and therefore in the mastery of society. To engage in science, we might actually want to address the questions raised, they are interesting. Given that the ape animal living in the forest was selected as the best form to give rise to a mammalian superorganism, why did an upright posture come to the fore as the primary alteration in form, acting as a foundation for the further necessary changes, the most outstanding of which, making its presence felt a good while later, was increasing brain size? From the outset we know that the vacuum the hominid line was set to balloon into and fill was the social vacuum. The apes that came out of the woods and made the ground their home must of been evolving toward an ever more intensely social form from the word go. At the same time the perverse emphasis upon the survival value of attributes relative to the physical environment we see in Isaac must be applied to the course evolution took. Baboons live on the ground in large troops, but they are grazers, it may well be that an ape adopted the kind of omnivorous diet that has been observed in some chimpanzee troops and they developed hunting strategies which led them toward the ground, and more importantly, toward far more intense social relations. 'For instance, do potential feeding niches really exist that would make bipedalism adaptive?' Asks Isaac. Awareness of chimpanzee hunting strategies did not exist when Isaac wrote this just over twenty years ago, but we are all well aware of this today, plus the quite sophisticated use of tools for catching termites and cracking hard nuts. These are exceptionally important observations in terms of providing valid reasons for speculating on the possible early avenues of evolutionary divergence that first set the hominid line on its way. We could speculate all day on the actual first steps and toy with the significance of the ideas we come up with. But what we know for sure is that human nature is corporate and it was this nature that created our earliest ancestors. So no matter what we know that upright posture came into being because it fostered the complimentary shifts in form that all come together to make an ever more potent superorganic form. To work how the pattern of evidence fits the logic of the argument we need to theorise on the kind of evolutionary transformations that would of fostered the increasingly social animal's development. What stands out in all my work is the importance of identity. All species must have identity fixing parameters, but we are talking about a special mode of identity formation that takes place in the social domain and thereby incorporates the individual into a social unit. It is clear enough from watching chimpanzees organise a hunting party where specific roles are adopted to lay a trap for their prey, that these strategists would benefit enormously from better integration into a social unit. If the prey were available to fund such a shift, how would it come about in terms of physiological transformation? We know that the first indications that our kind is on its way is the appearance of ape like creatures with an upright stance. What would this stance do for them?

Free their hands, and so we see tools come on the scene, and what are tools, tools are full blown evidence of superorganic form. So from the day upright stance and tools appeared our kind was already evolved, these were human beings, but in an early stage of development, because it is the existence of a true superorganic form, with real exoskeletal attributes, that defines the human species. Not upright posture, not tool use, not speech, these are not the indicative attributes of the human species. Having an exoskeleton, this is the single identifying mark of our kind. Tools are the evidence of this mark, not just in themselves, but in what they tell us about what the animals whose bodies these tools formed part of looked like as superorganic creatures living in established nest sites, home sites at the centre of a fixed territorial range. With this conception in mind we are more inclined to reach back from what we know about the earliest bipedal hominids on the ground, into the forest where we know nothing about their antecedents. What is evident is that the creatures who came to earth and stood upright must already of evolved into a fully superorganic form of ape while still living in the forests. These forest dwellers, like the hunting apes of today, must of evolved an ever more elaborate form of social unit even while they were still apelike creatures. Having evolved as superorganic forest dwellers, the limitation on their further superorganic development would of been apparent in a forest environment for creatures of their size, they were not insects. Apparently, somewhat to my amazement, I must admit, someone worked out what form a superorganic type of mammal would have to exist. Scientific method is amazing, and I wish I was able to do the maths upon which it is based. But what you do with the results is what really matters. 'Hamilton could be said to have inaugurated the field with his introduction of the conceptual framework of kin selection, which solved, among other things, many of Darwin's puzzles about eusociality in insects way ants, bees, and termites live "selflessly" in large colonies, the most of them sterile servants to a single fertile queen. But Hamilton's theory didn't solve all the problems, and among Richard Alexander's important contributions was his characterization of the conditions under which eusocial mammals might evolve "prediction" stunningly confirmed by the a subsequent studies of the amazing South African naked mole rats (Sherman, Jarvis, and Alexander 1991). This was such an astonishing triumph of adaptationist reasoning that it deserves to be more widely known. As Karl Sigmund describes it, Hamilton's ideas led to a most remarkable discovery when, in 1976, the American biologist R. D. Alexander lectured on sterile castes. It was well known that these existed for ants, bees, and termites, but not for any kind of vertebrate. Alexander, in a kind of thought experiment, toyed with the notion of a mammal able to evolve a sterile caste. It would, like the termites, need an expandable nest allowing for an ample food supply and providing shelter from predators. For reasons of size, an underbark location [like that of the presumed insect ancestors of termites] was no good. But underground burrows replete with large tubers would fit the bill perfectly. The climate should be tropical; the soil (more than a hint of Sherlock Holmes here!) heavy clay. An ingenious exercise in armchair ecology altogether. But after his

lecture, Alexander was told that his hypothetical beast did indeed live in Africa; it was the naked mole rat, a small rodent studied by Jennifer Jarvis. [Sigmund 1993, p. 117.] Naked mole rats are surpassingly ugly and strange, a thought experiment of Mother Nature's to rival any of the fantasies of philosophy. They are genuinely eusocial. The single queen mole rat is the sole female breeder, and she keeps the rest of the colony in line by releasing pheromones that suppress the maturation of the other females' reproductive organs. Naked mole rats are coprophagousthey regularly eat their own fecesand when the grotesquely swollen pregnant queen cannot reach her own anus, she begs feces from her attendants. (Had enough? But there's much, much more, highly recommended to all whose curiosity exceeds their squeamish-ness.) A bounty has been learned from the study of naked mole rats, and other nonhuman species, using the techniques of Darwinian reverse engineering using adaptationism, in other words there is surely more to come. E. O. and Wilson's own important work on social insects (1971) is deservedly world famous, and there are literally hundreds of other fine animal sociobiologists. (See, e.g., the classic anthologies, Glutton-Brock and Harvey 1978, Barlow and Silverberg 1980, King's College Sociobiology Group 1982.) Unfortunately, they all work under a cloud of suspicion, raised by the escalation of greedy claims by a few human sociobiologists (through their megaphones, as Kitcher suggests), which is then echoed by the escalation of blanket condemnations from their opponents. This really is an unfortunate fallout, for, as in any other legitimate area of science, some of this work is great, some is good, some is good but false, and some is badbut none of it is evil. That serious students of mating systems, courtship displays, territoriality, and the like in nonhuman species should be tarred with the same brush as the more flagrant oversteppers in human sociobiology is both a miscarriage of justice and a serious misrepresentation of science.' (Darwin's Dangerous Idea : Evolution and the Meanings of Life, Daniel C. Dennett, Penguin, 1996. Page 483 - 4) It is really so frustrating to read material like this where the subject I love is presented with such passion, by people who are such out and out enemies of the subject, and who have the bare faced gall to make out that they are the defenders of its integrity just because they are bone fide professionals, while anyone who seeks to take science to its logical conclusion, even if they too are professionals, by including humanity in its remit is a blackguard and a menace. What is tantalizing about these diatribes written by the high priests of theocratic science, is the frequent mention of these rogue traders in knowledge  WELL WHERE THE HELL ARE THEY! I can never find them. I would pay good money for a look at their work. And why do we never get any references to the library of books these people must surely of written to justify all the uproar the priests bleat about that is damaging their good work and name? But, the scientists are clever, and this I admire and adore, no matter what. It is a bit like looking at the work of Michael Angelo splattered gorgeously all over the walls of an obscene building such as a house of God. The theocracy was the sole patron for talented people and so their skill was naturally perverted by being used to

represent the deviant ideas of the Jews about the nature of reality. It is a tragedy for humanity, but the work is stunning and must be admired in the same way we may instinctively recoil from some vile insect, like a tarantula, but driven by our intelligence we must admire its form and the execution of the process that created it. So it is with the work discussed by Dennett, here. Dennett himself is a most detestable person in the context of our subject. But that is no reason to ignore the fine pieces of knowledge he and his kind rob from us to weave their lies about in order to serve their masters, the Jews. The work he refers to here sounds brilliant and it is exactly this kind of analysis that we would anticipate in the post Judaic world scientist would be free to apply to the study of humanity; the very idea of which so appals Dennett who stains himself to try and ensure we are kept aware of a false barrier between humans and all other life forms. So, presumably someone, if the church would allow it, could apply the ideas of Alexander to the apes that must of lived in the forest, and ask what they would of needed to do in order to become superorganic beings. Note Alexander is represented here as focusing upon the evolution of a sterile caste, but this is only to home in on a prime feature of a superorganic species, occurring in a specific form. This adheres to the theistic rule that scientists must focus upon forms and not study the nature of none physical qualities which concern the nature of forms. But the fact is that the question is the same in terms of demonstrable proof whether you ask what a creature would have to do to create a sterile caste or what it would have to do to create a superorganic form, these are two questions leading to the same end, do you want to follow the circle to the left to find out where it goes, or to the right? And so, returning to our last point of focus upon the material of Isaac's, we can see that he is asking the wrong the question when he wonders whether the niches exist that would make bipedalism a valid move for an ape. The answer is no, because bipedalism in anthropoids is not a response to niche exploitation in the ordinary sense, only in the special sense of introverted force of evolutionary pressure where the social environment becomes the vacant space where potential lies for an animal to evolve and thus gain in their exploitation of the physical environment by turning the face of a superorganism upon that outer, normal, environment. Bipedalism was a strategy empowering the superorganic form which had undergone the preliminary stages of necessary evolution in the forests, what was required, as indicated by Alexander's reasoning, was a shift to a domain that would support the establishment of an expandable nest capable of housing all in one close knit location. On this basis we could say that the bipedal gait was required because in order to take their eusocial evolution further hominids had to become ground dwelling, they were not going to develop the individualistic strategy of the gorillian form which relies upon brawn for safety on the ground, because their strategy was the transformation of the individual into an integrated superorganic form so that the social unit became the organism. If we suppose that hunting was part of the fuel supply enabling this process to go ahead, and the requirement to evolve a centralised home nest site was part of the socialisation process wherein an animal evolved a true exoskeleton then we can see how the shift to ground locomotion and the development of dextrous hands would be positively linked. And all this would be able to proceed without any need for an exceptional increase in brain size, although intelligence would of been central to the process leading to a social animal with complex creative demands being made upon its ability to work materials. At this stage the medium of social unity would of been on a par

with the familiar physiological range of identity mediums from the animal kingdom. Naked skin will of been established, I would of thought, and during the million years or so between the establishment of bipedalism and substantial encephalization a superorganic fauna will of spread across the terrain that could support such territorial creatures s these early hominid superorganisms must of been, and racial differences will of been important in defining the superorganisms populating the range where they lived. Competition will of occurred between these creatures for control over the niche environment they had evolved to exploit, and this will of kept the pressure on the latent potential of the mammalian physiology to release ever more of it potential to create a superorganic form. At the core of this process, as ever, was the ability to increase social unity. The increase in brain size is loosely associated with intelligence, but as we can see there are two primary modes of intelligence, social and practical. These two evolved side by side because as the social integration increased the ability to create exoskeletal fabric, was ever more important, and a central feature of exoskeletal form included the ability to exploit the home range which the superorganism possessed as its territory in opposition to its own kinds competitive need to expand its reach. A territory is in effect part of the exoskeleton, this is obvious in our world where we make such a business of setting boundaries and changing landscapes to suit our needs, and covering the surface of the planet with structures that facilitate our exploitation of our terrain, but it will of been so right from the day the first superorganism stood upright and wielded a stone to make a shelter at the hub of a domain from which it drew its sustenance. The crucial neurological transformation that took place as the brain grew in size concerned the adaptation toward ever greater social integration, this is what enabled an increasing powerful superorganism to evolve that would out compete its rivals. The single feature that we are concerned with here is language. The increase in brain size has to represent the coming of language, but not the coming of humans proper. It is evident there were a number of stages in the evolution of linguistic ability. This is not surprising when we consider the nature of language, it is rightly thought to be the hallmark of our species, for it is language that sets us apart, it is in fact language which brings to fulfilment the unravelling of the potential of mammalian physiology toward the realisation of a true superorganic form in which the individual is made discrete at the same time they are made dependant upon the social body for the uniqueness acquired by the creation of the ability to act with self centred discretion. It is our ability to reason, courtesy of the language that integrates us into the superorganism, that gives us our individuality, such as it is. And this is why, with the increasing power of the superorganism, has come an increasing expression of individual consciousness. But, as I say, this transformation toward a fully symbolically empowered linguistic creature occurred in stages. The animals with the enlarged brains will of been articulate after a fashion, maybe so articulate that if we could observe them today we could learn what their communication was and communicate with them. I say this because while we have examples of complex communication in the animal world, most famously in the marine mammals, the mode of communication in these creatures is alien to us, whereas the mode of communication in early humans must of been linguistic in its form, and as such our kind of baby. When you think of the ways that stone age peoples communicated, as recorded by anthropologists and travellers, in the not very distant past we might imagine that these people might of been able to communicate fluently with the proto-humans of a million years ago. Stone age people

apparently blended their verbal display with all kinds of demonstrative behaviour, body language, and the whole manner was supposedly very different from the way we are familiar with in our well ordered and strictly defined articulation of what we have in our heads. 'It is also hard to make sense of the intricacy of the brain without supposing that the adaptive advantages that have brought it into existence have long involved culture of increasing complexity. However, to keep our topic from becoming dull and predeterministic perhaps we should allow for the possibility that the enlarged brain, like bipedalism, might have been a preadaptive development that was favoured by selection for reasons other than culture. This point notwithstanding, for the time being I shall treat the brain and the culture it sustains as likely to have evolved as a single adaptive complex, that is to say as a co-evolution.' And, on this subject of brain evolution we get this from our professional 'scientist'. He, once again, states the obvious, that there is a common thread of force driving the brain's evolution unswervingly in the same direction, for millions of years. But, once again, having thus stated what is undeniable, he ducks out of it, he makes the ludicrous assertion that to stick with this simple fact would lead to boring, predeterministic ideas! The man is too disgusting for words, sickening, vile, insane. But a highly respected, extremely intelligent man, of the first calibre, in the theocracy. Nonetheless, despite his reservations, he is prepared to accept that, as the brain is responsible for culture, he will, reluctantly, we understand, treat both the brain and culture as if they were somehow related to one another! Well ain't that marvellous. I suppose if he were making a geographical study of a modern nation, although he would recognise that cars do not actually make roads, somehow, in some way, it could be said that roads are a product of motor vehicles, and so, reluctantly, he would try and explain the presence of roads as being, somehow, related to the use of vehicles. It is a good job the man is not a geographer, with this kind of incisive application of intelligence he would probably get an Oscar - or should that be a Nobel, or more likely a Knob, to stick on the top of his head? 'We are rightly impressed with the biological success that seems to have followed from the development of the brain through some critical thresholds, but it must be remembered that enlarged brains require prolonged infant dependency and high quality nutrition (Sacher & Staffeldt, 1974; Martin in Lewin, 1982). Both of these are expensive commodities in the economy of nature. No other lineage has experienced selection producing such an extreme development. The central puzzle to understanding our origins, therefore, remains the problem of figuring out under what novel selective circumstances this trend was initiated, and under what conditions the selection was sustained.' It seems extravagant to quote a block of work and then to keep pulling junks out and repeating the exercise, however I believe it is liable to be helpful in the task I see before me, of seeking to induct people into a correct, but novel, way of understanding themselves. Duplicated selections contain important subject matter and we may regard this practice as effecting an increase of magnification upon the sliver

of intellectual deposit that we already have upon the slide. Homing in upon this piece, for example, is vital. Isaac makes a crucial point here about the extraordinary nature of human evolution, we know that we are extraordinary, but how does this reality pan out when we seek to understand it in scientific terms? Like this, we see that the brain, as the organ of intelligence, is the nub of the matter, and we interpret this organ in terms of a cost analysis; it is mighty expensive in terms of nurturing care, and in terms of nutrional demands. Not surprisingly therefore this particular evolutionary adaptation is unique to humans. And thus, the question delivers itself, How did this organ, our brain, come exist? We may emphasise the points made by Isaac by noting that the brain is an incredibly expensive bit of kit to run, it is in effect the engine in the vehicle. The fact is that it is not possible for the brain we humans have to evolve, it is, quite literally impossible, and science has know this fact for a long time. The reason is that it cannot possibly pay for itself, it would be like using a second world war Spitfire engine, the Merlin, to power a Mini Cooper. Aside from the practical arrangements, the fuel bills would not make any sense, no one would do it, no one does do it. Unfortunately Nature does not have the advantage of a supreme intelligence guiding what it produces, so it did not know that putting a brain in a human that consumed two hundred percent of all the food an individual could possibly find to live on did not make sense, and would inevitably lead to the starvation of the animal so handsomely endowed. Poor stupid Nature, in its bewilderment, just blindly went ahead, and by producing an animal that was guaranteed to starve to death as soon as its evolution was perfected, it created the most successful animal on the planet today. Wow! How did Nature do that? Maybe someone should try fitting Minis with Merlins, they may take off, and make the inspired genius a fortune. If the Merlin is fitted to a fighter aircraft it works, it makes it possible to fly, and to do so with speed and agility. It is not that a massive power unit is inherently worthless, on the contrary, it is a question of what body it is fitted into. And we may suppose the same applies to the human brain. While one human brain is massively over endowed with intellectual capacity for the fulfilment of the needs of any individual animal that only has the task of feeding itself, surviving hazards, and dealing with the routine of intersocial behaviour, if the this enriched endowment can be made the basis of a superbrain then we enter a whole new ball game. And obviously this is exactly what idiot Nature did. But it is vital for the survival of the Jewish master race that this knowledge does not become known and so Isaac, being a priest in the Jewish theocracy makes sure that when he focuses these scientific questions he misdirects our attention away from the nature of our kind toward the form, in accordance with the dualistic directive of priestcraft. Under what conditions he asks, whereas he should be asking what forces was human form subject to that could bring about this result. Conditions set limitations, forces extend potential, the difference in terminology here concerns perspective, although we are supposed to be considering dynamics, Isaacs guides us toward a static sense of physical being that must wrestle to adapt itself to challenges it meets. Curiously, in the passage leading up to the piece selected from Dennett, he actually discusses the validity, or otherwise of seeking knowledge. Here he follows his fellow priests example, that of Pinker, as quoted above, in making out that there is no threat from the truth, we must simply have faith. Of course there is indeed no threat from his mythology of truth, but I think that most people would see a massive threat in the truth, as revealed by me; not necessarily to themselves, but to society at

large, and especially to the most important elements of society. I shall not trouble you with a block of Dennett, I was going to, but I think what I have just said can stand as it is. If you care to, you may search out his words for yourself, they are fairly droll, and just as you might be able to conjure up yourself in imaginary imitation of this man's work if you have a few idle months in which to try and reduce your heart beat to near zero by means of slow breathing and lack of eating and sleep, or whatever , I simply do not know how to make a brain that stupid, but if your interested you may be able to work it out before you kill yourself trying, so that, your brain becomes comatose and incapable of delivering a meaningful thought, bar an impulse to deliver a sudden burst of energy allowing you to mimic a Dennett, a Pinker, a Gould, a Dawkins, and all the other famous, brilliant communicators of modern science that glorify the theocracy's magnificent intellectual institutions. This list of five ways in which the 'brain-culture' duality may of come about is facile. It is like talking about the leg-walking system and hypothesising that this system came about by people walking to the river, walking to the shop, walking to the hills, and so on. What on earth is it supposed to mean that the brain-culture system came about due to the making of tools, hunting, gathering, socialising? These things are culture, damn it! Hunting may be carried out by a lone feline or a pack of canines, and is not necessarily a social behaviour, but in humans culture is implicit in hunting. We saw in my earlier speculation about how the initial stages of superorganic formation could of condensed from the genetic attributes of forest dwelling apes guided by behavioural strategies such as hunting that is observed in modern chimpanzees and is so obviously social in its nature requiring that these animals act as if they were a multi-headed beast, with individuals adopting specialised roles. If we are saying that hunting in humans is culture, not a behaviour leading to culture, then clearly we are attributing culture to chimpanzees. However, we can make some distinction about this, for crucial point is that not all chimps hunt, whereas we are assuming that all hominid tool makers hunted, if they hunted at all, they may just of scavenged. But working from the insight given us by chimp behaviour we are entitled to suspect that it was the acquisition of gorgonic attributes, that is being many headed, that fed the newly evolved ground dwelling hominid superorganisms. And today, or until recently, the modern humans living in the jungles of Africa still employ tactics that involve leaving strategically placed nets and then driving forest animals toward them by forming a line and making a hullabaloo. On this basis we can imagine that the gap in the fossil record noted by Isaac can be accounted for, indeed is accounted for by a natural extension of the narrative I have provided above, in an attempt to match my idea of human corporate nature to the points raised by Isaac's presentation of the Jewish idea of human divinity, that shows humans are simply unique in all of nature, and cannot be accounted for by any straightforward biological means such as we might apply to any other species. Fig. 25.5 shows that for the last four million years a useful if still somewhat patchy fossil record of members of the family Hominidae has been recovered. We need more, but what we have is a handy start. A similar useful but patchy series of hominoid fossils has been recovered from the time range from about eighteen to eight million years ago. In spite of loudly enunciated early claims to the contrary, a concensus is now emerging that none of these earlier hominoids can be classified as members of the family Hominidae.

Between the Miocene and the Pliocene to Pleistocene fossil samples, there is a four to five million year gap, a period for which we have as yet virtually no hominoid fossils of any kind. This is the period during which the biochemical evidence would indicate that hominids, chimps and gorillas separated. Although we know more than Darwin did about the range of skeletal organization patterns that existed before divergence, our interpretation of the divergence itself is still obliged to be fossil free. (Page 518 - 9) This gap in the fossil record has been accounted for by the natural means of supposing that the relevant species lived in unfavourable terrain for fossil preservation, forest terrain being a fine example of the type where would not expect fossils to be deposited too readily due to the highly organic nature of the environment where decay would be rapid and effective to a maximum degree. Such a gap is liable to induce a variety of misleading ideas into the minds of workers in the field and I have no accounts handy, not have I read any in recent times to guide me on the matter of just how these speculations have gone. But we can see that my account lends itself naturally to the problem in a very subtle way for it not only indicates that a forest habitat is liable to of been the right location for the transitional phase from ape to hominid, but that once this phase had been completed and produced a true form of superorganic ape, it acted on the mechanistic imperatives associated with Alexander's theorising about the requirements for the evolution of a superorganic form and shifted of its own accord into the daylight where its bones all of sudden become available to our searches. This paints a picture of an already fully evolved humanoid form of creature coming out of the jungle to unleash the natural potential of its mammalian physiology directed as unleashing the potential latent in the social environment of mammalian form. In the earliest remains of the human line that we have thus far obtained then, we are seeing a highly advanced humanoid form. Thus where we try to make sense of the sudden appearance of bipedal gait and tool fabrication in terms of the environment in which it first appears, a natural enough thing to do, we are mislead. The open terrain, its niche environment has nothing per se to do with the evolution of upright posture or tool making behaviour, these attributes were already fully formed before humans set foot on the plains. The shift to the plains represents the first great transition to a challenging environment that has become a characteristic of our kind, a move which reveals the sanity of Nature's investment in the lump of meat stuck on your shoulders that we like to think so much of. A translocation, what is more, such as Isaac says only occurred, for the first time, after we came along, some 100,000 years ago. As ever, got their heads stuck up their own arses these people; but, for once, with good reason. Except that, if they would only approach the subject with an open mind, focused on the necessary destruction of mythology, and thus the age old basis for order in our society, they could of seen this for themselves long, long ago, and saved Darwin the trouble of leading us all up the garden path; where he liked to spend his days at Down House walking round and round in circles, and no doubt came to the conclusion that this exercise would be good for the rest of us. Preadaptation

Just a word about this. When I read a feature of human physiology, which poses the most difficult challenges for the priests to interpret according to their nonsensical mode of reasoning, described as posing a problem because it may not be related to the context we think it is related to by way of its function, and so it may be an intrusion into a context for which it was preadapted, I wince. This is such an evil perversion of the beautiful science that these charlatans have taken possession of by means of power and wealth, via the institutions they are inducted into, that provide the means to go and scrape the surface of the earth looking for the vital clues that act as a licence to preach science. Turn up the magnification to max. 'However, to keep our topic from becoming dull and predeterministic perhaps we should allow for the possibility that the enlarged brain, like bipedalism, might have been a pre-adaptive development that was favoured by selection for reasons other than culture.' This is sheer, unadulterated arrogance, they do not know the answer, they do not care, and so they just offload some vomit spiel that meets the objection, like a thief explaining why he happens to fit the evidence of a crime by saying there may of been an earthquake in Japan when he was visiting London and that could of caused the juxtaposition of the loot and the space under the floorboards in his flat. A thief would never be so stupid as to say something this ridiculous, knowing the grip of authority would not take kindly to being treated with contempt. But these priests are an authority unto themselves, they each stroke one another's ego, playing the same tune even when they pose as intractable adversaries, they can come out with any garbage they like, and who is in a position to challenge them? They own the evidence, and they own the means to speak about it. I raise the subject now because as we have teased out of Isaac's excellent description of the pattern revealed by the evidence a probable explanation for that pattern, by applying a nontheistic model to that evidence, a scientific model in other words, we have found that we have an example of an evolved feature, unique to humans, that could create the illusion of preadaptation. We have seen that our tree dwelling ape evolved in the forest to fill the social vacuum created by the evolution of mammalian physiology. As this process took shape the resulting superorganic form was obliged to give up a strictly arboreal lifestyle and to descend to the ground. This process involved the evolution of bipedal gait as ground-dwelling demands combined with nest-making demands  that is the demands of creating exoskeletal structures in which to house the newly evolved superorganic form  to favour a mode of locomotion dedicated to the ground and allowing the dextrous use of materials. To our eyes, seeking the sources of our evolution, and finding only the evidence of bipedal gait existing in the open savannah, it looks as though this posture evolved for the open savannah, but in fact, while it was perfectly suited to this open terrain, it had already evolved to completion while the first humanoids were living in the woods. Thus bipedal stance could be, badly, described as having been preadapted to the open terrain. But this is a spurious way to describe what must of happened, according to our rationalisation of the evidence, in keeping with what we know was the driving force behind all human adaptivity. Bipedal gait was an adaptation to the social environment, as all adaptation associated with our lineage must be, and having adapted to this end, the resultant creature was empowered to extend its terrain into otherwise unavailable niche environments. It is this ability to extend into the otherwise untenable niches of the earth's biosphere that makes the superorganic form

a viable strategy, and the recognition of which offers us a means of discovering an answer to the questions Isaac asks when he talks about finding out what environmental factors made tool use, increasing brain size, or upright stance, a positive adaptive shift. One explanation covers all, it is that a superorganic form can survive where a loose conglomeration of competing individuals, constituting the normal species, cannot do so well without focusing upon the specialisation of form that leads to a diversification into a range of species. Logically, it should be clear that while one adaptive strategy leads to a focus upon a niche, thus adding to the niche, the other leads to a generalised ability to exploit all niches, which is exactly what characterises our own kind as we like to think of ourselves, as Isaac says. There cannot be such a thing as preadaptation. Legs did not evolve in a way that justifies the description 'preadapted' to open land. They evolved to allow an arboreal animal to become a terrestrial animal, and the drive to become terrestrial came from within the latent potential of that animal's basic physiology, which had a capacity for social integration between individuals that was awaiting realisation. A hallmark of mammalian physiology is the inherent intelligence of the mammalian brain. 'Mammals differ from other vertebrate animals in many ways, one of the most important being their comparatively high degree of intelligence, which is associated with the structure of their brains. To their intelligence they owe a great part of their evolutionary success; they are adaptable and, although they are to a large extent creatures of habit, they can alter their behaviour patterns to suit new circumstances.' (British Mammals, L. Harrison Matthews, Collins, 1963. Page 2) Loosely put, we can see, that one may very well say that human bipedalism was preadapted to the open savannah, where it came into its own. As reasonable as this mode of expression seems on the face it, it is thoroughly misleading for the very reason that it appears so reasonable. It is the job of anyone interested in speaking for science to see that they do not make such crass use of the superficial, but rather that they ensure the unbroken threads of causality are properly revealed in the narratives they give that turn the patterns of evidence into accounts of reality. 'Social Dynamics treats of the development of humanity. This development is subject to invariable laws. "Each of the successive social states is the necessary result of the preceding state and indispensable condition of the following state."' (Organismic Theories of the State : Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the State as Organism or as Person, F. W. Coker, AMS Press, 1967, page 119) Coker is here quoting from Comte. I have just read this today, and it fits in nicely with the subject discussed in this section. It seems that Comte, the first real sociologist, who sort to apply a scientific method to the study of humans, here had in mind the stages of civilisation, such was the limited scope of the vision of the first

sociologists. But it is nice to see that the principle he deduces here is applicable to the earliest evolutionary transformations of our species, where we may apply its insight to the evolution of human form, since we have determined that all human form is related to the social state of the organism. Thus while Comte has in mind patriarchal or democratic societies, we may with equal justification have in mind bipedal gait of brain size as successive social states. And, on this basis, we may use the same rule as Comte, and say that each successive physiological change is a necessary result of the preceding social change, and the indispensable condition of the next social state. In our example bipedal gait was the necessary result of increased social cooperation producing a true superorganic form, and the realisation of bipedal gait was the indispensable condition of the next social state realised in the translocation of hominid populations from an arboreal setting to an open savannah terrain. Thus social form is reduced to physiological form in the earliest stages of hominid evolution, when hominids were still true animals as we would recognise them to be, if we had cognizance of them as they were when they were undergoing the transformations that we are considering at this moment, as discussed in Isaac's piece. Crucially then, in complete opposition to the establishment, we can say that upright posture, tool use, and brain size, are not adaptive responses to the physical environment, they are physiological responses to the impulse to exploit the social potential of mammalian physiology as it had unfolded in the arboreal line of primates prior to the divergence of a distinctly hominid line. This fact is perfectly obvious, since it is encapsulated in the fact that it is not possible to equate the brain size of individuals to a nutrional pay off. The fact is that none of these features of individual form are in any direct sense related to a nutrional pay off, although this preconception is what Isaac constantly tries to force onto the facts, and, in acting in this manner, he is representative of the whole theocratic establishment which is determined to see the process of human evolution as a divine inspiration, focused on creating the supreme elite individual, in the guise of themselves, of course, as defined by themselves because of the elite position they do most definitely hold in our intellectually perverse society.

Shit Eating Rats, Piss Drinking Monkeys 'The peculiarities of the early hominid megadont phase presumably relates to diet, but what this was continues to baffle us. Scanning electron microscope (SEM) studies of tooth wear by Alan Walker (1981) and others suggest that non-siliceous plant tissues were being consumed - presumably fruits (sensu lato) or seeds. But what fruits or seeds? And why such large teeth? These questions call for studies of floristic communities and the feeding opportunities they offer as well as scrutiny of fossils.' This is no place for squeamishness, all we are interested in is reality. I do not pretend to be able to answer directly the question asked here, in the above exert, but there is a very interesting attribute of superorganic species' that concerns, not diet exactly, but rather eating habits, and modern humans are very much included in this peculiarity.

It is a characteristic of human behaviour that we consume none nutrional foodstuffs, for behavioural reasons. In other words we consume social foods, social food is not to be confused with eating socially. Interestingly, these substances, these social foods, are sometimes known as the food of the gods, the peyote cactus, being an extremely potent hallucinogenic, is an example the kind of social food that evokes such reverence and denomination. We know that the gods, or simply God, in our culture, are, is, really the superorganism, and that these foods are really feeding the superorganism's collective body directly, or a special segment, or organ of that body, not the individuals who actually do the eating. These individuals, by eating these non-nutritious, social substances, food of the gods, or mind food, are thereby inducted deeper into their role of creating the superorganism by consuming these psychoactive foods, foods of the superorganism. It is self evident that we evolved to engage in this drug taking behaviour as part of our subduction into a superorganic form, but in the light of our ruminations here, we might ask just when this particular facet of our species first expressed itself? The anal fixation of mole rats upon their own waste products clearly forms part of their species social adaptation leading their becoming a true superorganic species, their own shit is their divine meal, and so naturally, they share it. We may imagine that it contains hormones reinforcing corporate identity, no doubt information exists that would answer this question, but I do not have it and I think we can take it for granted. In what I have seen described as Edward O. Wilson's favourite ant species, the Leaf Cutter ant of South, or Central America, these creatures also share a common foodstuff, a fungi which they grow in gardens in their nest, and which they share with one another. Once again we may deduce this is their God-food, and it serves to reinforce their corporate identity in some manner. Piss drinking monkeys? Well, not quite, a bit of artistic licence here in order to find a catchy heading, don't want to lose the interest of the little ones do we. The human species have acted upon their early evolutionary development enabling them to enter any environment where food is available, and they live in all terrestrial niches the world has to offer, some of which draw their viability from the sea, and might be considered semi-marine niches. Humans have not evolved to live in the water, despite the notions of an aquatic phase muted by some fanciful commentators, because this would require the evolution of a separate species of human being, and that evolutionary trend would be in direct opposition to the nature of human beings that evolved to form a corporate social organism, not a specialised individual form adapted to a specific niche environment. The aquatic ape theory is alien to human nature and as such utter nonsense; no wonder it has been so popular, in a minor way, anything to avoid reality. While human species identity has remained unchanged, despite the adoption of the most contrary habitat ranges, human behaviour has likewise conformed to the same narrowly defined, uniform range. But the various habitats have imposed variety upon cultural modes expressing these uniform behavioural patterns, in exactly the same way racial identity has shown an infinite capacity for representation of corporate identity, while always conforming to the same requirement to be a superficial expression of territorial location, and an absolute definition of superorganic identity, but nothing more, not threatening to go deeper by evolving a human form adapted to a specific niche. Part of that variety within conformity to a general pattern, is also revealed in the common practice of consuming superorganic foodstuffs, while accessing a diverse range of local plant materials. Some members of the superorganic fauna that colonised the more northerly areas of the European landmass made use of

the fly agaric mushroom, the pretty one with the red cap covered in white spots, that grew in the woodlands covering the territorial domains to which they had become adapted via a combination of superficial physiological transformations that were essentially racial, and concerned corporate identity, plus more crucial behavioural and cultural transformations based on the acquisition of information which induced changes in the exoskeleton of the superorganism, enabling the creature to occupy hitherto vacant terrain. Part of these changes in the exoskeleton, enabled by means of language upon which the evolution of knowledge was based, included the particular local organism consumed to induce a heightened intensity of superorganic identity, bringing about a deeper integration of the biomass living within the evolving exoskeleton as it became adjusted to the terrain it was advancing across. Needless to say, the consumption of this magic food, connecting individual consciousness with corporate consciousness, experienced as a state spiritual awareness, was the basis of a social hierarchy. Thus the superorganic food was literally responsible for the fabrication of physiological structure within the human organism. This allowed a priesthood to be founded on the basis of access to the psychotic states induced by this poisonous toadstool; today it seems to be a feature of priesthoods that they are made up of naturally psychotic people who have only to be inducted into a religious mythology to show their true nature, and who need no artificial stimulation to perform beyond that induced by knowledge of the law ....... but I won't start ranting, as much as I would like to. Any road, being poisonous this mushroom made the person who ate it ill, one consequence was vomiting, not too nice, but somewhat like whacking-up smack, when people inject heroin they often vomit as a reaction to the drug, so they tell me. The priestly order were the ones who had the privilege of consuming this raw mindfood, and the other members of the organism would be included in the process of heightened identity unification induced by these superorganic foodstuffs by drinking the urine of the priests. The urine retained enough of the active ingredient of the fly agaric to induce hypnotic sates, thus allowing people to commune with the spirits, albeit to a lesser extent no doubt, while not having the more dangerous and unpleasant side effects experienced by those who ate the thing raw. One might ask whether risking being poisoned to death, and getting off lightly by nearly vomiting to death, would not actually be preferable to drinking some half deranged priest's piss, but that is a matter of personal taste I suppose. And so, with Isaac's remarks in mind, and our own analysis of the manner in which apes turned into humanoids, we come back to the question, When did humans evolve this symbiotic type relationship with special, non-nutrional, foodstuffs? We have recognised that apes must of undergone a transformation into a fully superorganic form while still remaining apes, and in order to realise the potential of their transformation the newly formed apes were obliged to come down from the trees and take up a permanently terrestrial lifestyle, and this moment is one candidate for a cusp point at which the shift is made from ape to hominid, all this while still living in the jungle. Could it be that central to the evolutionary process during the initial stages bringing about the unification of individuals into one superorganic form, sharing one mind, was initiated, or facilitated, by some psychoactive plant substances for which the none superorganic ape species developed an ever greater susceptibility, because doing so facilitated their evolution toward a superorganic form? People observing the absolute frenzy involved in the chimpanzee troops, preceded by the extraordinary care involved in the execution of the hunt during which there is great calm, followed by the ecstasy of the kill, plus the novel modes of food

sharing associated with this special food stuff, meat, have said it looks as though the eating of this meat-of-the-chase induces some kind of euphoric state, just like we would associate with drug consumption. Maybe group hunting was a precursor to actual drug taking, where behavioural stimulation promoted the evolution of a physiology which was aroused by intense social behaviour, and then narcotic stimulants were found to trigger the same responses and so acted as the next baton of evolutionary advance carrying individual physiology toward an ever more integrated superorganic form; each baton of sociality increasing the spiral pressure of the spinning vortex that would draw the human out of the ape. We know that racial physiology and language are two major batons of evolutionary advance derived directly from the force of human nature. We may be sure that bipedal walking, tool making, increased brain size and increased cerebral organization were similar batons adding to the formation of a living rope of interlaced causal threads that is our human form. We know we take drugs with a passion, and we know we like violence as if it were a drug, so we may guess, for the time being, that these two are threads woven into our being at some early stage of the spinning out of human nature to form the rope that is our physical being. The spinning vortex of sociality feeds the loom on which our kind is woven by Nature, the threads are drawn into the physiology of the individual, dyed in an infinite array of colours, which are woven into the social matrix; and the cloth is being woven still, see the pattern unfold, look, look ............... do you see? The loom is language, I am weaving for you now. But prior to the weft and warp of words weaving knowledge into a pattern upon which the social fabric is modelled, there comes the spinning of genetics creating the physical being of living flesh and blood. While the artistry of my scientific philosophy reveals the image created by language through time, the art of the scientific practitioner will unpick the thread of human physiology by revealing the batons strung along that thread in a time sequence, so that the thread of human physiology, visualised as a string holding a series of distinct societal beads, will culminate in the linguistic gem which will begins to turn the thread into a cloth. The one dimensional form of physical organic being will thereby be lifted onto a another plane, occupying a further dimension of space which we know as the social dimension, not only possessing forward momentum as it twirls of the spinning wheel of genetic evolution, now possessing a means of lateral expansion, the organic material acquires a two dimensional form where threads interlink ever more tightly as the threads of the biomass proliferate and fan out across all of the space within which life exists. So that prior to bipedal walking, we now have drug induced states of social intensity, which involved the first symbiotic relationships between humanoids and another species, such as we would more definitely associate with domestic species, and prior to this food of the gods candidate for increasing superorganic form, we have hunting behaviour fuelling the evolution of a hyperactive social impulse to work cooperatively. And we may guess that the ape evolving a hunting strategy turned on other apes, just as chimpanzees focus upon a kindred form in the monkeys they hunt. The point about this strategy is that these creatures, having a similar form, are more nearly matched, and so adapted to the same environmental terrain, where simply the best equipped to predate becomes the predator, and the other becomes the prey. It may be this prey predator bifurcation occurred within the ape fauna of the forest of twenty million years ago, initiating the first moves toward the division of the anthropoid line which allowed humans to appear. We do need to tease out a subtle

chain of ever increasing social attributes spiralling mammals toward a superorganic form if we are to make complete sense of our present day constitution. I confess I feel I am going out on a limb taking this highly speculative proposal, concerning superorganic foodstuffs, so far. But I like the basic idea of following up on the human disposition to take drugs in this way, even though there is the possibility that this habit only came into being during the later phases of our evolution. In the paragraph re-copied above, we see a reference to exceptional dentition, and the soft foods it seems to be associated with, maybe they were masticating something that fed their corporate identity, not their bellies. The beauty of making psychoactive stimulants the vehicle of the early stages of the shift toward a more deeply integrated social form of anthropoid, is that this removes any need for the animal to of evolved any radical physiological adaptations that later came to characterise our kind, such as upright posture, tool use, exaggerated intellect. So we are not invoking preadaptation, we are simply finding modes of transition that make sense each in their own time and space, but also conform to the imperative to evoke a greater degree of superorganic integration. Thus, as when we make a journey, we only need make one step at a time but, while each step is complete in itself, all steps are guided by one directional force, where we want to get to, and thus we get to a very definite place as the steps accumulate. The evolutionary steps unfolding the potential of mammalian physiology to fill the social environment created by the coming of mammalian physiology itself, by creating a mammalian superorganic form, was directed by what we should call the force of human nature. The force of human nature has led from the jungles of twenty million years ago to the world of global terror of today, where still the competition goes on, and one animal preys upon another of a like kind, in a relentless drive for an ever more complete state of integration into one superorganic form. In other words we are putting a psychoactive foodstuff, which means a social foodstuff, consumed solely for reasons to do with social unity and social structure, into the role of catalyst in the process of lifting the mammalian animal, in the form of an ape, over the initially difficult threshold of starting to become a superorganic being. We can equate the ape fauna of twenty million years ago with an organic matrix, which constituted a compound subject to the laws of physics, as revealed in chemical processes. Within this matrix competition between species of apes, resulting in evolutionary change, acted as the force increasing the equivalent of pressure and temperature, a force operating within the finite mass of the faunalorganism which was the total ape fauna. There was one environmental domain left unexploited until one species of ape evolved an adaptive strategy that allowed it to evolve in-group cooperative strategies, so defined by their focus on out-group entities. Thus one ape became a predator of other apes by evolving, amongst other requisite attributes, an increased sense of identity. Identity, was from the outset at the nub of the process. In this seething biochemical soup, defined by the living bodies of the anthropoid fauna, a fauna which was replete with an extraordinary variety of form, eventually, something, a catalyst, not part of the organism itself, but instrumental in causing the reaction to go, lifted one species over the threshold which led toward an easy decent into the vacant terrain of social integration that was crying out to be filled under these competitive circumstances. Once lifted over this threshold it was an unceasing, headlong rush to fill this social void with a superorganic form. And this is precisely what is happening when we engage in the new strategies of suicide bombing, of all out war upon civilian society that is the hallmark of the newly ascendant wing of the Zionist movement, Al Qaeda, that is driving the planet's human

biomass ceaselessly toward unification under one master identity, Judaism, as it has been driven now for several thousand years, since the discovery of complex modes of creating exoskeletal form managed via language, and linguistic structures in the form of writing and the laws writing is able to evolve. So humanity glides down the path toward true integration into the social environment realised by evolving a fully superorganic form that we now know we have inherited today. We may relate this supposed vehicle of social unification, superorganic food, to the superseding vehicles that we know about, racial physiology, and language. We know race continues to act as a powerful force delivering corporate identity to individuals, but we also know that language, in the form of highly specialised mythologically based religions, like Judaism, has taken the place of racial physiology in the delivery of corporate identity. If we now add the predisposition to take superorganic foodstuffs, that evolved for exactly the same reason, to that of racial identity and fully symbolic speech, also evolved to deliver a corporate identity to all members of the organism, then we can see that drug taking habits fall into a similar recessive category as racial physiology, where they still have a major impact on our superorganic form, but one that is presented as particularly malicious in a world where we are shifting ever more toward one corporate mind based on linguistically transmitted myth. As a final word on this subject I would like to point out that the habit of using foodstuffs to induct individuals into a corporate identity seems to be alive and well, but it is now based on more ordinary foodstuffs that do appear to constitute items of nutrition, but which in fact are bad for us, and so ought perhaps to be designated as anti-nutrional, and as such non-nutrional in the same sense narcotic foodstuffs are, and thus they might be seen to have the same real nature as foods of the gods, existing to induce corporate identity, and so to sustain the priesthood that controls their supply and consumption, as opposed to consuming them themselves, a subtle shift in strategy arising from the equally devious shift in the form of the magic food substances. We can see that we can apply the term artificial to narcotic substances as well as we might to modern processed foods, for neither are oriented toward the natural physiology of food consumption. In effect the modern global corporations are self engineered priesthoods, whose identity is delivered in the form of a brand name, with their own competing hubs of veneration, we might call them temples, bearing their own distinctive, but basically identical, logos, be it MacDonald's, or Burger King, or Pizza Hut, or Road Chef, and so on. Thus giving themselves a corporate identity designed to induce emotional attachment in individuals, especially the young  capture them early  by means of priestcraft, the elite have produced ephemeral foods that are all taste and no substance, perfect to induce emotional attachment, and to be consumed as part of an image imbibing ceremonial act of consumption, no wonder people get grossly fat; we call these modern superorganic foods, fast-food. In effect fast-food is the latest form of food of the gods, it is an artificial product, just as naked mole rat's pooh is an artificial product. And this mole rat trap crap-cuisine, serves the same function in their superorganism as junk-food serves in ours; and it looks like its serves the same function to me from the effect it is having on the individuals enslaved to this new antinutrional foodstuff, big fat bodies, but fat fat, fat bodies. And lets face it folks, lager is about as close to drinking something that looks like piss as we are ever going to get, originating in northern districts of Europe too, come to think of it, and there seems to be no stopping the ever encroaching fad for this disgusting yellow, gassy, chilled brew; so maybe we are, at heart, piss-drinking monkeys after all.

To most people alive today, living in the centre of the Western world, as I do, the notion of equating corporations, of any kind, to a priesthood, and meaning it quite literally, is liable to appear absurd. It is, however, anything but absurd, it is not only correct, it is logically inevitable that corporations must be the exact equivalent of the social body we normally call a priesthood. By developing a fully scientific model of society based upon a biological conception of society, all aspects of society must be capable of being reduced to that model, and therefore all attributes of all aspects of social form must be capable of being attributed to some functional role or structure of the superorganic physiology that science is obliged to recognise as real once it has a true perception of human nature. Thus we need to decide what the defining attributes of a priesthood are, and then see what features of society conform to these priestly attributes. A corporation that serves the social needs of the people directly is, in effect, acting as a farmer of the human biomass. In the total human biomass, we could also include, as noted by Spencer, the biomass of domestic species, but we can also include the biomass of the entire planet, since this has been incorporated into our territorial domains, in all but a few cases, where untouched wilderness remains, for now. An organisation that manages the human population directly is bound, in our sophisticated world, to do so by highly developed means. At the heart of these means will be knowledge about how to carry out this management, or farming role, to maximum effect from the stand point of the interests of those doing the managing. The rules that these priests in charge of managing the human biomass will operate in accordance with, will inevitably be learnt by dealing with the human instinct to act in obedience to that which we have called human nature. Human nature is corporate, thus human nature forces humans to form groups. Humans have an instinct to form groups, they are fulfilled when in a group, and unfulfilled when not in a group. We might say the human animal is gregarious, but this would be to understate the matter, humans are far more driven to be sociable than is suggested by the idea of being gregarious, we are talking about necessary physical association, and life depending upon it. Alienation is the worst experience any human being can have, which is why some societies in the past, the Druids for example, as noted by Caesar, used the rejection of individuals, those refusing to acknowledge priestly authority, from social intercourse. This practice of the Druidic priesthood is related to the idea of being outlawed that was continued in these islands for a millennia after the Jews exterminated the Druidic priests and imposed their new method of social farming that still rules our world to this day. Being outlawed meant an individual would have no recourse to the laws of society, they would be an open target for anyone to abuse, in anyway they could. Humans must be part of a group, that is that. Some people may want to quibble about the use of the word Jew in this historical reference to the ethnic cleansing of the Druidic culture. People who have not the least notion what history is may think that reality is in a name, and thus they may think the Romans were responsible for the annihilation of the Druidic priesthood that they drove to a last stand on Anglesey, and then massacred to a man, and women. And then the Romans, I suppose, just happened to introduce the Jewish slave identity to Britain, and then disappear from the face of the earth, leaving the Jews proper, behind to reap the reward some two thousand years later. Well of course history is a facet of Jewish priestcraft. The Old Testament reeks of historical mythmaking, which, as pseudo Jews, our Christian priests continue to foist upon us today, as an account of our organic evolution and growth. Although of late we have actually had a Jew proper preaching history to us in the form of Schalmer, who has been given a

licence by the BBC to produce an endless amount of Jewish propaganda specially for the Christian slaves of Judaism who go by the name of Britons, under which, by virtue of this artificial label Britain, which is a legal construct, a construct of Jewish legal method, as inherited via the Romans from Sumeria, by whatever convoluted course, Schalmer can include himself. But can a Jew be British, given their affinity for Israel? Of course not. But since they are the priesthood, they can do as they damn well like, and as such a British Jew is, in reality, as British as some poor sod like me who is only British, and who has no other higher place to call their own, which they really serve. The best I can hope to do is to serve Schalmer's true home, Israel, via our artificial home, Britain, that is what all Christian and Moslem states exist to do, after all. There is no such thing as history, anymore than there is such a thing as God. What these priests, who call themselves historians, are doing is identical to that which the palaeontologists that we discussed above were doing when they sent deeply religious men off to Africa to look for evidence that would obliterate any possibility of anyone ever being able to believe in God in the future. These historians are simply corralling the evidence, and thereby possessing it, thus licensing themselves to cloak it in whatever outer form they cared to, which naturally was one that conformed to the demands of the priesthood, as ever. If this academic method did not exist then it would not be possible for all knowledge of any relevance to humans, always to conform to the requirements of Judaism, and the preservation of its authority via the ability to form the largest group of all by means of a common religious identity. We, as scientists, must look at the same stars the astrologer looks at, the same fossils the palaeontologists like Isaac look at, and we are forced to track social changes via the only extant record of those changes available, albeit they are always written by the Jewish priests who rule our world and write our records; anyone writing history according to the Jewish method automatically becomes a Jewish priest, they do not need to be conscious of this, Adolf Hitler was as Jewish as you could get by this definition, and he was in real terms too. I am the only person I know of who does not adhere to Jewish method, and I of course am a true atheist, a true scientist, a truth teller. Use the same evidence we must, but we do not have to fall for the bullshit that evidence is dressed in, which use the ideas that the human individual is an end in themselves for whose benefit history, like society, exists. The individual for whose benefit our society exists is the individuality that is Judaism, and to that extent Jewish historical method makes sense, because it weaves a story that places Judaism at the core of all things, as we see when insane ideas like those of the Mormons of America appear out of the woodwork, talking about the native Americans as the twelve lost tribes of Israel. What? Insane, that is what. But this is how the human organism spreads its uniform identity under one God, by endlessly reinventing Judaism. We do not need to be fixated upon the names of the people who carried out the actions reported in the histories we are told are our history just because these are the histories we are interested in, because we are not interested in events anymore than a doctor is interested in knowing the ephemeral minutia of a patient's daily routine when making an examination. We are primarily interested in processes, which we hope to discern operating through the evidence of events. Thus we do not care who did what to whom, and when, we only want to know what happened. We do not distinguish between Americans invading Iraq and killing people, or Al Qaeda kidnapping people and decapitating them, or planting bombs in public places. We are interested in the behaviour, not the events, the interaction of the groups, not their

names, other than the usefulness names serve as labels. Hence it is easy for us to see that these two groups, Al Qaeda and Americans, are both Jewish physiological structures, and they are working in harmony in a perfectly functional manner to produce a healthy outcome, superorganic growth of the Jewish organism. You cannot possibly see this if you are fixated upon the historical mythology emanating from the workshop of the priesthood, which is precisely why we are programmed with the theistic language, that is the software programmed into our brains by our process of acculturation, software that makes us absorb the myths as they are meant to be absorbed. However the complex manner in which America came to have its present identity is supposed to of occurred, the fact that cannot be denied is that it is a passionately Christian society in which the Jews are a powerful force, and any way you cut it, while the people who invaded Iraq last year may call themselves Americans because they live in a territory called America, their identity is pure Jewish. And therefore it was Jews that invaded the Jewish territory of Iraq last year, from the perspective of process, not Americans. On this basis we should call the Iraqis Jews, and indeed, so they are, just as we are, we are all Jews, and so were the Romans. But, but, the Druids were not Jews. Nor were the Incas. This is why these two priesthoods were exterminated, but only the priesthoods. Because the Jews wanted to enslave their populations to their own identity implant, and that is what has been done, and it is this process we are interested in teasing out. We are not interested in reaffirming the Jewish priesthood's mythology, on the contrary, we want to eradicate it so we know what the truth is, and so we possess a true science of humanity. A corporate organisation charged with the role of farming the human biomass will seek to find ways to make as much as possible of the biomass join its group. Yesterday, 26/06/04, I received an email from the American internet book dealer I use apologising for debiting my bank account twice, telling me they had corrected the error, and giving me a token voucher to spend this week. They thanked me for supporting their organisation. Supporting, this is corporate-speak. The idea of supporting this organisation never entered my head, I fortunately was just extending my overdraft limit the day they made the error otherwise it would of cost me a £25 charge from my bank, and I was telling the clerk what a brilliant book dealer this internet firm were, but I was not supporting them, I was just conversing. But they want to interpret all behaviour in this corporate manner, it is how they seek to manage their livestock, you and me. But all these people are doing is applying the lessons that have been learnt by the art of priestcraft down the ages, in just the same way the farmer does who looks after his livestock on the farm. So, what we are really saying here, is that a person who effectively farms human beings, in whatever way, by acting as a social manager, in whatever capacity, is, not a farmer, but a priest. From this purely scientific perspective, it is clear that corporate food outlets are priestcraft organisations, which therefore constitute priesthoods, and their structures, where they involve gatherings, or delivery of a message of some kind, or the distribution of a product, like food, do take on the attributes of a church. Naturally, in our modern world, since we have a religious priesthood, we would expect it to be involved in the management of people in these agrarian ways, and this is the role we would especially expect Jews, like Schalmer, to play in Christian and Moslem societies, since we know that this is the relationship that Jews, as the master race, evolved to have with the substructure defined by the Jewish slaveidentity implants. And we do indeed find that Jews tend to dominate in these agrarian

type managerial roles in society, being lawyers, actors, managers, politicians, and so on. Naturally, for this parasitic-cum-symbiotic relationship to exist between these religious identity defined hierarchical structures within the living biomass resident in the exoskeleton of the superorganism, the relative balance between the identities must be maintained and Jews must always remain as a low percentage, but in a relatively highly privileged position in any society they farm. Unfortunately I am obliged to go by personal experience, severely limited as it is, to verify these logical deductions about the social constitution by religious identity. It would be a heinous crime to ask to know what religious identity people were, in relation to their jobs. And proposing that this is done in order to find out what the proportion of Jews in the biomass is, and what roles they have in the hierarchy, would probably get you a prison sentence. So it would be best if everyone pretends they have not read this paragraph, and I will pretend I have not written it. There are, according to Lilienfeld, three spheres of operation in every social organism, (see page 147 of Coker). The economic, juridical, and political. This means any overarching priesthood, such as Judaism, must control money, law, and political action. It must do so via its religious programme of identity implantation which gives it possession of the biomass, which it then controls by strategic involvement in the structures the priesthood evolved by way of priestly knowledge for the purpose of farming society. Corporate enterprise is part of this priestcraft, which is why we see tobacco companies, fast food outlets, and such like corporate manipulators of human nature, always operating according to this selfish principle of maximum profit, minimal responsibility, maximum dishonesty practiced as an art form acting as a prime strategy of empowerment of the priesthood, and hence maximal use of manipulative techniques such as advertising, role model association, seductive presentation. And of course the law facilitates the existence of this, what I would call criminal fraternity, because these corporate farming operations are the powerhouse of the priesthood, lawyers and lawmakers being a fundamental part of the priesthood. Lying is the very essence of priestcraft, religion is the pure essence of lies. The Bible and the Koran, these are corporate lies on the grandest scale, creating mass illusions that embrace the entire biomass. We do not mean to be judgemental when speak in this manner of social communication directed at abusing human individuals, although I am using a judgemental term because I hate this lying priestcraft. Even so, that is no reason why we should not recognise that this manipulative behaviour is what nature has achieved by perfecting the human corporate form; civilisation amounts to Nature's perfection of the art of lying. Lying is what gives colour to the skin of the organism, by colour I mean identity, we acquire these lies, religious identities, and thus we are incorporated into the being that is controlled by the priesthood that emits the colour programme. If you think it is barmy to say you hate something but you are not being judgemental when you describe it in derogatory terms, then let me ask you if you like cancer, as a disease? no of course you do not, you hate it if you think about it, but you are not judging it when you speak of it with venom in your language, unless you are lost in a state of emotional confusion, or extremely ignorant, or plain stupid. And so, advertising, public relations, spin doctors, these are the roles occupied by the latter day priest. I met a young lad just out of college last night, 28/06/04, a friend told me about him, he has just obtained a job in advertising earning £25,000 a year! Only priests, social mangers that is, farmers of the human biomass, can earn such sums so readily. He seemed a nice youth, by the look of him, and he would no doubt be bemused by this account of the

profession he is entering and the equation of himself, a tattooed, modern, freethinking fella, with figure of a priest. But I am unravelling the pattern in the cloth, and tracing the thread of priestcraft which leads from the earliest foundations of complex social form in the Middle East some five millennia ago, right up the present. They did not have McDonalds beef burger joints poisoning their minds then, and we do not have golden bulls poisoning ours today, unless we are Hindus, but we have a priestcraft today, as we did then, because priests and their craft are an inherent part of human superorganic physiology, it is merely a matter of figuring out how to recognise the signs, the priests do not know them, only the social scientist may know these things. Priests do priestcraft, that does not mean that they know what it is that they do; an advertising wiz kid may be able to relate to the idea of farming the populace, they know all about human vulnerabilities for sure, but they would not realise that they are part of a united priesthood that forms a theocracy and culminates in a literally religious force, Zionism, and the identity which is the heart of it, Judaism. It is clear that Jews do have a powerful bias toward these kinds of social management affairs, the porn tycoon whose daughter runs the sexy party outlet Anne Summer's is a perfect example, and no one likes sexy knickers more than me, so I like a lot of the things the ever wily Jew seems to be driven to come up with to get rich. But there it is, they are famous for being in charge of finance and managing money, you can dismiss this as a nasty stereotype but the Christian slave implant makes the Jews the controllers of money in Christian society! And we must be able to account for Judaism in a scientific manner, just as we must be able to account for race in a scientific manner, or breathing in a scientific manner. I have already frequently noted how Jewish identity is evolved about the very idea of law as it arose in Sumerian society five thousand years ago. And we only need look at America to see how the Jews run politics, just as they did in Britain when Britain was the leading military wing of Judaic ambition in the nineteenth century, when people like Disraeli  look at the name  were the leading men of the day, and the thing that burned in the hearts of the British political elite more then anything was the question of Israel, which the British were so instrumental in returning to Jewish control. And it is to war that politics is always reduced, as we can see from Spencer's notions of the centrality of war in forming and sustaining priesthoods, (See page 132 of Coker). It is clear that, acknowledging that Christian and Moslem societies are Jewish societies, in another guise, that Judaism is to war as wet is to water. On the basis of all these considerations we must think that just as race will not go away as a factor in our sense of self, so it seems God foods keep hanging on in there too. What the hell Ratty, whose for another turd-turnover? Cor yummy, yes please, me, me! 'I can see no way of predicting the human pattern from the primate patterns without introducing some novel elements into the mix of variables.' Then, we might ask, why didn't you!

I am ducking and diving here folks, no planning in my world, I just cannot get my head round any real kind of plan, no wonder I find this writing a book business so difficult. But I hope my dynamic presentation will work in its own way without making me too vulnerable to scurrilous attack. I had planned on taking the next two essays after Isaac's but as I have unravelled so much from his piece I decided to go onto selections from Coker, whose book I have just finished and in the final stages of which I found some excellent material to copy and react to. However returning Coker to the library today, 29/06/04, I checked out the sale racks and came away with a small pile, amongst which is a book which I think we can usefully put to use in the elucidation of what has to be a primary objective of our effort, to reveal the sheer unmitigated blind selfrighteous ignorance of these endless flood of priests who have the free run of the media in which to dress up their robbed out material and spit stupidity into the very being of the presentations they make. The Great Apes : Our Face in Nature's Mirror, by Michael Leach, Blandford, 1996 is not a work of science by a scientists, as we dug into above in Isaac's case. This is a pretty picture book telling a bedtime story for the slaves to read and go ah! It bleats about the tragic destruction of the habitat upon which these nearest of relatives of ours depend but in doing, so while propagating the theocracy's lies about what human nature is it is a major tool in the ability of those who desperately want to exterminate all life not of service to humanity, by default, as a product of their Zionist philosophy of human supremacy vested in Judaism, in the pursuit of theistic power to go right on doing what they have always done. I am not sure that anything can change this process, but one thing is for sure, anything short of a total change of outlook will necessarily continue the pace of corporate expansion of the Jewish organism to form a blanket across the earth's surface smothering all life that is not drawn into the living tissue of the organism of Judaism. This result is predictable, left to nature, and we can do nothing else, but that is the one thing this book does make plain, we can build nuclear weapons, we fight wars, we can go to the moon, but we cannot stop ourselves ravaging the biosphere of the planet because that is what human nature obliges us to do and that is what Judaism evolved to perfect. Lets take a look at how the foundations of perverted physical anthropology laid down by the life long dedication to the task of people like Isaac and the Leakey dynasty, have made it a matter of ease for the misrepresentation of human nature to continue unabated. Leach opens the fifth chapter Man : the Super Ape, with a nice discussion of our species classification in which he tells us MAN: The Super Ape
'

system of animal classification, each species is grouped together with relatives within a family. Animals that are closely related are listed under the same genus; they are then given a second name which identifies the individual species. The words used are frequently strange hybrid mixtures of Latin and Greek, with the names of their discoverers sometimes thrown in for good measure. The idea is to provide a universally recognizable name which avoids confusion when scientists of different native tongues get together. The names are chosen almost whimsically by zoologists rather than linguists and they usually refer to some aspect of the animal, either physical or behavioural,
UNDER THE LINNAEAN

that makes it different from other creatures. For example, the polar bear is listed as Ursus maritimus, which translates as sea bear. When we came to classify humans, with typical immodesty, we honoured ourselves with the name Homo sapiens - wise man. As we were the only animal on earth to call ourselves anything at all, it was concluded that we were the most intelligent. Linnaeus himself wrote: 'I am well aware of the vast difference between man and ape, when considered from a moral viewpoint. Man is the only creature whom God has blessed with an immortal soul.' With a more detached and less emotive view, Desmond Morris reviewed the original choice of name and suggested that humans should be redesignated as the 'naked ape', which is a name zoologists from another planet may have chosen for us, if they had been given the task. When it comes to biological classification, the relationship between the great apes and humans lies in the differences that separate us, but from a personal point of view I find it is far more interesting and illuminating to look at the things we all have in common. In pure evolutionary terms, humans are one of the side branches on the ape family tree. There are minor anatomical features that differentiate us from the others. Our arms are shorter and our legs longer in relation to our body size. We walk upright and lack an opposable digit on our feet. Our canine teeth are smaller and our bodies are considerably less hairy and muscular. There are other distinctions but these are mostly hidden. The similarities outweigh the differences by a huge margin. Many biologists believe that humans are separated from the apes by what is found in our heads rather than by other parts of our anatomy. For both scientists and philosophers it is the brain that makes us distinctly human. Physically we are slower and weaker than the anthropoid apes; we are far less able to defend ourselves against predators and, without the aid of tools in some form, only a tiny fraction of our species are now equipped with the skills to comfortably survive in any natural habitat. The skulls of early man had short nasal clefts, showing that even then our species had a poor sense of smell. Human teeth are small and puny, unsuitable for either shearing meat or constantly chewing up leaves and grass. Humans are physically one of the world's most spectacularly non-specialized animals: we can't run quickly, climb trees confidently, crack nuts with our jaws, migrate efficiently, kill prey without the aid of weapons or carry out any of the everyday survival tasks that other species undertake. East Africa is regarded as the site where man first appeared in anything resembling his present form. Our ancestors were shorter than we are today and probably even slower at running. According to the accepted theory of evolution, early man had few natural advantages in the survival stakes, so he had to develop some special skills to compete. We know that many forms of early humans appeared and eventually died out, but the successful subspecies that was to colonize the earth proved to be the one with the most efficient brain. We have no way of knowing what triggered the initial blooming of human brain power, but there are some clues that point the way. Early hominids had short, stumpy fingers that were incapable of fine manipulation, but they had one huge advantage and that was a natural upright stance which left their hands free for collecting food and carrying large objects, while other primates walked on all four legs. One theory for the appearance of an upright posture is that our ancestors adopted this unique carriage as a way of keeping cool in the burning tropical heat. All quadrupeds present their heads, necks, shoulders and back to the sky and absorb a huge amount of heat when the sun shines. Many take to the shadows and coolness of tree cover for the hours around noon, just to avoid overheating, but this cuts down their available feeding time. It is possible that our distant African ancestors first stood

up so that less of their body surface was directly exposed to sunlight. Compared to a four-footed stance, our upright posture cuts down heat absorption by 60 per cent, allowing man to venture out when the other early primates were forced to stay in the shade. This would also explain why we still have hairy heads, as hair insulates against the heat as well as the cold. In those distant days before sharp stones were used as tools, hair would have grown throughout the life of humans and the resulting thick mat would have kept off the worst of the midday sun from their head, neck and shoulders. Standing upright would also have exposed their bodies to more breeze, increasing the cooling effect. A very different idea of the route we took to reach our current status is based on the possibility that pre-humans went through some sort of aquatic phase in their evolution. There is a major gap in fossil evidence that spans the time between 7 million and 3 million years ago. This is an unimaginably long period and evolution must have gone through many twists and turns before ape-like man appeared. Some scientists think that instead of leaving the forests and taking to more open land, our ancestors took to the water. This could have been a way of avoiding competition with the ancestors of the great apes. The evidence for this hypothesis is too strong to be completely ignored. There are many aspects of human anatomy that are significantly different from that of the apes and a water-based evolutionary phase would account for some of them. Few people really think that we went through a totally aquatic existence such as that of whales. Most subscribers to the idea believe that our ancestors had a semi-aquatic lifestyle similar to seals, where hunting took place in the water but breeding and resting happened on land. This would certainly help to explain our unique absence of body hair, for thick ape-like fur would be a hindrance under water. Humans possess a layer of subcutaneous fat which, in distribution, bears a strong resemblance to whale blubber but is absent in all other primates. For a species that is reputed to have evolved in the tropics, humans are appallingly inefficient at dealing with high temperatures. Unlike other land animals that live in hot environments, we have no way of conserving moisture, in fact, we waste it in extraordinary quantities. Humans drink and sweat more than any other animal of our size, our faeces are moist and our urine highly diluted. We will die very quickly without water, even in conditions that are less than hot. In common with marine mammals, we weep copious saline tears - a mechanism that is used to reduce the salt level in a body that is constantly immersed in sea water. When compared to apes, one of the most distinctive features of a human face is the strange nose. Why do we have nostrils situated beneath a strange fleshy hood, while apes have simple flat apertures? The sense of smell in apes and man appears to be very similar, so there is no real difference in function. It could be that our peculiar noses once acted as an anti-flooding device which prevented water entering our breathing system while swimming. It is interesting to remember that all the other apes, with the exception of bonobos, loathe water and will avoid entering it at all costs, while humans regard playing in water as a pleasurable experience. Humans exhibit a classic dive reflex from birth. Put a baby's head into water and its heart rate immediately slows. This effect reduces the amount of oxygen used and has been adopted by marine mammals when they want to stay submerged for long periods. New-born babies also exhibit an astonishing swimming skill, at a time when they are virtually incapable of any voluntary muscle control beyond crying. Their eyes remain open under water and they swim not with chaotic splashing but with rhythmical, balanced actions; they even control the direction of movement. Based on

current knowledge, it is entirely possible that our ancestors did indeed spend some time as semi-aquatic animals, hunting for fish, crustaceans and other food in the shallow waters of tropical Africa. The actions of prying and grasping in these slippery conditions would be one plausible cause for the development of our slender and highly manipulative hands. Lacking the sharp teeth, beak and talons of other fishing species, our dextrous fingers would have compensated in the finding and carrying of food. This could have been the point when arms and legs evolved into different tools; flat feet would have been ideal fins for propulsion. Unfortunately, fossil evidence for this idea remains unknown and, even if it were found, anatomy alone would be unlikely to give us clues about the behaviour of these distant creatures. Human evolution may have gone through a water phase but at some point it moved back on to dry land. For land-based hunters the advantages of the extra height given by a twolegged posture must soon have become apparent. Elevated heads can peer over long grass and provide more efficient long-distance sight when searching for either prey or enemies. Even now many primates will stand on their hindlegs when excited or frightened. They may be able to maintain the position only for a few seconds but it gives them an excellent view of their surroundings. Our ancestors would have learned that hands not needed for walking can be adapted for other skills. The first tools were used by man around 2 million years ago; they were simple cutting stones, created by chipping off a few flakes to modify and sharpen a rock that was naturally close to the right shape. This tool design did not significantly alter for the next million years, but it had a profound effect on the long-term success of humans. Until the first stone was sharpened and used to kill a wild animal, feeding would have been a matter of finding fruit, shoots and other plant material. This would have been supplemented by birds' eggs, insects and reptiles that were easy to catch. Red meat would have been a rarity and probably the result of a lucky find. Tools changed this. Suddenly humans could kill larger animals and their diet improved dramatically. The image many of us have of our grunting, low-browed ancestors as rampaging, carnivorous arch-hunters is very misleading. Remains of meat meals eaten long ago are easy to identify through the way the bones have been cut. Meat-eating animals such as hyenas and big cats leave very different marks on a skeleton to those made by a human armed with a stone knife. Evidence found in caves shows clearly that, even with the aid of weapons, humans had difficulty bringing down big prey. Skeletal analysis in Africa tells us that most meals were made up of young animals or adults with physical disabilities such as arthritis or broken limbs. In other words, humans were killing animals that were not fast enough to escape. There are very few signs of meals made up of large healthy adults or powerful species such as rhino or buffalo that could easily defend themselves. The use of tools for hunting still made a considerable difference to the welfare of early humans. Their normal diet, consisting almost entirely of available vegetation, was low in protein and required a long time to gather. The introduction of animal flesh, even once a week, was a significant step forward in the history of human nourishment. Red meat is a concentrated form of protein. Over relatively few generations, successful hunters and their families would have put on body-weight and become more muscular - which in turn helped them catch more animals. It also gave them more 'leisure time'. One good meat meal would have been the equivalent of a whole day searching for nuts and berries. An improved diet would have resulted in lower mortality and the population would slowly have started to grow. Inevitably there

would then have been increased competition for food and space, so man started to increase his range. Most tropical environments are 'user friendly'  the weather is good and food abundant  which is why the area around the Equator is home to most of the world's species of wildlife. As early humans wandered further afield, they would have encountered conditions that were less hospitable, containing fewer animals and subject to harsher winters. If anything, this would probably have accelerated the development of their brain, for our ancestors had to find ways to adapt if they weren't to die out or be forced to move back to warmer climates, where there would be a hostile reception from the locals. Humans learned to use animal skins as clothes and to make their homes in caves in order to protect themselves against the weather. Fire soon became the ultimate survival tool and a new age began. Obviously much of this is conjecture and can never be truly proved, but the ideas are widely accepted by most scientists. Some 50,000 years ago humans were found only in the tropics and warmer belts of the Old World. Northern Europe was reached just 30,000 years ago, then Siberia 20,000 years ago, the Americas 11,000 years ago and New Zealand just 1,000 years ago. In 10,000 BC the whole human population of the earth probably totalled less than 10 million; now there are more than 5,000 million and the figure is rising alarmingly. We are adaptable, non-specialized animals with one factor in our favour: a good brain. Our ancestors survived and passed on their genes because they had the intelligence and capability to evaluate changing conditions and work out ways of adapting to them. This took the form of building shelters, making weatherproof clothes and hunting in organized groups armed with spear throwers, slings and bows. But, most important of all, man had the power to think in the abstract, consider the future and its various possibilities and then consciously plan ahead. Life is simple for species that lead a solitary life. Apart from external factors such as weather and food supply, their actions are quite random. Communication is almost totally unnecessary as they have no information to pass on and nothing to address it to. In dealings with other members of the species, only a few simple signals need to be employed. These vary between groups but the basics are courtship signals, aggression, submission, territorial rights, etc. When animals live in tightly knit groups, the need for communication grows. In the absence of language, evolution has produced what is called the 'pecking order'. The majority of group-living animals have developed a hierarchical system where actions are controlled by a single individual, usually the biggest. This dominant animal makes many of the everyday decisions and the others comply. Rebellion is quelled by physical punishment. There are advantages in being a member of a larger group: each individual is less vulnerable to attack and, in predatory species, a pack can often hunt more efficiently than a single animal. There are many signals used within social groups. They come in the form of individual scent, group scent, body position, facial expressions, tail position, vocal sounds, etc. But is it language? No two people will agree on what exactly constitutes language. A wolf is perfectly capable of signalling to another pack member that he owns a certain piece of meat  so keep away. But the same signal, a growl with exposed teeth, would also be used to threaten a trespassing bear or a rival male challenging for breeding rights. This is not true language; rather, it is a simple code that conveys a limited message. Some biologists have defined language as the ability to consider a subject that is not present. A wolf will respond if his meal is being threatened by another, but no

wolf could think about a meal in three weeks' time. Only humans appear to have the abstract thoughts to consider 'what if?' and 'maybe'. These may seem to be of minor importance but they do open the doors to questions of much greater consequence. The fact that we can think about future possibilities and variations gives humans the luxury of choice and adaptability. But this would have been totally useless unless the ideas could be passed on to other members of the group, so that all could benefit or act together to make the plans work. Man is a highly social animal. We appear to have evolved as such and every clue indicates that we have always lived in family groups. In order to hunt efficiently, plan for the future and, possibly, compensate for our lack of physical prowess, humans developed language. Working out the exact timetable of human physical evolution is difficult enough due to the scarcity of hard evidence and the numerous ways in which fossils can be interpreted. Consider the plight of those attempting to work out the history of language, for here there are no pieces of real evidence. The mechanics of producing words  and therefore language  are housed in soft tissue that does not fossilize. We have no real way of looking at early man and assessing the complexity of the voice box. Brains do not last long after death and leave no fossil record; we can only measure the inside of skulls and work out the size and shape of the brains that were once housed within. But this gives no sense of their capabilities and the scant information can point us totally in the wrong direction. Neanderthal man had an average brain size that was almost 10 per cent larger than that of a modern human, although it needs to be said that they were bigger overall, making the size of their brain proportionately little different from ours. Yet Neanderthal man used crude stone tools that did not change in design for over 150,000 years; compare this to the technological changes that have taken place in our own short lifetimes. Neanderthals showed little sign of adopting abstract behaviour such as experimenting with art. So how advanced was their language? The truth is that we really don't know when language was first used. It may be a pointless quest for, like all other major characteristics, even a basic language would have taken hundreds of generations to evolve. Early human vocal signals were probably as basic as those of the wolf. Then nouns would have appeared and gradually the vocabulary would have expanded. The transition from primitive grunts to modern debates over the creation of the universe is a quantum leap that should completely defy our imagination. But still we take it for granted. In the late twentieth century there are a little over 5,000 known languages in the world and an unknown number have disappeared into oblivion before being recorded. In common with the other apes, humans use a wide range of facial expressions to signal emotion. Only we have more muscles and therefore more control over our faces than any other animal. Fine movements of lips, cheeks and eyebrows in any permutation are used for signalling. We can broadcast many subtle signals without uttering a word. Some are universal and appear to be genetically controlled rather than learned. Smiling is understood in every culture; it appears spontaneously shortly after birth, even when the baby is blind and has no chance to copy the action from its parents. Our modern smile has its origins in the fear-grin that is familiar to anyone who watches chimpanzees for any length of time. Chimps pull back their lips in an unnaturally wide 'smile' when faced with extreme danger. If the fear is generated by a dominant male, the grin is recognized as a sign of absolute submission. It shows that the subordinate animal is posing no threat. From this beginning it is just a short step for a grin to become a message of friendship. Modern humans smile for many

reasons. It signals contentment and relaxation, but most of all it conveys to the viewer that the smiler is not hostile. We smile at strangers to help break the ice, without realizing that this action dates back to a time in our history when humans had no verbal language at all, when our main communication was, like that of apes, carried out with actions. Smiling can be used in moments of extreme stress as a way of placating the aggressor. Most children at some time in their lives will be ordered by an adult to 'wipe that stupid grin off your face'. This indicates that the signs are being misunderstood, for the grin is not showing arrogance or mirth but submission. In the face of threats from a dominant human, many people use the 'smile' to signal that they accept their low status and are not challenging authority. Just as chimps do. The modern conventional smile is simply a logical extension of this, especially to strangers. It shows that we mean no harm and have only peaceful intentions. Other gestures are dictated by local convention. A protruding tongue in Europe is a mild insult, while in the New Zealand Maori society it is used as part of a greetings ritual. Humans as we would recognize them today have existed in some form for around 2 million years. But cultures that we can understand are surprisingly recent. Until long after the end of the last Ice Age, about 50,000 years ago, humans were hunter-gatherers living in small family groups. Then, slowly and spontaneously at various places around the globe, man turned into a farmer. The dawn light of the agricultural revolution fell on humans some 10,000 years ago and it changed us for ever. Around that time, we believe, there was a fortunate quirk of nature that was literally the seed of our farming efficiency. Agricultural wheat, as we now know it, did not exist then. Its immediate ancestor was just one of many wild grasses that grew somewhere in Asia Minor. For some reason this seems to have accidentally crossed with a form of goat grass and, against all the odds, produced a viable fertile hybrid. This was emmer wheat, and it came with fat, heavy seed heads that were bigger than anything seen before. This was to be the staple crop of proto-farmers. Nowadays we constantly experiment with cross-pollination and genetic engineering in order to increase crop yield, but emmer wheat was the result of a natural event. At some stage in our history someone must have posed the question, 'What will happen if I put these seeds in the soil?' It would never have been quite as simple as that, but before agriculture really started the experimental farmers must have taken the decision to act today for the benefit of a future time that was beyond their ability to measure. This was not a programmed reflex action, but a considered, intelligent gamble. Some animals do appear to make provisions for the future. Squirrels bury nuts in the autumn and retrieve them in the cold winter months when food is scarce. But this is an instinctive response to an abundance of food, it is not a planned, cohesive strategy for survival. Squirrels born just six months earlier have no way of knowing in autumn that soon the leaves will fall and thick snow will blanket the land. They bury nuts because instinct tells them to, not their brain. Research shows that squirrels do not remember where they left the food, they find it through a combination of sporadic digging and an acute sense of smell. Sometimes they find nuts they themselves buried, sometimes they find nuts cached by other squirrels, but even more often the nuts are not found at all. Several animals show this type of behaviour, particularly rodents, but it does not signify an awareness of the future; rather, it is simply a deeply rooted response. Human evolutionary and cultural history is peppered with watersheds that shaped our future. Relative importance lies in the eye of the beholder, but few would

disagree that the discovery of controlled farming was a true milestone. Along with fire and language, agriculture was a skill that, once mastered, would change our existence. For such an earth-shattering discovery, farming took a surprisingly long time to reach the rest of the world. From its original appearance in the Near East, the new agricultural skills spread painfully slowly. One well-researched figure estimates that agriculture moved north and west at the rate of 1,000yd (1km) a year. Not all environments are suitable for sustained agriculture and the concept completely bypassed cultures in areas such as deserts which were incapable of being cultivated. For the first time, humans had a degree of permanence. Instead of moving regularly to follow migrating animals or escape the weather, they stayed on one site. Animals were domesticated around the same time. Cattle and sheep were kept for meat and milk that supplemented the unpredictable harvests that must have been experienced by farmers who were learning as they went along. Until that point we were semi-nomads, our worldly goods confined to whatever we could carry. There was little point in developing an arsenal of weapons and tools if they were not portable. Agricultural stability meant that buildings could be erected and large tools made  and kept  to help till the soil. Big pits could be dug where food was kept cool and stored in preparation for the cold desolation and hunger of winter. The very nature of man was changing. There is no argument about the intrinsic importance of agriculture to the success of human beings, but we need to realize that the spin-offs were not always beneficial. As agriculture permeated and eventually took over our methods of food collection, humans lost the wisdom built up by their hunter-gatherer ancestors. It created an absolute reliance on artificial methods and, if things went wrong, this could be catastrophic. In a truly wild environment there are natural cycles that drastically reduce food supplies. Specific diseases of prey animals or food plants and drought can bring about starvation in any species population. But it is always the specialist feeders that face the greatest risk, for if their one food supply vanishes they cannot shift their attention to a different source. Our ancestors survived by eating shoots, grubs and other organic substances that we no longer see as edible. The possible results of total reliance can be seen in the Irish Potato Famine of the nineteenth century, when blight hit the staple crop and virtually wiped it out. Hundreds of thousands died or were forced to emigrate, because the potato plants did not yield their usual harvest. Their ancestors must have found plenty to eat in the same habitat, but agriculture had swept away the early skills and few now had the knowledge to live off the land for any length of time. The success of farming brought with it another hidden danger. Instead of having to find food by digging and scavenging, suddenly it could be grown on the doorstep through sowing, irrigating and harvesting. So more and more was planted. Eventually the chosen crop formed most, if not all, of the diet. Despite the fact that they had to work hard for it, with their wide variety of foods, pre-agricultural humans had a balanced diet containing vitamins, minerals, roughage and the occasional concentrated protein. Arable farming, however, was based almost entirely on starchbased crops such as corn (maize), rice and potatoes. Good as they are, when these substances completely take over, the diet is nutritionally poorer. Going back to skeletal analysis, we know that many early hunter-gatherer societies contained a high number of individuals who were physically bigger, had fewer bone diseases, kept more of their teeth and often lived longer than people in later societies who relied on a monoculture farming principle. All because their diet was better. To quote just one example, late Ice Age men in what is now Greece had an average height of 1.78m (5ft

lOin); 2,000 years after the adoption of agriculture, this had fallen to 1.63m (5ft 4in). A similar percentage drop also applied to women. It is ironic that the early man-creatures roaming East Africa would probably have had a diet similar to today's chimpanzees but, with the triumph of agriculture, the quality of human nourishment subsequently plummeted. Due entirely to our intelligence and creativity, for thousands of years the human diet was poorer than that of the apes, most of whom consume several hundred distinct sorts of food. In the West today we rely on less than twenty plant species for 95 per cent of our basic nonmeat diet. Whatever the long-term results of farming, the system has one undeniable advantage: cultivated land always produces more edible material than a wild patch covering the same area. This means that although the menu may be less than exciting, more people can eat, and that has always been the one overriding consideration. Farming marked the first of several revolutions that were to radically influence every aspect of our existence. The earliest known written language appeared about 5,000 years ago, with a complex pattern of syntax and grammar. The first known wheel was used about the same period, but even this hugely important invention has not reached every corner of the world. There are still cultures that have not adopted this most basic of human gadgets  and see no reason to. There have been several milestone 'revolutions' since agriculture. Industrial, electrical and atomic have all had their effect on our lives. Our history spans around 2 million years, yet most technological advances have taken place in the last century. At first glance this is an unbalanced development, but it should not be that surprising. Scientists working now are building on research carried out by their predecessors over centuries; they are plugging into a vast network of accumulated knowledge. Inventors now do not have to work out a power source before constructing a computer; they simply plug in and throw a switch, leaving more time for their own specialities. The basic components of high-tech inventions can be bought off the shelf, instead of being built from scratch. Technical education for children was a rarity until the early twentieth century; now most people leave school with at least a rough idea of the principles that govern science. And, finally, there are more people today working in science than in the rest of history put together. The reservoir of resources and knowledge alone explains why there has been a mushroom effect in scientific development. We may live in a high-tech society but our automatic actions are still guided by basic instincts shared by the other anthropoid apes. We are starting to realize that even humans use body language unconsciously to express emotions. Due to the high mobility of people, the telephone is now the most important means of instant communication. It is well worth watching someone talking on the phone as they try to put over an important point, or, better still, become angry. Arms are waved about, fingers pointed and faces fold in scowls. To no avail, for the recipient on the other end of the line can see none of it. This is purely instinctive, just as with the apes. We use body language without thinking about it. It is estimated that humans use around 3,000 different hand signals as part of their non-vocal communication. Like languages and dialects, these are different throughout the world and no one culture uses all of them. Gestures need to be seen in context to be fully understood. Gorillas often mate face to face and usually keep close eye-to-eye contact throughout. This helps to maintain the bond, making the act personal. In any relationship between close individual humans, unbroken eye contact is also important; it can be seen between mother and child, lovers and close friends. But without the underlying security of this

relationship, the stare takes on a different meaning. When rival silverback gorillas meet, they glare at each other. This is a direct challenge, as neither will look away and accept the dominance of the other. It builds up the tension and frequently results in more aggressive displays or even violence. Similar scenes take place when a stranger walks into a bar and stares directly at a local man. If the eye contact is prolonged and unbroken, the atmosphere thickens. We are not comfortable in this situation, for no reason other than that it is a threat-relic of our man-ape past. The feeling of unease is effectively used by people in dominant positions; they frequently use an unblinking gaze to 'stare down' subordinates, making them more submissive. This can clearly be seen in boxers, teachers and even parents. Humans evolved as social animals, so had to learn to live peaceably within a settlement, and this is not an easy matter. Every group is made up of individuals, each with their own temperament and needs, yet they have to act cohesively to survive. One of the ways animals achieve this is by copying the actions of a single individual or the dominant core. Gorilla groups are guided by the silverback. When he sleeps, everyone sleeps; when he starts to build a nest, they all do. Overt compliance is an excellent method of avoiding conflict. Humans are not quite so straightforward. When subconsciously giving out signals, we often use postural echo  or, in other words, we copy each other. If two friends sit together talking and one crosses his legs, it is more than likely that the other will soon do the same. If one leans forward and rests his hands on his knees, it will not be long before the other copies the movement. This kind of group behaviour can be seen by any interested observer yet is rarely noticed by the parties involved. This is exactly what apes do in the same circumstances in order to pass friendly signals to each other and prevent friction within the group. Resting chimpanzees spend a great deal of time delicately combing through the fur of neighbouring animals. Mutual preening of this nature has little to do with keeping clean; its prime function is to strengthen bonds by emphasizing group dependency. Humans display exactly the same behaviour all the time. How often do we see a wife removing a fleck of dust from her husband's coat before they leave the house. Or a father straighten his young son's tie as he sets off for school. We all do it automatically, not for cosmetic reasons but for physical contact and mutual reassurance. Whenever animals live in structured societies, there is likely to be competition for food, mates and territory from neighbouring groups of the same species. It is impossible to generalize about the nature of such rivalry, for there are species, such as badgers, where individuals freely travel between groups and aggression levels are low. But in most cases, competition is so fierce that outright war ensues when rival bands meet. The whole group may join in the battle or it might be only the dominant males that fight. Humans are not equipped to survive alone. Our ancestors, until comparatively recently, would have lived in extended family groups made up of less than a few dozen people. Then almost everyone was related and all members knew each other well. Occupants of nearby villages may have been known and recognized, but they would also have been treated with suspicion. Twentieth-century life has changed this culture to an incredible degree. Most humans are now city dwellers, surrounded by literally thousands of total strangers. Psychologists tell us that few people are comfortable with this, so we recreate small-scale, more comprehensible, close-knit communities by joining golf clubs or supporting local football teams. Other clubs and teams then become the token 'enemy', to be mocked and defeated whenever possible. Membership of the group is advertised with scarves, badges and songs, each of which helps maintain the internal

bond between individuals. At a primitive level the superficial interest that adheres the membership is probably less important than being a member of a manageable, friendly 'family'. Be they football supporters or a rival quiz team, the opposition are simply outsiders. This is what prompts the majority of sports-related violence. Soccer hooligans are lapsing into behaviour that their ancestors would have adopted when faced with another band of hunter-gatherers. Humans live in a sophisticated world, but our behaviour has not caught up and is still remarkably close to that of the fur-clad hunters that once lived in caves. Each of us has a basic desire to be a member of a small group in order to make sense of social structure and remain an individual. When ape groups become too large, one or more wander off to start another  which is how our ancestors would have responded to a similar situation. Humans cannot cope with the rapid changes that have occurred in our society. Instead of living in small groups, the majority of humans are now brought up in tightly packed colonies containing millions of individuals. So we should not be dumbfounded to find that urban man suffers far more from stress-related problems than any tribesman living in a small family group in New Guinea or Brazil. Humans are a phenomenally successful animal. We are the only species in history that has the power to dictate not only our own fate but also that of other species that share the earth with us. Many believe now that we are too successful. Modern medical science has either eliminated or enabled us to control most of the diseases that once kept our population in check. In the Middle Ages few people died of old age and those that did were often buried before they reached fifty. An increasingly high percentage of us can realistically expect to see our eightieth birthday  everyone is living longer. Frighteningly lethal hunting methods have wiped out the majority of serious predators that threatened our survival and agriculturalists are rapidly learning to coax crops from areas that were once barren scrubland. We have conquered most of the natural factors that normally restrict the population growth of every other animal. In any stable environment, the numbers of each resident species is limited by food, predation, disease and living space. Without these limitations the human population is doubling approximately every thirty-five years. It is mathematically provable that the earth cannot sustain this unimaginable growth rate. The reign of humans on earth has been directly compared to fleas infecting a dog. This may be insulting but the analogy is accurate. Parasites can exist only on a host animal that supplies food, warmth and shelter. From a strictly biological viewpoint, it is in the fleas' interest to expand their population, so they breed. It is equally in their interest that the dog stays fit and healthy, but occasionally the number of fleas grows too high and they take too much blood when feeding. The dog then becomes anaemic and dies from a secondary infection. With the loss of their host, the fleas also die out, for they have nowhere to live and nothing to eat. If the human population continues to expand, in 200 years we will have exhausted the reserves of oil and other resources that keep twentieth-century humans alive and mobile. The air will have become too polluted to breathe and our waste will contaminate our drinking water. On top of this many 'wild' habitats will have been turned over to crop culture and 70 per cent of the world's wildlife will have died out. At the moment we calculate that there are around 30,000,000 species of organic life on earth. Realistic estimates indicate that around half of these will disappear by the year 2100. That is a wholesale extinction at the rate of seventeen species an hour. Mankind has lost touch with the idea that we are merely part of the natural world rather than masters of it, even though our brain gives us the ability to

control our surroundings. While humans were confined to tiny isolated populations in the tropics, our actions were ecologically irrelevant. Now they have a major impact on the entire globe. We have just two choices in the very near future: we must learn to consume less and drop our breeding rate or attempt to live with the consequences of ignoring the problems. Our ultimate nemesis is unlikely to appear in the form of universal destruction on a biblical scale. Total extinction of such a successful species is difficult to imagine, although it did happen to the dinosaurs. More probable would be a new disease that spread rapidly as a result of high population density, lowered physical strength through a worsening diet and unclean water. There are many precedents for this scenario. When European rabbits contracted myxomatosis, 98 per cent of them died within six months. The same mortality is entirely possible in humans, should a similar virus infect urban areas where thousands of us are packed into a few square kilometres. The city habitat, with its high population of constantly moving and mingling people, all living in warm buildings, is a perfect breeding and transmission medium for a huge number of known diseases. Unlike bigger animals, disease-creating 'bugs' are constantly mutating, and because their life cycles are so short, their evolution is rapid. The common cold is a perfect example. Just as we build up an immunity to one form, it mutates into something slightly different that cannot be recognized or dispatched by our antibodies. There is a widespread theory that our final fate doesn't lie in the fall-out of atomic warfare but in decimation by a virus already known as harmless that, in some altered form, will break down a critical function of our body system. This may all sound rather bleak and obviously the future could be very different, but few biologists would disagree with the hypothesis. Man is now too successful for his own good we are in danger of engulfing the planet that we need for survival. (Pages 88 - 103) Bite, bite, bite! I want to say something, but I will bite my tongue. Lets try a straightforward criticism of this narrative, although God knows it does not deserve a moments consideration, it is not serious, it is not meant to be, it is simply bullshit propaganda for the priesthood, the theocracy. Lets ask ourselves in what essential way this ludicrous fairytale differs from the infallible scientific argument I expound above when dealing with the detail of human evolution? I have a key, it is as simple as that, my key is the fact that humans are a superorganic species that evolved from apes to form the world we live in today. Leach's brain sucking drivel also has a key, it is that which we find in any mythological work, especially the Bible, man is an animal realised in the individual person and exists in the name of God. God is not invoked here, but man as a free person is the key to which this stupid account adheres, and in doing so, although it purports to be a scientific account based on biology, anthropology and evolutionary ideas, it nowhere retains a biological and evolutionary theme, it retains a psychological theme, which is the hallmark of theology, as the focus upon the person as the end in themselves for which human sociality exists. The corporate being exists to serve the person according to these charlatans, whereas it is the other way round, but by inverting this dynamic they get to manage it by saying we are doing what we want to do, while we are really doing what they want to do and they are working the human biomass, as I have made plain, like farmers, and to do this they have to have a

distinct identity from the masses, and they do, they are a priesthood and this fine example of their craft is an indication of how they work their skills as human farmers of humans. I could make my way through this garbage and pick up points, it would not be uninteresting, but I have done it already with Isaac and you can do it for yourself. Why bother inserting it then? Well I thought I would pick my through it, but now I cannot be bothered, but it is a fine example of how these people whiter on and on about stuff they know nothing about and never seem the least bit concerned to address any real questions arising out of the fact that we are animals and we evolved. Anyway, I have shown you above how to reason that with the potential of the social environment that came into being as a void, a vacant potential territory for evolution to enter, with the coming of the mammalian kingdom, we can account for the evolution of humanity in the finest detail without any contrivance, without any recourse to elaborate inconsistent theorising and with periodically declaring how certain things such as how speech came to exist, can absolutely never be known. The priests love this don't they, their greatest weapon, to say there are things that can never be known. These people are the ultimate low life of humanity, the most highly regarded, adored, and powerful upon whom the entire social structure depends, because by robbing all evidence from which knowledge can be fabricated they become the robber barons of the social being, and we become their dupes, or you do anyway, and I tend to get dragged down the plug hole with you because the flow of morons is such as no one can resist except by being a priest in order to join the flotsam drifting to the upper echelons of society. So wake up and pay attention you lot. Damn it! Monosyllabilism Authority - Priest You may be sick of me going on about this priesthood and that priesthood, it is monotonous, tedious, tiresome, repetitive and downright wearisome, I guess. You may want to say 'me think he doth protest too much', and 'when does the priest hunter become a priest?' Priest is however an appropriate term for anyone who has a position of authority of any kind in a human social group, and any formal structure of social effort, of any kind, likewise warrants the word priesthood. I refrained from buying a book on religion from the library yesterday, 29/06/04, because it was just a religious treatise for dorks who want to be slaves or priests, but in the opening chapters some mention was made of criticisms of religion and Durkheim's name appeared, and then the functionalist approach was refuted by pointing out the difficulty posed by the question How, if religion was a functional attribute of human social behaviour, functionalists could accounted for secularisation? Of course I do not see any process of secularisation. This is such a frequent ploy used by priests, they set up a false position and then another branch of the theocracy comes along and knocks it down again, we even saw Isaac declaring this was common practice within the scientific establishment, a kind of sport, as if it were a legitimate way of pursuing true knowledge! I see only an organism, like the noted Greek philosopher Parmenides, who devastated his world with his rationality, I think only of unity, not duality. And since ours is a unity in which theocracy still rules our

world as much it ever did, I see these secularised structures as mere organs of theocracy, and the truth of this is revealed in the devolution of the basic principle of duality, upon which theistic myth is based, to the academic branches set loose from direct control by the church just a short time ago, places where science is practised so that, just as we have seen that calling people Romans, Britons, or Americans does not diminish their Jewish identity, it merely obscures it under layers of exoskeletal structure, the same applies in relation to the devolution of political power categorised under a host of new terms. But what is nice about noting this link between the process of devolution of authority away from direct theistic control to a substructure of the theocracy created under a legal framework, which is then given a new name, is that the new categories cannot be mere words, even though the way we understand them means that that is all they are in reality, these illusion of independent existence actually has to appear to have some material form to make it look real. And so we see a direct link between a need to secure religious authority's continued absolute rule, while allowing the reach of its authority to be extended to embrace all of society under willingly  by consent  as they say. This is done by spinning this interdependent social fabric, consisting of linguistic constructs, and associated structures. Thus just as the message and the ink on a page are one and the same thing, so the words and the social structures they denote are one and the same thing, and these social structures are the creation of a priesthood writing in stone, steel, tarmac, what have you. This is why monumental architecture evolved as a behavioural expression of human nature. Pyramids were the writing in the sand that could not be blown away. So this means that the best way to recognise this ever present theistic influence it to offer a counter strategy to that of the priests by making sure we counter their infinitely varied nomenclature with a monosyllabic nomenclature. We must apply the term for an acknowledged member of the priesthood to all people who carry out the bidding of the theocracy, whether or not they are themselves aware it. The result is, in places, an intrusive monosyllabic nomenclature that becomes a little tedious, perhaps, but which is due to the all revealing idea of evolution which I am applying to human society for the very first time in human history, in any meaningful manner. Evolution sucks all into its embrace as it replaces the idea of God, which evolved to do the same in a supreme act of intellectual perversion. Looking at the Leach contribution, just imagine what would be the state of affairs in society if Darwin had not earthed scientific enquiry in the physical being of human physiology which makes it possible for a flow of this kind of ceaseless drivel to be presented to the masses as the best that science can say about human beings. Drivel fills the void in knowledge created by Darwin's false idea of evolution with self centred fantasy. We will shortly see a little sample of the tide of thinking, courtesy of Coker, that was focused upon the organic nature of society. Without Darwin this tide would of become a flood to drown the theocracy. Imagine if a run of the mill overview of the kind extracted for presentation above, were telling the truth as I have revealed it, what then, what would the world be like to live in? Completely different, that is for sure. Do you think this knowledge would be tolerated by our masters? No chance, if we want the truth we must find it for ourselves. Identity - Jew If the resulting monosyllabic nomenclature which leads to every person with any kind of authority role in society being labelled a 'priest' is bad enough, the same

effect in respect to religious denomination is catastrophic, everyone, from Moses to Hitler, ends up being called a Jew, pure and simple. This is not tedious, this is not annoying, this is an evil unlike any evil imaginable, this is a vile crime, that is, it is a vile crime against our masters. and since our masters are us, it is a crime against the self, it is a crime against society. This is not a rigorous presentation of scientific knowledge, it is a philosophical presentation of scientific themes that we cannot have free access to because of the theistic society that we live in. Therefore there is not too much finesses in the presentation and no attempt to ameliorate the damaging consequences of the release of the truth, I am afraid this kind of consideration is alien to me and I am interested in sucking up to the human qualities I hate. Reading the work on Gierke the one idea that we are presented with is as a consequences of society being perceived as an organism is that of society in possession of personality, which I have stated is nonsense, it is the application of the personal, the individual, to the collective form. The word that these thinkers should of been using instead of the theistic-personal term 'personality' is the scientific-functional term 'identity'. since we live in a theocracy where we are all inducted into a mind via our language programme that directs our self awareness we only have theistic words to use to think in ordinary ways about life. Personal denominations which define in and out groups, like Jew and Hindu, conform to this conceptually isolating requirement. But once you have a scientific conception of society that has broken free of this constraint so that you can apply scientific nomenclature to your account then you recognise that society, while it doe snot have a personality, does have an identity. The identity of our superorganism is Jewish, therefore we are all Jews, if we are Hitler, we are still Jewish, no one can escape being Jewish in our society. If you have power then you are a priest, power of any kind, therefore someone like Hitler is not only Jewish, he is a supreme Jew, just as someone like Moses was. There is no difference between someone like Hitler or Jesus, or Mohammed, these individuals are the same functional forms in the superorganic physiology. Hence we find we have the same requirement forced upon by a true scientific model of society as we noted above concerning the need to be constantly aware of the nature of people with authority, we must adopt a monosyllabic terminology for describing the identity of people, all people are Jews, just as all people in authority are priests. Certainly this creates a degree of confusion for us when trying to understand society because we know for a fact that there are different kind of people living different kinds of lives and recognise them by their culture which we speak of in terms of their corporate identity, thus Jew, Christian and so on. Yes these identities exist, but they are not the identity of the superorganism, as organism, like a species can only have one identity, any other notion about identity is absurd, as we may see if we imagine having separate personal names for the different main structures of our body so that while we may be called Jack or Jill our legs might be Bob of Betty and our livers Tom or Tracy. Reversing this thought we can see that what the religious denominations we take to be defining individuality are really defining is not personal, but structural. So Jew, Christian, Moslem, Hindu, British, Welsh, Indian, and so on, all these names are describing structural elements of the superorganic physiology of the Jewish superorganism. The superorganism gets to tally with just one of the structural elements of its physiology, the master structure, the brain, the core, and that is what we call Jewish.

Form - Biology Later this year we get to vote on devolution, on whether or not we want a North West Regional Assembly. This not about any meaningful change beyond the internal structure of society. A new name will be turned from fantasy into reality, but the name will not represent a new being, something distinct from the Westminster government we have today. What is this all about, why now? Westminster government is being relegated to a secondary status in the transfer of power to a continental authority, the European constitution being agreed just last week, and we will get to take part in the second referendum of my life time to seek a mandate to give up the sovereign power of the British state that belongs, in the final analysis, to the people, not the statesmen that rule us. This principle can be found in the works of medieval thinkers reviewed by Gierke where much of the effort engaged in by the lawyer-philosopher-theologians of the middle ages concerned finding a means of delivering authority to a centralised figure while still making that figure's authority a grant from another ultimate source. The solution to this conundrum that we see being played out by the lawyers that rule society today in the guise of politicians, is that the people, at some singular point in time accept the authority of the king, parliament, or whatever. This is a one off grant of authority, such as we see delivered by a referendum, there is no going back and the authority thus empowered is made autocratic by this action. However, it follows from this system of social organization that the power granted to the central authority does not belong to it, so while it may use it in anyway it sees fit, it cannot give it away. And it is this principle of sovereignty as a grant of the people that is being acknowledged by Tony Blair when he says he will submit the European constitution to a vote of the population of the day in order to secure a mandate for the shift of power from Britain to Europe creating a new centre of authority. And so, coming back to our original question, why a regional assembly, and why now, we can see that what is touted as a decentralising process delivering autonomy to the regions is anything but. This is a macrocosmic development intended to facilitate government from a more distanced centralised authority based on the continent. Such a continental authority must find it easier to deal with a series of enlarged regional entities denominated by a none personal anonym such as 'North West Region', rather a plethora of highly personal localised names such as Cheshire, Lancashire, and Cumbria. Although of course, these personal names for districts will themselves of been artificial constructs once upon a time, imposed by some priestly authority calling upon the art of law for its inspiration just as the priests continue to do today. This is the two edged sword of priestcraft, you want to fix the biomass which you are in charge of upon some artificial identity, be it national, local or religious, or even racial, not so popular today of course since Hitler gave it a bad name, but when the time comes to expand your authority the problem is how to move on beyond the bigotry that was formerly a supreme act of reverence. Given this dynamic it is hardly surprising that politicians, lawyers and theologians are the supreme liars, charlatans, tricksters and thieves, of all humanity. How bizarre that the ultimate low life should be the lords of society; flotsam floats. But that is the way it is because we are not humans, as distinct from animals, we are animals and nature determines everything we do. The change from familial identity structures to bland structural entities is a visceral organic growth process adjusting the body to the changes taking place in the territorial occupation which defines the organism. The shift from nation states to

continental confederations is directed by the coming of a unified global authority under one legal authority. This is the creation of one God, one superorganism. New connective threads are required to deliver these changes enabling the new command structures to deliver their commands to the tissues they are in charge of. The process is biological, not social, directed by nature, not human beings. In a book about identity Political Identity, the author, W. J. M. Mackenzie, has a chapter called Powerful Abstractions : Nation, race, religion, class in which he begins his discussion of religion thus 'The case of religion is not biological but cultural and semantic.' page 137. We cannot accept this, and so once again we find ourselves homogenising language by invalidating distinctions we all take for granted, at this rate we are going to have no language left and we will be reduced to humming at one another in order to communicate our ideas, this cannot be right. But this result is appropriate if we assume that language is the information medium creating superorganic form, as we decode the connection between the language we use and the form it gave rise to we should indeed find that as we decode the meaning of the word the structure is vaporised in so far as the meaning of the word is vaporised. However what is real, and what is not vaporised simply by denying the meaning of a word is the material representation the words has resulted in that is the social fabric I have called the exoskeleton. Just because we call politicians priests do not mean there are no longer politicians, just because we call Christians Jews does not mean there are no longer Christians, and just because we call cultural forms biological does not mean those cultural forms cease to exist. What all this decodification does mean is that we change our understanding of what these things are. Social structures are physical entities and they act as such in relation to the organism that created them so that a social terrain exists which is a physical terrain in which the organisms which acted as its creator are made to act in a highly structured predetermined manner in the same way that water makes the watercourses that water is then obliged to flow through. John Prescott is a senior politician in the present government whose name is associated with the push for regional government, it is one of his babies and has been for a long time, we are told. So we might say that regional government is a political project sought by a dynamic, fat, nasty, brutal, ignorant, forward thinking individual, contradicting my assertion that it is a biological process driven by organic evolution like any other organic process. We must appreciate that we are trying to apply science to humanity and this means thinking on a deep timescale that reduces personal involvement in any events, whatever they may be, to a blur. 'In the modern labor movement, within the limits of the national organizations, we see decentralizing as well as centralizing tendencies at work. The idea of decentralization makes continuous progress, together with a revolt against the supreme authority of the central executive. But it would be a serious error to imagine that such centrifugal movements are the outcome of the democratic tendencies of the masses, or that these are ripe for independence. Their causation is really of an opposite character. The decentralization is the work of a compact minority of leaders who, when forced to subordinate themselves in the central executive of the party as a whole, prefer to withdraw to their own local spheres of action (minor state, province, or commune). A group of leaders which finds itself in a minority has no love for strong national centralization. Being unable to rule the whole country, it prefers to rule at home, considering it better to reign in hell than

serve in heaven. Vollmar, for example, who in his own land possesses so great an influence that he has been called the uncrowned king of Bavaria, cannot consent to play second fiddle in the German national organization. He would rather be first in Munich than second in Berlin!' (Political Parties : a Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, by Robert Michels, Collier Books, 1962. Page 198. First published 1911) Michels is not lending himself directly to my account of human social forces, but this work is a natural source of ideas for me to draw on given the centrality of a caste organ of authority in the conception of the human organism as a superorganic being. Here we have a curious switchback affair of an idea where Michels recognises that the masses form a body and the elite form a body but ends up by making individual motives the central force in this whole discussion. Individual motives exist, whether we use Vollmar or Prescott to give substance to our claim to be aware of them, but they are of no consequence whatever because in society there will always be a range of views ready and waiting to accommodate a new force seeking to assert centralised authority over society. We are use to thinking of the Spanish conquistadors as having overthrown an empire with a few men assumed by the amazed inhabitants of the Inca empire to be gods. In fact the truth is rather more prosaic, the Incas terrorised their satellite cultures as all leading cultures exploit a group of underlings, and with the arrival of a potential new ally local tribes were ready and waiting to oblige the Spaniards desire to dethrone the Incas. No doubt, Isaac, would say the existence of the tribes allied against the Incas were a proof of preadaptation being a real thing, as these people were adapted to the arrival of a foreign power who had all sorts of new technology preadapted to the primitive tribes people who would welcome it. The same applies in Iraq today, the Americans invade Iraq to remove the man they use to support, Saddam Hussein, and they are spoilt for choice when looking for people to become puppet rulers willing to impose European democratic ideas on an society where democracy is inherently alien, because the Jewish slave implant of Islam is infused into the identity of the biomass occupying this territory that was codged up by British imperialists less than one hundred years ago. Thus it is completely irrelevant who supports what, just as it is completely irrelevant which particular portion of a swollen river happens to sweep little Johnny of the bank and end up in his lungs when they sweep him out two day later. Prescott came into politics via the union route which is why he ended up in the Labour movement and so there is some especial relevance in the short passage fro Michels because we can see how Prescott will of formed his personal opinions according to some notion of drawing power away from central government to empower the ordinary person, it just so happens that the course of time has resulted in the idea he has advocated for decades coming into its own, but for reason not in the least bit associated with any reasons he either gives today or would of thought of decades ago, but rather for reasons to do with the physiology of the superorganism. I have been talking of the exoskeleton of the superorganism and speaking of it as being biological, there is some difficulty here in that we end up, if we follow this route, speaking of a train, say, as an organic entity, which it is, but only in the sense in which a coral reed or a snails shell or a termite mound is an organic entity made via the agency of a life force. Speaking of a machine in the same manner as a living

animal does clash with our sense of reality and we do not want to create a sense of the absurd. The sense we have of things, however, we must be aware, can force upon us absurd ideas when we discover the truth, the fact that the earth is spinning at 22,000 miles an hour is about as absurd a thought as it is possible to have, but it is a true thought. Accepting that social infrastructures and all that we call artificial is part of the exoskeleton of the superorganism presents us with a whole new conception of reality and perhaps there is a better way of describing it then to reduce it to a common term to that which we apply to living tissue. To this end, and acknowledging the inorganic nature of exoskeletal material we can think of the exoskeleton as a physical environment rather a physiological form, we may continue to think of the exoskeleton as a physiological form when we concerned with the interaction taking place between the human biomass and the exoskeleton within which it exists. This is like thinking of a snails shell as a piece of inanimate matter when empty of its living cargo but otherwise regarding the whole as the animal, and thus organic, when occupied by a living snail, and this does conform to our natural way of understanding these tricky questions. This idea is what leads me to make the comment above concerning the idea of social structure as a physical environment. I particularly have in mind things like the infrastructure which causes human behaviour to act as it does, so that the coming of ocean going ships leads to the discovery of new lands and then their occupation by Europeans, and the coming of the industrial age leads to the invention of materials and means of production that lead to aviation and now people fly all around the world at the drop of a hat. The elements of the social terrain, ships, planes, and so on, are the valleys cut into the social environment along which the biomass flows irresistibly causing the physical territories within which these social structures are overlain to be watered by the superorganism which gives rise to these social forms. But within the social environment the dynamics of the living tissue is organic, so that it is not meaningful to speak of religion as being cultural and semantic as distinct from the racial which is biological. As I have often stated already the nature of these things is identical, hence the reason Mackenzie ends up discussing them in one block, the point to be clear about is that language is as biological as anything ever could be and so, therefore, is its product, and since the identity product we call religion is not substantial in itself it is purely biological, it is simply the identity infused into the organism. Interestingly the first person to pay much attention to the social study of society from a scientific view, Auguste Comte, did so by invoking the idea of Social Physics. However a quick perusal of his work reveals a poor conception of the idea which we find culminating in my insight that society is a physical being. He has the right intuitive ideas but he is enmeshed in the mind set of his day and he cannot help but think in terms of politics and ideals. Thus he says: 'The ancients used to suppose Order and Progress to be irreconcilable: but both are indispensable conditions in a state of modern civilization; and their combination is at once the grand difficulty and the main resource of every genuine political system. No real order can be established, and still less can it last, if it is not fully compatible with progress: and no great progress can be accomplished if it does not tend to the consolidation of order. Any conception which is so devoted to one of these needs as to prejudice the other, is sure of rejection, sooner or later, as mistaking the nature of the political

problem. Therefore, in positive social science, the chief feature must be the union of these two conditions, which will be two aspects, constant and inseparable, of the same principle. Throughout the whole range of science, thus far, we have seen that the conditions of combination and of progress are originally identical: and I trust we shall see, after looking into social science in the same way, that ideas of Order and Progress are in Social Physics, as rigorously inseparable as the ideas of Organization and Life in Biology; from whence indeed they are, in a scientific view, evidently derived.' (The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, translated by Harriet Martineau, Published by Calvin Blanchard, 1856. Page 401) Yes, and so with a true conception of society we do indeed learn that the living organism can be envisaged in terms of political order and progress and this is seen to be united in the Zionist philosophy of unity under one God, which is brought about by an endless series of wars of extension into none Judaic territories, or Judaic territories requiring reorganization, followed by periods of consolidation of identity and structure. Comte does not appear to grasp just how detached a social scientist must become from their subject in order to grasp reality, he seems to be advocating a political plan, and yet in the section preceding this comment his criticism of thinkers n the subject hitherto consists of a rebuke for their sole concern with practical matters, I cannot see, from a quick look, quite how Comte thinks he is getting us away from this parochial view of life. A social environment is a real physical environment that has its own physics. The fabrication of social structures weathers this environment and moulds it, resulting in a social terrain in which the organisms that we call individuals live. Consequently the individual is constrained by the physical terrain of society to act in a given way, thus a social environment is deterministic of individual will, meaning there is no such thing as absolute freewill in a social setting. So the evolution of automobiles, and the establishment of a society given over to the car, where roads run everywhere, where town shops close and superstores open in the outskirts of population centres, and public transport becomes rationalised, all develops a human social environment that is in no sense whatever amenable to individual choice. We have to have a car, or we are liable to be seriously hampered in our ability to access the social environment that evolution has created for us to live in. And yet, bizarrely, as we all know, the ownership of cars is the pinnacle of choice! How can that be? Because when we make this observation we are assuming the existence of the infrastructure that makes the car a necessity and so we do not factor this aspect of the question of individual choice into the idea that we gain in our ability to make choices by having the freedom a car gives us. It is clear that the evolution of the car has a natural life cycle and the dynamic of choice alters through time, emphasised when motoring was new, minimised as motoring becomes ubiquitous. This is the kind of model Comte should of been anticipating, and to my mind if you are going to speak of social physics then I would of thought this is where you would get to. I will have to find time to take a further look at his work, I bought the book because of what Coker said about his ideas on the social organism so there must be something there to draw on for our investigation of the intellectual deposit pertaining to the idea of Super Being. I have been speaking of the social structure as organic, not subject to physics, but biology. But the fact is that this exoskeleton has the qualities of none living matter and as such physics is a fair medium through which

to understand its form and evolution. we should not let the scientists compartmentalization of areas of reality to obscure the fact that all facets of existence are interwoven seamlessly and our habit of conceptual organization is a behavioural imposition upon reality. We can see from this that the universe might naturally shift through cycles of inorganic, organic and back to organic without any meaningful break such as we seek to impose when we make the firm distinction between life and one life. It is no wonder we have such a hard time defining life when it may well be a figment of our box-like imagination. And we must also bear in mind that all of these distinction are handed down to us from theists who thrive on this kind of manipulation of society though linguistic delineation. A piece of Comte has caught my eye so we might as well have a rock from his quarry. It is best that I tell you what Positive Philosophy is before we go any further. Comte should of called his philosophy The Philosophy of Scientific Method, for that is exactly what it is. And I must say that is exactly what I have striven to create myself, although by way of practicing the scientific method within the area of interest which I find so compelling, because this is where there is no knowledge available of a scientific kind, or rather there is a gaping hole that no one seems to notice. Comte gets his denomination 'positive' from the fact that science is derived from independent attributes of reality, as opposed to the antiquated methods of religion which relies upon products of pure fancy, that happen to be self serving, for its notions of reality. Thus religious ideas are negative, while scientific ideas are positive, in the same sense that a person who says they will check the brakes on the car, but they know they are safe, is negative, compared to person who says they have checked the brakes on the car and they know they are safe. Will goes with but, have goes with and. But denotes a discontinuous link in the sequence of actions relevant to a described event, and is as such presumptuous. And indicates a fixed link between actions relevant to a described event, and as such and is positively affirmative. The one offers a weak link, the other a firm link, and hence one is negative, the other is positive. We can see from this idea that the basic character of scientific knowledge, so reviled by the theist, is that science embodies a causal connection between action and ideas, and therefore science develops ideas which may be characterised as deterministic, although of course ideas determine nothing of themselves, which is precisely why the theists ideas are negative in respect to the real world they presume to describe, because they are without causal connections linking a serious of actions leading to an articulated event, beyond those of their own making that they love to speak of endlessly. Influence of Biology upon the Positive Spirit Looking now to the higher functions of this science [Biology]  its influence upon the positive spirit, as well as method  we have only to try it by the test proposed before;  its power of destroying theological conceptions in two ways:  by the rational prevision of phenomena, and by the voluntary modification of them which it enables Man to exercise. As the phenomena of any science become more complex, the first power decreases, and the other increases, so that the one or the other is always present to show, unquestionably, that the events of the world are not ruled by supernatural will, but by natural laws. Biological science eminently answers to this test. While its complexity allows little prevision, at present, in regard to its phenomena, it supplies us with a full equivalent, in regard to theological conceptions, in the

testimony afforded by the analysis of the conditions of action of living bodies. The natural opposition of this species of investigation to every kind of theological and metaphysical conception is particularly remarkable in the case of intellectual and affective phenomena  the positivism of which is very recent, and which, with the social phenomena that are derived from them, are the last battle-ground, in the popular view, between the positive philosophy and the ancient. In virtue of their complexity, these phenomena are precisely those which require the most determinate and extensive concurrence of various conditions, exterior and interior; so that the positive study of them is eminently fitted to expose the futility of the abstract explanations derived from the theological or metaphysical philosophy. Hence, we easily understand the marked aversion which this study is privileged to arouse among different sects of theologians and metaphysicians. As the labors of anatomists and physiologists disclose the intimate dependence of moral phenomena on the organism and its environment, there is something very striking in the vain efforts of followers of the old philosophies to harmonize with these facts the illusory play of supernatural influences or psychological entities. Thus has the development of biological science put the positive philosophy in possession of the very stronghold of the ancient philosophy. The same effect becomes even more striking in the other direction, from biological phenomena being, beyond all others, susceptible of modification from human intervention. We have a large power of affecting both the organism and its environment, from the very considerable number of the conditions which concur in their existence: and our voluntary power of disturbing phenomena, of suspending, and even destroying them, is so striking as to compel us to reject all idea of a theological or metaphysical direction. As in the other case, of which indeed it is a mere extension, this effect is most particularly marked in regard to moral phenomena, properly so called, which are more susceptible of modification than any others. The most obstinate psychologist could not well persist in maintaining the sovereign independence of his intellectual entities, if he would consider that the mere standing on his head for a moment would put a complete stop to the course of his own speculations. Much as we may wish that, in addition to these evidences, we had that of an extensive power of scientific prevision in biology, such a power is not needed for the conclusions of popular good sense. This prevision is not always baffled: and its success in a few marked cases is sufficient to satisfy the general mind that the phenomena of living bodies are subject, like all others, to invariable natural laws, which we are prevented from interpreting in all cases only by their extreme complexity. But, moreover, positive biology has a special conquest of its own over the theological and metaphysical systems, by which it has converted an ancient dogma into a new principle. In chemistry the same thing occurred when the primitive notion of absolute creation and destruction was converted into the precise conception of perpetual decomposition and recomposition. In Astronomy, the same thing occurred when the hypothesis of final causes and providential rule gave place to the view of the solar system as the necessary and spontaneous result of the mutual action of the principal masses which compose it. Biology, in its close connection with astronomy, has completed this demonstration. Attacking, in its own way, the elementary dogma of final causes, it has gradually transformed it into the fundamental principle of the

conditions of existence, which it is the particular aptitude of biology to develop and systemize. It is a great error in anatomists and physiologistsan error fatal to both science and theology endeavor to unite the two views. to Science compels us to conclude that there is no organ without a function, and no function without an organ. Under the old theological influences, students are apt to fall into a state of anti-scientific admiration when they find the conditions and the fulfilment coincidewhen, having observed a function, anatomical analysis discloses a statical position in the organism which allows the fulfilment of the function. This irrational and barren admiration is hurtful to science, by habituating us to suppose that all organic acts are effected as perfectly as we can imagine, thus repressing the expansion of our biological speculations, and inducing us to admire complexities which are evidently injurious: and it is in direct opposition to religious aims, as it assigns human wisdom as the rule and even the limit of the divine, which, if such a parallel is to be established, must often appear to be the inferior of the two. Though we can not imagine radically new organisms, we can, as I showed in my suggestion about scientific fictions, conceive of organizations which should differ distinctly from any that are known to us, and which should be incontestably superior to them in certain determinate respects. The philosophical principle of the conditions of existence is in fact simply the direct conception of the necessary harmony of the statical and the dynamical analyses of the subject proposed. This principle is eminently adapted to the science of biology, which is continually engaged in establishing a harmony between the means and the end; and nowhere else, therefore, is seen in such perfection, that double analysis, statical and dynamical, which is found everywhere. (Page 330 - 32) Where to Begin It has often been a question whether, in studying each organ and function in the whole scale, it is best to begin at the one end or the other;to begin with Man or the simplest known organism. I do not consider this question so all-important as it is often supposed, as all qualified inquiries admit the necessity of using the two methods alternately, whichever is taken first: but I think that a distinction should be made between the study of the organic and that of the animal life. The functions of the first being chemical, it is less necessary to begin with Man; and I think there may be a scientific advantage in studying the vegetable organism first, in which that kind of functions is the more pure and more marked, and therefore the more easily and completely studied: but every investigation, anatomical or physiological, relating to animal life, must be obscure if it began elsewhere than with Man, who is the only being in which such an order of phenomena is immediately intelligible. It is evidently the obvious state of Man, more and more degraded, and not the indecisive state of the sponge, more and more improved, that we should pursue, through the animal series, when we are analyzing any of the constituent characters of animality. If we seem to be by this procedure deserting the ordinary course of passing from the most general and simple subject to the most particular and complex, it is only to conform the better to

the philosophical principle which prescribes that very course, and which leads us from the most known subjects to the least known. In all cases but this, the usual course is the fittest, in biological studies. Here we conclude our review of biological science as a whole. The extent to which I have carried out the survey will allow us to consider its separate portions very briefly. In doing so, I shall follow the order just laid down, passing from the simple considerations of pure anatomy to that positive study of phenomena of the intellect and the affections, as the highest part of human nature, which will carry us over from biology to Social Physics, the final object of this work. (Page 334) This is actually an amazing piece of writing, perhaps the best fragment of writing I have ever seen. According to the translator Comte's work appeared in eight volumes, each eight hundred pages long, she (I assume the name is feminine) has reduced it to one volume of the same bulk. The reason being that Comte had never set out to write a book, but rather the material for his work had accumulated over many years of giving lectures and as a result there was much repetition, and this on top of a rather pedantic style of expression employed by Comte in an attempt to be fully understood in a field that was not equipped with a ready made linguistic vocabulary of its own, unlike that of the ancient way of knowing he refers to here. Theological vocabulary is infused into society so perniciously that it delivers the mind we are all programmed to obey by virtue of 'our' very own thoughts, the formulaic power of this vocabulary being so great that, since Comte's day, it has managed to dissolve the fruit of scientific method in an acid vocabulary that is so corrosive of true knowledge, producing a theological jelly that passes for science today. Actually produced between 1830 and 1842 the original volumes were a product of the critical period that constituted the birth of the scientific age. For Comte the application of scientific ideas to life, arising from the work of people like Bouffon, Linnaeus, and many others, would be as new and revelatory as the scientific ideas produced by the discovery of the double helix in the world of genetics is to me, as I was born in 1955, and have grown up in a world that only became aware of genetics as I passed from childhood into adulthood. What is so special about a time such as Comte lived in is that ideas are necessarily free flowing as people are finding their way. We are not talking here about the birth of an idea, such as genetics, but the birth of a subject, biology, in such a case ideas must first be released before the knowledge perverts can respond and dissolve their meaning to fit the ancient mould. This initial phase indicating a freedom of expression is encapsulated in these remarkable comments from Comte. Imagine anyone saying today that science was in any way, shape, or form, antagonistic to religion! Its inconceivable, we all 'know' that the harmony between science and religion is sublime, the Vatican has its museum dedicated to Galileo and astronomy. We 'know' that without the church science would not even exist, and we hear all the time that the notion of a war between science and religion is as antiquated as any idea could possibly be. Yet Comte speaks of the penetration of scientific method into the arena of life as 'the last battle-ground, in the popular view, between the positive philosophy and the ancient.'

Today, despite the power of religion being massively increased relative to a few decades ago, despite the new global religious war in the name of Zionism, under the guise of Islam, despite the occasional obscure books asking why, flying in the teeth of the incontrovertible fact of evolution, there is a ceaseless barrage of garbage from the theists about how unique humans are and how we cannot say what human nature is, all showing how nothing has changed since Comte's day in terms of the advance of science in the field of biology in relation to this last battle front, despite all this, we are being told that there is no conflict, there is no war, between science and religion. And this is true, the war is over. All this is the sure sign of an outright victory, where the victor gets to tell the tale. Meanwhile science is not so much long since dead and buried, it was aborted as a foetus; Darwinism being the prime abortifacient. And here, in Comte, we get to see the living thing during its gestation, as it was when still alive and healthy! Of course now it is nothing but a fossil buried under a pile of sterile intellectual detritus; still delightful to see though, if only we could still read science today instead of the endless garbage we have been obliged to trudge through in our exploration of the tragedy of science as we try and deliver something real, something that will destroy religion outright, exactly as Comte indicated must happen for science to exist. Comte, when discussing biology, says 'the positivism of which is very recent' because considering life in a scientific manner, a positive manner, is so new, and this fact can be seen emerging from these words that I have spoken of in terms that make them out to be the most extraordinary words in all the world. Here is being voiced the fact that just as open land gives way to occupied land in a manner that is absolute, so religion gives way to science in a manner that is absolute. As science advances, Comte is telling us, so religion must, of necessity, recede. As I always say, you cannot be a scientist unless you are an atheist actively seeking to eradicate religion from society, it is implicit that to Comte, as to me, this was self evident, and he lived in a world where he saw the reality of the process in action. Long ago he saw a bright future, I live in a miserable present. The trouble is that this evidence of the decay of ignorance led him to foresee a scientific age coming into being, where we know nothing could of been further from the truth as today we descend ever more precipitously into a dark age of religious ignorance where science is nothing but a ghostly figment of the priest's pervasive imagination. What is not recognised here, in Comte's work, is that science and technology are two different things, and we live in a technological world, that is the product of a scientific flourish, but most definitely not the realisation of a scientific world. The nineteenth century scientific dream lived on in the imagination of Comte's compatriot Jules Verne and our very own dreamer H. G. Wells, but that is all it was, a dream. Their technological innovations courtesy of the mind's eye, inspired by science, we all know all about, but the utopian ideas expressed in Men Like Gods, forget it! Men Like Robots, now if Wells had written that, he would of cracked it, that would of been prevision for y'u. Of course Brave New World by Huxley does give us this vision of the hell we live in, but it is only told as a story, as such it is made into a nightmare that effectively tells us that we do not live like this, yet, no scientist dare reveal the truth of this tale, that we do live like this now, we evolved to live like this, and we like it therefore. The creators of the Borg in Star Trek utilise the same priestly trick of taking a common idea, drawn from reality, and then turning it into a parody of reality, here making the Borg represent a superorganism in which all individuals answer to one mind mechanistically, in a very crude and simplistic way. All people who, in any sense, acknowledge a religious identity, are absolute robots, that is what the religious

programme is, a programme to run a biological machine composed of 'intelligent' units. Language is the machine code, theology the operating system; and science, just one piece of software. I say that no scientist dare speak the truth on this question, but sociologists do deal with the question raised here in a routine manner. It is a familiar point to acknowledge that individuals are bound up in an extremely oppressive system of constraints, but one to which they are adapted in the same way we are adapted to atmospheric pressure, so that we are amazed to discover that the weight of the air amounts to fourteen pounds per square inch of our skin's surface area. In the social context the idea is that while there are a rules of one form or another impinging upon us at all moments, we are so attuned to them that we simply do not notice them. This is completely correct, and the best description I have of this situation is to be found in Invitation to Sociology : A Humanistic Perspective, by Peter L. Berger, first published in 1963, where chapters four and five, Man in Society and Society in Man deal with this topic. But all this is merely descriptive, and as such it cannot be deemed scientific. To be scientific it would have to account for this state of affairs and tell us why it came about in the sense that Comte speaks of when he says that : 'Science compels us to conclude that there is no organ without a function, and no function without an organ.' And so sociology, to be a genuine science in its own right, would have to take on the mantel of biology that treats the organism in this manner, where any material observation is seen in purely functional terms. Why are we so attuned to social regulation? How did this come about, and what does it tell us about being human? In the end, having made the observation in a perfect manner, Berger simply dismisses it as of no importance, and then he even goes on to say readers will be wondering why he bothered to make the observation so carefully if he is only going to dismiss it as being of no relevance to anything. This is it, sociology is not science, there can be no better example of so called science being dictated to by religion, this even when the author is engaged in a work that makes him subject to the condemnation of being an atheist, something he virulently denies as he declares his deep affection and respect for knowledge perverts, for the work of religious people in other words. All science must pay homage to the theocracy, in the sense that all science comes from the establishment. Comte even tells us that there is a law concerning the advance of knowledge that can be derived from the relationship between the waning of theism and the waxing of real knowledge and used to determine whether or not a branch of enquiry is a real scientific subject. Biology conforms to this law, one wonders how sociology might fair today if subjected to this test, certainly I do not regard it as a science in any sense. If sociology complies with Comte's Law of Scientific Knowledge then the advance of sociology should have the effect of making religion recede from those areas sociology touches upon, and it should do it in two ways, by enabling an ever increasing degree of prevision, and by enabling an ever increasing degree of control over its subject material. Sociology fails the test miserably. Not only does it do absolutely nothing to confront religion, as we have seen when considering Berger, but furthermore, by pretending to make the challenge it performs the exact opposite function, it acts as a shield defending religion from deeper criticism or analysis. Sociology delivers no

more power of prevision than a worm might be supposed to possess regarding the destiny of its species. And it offers not the slightest shred of knowledge that a practicing professional could utilise, with a sense of absolute certainty, regarding outcomes pertaining to the management of any aspect of society covered by the discipline called sociology. The one get out clause the sociologist might seek to claim for themselves is denied them by Comte's law, for he says that one or the other avenue of demonstration of validity will be available no matter how complex the problem if the branch of science is a true and valid branch. A true and valid branch would act in accord with the scientific method, or the positive method as Comte would have it. Invariably what we see with sociologists, as with Berger, is that after doing a fine job of routing out facts, to give them possession of the material, they then make a play of rendering those facts in a consistent manner, as we saw Isaac do with the materials relating to physical anthropology, and then, at the last moment, they make a clean break from the positive connection between action and ideas and just dismiss the significance of all their hard work, to conclude that all is a mystery and we must look to the priest for our best ideas on the nature of existence. Thus we must conclude that while Comte could speak in the affirmative of biology, we must deny the subject of sociology a place in the pantheon of scientific subjects. Did sociology predict the Nazis, the world wars, the global society, the advance of Islam into the West, the re-establishment of Israel and the centrality of this country in world affairs which we can link to the conflict between cultures which has given us the new age of global terror, and a world dominated by one superpower? No, it told us nothing. Because sociology does not do this kind of thing, sociology chases the lamb's tail as it wags, and that is all it does, making excuses, not offering explanations and predictions. Because sociology is the product of priestcraft, not scientific method. Our delineation of human nature as corporate, with its ensuing consequences, does comply with the scientific method, does offer factual knowledge, and does allow a devastating degree of prevision which continues the link of the past we call history toward a future we can call hell. This work is riddled with the future as we elaborate upon the Jewish superorganism that we are, and how Judaism is linked with everything we do, and how this means that one day there will be the world as set out by the Jews so long ago, ruled by one God, their God; God and the superorganism being one and the same thing. Now why couldn't the sociologists do this! Of course it goes without saying that armed with this knowledge we could pass laws to eradicate all religion from society, and so save humanity from the ever increasing state of evil into which we are plummeting in obedience to the Jewish ideology. We must obey Nature's directive to grow and become one, to be a superorganism, but we do not have to do it in the guise of Zombies driven by a slave implant. We can take control, as Comte says we should be empowered to do when science is unleashed upon the world. What is most fascinating about this thought is that if science allows prevision and control then Judaism is the greatest science ever, since the idea of one world under one God is an ancient insight into the future, and amazingly the Jewish identity programme is delivering this result. So the priests who wrote it must of recognised the significance of the knowledge they were formulating because within the microcosm of their world at the birth of civilizations, they could see the dynamics played out in miniature before their eyes. This is truly impressive. But if men could do this several thousand years ago why can we not do the same thing today in line with our modern knowledge of the universe and the limits of the planet, to act as our guide as to how we should best manage our affairs according to the

parameters set by nature? The answer is that the same priesthood that wrote the programme that has delivered the result is in control, and they are determined to stay there, and this is why Judaism continues to thrive while science as an idea of existence is an abortion. Apart from the snippets of Comte I have selected and commented upon, which deliver a clear cut expression concerning the nature of the intellectual climate, I must confess I find making sense of much of what Comte is saying here nigh on impossible, and I wonder just what the original said; one cannot help but suspect that our translator has been a little too happy with the hammer and chisel, and too frugal with the fine polish and finish. But no matter, we can still glean a few fragments of great significance from this early exponent of science as the be all and end all knowledge. The last fraction, Where to Begin, I took because it contained a sentence that caught my attention 'It is evidently the obvious state of Man, more and more degraded, and not the indecisive state of the sponge, more and more improved, that we should pursue, through the animal series, when we are analyzing any of the constituent characters of animality.' This, plainly, evokes the idea of the evolution of life in a sense that suggests that all life on the planet is of a piece, exactly as we now know it is. So this idea must of been perfectly obvious to people at the time when Darwin was growing up, and realising this kind of thing is something we must seek to do as we try to understand the challenge the theocracy faced when it sent Darwin off to far distant lands to come back with a theory of evolution that conformed to theological principles of duality, by focusing on form, while paying no attention whatever to the nature of any particular life form. The challenge of science, with the last battle line drawn by the subject of biology, before which Judaism must stand and face extermination, or destroy its adversary, was out there. The new knowledge had to be perverted in the usual way, according to the usual dualistic formula, which splits information from the form it creates, thus reducing knowledge to the status of a piece of inert matter that could be manipulated freely by anyone who cared to have shot at it; like carving wood, except of course blocks of information in the form of knowledge are cut with words, not chisels. By focusing only on the physical bodies of species Darwin made the competition between these material entities and their physical location the sole matter of interest, and thus his theory took on the lopsided character we know it bears the hallmark of so much, to this day, where evolutionary progress is said to be driven purely by a model of chance accumulation of genetic increments of value, and where any kind of model that embodies the acquisition of potential that is then released is rejected out of hand, for this latter model would smack resoundingly of the 'unique' human character of intelligence, planning, and forethought. But we know perfectly well that all forms come into being in a point place and time frame, from which point they then disperse. We know this from our own creative actions where we see a new machine, the locomotive for example, coming into being and within a few years rail track is all over the place. This is latent potential operating between a physical form and an environment that, relative to that form, represents a void, a vacuum waiting to be filled. This latent potential is exactly what was embodied in the newly evolved terrestrial ape that had bipedal stance and the makings of a superorganic form able to generate exoskeleton, and thus to manage any environment, it just had to pour from

the woods and into the open, and it did. Thus we completely invert Darwin's ludicrous, simplistic, and utterly perverse interpretation of evolution, that earned him a slab of marble in Westminster Abbey; today our notion of Darwin as the enemy of religion is made a reason to wonder at just how this bloke got to be so honoured  oh dear me yes, isn't life strange and all and all, isn't life strange. But not half as strange as the farmers would have you believe. Leach ......... There was one piece of Leach's account that I did like, the Simple Simon Says gorilla instinct, which offers another line of evidence about how the early stages of ape to human evolution might of been driven. On this basis gorillas appear to be a mini-superorganism, or social form with the latent potential of superorganic form. This is exactly what we would expect to find in our nearest relatives for we know that the anthropoid line, of all mammals, has turned out to be the one with the basic form best suited to become superorganic. It is clear enough what the key factor in the physiological makeup is in this selective event, the possession of gripping hands. The reason we can be sure of this is that the one thing that makes a superorganism possible is the ability of the creature concerned to fabricate exoskeleton, in insects this task is performed by use of the mouthparts, in primates it was the hands that opened the way to this adaptation. For Isaac this would invoke the idea that apes were preadapted to form a superorganism because they had hands long before they ever started making exoskeleton. To reason like this is an offence against scientific reasoning. The mammalian form had the latent potential of a social environment implicit in its being so that some mammal had to evolve to fulfil this role, hands lent themselves to this and so they were a feature of latent potential awaiting expression, this is not preadaptation. Preadaptation implies forethought by some supreme being, even though Isaac only means to say it arises from a broken chain of causality, in order to make sure that there is no possibility of discerning a thread of causality which would reveal human nature and destroy belief in God, no establishment scientist wants to do anything to threaten religion. The fact that gorillas became terrestrial but represent a line developing evolution focused on individual physical prowess, leading to a massive ape adapted to the physical environment, as opposed to the social environment, indicates that early hominid qualities have been carried down through time, but expressed in relation to the alternative environmental modes, and we might note that no ape has evolved to fly, there are no ape bats, or ape equivalents of flying squirrels, and neither has any ape evolved into a marine creature. Meaning there is no incentive in the ape-hominid form to shift toward the water, this slot was taken over by a variety of other mammalian forms. Apes, other than humans, did evolve to become terrestrial, and social, this was the ape's forte, and this diversion from the rest of the mammalian lineage has to be traced back to the evolution of limbs offering a fore grip, where the original mammalian species were four legged affairs. So mammals went from quadruped-terrestrial to forelimbed-arboreal, and on to bipedal-terrestrial, and in the process a superorganic thread was spun from the wheel of mammalian physiology. And chimps, our nearest relatives, seem to represent a middle way between the gorilla and human mode of adaptation, where they have acquired some of the benefits of social adaptation, but remained adapted to the physical environment, and they live a life style that likewise bridges the two distinct zones of arboreal and terrestrial living. Hominids, made the break, left the trees behind, and took to the wide open spaces.

Part III Superorganic Reality First Phase, The Exoskeleton - An Idea Too Far It never rains, but it pours! Not something you can say of this summer, it pours all the time, but something you can say of the subject matter pertaining to this work. When I began this book a couple of months ago it was inspired by one simple thing, evidence, I had found hard evidence of the fact that I was not the first person to realise that human beings were animals, that they had evolved, and they were therefore a part of nature, but not in some Biblical sense, in an absolute sense. That evidence had come to light by pure chance when I found a piece in a book already on my shelf, about Gierke. This was a major breakthrough since the revelation that the lawmakers had been obliged, for many centuries, to think of society as an organism, was exactly what I did expect given the realisation that language is the information medium extending the programme that makes human form, from the individual, to the social domain, laws being the actual linguistic-genes, so to speak, directing the formation of corporate form at the social level. Then, miraculously, I drop on Ouspensky, also sat innocently upon another shelf. I already had Spencer, and suddenly I realised I had three distinct voices declaring, in no uncertain terms, that humans were an organic, as opposed to a self made species, in their entirety. More than three years ceaseless searching had preceded this purely chance discovery, and I was delighted. My idea was that if I could prove that it was not simply an aberration to think of human society as an organic phenomenon then this was proof of the potential validity of the notion, obviously, an analysis of the ideas formerly presented, why they disappeared so completely from view, and how they can be made the basis of a new age of enlightenment in science, is what this work has to be all about. I set to work But the revelations just keep pouring in. You will find a record in this work of the arrival of a book by Durkheim, from America, in which I found the most cursory reference to Coker as a source of thinkers on the subject of human superorganic being. Yesterday I sent that book back to the British library after having been treated to a fist full of authors who must of devoted their lives to their attempts to unravel the mystery of human society, just as I have done, and who found the new science of biology the key to their enlightenment, and thus they modelled society on the physiology of the organism. Now what? Last night, 29/06/04, being a bit shattered from waking too early for my usual routine, I was standing around at a loss as dusk fell, too knackered to even drag my sorry arse to the ale house, when the red spine of a book on a shelf by my desk, captured my attention. The Concept of Cultural Systems : A Key to Understanding Tribes and Nations, by Leslie A. White, Columbia University Press, 1975. I lifted it and opened it at a chapter all about the origination of the idea of society as an organism! I ask you! I could not believe it. More clues, more

revelations, and in this case a very nice addition to the story offering me information about when the idea peaked, something I had already more or less deduced from what I had found in Coker, and when the idea drifted from view. Added to which, since this author was instrumental, as a popular academic-priest, in burying the corpse of true human science, this book was bound to be a godsend in my efforts to exhume human science and breath life into the carcase once more by revealing the crime, and indicating the guilty party. Nice! We will be having some of that, I feel the lifting of a whole chapter coming on; all in good time. I guess this is how Raymond Dart felt when he realised he had found the earliest hominid fossils in some stuffy South African museum collection - if I am remembering my facts right there, or how Heinrich Schliemann felt when he dropped upon the hordes of bronze age gold he found buried in the soil of Ancient Greece. What I have been unearthing during my excavations this year have been so much more valuable than anything discovered by any archaeologist or palaeontologist, ever, which is why the academic institutions have devoted themselves so completely to the eradication of this evidence from view by heaping masses of detritus, like the sample from Isaac above, sloughed from the festering corpse of academia upon the real layer of intellectual gold which bubbled up from the cauldron of nineteenth century freethought. Oh too much passion do I hear you say? Really, and what dominates our world view of evolution today? Creationism, or such stuff as that from Leach, which is as different from the gist of creationism as six is different to the sum of two threes, no difference, Leechism, Creationism, six of one, half a dozen of the other, both constitute the ultimate obscenity and insult to humanity, one is from the house of science, the other is from the house of God, mirror images, not of Nature, but of each other. This is what dualism makes possible. The fabrication of an illusion reflects reality in the same way a mirror reflects a face. The reflection in the mirror is not another something real, real meaning substantial in accord with its appearance, and neither is mythology something real in accord with what it reflects. God is a reflection, an illusion, a key figure in a coded pantheon of linguistic creativity reflecting observed reality, but not something substantial in accord with what it is said to be; myth is not reality. We can experience God as something real, just as we can utilise reflections in a mirror as if they were a product of the direct line of sight. But we cannot kill the man by shooting the reflection, and we cannot know the world by knowing the reflection. However, the fact that we can experience mythology as real is the trick foisted upon us in the making of our kind, this is what makes us a perfect superorganic being, united into a body we do not even know the real nature of, that we can only see by way of a reflection in our mind's eye. The problem is resisting the illusion that is our mind, for we have no mind, we are part of a mind. Science, it seems, when it comes to knowing ourselves, is as much about fighting to be free from within, as much as it is about struggling to explore that which is without. Academics have performed this task of deposition upon the corpse of true insight unconsciously, in obedience to their identity programme written by the theocracy they serve. So, in making my fruitful diggings possible, their masters have been defeated by the academics own systems of research which have allowed me, in a somewhat haphazard manner, to unearth the evidence, and let reason reflect the golden light of truth once again. Although I must say that if it were not for the internet and my free access to a veritable sea of books through that most marvellous American internet bookstore Alibris, I would have nothing, or the next best thing to nothing, very little. See how I curse the Americas as a slave state of Judaism, and yet

it is the greatest source of freedom at one and the same time, which is because society is not a man made conspiracy in the grip of some malevolent gang of criminals, it is an organism which is formed about an organic principle which has woven into it identity structures which posses the individuals of which the biomass consists. Hence the systems which empower the prime identity through knowledge control are freely available to others, as long as you do not have a virtual, or actual police state, in which information is controlled by a fierce system of observation such as we might associate with the former Soviet block. The problem with Soviet control, a most bizarre, and tragic thing to our personal way of experiencing, is that it involved the setting into place of an extremely tight structure, in effect making, as far as possible, a concrete exoskeleton. This behaviour was a product of the shift from one structural mode of priesthood to another, the intensity of authoritarian pressure, as in the case of the French revolution which occurred, in the time frame of the corporate organism, just moments before that in Russia, a difference of a mere dozen decades or so, one heart beat, had to be intense to let the new priesthood take root. Nothing of any significance about the priesthood altered one iota, there was just a change of identity, like becoming black instead of being white. The core identity of the beast remained unchanged, the identity switch was necessary, in both cases, that of France and Russia, simply to introduce new superficial organic structures necessary to superorganic growth as nation states became ever more entwined and leading up to the stage we are just completing now with the passing of a European constitution. What the intensification of authority meant was that while the world within the resulting fortress was rigidly controlled, constricting the natural state of permeability between the independent organism, as it was perceived to be in the political speak of the theistic priests, and the outer world. The soviet priesthood ignorantly conceived itself to be, just as all states tend to do, an independent political entity. This blind ignorance of the elite comes about because the superorganic physiology is reliant upon the robotic actions of self obsessed individuals who are incapable of perceiving the reality that lies beyond their infinitesimally tiny world view  and an exaggerated degree of isolation is not commensurate with the nature of the human organism, permeability between superorganic structures is inevitable because they are of one species. The osmotic boundary between superorganic structures concerns, first and foremost, the transmission of information, nothing can go where information does not lead the way. The point being that other states, at best, represented other discrete organisms in a faunal population, but, given the Jewish nature of Communist Russia, in common with all other states in Europe, America and Australasia, the real state of detachment was not even this distinct. Russia's Jewish nature could not be, in any sense, erased by so fleeting and meaningless an event as the Russian revolution, not even something as vastly more dramatic as the two world wars, but still relatively miniscule in relation to the depth of corporate identity, could induce this result; not even if Hitler had won. It would take something far more profound than such major historical events as these, which really only represent healthy signs of growth, and I hope you are looking at that profound something right now, offering a means to a change of identity. Russia was not one organism in a faunal population of superorganisms, it was one structural unit in one superorganic organism, the Jewish superorganism, exactly as all states are that have any influence emanating from the Jewish identity implant. Knowledge advanced on the outside, beyond the Russian priesthood's direct control, and the alternative identity structures beyond the limits of the soviet bunker acted as a

constant threat to the renegade authority of the soviets. In the end the inevitable happened, the concrete crumbled, and now we just have regular blot on the landscape of inequality, corruption, and the free flow of information that a human organism must have to be healthy. So phases of exaggerated calcification can occur in a superorganic structure defined by identity parameters, an exaggeration of identity that causes internal structure to be temporarily overemphasised, relative to collateral organic identity structures, by the incumbent priesthood. Such deleterious behaviours are perfectly natural, being due to some constitutional imbalance developing in the bioflux of a the superorganism and affecting the living material substance within the exoskeleton, whose mass response results in slight adjustments in the fine detail of the identity constitution of the priesthood, providing a feedback loop between the body and its controlling organ, and creating, as a direct consequence, superficial changes in the appearance of the organism's social structure, thus a monarchy becomes a Communist regime. It follows, logically, from this description of superorganic dynamics, that a system of control which accommodates the smooth running of the feedback loop between the biomass and the guiding authority, while in no way changing the nature of the relationship between the core and its dependant biomass, must be the most appropriate organic system for a supermassive superorganism to evolve; and this is precisely what the democratic form of priestcraft represents, autocratic rule by consent of the people, as we might say, but perhaps should say, authoritarian rule guided by feedback from the people. To our ephemeral perception these life processes result in changes of the most major import, but this conception is merely the myopic vision of an ant-minded ape living in a big world. Jewish identity is not a fine detail, it is deeply infused into the fabric of the organism, and most individuals are entirely oblivious of the Jewish aspect of their identity, because it is imbued into the actual exoskeletal structure of the organism, so that when people take up offices within that exoskeleton they act as agents of Judaism, quite unbeknownst to themselves. In order to understand this we should recognise that as human individuals we too have a bilateral identity composition, an inner and an outer representation of ourselves. Our racial identity is part of our identity, both personal and corporate, and within our brains the same identity status can be noted, we hold within our brains a conception of identity which is both personal and corporate. In the superorganic organism the same bilateral composition applies and this is revealed in the inner social fabric of society, in its institutions, and in the outer form of the identity more closely associated with individual activities, such as the occupations, cultural behaviour and appearances of people. Jewish identity is so ancient that Judaism is associated with the deep structures of the organism predating the Christian fabric raised on top of the Jewish cultural heritage, and this is how to understand the point I am seeking to put across at this moment. How else do you imagine Judaism as an identity manages to survive as it does, and have the unique historical record that it does, and the unique place in life today, that it does? Human exoskeletal structure is not conducive to a reef, or even a termite like, rigidity of form. Yes, when we have Star Ship Enterprise like, city sized interstellar space ships, cruising the great void, we will have such a rigid exoskeletal structure, but that is a whole different ball game to what the Russians were trying to do not long ago, and what the North Koreans are seeking to do in a like style today. The North Koreans must fail, it is in the nature of the beast, it is simply a matter of time, and maybe a few dozen nuclear weapons strewn about the place, slaughtering a billion or two people here and there, which will get the historians in a tizwaz for a century or so. But the Jewish organism will scarcely bother to yawn and turn over in

its sedate transition toward global domination at such a piddling thing, as the fury is unleashed against it so its being will be fed, and grow stronger, and the world will be consumed by its dead weight of ignorance. But the mass of the beast will still leave room for a few of us to pick its brains, if only for amusements sake. Working with Smooth Undifferentiated Clay Deposits In the superorganic world it is not the fabric that counts, in the long run only identity counts for anything. Judaism is identity boiled down to its essence, or the closest thing to it that our human world has yet seen. That refinement of human essence, to this extreme degree, is made real by the production of a body of identity texts. These texts form, in relation to our sensually perceptive apparatus, a mirror which reflects an image of social reality. It is our sense of hearing, as a prime instrument of linguistic communication, that is concerned in this act of sensual perception. The ears are in effect the mind's eye when it comes to the delivery of information of identity by means of language, aided, as all senses aid one another, by our other senses too. But we now know, having discovered the true nature of human nature, and therefore the nature of racism, which utilises the medium of sight to deliver corporate identity, that language evolved as it did, into a symbolic form of communication, primarily in order to deliver identity by means of language, for symbolic language was the key to the evolution of true superorganic beings, whereby superorganisms based primarily upon visual cues could be united into complex organisms constituted about linguistically generated identity components. Which brings us round in a circle in this paragraph as we come back to the mythological texts that appeared soon after we opened our discussion of human essence condensed into a real artifact of human physiology. Evidently ears, their nature and form, have to be important in this process of identity transmission, it is just that their passive role makes them fall out of view when we look at these issues. And a further point we might make even as we emphasise the role of the ears in the delivery of the message infused into the texts, is that in devising texts, the way was opened for the eyes to play an increasing role in supporting the ears in this ever happening dynamic of evolving corporate form, and the need to deliver identity to all parts. To the likes of Isaac this would come as a revelation How could the eyes fulfil this role? They must of been preadapted for writing, wow! Poor sad man. The potential to write has existed since the universe came into being some fifteen billion years ago, just as the potential for a planet to form with oceans has always existed, it was just a matter of the form appearing out of the matrix. If it ain't in there it cannot come out. Nature cannot evolve a capacity to find things that cannot exist, and humans cannot become the instruments of creating that which cannot exist. Writing was therefore a niche opportunity latent within the social terrain created by the evolution of human corporate physiology, awaiting exploration by a human form incorporating the elaborate hierarchical structure which is necessary to deliver a true writing system. Just as the savannahs were a terrain of the earth awaiting exploration by a mammal capable of forming the necessary group of interdependent individuals with pooled identities linked by a physiology supporting close physical integration that could exploit the open expanse, naked skin, a deep sense of unity induced by the intimacy of naked bodies, shared warmth, moist skin increasing intimacy upon close contact, a divine stickiness  oops, revealing my

delight in perverse intimacies there, the touch of breasts, the kiss  and all that plonker Leach can think of is to imagine this came about because we were evolving toward becoming warm blooded fish! It is unusual to think of the ears in this sense, we are not really aware of their role in mental imagery in the same way we are in respect to our power to register light borne information. And considering this lack of awareness of our ears, they being just holes stuck in the side of our heads that are, in effect, behind our line of sight, is interesting because of course in all our discussions there is an ever present ambience of unwittingness pervading our thoughts as we try to comprehend how it can be that we, as individuals, quite simply do not exist, and that we are simply cells in a vast organism which does with us exactly what it needs to do, and that is all we do, what we are required to do. Ears, think ears, they are a sneaky device in this set up. Ears lend themselves to the ingress of uninvited information, we cannot close them as we can our eyes. Forever open, and they are not just focused upon that which is coming straight at us, they are like a radar with a receptive range that operates through all angles of the world surrounding us, perfect for purposes of inducing social integrity. And all the while, they are so there, so incapable of being turned off, that we are completely oblivious to their presence. So there that we do not, paradoxically, know they are there at all. In this respect, despite being a sense organ of immense importance, we are no more aware of our ears than we are of our stomach. Boy, in the context of this discussion concerning human nature, the great mystery, that is one hell of a thought, don't you think? And while we are tuned into this subject we might pause to throw music into the frame as a precursor to the evolution of highly abstract linguistic communication, since we can image that before full blown language evolved a mode of communicating uniform identity via the lugholes may of been an important facet of corporate identity deliverance; if you can do it via the stomach  fast-food  why not via the ears. If we think about the sort of noise that delights some people today, a mind numbing shrill pitch or deep bellow that opera unleashes upon us, or the brain stunning beat of black gospel demons, it is dead easy to see how small bands of incipient superorganic beings may of bolstered their social unity while transfixed about the camp fire, where the eyes would fall into second place in the hierarchy of senses of perception just as the ears pricked up and let the hypnotic message flood in. Maybe the use of fire really evolved as a social tool, and not as a means of keeping warm or of providing defence from wild animals, or even for cooking food. Perhaps it was the entrancing effect of a burning fire that acted as a device inducing corporate deliverance into unity. Just imagine the evolution of an animal that can use fire, this was not a human being, this was a precursor of our kind, it must of seemed a very strange and magical thing this fire, maybe these pre-humans first developed divine sensibilities from such contemplation, that later turned to the sun and the heavens in general when we blossomed. Fire, in this scenario, would of acted via sight, and having attracted an audience on the basis of trance, opened the way to the evolution of behaviour emitting harmonising vocals to act via the ears, like wolves howling, except in humans all would of sort to join the harmony to make one howl to unite equally, not a lone howl to establish hierarchy. And so the batons of corporate deliverance shift between the senses as the organism waddles its way into the future. How I love to sit and stare at a burning fire, wood in the garden, or camp site, coal in the grate, doesn't everyone like to stare into the flames and dream? And once fire was on the exoskeleton's menu of tricks, all sorts of additional openings would be

unlocked. Societal, think societal, exactly the opposite of these damned theistic knowledge pervert priests we keep having to resort to because they have robbed out, and perverted all the evidence. I am being a little fanciful, because I just want to introduce the ideas as they come to me, by doing this I remind myself of exactly what I criticised in Leach's pathetic account. The difference however is that my ideas are threaded about a core of reason which is scientific, whereas Leach's, ideas like those of all authorised scientific preachers, are centred about the idea of human individuality, so that each advance has to be justified on the basis of human will power and desire. This theistic dogma is as unscientific as it is possible to be. Nothing I say requires human intent, at any point, it all just happens naturally. We do not, for example, have cars because we want cars, there is no human intent involved in the use of the car, we have cars because the dictates of the priesthood determined, by their programme which forces them to compete for power, obliges us to have cars. Society is not ruled by consent (theistic word - personal), society is ruled by feedback (scientific word - functional). The difference between us is why I never have to say there is something we cannot know, and may never know, or have no idea about. In contrast to these priests, who, in dealing with science applied to people, never know anything of any final sort, while when their senior partners, in the acknowledged theocracy of the church, have anything to say about people they think they know absolutely everything with complete certainty. The linguistically constituted mirror must be fashioned by what we call an artificial means, but in a process that is of course purely biological, the word artificial merely meaning organic form that is part of the superorganism created by Nature via human agency. And thus Nature creates an image distorted by priestcraft to suit the need to farm the biomass effectively, which is the function that the priesthood evolved to carry out. The distortions infused into the linguistic image are dictated by the needs of the organism, thus the texts reflect the nature of the organism and act as the fluid-genetic medium generating and managing the organism's form. The Bible, as we Christian implantees know this body of fluid-genetic material, is, by implication, a refined essence of humanity, one that is long overdue further distillation, but is well beyond the ability of any still's capacity to refine usefully. In the pile of eight books I came away from the library with yesterday, 29/06/04, from which you have already been treated to one extensive piece of mythological priestcraft, I now want to delight you with another item, of exactly the same nature, being pure priestcraft, but of quite another kind. I splashed out seventy five pence on Christian Origins : Theology, Rhetoric and Community because I spotted a chapter entitled Gregory of Nyssa : the force of identity, by John Milbank. As I found myself weaving an account of modern civilisation's growth in terms of physiological dynamics, in which I have just drawn out an explication of the nature of Jewish identity in terms of this scientific examination of human society, where I conclude with a statement on the force of identity, a force which I am, of course, always aware is the representation of human nature in our world, and therefore the very being of God in the Jewish mythological texts, I took a scan at this piece by Milbank and thought you should have the opportunity to do the same within the body of this work. It is a little chewy, so make yourselves a cup of tea, sit down, take a sip, and read in a relaxed but focused manner. While the pasty verbiage is spotted with jargon which is more less meaningless to the uninitiated, do not let that distract your

attention, just get the gist of the thing, and then spit it out, take a further swig of warm comforting tea, and proceed to ingest more of the gooey 'substance'. This is where the antiquarian of knowledge has to develop a few practical gifts as they exert there intelligence to extract the information from a whole range of mental deposits. Sometimes you want to know how a smooth clay compares with another identical looking item from another locality, and so you suck it and see, the level of grit may reveal something. Religious treatise are, by their very nature, a kind of linguistic pap, somewhat like baby's squawking, it seems meaningless, it is definitely irritating, but you know that it means something to those making the noise, and you just have to check it out to see if you can work out just what the trouble is with the little mites. So it is with this sample, have fun, do not let its squeal get on your nerves, and like a baby's cry, there is something human, primitive, but human, in there to delight the adult being. GREGORY OF NYSSA The force of identity John Milbank My excuse, as a systematic theologian, for addressing some issues in historical theology, is threefold. In the first place I am concerned with the way in which much recent treatment by systematic theologians of the Cappadocian position on the Trinity accords ill with the best and especially the most recent scholarship on Gregory of Nyssa. The implication of this scholarship is that many of the contrasts between Gregory and Augustine on the matter of the Trinity have been overdrawn, even as regards the yoking together of trinitarian with psychological concerns, as I shall later explain. In the second place I am concerned with the relevance of Gregory to contemporary debates concerning the relation of the philosophical category of being on the one hand, to the theological category of gift on the other. Thirdly, and most specifically, I am interested in Gregory's strong advocacy of apatheia, both as ontological norm and as ethical goal, which contrasts sharply with a tendency in recent theology either to reject or to qualify apatheia in both respects, in the belief that it represents a hellenic contamination of the biblical inheritance. In the face of this assumption I shall suggest that in certain respects Gregory stresses apatheia even more strongly than his pagan predecessors and near-contemporaries, precisely because he thinks this is demanded by the deliverancies of revelation and by categories of gift rather than being. This emphasis in his thought may seem, on the face of it, to accord ill with those aspects of his teaching which modern Christians have found congenial, namely his validation (or at least apparent validation) of relationality, communication and growth, distinct personal existence, emotions of certain kinds, generation and embodiment: in other words all that we might take to characterize the life of persons in material space and temporal duration. We take it that the positive valuation of the latter will be bound to include also a validation of the worth of the passions, and in this view we are, indeed, at one with much of ancient philosophy, although it made the correlation for opposite, negative reasons, being somewhat suspicious of the passions along with time, embodiment and spatial relation. From the point of view of both ancient and modern philosophy, it might be

thought that Gregory is inconsistent in promoting a positive view of the latter three categories, and yet maintaining, even augmenting, apatheia.* However, I shall argue in this chapter that Gregory was not necessarily inconsistent, once one has grasped that instead of validating the passions he attempted the different task of redefining activity in such a fashion that it is no longer straightforwardly connected with notions of self-containment, self-sufficiency and autocracy normally taken to be the reverse of the passion-governed life. Instead, for Gregory, it is possible, at every ontological level, to be in the same instance both receptive and donating, without being in any sense subject to anything else that is not oneself, or in some way inhibits one's ideal reality. Here to receive is somehow already the movement of a counter-donation on the part of the will. I shall describe this conception, which will be further elaborated in due course, as active reception. For now one should note that if it redefines receptivity as action, it equally redefines action as receptivity. In my conclusion I shall suggest why the strategy of embracing active reception might be more radical and more defensible than the modern strategy of abandoning apatheia. But first of all I will outline this strategy of Gregory's under four headings: those of reputation, generation, growth and embodiment. One of the key sites for the tyranny of the passions, according to Gregory, is that of doxa, or worldly glory, honour, credit or reputation. As with many of his pagan predecessors, a suspicion of worldly honour goes along with an apparent retreat from the social and political as such. This sphere encourages us to believe in the realities of obscurity of birth or illustrious birth, or glory or splendour, or ancient renown, or present elevation, or power over others as Gregory puts it, whereas such things have no real hold in Being. They are all rather a matter of human fictional imputation, and in Against Eunomius Gregory takes a fairly cynical view of human government: it being the case, he argues, that all humans are fundamentally equal as created, no human rule over other humans will ever be tolerated for long, and political history is bound to be a story of rise and fall. In this sphere, prestige is a matter of reputation and reputation is always bloated, never adequately warranted. Thus Gregory shares the late antique tendency somewhat to devalue the political as a sphere of self-realization, in favour of the inner soul, as being more self-sufficient, less prey to the delusions or vagaries of repute and the degradations of time which tears from one every possession, whether of material goods or civic honour. He also augments this shift in so far as he advocates, at least for many, a withdrawal from the institution of marriage. The latter is viewed as peculiarly subject to the dominance of the passions, but not especially, and in fact, hardly at all, the sexual passion; much more as tied to the attempt to extend one's worldly glory beyond the present generation, to ensure that sons will preserve one's name along with their inherited possessions. Also with a well-nigh inescapable melancholia: to embrace one's wife is always to embrace the one you know you will eventually have to mourn, or else will have to mourn you: therefore it is already an embrace of suffering, and a lure which engulfs the present in a perpetual reminiscence (Gregory of Nyssa would not have liked Shadowlands). Marriage contains no remedy for these things within itself, although it can be used for the good, says Gregory, by those with sufficient gifts. For the weaker, however (presumably including himself), virginity is the safer course. Gregory's critique of marriage shows that he not only distrusts present civic glory, he also wishes to escape from all traces of human reputation left by time. Hence in On the Christian Mode of Life he exhorts us not to follow fashion, or seek truth in inherited opinions, but to turn inwards for the contemplation of abiding truth. This sounds like a thoroughly Cartesian rejection of all inheritance and mere

reception. However, Gregory builds his entire theology not round a defence of the inner citadel against the buffetings of illusory glory, but rather round a different, and more abiding doxa, which includes a more positive view of processes of historical transmission and public visibility. As to the first, one can mention the prologue to On the Making of Man, where Gregory wonders whether he should just praise his brother Basil's uncompleted Hexamaeron and not tarnish his reputation by producing an inferior conclusion, concerning man, since he regards himself as a far lesser thinker. However, he justifies his enterprise by arguing that he will more reveal Basil's greatness if he shows that this can engender an equally great work in his disciple. In other words Basil's identity is no longer complete and bound up in his own works, and equally a praise of Basil is no longer just something conferred on him extrinsically, manifesting nothing new of his essential being. On the contrary, Basil's identity resides in the spirit of his writing, in a certain force which can communicate itself, and in praising Basil, Gregory is not just passively recording his greatness, but demonstrating it by actively appropriating it, so revealing its fecundity. As to the second aspect of doxa, public visibility, one can mention Gregory's discussion of whether one should reveal one's good deeds in On the Christian Mode of Life. Here, following the words of Jesus about not displaying one's piety, Gregory insists that good deeds performed for reputation will cease to be good deeds because they are being traded for a perishable, worldly good. However, he also has to confront texts about letting your light shine before men, which suggests that an entirely invisible good could scarcely be a good at all, since it would do no good, and certainly could not encourage in the good. Gregory resolves this aporia of virtue and visibility by requiring that we should give glory to God alone: that is to say, let shine in our deeds, God's deeds, since all good deeds are given from God. Whereas for the world, virtuous deeds result in praise, for Gregory virtuous deeds are only, in themselves, the praise of another, attribution to God as their source, which is at the same time an offering of the deeds back to God as a return of gratitude. Inversely, in giving us the grace to become virtuous God is glorifying us, that is to say praising us not for our virtue, but that we can be virtuous. Virtue for Gregory is a power, dynamis, and a power that we must will, and yet this power, including our will, entirely begins before us as the Power of God. And though we receive it, we can only receive it actively (else it would not be our virtue) to the limit of our participating capacity. Against Eunomius and his view that the Father's glory is essentially incommunicable Gregory calls attention to the fact that even human creatures, never mind the Son of God, can be glorified by the Father, without finite limit (that means for us, endlessly) with his glory, which is to say his active potential or dynamis. The trinitarian context will offer a yet more radical twist; not only does God's dynamic praise of us precede and permit our virtue, this is even the case (though in an altered sense of precede which involves no temporal priority nor hierarchical supremacy) for the divine Logos who is fully and essentially God himself, since the Son is the glory and the dynamis, besides being the wisdom of the Father. And this means that the Father's own virtue consists in offering a previously unmerited praise to another, just as he essentially persists also in receiving back this praise. We are now in a position to contrast Gregory's views of worldly and divine doxa. The former is empty, and here praise has a secret priority over what is praised. One would expect a contrast to this to be made in terms of an indication of stable identity, of what really belongs to things and to human beings. In other words, a rejection of the rhetorical world of persuasion in favour of the dialectical realm or vision of abiding realities. Yet Gregory scorns dialectic as much as rhetoric: reality,

as the infinite being of God, cannot be grasped under a category, nor can created realities be so grasped either, for they mirror this incomprehensibility and are in a state of constant flux. How, then, can one identify Gregory's discourse, which one notes is marked by the piling up of persuasive arguments after the fashion of the second sophistic, and by the celebration of less ornate but thereby all the more sublime figures of speech which he takes to characterize biblical writing? I suggest as a kind of doxologic, in which persuasion and encomium is not directed towards the possession of glory by oneself or another, but rather to the constant transmission of glory which is all the more one's own in so far as another person can receive it and repeat its force. As with human glory, surprisingly, so also in the case of divine doxa, praise has priority over what is praised, yet this is no longer secret, but out in the open and with a different intent  not to hoard praise but to exchange it, such that praise is never simply of oneself or of another. Supremely, we know in praising God, in offering him glory which is his own, and not in seeing God, nor in manipulating men. This 'doxologic' is followed by Gregory in The Life of Moses, where he defines virtue as perfection, as the infinitely active, unlimited, entirely dispassionate life. As such, it cannot be contained, and therefore, unlike Plato and Aristotle, Gregory offers no logos of virtue. Nor can he offer his own life, nor could anyone, as an example of virtue, since virtue as infinite cannot be attained. All Gregory can do is exhort to virtue, and praise a virtue which is never present, but which nonetheless arrives through praise, since it is an offering of praise. For this reason Gregory can claim that though we do not know and cannot exemplify virtue, we can still have a part (mesos) in it, if we proceed from activity to activity, for activity only remains active if it does not seek to lay hold inwardly upon its activity but continuously receives more activity from the divine source. In this context a certain reception from the narrated memory of other human beings also is possible: one may praise Moses and offer him as a kind of example, since he was the sublime man who pointed absolutely beyond himself to God, and to the God-Man. In imitating Moses, therefore, we are imitating a man who is paradoxically imitating  that is to say following behind the back of  a man who is yet to come: Christ, just as for us also the full body of Christ is yet to be realized, and we follow in its wake. Nonetheless Moses plays for us a slightly more positive role: his finished life is itself a mesos, a part, which has connotations of both role and inheritance (the double sense in English of a 'lot') just as Gregory insists that Moses played a part in the politeia, a political life, but a polis now more in time than space. Moses is a more appropriate example than a present contemporary saint, since his life is over and therefore we are less tempted simply to copy it but see that it is to be taken further, extended differently and yet sustained as the same. In other texts Gregory suggests that properly speaking there is only one human being transmitted from person to person; it follows that epectasis applies transgenerationally as well as internally, and Gregory does not exhort us to leave behind the Chaldeans and Egyptians in the sense of leave behind history, but in the sense of leave behind our passions, which they allegorically stand for, and pass, not from place and body to spirit, but in every place and every body from passivity to activity. My second heading is that of generation. I have already mentioned how Gregory treats an exchange of glory within the Trinity. The Son is the Father's doxa; without the Son the Father is without doxa and the glory of both is the Holy Spirit. Here the Spirit is the bond of glory in exactly the way he is bond of love for Augustine. This giving of glory within God is dealt with by the Bible in terms of metaphors of generation, Father to Son. One of the main questions at issue with

Eunomius was how this generation was possible without passion. Eunomius claimed that all generation necessarily involved passion, and therefore that the Son was subordinate to the Father, who is in himself utterly uninvolved in any such transitive activity. To this, Gregory responds that even in the case of human generation, children do not have a different or a lesser human essence than their parents. Even though human generation is passionate, it already gives the lie to Eunomius' assumption that cause and effect will diverge essentially, or that a beginning is a kind of pre-containing foundation. (So much for the idea that all the Greek Fathers laid great store on the Father as arche, prior to relationality.) Furthermore, the passionate aspect of human generation is only an aspect of the post-fall emergency economy; humans were originally intended to self-propagate in a purely active mode. Such propagation was restored in the case of the Virgin birth, in which Mary's integrity was not cancelled but rather re-affirmed by her receiving of the Logos, when her body was entirely transparent to her active willed assent. This assent involved a speaking of a word from her mind which Gregory presents as a further example of non-passive generation even amongst human beings: it is not that the word receives something from the mind, rather that it is the activity outgoing from the mental source. Therefore to defend generation without passivity in God, Gregory makes appeal to certain instances of causality within time to show that such a possibility exists even when generation involves movement and alteration. And, as Michel Barnes has shown, he is involved here in defending a certain account of the diversity of kinds of causality. Gregory accuses Eunomius of assimilating all causality to the model of a voluntary, artisanal imposition of form on matter. In so far as Eunomius speaks of dynamis, he thinks of it not as a power that is automatically self-communicating, but rather like the power of an emperor which can be exercised or not at will. No action or energeia for Eunomius belongs essentially to a nature but arises only for the occasion of producing a particular work (ergon) and is precisely adapted to just this one work and no other; whereas Gregory points out that many causes produce diverse effects in different receptacles, thus rain always moistens, but quickens myriads of diverse seeds, fire always heats, but heat hardens some things, melts others. For Eunomius the Son is an ergon caused by an act of energeia of the Father precisely adapted to this one work (whereas for Gregory the same causal dynamis of the Father both generates the Son and creates the cosmos with all its diversity of effects), but the act of the Father is not in itself the Father, who as strictly the ungenerate does not of his essence enter even into causation. Here it is worth noting that while Gregory attacks, on apophatic grounds, Eunomius' identifying of God with an essence for which we can give a word  ungenerate  there is another sense in which Eunomius' God is more ineffable than Gregory's in so far as it is totally non-participable. Gregory defends not just God as incomprehensible ousia, but also God as incomprehensible dynamis  as inherently giving and effecting (and affecting). According to Gregory, to grasp divine causality, one must employ analogically examples of all modes of created causality. The artisanal model applies somewhat to creation, but here it must be supplemented by, and in the case of trinitarian generation abandoned for, other causal models. Physical generation is one, the generation of mental power in the incorporeal word is another, yet equally crucial is the much more materialist instance of material efflux, or the self-propagation of a material power. Here the supreme example is fire  fire, like mind, is in ceaseless motion, inherently contagious  it exists to effect, and it cannot but heat. Again and again Gregory says that the Father is like this. Barnes has shown how Gregory is here drawing on a key motif within Platonism itself. From the Hippocratic tradition, Plato took over the

notion of a power physics according to which the cosmos is composed of fundamental self-propagating elemental qualities usually arranged in pairs of opposites. Unlike the materialist philosophers, the more human scientists, the doctors, refused to treat the combination of those elements as merely epiphenomenal in relation to their corporeal components. This, however, suggested that the philosophy of material elements could not provide an adequate ontology, and that what arrives later cannot be explained as an aggregate of the earlier, but only in teleological terms as an arrival from a transcendent source. Hence in Phaedo (an important source for Gregory) Plato says that the number 2 is not to be explained as 1 plus 1, but as a participation in the form of Twoness. However, the spiritual forms themselves are conceived on the model of power physics. Just as fire heats, so justice makes just and so forth. Despite the continued dominance of the artisanal model in Plato's account of the relation of ideal to matter  that is, ideas inform a substratum  the transposed power physics gives an idea of participation which the Neoplatonists can later develop into the notion of emanation. Hence Gregory's insistence on dynamis represents a very Platonic moment in his thought. And the notion certainly lent itself to thoughts of threeness  for Plato in the Sophist there is a dynamis to affect and a dynamis to be affected. The combination of the two is a third reality. However, in that dialogue Plato supposed that real being must be outside affecting and being affected, including being known, and if to the contrary it appears that being can somehow be known then true being must after all embrace both the unchanging and the changing. Without truly solving the problem of the self-dissolution in Platonism which this suggests, the Neoplatonists insisted that what is truly and absolutely One does, nonetheless, communicate itself, just as the sun must pour forth its rays. Yet Gregory, of course, takes one step further: the source is now in no sense beyond its rays, and there is no way to return to the source by abandoning the rays as merely a mirrored reflection. The Father, Son and Spirit are one equal dynamic display of glory. While at times Gregory treats the