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    Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic Jeremy Adelman PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 2 + Iatoduetion ‘These ate some of the might-have-beens that need to be understood as part of a more general appraisal. Inthe end, this book shies away from Clegant theories premised on simplifying assumptions that gloss over hhow and why agents made the choices they did, If nothing else, the com- parisons invoked here should illustrate the effects of strategic decisions bby people who had to make judgment calls in a historic juncture in which the foundations of power were under threat at home and abroad. The Choices and the eonificts they produced yielded to histosies that none intended and few envisioned, Yet, in making history by groping through 4 labyrinth of forked paths they created the opportunity for their heirs fo imagine anew the prospects for personal and political sovereignty. 1 Empires That Bleed Ina lever to the ruler of the Portuguese empire, Dom Joao V, Overseas Councillor Alexandre de Gusmio, likened monarchies to bodies whose lifeblood was tade. Writing in 1748, he observed that losing trade was the “same as what happens to human bodies when blood is drained, Speaking fcankly, tis is where Portugal is heading, for while we struggle to extract money she is heading for poverty and, asa consequence, hee Ruin.” Gusmio, a powerful minister and architect of imperial policy inthe middie of che eighteenth century, echoed a longstanding belie in early modern European statecaft: private wealth and public welfare were inextricably tied to commercial power! “The concern about the wealth of the empire and che health of the monarchy also obsessed insiders in Madrid. José del Camyillo y Cosio, minister of state, navy, war, and the Indies to Flipe V, penned similar diag noses and prescriptions that influenced later generations of imperial thinkers and policymakers, tapping into idioms of the body to drive a spot At Hoteles Spe psiloc lected Ceara argued. Her defenses were decrepit, her education was antiquated, and her administration amounted to lethargic enforcement of obsolete reg lavions. Bue above all, Spanish commerce had become the preserve of hhandfal of entrenched monopolies that stifled trade and business Campillo’s Nuevo sistema de gobierno econémsico para la América (1743) called for reconstituting the monarchy not as the agglomeration of dis: persed provinces bound by systems of privilege, but as the center of vast dominions teeming with competitive traders: an ideal empice. Nuevo slstema also drew the pavalel between monarchies and bodies sustained by the circulation of commodities owing throughout the dominions and so ano de 1748 por Alas de Gouna’ in ikotess Neconl de 3 (hereafer BNL, Coledo Pombalina fret CP, ‘nde Gua ne nie Chri, Alexandre de Ga ‘aloe L the body et 14 © Chaptet One converging on the hear: Spain, “Commerce” he wrote, “is what maintains the body olive like the cicculation of blood in the natural hody.™* Ir likening monarchies to bodies was nothing new in discourses of European statecrat, what was becoming clearer in the eighteenth century was how important the circulation of commodities was in defining power polis The apotheosis of mercantilst empires and the heightened atention to the tes between teade and monarchies, blood and bodies, coincided with the apogee of European dynastic rivaleies. Especially once the politcal geography of dynastic boundaries of western Europe took shape after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, competitors looked overseas—and especially tothe Americas—in the quest for markets, materials, and military superi ‘ovity. For Iberian powers, the frst claimants to extensive colonies in the Americas, expansion had always brought rivalries in cow. Bur after 1648, the Dutch, French, and increasingly the English fixed their atention on tains in the New World ta sete scores in the Old World, $0 it was not jnst that Therians were losing trade, and therefore blood. They were los fg ieto ther svals. Gusmao and Campillo were therefore vexed by a his: toric riddle: how could Portugal and Spain, mature empires, catch up with theie rivals whose hody polis were more youthful, ital, and encrgeic?* Perceptions of backwardness and vulnerable sovereignty framed the policies with which imperial rulers and magnates governed their domains ‘The concern to reverse the trend raised a set of thorny issues ahout the proper balance besween public good and private interest. In general, Enlightenmene thinkers promoted the idea that private interests were not js the cornerstones of public good, but enjoyed an autonomous status Tf monarchies needed trade, they had to accepe their dependence on members of the civitas that did the srading. Thus, the health of the regimes was tied explicitly to the privileges of private trading fortunes, ‘Wise monarchs encouraged private interests a8 a way of promoting public welfare, This has become a common way to understand the origins of sniodern political economy and of the Ealightenment’s bequest to think ing about wealth and public affairs. ‘el Campillo y oso, Nuvo sistoma de gobierno econimico para la Anica 14, Circa Universi delon Andes 1971)p. 7. The work eased pend wah fa ein, ul ae th author death "A fneovesew ofthe tenons cested by impr seat Peggy Li, Alani Empire The Ket ‘Tae and Revolton 171-1426 (Balke [ato Hope Uaieacy Pres 1983), Ser alo the fist ball of To alpen Dong, Reforma ‘Aslan doe per Io, ‘Anas Editor 1985, On the lai wag cnc dco pl espa ‘sy modern rope see David MeNal the Rie of Cal ‘Rett Becerra of California Pr 1988) ep ha. 2. ye Fr Enpires That Bleed © 15 Bur the view that there was an essential primacy to the private world ‘of property and personal interests a8 « condition of the commonwealth ‘wat more troublesome when it came to Europe's less dynamic flanks, Iberian rulers and their ministerial cicles did not shy away from the “underlying notion thar public and private spheres were autonomous. But ‘autonomy was nor che same as independence. Rather, they insisted on ‘mutual dependence of private interests and publie welfare because unfet ered personal drives too easly cascaded into private vice and corup- tion, Some public check was necessary to curb the excesses of private avarice. Good rulers had to create a centralized, more elfectve state prevent private rights from backsliding into pessonal privileges, and then ‘obstacles go socal betterment. Merchants and monarchs shared the same fate—and the prosperity of one gave anew lease on life to the other. The art of statecraft implied creating calibrated, countervailing sources of authority 10 halance—indeed, to integrate more vireuously—private and public domains while respecting the autonomy of exch? If one hears echoes of Montesquieu’ doctrine that abuses of power oF privilege required checks and balances, this chapter explores bow, in the Iberian context, the concern for a new equipoise was heightened because imbalances had weakened the monarchies and lft them prey to Europe's rising dynasties. Foe Iberians, therefore, the political economy of statecrafe reflected much more than a European skill. Rather, the fates ofpivate and public fortunes were coiled in Atlantic imperial structures. Empire was the means to realize a strong monarchy and aa opulent merchant class because merchant capitalism made its fortunes through imperial ventures and empires rested on politcal foundations thas presumed that kings were nat- ural conveyors of godliness andl affluence to the rst of the world.” Irena, Wans If the Iberian Atlantic shared norms and institutions, it was nonetheless ‘turbulent sea of politcal and commercial rivalry, Warfare simultane ‘ously intagrated and featared the lgal frameworks of sovereigaty for all “Jos tina age, ihe Ceniy Spi Pal Ean: Epemoogy and Dating” Eighteenth Cnr Though 1 (203) 295-314 “ILM. Elbe, Se eee and clei Exly South Cetuy Spain” Past 2 Obj of Fran Pay in the In D.C. Coleman, ey Reso of Merce (ono 16 © Chapter One ‘empires, Imperial wacfare became it seemed to many, a permanent state of affairs for Spain and Portugal. Faropean rivals struggled and skit- ‘ished increasingly for commercial supremacy and carried their compe- ticion far from the seas of central power In effect, imperial contestants displaced theie conflicts over borders and alances in the Old World, how thar the legal cartogvaphies were more or lest recognized by the ‘Treaties of Minster and Westphalia (1648) and Utrecht (1713), co ights ‘over borderlands in the New World. These treaties may have acknowl ‘edged the sovereignty of the signatories and fastened some of che borders beeween states in Europe. But they also provided che interstate frame work foc ramped-up competition berween them while displacing it ove Seas, creating the European architecture not for peace but for state sggrandizement and jostling for commercial supremacy through imperial ‘warfare. Thos while national sovereignsies began to take shape in Euro alter 1648, imperial sovereignties became more contested than ever. “Beyond the Line" as one English saying went, “might makes right"* his intensified European rivalry involved no just any kind of state. These were imperial states strugwling for ascendancy not just within Europe but across the Atantic world.” Afterall, whae sparked the War ‘of the Spanish Succession was Madrid's giving the asinto slave-trading fomtract ro @ French firm. Ten days later, fearing a French lock on the ‘commercial networks binding Europe, Africa, and the Iberian Indies, England and Holland declared wae against France and, ipso facto, Span, Porcugal, allied with England, thus gor swept into the confit. French forces took aim at Portuguese outposts, After attacking Principe, Sa0 ‘Tomé, Benguela, and othet Portuguese outposts in Aftica, Preach troops innvaded and sacked Rio de Janeito, hoping ta claim a vital comer of the Adlantic slave trade and open a French lifeline co the silver lodes in the interior of South America, Rebellions erupted in Bahia, Sao Paulo, and Pemnambuco as colonists exploited the occasion to drive out intrusive Portuguese colonial officers. Brazil appeared to be breaking apart as its ‘metropole got sucked into a war between sivas, Writing Lisbon, AntGnio Rodrigues da Costa noted that Brazilian riches were no guarantee that "Sane Scand Baars Hein, Sth, Trade and Wr Spain ond Arica the Mating of Early Modo Europe aioe Joss Hapins Unversity Pre 200). hg Cn, "Zone a, Zo of Vices Te Legal Geography oe Bis Ali {GE 1772" Willan and Mary Quarterly rd er, 0.3 O03) pp ASA Sac haw hen slight ecco agua ropa ne “per wee, oF, od aud aban cnr tad ated ae they bmped Sp again eachother 1 tecnme mons Alam arping beret Alan etapa oe lcd eer ‘a varie a ste fost. Chal Til, Coercion, Capa and Erapon Sse, |. Empires That Bleed «17 Brazilian subjects would stay loyal o Portugal—or indeed any European ‘master at al. Such were the peripheral implications of European impe- tial civalry® “The Treaty of Utrecht helped settle some of the boundaries between European powers, but it did litle ro put an end to Atlantic warfare. IF anything, the relationship hetween interimperial warfare and trans atlantic commerce got more entwined as the slave trade became a luera tiveand large-scale venture binding Aftica, the Americas, and Europe into fan increasingly explosive, violent, and profitable knot, As part of the “peace” of Usrecht, the asiento contract was granted tothe English South Sea Company, chartered in 1711, just in time to take advantage of the post-Utrecht Settlement. Now English merchants could ship slaves and, ‘more impoztant, English manufactures rucked into holds below decks to Spanish colonies, Portugal was also fought over but collapsed more ‘unambiguously into the British trading orbit after the 1703 trade and defense teary between Lisbon and London. No wonder the French were 0 eager to stake claim before the selement and worked so hard to undermine English and Portuguese claims in the New World. So, while Spain and Portugal clung to thee formal colonies, they themselves became informal branches for merchant capitalist in northern Europe? To make matters worse, Lisbon and Madrid tried to displace their dependency on and losses to other Furopean powers hy taking aim at each other. The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) was supposed to inscribe legal foundations of the exely modern imperial structures and define the borders of ce Iberian onisns. Instead guaranteed constant conflict around the River Plate borderlands. According to he treaty all lands up toa line 270 leagues west of the Azore Islands fell within the Poreguese realm, and beyond that all claims were Spanish, This neat arrangement created 2 mess, however, when the imperial border sliced through the meandering rivers ofthe Platine drainage basin, Coldnia da Sacramento, small Portuguese tochold on the east hank, gave foreigners a perch on the Spanish riches descending by mule train from the great mines of PPotos in the Andes en route tothe port of Buenos Aites. This was a geo- sraphic recipe for conseant fighting chat afflicted both sides, Alexandre "Seo and Sten, Slo Trade nd Warp. 120-21 and 131-4; Ferman A. No ace, 1979), ps 15-2 Vig Naya Pino, © owo Bras « 0 comdro Ange Pornaade St Paco: Compas Ears Nasional 1979) pp. 11, 249-8 Gentry Wales Spani Politics ud Inperil Thad, 1700-1789 (looming: lads Univers rs 1979) 9p. 206-10, HE Fhe, The Pregl Trade A Sty of Argo Commer bandon: Methaes, 971), pp. 32-40. 18 © Chaprer One de Gusm for one fle that Portuguese recovery in Europe should begin with peace with Spain. Rathee than fight over distant possessions, drain ing blood from the imperial bodies, pace woold allow the rivals to stand up to their more dangerous competitors, France and Briain. In 1750, he sponsored the drafting ofthe Teeaty of Madi (sce fi. 1). This was sup posed to separate the overlapping powers in the River Plate and clarify the borderlines separating the two Iberian empires s0 they could coex in peace and concentrate their energies on promoting trade between the metropoles and their possessions. But suspicions die hard. The ink had barely dried on the weaty when Schastio Joxé de Carvalho © Meo, later the Marquis of Pombyl, advised his stepbrother in Brazil co be onthe Yook tut for the Spanish colonies belonging to a “gente de guerra e servile”! Carvalho’ worries were prophetic. Peace between the Iberians was fatile because they each tied to overcome their dependency on England or France by trying to take advantage of the others weakness. Spanish and Portuguese forces repeatedly violated the treay’s boundary provi sions. The Seven Years War shattered the bref “peace” and was the climax ‘of Therian ignominy. Enalish naval forees, with imposing artillery and out ‘numbering the defenders, overwhelmed Spanish colonial defenses. Two of Spain’ naval bastions, Manila and Havana el 0 Betsh forces. When the viceroy of New Spain heard the news ofthe fll of Havana, he braced the \wealthiest of Europe’ colonies fora British assault Inthe end, France buck led before Spain and sued for “peace,” sparing Mexico the fate of a posi ble British invasion, Portugal also cook a beatin, in spite of her alliance with the victor Britain, In 1762, Spanish rroope crossed into Postugal aad began marching onto Lisbon, before stalling and then withdrawing, The real fighting, as usual, took place in the colonies, where the two empires ubbed shoulders. In the River Plate borderlands, Spanish forces and their Indian allies used the oceasion to drive Brazilians from the east bank." Addantic treaties did not resolve the frictions of militarized imperialism. The Treaty of Pars (1763) was supposed to calm the waters, But relations TNL, CR Ce 26, 32-36, Cara to Mendon, July 61752. The bu ‘aces owen the Rie las desig fo Balan nds ina Spnsh etry. The araguay River satin Matto Gran he Patan dese uch of Minas eras the wate of he Unsgay took om Seta Catarina aad Rio Grande do Sal Alte bor {eed eto eopiey ad thn led the agi River le Fr dean the ea, tes Coteto, Acct de Guam, 25 pp. SOTA. “Thnpave inci Unemrin Toerer AHL), Conseio Ukeanarno (heer (U), Ohne 235,42, Apel 1, 176, Kennet Mexwell, Croce and Conpraces rt ond Prog 1750-1a08 (Cane Cambie Uses ra 1973), 3 radon let on he Bch ite Se Fed Aoderon, ibe of War The Seon Yrs Wor and th ate of Empire Brae Nos Ae reaty of Madi (1750 20 © Chapter One between Lisbon and Madrid remained strained. Infact, it was the blood letting in the River late that prompted the government to relocate the capital of Brazil from Salvador to Rio de Janeiro in 1763 to help secure the Portuguese borders. In a ifr tat, Spain created a whole new viceroy alty of the River Plate, with a capital in Buenos Aires, in 1776. Iberian: suspended their differences long enough to sign the 1777 Treaty of San Tidefonso chat—once again—was supposed to clarify che boundariet between the two empires, especially inthe borderlands ofthe River Plate, when Coldnia was finally ceded to Spanish hands. As a gesture of tht new entente the new viceroy in Buenos Aires wrote to Rio de Janeiro cel: tdrating the new “peace,” and suggesting that each power tur its defense to rounding up “delinquents, thieves and assassins.” Peace would also allow them to go after the even worse scourge, comtrabandistas, and apply thet nls co "a method of delivering to each other fugitive slaves." Stil, comity did not dispel competition. As long a Lisbon and Madric fought with each other while losing ground to their northern Europear rivals, the job of enforcing restrictions against intetlopors fell ro the ‘understaffed, ill-equipped, and corruption-rdden civilian administrators in the colonies. Applying restrictions and upholding metropolitan prvi leges in the New World therefore became a hopeless task, Reluctantly and fifully, metropolitan authorities and many agents of peninsular mer ‘chants in the colonies gave up on the old system of “fleets” and fairs and lee individual licensed vessels trafic among imperial pots of call ‘One sign of the difficulties Iberian states had in enforcing the laves was the sprosd of simaugling. Always x leat in the vofonesy bbecame a bonanza for all sides (except for royal treasurers, who walled about delinguents depriving the common seal of is revenues) as the cighteenth century wore on. The old nexus of the fleet system, the Panamanian isthmus, swarmed with smugglers and plunderers. who launched raids and traffic along the north coast of South America, and used the Pacific side to penetrate the ports of Guayaquil and Callao Indeed, even in times of peace, in Riohacha, Santa Macta and the gateway port to the Magdalena River, Cartagena, illegal trade was an importa: ‘of mercantile rents and a significant means for colonists to mee: their rudimentary needs. The lagest commercial suice in South America ®AHU, CU, Cana 123, do. $1, December 20, 1773 ohn Loc, Spans Colo Adnavistation, 1782-1810 nde. Aloe, 1958) op. 34-39; Kemet Maxwe Pom, aro of th Enighennore (Cambridge: Cmte Uwe Pes, 1°95, ffm R. Faber, Commercial Relation between Spain and Spanish America i the Era of fires Tade, 174-1796 Lverpol Center for Lt Asean Stes, 1985p. 13-1 Walls Spanish Poti and ral Trade, pp 210-22 Empires That Bleed * 21 was the River Plate, the crucial back entrance tothe Andes. Practically from the time the Spanish began mining Poros! silver on a large scale, foreign merchants learned to ply the trails up from Buenos Aires through ‘Tucumén to Potost (which Was why che Spanish government fought relentlessly for control ofthe east bank of the River Pate). Indeed, by the cighteenth century, the denizens of Buenos Aires were only to willing to join the venture ss intermediaries between silver supply for Enrone and colonial demand for the European manufactures." Contraband in the Spanish colonies had spillover effects on Portugal's trade, whose regula tors had difficulties of their ov keeping traders in line. Even runaway slaves based in the hinterlands of Mato Grosso's quilombos made a swift business handling illegal traffic between the Brazilian littoral and the Andes—carrying contraband inland in return for silver destined for the ‘coast. One 1785 report 19 Martinho de Mello e Castro, the minister in ‘charge of th colonies, denounced che “multiplied damages, contraband, and violations across the continent, ports and coasts of Brauil... with iereparable harm to the lict and legal trade" ‘As the problems mounted with each wag the jereminds about decline and decay got more of a hearing. Monarchs and ministers soon discoy cred, however that they were dealing with an ageless paradox it would have been easier to emend the empires if the rescurces had been more abundant and margins for error more generous. Bu had it been easier to ™ucivo General dels Nec Haga (bein AONE, Coli. Conabandon, VI, 4 3855408 on contend in Panam 748; Lance Re Geshy "hn ela Diem Senin in Nes Grads, 1713-1768? in Jon RP An | Kath, 3d Astieny McPoiu, ck, ef dt frac fires Bese Gnd and Port Hato Rove: Lowa Sexe Univriy res, 19M py 123-46, em, Th Pola im) of Samet: Reponl Informal Eco ny Bobo cde, COs Wenviw Pre, 1997), pp. 33-106. For Barns Ae _ Mowtakien, Contabandoyeourl enol glo XVIL Buonos Aire El Adan ye eta ‘3p poramo (Boe Aire CEAL, 1940, oo CarcrDaguero Gone, Ch ya Pp. 486-21 ter JS, "Un sal de oo y plata qu eran card Espada 2 France Police mercantile yl convo cou Pana nl poe de Clos cmon y Sada 2 (1989: 219-7, Paloma Fendnes Pe, sexi fa de rtp: Redes de penton Ico mercantile om Cd, 1700-1812 (aid Sho NAHU, CU, Cidice 311, . 22-23, Jumacy 5, 1785; Luiza Rios Rice Volpat, 4 Matto Grow: Resiteneia Nei em Stade fori oJ Jon Ree fl Erste Gorey ree, po oe Fa Hrs Gir Gouermnent se Trac! with Special Reference 0 the Admaisraion of the Mangus of Lavra, Very 176-1779 (eke, Uninet of Calera Pes 1968, reform, there would have been less incentive. The greater the incent tnd impulse there was to change, the more imperial rulers had 10 con tend with monumental constraints. Awarouies oP Revonss It is tempting fo conclude chat the structural imbalance berween the incentives and constrains to change locked empires into fates they could not escape, Indeed, the history of empires has heen dominated by jut such master nacratives of the cycles of rise and inevitable decline. One of the great works of hisrory—Edward Gibhon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire—was published just as American colonists revolted agsinst London; political evens thereby gave it propetic echo. Readers in Spain and Portugal and their colonies did not have to stetch their imaginations too hard to recognize themselves in Gibhon’s words about Constantine's capital: “the decline of Rome was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness. Prosperity ripened the principles of Adecays the causes of destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest tind as soon as time or accident had removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded tothe pressure of is own we its ruin is simple and obvious; and instead of inquiring weby the Roman ‘empire was destroyed, we should rather be suepesed chat it had subssted $0 long.” Gibbon’s work comiributed to what was by then a gathering Connett abuut whee it was pumible to coubine empire with good jovernment at all. ‘But despairing did not lead automatically to doomsaying. Abbé Raynal, Edmund Burke, and quite a numberof Ibesian thinkers devoted. {enormous attention to showing that empite and good government were ‘not necesarily incompatible, but that sordid habits—in the terms of the dlay,“corruption”—couldl turn a virtuous arrangement into a venal one. “The prince’ tal imperial theorists claimed, was to extrpate the source of corruption. The peoblem with empires was that possession of prop- erty was so prone to becoming the owners personal passion because the ‘opportunity t0 amass was so great. Accordingly the very foundations of virtue, possession, and trade could degenerate into oligarchies of wealth "on the sities of etna clo, ee Manes Olin, Thy Ris and Decline of Nations New Haves ae Usiesy Brey 1982 ison, Dulin and Pall of te Remar Ppp. 435-36; ca he bistigraphy of spa, hathony Papen, Peoples and Eps Shor History of Earepaon Migration Exploration od Consus ftom Croce to be PrsoeNew York: Random Hee, 2001), Empices That Bleed + 23 and power if not watched carefully. The awareness of these intertwined dilemmas compelled the figures of the Therian Enlightenment to try harder to show that Madrid and Lisbon could be great cities ruling grand empires!" “The debacle of the Seven Years War was an eye-openee could Iberian rulers cope with the costs of a militarized fessing neutrality in the superpower conflicts while displacing the bur ddens of their weaknesses by taking on their immediate neighbor. The Portuguese minister to London, Martinho de Mello e Casto, informed his government in 1764 that Portugal was caught in a spiral. He warned that Spain wonld try to recover some pride afte the humiliation of the Seven Years War by dwelling on false grievances with Portugal. And behind Spanish complaints were French ambitions, All this only chrew the Pormaguese back into an unwanted defensive alliance with Britain." Im Spain especially, che humiliation of war inereased the volume of reformist discourses, especially once Carls Ill acceded to the throne in 1759. The spasm of bread riots in Madrid in 1766 only intensified the sense that reform was more than urgent; it was a condicion of survival” The reforms were the offspring ofa particular brand of thinking about cme, While maintaining some affinities with the philosophy of his tory ofthe Enlightenment, eighteenth-century political economists were concerned withthe proper balance between the state and civil society, the ‘capacities of domestic agriculture and foreign trade as cornerstones of tgreamess and wealth.” Spanish and Portuguese writers were distinctive Tuainly in the degree to which they placed empire of the center of their diagnoses and prescriptions for national revival, First, while domestic ‘agriculeare was clearly anemic, attacking its malefactors got reformers imo hot water because it meant assaulting feudal vestiges. This was all No longer sce By pro- 5.6.4. Pocock, “Gions Deine and Fall aod the Wold View ofthe Late alge? ni Yr Comme dH (maps Can Urey "BNL, CP, Cine 61, 213, August 2, 1764 cocrespow aso. See also £238, tar 2, 1764 ABU, CU, Cie 867, 1 Inu part o Magee de Lava Api 1, 1768 Sinan Si, ier, Trade ad Wir pp. 246-84 Sly | Sei an ata ‘of tapi Span an! Nw Spin bn the Age of Chae Ht, 17591789 {alone Joes Hope Unisys 2003, pp 4-115, Allan J. Kut, “The Bal Refs of Cha inh Vicoply of New ran 1759-1776 a ibe Kuti Mefuaoy ede Reform ad ron p14 Rout 1981 pei 25 MN Fle Emon an te Rw of Caton. 6567, fee comparsoat of Enpland and Fence, 24 + Chapter One too cleae in the Spanish nobles resistance to agrarian reforms and thus complicity behind the 1766 bread riots¥ Dependence on nobles also had & politcal logic. Iberian poliical discourses had deeply seated Catholic ‘conceptions hor ofthe conquest of Muslim power in the peninsula chat ‘relied on regional kingdoms for spiritual, politcal, and ideological success, ‘Asa result; monarchs had to contend with the ingrained power af nobles, ‘who defended ther local autonomy, principles of sel-governing localities, and feudal might over peasants, all ooted ina medieval stucture of urban selfrule of Castilian and Portuguese Cortes. Fdal clements thereby ere ated the conditions for theie own political welity to the monarchy even as they became obstacles to social and economic change. Complex, multlay cred, decentralized regimes actively promoted the idea ofthe monarchy as the visible image of a mystical power and steeped themselves inthe courtly rituals of deference. But they didnot centralize cheie metropolitan domin fons to the same degeeeas did thee rivals Britain and France In this context, acenting imperial trade as a way to bring greatness to the monarchy was not just a second-best option. It was a founda sional principle of theory and history. Ascribing to empie the source of ‘Madei’s and Lishon's geeatnes, in effect, converted what was a eait assomption about overseas trade for other European pours into a basic theory of Iberian statecraf. This meant tackling the ailments of the tempies atthe capillary systems that connected the heart to the body's textemities, the colonies, Por Campillo, a spokesman for reform, the tes between sovereignty and empire Were clear enough—and the problem was best eackled as # qransalancie pheouwuour "la Awesica, ‘commerce is in complete stagnation, only sickness and political death ‘will come" And death in the Indies posed certain demise of the metro pole, But itis also important co note that Iberian political economists ‘were also explicit about how to conceive of empire. The Portuguese and Spanish domains rested on relationships between theie component parts For rulers in Lisbon and Madrid, empire was not a political or social seructute that radiated outward frm a Portuguese” or “Spanish” nation, Te was not the nation that had created empires. I anything, the sources Joba Hasde, “Esraonia © Umiacim on Bains Teaduodones y radeon, 717i? Monee y Cradto 147 (December 1978 47-7) Mige Aral, Ang bral Bacon: Ail, 1978 Jorge M. Pde, “Psion and the Sty of Commerc, Indy snd Money: Foil Economy, Moralty and Socal Thought Some Nees fom a Prague Viewpoint” Econowss esos 22-281-2 mri, Cotes ctr poli no poral do antioretie Lion Bains CComman 198 stand Sin Sey Trade and Wor. 159, othe pl syadal” cha . «& freee Empires That Bleed + 25 ‘of greatness—or recovery flowed the other way around. It would only be ‘through vtalizing empices, insisted reformers, that Iberian nations could ensure chie sovereignty inthe European concert of emerging nations. ‘Making empire the framework of sovereigny helped adapt ideas of cighteenth-century political economy to Iberian setings. Bu it did not make the job of reform any easier. I just redefined the historical legacies, that had to be overcome. To many observers, the empires had fallen victim tothe very sources that had founced them. They were decrepit product of centuries of seigniorial habits, conquistador customs, and lax polices that thrived ro long as there was access to gold and silver mines, forced and fertile lands stolen from oppressed Indians. The Asturian economist Podro Rodriguez Campomanes, a follower of Campillo, warned his sov cereign of what was at stake if be hung on to old ways. In 1762, as English forces stormed Spanish outposts, he finished a major tceatise for the new Spanish rules, Carlos I, called Reflexiones sobre ef comercio espaol a Indias. “The evil, Seog” he weote to the king, “lies in the body of the Nation or in the cules chat until now govern the Traffic withthe Indies” What ensued in the treatise was an extended analysis of the mishegotten rales that choked whae should flow more feel): rade beeween the meteo- pole and its possessions in the New World. Campomanes excoriated the ruling habis since the Spanish monarchy set foot in the New Word Spanish magnificence during Carlos V's reign built on the “grand con ‘quests of Hernan Cortés and Francisco Pizarro" and consolidated “the fundamental political Syssem ofthe Indies” But these were weak founds sions, Campomanes cited Menresguiew’ observacion thie "Spat sw from the start that its discovered lands were the objects of Conquest, while other more refined peoples than they recagnired that thie attention could be directed by the reason of Commerce.” Herein lay an importanc distinction that informed so many Iberian imperial theorists: there were different kinds of empires. For Campomanes the distinction between ‘empires of conquest, whose greatness Was tied to the moment of concep tion, and empires of commerce, whose greatness was self-sustaining, helped explain what was weong withthe Spanish realm. What once made Spain great was now obsolete. The French and British newcomers devised "Camgllay Can, Naor toma, 7, Davi rang, “La monary ca? a trnaconr Ibovameice Zaagon Rereap, 1998) pp. 15-45 Alan Kusthe sd Loel Bade “toch Indes aod the Ong of the Bourbon Calo Reoanaion” spon American UitoralResew 731991) 399-807, Aathony Papen, Eds of ite Worl cages of Empire inSain, an and rc, 15001800 (Now Hae Ye Usinersty res, 1998) py. 113-24, Robert. Saity "Engh sonone Though Spain, 177-1848? South Ae Quote 67.2 968 313 26 + Chapter One new “fundamental political Systems” for their colonies in order co fash jon even more robust nations. Campomanes likened Spain to Carthage ‘nd Spain's rivals ¢o Rome: "When the Roman Republic began to prepare the ruin of Carthage t did not have to use other means than to seduce t just a few countries the navigation of Carthaginians, and thus limiting the hiumber of Galleys of wat™ “The distinction between empires of conquest and empires of commerce ‘was most powerfully captured in Abbé Raynals Enlightenment magnum ‘pus, A Philosophical and Political History ofthe Setlement and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies, a prominent work on the bookshelves of Portuguese and Spanish reformers in the latter half ofthe cighteenth century (until it was formally banned by Spanish censors in 1779, whereupon it became a kind of underground classic). After co trasting the various European patterns of expansion, Raynal concluded that it would be easy to seize the Spanish colonies ftom Spain since the: defenses were weak. But controlling chem was another matte: “From inclination, from laziness, from ignorance, fom custom, and from pride they are strictly attached to thie teligion, and thei government, and will never conform 10 new laws. Their prejudices will furnish them with sveapons sufficient 10 repel their conqueror; as the Portuguese, thrown into a remote comer of the earth, formerly drove che Dutch out of Brazil when they had almost entirely subdued i” Raynal, Montesquien, and feven Adam Smith confirmed what Spanish and Portuguese reformers were already preaching: the empires had co change 10 survive." Tia idea that historical events—nor some basic detect of moral character— necessitated refort ale had wellsprings in che colonial fringes. Over the ‘course of the eightsenth century, merchants in the colonies grew louder and louder in their clamor for reform—in large part in response 1 ‘mounting competition and contraband, Merchants inthe Caribbean and the River Plate were especially alarmed by che lack of order in commer: cial affars, Merchants in Santa Fé in Nucva Granada pleaded for some ‘elation of ering restrictions in 1764 so that they could adapt co the Competition and therefore restore the colony's wealth. This would remove obstacles (0 their ability to counter the illegal competition and dro Rodrigues Campomans, Ralsonssabresl comer pala Indias (176 se Veente Loma Rom Made fsate de Ena Fase 1988, 9p. 3-4, 50, Fanos Xavier Gs “Te Spish- Acerca Taton of Represenaon ad Is Enropan Rover” Jounal of Ltn Aner Sues 21 (1994) 2-8 SGnmpenans aflsione sede omer, ply Abbe Raya, A Pieapbiel nd Poa History ofthe Stems end Tadeo he aps ete Eat and WS. ‘adn (Eanturghr 1792) book ght, p. 14h; Richard Hy The Eighooth Conny Revlon St rico: Peston Univers es, 1988), hap. 3 pire That tu rotor sme conrol ove local marke “Thone capable of mani taining themselves inthis sate of compete informality and inigence, with which this pincial nerve ofthe body politic hay sured in our optbli dee teeta f oor ecient sod deerved oleae ‘Weimplor his royal magnifcence co allow fr te solid establishment of the teadeof hi coera” What sey did no sete—aut whch thoes kepe decrying shat in the absence of ener offal extent th ight resort to their ow, not eniely lawful, ways of doing busine “here the colonial pressre for change were strongest can hese in ths PectngneseenpirThe historic weaken of Lion aver Hews cou bined with the greater penetration of foreign, especially Brith, dre trae in the clones, gave Brava prceng aitonomy compared % ¢he Spanish colonies ands more asterive role vo colonial merchants in imperal busines. In important venures like the ave trade the seat of tterchant power was based much more in the colonies than athe metop- dle. Indeed, LsosBraian merchants had become so astonomov that they dd norhave call fo dejure reforms with the sme sense of urgency. WWitle Gumian wocthans! proeecd about being tino t By ee wares within her iceryaly, Pgs and Beis were bay beak ing down ancient barriers to ade across continents. As Luiz Felipe de ‘Alenastro as recency shown, cere was a flourishing tlico fam tense (a Rio de Janeiro Alan) as crly as the sevententh cen i rch the eventual api of to colony cnjoyed mend nnd 6 Promote is circlation of commodities and captives independent from Pedi Bunter gestae lel bey og powpetal cube Ral ‘Atlant, and o instrumental inthe ive trade that booted the expan Sion of the tapleexporing fone in Brel that they compelled the Hag ovens anes 1758 cpt dere ten og tin (Cone and Brian ports. fn let, the slave tade became the thin cod ca wedge opening up Iberian Aan commence to merchant captains ees AGNS, Colonia Conlado I 14247; Conmlade 1&1 295; Wales, Spans Pols and Impre Trade pp. 210-14, Man Beil Great Btain ad the Trades ftom Csi and Liston to Spah Amv ané Br 178-1783? Hispani American Las esata de on comers ero out Aono da Laval 9 Cot, 1777-1815 (Cina: Donte naverdad aiken dl ed, 1938), pp. 76-12 The nest chapter wl fois on his ress more dete Agave Nain Toco do Tomita ANT, Jota So Che herateJoh Magee, Cana 3D, £ Lt Flip de Alesse, Tata dos Vise: rap do Ba gon and Menlo Horns © Arc to proj: rade Aan eidads [pet merc no Rio de Jans, 1790-1840 (Rio Jie iad, 1993 28 © Chapter One Inthe Portuguese empire, restrictions on imperial trade had relaxal ‘more gradually over a longer period of time until finally the govers- ment shelved che remnants of merchant convoy systems in 1765. But there were sill consraints designed to favor Lisbon as the entrepot for imperial commerce that drew constant complaints from merchants in the colonies, In 1772 a royal decree affirmed that intercontinental tra fic was licit, 50 long as it did not involve “foreign” merchandise and carvers sailed through Lisbon. In the words of Minister Martinho ce Mello e Castro, the law was designed to curb “the pernicious conse- quences thae arise when ships coming from Africa sail directly to Brazilian ports.” The deerve "requires them to return directly to the City ‘of Lisbon from Angola without calling elsewhere and [they are] cor pleely forbidden from selling any goods” beyond Lisbon. Merchans immediately filed for exemptions. In 1777, the owners of the Santssima Sacramento got permission to sail 10 Asia provided the ca tees paid their levies at Portuguese ports. And while they could not carry foreign produce ont of Lisbon, they got permission to make calls in foreign ports, unload “national” produce, and pick up “foreign” goods along the way. By 1784, even the metropolitan minister Mello e Castro observed that trade had leaped ahead of its legal infrastructure and that the government had to do something to catch up with privae ‘What political economists wanted was « workable compromise that ‘would adape the imperial realms without challenging domestic feudal pevileges within the peninsula. They also wanted to accommodate colo nial demands for greater iberty to trade within empiee. Looking to tempire sas therefore « way of resolving the obstacles to Iberian reo aissance (for those who looked backward) or Iberian national sover- cignty {for those who looked forward). Though this reform paradigm was hy nature a compromise, it did have a fundamental goal: 10 nationalize” empires that had become decentered, sprawling domains vullaerable to external predators and were failing to magnify the ope- lence ofthe metropolitan cores. The reforms were aimed at turning cen ‘wifugal regimes inside out so that resources and loyalties could flow ‘more smoothly and amply to Lisbon and Madeid, There were impor- tant analogous efforts afoot in other Atlantic systems. Indeed, it was the centralizing, metcopoltan thrust that so alienated the British North ‘American colonists before 1776, But if this was 2 compromise, litle ‘could disguise the fact that it meant a change in the basic relationship berween the component parts of che empire, between the colonies ard Empires That Bleed + 29 the mettopoles, and within the colonies themselves to solve the prob Jem of Iberian sovereignty.” ‘embodiment ofthis effore 1 re-center the Spanish empire was José de Galvez. Visitador general to New Spain from 1765 to 171 and iin ister ofthe Indies from 1776 until his death in 1787, Gilvex sponsored policies designed 10 holster the sovereignty of che Spanish empire by Feconsttuting it as a functioning core with functional pe in New Spain he expelled the Jesuits who challenged the authority of the state, suppressed populae uprisings thae rallied to the support ofthe banned press, and sent military expeditions to pacify and settle she noth ‘em borderlands of Sonora. When he moved to Madrid, he established the new Viceroyalty of the Rivee Plate, with a eapital in Buenos Aiees, 0 enforce Spanish sovereignty, and dispatched his own paladin, Juan Antonio de Areche, as wisitador general of Peru. The common feature of all these initiatives was Galver’s determination co extend law enforcement to the crrtoral limits ofthe Spanish empice and to enhance the power of ‘enforcers within it. Galvez, though nota thinker with Campillo’ or ocher political economists" originality, converted their ines of thought into pol icy and applied a pragmatic vocation for eform co rebuild Spanish impe ial sovereignty “The epitome of Gélver’ efforts to infuse fesh blood into the empire vas comrcio libre. Inthe wake ofthe Seven Yeats Wa, the Spanish gov éxnment brought down some of the old barriers to trade within the empire bit by bit unt it issued a sweeping decree in 1778, Galyee put an tnd to decade of wavering over the preservation of old monopolies, the flee system, and the legality of open trade within the empire. The king's decree announced that “only a free and protected Commerce between European and American Spaniards can restore Agriculture, Industry, and Population in my Dominions to their former vigox” Fourtecn peninsular ports and thirty five American ports were given rights to trade within the émpire without having to apply for special permission from che priv leged entrepdt, Cid, Only New Spain and Venezuela were exempt— ‘hough theie ports were swept into the new doctrine in the late 1780s. By 1789, there was a system of open trade within the Spanish Aelantic, in which the archipelago of colonial ports could trade with each other and the ports that cicled the peninsula. The idea was to increase commerce °h J Marshal, “A Nation Defined by Epic, 1755-17767 in Aleraner Grant a Kea Sige ee ning Kang? he Maing Bt Fy (Land: Roe 1995) pp. 208-205 der “Esp end Authority nthe Laer Eighcenth Cet Jowna {fpr and Commons Hoy 135 (1987) 108-2 itn an Sin Apne of Engi, pp. 0, on Caer bakarounds Kote a adel "Prec aloe sad he Oc ft Bonn Colonial Reogai on 594 30. + Chapter One as a whole within the empire, and thus expand the pool of rents tha ‘ould be taxed by the royal teasury. Comercio libre would thereby ensure greater transfers to the metropole and te government from the colonies by conferring them expanded rights to trade within the empire. Here was 1 reform model of “defensive modernization,” in Stanley and Barbara Stein's words, which sought to preserve and defend ancient systems of sovereignty by reconstituting the interests of empire By the 1770s and 1780s, it was increasingly clear that defense of the ancien régime had to make commercial policies fit the needs of state builders. But i¢ should be stessed that this was not “fee” trade as we now understand the ter, Commerce with “foreign” poets remained ile tal. Only the licensed ports were gateways for long-distance trade. And Femnants of protection for Spanish merchandise (like clothing, wines, oils, and furniture) persisted The point was not to malke imperial subjects, absolutely free to enjoy rights to trade, but to direc these contingent Tights to the larger purpose of funding the monarchy's treasury. Moreover, Galvee sil thougl that the one area where the empise was defeating itself the most was in the mining industry, because its yield was allowed to trickle out ofthe empire. This was a sector that could more directly augment the resources of the state. He wrote, “Just 38 mining is the of fin and fount for metals which give spirit and movement to all human ‘cupations and the universal rade of this world, by justice it cherefore reqs the special attention ofthe government.” Galver was nos neces sarily equating specie with wealth; money was not an end in itself. The point, in Galver' view, was not jut fo pump precious metals out of colo ial ground but to ensure tha they stayed within the commercial ciscuitry ‘ofthe Spanish empire, buoying transactions across the realm."* In this sense, Galvez remained faithful co some deeper mereantilist pre cepts, nota few mercantilst policies: economic life was governed by a “eirclar flow” subject to discrete and distinctive laws that determined levels and movements of prices, wages, and rents. The accumulation of bullion in sate coffers may have been «necessary condition fora wealthy society, especially as it gave the state the means to uphold it sovereign But it was not sufficient, Mining would only contribute to national ‘wealth if trade as a whole grew and could absorb the infusion of meals, Circulating it through the commercial body. Therefoce, Glver was breaking Sin and Sin, Apogee of Enis, 381; Fhe, Commercial Reltins hee ‘Spain and Spanish Arai, 9p. 9-10 13-15, Wales, pons Pole and ner Trade * Cain rain, “La mona ain” p36; MeN, Palit Economy ad the Rie of Cptlins Fp. 28-29 . Empires That eed * 31 fom his predecessors by shifting the focus away from peninsular trade and uniditetional flow of bullion to Spain, that is, an overscching con ‘ern with the empite’s “balance of trade” In is doctrinal place, Madeid row emphasized ipperal rade and the favorable balance of trade beeween Spain and the ret of the world. The peninsula, the heart of the nation, ould be rich peovided the empire were rch, which meant expanding oppor: tunities to trade to all precincss, Asimilar drive co promote “nacional” sovereignty through re-entered empire, striking a new balance between colonies and metzopoles, ook ro0t in Lisbon. The zeal for reform came alittle earlier, in the 1750s, in pare becanse it was harder to maintain che illasion chat the regime eould survive without change. The gold bonanza from Minas Gerais had peaked. Then the Lisbon earthquake in 1755 and the Spanish invasion ‘f 1762 intensified the urge to defend Portuguese sovereigny by nation slizng its empite. The champion of reform was Sebastizo José de Carvalho ‘Mel, later tiled the Marquis of Pomabal in ecognition of his overwhelm ing inflacce. Pombal did not have Galver's colonial administrative exper ‘ence, but he did have the supeeme confidence of the king, Dom José, who fzive Pombal almost complete contol over the Portuguese empire. With Dom José death in 1777, Pomba’s influence quickly waned, and he was forced out of office in dsrace. Like Galvez, he sought to ensue tha pe ‘ous metals ofthe empire emained within its borders and did not leak out, ven to “eiendly” rivals. Fansthing, Pombal’s polices were more concerted because he believed there was one important obstacle to Portuguese grea ‘eat er Salliance” with Britain. Writing in his memos be later noted that the English had firmly bound the [Porcaguese] nation in a sae of depend «ce. They had conquered i without the inconvenience of « conquest Pombal also had to do something about selations between Lisbon and Brazil. For halfa century, Portugal thrived off colonial extraction of gold and diamonds, But the euphoria waned pretty quickly in the 1750s, Exhaustion of the most accessible lodes of diamonds and gold was one season. But officials also pointed to che inability of the imperial state to enforce its own regulations, which let precious staples leak out through commercial regulations. One eeport from Minas Gerais in the 1750s fobserved that the decline of gold and diamond production had to do ‘with the Iax enforcement of mercantlst rules, not that the rules were choking ousput. No one stopped colonists from creating their own indus- ties. Instead, Brazilians were becoming self-sufficient nd imported less 2 Hecacer Meron (Lendon: Gee Als ad Unwin, 155) 2,9. 175-86 Cian Al K, Manchest Bit Preomionee ea i Ris ond Dec A Stay t European Expenion (193); New Yorks Octagon Booka, 1964p. 39 32+ Chapter One ‘rom Portugal. This kind of reporting was music to Pombal's minsteria cars, He wae only too keen to welcome intelligence that ceinforced bis, Jmpulse to consolidate sate power over the king's dominions. No less, than Galvez, Pombal was looking for a new model of empire, efecively to place colonics at the service of the nation, to shore up an old mona chy, and to put precious metas to work to make an empire of commerce anything, Brazilian gold had misguided Portuguese rulers into thinking they were wealthy: "Gold and silver are fotitious riches... the more they are multiplied, the les is eheir eal value The key to vitalizing and nationalizing the empire was striking a new balance between its ompo- nents: Porsagal should export manufaewured yoods to Brazil in etaen for primary staples so that the two sides ofthe Atlantic could complement ‘each other's commercial needs through specialization, What was new ‘vas the proposition thatthe colony, and its erading fortunes, had to be thriving fr the metropole to export its wares. Accordingly, Pombal sup ported merchants who would sustain che scheme, and, where necessary he also fostered state-chartered firms to invest in colonial commercial ventures (Grio Pari and Maranhio in 1755, and Pernambuco and Paraiba in 1759). In this fashion, not only would trade ris, it would also ‘become more national; Lisbon would become the central clearinghouse of is empire." In both empires, therefore, reform was about creating a new pac with, and within, the Americas—in effect to make them “real” colonies of late ‘ercantilise empires. In a fundamental respect Pombal and Galvez were proposing ro pu the cwo empires oi wounes if uot aioe perfect, mec ‘antilist foundations, The old conquest model, associated with the quest for gold, silver, and preciositis, was sterile, nor stimulating. Tt had ‘become an end in ite, The task for reformers was not simply to bury the old obsession with the flow of precious metals to private and public coffers, but to transform imperial trade so that bullion could flow more healthily through the body's arteries. In this fashion, Spain and Portugal need not repudiate the past but simply transcend it. Doing so required taking what they conquered and placing these possessions at che service of a different model of wealth and greatness founded on commercial activin If this package appeared to advocate an altered course of brian his tory, there were limits to its novelty. Freedom to enjoy property rights, yy ‘ended soporte on Bion ide, 17505 Pol i Manche risa Prone in Bra p40, Manel oma Se Das len, “Lt Coll Bn 7 in ao Cie oy ‘f Latin marca Carbs CmbdgeUnveri rs, 1985 2, pp. 601-60 Expires That Bleed +33, especially in commercial matters, was, in important and fundamental ‘ways, sill relative. Comercio libre was contrived under 4 regime in Which commerce seeved public and private interests simultaneously— and both interests were best guarded by a strong state to constrain rou tine excesses of seléinteested individuals. Iherian reformers had co lovercome a very special kind of passionate avacice—Jove of conquest in pursuit of treasure. "To rescue the monarchy from iss own weaknesses, the state, guided by 2 new kind of enlightened minister, had to lute, cajole, and force the lending members ofthe civtas co follow a new par- adigm of empire. By contrast, a new sprit of economic sentiments was tt work in Britain and France, one that vindicated uncertainty and made a vietue out ofa “fatherless world” (in Adam Smith's words). French and Brith political economists observed how this order emerged from the prosaic daily activities of selfinerested people. This was a conceptual ove that most important thinkers and policymakers in Lisbon or Madrid could not follow. While sharing the view that trade was more than simply a zero-sum game, and conceding that selFinterest could be made, under the right ctcumstances, to promote general interests, polit- jeal economists in Spain and Portugal were committed to precepts of ‘order, hierarchy, and stability—all knowable by the prince, More than a fre suspicion of disorder or uncertainty was involved. So too was the perception of backwardness, especialy in she vortex of imperial wars in ‘which rulers had les and less contro, and more and more was a stake, Commercial discourses crystallized the aspirations of Iberian thinkers ‘whose primary concerns were the rebuilding the foundations of regal Sovereignty atthe core of world empires.” Inerenat Banoasns There was a rub in the prescription: building a great state was the uk ‘mate goal, but the sate was also the only agent capable of caching Private habits that deprived it of vitality. How could the stare be the ‘means to achieve greatness and the idyll a the same time? The vay aut of te circular problem vas an entente besween political and economic power holders—giving each room to maneuver autonomously, "Tama Rha, Economie Sentimants Adam Sith, Condorst, and the night (Combing, Ma Hasard Unies Pr, 2001), pp. 223-25; Sr mae thes sls in thinking abot markt as Alert, Hischaan, The atone od {aivry rey 1976 The em "ener re” was inv hy Campo lf in 34+ Chapter One bot inverdependently, Ths solution, at frst glance a matter of pragmatic hhalance, goes to the heart of another problem of empire. There i atca- dition of explaining the nature of Spanish and Portaguese imperialism as the products of cozy pacts between ascendant monarchs and ceutiet lites, with vast colonial spoils as the bonding agent for an alliance of freed. Indeed, this has been a standard way of explaining European imperialism tous court. Lenin and Schumpeter, forall their differences, agreed that imperialism was the political outlet for social elites hungry for extemal profits and rulers yearning for grandeur” This familiar fanctionaliserestmentnecds reconsideration. ln par, it tends to convert ‘what needs explaining—the compact berween public and private powet- holders—into «departure point. Allimportant sequencing, and thus causal linking, i revered, At least inthe case of the Iberian empire, it was the acquisiion of the Americas that created the empires, and not empizes and alliances of greed that conquered the Americas. The approach also exaggerates the compatibility and consonance between private and public powerholders, where there was in fact enormous Strain and conflict. Indeed, the whole point of reform, as Campomnanes ‘and others insisted, was to bresk down private venal habits of those with fntrenched sakes precisely because they undermined state power.” Magnates and rulers were brought together through dependence on a specific kind of exchange bewween the fractious parmers of the old ‘egimes. For this reason, this book accentuates the bargaining and strug sing over imperial spoils beeween its principal agents, which at times ould be far more dysfunctional than common accounts have allowed Here was the unstable imperial deal: Merchants enjoyed rents, returns or ivestment in trading activities that were protected from intemal ane cexternal competition, and clustered in powerfol guilds that governed the entry and exit of traders. Guilds served as self-regulating devices, with legal authority conferred by the monarchy to issue commercial li ‘They reinforced a system of privileged access to mercantile activity. Ie return for the “legal personality” oftheir guilds, merchants earmarked share of their proceeds for the imperial coffers, revenues for a cash starved treasury. In this fashion, mercantile rents could fund the imperil Fara cal eave of tr imperinnsxMichod Bara Rew, The Eo of lmperaon (Landon Pepi, 75), ech. 2-3 Aan Cain, Sota Desa Lando: Wee, 1991p 9p 15-30 for acsqu of ‘ances so tena isofielexanstas, Thi ew of emp conse tfexpunsion hs teen sexy explored i Henry Kamen Enpver How Spa Became rd Pome, 14921763 New Yrs Harper Calis, 203), “SMa Row, "Rents and Thee Corporate Canssorces Saf aon 3-38 yy 7 Empicer That Bled +35 treasury, while rising state revenues could fund imperial defenses of met cantile property rights Interlocking telaions berween rulers and magnates was as true of Iberian empires as any other. There was one important nuance: the ri procity of inteests—indeed, the very definition of interests—was vulner- able tothe state's chronic inability to make good on obligations to honor debs and protect rentir systems. What was lacking was not wealth but the sate's credible use of power co enforce its distribution. If the stare could not protect the privileges of imperial traders, rents seeped out into the hands of interlopers and fre-riders, Tis in tra forced the imperial states to have to fight—albeit relucantly—

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